Constitution for National Integration and Development - Africa ...

Constitution for National Integration and Development 

Constitution for 

National Integration and 

Development 

Olusegun Obasanjo 

1


Constitution for National 

Integration and Development 

By 


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First Published 1989 by 

Friends Foundation Publishers Ltd. 

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Nigeria 

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© Olusegun Obasanjo 

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3


T 

Preface 

he intent in this pieces is to share my thoughts with the 

readers and the general public on how to arrive at a 

constitution that will aid national integration and all-rounded 

societal development, a constitution that can weld together the 

different sections of Nigeria as well as the different sectors of the 

economy in order to overcome the persistence of abject poverty, 

hunger, unemployment, urban decay, rural squalour and general 

stagnation. 

Politics today has gone beyond the practice in the Grrek City States 

where every citizen gathered at the Agora to deliberate. In the same 

vein, the communal democratic practices of the Tiv and some Igbo 

societies as well as the checks and balances of the centralized 

authority systems of the Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani people cannot 

be the basis of governance today. But then, the yearning for 

democracy i.e popular participation in the governmental processes 

with guarantees of fundamental human rights and freedom of 

expression within the law remain a basic desire of all peoples from 

the Greek City States through the pre-colonial Kingdoms and 

Empires in Africa to the post-independence societies in Africa. 

With the level of development, democratic practice can no longer 

be set within the realm in which all citizens participate in 

governance, it is still feasible to arrive at practices that make 

genuine representatives of the people responsible and responsive to 

the wishes of the people at large, a lot can be learnt from the checks 

and balances that existed in the various pre-colonial societies that 

make up present day Nigeria. 

With a total of about a hundred years of colonial rule followed by 

political independence, and the creation of modern large nationstates, 

it will be ridiculous to the extreme to expect that the orecolonial 

chiefdoms will be re-created. My going into the past is to 

anchor the present and the future in the politics of consensus which 

was the practice of the past rather than the rancorous antagonism, 

iii 

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opposition, confrontation and hostility of the Western-type of 

democracy involving government and opposition – an alien 

political culture. What remains of the traditional rulership in each 

locality as custodians of our tradition and culture should be 

preserved within each local government as arbiters in social and 

civil misunderstandings in their areas of jurisdiction. They should 

play the role of advisers and father figures within their areas with 

respect and dignity and not be involved in derogative and 

sometimes divisive partisan politics. Their dignity is also preserved 

through their being represented at the National Council of State. 

The failure of the colonial powers to graft such desirable aspects of 

the past on to the present rather than super-impose their own 

experiences on us and our perpetration of this practice in the postindependence 

period has in part led us into the quagmire of 

governmental instability. It is needless to reiterate the fact that such 

instability has diverted our attention from the fundamental goal of 

ensuring a better life for our populace. 

The failure of the two Republican efforts to ensure and sustain 

popular participation in Nigeria has produced not only antidemocratic 

culture, but also an anti-development orientation. This 

book sets out alternative ways of overcoming many of the 

problems that arose from our experiences in the two Republics. 

I admit that at the end of the day, much of what we make of it will 

depend on both the operators of the constitution and on the system. 

A good system needs a good operator to get the best out of it and 

both must go together. If our operators have the preconceived 

mentality of politics as warfare, where you do almost anything and 

everything to win and where, after winning, you carry the loot and 

spoils of ‘war’ to be shared only within the victorious side, then we 

must provide a non-warlike and non-combative atmosphere to 

guard against this mentality. And yet we must ensure availability 

of choices, genuine choices for the electorate. The aim is to extol the 

virtues and expand the practice of consensual politics which had 

been the age old practice in most traditional African societies. If we 

iv 

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are going to substitute an evolutionary process for the emergence 

of a political party of parties be legislative process, we might as 

well go the whole hog to remove contradictions and divisions. Any 

constitution, particularly the current two party variety being 

knocked to shape can metamorphose at any time in future through 

a consensus into the type of constitution being proposed in this 

book. 

What is proposed here is not a classical one-party system, but a 

duality which provides checks and balances, unity of purpose 

while respecting the richness of our diversity and allowing for the 

emergence of strong leadership that is not autocratic. The proposals 

in this book are essentially the product of Nigerian experience and 

situation but adoptable and adaptable in not too dissimilar 

circumstances. 

No commercial or industrial organization ever creates the 

contradiction or the division of an opposition or confrontational 

culture within its system. Although the aims and objectives of 

commercial and industrial organizations are profit oriented they 

are basically human institutions that respond to stimuli and 

management. The talk, discuss, and debate until they come to an 

agreement or a consensus. All views are accommodated and all 

differences are solved. Policies then evolve which are implemented 

in the corporate interest. I believe that is can also happen at the 

national level of the management of human affairs. 

In preparation or the third Republic, the cravings all around the 

country are that people do not want to be in opposition. If people 

detest being in opposition, why should we continue to create for 

them what they do not want. I have found that in the second 

Republic, those who managed their state affairs but whose political 

party did not control the federal administration felt a sense of loss 

or is it a sense of inadequate booty or loot. What ever it is, they felt 

excluded and unfulfilled. With such feeling one could not expect 

them to be cooperative builders of the national edifice. And yet the 

economic tasks ahead of us between now and the end of the 

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6


millennium are so gargantuan that to succeed, these tasks do not 

admit of the luxury of opposition, division, exclusion, 

confrontation, bitterness and pulling down. No one individual or 

one group can do it alone. We need to accommodate dissent and 

overcome negative tendencies. We need to achieve consensus and 

put all hands on deck. 

The observable trend so far is that old political alliances have 

endured and will endure into the two-party system that is being 

prescribed for the third Republic. The principle that seems to 

matter is ethnic and linguistic affinity into which ethno-religious 

sentiment is creeping. We must not allow this trend to continue if 

our nation is to develop. 

Some of the ideas in this proposal might have been articulated by 

others unknown to me while others might have been discussed and 

adopted or rejected at other for a. Such canvassing, adoption or 

rejection do not detract from their worth as I see them. 

I thank Dr. Femi Badejo who was fired with enthusiasm when the 

idea of this book was mentioned to him and he nudged it on. He 

also made Friends Foundation Publishers come on board for the 

publication. My appreciation also goes to Mr. Ayodele Aderinwale 

whose research work on this book makes him an ally or an 

accomplice depending on how you se the book. I thank Mr. Siji 

Soetan and other friends and experts who read the manuscript and 

offered very useful suggestions. I take full responsibility for any 

inadequacies that the book may contain. 


Ota, January 5 th 1989 

vi 

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Table of Contents 

Preface…………………………………………………….. iii-v 

Introduction………………………………………………. 9-15 

Part I 

Constitution: Nature, forms and 

Sources………………………………………………………17-29 

Pre-colonial constitutions and the 

Impact of colonialism……………………………………… 30-64 

Nigerian constitutional Development…………………… 65-79 

Nigeria Today…………………………………………….... 80-92 

Part II 

Towards the new order: 

the party system………………………………………….....94-118 

The Organs of Government………………………………..119-154 

Fundamental Objectives and directive 

Principles of State Policy…………………………………..155-170 

Conclusion………………………………………………….171-180 

Appendix I………………………………………………….181 

Appendix II…………………………………………………182-183 

Index ………………………………………………………..184-186 

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T 

Introduction 

he foundation to the first Nigerian Republic was faulty because 

the constitutional developments prior to independence had 

vii 

encouraged ethnic parties and ethnic leadership. At independence, 

the parties could be easily pigeon-holed into the various ethnic 

divisions of the country. The logical inter-ethnic suspicion and 

consequent feud that accompanied such a situation resulted in the 

burning of lives and properties. Rather than build, we started 

destroying. The military intervention could not halt the process 

until we had the highly destructive civil war. The literal translation 

of the civil war was the loss of many able bodied Nigerians whose 

brain and labour could have gone into the developmental process. 

In addition, the war not only destroyed the little that we had 

created, it hampered further creation on both sides of the divide 

until it was prosecuted to the end. 

The second Nigerian Republic fared only a little better than the 

first. Not only did ethnicity rear its head again despite the 

provisions that were meant to check it in the 1979 Constitution, the 

politicians, this time had perfected the art of squandermania with 

the availability of oil money. The post civil war gains and the riches 

derived from the blessings of nature in the form of crude petroleum 

were literally looted and squandering spree into check. We were 

driven into various debts for which we have no viable projects to 

show. 

The prevalence of selfish politicians in the two earlier Republics has 

negated our potential capabilities as a nation. Good decisions that 

could have enhanced our development have crashed on the rocks 

of ethnic chauvinism and personal aggrandizement and 

insensitivity to the feelings and needs of the general populace. 

From the little I have seen of the preparations for the Third 

Republic especially, in terms of the mentality, the attitude and 

expectations, the dominant disposition is that of “what we will get 

9


out of the system” and definitely not what we can put into it (even 

among the so called newbreed). This makes the joke of the new 

greed rather than the newbreed so frighteningly real. Solidarity is 

avoided by the so called leaders because of what they hope to gain 

from competing political forces at the expense of the interest and 

well-being of the people. 

Until we are able to substitute service and consensus for politics of 

opposition, confrontation, exclusion, non-fraternisation, ethnicity, 

vindictiveness, and money bags, we may not be making much 

progress as a nation. 

We definitely cannot continue along this path of endemic socioeconomic 

and political crises, instability and uncertainty. We must 

hand-over a better economy to the next generation with the debt 

burden on their young necks removed. In addition, we owe them a 

viable political arrangement that can with-stand the stresses of an 

uncertain world economy. 

In order to ensure that our generation is relevant to human 

civilization in this part of the world, there is the urgent demand for 

national integration. This is our first priority. Lack of cohesion has 

turned many viable options into caricatures. With a united nation, 

we can begin to confront the inherent problems of underdevelopment, 

dependency, stagnation, growth, technological 

deficiencies, conflicts and an unsympathetic world. 

General Murtala Mohammed's speech to the inaugural meeting of 

the C.D.C. on 8th October 1975 gave a general guideline from 

where the C.D.C. proceeded to produce what eventually became 

the 1979 Constitution. The military administration, had the 

opportunity to re-draft the 1979 Constitution, but we refrained 

from doing so. The few changes that were made did not affect the 

structure or orientation of the draft as prepared by the C.D.C. and 

deliberated upon by the Constituent Assembly. The changes, in 

the main, concerned the removal of the electoral college with 

respect to the election of the President and the entrenchment of 

10


certain important enactments notably the Land Use Decree. The 

removal of the Electoral College was essential, so as to ensure that 

the will of the citizens prevail over the election of the President. If 

the desire in a democracy is the wish of the majority, I did not think 

that its within the spirit of the constitution to allow corrupt 

politicians to start back door arm twisting and “1obbying” their 

euphemism for bribery - to change the will of tile majority as 

manifested in a first ballot. However, if this popular will was 

expressed in favour of a different candidate in a run-off election, 

we felt such an election will be democratic and preferable to an 

electoral college which is much more easily manipulable. 

While the 1979 Constitution was standard enough, we felt some 

major areas where we differed must be left 'intact in order to ensure 

that I the Constitution was the popular will of the Constituent 

Assembly. These areas on which I felt differently were the numbers 

of political parties, the terms of office for the rulers and the role and 

functions of institutions like the National Council of State. The 

bitter experience of the second Republic has reinforced my 

conviction on some of these positions that I held then. 

The failure of the second Republic has again confronted us with the 

historical fact in Africa that multi-partism or even two-party system 

is anathema to our age-long experiences. Party divisions have 

tended to divide society in such a way that the integration needed 

for development has always eluded us. While I am not saying that 

an integration process through a mono-party will solve all our 

problems. I am saying that unity of purpose will go a long way to 

advance our aim. As I will articulate shortly, a well thoughtthrough 

one-party system will be an effective panacea to the disintegrative 

tendencies in our political system. And as I stated 

earlier, to realize such integration is to take the first basic step 

towards the amelioration of the underdevelopment that has kept 

our people impoverished. This is why what is being proposed is 

not a classical one-party system with the attendant concentration of 

all political power and authority in one person, as has been the 

practice in some African and non African countries with 

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accompanying disastrous consequences on the sustenance of 

fundamental human rights and democratic principles. 

My proposal strictly maintains the separation of roles, r and 

functions between the party, the government, and the state. Also 

within the government the distinction between the Legislature, the 

Executive and the Judiciary is maintained. The power and 

authority of party leaders and that of the government heads is 

neither monopolized by one person, nor is it made residual in a 

group of persons of the same men. 

In some critical and crucial areas of sensitivity and importance to 

the state, the final decision-making authority is the National 

Council of State which stands distinguished and distinctive from 

both the party and the government. The Council of State in this 

proposal is made to consist of a cross-section of mature and 

eminent citizens that make up the state. They hold no party 

allegiance nor loyalty except loyalty and allegiance to the state or 

nation. And yet there is the clear and unambiguous line of 

demarcation of duties, functions and responsibilities between the 

head of government and the party leader to perform without 

inhibition or obstruction by one against the other. 

To my mind the proposal should minimize electoral fraud and 

malpractices, There can be no "winner takes all" as both the winners 

and losers are all in the same party. Failure in an election for 

government office would not mean ineligibility for government 

appointment or party election and vice versa. There is also true 

joint responsibility for running faire and free elections by the 

government, the party and the Council of State. Since the Electoral 

Commission is responsible to the Council of State with statutory 

allocation of funds, other agencies or commissions for which the 

Council of State is responsible must also have statutory allocation 

of funds. 

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The problems that have confronted us in the past were mainly of 

horizontal integration. They have been physically and 

psychologically destructive. But worse still, there are now signs of 

problems of vertical integration. These are bad signs. For now, it is 

a small sore but if allowed to fester, it would be fatal. We need a 

frame work that will help horizontal integration which is an 

essential pre-requisite for development. Our development must 

deliberately take cognizance of the problem of vertical integration 

now rearing its ugly head. 

While 1 believe in the concept of federal character and it could be 

said that our administration perfected its theory and practice albeit 

without sacrificing merit as determined by track record of 

performance and achievement, my system revolts against ethnic 

politics. I see zoning as a manifestation of ethnic politics and a 

manifestation of the "warfare and loot" mentality in politics. But for 

those who have that mentality, there are enough offices and 

appointments within the party and the government as proposed in 

this book that can be zoned. What the 1979 Constitution says on 

federal character is adequate. We must not resort to more divisions. 

Rather we must seek an imaginative and an ingenious way of 

operationalising the federal character provision of the constitution 

to create a sense of belonging and of having a stake in Nigeria for 

all Nigerians. 

At the beginning of the work of the Political Bureau, I was written 

for my comments. As at that time, I could not contemplate 

legislating the number of political parties and thought that the 

number of parties would be left to evolve. However, with the 

legislation of the number of parties, I am of the view that we should 

go the whole hog which is what this book is about. More important 

to me is that whatever we can do to stabilise democracy and 

orderly succession must be done not necessarily the way others 

have done it. It has to be home grown and peculiar to l our 

circumstances. 

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Organization of the Book 

The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 provides the necessary 

background to the model constitution for national integration and 

development which I set out in part II. 

Chapter I surveys the idea of constitutions in general by looking at 

the nature of constitutions in terms of definitions, sources, types 

and forms. 

Chapter II involves an historical survey of the constitutions of some 

of the pre-colonial societies that existed in the geographical area 

that is now modern Nigeria with sprinkles of examples from other 

parts of Africa. I pay particular attention to the tendencies to have 

governments that existed without “opposition”, but had 

institutionalized checks and balances that prevented dictatorial rule 

by autocratic monarchs, chiefs and community leaders. In the 

chapter, I also show the negative effect of the interference of 

colonia1 rule with such checks and balances especially the creation 

of the Sole Native Authority system in Nigeria. 

Chapter III examines the history of constitution making in Nigeria 

from the amalgamation to the Republican Constitution of 1963. 

This chapter, not only tells the story of constitution making Nigeria, 

it goes further to show how the attempts had fostered the division 

of the country along ethnic lines. And this ethnic division I am 

suggesting has been a major bane of our developmental effort. 

Chapter IV constitutes a survey of the fundamental divisive 

tendencies in Nigeria today. In this respect. I pay attention not only 

to ethnic differencies, but also to the strong rich-poor gap and the 

rural urban dichotomy that has bedeviled our developmental 

process. 

Chapter V marks the beginning of the second part of the book. 

Here the arguments for and against the one party structure are 

examined. The structure of the proposed one party is outlined. In 

14


the chapter, the various party offices are delineated with functions, 

duties and responsibilities of each office. Also described are the 

election procedure into these offices and the tenure of office of each 

occupier .The role of the party and the relationship of the party to 

other state apparatus are spelt out. 

Chapter VI deals with the organs of government. The composition 

of the various organs of government, their functions, duties and 

responsibilities are outlined. Here I introduce a National Security 

and Economic Council designed to bring the state and national 

functionaries together for all round security and effective economic 

planning and execution. A similar body is introduced at the state 

and local government levels. 

In this chapter I also suggest the need to give the National Council 

of State more responsibility. i o avoid the possibility of the body 

losing touch with reality the composition is made to include people 

from all walks of life. While I embrace the presidential system, the 

African version for '"life presidents" and philistinic and petty 

politics made me suggest that the president cannot succeed himself 

but can succeed his successor. This gives him time to reflect and the 

citizens time to assess. 

In the chapter, I also advocate the adoption of a unicameral 

legislature. The structure of the judiciary is closely examined and 

suggestions are offered on how to ensure a fearless and 

independent judiciary which I see as a sine qua non for a 

democratically viable political order. 

Chapter VII recommends the objectives and directive principles of 

state policy that are stipulated in the 1979 Constitution and In the 

light of our experience, suggestions on proper implementation are 

offered. 

Chapter VIII is the conclusion. It synthesizes the earlier chapters 

and offers suggestions on the development of the economy. 

15


PART I 

16


T 

Chapter 1 

Constitutions: Nature, Form and Sources 

he simple fact that the term constitution can, and has been 

variously described by people of different persuasions makes 

complex an otherwise simple phenomenon. There are two possible 

ways of confronting this task. One can take the narrow and 

reductionist perspective of conceptualizing a constitution based on 

the legal expects conception. But is better to undertake it from a 

broad perspective to enable us take advantage of the rich history 

that informs the emergence of modern day constitutions. 

Broadly speaking the constitution of a country describes the whole 

system of government in that country. It also refers to a collection 

of rules which establishes and regulates the system of government 

of a country. The rules themselves must be understood from two 

dimensions. Firstly, in a strictly legal fashion, they are rules written 

down, recognized and applied by the judicial system or the law 

courts. In the second more dynamic sense of it, these rules might be 

seen as either non legal or extra legal. That is, these rules may exist 

due to usages, practical understanding, customs, or conventions. 

Such extra legal rules could be written or unwritten. But in general 

they are neither recognized nor applied by the law courts. 

However, they could be effective in regulating the operations of 

government. It is in this sense that one can understand the British 

Constitution and the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 

Principles of State Policy that are enshrined in the 1979 

Constitution of Nigeria. 

Legal experts insist that the Constitution refers to the select rules 

which regulate and govern the conduct of government and which 

17


are embodied in a document. By their very nature such rules are 

legal, in the sense that they are justiciables. Given such a narrow 

and reductionist conception, a Constitution amounts to no more 

than selection of the fundamental principles upon which the 

government of a country is established and conducted. This is 

perhaps only a shade more refined than Aristotle’s 4 th Century 

conception of a Constitution as the arrangement of offices in a 

State, especially the highest of all. 

The point is that such selected rules or arrangements do not exist in 

a vacuum and are merely parts of the whole system or 

constitutional structure of the country. This stand point is forcefully 

reinforced by the common phenomenon of the disparity between 

constitutional stipulations and concrete practical realities. For us to 

have a comprehensive description of a Constitution it is better to 

visualize it as a document in which the collection legal rules are 

supplemented and modified by usages, conventions, customs and 

interpretations of these legal rules by courts of law. 

This operational definition of a Constitution ahs a long history 

behind it. In the first instance during the early Greek period 

arguments concerning the basis of the constitution of a state 

inspired political philosophies. 

Again, during the period of the Roman Empire these arguments 

gave the Western world ideas about the realities and significance of 

law as well as the idea of the essence of national unity. Theorizing 

on the best type of Constitution was an important and favourite 

pastime of political philosophers. 

This was the prevalent trend until 1789 when the effectuation of the 

American Constitution and the consummation of the French 

Revolution with its attendant paraphernalia gave the modern 

world the first examples of modern Constitutions. Such was the 

impact of the French revolution in Europe that it influenced 

constitutional development all over Europe as far as Poland and 

Russia. Infact by the end of the 19 th Century, the countries of the 

18


old Commonwealth i.e. Canada, Newzealand, Australia, were all 

having documentary Constitutions. 

