Final Report Breaking through the Equity Barrier in Environmental ...

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3 Mkt, Sov: sensitive to E/P and K/U only together, in interaction 4 AtP: shows a complex result – Sensitive to K/U only when efficiency tradeoffs (P) are present. – Sensitive to E/P only with full knowledge of one’s situation (K). 5 SB: not sensitive to E/P, but fully sensitive to K/U and T/M – The non-dependence on E/P may be interpreted by the fact that this equity principle involves a high degree of uncertainty regarding the final allocation, which depends on representatives who must be trusted. – This reason may also explain why SB is sensitive to T/M – the only principle to show such dependency: it matters whether real money is at stake or not. 6 IGE, Cns, Par, Exc: These are not statistically sensitive to the context factors of the experiment. They are also among the principles attracting most support. Another way to examine the sensitivity to (experimental) context is to examine the actual values of standard deviations of the MFD descriptors. As shown in Table 7.11, these are sensitive to the category level of aggregation (level 5 versus level 11: see Figure 7.2). Table 7.11 Context dependency at different levels of aggregation 11-level agg Variation StdDev 5-level Variation StdDev A Mkt 10 4.27 Most dependent on context A Mkt 4 1.85 B Sov 6 2.74 (maximum) B SB 2 1.04 SB 5 2.27 VE 2 0.99 VE 4 1.60 Sov 2 0.93 Mm 4 1.51 Mm 2 0.89 C Egal 3 1.50 C AtP 1 0.463 HE 3 1.48 Egal 1 0.458 AtP 3 1.39 Cns 1 0.35 Exc 3 1.06 Exc 1 0.35 Cns 3 1.04 HE 0.5 0.27 D IGE 0 0.00 Least dependent on context D IGE 0 0.00 Par 0 0.00 (zero) Par 0 0.00 In Table 7.11, ‘variation’ measures the distance between aggregation categories across which the equity principle is spread out, for all scenarios. Mkt (market justice) spans the maximum 4 between categories 1 and 5 in the 5-MFD, and the maximum 10 between 1 and 11 in the 11-MFD. By contrast, IGE and Par lie totally within a single category, even in the 11-level description; namely, a clear majority support in all eight scenarios, exemplified by the Figure 7.5: Equity preferences for the Pareto compensation principle in scenario 1. Controlling one level of aggregation by the other, it seems that four groups stand out in Table 7.11: w Group A (high sensitivity to context) : Mkt w Group B (moderate sensitivity) : Sov, SB, VE, Mm w Group C (low sensitivity) : Egal, HE, AtP, Exc, Cns w Group D (not sensitive to context) : IGE and Par (constant majority support) 112 Breaking through the Equity Barrier in Environmental Policy
Figure 7.5 Equity preferences for the Pareto compensation principle in scenario 1 The high sensitivity of Mkt will be examined further in the following section. This result has important implications for the implementation of ‘market-based instruments’ as policy tools. If corroborated in further experiments, this would suggest that the transaction costs of implementing MBIs may outweigh their theoretical benefits, especially in societies which have certain strong equity preferences. It also suggests that MBIs should only be implemented after some knowledge of such preferences has been gained, as well as the social and political conditions in which they would be implemented. Delving deeper into the data, let us examine the frequency distributions at the original disaggregated level (21-valued distributions), and focus on the two most discriminating context factors for each equity principle. These two most discriminating factors are identified by the two smallest correlation coefficients between any two scenarios, as shown in Table 7.12. Table 7.12 Smallest and second-smallest coefficients of correlation, with scenarios shown (original disaggregated data: 21-valued frequency distributions) Equity Min CC 1st DF Equity Second Min Second DF VE -0.16 MEK/MEU VE 0.14 MPK/MPU A Mm -0.15 MEK/MEU A Mm 0.24 TEK/TEU Mkt 0.00 TEU/TPU Sov 0.35 MPK/MPU Sov 0.19 MEK/MEU HE 0.47 MEK/MEU Cns 0.45 TEU/MEU AtP 0.49 MPK/MPU B HE 0.46 MPK/MPU B Mkt 0.50 TEK/TPK AtP 0.47 MEK/MEU Egal 0.52 MEK/MEU SB 0.49 TEU/MEU Cns 0.55 TEK/TEU Egal 0.49 TEU/MEK SB 0.56 MEK/MEU IGE 0.55 TEU/TPK IGE 0.63 MEK/MEU C Par 0.61 TEU/MEU C Par 0.69 MEU/MPU Exc 0.69 MEK/MEU Exc 0.72 MEK/MPK DF Discriminating Factor (across scenarios) CC Correlation Coefficient (smallest and 2nd-smallest) Breaking through the Equity Barrier in Environmental Policy 113
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Breaking through the Equity Barrier
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Breaking through the Equity Barrier
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Executive Summary The issue Environ
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The review on fairness and equity w
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3 Factors that did not affect equit
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1 The experiments have clearly demo
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The key findings from the experimen
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4.3 Equity criteria 42 4.3.1 Focus
