The aftermath of the beaching REPORT OF AN INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY 24TH JANUARY ONWARDS
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4 WEDNESDAY 24TH JANUARY ONWARDS
4.1 At Branscombe, DRS, the onshore salvors, swung into action on Wednesday morning, and from
then on managed to balance the removal of containers and larger items of cargo with patrolling
beaches from Exmouth eastwards and clearing more widely scattered debris on a daily basis.
The former demanded dismantling and cutting up to enable outward transit by road (narrow
lane) and a landing craft where they could be removed by sea. DRS were contracted by the
maritime salvors and were present on the beach at Branscombe 24/7 until October 2008. Their
personnel became local heroes and were feted by the community before they finally left.
4.2 On Friday 26th January a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) was set up ‘to support the MCA
and coordinate shore based activity’ to quote the MCA. At the same time it was decided that
two ‘multi-agency teams, one in Devon and one in Dorset were needed. On the Saturday
morning a public meeting was held in Branscombe to inform the locals about what was to
happen now; they presumably knew better than most what had happened so far. The SCG met
for the first time on that Saturday and included the National Trust (NT) who had had to
gatecrash a meeting in Dorchester on the Wednesday to get in on the act, although they were
the landowner of the Branscombe upper beach. It met to agree its own terms of reference.
4.3 It is clear that from Wednesday 24th DRS got on with their work quietly and efficiently
and their manager on site (in the end a special local hero) and his compound became a
reference point for locals and local authorities as well as a repository for salvage. In
contrast, officialdom was still inventing more machinery and meetings on the 26th, a
week after the beaching of Napoli. In the context of the contemporary planning the
SCG setting up was perhaps a week late, as were the ‘Silver level’ teams set up to be coordinated
by it at the same time the SCG met on Saturday the 27th to agree its terms of
reference! The question looms: ‘was this still necessary by then’ In a throwaway line
the MCA’s report claims that ‘the MCA and SoSREP regarded the model as supportive’,
as though setting themselves a little apart. There appear to have been at least fourteen
different permanent official organisations involved in these operations and ten
temporary ones which seem to be needed under present contingency planning once an
incident has happened. It should not be beyond us (and the powers that be) to simplify
that and cut down the numbers of personnel, groups and meetings (even virtual ones),
involved. While all protest that competition does not exist, jealousy is absent and no
one patronises, we sensed that the reality is different. Some witnesses complained of
being sidelined, or feeling out of the loop, despite being members of particular groups,
others that their obvious local knowledge and availability was ignored. (DCC
Environment Directorate, the NT and the Devon Sea Fisheries Committee were cases in
point).
4.4 WE FIND that too many cooks seem to breed more, if only because coordination, and
the need for support, becomes more complex as communication falters in the face of
overload. The simplification of organisation for on-shore contingency handling into a
single hierarchy with minimum overlaps could correct all these things at once. It should
be accompanied by a review of the most local of resources and their potential
incorporated in relevant plans. (5.6 and 5.16.6 refer).
MSC Napoli The aftermath of the beaching Report of an inquiry 21