By the 20 th Century the newer emergent states of Africa and Asia 

were given documentary Constitutions as the symbol of the 

attainment of political independence and sovereignty. In recent 

times, it has become the vogue amongst states moving from a 

period of military interregnum to participatory democracy to enact 

and give unto themselves a new documentary constitution. In effect 

therefore the constitution has acquired a new toga as a useful 

device signifying the birth or re-birth of a state. This is perhaps the 

underlying current of the conviction of that eminent scholar, 

Professor K. C. Wheare in insisting that ‘if we investigate the 

origins of modern constitutions we find that practically without 

exception they were drawn up and adopted because the people 

wished to make a fresh start, insofar as the statement of their 

systems of government was concerned’. 

For now let us examine the contents of modern day constitutions, 

the sources and the forms which these constitutions might assume. 

CONTENTS OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 

Most Modern constitutions have at least 4 essential items viz: 

A. Preamble 

B. Governmental Structure 

C. Fundamental Human Rights 

D. Amendment Procedure 

THE PREAMBLE 

Technically speaking, the Preamble is strictly not part of the body 

of constitutional provisions regardless of the peculiar status it 

enjoys among the contents of Modern constitutions. In several ways 

the preamble to a constitution is basically different from other 

provisions. First, it is a statement of ideals. That is, it states the 

spirit informing the constitution and gives a precise explanation of 

19


the reasons for the constitution as well as the expectations of those 

who are to be bound by the constitution. Essentially therefore it is 

nothing more than a political and moral sign-post to guide and 

direct the political behaviour of office holders. 

GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 

All constitutions must as a matter of necessity specify in clear and 

unmistakable terms the organs of government, the power and 

functions of these organs and how their excesses can be curbed. 

The constitution equally stipulates the category of the expected 

inhabitants of these arms the procedural mechanism for the 

effectuation of the selection of office holders. Most importantly, the 

relationship between these organs of government must be duly 

specified. 

Thus, the desire for a rigorous adherence to the tenets of the 

doctrine of separation of powers and its corollary in practice (the 

institution of checks and balances) has involved the making of 

elaborate provisions. For instance, while the 1963 Republican 

Constitution in Nigeria specified the responsibility of the Cabinet to 

the Parliament, the 1979 Constitution which was a Presidential 

system, stipulated without any equivocation or ambivalence the 

independent status of the three arms or government as well as the 

areas of interdependence. 

As regards this power distribution, the 1979 constitution specifies 

the authority of the various arms of government and the 

specification was based on the principle of separation of powers 

which ascribed a separate and independent status to each organ. In 

effect no single organ of government could ever control or exercise 

all the powers of government. Whereas a more than cursory 

familiarization with both the Independence Constitution and the 

1963 Republican Constitution reveal a qualified application of the 

principles of separation of powers, the Parliament was empower to 

supervise, regulate and select the heads of the executive. Again 

20


both constitutions provided the Parliament with the power to 

supervise the judicature. 

All constitutions must as a matter of necessity denote the various 

levels of governments as well as the responsibilities of these levels 

of government and their relationship with one another. It is within 

such a context that we can have the distinguishing feature between 

unitary and federal constitutions. A federal constitution not only 

specified that the major levels of government are co-ordinate and 

co-equal it also provides and enumerates the powers of these levels 

of government by listing items under three different legislative lists 

viz: exclusive, concurrent and residual. With a proviso that, 

although both the Federal and State governments have rights to 

legislative on items within the concurrent legislative lists, in case of 

an inconsistency between federal and state laws, the federal law 

shall reign supreme. But then, it should be noted that the “residual 

list” is not a list as such, it usually consists of the items not 

specifically mentioned in either the exclusive or the concurrent 

lists. For the first time the 1979 Constitution established the third 

tier of government i.e. the local government, it was accorded clear 

constitutional status in terms of defined and stipulated 

responsibilities, funding and security of existence. 

A unitary constitution empowers only the central government to 

carry out certain functions. If there are other unit”, such units exist 

at the pleasure of the central government. 

FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 

As it relates to the governed, perhaps the most important and 

crucial content of the modern day constitution are the fundamental 

human rights provisions. Such is the import of this constitutional 

item that it has sometimes formed the basis for a classificatory 

scheme of constitutions. Fundamental human rights provisions are 

not only necessary in theory, they are more so in practice. These 

provisions provide assured security of life and property for the 

hapless citizen that falls under the tyranny of the abuse of power 

21


more effectively than a collection of rules which organize rather 

than restrain the exercise of political power. 

But then, only very few constitutions stand the test of time with 

regards to respect for fundamental human rights. These provisions 

place severe and thorough going limitations on the authorities and 

actions of the government. The Shugaba Abdul Rahman Vs Federal 

Minister of Internal Affairs, 1981 (2 N.C.L.R. 469) case was an 

illustration of the operation of fundamental human rights clauses in 

practice. The court not only declared the actions of the Internal 

Affairs Minister as illegal, but also that the provisions of the 

Immigration Act of 1963 was inconsistent with the provisions of the 

1979 Constitution, This was a landmark case that makes one feel 

proud of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria and the Nigerian 

Judiciary. 

I cannot hut agree with Thomas Paine's insistence in his book The 

Rights of Man that a proper constitution must as a matter of 

necessity fulfill four criteria viz: Firstly the, basic rules must be 

articulated both consciously and deliberately by those who are to 

live under and operate the constitution. 

Secondly, the constitution must in every material particular be 

regarded as Supreme because it is the progenitor of the institutions 

it has established, as such constitutional rules must not only be 

binding on all the institutions of government, these institutions 

must not exist or operate outside these constitutional rules. 

Thirdly, the aim of a constitution must copiously be to limit the 

authority of government. As such, it must outline in clearer and 

more specific language the authority of government. 

Fourthly, in the effectuation of constitutional provisions, the actions 

of government which outstrip the imposed limitations on the 

authority of government must be regarded as unconstitutional ultra 

-vires and beyond the powers of law, 

22


However, I must insist that determining the extent of entrenchment 

of individual rights in the constitution is to say the least an arduous 

task. A Carte-blanche insertion of such rights might render the 

government ineffective. Ii a government is not to be continuously 

crippled, it is necessary that individual rights and liberties should 

be stated in relative terms, and never in absolute terms, Obviously 

stating these rights in absolute terms would cripple the machinery 

of government. This is why it is generally agreed that some form of 

restriction be imposed upon such guaranteed rights. Consequently 

most modern constitutions qualify the exercise of these rights with 

injunctions such as “in accordance with law" or "subject to public 

morality and order". But then, it has been reasoned that a difficulty 

might arise because such a proviso tends to reduce such rights to 

an empty platitude. This is because such provisions tend to give the 

legislature and executive enough leeway to determine when the 

rights may or may not be exercised. The implication is that rights 

may or may not be exercised. This suggests that the enjoyment and 

exercise of these rights depends greatly on the tolerance and selfrestraint 

of the executive and legislature. 

In a bid to reduce the subjection of citizen's rights to the vagaries of 

the whimsical pleasures of the government, constitutional framers 

have tended to entrench in the constitutions some desirable 

objectives. For instance in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution, such a 

statement of these desirable objectives is exemplified in the 

fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, But 

then, these clauses contained in sections 14 to 22 of the constitution 

are non justifiable. 

Consequently, the statements cannot be enforced by the Courts 

especially if the courts are to steer clear of political controversies. 

Perhaps the only lasting hope of the common man against 

governmental tyranny and all forms of administrative abuse lies in 

the utilization of the vote. 

23


AMENDMENT PROCEDURE 

This is another important feature found in almost all modern day 

constitutions. The importance of this feature is further accentuated 

by the fact that it has become one of the classificatory schemes for 

dichotomizing between constitutions. As such it is common to hear 

in the discourse on typologies of constitutions, the categories rigid 

and flexible constitutions. 

Constitutions which allow the same method f or passing ordinary 

laws for its constitutional amendments are dubbed flexible. 

Whereas constitutions that have provisions which can only be 

changed through a process other than that for passing bills into law 

are said to be rigid. 

Such procedures are usually long, cumbersome and difficult to 

realize for the purpose of effectuating change. Britain is a notable 

country with a flexible constitution while Nigeria (1st and 2nd 

Republics) U.S.A., U.S.S.R. Switzerland, Australia, and Canada are 

typical examples of countries with rigid constitutions. 

Even t hen, the degree of rigidity in a constitution varies. A survey 

of the literature on constitutions reveals four broad categories: 

a. In this case, although the legislature is empowered to 

amend the constitution certain restrictions such as 

submission of such an amendment to a referendum, or a 

joint session of both chambers of the legislature and 

requiring a two-third majority in each of the two chambers 

as for example in U .S.S.R. or a three-fifth majority of the 

joint sitting as is the case in France. 

b. Another category is typified by the arrangement in 

Switzerland and Australia which vests the final decision in 

the people. This is because the consent of a majority of the 

voters is seen as necessary for a constitutional amendment 

even though the initiative for such an amendment is taken 

24


by the legislature. In addition to this Switzerland allows 

50,000 voters the right to also initiate or propose 

constitutional amendments. 

c. In some federations the component units (a prescribed 

majority) has the final say In matters of constitutional 

amendment- For instance in Nigeria under the 1979 

Constitution 2/3 affirmative vote of the states is required 

alongside other conditions. In U. S. A. 2/3 majority of the 

states must vote affirmatively. Australia and Switzerland in 

addition to the consent of a majority of the component units 

as other requirements. For instance, in the Australian case, 

constitutional amendments that seek to alter territorial units 

of an}' state in Australia require the consent of the affected 

state. 

d. Until the repatriation of its constitution a few years ago. 

Canada provided us with another interesting category in 

which the final decision was left in the hands of an outside 

authority. Such decision could only have been made by the 

Sovereign in Parliament in Britain under the Canadian 

arrangement. 

From the foregoing it is obvious that by and large, a flexible 

constitution has one great advantage over the rigid constitution. 

That is in crucial times of fundamental social turmoil, cleavage, or 

change, certain fundamental issues of outstanding political 

expediency may be adopted and incorporated into the constitution 

without recourse to a long and winding process. Perhaps like James 

Bryce in his Studies in History and Jurisprudence observed: "flexible 

constitutions can be stretched or bent so as to meet emergencies 

without breaking their framework; and when the emergency has 

passed, they slip back into their old form, like a tree whose outer 

branches have been pulled on one side to let a vehicle pass ..." On 

the other hand constitutions that have been tagged rigid have in 

practice displayed a surprisingly high level of 1exibility. For 

instance the American constitution has shown a "capacity to fill in 

25


the interstices and to spell out in detail (s) the broad general 

provisions it contains ", such that with an increasingly generous 

judicial interpretation and a congressional stance of responding to 

the needs of the times if and when demonstrated, the additional 

flexibility has been normally forthcoming. A survey of the twenty 

six major amendments would confirm my summation of the 

American constitutional experience. 

On the whole, the discernible trend among nation-states has been 

that of the adoption of an infinitely flexible c0nstitution by unitary 

states whose population are almost always relatively 

homogeneous. While most federal states with their 

multinationalities and diversities feel safer with a rigid 

constitution. 

SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULERSHIP 

Having examined the nature and forms of constitutional rules, let 

us now turn to the sources of these rules. A survey of the extant 

literature on constitutional rules indicate four broad and major 

sources. These are: 

(I) Written documents 

(2) Organic documents 

(3) Adjudications 

(4) Customs and Conventions. 

WRITTEN D O CUMENTS 

This has over the years been ascribed a central position as regards 

source of the fundamental rules and regulations genera11y 

described as constitutions. But then, it has been observed that the 

attitude towards the significance and importance of the written 

document is not one and the same. While North American, Western 

European, a couple of Asian and African countries regard written 

documents as the nucleus around which the total body of 

constitutional rules gravitates, some Latin American countries 

26


generally ignore t he provision of such written documents. In a 

similar vein, some communist bloc countries tend to pay lip service 

to provisions of written documents. The difference in the attitude 

towards written documents as the nucleus of constitutional 

rulership is a function of the social context of the governmental 

structure itself. In recent times these written documents are 

produced by august bodies and committees convened specifically 

to produce a workable constitutional arrangement. 

ORGANIC LAWS 

These have remained a core and common source of constitutional 

rules because most written documents merely make provision in 

broad outlines thereby creating certain gaps. Organic laws are then 

special legislative enactments specifically directed towards filling 

such gaps. 

Most constitutions for instance, do not go beyond the establishment 

and the outlining of major governmental agencies. In some 

instances, a written document merely makes a passing reference to 

the departments or ministries of the executive arm of government 

without specifying what these departments communities are, how 

many are to be created, and what are the powers and functions of 

each. The 979 Nigerian Republican constitutions is a typical 

example. In the section concerning the Executive and Public 

Service, there was no mention of the number of ministries to be 

created or even an outline of the functions of each ministry and the 

modality of performing these functions: Consequently it became 

imperative that organic laws be enacted to resolve such question. It 

is within such a context that the law establishing the Ministry of 

Science and Technology can be appreciated. This is why it has often 

been suggested that organic laws give operational meaning to 

provisions of the written document. That is organic laws organize 

specific institutions and agencies of government. Thus regulating 

the exercise of public powers by the organs formally established by 

written documents. Conceivably we might then describe organic 

laws as legislative enactments which concern themselves with the 

27


basic organization and procedures for the functioning of the 

machinery of government. However it should be strongly noted 

that, they are by nature, of legislative rather than constitutional 

origins. This however does not diminish their status, because once 

they are enacted it becomes quite difficult to change them. 

ADJUDICATIONS 

The nature of the provisions of written documents are such that 

they deal with general issues, the provisions are therefore highly 

generalized and broad statements of law. Thus, when specific 

problems crop up, there are usually controversies over the extent to 

which such broad provisions and statements can be applied to 

concrete issues of everyday governance. It then becomes the 

onerous responsibility of the judiciary to state in m9re precise terms 

the meaning and intent of these statements. In the long run these 

judicial interpretations are compiled and become a fundamental 

Source of constitutional rules. 

The importance of adjudication as a major source of constitutional 

rules is perhaps the strongest contribution of America to modem 

Constitutional history. Although this aspect of the American 

constitution evolved as a convention, most modern constitutions 

have tended to entrench the idea of judicial review into their 

written documents. For instance Sections 212 and 213 of the 1979 

Constitution empower the judiciary to undertake judicial review. 

The validity of such judicial pronouncements is made sacrosanct by 

constitutional provisions which stipulates the rulings of the 

Supreme Court as final. 

CUSTOMS AND CONVENTIONS 

Indisputably, customary practices were the earliest form of law 

making. Their peculiar feature is that of general acceptability by all 

and sundry. These customs and conventions are therefore practices 

and understanding which overtime have become acceptable as a 

part of the system and operations of the government. 

28


Consequently, these habitual practices are not written down in the 

same formal and official form of the written documents, organic 

laws, and adjudications. Inspite of this however, they are 

regularized and obeyed as fundamental rules of government and as 

such become authoritatively binding like written constitutional 

rules. The idea of the British Prime Minister holding office for as 

long as he enjoys the confidence and support of the majority in the 

House of Commons, actually evolved as a convention. Again under 

the American constitution the President is to be elected by the 

Electoral College, whose members are selected by the states. These 

members are constitutionally bound to choose the President 

according to their individual and personal judgments and 

convictions without outside' interference or influence. However 

over the years it has become the custom for members of the 

Electoral College to pledge to vote f or the particular candidate 

favoured in their state. Consequently the winner of the Presidential 

race is always known before the Electoral College convenes to 

choose him. 

Again, most of the pre-colonial systems in Nigeria operated largely 

on these customary practices. On a final note, it has been observed 

that the newer emergent states of Africa have tended to incorporate 

the Constitutional Customs and Conventions developed in Europe 

and North America into their own constitutions as basic provisions. 

Such incongruent grafting and mismatch constitutes one of the 

major problems of constitutional developments in Africa. 

29


Chapter II 

Pre-Colonial Constitutions and the Impact of Colonialism 

H 

aving dwelt on the nature and sources of Constitutions, 

especially the European type of documentary constitutions. I 

shall attempt a brief expose of the precolonial constitutions in some 

of the various societies that make up the modern day Nigeria. I 

must insist from the outset that my task here is neither to undertake 

an elaborate rehash of the pre-colonial history of Nigeria: nor am I 

concerned with an unnecessary embellishment of the existing 

literature on the subject. Rather I intend to concern myself mainly 

with a broad outline of the constitutional rulership in these 

nationalities, focusing as it were on the institution of checks and 

balances the bedrock of political praxis of these pre-colonial 

political states in Nigeria. 

Unfortunately because of the ethnocentric, value laden, and rather 

judgmental writings of the early chroniclers on African political 

institutions we have tended to regard pre-colonial political 

institutions with general disdain, culminating in a rather hasty 

description of these institutions as archaic, primitive, crude and 

generally dysfunctional to the process of modern development. We 

seem to, conveniently, obfuscate the institutional complexity and 

sophistication of these systems of particular importance is the 

institutions of checks and balances which in itself is a remarkable 

tribute to the administrative genius of pre-colonial African rulers. It 

still remains a puzzle and an odd paradox of immense 

philosophical implications that we have over the years unwittingly 

jettisoned these enviable and clearly adaptable political practice. 

30


In spite of everything, one indisputable fact that stands out in clear 

relief is that these institutional arrangements were a definite idea of 

the dominant political rulership within these nationalities. It found 

explicit manifestations in their culture through their institutions 

and reinforced via social control expressed in many cases through 

beliefs. 

Prior to formal colonial hegemony in 1861 two distinct political 

superstructures were clearly discernible viz: The State centralized 

societies which were clearly governed by dominant social groups, 

who sustained their domination over the citizen by an ideology 

based on religiously backed institution of kinship and expressed 

through various rites and ceremonies. The non centralized societies 

were organized on an ideology based on age an religious positions. 

Although one can broadly classify these political arrangements into 

two, it is importance to stress that within each category there are 

slight variations from the archetypes. For instance there are three 

clearly identifiable variants of the centralized system. These are the 

pyramidal or federal type, as typified by the Oyo empire, the 

associational monarchy and the centralized monarchy. As for the 

decentralized societies on might talk of several categories such as 

the classical segmented society, the ritually segmented society, the 

universalistic segmented society etc. I will dwell more on the 

classical segmented society of the Ibos and the ritually segmented 

societies as typified by the Efiks and the Ibos of Southern Nigeria. 

It will be recalled that while discussion the sources of constitutional 

rules in the last chapter I did mention customs and conventions as 

one of the major sources. It is within this context that I can ascribe 

as one of the major sources. It is within this context that I can 

ascribe with relief, and without fear of contradiction a 

constitutional status to the age long political institutions, 

arrangements and practices in the pre-colonial Nigerian 

nationalities. Let us now turn our focus in this discourse on these 

constitutional arrangements. 

31


(A). THE CENTRALIZED SOCIETIES: 

Generally these societies exhibited a high degree of centralization 

of political power and authority. In the same vein their armies and 

judicial systems were quite centralized such that the central 

government exercised considerable authority over the constituent 

units and the subunits. Again it was a hierarchical structure with a 

clearly distinguishable flow of authority from the monarch through 

his chiefs, councils, tributors, intermediary officials, to the village 

heads. The underlying political theory in these centralized states 

was that of the need for a united and strong society. Naturally, the 

only means of reinforcing this was to concentrate power in as few 

hands as possible. Though sub group autonomy, individualism etc. 

might be eroded, it seemed a rather fair price to pay for the security 

and stability of the nation. However it must be borne in mind that 

the degree of concentration was not the same in all centralized 

societies but rather it tended to vary with the types identified 

above. This would become more perceptible as we turn to the 

specifications of each as we examine the three variants under this 

category. 

A. 1 THE CENTRALIZED MONARCHY 

This category exhibits perhaps the highest degree of centralization 

of political power and authority. Such was the nature of the 

governmental structure that although the component units might 

be somewhat heterogeneous, rarely is any form of autonomy 

conferred on them. Thus placed on a continuum, the tendency was 

towards a unitary system rather than a federal system of 

government. As studies by a number of people including Dudley 

and Whitaker Jr., have shown the Hausa-Fulani Emirates typify this 

form of arrangement. Structurally, the basic unit of organization in 

the Hausa-Fulani Society is the compound or group of compounds 

which make up a ward with several wards making up a village. In 

the same vein a group of villages either clustered or scattered 

constitutes a fief ruled over by the fief holder. The state is than the 

totality of the fiefs within a specific and definable area, plus of 

32


course the vassal states (where applicable) and the capital town 

with the Emir presiding over the affairs of the emirates. In theory 

the authority of the emir over his domain was expected to be 

absolute, and final, however since in most cases the Emirate is 

usually a vassal state of Sokoto or Gwandu the final and ultimate 

repositions of power was either the Emir of Gwandu or the Sultan 

of Sokoto. By the end of the 19 th century, Sokoto dictated even to 

Gwandu. 