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List of tables Table 2.1 Number of
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1 Introduction 1.1 Issue Environmen
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1.5 Acknowledgements Our appreciati
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Table 2.1 Number of ‘Google Schol
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In our view, the language would be
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Perceptions of fairness divide betw
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2.2.4 Equity and context Dependency
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In the 1930s and 1940s, social psyc
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eflect a collective (or social) pre
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trade-off. The problem is couched i
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International water policy has been
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Bakker (2001) documents three oppos
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one of the wettest parts of Western
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Step 1 The foremost task was to cle
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3.2 Theoretical underpinnings 3.2.1
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certain patterns or regularities. W
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Prior expectations introduce a new
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Group 3: Process equity principles
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Correlates are auxiliary or seconda
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It is our intention to develop a me
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Increasing population As a populati
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Policies to realise these savings a
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3 The format chosen did not pit one
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4.3.3 Implementing equity criteria
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4.3.4 Information gathered on equit
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Figure 4.1 Ex-house scheme water us
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The total number of ‘returns to s
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Figure 4.2 Geographical boundaries
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Education level The metropolitan an
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5.1.2 Water use characteristics Wat
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Calculating an overall water consum
Page 79 and 80: Figure 5.2 Distribution of rankings
Page 81 and 82: Figure 5.4 Distribution of rankings
Page 83 and 84: The equity criteria that face the s
Page 85 and 86: Results also show that for those po
Page 87 and 88: In summary, the equity criteria cho
Page 89 and 90: As a result, knowledge of the incom
Page 91 and 92: 5.4.3 Age and equity judgments Age
Page 93 and 94: Table 5.10 Students and non-student
Page 95 and 96: To summarise metropolitan versus co
Page 97 and 98: Table 5.15 Reasons for ‘Bore wate
Page 99 and 100: 5.5 Influence of policy context on
Page 101 and 102: Considering then the ability to pay
Page 103 and 104: Having said that, there are factors
Page 105 and 106: as a benchmark; in this case, we ne
Page 107 and 108: 6.2.2 Three stages in equity-based
Page 109 and 110: is that we do not yet have rigorous
Page 111 and 112: Ability to pay principles w w w Pro
Page 113 and 114: Table 6.1 Equity principle Egal Max
Page 115 and 116: Table 6.3 Full factorial treatment
Page 117 and 118: 7 Experimental results and discussi
Page 119 and 120: order of the X-axis: this is meant
Page 121 and 122: Figure 7.3 The same distributions a
Page 123 and 124: 7.3 The role of the experimental co
Page 125 and 126: In absolute terms: (2a) DP (K) > DP
Page 127 and 128: 7.4 Sensitivity of equity judgments
Page 129: To say more about the sensitivity o
Page 133 and 134: 7.5 Policy dimensions of equity jud
Page 135 and 136: 7.6 Electricity pricing and water p
Page 137 and 138: 7.7 Experimental and survey results
Page 139 and 140: As Table 7.16 shows, a number of th
Page 141 and 142: 8 Conclusions The main hypothesis u
Page 143 and 144: From the results of this study obta
Page 145 and 146: Cowell & Cruces, 2003, Perceptions
Page 147 and 148: Perrenoud, P. 1999, The Key to Soci
Page 149 and 150: Appendix 1 Scheme water survey Brea
Page 151 and 152: 3 How do you rate the threat of com
Page 153 and 154: Water is restricted using prices 4
Page 155 and 156: PART C ABOUT YOURSELF Information f
Page 157 and 158: 9 How much scheme water does your h
Page 159 and 160: Appendix 2 Bore water survey Breaki
Page 161 and 162: 4 How do you rate the threat of com
Page 163 and 164: PART B HOUSEHOLD BORE WATER A numbe
Page 165 and 166: Market determines prices 12 Assumin
Page 167 and 168: 6 How would you best describe the d
Page 169 and 170: Appendix 3 Bore survey follow up le
Page 171 and 172: Appendix 5 Electricity pricing surv
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