16 AUD European Defence Agency MAAC Terry Saunder
16 AUD European Defence Agency MAAC Terry Saunder
16 AUD European Defence Agency MAAC Terry Saunder
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Lessons learnt from the military<br />
certification of an existing EASA<br />
type certified aircraft into a military<br />
role (MRTT)<br />
MAWA Conference<br />
7 Jul 11<br />
<strong>Terry</strong> <strong>Saunder</strong>
Scope<br />
• Why airworthiness<br />
• Recognition of Prior Acceptance<br />
• Application to KC-30
Why airworthiness
1985<br />
1987<br />
1989<br />
1991<br />
1993<br />
1995<br />
1997<br />
1999<br />
2001<br />
2003<br />
2005<br />
2007<br />
2009<br />
ADF Fatal Aviation<br />
Accidents 1985 - 2010<br />
7<br />
6<br />
5<br />
4<br />
3<br />
2<br />
1<br />
0<br />
Technical regulation<br />
Operational regulation
Airworthiness<br />
• Initial certification<br />
• Continuing airworthiness<br />
• Instruments:<br />
• Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC)<br />
• Service Release (SR)<br />
• Special Flight Permit (SFP)<br />
• Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)<br />
• Recognition of Prior Acceptance (RPA)<br />
• Design certification
Jargon<br />
• National Airworthiness Authority (NAA)<br />
• Military or civilian<br />
• Configuration, Role and Environment<br />
(CRE)
Recognition of Prior Acceptance
Recognition of Prior Acceptance<br />
• Most ADF projects leverage off RPA:<br />
• Previous NAA certifications for extant<br />
aircraft designs<br />
• Previous NAA certifications for extant<br />
system designs<br />
• Engaging an NAA to oversight the design<br />
of ADF-specific modifications
RPA #1: Extant aircraft design<br />
• RPA Focus: Assess compatibility of design<br />
with ADF’s proposed Role + Environment<br />
• Highlight incompatibilities between green aircraft R&E<br />
and ADF’s proposed R&E<br />
• Analyse, evaluate and treat risk<br />
• Identify risk treatments approved by NAA<br />
• assess applicability and acceptability
RPA #2: Extant system design<br />
• RPA Focus: Assess compatibility of design<br />
with ADF’s Configuration, Role +<br />
Environment (CRE)<br />
• comprehensively evaluate:<br />
• compatibility with ADF CRE<br />
• identify risk treatments approved by NAA<br />
• assess applicability and acceptability
RPA #3: NAA Oversight of ADF Mods<br />
• RPA Focus: Certify delta between NAA and ADF<br />
Role and Environment. Certify systems the NAA(s)<br />
will not.<br />
• Identify deltas between NAA’s assumed R&E and<br />
actual ADF R&E, then treat any risk<br />
• Provide full certification oversight for systems the NAA<br />
refuses to cover<br />
• Provide corporate governance oversight of NAA<br />
efforts (to extent permitted)
C-17A
AEW&C
MH-60R
KC-30
KC-30 con’t<br />
• EASA<br />
• Accepted as suitable NAA for original type<br />
certification of A330-200<br />
• Accepted as suitable NAA for physical AAR<br />
modifications to A330-200<br />
• INTA<br />
• Not originally identified as a suitable NAA<br />
• DGTA-ADF site visit and review of INTA<br />
certification system in May 04<br />
• DGTA-ADF recognition of INTA as an NAA
KC-30 con’t<br />
• EASA STC issued for AAR<br />
modifications - no system operations<br />
• INTA Technical Certificate issued for<br />
KC-30A including operation of AAR<br />
equipment and systems<br />
• INTA certification activities considered<br />
ADF Role and Environment
KC-30<br />
• ADF Project Office<br />
• Engaged with INTA during type certification program<br />
• Assessment of INTA’s role and operating environment<br />
assumptions<br />
• Independent compliance findings for some airworthiness<br />
requirements not comprehensively assessed by INTA<br />
• Reviewing partial/non-compliant outcomes from the<br />
INTA certification program and assessing limitations,<br />
special conditions and residual/retained risks
KC-30 con’t<br />
• Boom failure<br />
• ADF AA sought additional assurance that INTA<br />
certification program assured an acceptable<br />
level of safety<br />
• DGTA (TAA) and DACPA (OAA Rep) visited<br />
INTA in Dec 10 and confirmed that the INTA<br />
Technical Certificate provides a sound basis for<br />
KC-30A RPA
Reference<br />
• AAP7001.053 Technical Airworthiness<br />
Management Manual (TAMM)<br />
• Section 2 TAREG 2.2.7 Informed RPA<br />
• Section 3 Chapter 12 Annex D<br />
• http://www.defence.gov.au/dgta/
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