At the basic unit of organization (the compound) there is the 

Maigida who is the most senior male in the compound, the 

Maiunguwa is the head of the ward and he is appointed and can be 

dismissed by the Mai Kasa (village head) who as the chief executive 

of the village issues orders which are binding on everyone. To 

accentuate the effectiveness of his orders, the Mail Kasa utilizes a 

retinue of clients like the Fadawa (unofficial courtiers) and Barori 

(retainers) these enabled him to act as independently of the Mai 

Unguwa as possible. In essence his power in relation to the village 

was a function of the extent of his usage of such functionaries. The 

cumulative effect was the reproduction of “State Offices” at the 

village level. It was thus not uncommon to come across instances of 

“ward heads” being appointed as Makamas Galadimas etc. This 

invariably meant a competitive political atmosphere. This naturally 

became an integrative factor at the level of village cohesion, 

stability and persistence. One point not to be under emphasized is 

the absence of an official role for an opposition thus reducing the 

plausibility of the development of divisive elements. Obviously the 

pivotal point of the community’s rotation was the chieftainship. 

But then, the village head is also an appointee of the overlord or the 

fief. These are in turn responsible to the fief-holders who in the 

main are state officials resident in the capital town of the state. 

These are the Hakimis of the emirate system. The Hakimis are also 

responsible to the Emir for all their actions as such they can be 

dismissed by the Emir, just like they can dismiss the overlords who 

can equally dismiss the village heads. Gleanable from the above, is 

33


the picture of a highly hierarchical authority with power flowing 

from the Sultan downwards. 

At the Emirate -level in the Hausa- Fulani estates there is no place 

in the power structure for a council of state. Since directly and 

indirectly all offices within the state are held at the Emir's pleasure. 

Although the Emir bad a retinue of specialized councillors 

handling specific portfolios, the trend was individual consultations 

with these councillors, rather than a sitting of council of state. This 

tended to make the Emirs absolute rulers. But then the Emir owes 

his position to the Sultan of Sokoto. 

Thus his appointment and deposition was with the Sultan of 

Sokoto who apparently was the Alfa and the Omega. Infact, the 

power of the Emir in external relations was qualified on the terms 

of relations with the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Gwandu. But 

by the end of the 19th Century, Gwandu had to bow to the 

suzerainty of Sokoto both as the political and spiritual headquarters 

of the entire Fulani emirate system. 

Infact, this position of overlordship ascribed to the Sultan of Sokoto 

over the Emirs was confirmed and reinforced by the vassal/ 

overlord relationship between them. To this end, annual tributes 

came from the various Emirs to the Sultan. Again the appointment 

and confirmation of the Emirs in office was the sole prerogative of 

the Sultan, who also had the right to arbitrate disputes between 

Emirs and decide on matters of succession. In essence the Hausa - 

Fulani state5 had a power structure that was highly centralized and 

hierarchical with the Sultan as an almost absolute aut0cratic ruler. 

But then the situation in Sokoto was more of dual monarchy, 

because the Waziri (the Prime Minister} shared power with the 

Sultan. 

lnspite of retaining the ultimate power, the Sultan left the control of 

the administration, appointment of fiefs, promotion and dismissal 

of officials in the hands of the Waziri thus making him perhaps the 

second most powerful individual after the Sultan. 

34


The fiscal machinery of the State was quite elaborate dating back to 

the ancient tribute in grain and other local products. These taxes 

and dues included the Zakat - that is income tax for charitable 

purposes authorised by the Quran, the Jangali (livestock tax), the 

Kharaj (Land tax) Jizyah (capitation tax) etc. There were also 

collection of dues on luxury crops like tobacco, onions and sugar 

cane, market fees, tolls on caravan routes and also Gaisuwa 

(tribute). The village heads collected these taxes at the village level 

retaining a percentage for themselves as remunerations. The rest 

was handed over to the intermediaries who took a percentage and 

returned the rest to the fief holders and this continued until a 

substantial portion reached the treasury. 

There was a conspicuous separation of the executive from the 

judiciary. Although the King as the head of state and supreme 

judge exercised judicial functions in some matters with the advice 

of the Chief Alkali and other lega1 experts, in the main the bulk of 

the judicial powers and functions were carried out by the Alkali 

under the Maliki Code. Essentially and because the performance of 

these functions required an extensive and deep seated knowledge 

of the Sharia law, it was left in the hands of the special class of 

professional magistrates who were generally learned in the law and 

had unbridled access to libraries containing the works of eminent 

jurists. 

What we see from t he above is t he picture of a highly centralized 

and hierarchically organized feudal state, rested on a framework of 

the separation of political power (centralized in the overlord) from 

the administrative and judicial machinery, oiled and fueled by an 

elaborate fiscal arrangement. 

Again the hierarchical structure ensured a series of checks on abuse 

of power and maladministration by superiors in the hierarchy and 

this moves up the administrative ladder until the buck stopped in 

the office of the Sultan. The Sultan like most of the rulers realized 

that it was in his interest to cater for the well being of their subjects. 

Apart from this, the selection of a Sultan was a careful affair. 

35


Generally the people reciprocated this gesture with an outward 

reverence of political power and authority further reinforced by the 

Islamic injunctions exhorting the people to an unconditional 

subservience to the rulers W ho .have been ordained by Allah. . 

This in broad outlines was the feature of an intricate and complex 

political arrangement in then Hausa - Fu!ani states. The 

arrangement was found so perfect that the British did not venture 

to disrupt the well oiled machinery functioning with a comical 

finesse and efficiency. That was the bedrock of the persistence and 

existence of the Hausa - Fulani States. 

A. 2. THE PYRAMIDAL OR FEDERAL TYPE SOCIETY 

The peculiar nature of the structural organization of these societies 

is such that the provinces as autonomous units were not directly 

administered from the center. Such was the nature of the 

arrangement, that it can be aptly described as a loose federation. 

This is because the component subunits were merely required to 

pay occasional homage to the rulers, contribute to war efforts, pay 

tribute and taxes to the metropolitan rulers. 

Most importantly, the rulers of the sub-units were chosen through 

the indigenous succession system. It was only in some instances 

that the confirmation of the metropolitan rulers was required. At 

times both covertly and overtly the metropole might attempt to 

influence the choice of the ruler. Both the Oyo empire and Bini 

Kingdom in Southern Nigeria typified this category. 

Structurally, most of the provinces that made up the Oyo Empire 

were conquered during inter-tribal wars but their boundaries were 

not adjusted. Inspite of all this, the central government could 

control the units. Firstly the provincial ruler could be disciplined if 

and when he failed to perform specific obligations. This could be 

effectuated either through deposition, stirring up or fomenting 

rebellious and insurgent dispositions by his subjects or in extreme 

36


cases resort to the ultima ratio regum - war. 

Again over certain allegations, a provincial ruler might be issued 

with a court summons to appear before the metropolitan court. 

Also in cases where citizens of a particular province protest to the 

center alleging impropriety and general misconduct against their 

provincial rulers, they were granted audience and response. Even 

then the checks and balances were a two sided affair, for the 

provincial rulers could also curb the excesses of the central 

leadership either through an outright refusal to pay obeisance, 

refusal to carry out traditional obligation or when sufficiently 

militarily equipped, they rebelled or revolted against the authority 

of the metropolitan rulers. Let us now turn to the specificities of the 

Oyo empire. 

Given the near confederative structure of the Oyo empire the 

relationship of the central government in Oyo to the provinces gave 

the provinces a great degree of provincial autonomy. More so the 

style of government especially before the 18th century was simply 

one of disinterest by the center, such that the style of government at 

the center was replicated in the provinces. In which case the Oba at 

t he provincial level also had his retinue of counselors. To reduce 

the administrative distance and get closer to the provincial Obas 

the Alafin appointed the Commander-in-Chief of his imperial army 

from the provinces. This trend started with the appointment of Aare 

Kokoro Gangan of lwoye. 

It was perhaps within the main political structure that the 

institution of checks and balances was most animated. The office of 

the Alafin was the most important of the institution. The Alafin was 

not just an ordinary Oba like the provincial Obas. He was more of 

an institution whose ideological validation lies in the myth of his 

ascension to power. As such he was the executive head of 

government from whom all laws, emanated. He was ably assisted 

by the Oyomesi in executing state policies based on customs and 

conventions. He was the only one that could order the death of any 

37


erring citizen in his domain, since only his office had power over 

death and life. He could also declare war and conclude peace 

treaties. His powers were near total. But then he treaded with great 

caution in the execution of his powers because of the traditional 

constraints or checks on his power by both the council of the state 

(the Oyomesi) and the Ogboni. 

The Oyomesi as the council of state had seven Kingmakers who 

infact were the real administrators of the empire and the principal 

state officials of the Oba. [t was usually headed by the Basorun. 

who was the Commander of the capital city's army and Chief 

Minister of State. Indeed he acted as the regent in between the 

death of one Alafin and the installation of a new one. Each member 

of the council of state had a specific portfolio attached to his office. 

In the main they executed the orders of the Alafin and in case of 

impropriety he was deposed by them. As Kola Balogun noted, this 

could be done through a complex and intriguing process, at times it 

could be simple trickery involving a careful manipulation of 

customary laws. For instance, a masquerade entering the palace 

and grabbing the Alafin was a death sentence for Alafin Jayin. The 

custom that the Alafin once touched by a masquerade must die had 

to be respected. 

Another important institution in the governmental structure was 

the Ogboni. This was an important ancient Yoruba cult whose main 

purpose then was the maintenance of peace and prosperity within 

the empire. In terms of governmental functions, the Ogboni played 

some judicial roles. For one thing in case of a quarrel between the 

Alafin and the Oyomesi they mediated and their decision was 

binding on both parties. Again they perform fundamental 

ritualistic functions, serving as the communication link between the 

living and the dead. This conferred on them a reverence and 

sacerdotal status. The Alafin was never a part of the Ogboni 

meetings and proceedings, he was represented by an Erelu (Woman 

Ogboni) at the Ogboni meetings. In cases of misrule, tyrannical 

tendencies, disregard for fundamental customs and traditional 

practices capable of disrupting societal equilibrium, the Oyomesi in 

38


concert with the Ogboni might advise the Alafin to either commit 

suicide or abdicate the throne. Such was the nature of complex and 

interwoven checks on abuse of power, that some have tended to 

describe the position of the Alafin as that of a constitutional 

monarch. 

There was also a group of military nobility called the Esos. They 

ranked below the Oyomesi and were the imperial warlords. They 

were led to war by the Aare Ona Kankanfo who was almost always a 

powerful personage, who did not exhibit any form of subservience 

or obsequity even (albeit occasional) before the Alafin. The Aare was 

undoubtedly the most powerful military man of his time. He had 

seventy captains of the guards under him. Sixteen of these were the 

seniors while the remaining fifty-four were the junior ones. 

Surprisingly the Oyomesi took precedence over the Eso because each 

Oyomesi had ten Eso under him. 

There was also the office of the crown prince (the Aremo) who 

literally reins with his father until 1858 during the reign of Alafin 

Atiba when the Aremo was required to die with his father. 

To help the Alafin perform his functions effectively (especially the 

direction and administration of palace affairs) there were the 

Eunuchs, they were the lordlings of the palace. Although generally 

called Baafin or Iwefe the important ones were the Otun Efa who 

represented the Alafin in religious affairs and was in charge of Koso 

town where Shango was worshiped. The Osi Efa represented the 

Alafin in political affairs and was perhaps the most honoured of 

them. He had the responsibility of representing the Alafin on 

occasions. Thus he could carry not only state umbrella but equally 

the crown on such occasions. 

There was the office of the priests and priestesses whose positions 

were religious and sacerdotal. lnfact no major decision was taken 

without Ifa divination, as such these priestesses had a conspicuous 

religious and ritualistically Important position in the government. 

The two main ones were lya Ori in charge of the propiation and 

39


divination of the Alafin’s destiny and lya Mole whose main duty 

was the worshipping of the spirits of the departed Alafins 

Deducible from this brief outline of the structure and mode of 

governance in the Oyo Empire was that the system of checks and 

balances was at its best. At every level within the empire there was 

always a form of constraint or check on the excesses of the office. 

The situation was that of one office being counterpoised by the 

other. Whilst about two or three office might be linked together in 

an action set, the placing were such that would act as a constant 

check on the other, and collision courses were usually averted. 

Even in instances w here the occupier of a particular office 

personalized the office through his rather powerful personage, like 

the case of Basorun Gaha, the resistance and the inbuilt mechanism 

of the system eventually gave Alafin Abiodun enough leeway and 

elbow room to indulge in political intrigues with which he was able 

to out manoeuvre Bashorun Gaha. 

This sort of structural arrangeme1'1t was neither particular to, nor 

an exclusive feature of the Oyo Empire. Excursion into other precolonial 

social political systems reveal that variants of such 

structural arrangements dotted the geographical spread of present 

day Nigeria. The Igalas in the Middle-belt were operating a similar 

system. In the same league was the Bini in the Mid Western part of 

the country. 

The Bini Kingdom presents an interesting case-study in the careful 

utilization of one political office to check another, with the 

"checked” office/officer given enough el bow room to balance this 

check on its powers. The works of Professor Igbafe, Ifeka and Stride, 

and most recently Dr. Ikelegbe paint a vivid imagery of the 

carefully evolved administrative machinery lubricated (rather than 

luxated) by an arrangement of effective checks and balances. 

The Bini Kingdom was organized like the typical centralized 

hierarchical monarchy, based on a tributary system. As such, at the 

40


level of the political administration the Kingdom was pigeonholed 

into tribute units. Each of these units was under the control of the 

overlord w hose major function was to articulate the wishes and 

fears of his people to the Oba of Bini. In the same vein it was 

incumbent on him lo convey the Oba's instructions, directives and 

wishes to the masses. The overlord remain essentially as an a 

appointee of the Oba The position was such that if the Oba 

perceived a threatening growth in the influence of the overlord his 

unit could be split and part of it given as largesse to unwavering 

supporters of the Oba. Even then, the power of the overlord was in 

some instances subsumed and /or undermined by the positions 

and powers of the Enigie (the Duke) and the Odionwere (akin to 

village heads). In most cases the Dukes were chosen from the 

members of the royal family. On the other hand the oldest villager 

was more often than not appointed as the Odionwere. Both the 

Odionwere and the overlords of the units were responsible to the 

Oba of Bini through the Enigie. The Enigie in essence was a district 

head of a group of villages. The Enigie was accountable to the Oba 

for all his actions and served as the vital link between the Oba and 

all his people. The role gained more importance and became 

increasingly vital given the near secluded personality of the Oba: A 

condition deemed crucial for the sustenance of Oba’s institutional 

myth. The consequent air of esoterism with which the Oba was 

shrouded gave added impetus to the sacredness and sanctity of the 

Oba. 

On this basis, legislative, executive and judicial powers were 

reposed in the Oba. In appearance the Oba occupied his position at 

the top of the hierarchy and bestrode it like the Alpha and the 

Omega. What with his power over life and death. However, to 

conclude that he was absolutely autocratic would be to display a 

superficial understanding of an otherwise complex phenomenon 

and that would be missing the beauty and finesse of the system. 

In the first place, in the effective exercise of his considerable 

powers, and the performance of his numerous functions the king 

was assisted by a retinue of chiefs, and councils. Law making for 

41


instance, must be done in conjunction with the Uzama (the council 

of state.) The same thing applies to administrative functions like 

fixing festival days, declaration of wars and the conclusion of peace 

treaties. The necessity of consultation with the Uzama on law 

making was in practice a great constraint and check on the powers 

of the Oba. To ignore or treat with contempt the position of the 

Uzama was to set off a long chain of catastrophically events with 

consequent possibilities like protest, non execution of orders e.t.c. 

Perhaps more significant is the compelling need to follow 

precedents in various sphere of decision-making. To ignore these 

precedents without sufficiently compelling reasons was to embark, 

on a risky and perilous journey capable of shipwrecking the Oba on 

the quicksands of autocratic maladministration and misrule. 

Of importance within the Kingdom's political system was the 

ability of the people to check any attempt at veering into the unsafe 

terrain of tyrannical despotism. This could manifest in a variety of 

ways such as t he utilization of magic and esoteric knowledge of 

sorcery, the outright refusal to pay the annual or bi-annual tributes 

of livestock, meat, palm oil, yams etc. Or as was witnessed during 

some periods - a high emigration of the people to areas perceived 

as more conducive. In essence, the Bini Kingdom (while the 

Europeans were still searching for the most effective vehicle to 

transport them from the state of nature) had already given concrete 

manifestations to the latter day basic postulates of the Lockean 

theory of rebellion and statecraftship. 

The informing and instructing ideology of state was an 

uncompromisable need for consultation and consolidation, and 

definitely not oppositional politics, or the division of society into 

various antagonistic camps. 

The institutionalized mechanism of checks and balances was so 

complex that within the system one could discern a perpetual 

counter positioning of the various offices. But then the overriding 

and underlying political philosophy was that of a consensual 

rulership based on tolerance and a disdain for the pettiness of 

42


official opposition. The point is that, generally within the 

traditional African setting the opposition was synonymous with 

enmity and since it was not possible to have loyal enemies, it was 

only natural that institutional opposition was not part of the 

governance. This will further be buttressed as we go through the 

different societies. 

B. THE NON-CENTRALIZED SOCIETIES 

These societies were based on a political philosophy of individual 

liberty, fraternity and egalitarianism. Invariably such societies were 

infinitely republican in outlook and political praxis. Theirs was 

participatory democracy par excellence. As such the emphasis was 

on sub-group autonomy and a government based on the people. 

Emphasis was placed on extensive public participation in the 

political process. The pivotal thrust of these communities were the 

kinship and the age sets whose organizational principles informed 

the very rubric of governance. 

More often than not most writers have tended to limit the existence 

of this political and social arrangement to the lbos. However, It is 

interesting to note that the Tivs of Benue, the 19biras of Kabba, the 

Biroms of Plateau as well as the Bura of Bauchi also had similar 

political organizations. 

Several scholarly studies, such as the works of A.E. Afigbo, Robin 

Borton, J.C. Anene, Ikelegbe etc. place the lbos strictly within the 

category of the classical segmentary society. The basic social units 

of the lbo was the single village made up of scattered homesteads 

and linked together by ties of kinship. While the largest political 

unit was never larger than the "village group" - this consisted of a 

number of villages sharing a common cultural identity, each of the 

villages was unreservedly autonomous in the management of its 

own affairs. In terms of governmental structure, political power 

within these communities were placed in the council of elders, 

village assemblies and age sets. In practice, governance and 

43


political institutions were sustained by kinship, gerontocracy and 

popular participation. 

The highest organ of deliberation and legislation was the Oha na 

Eze. This consisted of all adult males with the Eze presiding. But 

then the discussions were not only free, decisions have to be 

arrived at through a consensus of opinions on the matter. Infact the 

Oha na Eze to all intents and purposes served as an avenue through 

which the people could protest and object to policies perceived as 

blandly inimical to their interest and continued survival. This was 

because the Oha na Eze is the village general assembly. As such it 

was the people's Forum. The assembly also served as a check on the 

activities of the Ndichie (Council of Eiders) which is presided over 

by the Eze who was supposed to be the eldest. However his 

position within the council is like that of a primus inter-pares. In 

effect he could not impose his desires on the other members. 

Apart from the Oha na Eze there was also the Umunna (Kinship 

groups), the age grades Olu E'biri, titled societies and other 

societies such as the Umuada and the society of craftsmen. 

The Umunna, although the lowliest in the governmental power 

structure, it was nonetheless vital and quite important in the 

process of decision making which in itself was a culmination of 

deliberations and representations at various levels. All issues were 

discussed firstly at the level of the kinship group and the 

consensual decisions taken were then elaborated and articulated by 

the kinship leaders at the council of elders. Such was the 

importance and relevance of the kinship group that its input was 

seen as a pre-requisite for governance. What ever decision that was 

taken was communicated to the Oha na Eze wherein the final 

decisions were reached and settled. 

The execution of policy decisions was the responsibility of the Otu 

Ebiri. But they were an essential part of the administrative 

machinery. If they did not agree with a particular decision of the 

council of elders, they could refuse to implement the decision, 

44


protest against such a decision and generally constitute themselves 

into a pressure group to the Oha ha Eze. 

There was also the Ozo and Nze titled societies. Though they 

generally acted in an advisory capacity, they nonetheless 

constituted an important influence on the political process. Their 

opinions were important for high level decisions, and similarly for 

their roles in the settlement of disputes. Their power base arose 

from the reverence the Ibos have always had for industrious 

achievements, relentless pursuers of fame, successful people and 

the old who were regarded as sages and repository of wisdom. 

Thus their opinions were never treated as rivolous. 

Quite apart from this, there were the ritualistic rites and checks. 

There was A la the goddess of earth. The Ala was generally feared 

and revered by all. Perhaps more important was the Oracle of 

Chukwu at Arochukwu which exercised a predominant and 

considerable influence over the whole of Iboland regardless of 

clans or villages. Such was its influence that it extended to the 

Ibibios. For one thing it was the final court of appeal to which 

litigants and respondents came from far and wide and everyone 

respected its pronouncements. Again, there was the oracle of 

Agballa at Awka, this was eagerly sought by many Ibo for judicial 

decisions and for prosperity and all the good things of life. 

Apart from these major ones, there were in existence a gamut of 

community gods and priests, these were able to check and curb 

excesses within the system firstly because the small sizes of 

communities enhanced cohesion. Again most ritualistic 

pronouncements were backed with awe inspiring supernatural 

sanctions. The priests were thus able to regulate conflicts and 

administer sanctions and generally contributed to social 

equilibrium and stability. 

Such was the simple, egalitarian, libertarian and fraternal 

disposition and outlook of the Ibos and their sophisticated 

republicanism, that early chroniclers of African political praxis 

45


were so chagrined to find that the supposed natives have long been 

able to throwaway J .J. Rousseau's chains shackling man 

everywhere, and have left Hobbes and his solitary, nasty and 

brutish man in the state of nature, that they dubbed the Ibos 

variously as acephalous, stateless and derisively referred to the 

Ibos. Tivs, etc. as people with "no government". 

THE TIVS 

Like the Ibos the Ti vs were quite individualistic. The consequence 

was that the nature of political authority was highly segmentary, 

non hierarchical and non centralized. Infact such was the nature of 

the power structure that the conception of an executive 

chieftainship has no observable mode of reference within the Tiv's 

political arrangement. 

The Tiv society was organized into Septs. Within each Sept were 

kindred groups. a group of family or groups of families clans and 

or sub clans. The Uipaven could be regarded as the minimal 

community in terms of territorial space. The community's affairs 

were directed by the elder or leader. But then the position of the 

leader was not based on one variable but was based on merit, on 

achievement and possession of esoteric knowledge of ritualistic 

formalities. In essence the elder like most gerontocratic systems 

were the older generation who were reverred because of the 

intrinsic qualities old age was supposed to have vested in them. 

While the opinions of these elders were regarded with deference 

and cherished, it did not in any way bestow' any form of political 

authority on them-, For the egalitarian foundation of the Tiv's 

society did not posit of any hierarchical posture. Even then in times 

of crisis an elder was chosen to specifically act as the articulation of 

the collectivity's opinions, fears, prejudices, prides, and position. 

The wealthy members of the society were never invested with any 

form of political power and authority. Although in terms of social 

prestige, posture and influence they might lool:I1 large within the 

community, they were nonetheless whittled down to the size of 

everyone. Laura and Paul Bohannan in a very perceptive study of 

46


the Tivs observed that "Tiv egalitarianism was more concerned 

with whittling everyone down to the same size, and then with 

giving everyone the same chance". 

As such the "Tivs social engineering was one based on the 

principles of egalitarianism, liberty and equality. The persistence or 

the society was basically a function of several constraints placed on 

the cultivation and acquisition of political power and authority by 

any individual. Theirs was a complete: rejection of Hobbes most 

vaunted Leviathan. The nexus of and the rallying points of their 

political praxis was that of consensuality. Although opposition 

groups were extant within the system, they were expected to serve 

as the limiting factor on the plausibility of political power hijackers. 

The Tivs were more concerned with the presentation of a united 

front grafted on an egalitarian social structural arrangement. The 

tendency was towards the preservation of individual liberty. 

Submissions to the general will was supposed to be in the 

pursuance of a common goal. The submission was not to be 

obtained de-facto, dejure, tacitly or expressly, but by mutual 

sensibilities. The individualism and segmentation was not a 

determinant of the ability to conere when vital, rather it served as 

the rallying point because each individual recognized the 

sovereignty of other. Again another typical example of consensual 

politicking, political praxis hinged on the avoidance of oppositional 

politics, avoidance of bellicose and belligerent political competition. 

The overall effect was the production of a cohesive and integrated 

society. 

THE EFIKS 

The city states of the Efiks represented another interesting 

dimension in the apparently endless variations of the pre-colonial 

political system of present day Nigeria. The Efik were said to be 

ritualistic. Studies such as the works of Donald Simmons, Forde 

and Jones, Alagoa, Efiong Noah among others confirm the 

ritualistic but segmentary organization of the seven settlements 

47


inhabited by the Efik’s on the lower Calabar and Cross Rivers in the 

South-East of Nigeria. 

The basic social unit was the polygynous family. But then there was 

the Ufok (house), here you had male descendants of “a recent 

ancestor and all the slaves they owned”. The head of the Ufok was 

the oldest living male. At a macro level, the Efik settlements were 

usually divided into wards, each ward tallied with a larger body of 

patrilineally related men. 

At the level of socio-political organization, the typical Efik 

settlement was divided into age sets. Each set consisted of all men 

and women “born within a one-year period”. The social political 

responsibility of the age grades varied. Some were responsible for 

guard duties essentially to alert the community of an impending 

enemy attack, slave raids or slaves rebellions. Like a typical African 

society age was revered and the wisdom of old age was held in 

high esteem, as such while members of the same age grade could 

address each other by the term da, it was sacrilegious and 

abominable to call a member of an older set by this term. 

In terms of social classes it was common to distinguished the freeborns 

from the slaves. While the free borns were given all the 

natural rights and privileges. Certain restrictions were imposed on 

the rights of the slaves. For instance a slave could not aspire to 

membership in the upper echelon of the Ekpe society, he had not 

right to wear certain customary apparels, like velvet cloth. But then, 

descendants of a slave could acquire a free status by the third 

generation. By then he would be entitled to all the benefits of a free 

born. Even then, the slave was expected to be treated kindly insofar 

as he was not insolent, disobedient, guilty of theft, sorcery or 

adultery. 

The Efik settlement was usually under the control of a senior Obon. 

The Obon was usually highly ranked in the Ekpe society and usually 

headed the highest grade in the town. It was incumbent upon the 

Obon to enforce laws, adjudicate and settle disputes, led the army 

48


to war and arranged peace treaties when necessary. In a nutshell he 

was the head of the society. 

But them the activities of the Obon gained credence within the 

context of the Ekpe society. In practical terms, it was the Ekpe 

society (leopard society) that initiated laws ensured compliance 

and in important cases it adjudicated on protected properties, and 

helped in recovering debts. This particular function was quite 

important because the Efiks were essentially a trading people. The 

Ekpe society was therefore a fundamental institution of 

government. It was in practical terms the “actual executive 

government of the typical Efik settlement. 

Although the Ekpe was a secret society it fulfilled religious and 

social functions within the city states. Its paramount function was 

that of governance. Effiong Noah quoting Consul Beecroft observed 

that the Ekpe formed the legislative, the executive as well as the 

police establishment in the Calabar city states. In more specific 

terms the functions of the Ekpe society covered ordering civic duties 

like street cleaning and nightwatch. The authority of the society 

was in the same vein binding on all members of the Efik 

community. Effiong Noah cited the examples of King Eyo Honestly 

I, who was ruined by Ekpe fines inspite of his membership of the 

Ekpe society. 

The Ekpe society was made up of several grades, with each grade 

possessing a distinctive costume. Within the higher grades there 

were varying sub-divisions. Although membership was open to all 

inhabitants of the community, only the free born and the unbonded 

could ascend to the upper echelons, the slaves or the bonded were 

usually consigned to the lowest rungs. The wealth of an individual 

served as the surest ladder of ascension as that provided him with 

the resources to pay all the necessary fees. Inspite of this no 

individual regardless of his wealth could override the orders of 

Ekpe. Such orders were regarded as sacrosanct and inviolable. The 

execution of this order was never waived for the benefit of anyone, 

instances abound that attest to the placing of everyone on the same 

49


pedestal on such issues. There was the case of Dick Ephraim who 

was forced to pay his debt to captain Morgain in 1785. There was 

also the case of the case of the imposition of trade embargo on the 

British firm Guinea Company at Adoogbo in 1855 as a reprisal for 

the destruction of Old Town by the British Warship Antelope in 

1855. Again in 1856 the missionary compound at Duke Town was 

sealed off on the orders of the Egbo society. 

The enforcement of Ekpe instructions was the onerous 

responsibility of the Brass Ekpe. The Brass Ekpe was represented by 

Idem Ukwo a masquerade that was revered. 

In a nutshell the Efiks had a system of government that placed 

everybody on an equal footing and pedestal as far as compliance 

with societal norms and laws were concerned. Inspite of its 

gerontocractictraits, the youngest members of the community and 

even slaves had a say, by virtue of their membership of the Ekpe 

society. Nobody was allowed to arrogate powers to himself. There 

was no emphasis on oppositional politics. The dominant and 

observable trend gleanable from a familiarization with the 

historical documents on these societies was a tendency to function 

without the expendably avoidable practice of splitting society right 

down through the middle in the name of alternative government 

garbed in the epithet of opposition. Their society was able to persist 

and exist until the imperial forgers engineered the disequilibration 

of the extant social forces. 

PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES 

AROUND AFRICA: 

Having discussed the pre-colonial political structures of some 

societies in pre-colonial Nigeria, I shall linger a moment longer on 

pre-colonial structures by undertaking a very brief outline of the 

structural arrangements in some societies in Africa. The import of 

this is to show the peculiar trend towards the avoidance of 

oppositional politics, “the constitutionalisation of politics, the 

routinization of the conflict and the overall political praxis of 

50


consensual politics.” Towards this end I shall dwell on the 

structural arrangements of the Karmojong in the North Eastern 

district of Karamoja in present day Uganda in East Africa the Zulu 

in Southern Africa, and the Asanti in present day Ghana in West 

Africa. 

THE KARAMOJONG 

The political community of the Karamojong was structurally 

similar to the arrangement among the Ibos in Eastern Nigeria. 

There was the strong emphasis on non centralization of political 

power and authority. Decentralized though, the political system 

was quite authoritative. 

According to Gukiina in his study of Uganda, he noted that the 

Karamojong political community was actually a policy group that 

pursued certain values of, and actions based mainly on the 

common interests of its members. Again the members of the 

community “interact and have strong sense of oneness” on the 

basis of their commonly acknowledged individual rights, 

priviledges and obligations. These rights and priviledges like some 

sort of social creed and obey decisions of the elders as a group. So 

fundamental was this body of rights and priviledges that the 

violation of any amounted to a violation of the whole community 

and that was punishable only on the orders of the elders. 

The Karamonjong society was essentially a gerontocratic society in 

which case, political and social organizational structures were 

based on age. 

The society was divided into a series of age based corporate groups 

“interrelated in accordance with a set of general principles” Each 

age group consisted of all the men that partook in the initiation 

ceremony at a particular point in time. This was usually held every 

five or six years. In effect the oldest of these age groups became the 

source of political leadership and authority. The instructing maxim 

was the gerontocratic philosophy of ascribing infinite wisdom, 

51


maturity and deep seated understanding of “worldly matters” to 

age. As such the oldest age group was referred to as the Assembly 

of Elders. This assembly performed ritualistic functions such as 

serving as the medium of communication with the deity. The 

assembly was equally responsible for the negotiation and 

conclusion of war and peace treaties on behalf of the Karamojong 

society and the outside world. Again, only the assembly could 

resolve individual and group conflicts within the society with an 

air of authoritative finality. 

Above all, the assembly of elders was the legislature and the 

judicature within the society. All laws emanated from them and 

decisions were made by them on social issues. The Karamojong 

neither has a police force nor any such official organization. 

Decisions were enforced by the young men in the age group. 

Evidently such decision has to be socially acceptable to induce the 

young men to compel violators of social norms to abide by such 

decisions. The elders of course although cognizant of their ability to 

invoke the supernatural to enforce their decisions and the 

obligations of the junior age groups to carry out their decisions 

were, nonetheless, conscious of their social responsibilities towards 

the society. As such the emphasis was usually on consensus. 

Essentially the Karamojong demanded a total commitment of 

members to the values and policies of the group. This of course 

"provided the consensus on which the political system was based." 

Infact without a commitment to the values and policies of the 

Karamojong's there was no legitimate authority. In a nutshell the 

Karamojong's political experience was decentralized authority 

acquired through age and based on adherence to group policies 

and values reinforced by consensual approach to decision making. 

THE ASANTI KINGDOM 

The Asanti Kingdom was divided into villages. Each village was 

headed by an Odikro whose responsibility and powers in the village 

were to all intents and purposes purely administrative. Although 

he had power of adjudication in cases of dispute within his 

52


territorial jurisdiction. If his decision was considered unacceptable, 

unsatisfactory and unjust by the party/ies concerned they were at 

liberty to appeal to a higher authority (usually the Amahene). In the 

same vein if the Odikro’s handling of the village's affairs was high 

handed, draconian and a negation of the principles of social 

existence the villagers could protest. 

Each village was but a subordinate segment of the divisions within 

the Kingdom. Each of these divisions was under the jurisdiction of 

a divisional head - the Amahene. The Amahene was appointed by 

the King - the Asantehene on the advice of the – Asante - Man 

Council. The Amahene while exercising his control over the various 

villages and the Odikros under his jurisdiction was responsible to 

the Asantehene through the Asantehene council. But then under 

special circumstances he could seek direct and immediate audience 

with the A5antehene Again, the appellate powers of the Amahene 

over the villages was not final and could be challenged if his 

decisions were considered unaccepted to the parties concerned. 

The Asantehene was the religious and political head of the Asanti 

Kingdom. His position was comparable to that of the Alafin in the 

old Oyo Empire in Western Nigeria. Although the Asantehene was 

the head of the Kingdom, the supreme law making body was the 

Asanteman Council. Again the Asantehene must heed the advice of 

the A5anteman council in his governance of the kingdom. He could 

only ignore the advice at his own peril. The general impression one 

gets is that of an intricate system of checks and balances from the 

village administrator to the King and more often than not decisions 

were arrived at on the basis of consensus. 

THE ZULU KINGDOM 

The Zulu nation in South Africa was yet another kingdom in which 

the propelling force behind the state craft was basically one of 

adherence to the basic tenets to checks and balances at the level of 

governance and civic duties and obligations. 

53


At the helm of affairs was the King. His position and terms of 

powers he enjoyed and wielded were similar to that of the Emir in 

Northern Nigeria. The king held all the land in trust for the people 

He was in charge of, and responsible for all the national magic in 

the country. Through such ritualistic functions the position of the 

King came to be associated with the possession of therapeutic 

powers capable of curing all ailments. Although in the execution of 

his magical duties he was assisted by professional and hereditary 

magicians, they were nonetheless under compulsion to teach the 

king their art. As such the performance of these functions was 

vested in the kingship. The king was also said to possess certain 

objects inherited from his ancestor and the welfare of the Zulu 

nation was said to depend on them. As such the Zulu King was 

supposed to care for the whole of the Zululand. 

In his administration of the Zululand the king was usually assisted 

by a Council of Chiefs (indunas). Two of these indunas were 

.preeminent over the others. One is the Commander of the King's 

Army and the other “the great indunas" was the Prime Minister. 

His opinions carried more weight in the discourse of public affairs 

in and out of the council. The king had to follow seriously the 

advice and suggestion of the indunas and if he chose to ignore such 

an advice the council was at liberty to seize one of his cattle. Infact 

the prosperity of the Zulu nation was believed to be inextricably 

hinged on the wisdom of the council and the strength of the 

councillors to criticize fairly the decisions of the king. To a void “a 

loss of face” on the part of the king he was required to table issues 

before the council for-discussion and after everyone had spoken he 

then stated his own opinion of the issue. However, inspite of this, 

the members were expected to defer to the king and express their 

criticisms not as strong opinions, but usually couched in "oblique 

phrases" laced with diplomatic languages. Again the discussion 

was usually rounded up by the king and a wise king usually 

heeded the advice I petitions or the majority. 

The king was the supreme court of the nation and ai1 appeals on 

cases decided by his chiefs went to him. In carrying out his 

54


functions he was aided by resident indunas well versed in law and 

logical reasoning. These were called the induna of cases izinduna 

Zamacala. They usually gave verdicts in the king's name. The 

overriding position of the King was the unquestionable need to 

maintain the customary laws of the land regardless of whose ox 

was gored. As such he must not decide against the law, although 

he could create a new la w if and when the situation demanded 

such. When his positions were unacceptable the king usually took 

refuge in a face saving position by retracting his erring positions 

and insisting that his induna did err without his knowledge and 

authority. 

In terms of general administration, it was very rare for the king to 

call a full meeting of the nation, he intimated himself with national 

wishes and aspirations through his council. If the king chose to be 

tyrannical he could be killed by his close relatives through 

poisoning and with the acquiescence of the people. The death of 

King Shaka at the hand of Diagne, and the latter's death through 

Mpande was done with the support of the people because of the 

oppression and tyrannical tendencies of the King. Mpande that was 

just, fair and generous ruled for long. As such the King was obliged 

to treat his people especially his brothers and chiefs with care and 

firm head for good government. Within the tribes that made up the 

Zulu nation the various chiefs were under the same moral code of 

governance. Infact the subjects of a tribe could complain to the king 

if their chiefs became tyrannical or high handed. Infact they 

reserved the rights to revolt against him but they must inform the 

king of their decisions. 

The Zulus again present a case of a well thought out political 

process and state craft hinged not on institutionalized opposition; 

but one that allowed for dissenting views and created room for 

amicable resolution of these views without having to split the 

nation right through the middle. Theirs was an irrevocable and a 

reverent belief in the ideals of consensual politics: One that denotes 

an irreverence for institutionalization of opposition and a smacking 

love for a "constitutionalization of politics." Their political praxis 

55


showed that to be successful, a nation need not resort to the 

utilization of extraneous variables like multipartism and its 

attendant paraphernalia. 

One is not talking of the absence of dissension or differences in 

opinion, but pre-colonial Africa apparently must have realised the 

dysfunctionalities of institutionalized opposition since rulers could 

be checked and were checked without necessarily forming an 

opposition. Decisions were made through a process that involved 

all and sundry. 

The second essential ingredient is the prevalence of consensual 

decision making process. Thus before decisions were taken in precolonial 

Africa the state officials with the paramount rulers 

disagreed to agree and agreed to disagree until they finally arrived 

at a conclusion. The decision arrived at determined the subsequent 

action of the paramount ruler, the council of state or his court of 

advisers. Taxes were collected with ease, state machinery were 

operated with finesse borne out .of an adept understanding of the 

intricacies of a system based on a consensual leadership. Again the 

element of institutionalized opposition was absent. 

COLONIALISM AND TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 

The contact of the progenitors of present day Nigerian people with 

the Portuguese traders in 1472 was the earliest reported European 

contact with our people. Other nations came calling with the 

development of overseas trade. Shortly after the abolition of slave 

trade by the British in 1807 the penetration of the hinterland began. 

Came 1861 the annexation of Lagos was effectuated ostensibly to 

suppress "the illegal slave trade" With the passage of the Berlin Act 

of 1885 and later Brussels Act of 1892, the open sesame of the 

scramble for and partition of Africa became the vogue, such that by 

1879 the U. A. C. was able to "open up” the Niger River and 

undertook the government of the interior. Within this context, the 

Oil Rivers protectorate was proclaimed in 1885 over most of the 

coastal territories from Lagos to the Cameroons. 

56


In a piecemeal (albeit cavalier) approach the hinterland wad 

gradually colonized culminating in the proclamation of the 

protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1900. The year 

1903 marked the official introduction of indirect rule to Northern 

Nigeria through the Emirs. Came 1906 Lagos was merged with 

Southern Nigeria. Finally in 1914 the Northern and Southern 

protectorates were amalgamated and Colonel Lugard became the 

first governor. 

Much as one does not desire to get entwined in the gamut of 

rationalizations that have been proffered as the motif force of 

colonial adventurism and the imperialists’ desire to “open up, a 

continent which contains one fifth of the earth’s land surface and 

one nineth of the world population and a civilization that dates 

back to thousands of years B.C. when ancient Greece sent her elites 

to Egypt to learn, I cannot but agree with Dame Margery Perham 

that the dominant cause was the hitherto, the world had no urgent 

need for Africa’s products. More so the “discovery” of America and 

the new fields of commerce in India more than satiated the 

economic pressure of the increasing population of Europe for new 

markets for a long time. 

The main issue of concern here is the degree of socio-economic and 

political disequilibrium and structural disarticulation the 

colonialists inflicted on the African psyche and left as their legacy. 

Because of their singleminded and unabashed pursuit of the 

imperialist goal of maximizing pay offs from the colonial 

territories, the British sought to graft their hegemony on the 

existing political super structure and the economic sub-structure. 

At the same time removing aspects they perceived prejudicial clogs 

in their supposed wheels of progress. The end result was a subtle 

re-organization of most communities on a different basis of 

legitimacy, plus the creation of power structures that were non 

synchronizable with the realities of natural development. 

57


The genera] underlying assumption of British Rule was that 

African consciousness was parochial in nature, and consequently 

that he should be ruled through his traditional rulers but with 

modifications here and there. The result was that traditional 

institutions especially in the centralized societies like Northern 

Nigeria, Native Councils were set up to advise the rulers. It was the 

addition of this native Councils to the structure of native 

administration that gave rise to the phenomenon of "Emir in 

Council". However, with the Native Court Proclamation of 1900 

and the Native Authority proclamation of 1907 plus a host of other 

proclamations, the area of authority of the respective Emirs got 

delimited.. But then, the Emirs became the sole native authority 

such that the councils that were organized to advise the Emir 

merely acted in purely deliberative and advisory capacity and he 

was not bound by their advice consequently the Emirs became 

autocrats, autocracy to their previous positions. 

More destabilising was the arbitrary delimitation of Emirates. 

Places formerly under the authority of a single Emir became full 

fledged Emirates. Emirs of such places were given constitutional 

status of first class chiefs. A reorganization of the tax system gave 

the Emirs an established and secure income without the "burden" 

of most of their responsibilities to the people. Overall the Emir's 

political power and authority over the judiciary conferred on them 

wide autocratic rulership. Thus, a gulf was created between them 

and their citizens. This autocratic and authoritarian rulership of the 

Emirs during this period has been chronicled by writers of various 

persuasions. C. F. Wright an Afro-American visitor to Northern 

Nigeria in 1943 commented thus:"No dictator ever had greater 

power than these black agents of British Colonial Rule.” 

In a similar vein F.W. de St Croix writing under the title The Fulani 

of Northern Nigeria in 1943 remarked thus: "The Emirs power over 

the whole province increased and in each district, the Chief 

became, and still is an absolute ruler in his own domain." Such was 

this unswerving dedication to the cannibalization of pre-colonial 

political institutions that when they could not find corresponding 

58


structures in areas like Kagoro they resorted to the appointment of 

Chiefs over the communities. This was of course met with stiff 

opposition, until the people were cowed or subdued. 

In both the East and the West the impact was very debilitating and 

disruptive. Here was a situation in which there were both 

categorical and conditional norms with which the rulers were 

required to con form. This served as a check on the excesses of the 

rulers. For instance it was both an obligatory and categorical norm 

in the Oyo empire, for the Alafin to consult the Oyomesi before 

taking decisions. Indeed a long as he consulted this body his 

decisions were deemed legitimate. Where he contradicted this 

norm, certain sanctions could be manipulated against him. These 

sanctions define the conditional norms which included the refusal 

to extend certain traditiona1 courtesy to the Alafin refusal to 

comply wit h his decisions, punishment or outright prosecution. 

However the colonialists not only reduced the efficacy o these 

sanctions but literally overthrew them. 

Thus, the various paramount rulers in other towns tended to 

depend primarily on their recognition by the colonial authorities. 

This was regardless of whether the chiefs had fulfilled other 

traditional requirements for the assumption of office. In a very real 

sense the majority of the paramount rulers (the Obas) were no 

longer exercising traditionally sanctioned powers. lnfact and in 

essence they became virtually dependent on the colonial; officers. 

In spite of losing their sovereignty to the colonial state, their 

powers (the Obas) over their subjects increased, since they were no 

longer restrained by the traditional system of checks and balances. 

The resultant development was the virtual erosion of the checks 

and balances system. 

Among the Ibos it was an unmitigated disaster in terms of 

structural disarticulation and social disorientation neglecting the 

sophisticated and highly refined republicanism of their political 

philosophy: and praxis. The British sought the imposition of 

warrant chiefs, investing them with powers and authority, 

59


patterned after the Emirs. For a people not used to such 

domineering directives, it was met with stiff opposition which was 

replied by the colonialists with greater violence. 

The situation soon generated a feeling of uneasiness in our 

traditi9nal system which gave rise to a situation wherein litigation 

were brought against the rulers from both the subjects and other 

rival lineages. Infact the previous traditional system of checks and 

balance attempted a self reassertion, for instance, the more the 

British official preferred to rely on a particular ruler, the more this 

colonialists were confronted with chieftaincy disputes, which in 

most cases generated I complex process of negotiations between 

factions and groups. 

Again, while the colonial district officials were in theory supposed 

to act in advisory capacity. as a result it was only in extreme circum 

stances were these advisers to give directives to the chiefs or even 

interfere with their exercise of power. However , t he history of the 

practice of colonialism as regards the native authority system 

reveals several instances of interference by these Colonial District 

Officers in the affairs of the Native Authorities and the chiefs. 

Infact in all instances, and to all intent and purposes the British 

Colonial officials acted as Supervisors rather than advisers. lnfact 

such were the activities of these colonial officers in the Western part 

of the country that one could not perceive the existence of a clear 

line of demarcation between advisory and supervisory roles. 

Again, in certain localities in the Eastern part of the country where 

the traditional basis of authority of the warrant chiefs were always 

questionable or where the chiefs had jurisdiction over small 

political units, the British officials interfered with such regularity as 

supervisors that, it was inconceivable to see them as advisers. 

The cumulative effect of this was total social disorientation, 

political disarticulation and psychological trauma for the citizens. 

With the power of the traditional rulers undermined and eroded, it 

meant the symbol of charismatic authority, and bastion of 

60


authority, reverence and respect were withered out of the peasants' 

eyes. 

One needs not be chagrined at this development because the 

colonial native administrative system was predicated on the 

administrative theory and philosophy of a militarized society. The 

implication of this is that the colonial officers like the district 

officers bestrode their districts in true military manner, such that 

the new power structure placed the colonial officers over and 

above the kings and chiefs in their domain. The effect on the 

citizens was doubly debilitating. Firstly, the masses have had their 

sensibilities sensitized to the mythical authority of their rulers as 

the companions of the gods, and their symbol of life and strength. 

In effect the humiliation of the kings and chiefs meant that the life 

of communities were humiliated and injured. As such the placing 

of the appointment and deposition of chiefs in the hand of the 

colonial officers meant that once the king or chief, was overthrown, 

the life symbol of the people was also overthrown. 

The magnitude of the colonial bastardization of our culture can be 

grasped when cognizance is taken of the fact that the citizens then 

were mainly peasants. Peasants the world over are regarded as the 

bulwark of conservatism. Such a violent dis-synchronization of 

their social order and socialization process would indisputably 

create a tumultuous psychological imbalance, such that it would be 

difficult for them to religiously adhere to the adoption of a system 

which they were not privy to its evolution but was suddenly 

imposed on them. 

The grave consequences of such a disruption no doubt still 

pervades our political behaviour, and our attitudinal disposition 

toward our traditional political institutions. 

Again the role of the citizens within the political process had to 

change. He was no longer the object of governance, but rather the 

subject of governance. His power to query bad policies, 

administrative abuse and all forms of governmental tyranny was 

61


circumscribed. He was now exhorted to obey a new body of laws 

he did not understand and yet he must assume these laws were 

benevolent and just. When the District Officer commanded, it was 

to be unwittingly obeyed am followed. To do otherwise was to 

embark on a perilous and risky journey which is any case ended 

with the Resident Officer who could be a demi-god himself and 

who to all appearances was not answerable to anyone but himself. 

Such was the thorough going socio-structural disarticulation, and 

mental disorientation of the citizens that in some cases, it became a 

source of psychological and psychic displeasure. In the centralized 

states the effect might have been cushioned due to years of central 

rulership. But within the non-centralized republican communities, 

it was unmistakably crystal clear that it was most irreconcilable 

with their political praxis. That was the basis of several of the 

revolts against a psychologically disorienting system. Notable 

amongst such violent reactions against an equally if not more 

violently enthroned structure, was the Aba women's protest of 

1929. 

At the other end, such militarized society merely created a 

managerial model calculated not only to produce a subject political 

culture, but an attitude of intolerance, non-participant culture and a 

directive obeying attitudinal disposition. Such was the success of 

this scheme that an incongruity soon developed between the new 

attitudinal dispositions that was being foi6ted on pre-existing 

structures. The cumulative effects of this, was the carryover of such 

confused and unsettling attitudinal disposition to the new 

structures and institutions that were entrenched. 

The concrete manifestation of the attitudinal disposition is aptly 

captured in the local colloquial expression of referring to official 

duty as "government work" on which sweat should not be shed. 

The colonial officers merely ruled but never reigned since their 

authority had no moral and traditional locus. As such they were 

excessively reliant on coercion and the cajoling of the people. As 

such the people were no longer objects of governance but merely 

subjects w ho must obey directives issued to them because it was in 

62


their best interest even if they thought otherwise. This of course 

meant that those who came to occupy civil service positions saw 

themselves as servicing an interest other than their own interest 

and that the only way they could service and promote their own 

interest was through the wages /salaries doled out to them. The 

other option was to assume a compradorial character in order to 

take effective care of the immediate and extended family. The 

perfect execution of this position without any fear of consequent 

reprisal led to an apish imitation and accretion of this by the 

private business outfits in present day Nigeria. Nowhere is this 

more evident than in the service sector. Where the junior staff in a 

true imitation of the civil service idiosyncrasy, have adopted the 

epithet of “it’s not my father’s work” as such to extract optimum 

efficiency, and higher productivity the workers has to be bullied 

coerced and cajoled into giving out the best that is in himself. 

Expectedly he fails to identify himself with the organization, its 

goals and objectives. As I said earlier on, he is an automaton 

obeying directives, when confronted with unpleasant alternatives 

he jettisons them when possible. As such he is generally 

obsequising plus the demand for an unconditional and unalloyed 

obedience from the Nigerian masses under colonialism, through 

their schools which extolled un-wavering docility as one of the 

keystones of civility, enabled the nascent political elite who 

assumed office at independence to enjoy the effortless exploitation 

of the people through their brigand politics. The effective 

absorption of such doctrines, injunctions and epithets of social 

conduct is almost always attenuated by the concrete reality 

confronting the masses. The more perceptive and articulate 

sections of the people finding it difficult to reconcile the trite 

abstract teachings with their existential reality have in few instance 

attempted to break out of the lethargy that psychological docility 

had placed them in. This in part, is the explanation for the pockets 

of resistance to the mindless exploitative appropriation of 

expropriated surpluses. However, because such resistance does not 

have a wide support base because the mien of the generality is that 

of an overwhelming resignatory fatalism, such resistances have 

been easily quashed with the effective mobilization of the coercive 

63


apparatuses of the state. That is why, of the three forms of power 

identified by Professor Keneth Galbraith in his Anatomy of Power 

viz: condign conditioned and compensatory power, political 

conflict resolution between the elites and the masses has more often 

than not been resolved through the resort to condign power. That is 

the demand that the masses accept the elites positions and subserve 

same or face unpleasant alternatives. This of course is typical of the 

militarized society where there is no legitimate political base for 

authority aside from the barrel of a gun. That perhaps has been 

why condign power has remained the context of political conflict 

resolutions in Nigeria ever since. 

Finally I must insist that mine is not an attempt at an over 

romanticization of an idyllic past, but rather to first show the 

culpability of the colonialists in ignoring the golden dictum Natural 

non Facit Saltum (nature makes no jump) and secondly to utilize the 

past in explaining our present predicament and in pointing to our 

future path. These two shall remain the focus of my discussions in 

the subsequent chapters of the book. 

64


W 

Chapter III 

Nigerian Constitutional Development 

ith his amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 

protectorates in 1914 Lugard not only appointed himself and 

got ratification for the appointment but equally created a legislative 

council based in Lagos. Its activities were confined to the South. 

Even then, it acted merely in an advisory capacity. This body 

functioned until 1916 when the Nigerian Council was created. 

Theoretically the scope of activities of the new Council was to 

extend to the North. In practical terms, only the Lieutenant 

Governor and a handful of Northern Residents were on the 

Council. 

The Council survived until 1922 when the Clifford Constitution 

was enacted and it constitutionally brought back the pre-1914 state 

of affairs, that is the North again constitutionally became a separate 

territory from the rest of Nigeria. 

Although both the North and the South were to be regarded as a 

single political unit for fiscal and budgetary purposes, again even 

though all legislations as it related to customs and excise duties and 

the criminal law were applicable in both protectorates, the 

Constitution specifically barred the newly created legislative 

council from “discussing bills of any description pertaining to the 

North without the express consent of the Governor”. 

Again, under the constitution the four elective seats were zones to 

the South excluding the North. Such was the absurdity of this 

separatist development and so thoroughly fenced off from the 

South was the North, that when Northern leaders came down 

South they were treated with utmost suspicion and they 

65


responded in like manner. As the Sardauna noted in his memoir, 

when he visited Lagos for the first time in 1939 it was with a lack of 

the comprehension, suspicion dissatisfaction and outright hostility 

that he perceived southern politics and politicians. There was no 

persistent hand of friendship and brotherhood stretched by 

Southern politicians either. Ahmadu Bello’s experience I must 

suggest has been the foundation of our one Nigeria. The British 

pushed this obviously absurd and negative divisive and separatist 

position for selfish imperial reasons that allowing minimum contact 

between the North and South would ensure that the “special 

identity of the North” was not contaminated by Southern 

politicians. This special identity was that of regarding the North as 

one monolithic feudal monarchy which enabled them to further 

Her Imperial Majesty’s interest without let or hindrance. 

However subsequent developments did not tally with their 

projections, for one thing as the storms of the Second World War 

were gathering, agitations for constitutional change in both Ngieria 

and the Gold Coast had reached such a level that it would be 

politically inexpedient to ignore or attempt to procrastinate further. 

A realization of the inevitability of the advent of a new Constitution 

prodded the then governor Sir Bernard Bourdillon to summon a 

meeting with Northern Chiefs to intimate them with the reality of 

the situation. Having done that Sir Bernard’s successor, Governor 

Arthur Richards continued along this line when he took over the 

reins of Nigeria in 1943. 

The 1946 Constitutional proposals were drafted by the Governor 

who did not deem it necessary to consult the majority of Nigerians 

on inputs. Afterwards it was debated for only one day in the 

legislative assembly and sent to the Imperial Parliament for 

approval and was eventually enacted on the 1 st of January 1947. 

The Constitution attempted a reversal of the 1922 Constitutional 

position by bringing the North into contact with the rest of Nigeria. 

Although the Constitution did divide Nigeria into three regions, 

they were merely for administrative purposes. The three regional 

houses established in the regions were empowered merely to 

66


discuss general legislations and a right to pass regional budgets. 

The members of the regional assemblies were to be selected from 

the existing native authorities. It was from the regional assemblies 

that five members each were selected for the centre. 

Reactions to the Constitution were of course a question of where 

you sit determining what you see. While Abubakar Imam the then 

editor of the Zaria based Nigerian Citizens, opined that “The people 

of the North are ready to accept any form of government, --- 

provided that it is not such as will upset the present system on 

which the government was built up”; for others it was a stratagem 

of divide and rule par excellence. Chief Awolowo, for instance said 

that although the Constitution still looked pretty and new, it had 

managed to retain some of the objectionable features of the old 

Constitution which it replaced, and had certain unsavoury 

characteristics of its own and generally fell short of expectation. 

For others the most offensive issue in the Constitution was the four 

obnoxious bills. These bills plus the rather cavalier manner in 

which Richard introduced his Constitution gingered the NCNC 

into action, touring the whole country to raise money to send a 

delegation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies over the 

Constitution. The tour coincided with a couple of demands for 

wage increase in the North, and the fact that the Emir of Kano 

while on a visit to Lagos was a victim of sectional remarks and 

abuse, plus the unsavoury comments of the NCNC delegates 

during the tour irked the Northern leaders. In reaction Tafawa 

Balewa specifically warned “that we will never co-operate with that 

gang of agitators who are not even sure of what they are doing”. 

Consequently like the late Professor Billy Dudley observed, the 

Constitution which was intended by its author to bring the peoples 

of Nigeria into closer unity and to foster the spirit of cooperation 

between them and instead revealed the wide gap which separated 

the Northern from the South if not exacerbating and widening this 

gap. In essence the Constitution that was initially expected to last 

for nine years with minor changes at the end of the third and sixth 

67


year displayed a high level of anachronism within the context of 

political advancement in the country. Everything so far bad worked 

for a constitution that further separated rather than integrating the 

component parts of Nigeria. 

Consequently by 1949 the process of fashioning a new constitution 

was set in motion. Sir John Macpherson took steps to ensure as 

wide an involvement of the Nigerian people as possible in this 

process. This was to involve discussions even at the village levels. 

However and most unfortunately for the political future of the 

country, geo-political wrangling that were let loose at the 

provincial conferences in Zaria, Kaduna, Ibadan, Enugu and the 

General Conference at Lagos were to mar logical reasoning and 

rational inputs vital to the production of a viable and integrative 

Constitution. 

The Constitution in itself was riddled with contradictory 

provisions. While it devolved a degree of autonomy on the regions 

as regards the control of their internal affairs, they were made 

subject to the approval of the House of Representatives at the 

Federal level. 

Such rigid and complicated arrangements that bedeviled the 

Constitution led to reactions from all quarters. Chief Awolowo 

described the Constitution as a wretched compromise between 

unitarism and federalism. These lapse conspired with unfortunate 

developments to cripple the workability of this Constitution after 

only two years of operations. Disagreements over the question of 

independence actually sounded the death knell of the Constitution. 

On March 31 st 1953 Chief Anthony Eromonsele Enahoro, an Action 

Group back bencher moved a motion in the House of 

Representative “that this House accepts as a primary political 

objective the attainment of self government for Nigeria in 1956”. 

The Northern members of the house felt the remark was directed at 

them. The Sardauna on behalf of the NPC sought an amendment 

substituting “in 1956” for in effect as soon as practicable”. Insisting 

that the Northerners “were not ready to accept this open invitation 

68


to commit suicide”. He then remarked that “the mistake of 1914 has 

come to light and I like to go no further”. Sensing the possibility of 

adopting the proposed Northern sponsored amendment the 

Southern members promptly staged a walk out of the house. As a 

step further the Action Group Ministers, Bode Thomas. S. L. 

Akintola, Arthur Prest, Oba Adesoji Aderemi resigned their 

portfolions. The public was then informed of the supposedly 

reactionary and unprogressive stance of the Northerners. The 

Northern members were then subjected to public opprobrium and 

ridicule, they then boarded a special train back home vowing never 

to have any dealing with the South. They also drew up the Eight 

point programme which if implemented would have been 

secessionist. The House was adjourned sine die. The northern 

legislature made up of the house of assembly and house of chiefs 

(consisting of the northern members of the House of 

Representatives) drew up the eight point programme. 

The separate development policy of the past did not allow for 

mutual understanding and appreciation of one another. It should 

not have been difficult to appreciate the position of the Northern 

representatives at the time. In the first place, this was a region with 

a civil service dominated by non indigences. Secondary when 

compared to the other two regions, it was disadvantaged in terms 

of western education. This was compounded by an obvious low 

level of capital formation. It was only natural that they feel ill 

prepared to carry the burden of independence at that time. Their 

reactions of course, would have been influenced by the basic 

distrust of the Southerners that the British had inculcated in them 

and for which neither the Southerners nor the Northerners had 

done much to remove. 

The Southerners unmindful of the reaction and believing that the 

position of the Northern leaders were unrepresentative of the viewpoint 

of the Northern public organized a tour of the North. As 

Professor Dudley noted in his book: Parties and politics in 

Northern Nigeria “The end result of the tour was the Kano Riots of 

May 1953 which raged like an inferno for three days leaving in its 

69


wake 36 dead, 241 wounded and the loss of properties 

conservatively valued at ten thousand four hundred and eighteen 

pounds”. This coupled with the simmering crisis in the East 

culminated in the dissolution of the legislatures in the country. 

This was followed by the constitutional conferences convened in 

London and Lagos between July 1953 and January 1954. 

At the end of the 1954 constitutional conference in Lagos, the 

following decisions were taken: 

A) The acceptance in principle of the recommendation of the 

then fiscal Commissioner, Sir Louis Chick, as regards the 

question of the revenue allocation. 

B) The regionalization of the Judiciary and the public Service. 

C) The concession of an autonomous status to the Southern 

Cameroons. 

These decisions plus the positions earlier on adopted during the 

1953 Constitutional Conference were clearly the progenitor of the 

provisions of the Oliver Lyttleton Constitution of October 1954. 

Given the importance of this Constitution and its latter day 

implications, I shall be a bit elaborate in enumerating its provisions, 

such that we can discern how the Constitution can be seen as the 

actual genesis of our failure so far to realize an integrative 

constitutional arrangement that can foster national development. 

PROVISIONS OF THE 1954 CONSTITUTION: 

(A) 

REGIONAL AND FEDERAL LEGISLATORS: Taking 

cognizance of the federal principle, the Constitution 

provided for the usual three legislative lists viz exclusive 

legislative lists, concurrent and residual. Based on the 

deliberations and positions taken during the preceding 

Constitutional conferences the regional legislatures were 

70


given more powers than they previously enjoyed. For 

instance, the regional assemblies no longer required the 

consent of the Federal legislature before passing a bill into 

law. Most importantly and very crucial for latter 

developments was the devolution of more powers to the 

regions than the Central legislature. This particular aspect 

gave prominence to centrifugal rather than centripetal 

forces. In essence the constitution encouraged separatism 

and thereby weakened the chances for the realization of 

national integration. 

(B) 

(C) 

REGIONALIZATION:- Perhaps as a corollary to the 

increase in regional legislative powers. The Constitution 

regionalized the judiciary, the public service commission, 

the civil services, marketing boards, the cabinets and 

development planning. In the words of Professor Oyeleye 

Oyediran “only the Army, Federal Civil Service and the 

Foreign Service remained as genuine national institutions”. 

PRIMEMINISTERIALSHIP:- Surprisingly, the Constitution 

failed to provide for the office of a Prime Minister at the 

Federal level. It was not until 1957 that the office of the 

Prime Minister was created. Between 1954 and 1957, the 

Governor General assisted by a council of ministers 

remained in charge. 

(D) CENTRAL LEGISLATURE:- At the Federal level, the 

Constitution created only one chamber of parliament viz: 

The House of Representatives. Out of the 184 members, 92 

seats, were zoned to the north, 42 to the West, 42 to the east, 

6 to the Southern Cameroons, 2 to the “Federal Territory of 

Lagos” three ex-officio members and the speaker. 

(E) 

THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS:- Given the 

absence of a second chamber at the Federal level the need for 

an organ to give equal representation to the regions was 

glaring. Especially as this remains one of the fundamentals 

71


of the federal system. Perhaps in a bid to satisfy this 

condition, the 1954 constitution created a council of 

ministers in which each of the three regions presented three 

ministers and three officials respectively. These ministers 

and the officials were to be appointed by the Governor- 

General based on the advice of the Regional Executive 

Councils. But then the ministers must be members of the 

central legislature i.e. Federal House of Representative. 

Given the nature of their appointment it was natural that the 

loyalty of the ministers would be to their respective regional 

executive councils rather than to the federal executive 

council since they owed their posts to the recommendations 

of the regional councils. 

There were other provisions such as the elimination of official 

members from the legislature, the creation of regional premiers, etc. 

But these in the main were predicated on and ancillary to the major 

ones I have highlighted above. 

In a nutshell the new dispensation firmed up the introduction of 

government into Nigeria. This constitution in the words of an 

observer “was the kernel of all further constitutional changes which 

culminated in the establishment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 

on October 1 st , 1963”. Undeniably the constitution concretized 

regional power as the pivot of political power relationship. The 

consequences of this for the political future was aptly summed up 

by Oyeleye Oyediran who in his contribution to Nigerian 

Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-79, observed thus: 

If anything some of these amendments intensified the strains which 

existed not only between the centre and the regions, but between 

the regions and even communities within each region. In order 

words not only did the separateness continue beyond 

independence, worse still it added in its development profoundly 

serious strains and stresses. These additional elements converged 

to destroy respect for constitutionalism and the rules of the game. 

72


From our discussion so far, one recurring decimal of political praxis 

that stands out like a sore thumb has been sectional and ethnic 

rivalry and chauvinism which manifested itself in strong 

regionalism. This is why even a first year student of Nigerian 

politics will say, without battlings an eyelid that the bane of 

Nigerian politics is ethnicity. That ethnic politics has been the 

linchpin of our political praxis is not in doubt, what in most cases 

remains foggy is the rationale behind our inability to transcend 

such a situation. 

Some will argue that the very fact of our cultural diversity, 

different historical background etc. and again the imposed union 

by the colonialists have made the ethnic situation an inevitable and 

natural phenomenon. Two basic observations are in order here. 

Firstly, the usually bandied artificiality of the Nigerian nation-state 

is neither peculiar to Nigeria, not to the rest of Africa. Most 

European states and several other states in the world did not derive 

their boundaries by themselves. The boundaries in a number of 

instances were forced by external powers as remains the case in 

East and West Germany as well as North and South Korea. 

Secondly, the multiplicity of languages and ethnic groups are not 

African preserves. Out of the 36 countries in Europe, seven are 

multilingual connoting multi ethnicity. In France besides the 

French, the Italians and the Germans. In Canada there are English 

Canadians and French Canadians. One can cite innumerable 

examples like the U.S.S.R. India, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and 

even the United States around separate social identities being 

incompatible with an overriding collective identity or the absence 

of a common bond between the different nationalities making up 

the Nigerian nation state. These other nations have created 

common bonds and we should not and cannot do less. 

The only rational explanation for the pervasiveness of ethnic 

politics lies firstly in the stratagem of divide and rule executed with 

finesse to absurd levels by the British during their colonial 

rulership. This, of course, created enough leeway for the nascent 

leaders who upon assumption of office practiced prebendal politics 

73


of sustaining themselves in office through dispensation of largesse 

and patronage from the public treasury and who when faced with 

the possibility of public exposure invoked the thin spectre of 

ethnicity no only to cover their misdeeds but equally to develop a 

symbiotic relationship between themselves and the mass of the 

citizenry. 

Much as one might be inclined to agree that our basic differing 

social identities are quite capable of generating separatist 

tendencies and ethnic rivalry, I cannot but agree with the late Prof. 

Dudley that the Nigerian state like most of the African states can be 

described by Ibn Khaldun’s power state and that the function of the 

power state is the extension of its binding force, the subsumption of 

differing social identities under a dominant collective identity 

through the use of force and coercion or through the creation of 

linkages between the separate social identities. The most effective 

way of achieving this goal to my mind lies not in the legitimating of 

the present power structure but in the elimination of the pliable 

and veritable avenue through which the divisive tendencies have 

been orchestrated over the years. I shall dwell further on this in the 

latter part of this book. 

COLONIALISM, ETHNICITY AND REGIONAZATION OF 

POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA 

Indisputably the emergence of party politics in Nigeria was a 

creation of colonialism. The introduction of the elective principle in 

the 1922 Constitution led to the creation of Herbert Macaulay’s 

Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P) which put up 

candidates for the four electives seats to the legislative Council. 

Because the elective seats were restricted to the South, the N.N.D.P. 

never bothered to extend its activities to the North in fact the 

N.N.D.P. restricted its activities to Lagos where three of the seats 

were and never bothered about the one seat in calabar. The 

situation persisted until the late 1930s, when the Nigerian Youth 

November (N.Y.M.) successfully overthrew the N.N.D.P. in the 

election to the Lagos Town Council. The N.Y.M at this stage was 

74


truly a national movement, with branches in several cities in the 

South and Kano, Zaria, Jos and Kaduna. However the imbroglio 

generated over the nomination of a replacement for Kofo Abayomi 

on the legislative Council split the party leaving it with an almost 

entirely Yoruba Membership and thus began the political tension 

between the Ibo and Yorubas that has plagued Nigerian politics 

ever since. This ethnic tension which was generated because of the 

struggles for political office within the colonial structure was 

eventually exacerbated and manipulated to the extent that it 

transcended the political scene and became extended to almost 

every meeting between the two groups. 

The repercussion of this development was that future political 

alliances were affected by it. Thus it was not surprising but 

unhelpful for national unity and integration that by the time the 

Action Group was officially launched in March 1951 it emerged as 

a champion of Yoruba nationalism, much in line with the tenets of 

its progenitor the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which was effectively 

founded in 1948. Consequently, according to an observer the A.G. 

tended to work through the Oba and local men of property. In 

terms of leadership, basis of support and political philosophy the 

A. G. was predominantly a Yoruba part. 

Initially the N.C.N.C. had a broad national outlook, but with the 

pervasiveness of ethnic politics shaping the nature of political 

competition, and in order to give the party a power base in the geopolitical 

game it began making extensive use of tribal unions like 

the Ibo State Union, such that by 1948 the signs were unmistakably 

clear that in terms of leadership and support it was a 

predominantly Igbo political party. The defeat of Zik in his bid to 

enter the house of representatives in 1951 and the fact that he was 

robbed of his hard earned victory in the West finally se t the party 

on the irrevocable course of a tribal party. 

The British Colonialists for several selfish reasons had ali along 

displayed an irreverent commitment towards preserving what 

dame Margery Perham called the “very special identity of the 

75


North”. This undoubtedly meant the prevention of the Emirs and 

the North from the unregulated influence of the South and 

consequently a separatist development. Unfortunately this policy 

was hardly consistent with a rapidly changing Nigeria. Moreso the 

iron curtain between the North and the South could not withstand 

the forces of Western civilization that was creeping further and 

further north. But the policy of divide and rule had already 

established a feeling of mutual distrust and suspicion between the 

Northern and Southern political elites. This situation was such that 

by the time the N.C.N.C. delegation which toured the North to 

solicit human and material support for the abrogation of the 

Richards Constitution, began their campaign most of their remarks 

were seen as directed against the conservatism of the northern 

political elite. The late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was to threaten 

that if the Southerners did not desist form their unsavoury 

comments and attacks on the north, they (the North) would have 

no choice but to continue the “interrupted conquest to the sea” – 

that is to the South. 

It was therefore only natural that the Jam’iy – yar Mutanen Arewa a 

pan-Northern cultural organization of predominantly conservative 

malams, “basically interest in securing cautious reforms imposed 

from above by benevolent autocrats and at the same time in 

stimulating a sense of Northern identity” metamorphosed through 

“an hastily formed alliance by conservative nationalists and the 

Filanigida (the traditional ruling class within the former Fulani 

Empire) to a political party, the N.P.C.” partly in response to the 

emergence of ethnic politics and nationalism in the South. The 

main concern was the preservation of an ostensibly monolithic 

Northern identity and to counter the threat posed by the 

remarkable victories of the more radical Northern Elements 

Progressive Union in the Kano elections. Thus with moderate 

administrative, if not financial support from the British colonial 

officials, the N.P.C. began its own share of the divisive and brigand 

politics already started by its southern counterparts. 

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The process of drawing up the Macpherson Constitution was to 

later turn to a breeding ground for volatile and petty geo-political 

emotions and separatist tendencies. 

A strong and almost permanently damaging north-south 

dichotomy pervaded positions on most of the issues. For instance 

while the Northern delegation were insistent on their demand for a 

50% representation at the Central legislature and per capita 

division of tax revenue, the South was unanimous in their rejection 

of both demands. Such was the situation that the Emirs of Katsina 

and Zaria threatened that unless the North was given half of the 

seats in the proposed House of representatives they would prefer 

being separated from the rest of Nigeria on the basis of the 

arrangement before 1914. 

Within the South as we noted earlier on, there was ethnic rivalry 

between the Yorubas symbolized by the A. G. and the Ibos 

symbolized by the N.C.N.C. this was to gain further political preeminence 

during the selection of representatives form the Western 

Regional Assembly to the Federal House in 1951. The A. G. in the 

Western region maneuvered and manipulated some members of 

the non-cohesive and not-so-tightly controlled N.C.N.C team 

representing Lagos to stifle the ambition of Zik to be nominated 

into the Federal House. This undoubtedly precipitated disparaging 

ethnic commentaries form supporters of both parties. What in more 

stable and settled societies would by convention no be practiced 

became the order of the day and were being explained off as 

political party rivalry and constitutional inadequacy. This 

ungamely act was perceived as treachery by the losers. The 

consequences of the impropriety are still with us till today. 

Again around 1950, agitations for the creation of a Benin-Delta 

region had started to gather momentum such that it became a 

strong political factor in the 1954 election. To redeem its losses and 

recoup lost grounds, the A.G. Sponsored a private member motion 

in the Western House of Assembly for the creation of the Mid-West 

region. This was to serve as an inducement for other groups 

77


interested in state creations nationwide. Expectedly between 1956 

and 1958 the U.M.B.C. and the Ilorin Talaka Parapo which were 

clamouring for the creation of a middle belt state and the transfer of 

Ilorin province to the Western region respectively, and the Bornu 

Youth Movement interested in the creation of Borno State all went 

into various alliances with the A.G. In the same vein the United 

national Independence Party, clamouring for the creation of the 

Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) region went into an alliance with the 

Action Group. 

The twin implications of this was reflected in the official position of 

the N.C.N.C. which said that “the East cannot stand 

dismemberment as a sacrifice either for administrative convenience 

or for national unity. More so since the demand for the creation of 

COR was motivated by a negative dislike for the Ibo tribe”. Also in 

the North, the NPC was unequivocal in its stance that on no 

condition was the North to be split open to Southern intrusion and 

influence. 

Basically therefore, a move to correct the structural imbalance in 

the evolving federal system had to be smothered through ethnically 

chauvinistic arguments cooked up to ensure party dominance in 

each region. The failure of the British, to assuage the thirst for the 

creation of some of these regions, on the flimsy excuse that the 

regions would not be viable was more in line with the terms of 

reference of the Willink Commission, which said inter alia: “If and 

only if no other solution is possible to meet the fears of the minority 

should as a last resort, detailed recommendations be made for 

creation of more regions. Quite naturally, the Commission 

recommended against the creation of more regions. 

Since the agitations for the creation of regions did not abate, the 

British had to black-mail the Nigerian leaders at the 1958 

Conference that creation of more regions meant postponement of 

independence. Consequently the campaign for the 1959 federal 

election revolved around creation of more regions. With each 

78


statement and counter statement being reduced and rationalized in 

the dirty puddle of ethnicity. 

Along the same line, the motion for self government in 1956 which 

was moved in 1953 by Anthony Enahoro was reduced to a question 

of a plausible means of ethnic domination. With each statement and 

counter statement being reduced and rationalized in the dirty 

puddle ethnicity. Such was the pervasiveness of ethnic solidarity 

and alliances that at independence the nation and its three major 

political parties were not more than separate nations merely cohabiting 

until the final conflagration in 1966. 

Ordinarily, one would have expected that after thirteen years of 

military rule, during which as a nation, we fought a war of national 

Unity for thirty months, old political alliances would have been 

broken and new, more enduring and broad based alliances would 

have been formed. However the 1979 elections merely indicated 

that the ethnic allegiances and bases of the First Republic parties 

merely laid in waiting to be resuscitated. The nature of political 

competition and voting pattern merely followed the same old 

pattern by and large exploring and exploiting ethnics differences 

along the way. Thus compounding the problems of national 

integration and development and confirming the observations of 

P.C. Lloyd in his Article. “The Ethnic background to the Nigerian 

Civil War, “that Nigeria’s problem derives in large measure from 

the tensions which have arisen between that larger ethnic groups” 

and that “the hostility derives not from ethnic differences, but from 

competition between peoples of wealth and power”. 

79


T 

Chapter IV 

Nigeria Today 

he brigand nature of political competition and state 

administration in Nigeria since 1948 has successfully reduced 

politics and administration to intra elite squabbles and 

manipulation. The total devotion to this macabre politics has 

unwittingly turned Nigeria into an odd paradox in several respects. 

H ere is a country generously blessed with resources (both human 

and material), yet she has not been able to effective tackle and 

reduce the dysfunctionalities of underdevelopment. With the most 

innovative, and largest body of educated men and women in 

Africa, yet poverty amidst great wealth {both potential and 

present), ignorance, disease and squalor waste, corruption and 

gross indiscipline etc., remain the hall mark of our social life. 

The cumulative effect of this on the society are multidimensional, 

for instance if we agree with Dudley Seers, that the question to ask 

about a country's development are three: what has been happening 

to poverty unemployment and inequality. If all these have 

declined from high levels, this has been a period of development 

for the country concerned. I sincerely doubt if in 1989 and Nigerian 

can answer the above questions saying poverty, hunger, 

unemployment and inequality have declined progressively. 

1n their quest f or personal aggrandizement; Nigerian elites have 

always favoured prebendal politics at the expense of a more mass 

oriented and stability inducing political game. 

80


Naturally, the mass of the people are conveniently neglected and 

forgotten. They are inconsequential in the scheme of things except 

to be used. On those rare occasions when the dire need for the 

masses to provide an aura of legitimacy arises, contacts are usually 

made through appeals to primary loyalties and through the 

deployment of ersatz ideologies. The consequences of course, are 

that such appeal to ethnic sensibilities, boundary allegiance, 

linguistic affinities and ethno-religious sentiments, ensure that 

matters of principle are resolved in the most unprincipled manner. 

While this enables the elites to develop a symbiotic relationship 

with h the masses, the country appears disjointed, adrift, and 

almost always on the brink of total collapse. In spite of this, the 

obscene rich engage in their favourite pastime - conspicuous 

consumption, which is usually practiced to a level that would make 

anyone with an austere culinary taste puke in revulsion. Is it in 

order to hoodwink and pacify the masses from unguarded outrage 

that they (elites) then try to bribe their way through tokenry, 

euphemistically called charities and donations As a necessary 

complement the elites then regurgitate the trite ethno-nationalist 

appeal which assures them of constantly sale mass ethno-regional 

support. 

Conceivably the focus is almost on perfection of an effective and 

lawless spoils distribution system. Genuine issues of national 

integration and development are usually relegated to the 

background as long as it does not yield enough avenues of corrupt 

enrichment. Enabling the elite to raise mediocrity to the pedestal of 

a political dogma, corrupt practices thus gain a free rein and 

assume unbelievable dimensions. The consequent systemic 

paralysis destroys the effective orientation of the masses, while 

social values ate surreptitiously inverted. 

The epiphenomena of such social drift is the promotion of 

centrifugal, antidemocratic forces and social apathy. These divisive 

tendencies are multi-farious and multi-faceted but I shall restrict 

myself to a topical few in this discourse on national affairs. 

81


THE GAP BETWEEN THE RICH AND THE POOR 

That Nigeria is enormously potentially wealthy and currently 

reasonably wealthy is not in doubt. In fact such is the level of the 

country’s wealth and resources, that one can justifiably feel giddy 

with heady optimism. However our existential reality is one in 

which most of our citizens cannot be sure of two square meals per 

day. What is more alarming is the geometrical rate at which the gap 

between the obscene rich and the pathetically poor widens. 

Indisputably inequality is an innate phenomenon. At the same 

time, the essence of society is to reduce the vagaries of such an 

existence. The alarming hiatus between the two groups is fast 

becoming a gulf. This has been accentuated, because the intra elite 

squabbles over the pillaging of public funds has meant inability to 

fund mass oriented welfare programmes. The literal translation of 

this on the part of the poor has been the high incidence of 

malnutrition and debilitating diseases like kwashiorkor, diarrhea 

etc. Since poverty, ignorance, disease and squalor are never strange 

bed fellows, the problems of the poor becomes compounded and 

more aggravated. 

Meanwhile, the obscene rich elites continue a flagrant and 

unrestrained assault on moral values through their macabre taste. 

The consequence of such ribaldry assault on social norms, on the 

entire society is the odious and noxious debt bomb that is now 

asphyxiating our development efforts. 

As I noted in an earlier work 1 the life style of the elites and 

rulership has helped to undermine our resource base. Right from 

the ascension to power after colonial rule, the new leaders which 

came into power chanting the campaign slogan “Life More 

Abundant” were determined to provide a concrete example of 

what this meant. They swapped their small sized British built cars 

for large and more imposing American models. They then latched 

1 See, Africa in Perspective: Myths and Realities (New York: Council on Foreign 

relations, 1987). 

82


on to a veritable spending fever. With the leaders in such a “life 

more abundant mood.” Genuflection and immutability of the elite 

meant that their followers could hardly be expected to be in a hard 

working mood. They also developed the “highlife” and quick 

money making mood. Thus begun the open sesame for corruption 

and inefficiency. So pervasive and persistently nauseating were 

these social malaise that between 1975 and 1979 we were forced to 

deal’ severely with corruption and inefficiency. We dismissed over 

10,000 public servants, recovering ill gotten gains of political office 

holders and civil servants, but then the disease merely remained 

dormant. It will be instructive today to find out how many of the 

prosperities recovered then, and after that did the bureaucracy take 

action to revert their ownership in the governments concerned. At 

the earliest opportunity, with the resumption of party politics, the 

disease spread with greater virulence than ever before, inspite of 

our pre-emptive effort to stem the tide of such development by 

financing reasonable political party activities during election 

campaigns. Once we left the scene, it became obvious that most 

political parties had borrowed heavily to supplement public 

funding provide during the first election. Quite naturally they 

literally went on rampage upon assumption of office in a manner 

that suggested that they were making up for lost time. 

RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS 

Corrupt practices of the elite engendered the need to mythologize 

and mystify the political process in the country. This particular 

need has meant an incessant resort to fanning the embers of 

religious disunity. This has manifested in the encouragement of the 

masses to perceive themselves first and foremost, either as a 

Christian or a Muslim. This again has been made to conveniently 

coincide with ethnic boundaries. Thus it is not uncommon to her 

talks of the “Muslim North” and the “Christian South”. In order to 

create some sort of political base of operation posts, the elites have 

conveniently engaged in religious demagoguery by inculcating in 

the masses the need for a stout defence of their religious beliefs. 

This they usually insist can only be done when either a Christian or 

83


a Muslim co-competitor is not allowed control or incursion into a 

predominantly Muslim co-competitor is not allowed control or 

incursion into a predominantly Muslim or Christian section of the 

country. The usually bandied hollow and disruptive argument is 

that the acceptance of a person with religious belief other than 

theirs is bound to disrupt the social equilibrium they are presently 

enjoying and that they might be coerced into a new religious belief. 

This is of course banal as well as dubious, it only serves to further 

their effortless exploitation of the masses. At a macro level this has 

tended to promote a feeling of distrust, and suspicion, nonaccommodation 

and strong religious intolerance. The only 

beneficiaries from this unpleasant socio-political climate of course 

are the politicians and the elites who thrive best in a situation of 

chaos. This religious rivalry is not only promoted but benignly 

ignored as a potential source of political disintegration. Thus when 

conflagration erupts as a result of this atmosphere of religious 

intolerance, rationalization is sought incensed the other into violent 

reaction and the consequent reprisal. The unfortunate aspect of this 

is the questioning of the very fundamentals of our corporate 

existence as a nation. While the manipulators of religious 

differences are given the dubious title of sectional or religious 

differences are given the dubious title of sectional or religious 

champions and heroes. Again non-integrative and divisive 

attitudinal orientation and disposition is given the needed impetus 

to keep us apart. Religion must not be anything but a personal 

issue. It must not be raised in pitch, preaching, or practice to the 

level of destruction of the fabrics of the society. 

LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 

Closely related to the issues of religious difference is the pliable 

instrument that language and cultural differences has become in 

the hands of the master manipulators. The elites through a cheap 

resort to demagoguery and blatant disregard of historical facts 

have in their shrill and arresting voices insisted that prior to 

colonialism there was no linguistic affinities and cultural 

affiliations between the nationalities which constitute present day 

84


Nigeria. In essence they argue, that eh acceptance and absorption of 

the cultural traits and language of one nationality by the other 

implies an erasure of the unique identity of that group. 

Familiarization with pre-colonial Nigerian history shows the 

paucity and the deceitful nature of such an argument. 

In Nigeria prior to the advent of colonialism, increased 

transmission of cross cultural fertilization of ideas through reasons 

of extensive communication network and trade created a solid 

linkage between the peoples of the various nationalities. For 

example between the 13 th century when Islam was introduce into 

Northern Nigeria and the middle of the 19 th century when it began 

its Southward spread, it had created a common political culture 

and way of life for much of the area that became Northern Nigeria. 

Infact by the 20 th Century it had spread beyond the banks of River 

Niger, penetrating into large areas of the Yoruba Kingdom. At the 

same time Hausa language not only grew in importance, it also 

became the linking factor between people of various nationalities, 

even the Fulani conquerors themselves became Hausa speaking as 

time went by 

Inter-national conflicts and wars, aided by migration and trade 

began a systematic but natural blurring of the sharp edges of 

division between various culture areas. A concrete testimony to this 

development is to take a closer look at the boundaries of culture 

areas formed by the Ibo and Edo speaking peoples on the one hand 

and Yoruba and Edo on the other. 

Once you move away from the Yoruba core areas towards the core 

of the Edo culture area of the thin dividing line becomes less and 

less obvious until on is left with an admixture of both. In the same 

vein the inhabitants of the periphery of Yoruba culture area speak a 

Yoruba language which ahs more than just a sprinkle of Edo. This 

is more pronounced in the case of the Akure and Ondo people. 

Such a trend is also discernible when it is noted that the inhabitants 

of Akoko Edo district at the periphery of the Edo culture area also 

have a considerable accretion of Yoruba in their language. In a 

85


similar vein E.J. Alagoa in his contributions to the Groundwork of 

Nigerian History observed that linguistic affinities suggest that the 

peoples inhabiting the territory watered by the Cross and Qua-Ibo 

Rivers formed a cultural continuum with the peoples of the Central 

Benue valley. 

This cross diffusion is also apparent between the Ibo and Edo 

culture areas, moving eastwards towards the Niger and the Ibo 

culture area. 

The moving North of the Ibo culture area in the periphery 

especially around the Nsukka district the Ibo language spoken has 

more than just a sprinkle of Igala. One can deduce same for several 

nationalities in Nigeria or how else might one explain the existence 

of predominantly Muslim communities in the Northern part of the 

present Bendel State. The cumulative effect of this according to that 

erudite scholar of Nigerian politics, the late Professor Billy Dudley 

was that “by the beginning of the 20 th Century the diffusion and 

assimilation were already producing a homogenizing effect 

sufficient for one to perceive the emergence of a wider community 

(probably) covering the entire area now known as Nigeria, such 

that instead of a set of a discrete and separate entities (A, B, C, D, 

…nr) a related pattern (Ar Br Cr Dr ..nr) was visible where 

symbolizes the blurring of boundary lines between communities A. 

B. C. and so on.” 

Ordinarily one would have expected the elites and our politicians 

to exploit this naturally integrationist tendency to carve out a 

strong and united Nigeria. Alas, the reverse has been the case. 

Thus, it is the thin dividing lines that are emphasized and 

expanded until the integrating factors are finally demolished. Since 

this enable them to continue their perfidious acts of corruption and 

national economic sabotage, this has successfully thrown the 

masses off their (elites) trait. As they have also tended to side the 

elites against their perceived attempt at disproving their social 

identity and more importantly their “God sent” leader and savior. 

Thus they rise strongly and stoutly in defence of the champion of 

86


their linguistic and cultural entity. Any negative remark from the 

“foreigner” is seen as aimed at dimishing his stature, humiliate him 

and subject him to public ridicule. This is why it is not surprising to 

find discredited and corrupt politicians languishing in jail having 

the masses clamouring for their release. When they are released, 

they are treated to a tumultuous heroic welcome. Are the masses 

asses Nauseating as such an obscene spectacle might be, it is 

nonetheless the sad reality of our national life. Needless to reiterate 

the non-integrative and divisive tendency of this phenomenon for 

our national development. 

GENERATIONAL CONFLICTS AND WAR 

An emergent feature of our national – development which is 

potentially more dangerous than any which we have discussed 

above (because of the social group it affects) negatively is an 

imminent generational conflict and war. There is undoubtedly a 

justifiable basis for the young generation of Nigerians to feel that 

the older generation has let them down for not only did they inherit 

the colonial institutions, they have been fortunate to reap 

comparatively effortlessly from the resources this great country is 

blessed with. However. the people that the new generation look 

towards as capable of leading them in the march towards a just and 

egalitarian society have not just fallen short of expectation, they 

have in the cause of t he pursuit of their private selfish greed 

mortgaged the future. 

On that premise, and because or the idealism of their age the 

youths might find it imponderable to reconcile the variety or 

divisive forces that becloud their perception or the political process 

and their role within same. The idealism or the youths might not 

allow for an immutability of the elite, in terms of imbibing the 

idiosyncratic practices of the elites. As such the youths might reject 

the prevalence of the sociological concept of embourgoisement 

among the older generation. The youthful zeal might also spur 

them to find others of the same persuasion who are being 

dehumanized by the system they are immersed into. This coupled 

87


with the prevalence of unemployment, the consequent idleness 

confront them with three options. They seek an escape from reality 

by indulging in drug and alcoholism and other mind bending 

devices. Alternatively they might as is the common phenomenon 

migrate to other lands to pick odd jobs or more devastating still 

seek to unleash anger at the source of frustration and disillusion. 

What ever choice the youths take out of the three listed above does 

not augur well for the social and political development of the 

nation. If they indulge in drug and alcoholism and other negative 

devices, they destroy themselves and the society loses in terms of 

human resources. Emigrating to other lands, deprive the country of 

the boundless energy and the creativity of her youths. There is no 

assurance that they will return when and if the situation improves. 

We might very well deny them the opportunity for political self 

expression, and a chance to contribute positively in our strive 

towards a just and egalitarian society. On the other hand the 

youthful exuberance, idealism, immaturity and impatience might 

propel them to unleash anger on State institutions and government 

properties that they feel are stifling the yearning for self expression. 

In which case the elites and the elders will come down with the 

sledge hammer meant for reconciling deviancy with status-quo 

arrangements. Such youths might end up destroyed or destroying 

the society in which case the society loses again, one can infact 

visualize several other options or consequences. But that is neither 

here nor there. The important point is that the only way our 

generation can have relevance to human civilization in this part of 

the world is to create those conditions that would enable the next 

generation realize the best that is in them. Without this, any form of 

patriotic exhortation would continue to sound like Sanskrit to the 

uncompromising ears of the youth. Undoubtedly there is that 

urgent need to carve out a prime place for our youths within the 

political process to serve as a complement to our socialization 

process. I shall dwell more on this in the second part of this book. 

Suffice it to say however that the members of the younger 

generation have not been meaningfully integrated into our political 

process. Yet because of the idealism of their age, the patriotism of 

the youth cannot be paralled. 

88


THE RURAL-URBAN DICHOTOMY 

Nigeria is said to have an estimated population of about a hundred 

and twenty million. Out of this figure. 83.5 million live in the rural 

areas. Yet and quite surprisingly, the attitude of the elites in 

Nigeria towards the rural areas has been one of being neglect. 

While some of our industrialized cities have London, Paris, New 

York etc as their modes of references, most of our rural 

communities have only transcended the Koma village by thin and 

almost imperceptible margin. These communities have heard the 

fairy tales of our giddy petrodollar riches. They never had a chance 

to taste out of it except the crumbs which we have in our usually 

magnanimous and token gesture doled out to these areas. 

Although the neglect of the rural areas and their agrarian 

occupation originates in the colonial value system, it is not enough 

justification for the degree of neglect these areas have experienced 

over the nearly thirty years that we have been independent. This 

neglect takes several dimensions, firstly the rural areas are denied 

essential social services and economic activities. This has been the 

fundamental cause of the intolerable poor quality of life in several 

rural areas in Nigeria. Unfortunately over the years the rural urban 

dichotomy has obeyed the law of cumulative growth, such that the 

moment the gap emerged, some agglomerative forces made growth 

self perpetuating creating a zero-sum game situation in which the 

urban areas gained at the expense of the rural areas. This perhaps 

best explains why the rural-urban divide has become an intriguing 

phenomenon. As a result of several factors the 1970s witnessed 

increase in the rate of urbanization in Nigerian such that the 

national average growth rate was estimated at 5% per annum. In 

fact the rate for Lagos was double, such that by 1980 with a 

population of about 4.5 million, Lagos was still playing host to 833 

migrants daily, meaning that about 35 persons entered Lagos per 

hour with the majority of them coming to stay permanently. This 

has translated into stunted development for the rural areas. In 

effect these areas have remained backward and short of all factors 

of development, particularly capital and able-bodied men. 

89


The cumulative effect of this neglect has been poverty for the rural 

dwellers. But the elites have consciously over the years closed their 

eye to this. According to Gavin Williams, this is essentially because 

rural poverty is not seen as problematic in itself. For it is always 

assumed to be the natural state of the rural dwellers. 

Rural dwellers are normally not big protesters and agitators who 

use the mass media to draw attention to themselves and their 

pitiable plight. The only time their situation might be significant 

enough to cause anxiety to the ruling elite is when it stultifies the 

out put of marketed crops, because the attendant increase in food 

prices will logically reduce the income of urban dwellers and might 

provoke industrial unrest. The rural people normally never 

unionise, never protest and never raise their voices through the 

press; they are usually docile and un-revolutionary. 

The village dweller being a pre-industrial entity is usually 

conceived of as a residual phenomenon in an industrial society. The 

village, and the typical residence of the peasants remains now a 

mere subordinate segment of societal change and development. But 

then we cannot afford the luxury of a complete isolation of the 

country side. In the first place, these areas have over the years 

remained our food baskets. There was also the time that these 

communities produced the bulk of the wealth of Nigeria. And for 

our enduring and sustainable development land in terms of 

agriculture must still produce our wealth on renewable basis and 

not land in terms of vanishing minerals. Yet the rural dwellers have 

been important policy concerns only to the extent that they have to 

contribute to the growth of the urban areas. Strategies of rural 

development must involve the rural dwellers and offer more than 

greater pressure on land and the need to sell labour to more 

favourably placed commercial farmers. In effect the role of public 

policies over the years has been to support, stimulate and protect 

industry and commerce. In effect the urban based industrial sector 

has remained at the core of government action. We seem to have 

latched on to the belief that the rural dwellers cannot possibly be in 

the forefront in the march towards modernity as such development 

90


has to be at their expense. In essence the performance of the village 

economy is very poor if one measures it by the stat of welfare of the 

population. An because of our fire brigade approach to rural 

transformation it is difficult to visualize the needed achievements 

of increased higher incomes for the large mass of the rural poor, 

expanded employment opportunities for a rapidly growing labour 

force and the incorporation of the rural dwellers into the 

mainstream of the nations economic and political life. 

The overall effect of this continuous neglect has been the 

entrenchment of poverty as the trade-mark of the rural areas. And 

like J.C. Davies in his Human Nature in Politics, rightly noted 

poverty connotes a constraint pre-occupation with the problem of 

what to eat, how to keep warm and dry and stay alive and not 

concern with political questions, because without enough to eat 

there is no society; without a society, the adjective political has no 

noun to modify. 

Obviously to a large extent we have successfully alienated the rural 

dwellers from the political process. This means that they have no 

physical institutional expression as a social force in the state 

apparatus. The only time we have a utilitarian need for them is 

when they are called upon to confer electoral legitimacy on the 

elites. The important of this lies in the fact that the government 

lacks the necessary where-whital to get at the rural dwellers, 

appeals are only made to them through the symbol of impotent 

authorities and the bastion of conservatism in the ruralites’ eyes viz 

the traditional rulers. This is why the rural dwellers are still 

continuously protected by what Goran Hyden has called the 

“economy of affection and the residual elements of pre modern 

cultural agencies”. Thus we have consistently lacked the necessary 

control agencies to actually get at them or short circuit the 

potentiality of this segment of the Nigerian population to exit or 

opt out of the political process. 

Consequently a “we-they” syndrome permeates political attitudes, 

since the peasants posses very few of the resources that will allow 

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them participate in political decisions that will have economic and 

social consequences for them such as land utilization, education, 

welfare etc. In a nutshell the rural dwellers from a subordinate and 

often exploited group in their relations with their urban 

counterparts. The irony of it is that we cannot afford the luxury of 

continuing to ignore the rural areas, apart from serving as the food 

basket, they have remained as the producers of our wealth and are 

vital for increasing the import capacity of the economy through 

wealth creation. More importantly is the need to stop the flight 

from the country – side Rather than our usual fire brigade action of 

resorting to several emergency strategies now is the time to turn 

the rural dwellers into an effective integral part of the political 

process for like Juliu Nyerere noted “while other people can aim at 

reaching the moon, and while in the future we might aim at 

reaching the moon, our present plans must be directed at reaching 

the villages.” 

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PART II 

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O 

Chapter V 

Towards the New Order: The Party System 

ur discussion in the first part of the book has shown that all 

spheres of our national life (without a single exception) are 

riddled with problems. These problems abound in the political 

arena, in all sectors of the national economy, and even among the 

emergent social groups. Our bungling inability to transcend these 

problems have turned them into bottlenecks, which compound our 

process of national development. At the superstructural level, the 

problem is unmistakably that of a glaring lack of cohesion and 

national integration. Our two attempts at Western democratic 

practice has shown us as being incapable of creating and sustaining 

such Western structures. 

The exacerbation of divisive tendencies in our national life has 

resulted in the near total exclusion of a large segment of the 

population from meaningful participation in the political process. 

In the same vein, we have not allowed the wisdom of a linkage 

with our traditional political praxis to chart a progressive future for 

us. The demise of the first and second Republics were on the large 

part due substantially to the attempt by politicians to prevent their 

rivals from meaningful political participation. At another level, 

those invited to participate in government have always been 

blatant in their refusal (often bordering on intransigence), even 

when the maximums pay off of their political base could to give 

them more than they have been offered. As such, we have 

remained adrift in our political march to the future. Indisputably, 

such political circum-navigation and circumlocution is at best an 

historical cul-de-sac. It is only the resilience of Nigeria and the 

Nigerian that has kept the threat of disintegration at bay. The ideals 

of national integration demands that we evolve a society in which 

there will exist a logical interdependence between and among the 

generality of the people in the production and equitable 

distribution of goods and services. A social-formation in which 

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there are no permanent ruling elite groups. A society in which 

there will be equality of opportunity and esteem for every citizen. 

Our need for a unifying bond requires that we take the question of 

national integration away from the mere adoption of pious 

resolutions and Constitutional provisos and concretize same in the 

field of institutional order. Precisely, I am talking of the need for a 

systemic device that can effectuate the demotion of primordial ties 

and primary loyalties to their proper place in national politics. This, 

no doubt, requires the creation of effective political instruments 

which can be used by our rulers to bring about desired goals in 

every other domain. There is the urgent need to create a political 

machine, a self made indigenous institution that would destroy the 

“alien institution” conception of government, that will change the 

perception of politics in Nigeria as “we, against them,” that will 

erase our petty and philistinic attitude of conceptualizing politics as 

the allocation of valued object carried out before our greedy eyes 

and grasping hands that will turn our political rulers to conflict 

managers they are, that will enable us focus properly on the 

generation of valued objects and not only on its allocation. 

Arguably our distorted political behaviour is evidently the 

consequence of our cultural disorientation, which in itself is part of 

our colonial legacy. Here I am referring to the systemic practice of 

the institutionalized opposition which we have adopted as faitaccompli. 

Yet, this is a concept that is as alien as it is incongruent 

with our political past. My description of our traditional political 

past reveals that in arriving at political decisions our fore-fathers 

disagreed to agree and agreed to disagree. The word opposition 

had no constitutional or institutional expression in their political 

praxis. Infact government functioned and was legitimized on 

consensus. In most Nigeria languages the word opposition has the 

same connotation with the word enemy. Can we possibly conceive 

of a loyal enemy The intention here is not to rule out the possibly 

of dissenters or antisystem elements. These of course abound in all 

systems but the socialization process in well organized societies is 

such that they are usually reabsorbed into the dominant trend of 

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thought. Neither am I taking of an intolerance of opposing views. 

For one thing, intrigue has always been part of human interaction. 

The constitutionalization of politics and the democratization of the 

political process has always ensured that such people are never 

transformed into rebels who seek a total overthrow of the regime 

but are wooed and weaned through superior arguments. 

However, because of our blind adoption of a culture bound 

political practice, our behavioural dispositions have naturally 

varied without structural and institutional arrangements. The 

consequence has been the avowed practice of and the concern with 

the dire need to annihilate the opposition in politics. 

Our experience of party politics is on marked by the expenditure of 

valuable time and considerable resources on macabre ways of 

eliminating opposition parties and groups. These actions prompted 

by fear, have diverted our leaders from the more imperative task of 

national integration and nation-building. Our plurality has come to 

be described as our greatest weakness and strongest undoing. Yet 

this need not be so, Nigeria is neither the only multi-ethnic nor 

multi-lingual country in the world. If plurality has not heaped 

negativities on others, why should ours be a different case 

Ethnicity is not Nigerian. Ethnic differences is as natural to societies 

as having limbs is as natural to mankind. What we have merely 

done is to accelerate the ascendancy of our differences to the 

pedestal of a political dogma. This is why our multi-party bickering 

has been able to produce more regional/tribal barons and ethnic 

chauvinists rather than visionary national leaders and statesmen. 

Such is the level of the disruptive effect of this attitudinal 

disposition that even within a supposed homogenous region, tribal 

differences, linguistice affinities and boundary allegiances take 

precedence over more concrete issues of national survival and 

unity. Writing in 1955, after a study of the Western Region election 

during the period 1951-1954 Peter Lloyd observed that”… The 

individual… sees his elected M.P. as a man delegated to get as 

much for his town as possible – if he fails here, he will be rejected 

however important his contribution to the whole of the region has 

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been. Where wards in Ijebu-Remo Division were contested, the 

division appears along the lines of a recent dispute over the 

succession on the throne of the Oba. In Shagamu the NCNC was 

led by the son of the late Oba who had recently unsuccessfully 

claimed the throne, but who was highly popular.” Wouldn’t any 

observer of the Second Republic run the same conclusion without 

fear of contradiction 

Yet this perplexing and defeatingly asphyxiating state of affairs 

need not be so. The genesis is traceable to our un-wavering 

adherence to a systemic device and structural arrangement that is 

at variance with our social realities. An arrangement that has 

emphasized our differences rather than our similarities. I am 

alluding here to our multi-party system. A system that has 

encouraged the regionalization of party politics in a bid to secure 

political base. The consequence has been the open disdain for the 

rules of the political game. Our party leaders have mastered and 

explored all forms of extra-constitutional devices in order to 

capture the seat of governance. Consequently, political parties have 

become no more than small organized private armies secured to 

fight the electoral war with all the attendant consequences of a 

warfare. This rather morbid obsession with the practice of Western 

type democracy has created a situation in which those outside 

government (the opposition) sees the basis of their criticism of the 

government in power as that of vilifying it and anything short of 

this in deference to the rules of the political game is just not 

acceptable. As such the mood is that all actions of government are 

wrong and must be opposed at all cost even if it involved 

threatening the very basis of societal existence. Expectedly, the 

incumbent government can only feel safe it has successfully 

extirpated the opposing parties. 

The cumulative effect of such a political predilection has been that 

we bobble up and down like a yoyo at the level of the political. At 

the expense of a forward march into prosperity, we have always 

had choices made more on the basis of ethnicity rather than 

programme of track record of a party. This is a most unfathomable 

97


price to pay for an irrelevant luxury. A luxury that even within the 

European social milieu if relatively new. 

Familiarization with studies in ‘Government and Opposition’ 

confirms this. Hans Daalder writing in 1966 insisted that to 

recommend “opposition smacks of relativism and political values 

and of a disbelief in the possibility of establishing general 

agreement among men as to the details of their government” 

Rodney Barker in a rigorous and perceptive introduction to Studies 

in Opposition pointed out that political thinkers from Plato were 

more pre-occupied with the identification of those parameters of 

social unity, that would attenuate the possibility of society 

dissolving into anarchy. 

In a similar vein Rousseau in his “Social Contract’ outrightly 

condemned faction, and sectional associations. He has insisted that 

they only attack and weaken the roots of public agreement. 

Edmung Burke, in a speech delivered in 1744 to the electorates in 

Bristol, insisted and (strongly too) that in as much as the British 

Parliament remains the model of the nation, this variegated 

assembly (the Parliament) must form a common personality, a talkshop 

of one nation, with a singular interest-that of the whole 

nation. Hard core Libertarian scholars like John Stuart Mills, Hegel 

and his idealist successors have equally been most consistent and 

insistent in their rejection of factional politics. 

Yet the proponents of multi-partism argue that it is both imperative 

and didactic that we create an opposition, (a legal one) to 

government. Their argument is usually hinged on the need to use 

legal opposition as a viable instrument for “managing the major 

political conflicts of a society”. Also that it remains the strongest 

part of the society’s safety valve. 

In essence, the contention of such proponents is that the single 

party system is a veritable breeding ground for political frustration 

and political repression. The argument is that political frustrations 

stems from the deep seated feeling that “wrong policies are being 

98


pursued and the right people are not being listened to”. In essence 

those who feel sufficiently frustrated might decide to seek a violent 

seizure of power in order to re-organize the society on a different 

basis of legitimacy. Such a situation, it is argued provides the 

moisturization of the political soil for the growth of political 

repression on the part of the government in power. The higher the 

level of the political repression, it is argued the lower the level of 

political development. 

Taken at a superficial and, or surface level, the argument appears 

quite persuasive and convincing to the extent that one cannot but 

concur that multi-partism is the ideal in government. But then, 

what most African proponents of these arguments conveniently 

ignore is the fact that the Western Societies that insist on practicing 

this system have it as a logical outcome of a long and delicate 

process of constitutionalism and a domestication of polities. 

Glovani Satori writing on “Opposition and Control” in the Journal 

of Government and Opposition Vol. 1, No. 2 January 1966 noted that 

such practice requires and presupposes “quiet politics” and not 

“turbulent politics”. The practice belongs to a peaceful view of 

politics, not to a warlike approach in which the oppose is an 

enemy. For Sartori, the opposition must oppose but not obstruct, it 

must be constructive, not disruptive. A “real opposition has in 

view, the general interest and not merely personal antagonism”. 

The consensus among students of oppositional politics is that 

opposition presupposes consent on fundamentals and that there 

must be an agreement at the community and regime level. Lord 

Simon in 1937 referring to the British political praxis observed that 

‘Our parliamentary system (the British) will work as long as 

responsible people in different parties accept the view that it is 

better that the other side win than the constitution be broken”. This 

tradition of parliamentary oppositions has been the hallmark and 

convention of English politics for over a century and half. 

Yet if we scan through our checkered history as a people, can we 

say the same Does it seem conceivable by any stretch of 

imagination that anyone can anyone possibly go to the Shehu of 

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Borno and demand that he create arrangements by which his 

brothers might dethrone him and seize the empire. Neither is it 

conceivable for anyone to march up to the Sultan of Sokoto, the Oba 

Of being, or the Alafin of Oyo kowtowing and or prostrating and 

demanding that he lend you a thousand men with bows and 

arrows, cudgels and amulets to raise a rebellious army against him. 

From 1914 to the attainment of independent in 1960, if we remove 

the mindless exploitation of our resources and people, did the 

colonial government’s administrative machinery not function with 

clinical efficiency Most of the remarkable strides we have taken, 

the irreversible gains we have made, have all been done when we 

worked together in a single organization. 

The Nigerian political scene has not changed much since 

immediate pre-independence. It has been this or that Chief, Alhaji, 

Doctor or General. The policies and programmes have not differed 

too much either; emphasis and commitment have varied. The 

political spectrum that have appeared on the scene so far from the 

most rightist to the most leftist can be accommodated in the party. 

The major players of the political games since the mid fifties have 

been less than 1% of the Nigerian populace. In essence under our 

supposed multi-party polities in both republics, a more than 

cursory analysis of these parties would confirm that the A.G. was 

another label for NPC while the NCNC might as well be another 

label for the A.G. 

In the second Republic a close examination of the ideological 

orientation of party programmes, structural arrangements, source 

of party finance, leadership structures will reveal that the NPN 

remained essentially as another name for the UPN, GNPP, and 

NPP. Only the PRP could to some extent be seen to be different. At 

best the only point of difference in the other four was in terms of 

origin and composition of the hierarchy. Thus we might call the 

NPN a cadre party, the UPN a caucus party and so on. But than 

they all remain essentially parties of the elite, striving for the prime 

prize – the Presidency. 

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Quite apart from this, in the first republic what obtained in the 

regions was plus or minus a one party arrangement. In the Second 

Republic most state were virtually operating one party system. The 

states that were not, could not take concrete march towards 

progressive developments, simply because of the pulls of divisive 

oppositional petty politics. Yet we exhort multi-partism as the 

epitome of democratic governance. What banality, what resort to 

sophistry in order to deceive oneself and others. 

Agreeably the hallmark of a genuine democracy is the existence of 

a vigorous legal alternative government which publicly scrutinizes 

the policies and actions of the present occupiers of the seat of 

government without threatening regime survival. But than should 

we equate this with only multi-partism Alternative government 

can exist in a one party regime if we reduce government to the 

people who man the apparatus of the state. The additional 

advantage is the relatively peaceful mode of succession, that does 

not involve the avoidable and unnecessary dissipation of energy 

and scarces resources that the multi-party regime unwitting 

imposes on us. Liberalism the avowed instructing philosophy of 

multi-party political praxis actually hinges on freedom and choice: 

The ability of the people to choose between alternative polices, 

programmes and personalities. 

A quick survey of the opinions of liberal philosophers like John 

Stuart Mills, Walter Bagehot etc. Reveal an interesting divergent 

approach at the same conclusion. Mills writing in his 

Considerations On Representative Government (1861) opined 

that in a truly free state there must be, not just discussions and 

debates about the problematic of governance, but that this debates 

should spring from diverse approaches to the problems of 

government. In his words, this demands the availability of “many 

conflicting opinions”. Citing the Jewish priests as an example he 

felt convinced that the proper equivalent of the Jewish priest in 

modern state is not to be found in opposition but 

(Wait for this) in a free press! 

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Arguing from a different stand point, Walter Bagehot commenting 

on the English Constitution in 1867, opined that debates and 

antagonisms within the British parliament, though vital and 

necessary he noted that the distinguishing feature of the 

parliament, was that such debates were not conducted between 

Government and opposition but between a fluid and flexible, but 

nonetheless homogeneous parliament and government. 

Gleanable from the various articulated positions I liberal writers, is 

that for them, organized opposition is not the primary concern. 

Rather the main issue is the freedom to oppose and criticize. If that 

is accepted, it becomes deducible that the very essence of 

oppositional policies, is firstly to have open criticism of 

government and of its policies. Secondly to provide an alternative 

government when necessary irrefutably, these are essential 

components of a modern democratic government. But then, this 

can be achieved not only, within a multi- party or two- party but 

also in a one-party system. Infact much more effectively within the 

latter as will be elaborated in due course. Moreso in a society that is 

in need of an effective means of harnessing its resources, 

integrating its people and sensitizing their sensibilities to the 

political process A society that needs to remove the bellicosity and 

combativeness of political competitors This is why we must adopt 

as a primary and feasible responsibility the one party system with 

certain checks and balances. 

If we are to redress our failure at seriously evolving a just and 

humane society, if we are to stem the tidal waves of coups, if we 

are to integrate our ethnic communities once held together by the 

scaffolding of colonial rule into a coherent organic nation-state; if 

we are to provide the social cement to make for real national unity 

or less hectically, if we are to admit what is wrong with us, we have 

to be big enough to admit that our political start has been false and 

faulty. What I am saying is that certain aspects of the foundation of 

our nation-hood might have been approached differently. 

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Pontification on the relative merits of the one-party system as 

against multi-partism to my mind is really an academic debate with 

the high tendency of degenerating into a dialogues of the deaf. The 

point at issue is not the form of democracy, but the content of 

democracy: to ensure that one ethnic group is not priviledged over 

another; that one region is not developed at the expense of the 

other; and that the ruling elite do not lord it over the masses that to 

my mind is the challenge. 

Once we can ensure that the state is seen to be truly above partisan 

interests, once, it is seen to be even handed in its dealings between 

the competing interest groups, we would have begun the process of 

endowing our political institutions with the necessary legitimacy 

which is their ultimate safeguard against violent overthrow. This I 

must confess will not always be easy, especially now when the 

structural adjustment programme invariably insist on the 

retrenchment of social expenditure. And then, that is precisely 

when the need for equity and fair play becomes even greater. 

In an earlier work 2 I argued that a truly representative democratic 

political institution and consensual government will reduce social 

tensions and release creative energies by a long chalk; but then I 

man no assuming that this by itself constitutes a panacea for all our 

problems. The point to note is that the demand that we subsume 

our exacerbated differences is more crucial now than ever. 

In 1979, we refrained from decreeing a one party or two party 

systems for Nigeria for three main reasons. Firstly, it would have 

amounted to a major amendment to the constitutional draft as 

presented by the Constituent Assembly, and we had already 

decided against making substantial changes. Secondly, a two-party 

system would likely have ended in a geographical division, 

exacerbating one of our most persistent tensions, the North-South 

dichotomy super imposed on religious divisions and intolerance 

and thereby increasing instability. Thirdly, we believed then that 

2 See Africa Embattled, (Ibadan Fountain Publication, 1988 

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such determination should come through evolution and not 

through legislation. 

Coincidentally, we were beginning on such as evolutionary course 

when out of some fifty two applications, only five parties satisfied 

the conditions for registration in 1979; after the 1983 elections only 

four parties remained effective. Predictably, if we had conducted 

two more lections without interruption, I would foresee one or at 

most two parties remaining active by 1991. There are bound to be 

arguments for and against that evolutionary process taking into 

account the practice on both sides of the political divide. Much as I 

expect greater decorum and morality in such a dynamic political 

development, it remains a testimony to the slowly converging 

process of our polity. 

In essence my present suggestion that we adopt a one arty system 

is very much in consonance with a possible and logical outcome of 

our political development. All I am saying is that we give nature 

and history a gentle push in the right direction. This appears to be 

the only procedural mechanism through which we can transcend 

the divisive and centrifugal forces tearing us apart and diverting 

our attention from the more monumental task of integration and 

nation building. 

For it is within such a purview that ultimate unity is always to be 

hoped for in the subordination of sectional opinions to be the 

criteria of rationality. In some countries, it seems to me that their 

one party structure has been responsible for the enduring political 

and governmental continuity they are enjoying. It has also enabled 

them to move along a path of harmony, political stability, political 

unanimity and unity of purpose with a durable structure. I say all 

these, fully aware of the disinclination of the supporters of Western 

style democracy to see any virtue in having fewer than two political 

parties. In the same vein. I am aware of the abuses of the one party 

regime in Africa, Asia and the rest of the world. For instance I am 

aware that the co-optation of various elements into the ruling 

organization has not necessarily erased the differentiation that 

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sustained opposing groups in the first place. Again that the 

rewards of power have become so great that there is an increasing 

competition among even the most faithful lieutenenants for the 

uppermost positions. Consequently, opposition has shifted from 

outside the ruling organization to inside; thus making opposition 

more bewildering, frightening and threatening because it hides 

beneath the cloak of a friendly guise. But then a close examination 

reveals that if not all, most of these countries are party-states That 

is, the party is the state and the state is the party with the thin line 

of demarcation almost imperceptible. That, I make bold to say has 

been their Achilles heel. 

The consequence in the words of Aristide Zolberg, is the 

dominance of the party over government and invariably “the 

source of political power is expressly kept outside the provisions of 

the constitution, and the subordination of all organs of government 

to the party organization render meaningless the constitutional 

relationship of these organs to one another”. This is why we must 

accept that the utility of history for mankind lies in our ability to 

learn useful lessons not only from our past mistakes but equally 

from the mistake of others. As such, our own political machine 

must avoid the pitfalls of the others, precisely by drawing a strong 

line of demarcation between the part and the government. The 

personification of the party by the party leaders which has 

produced life presidents is again another precursor of the 

negativity of one party practice in Africa. This of course would 

have to be eliminated. I shall well further on this structural 

arrangement in the latter part of this chapter when I discuss the 

organizational structure of the party. 

I am sure an adherence to these basic norms would diminish the 

evils of the one-party system. This would reveal the one party as 

merely a technique. A modality for achieving a set goal, a means 

towards and end. Our goal in this case is national integration and 

the reduction of divisive tendencies tearing us apart and 

acceleration of development. The one party system, like knife is a 

technique. I am sure we will all agree that a knife is a knife, 

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whether in the hand of butcher, carver or farmer, it is a technique 

for achieving a set goal. It is the use to which we put it that matters. 

Too much opposition, that is an opposition that is pushed to 

extremes will tear the political system apart. Maurice Duverger in 

his Political Parties has observed that it is only within the two party 

systems that one finds an institutionalized opposition. In multiparty 

systems such a development can be effectively preempted 

through a sufficient and a thorough going diffusion of power and a 

separation of party structures and functions from those of 

government. 

It has been argued that within the one-party system, there is the 

plausibility of the government dominating and possibly hijacking 

the party, through an increasing distribution of largesse and 

government patronages. This can be significantly marginalized by 

entrusting the National Council of State with fundamental 

responsibilities in the functioning of the government. This will act 

as a check on the possibility of the abuse by the Chief Executive. 

Again it will be incumbent upon the parliament to vitiate such 

development by acting as a check on the activities of the executive. 

While the party congress would act as the vital check on the organs 

of government and party officials. The effectiveness of the party 

congress in carrying out such a responsibility would be realized 

when I outline the proposed party structure shortly. 

In the final analysis, no argument can be more persuasive than our 

collective strong desire to remove once and for all these bottlenecks 

that have become unnecessary and avoidable impediments in our 

development path. At this crucial time of national development our 

focus should actually be on national prosperity which should 

ramify individual prosperity and well being. Such prosperity 

cannot be achieved without stability, national integration, 

continuity and consistency. My insistence is that the one partysystem 

as our national rallying point would give us continuity and 

structured change, continuity and stability as regards fundamental 

policies and objectives and dramatic (but peaceful) change of our 

political dramatis personae. The idea of having one party is 

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confronted with non-institutionalized, overlapping and shifting 

oppositions that do no really perform the role of presenting clear 

cut alternative policies to the electorate. Even then, I want to insist 

that these functions thought to be the traditional preserve of an 

opposition party – that of proposing alternative policies, criticizing 

the government etc. can be found within the one-party regime. 

Multi-party bickering is definitely a luxury we cannot afford. Our 

discussion so far has shown that reducing democratic practice to 

the operation of two parties is wrong. The essential ingredient of 

democracy is freedom and the provision of choices for the people, 

crucial for me is that a democratic setting must involve a choice on 

personalities and a choice of programmes, fundamental human 

rights and obligation as well as freedom of expression. The Greeks 

that bestowed democracy on the world, did practice it without 

political parties. Although we have come a long way from the days 

of the Greek City States, blind allegiance to a doctrine that is 

incongruent with our existential reality is to say the least 

emasculating. 

With the single party system, mass mobilization of the masses who 

have been held down and crippled by years of degrading 

oppression and servitude can be done without the inhibitions of 

ethnic jingoism. Corruption would be seen for what it is and will 

not be hidden behind the thin spectre of ethnicity. Once all of us 

belong to the same party the idea of whipping up ethnic sentiments 

in the process of electoral competition would become a faux-pas. 

The morbid and near pathological fear people have for one-party 

system is the usually orchestrated tendency to degenerate into a 

dictatorial cum authoritarian arrangement. I am convinced that the 

possibilities of the unsavoury trend to having budding aspirants 

waiting for dead men’s shoes is more doubly debilitating. Once we 

have a settled periodic, voluntary and peaceful change, we can 

build up a stock of experienced men and women in public affairs 

who can continue to make contribution in other sectors of our 

national life and serve as our strategic reserve of resource materials 

in times of national need. I am sure that if we had got three or four 

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men of such vintage who could have brought their collective 

wisdom, experience and influence to bear on the situation, we 

would have avoided the scourge and tragedy of the civil war. 

Again our goal as the most populous black nation in the world 

should be that of bestowing on the world a functioning democracy 

carved around a unity of purpose, one that imbues a sense of 

participation, that allows people to communicate with government 

and the government with them. I am taking about the 

democratization of the political process. i.e. participatory 

democracy in the real sense of the word. For now let us turn our 

attention to the possible structure of the party and its relationship 

to and with the other institutions of the state. 

THE PARTY 

While the constitution should proclaim only a single party for the 

country, a clause should be added that the party shall be the only 

legal party until such a time that national integration and cohesion 

would have been significantly achieved. Any change can take place 

through an amendment of the constitution by adopting the normal 

procedure with a further requirement of plebiscite. 

However and most importantly, specific distinction should be 

elaborated between the party and the state. Party officials would be 

career officers of the party and cannot and must not hold 

government appointments simultaneously with party posts. They 

cannot as well contest for any elective office be it within the party 

or in the government. Any government official who is a party 

member remains simply a party member like every other member 

and enjoys the same rights and privileges. 

The party’s organization shall take root at the village and town 

levels which shall be divided into cells of about five thousand 

citizens and where there are not enough citizens in a community 

they shall team up with other communities to form a cell. In other 

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words regardless of the number of registered party members 

within such a cell as long as the community has about 5000 citizens, 

it shall be constituted as a cell. The cell will meet regularly and its 

meetings would be presided over by a cell chairman who will be 

elected from the members. The cell chairman hold office for two 

years, after which there must be an election. Such a person can hold 

office for as long as he or she continues to be re-elected every two 

years. There will also be a cell representative who will ipso-facto 

become the cell representative at the local government congress of 

the party. The cell representative shall also be elected for two years, 

there is no limit as to the number of times he can be re-elected. 

At the local government level there will be three structures viz: 

local government party congress, local government executive 

council and party secretariat. The Congress will be made up of all 

cell representatives, with a chairman elected from the congress. He 

will preside over meetings of the congress which shall be held at 

least twice in a year, excluding emergency meetings at which 60% 

of delegates will form a quorum. The term of office of a local 

government party chairman should be five years. He can be reelected 

and he can succeed himself for a total of four terms i.e. 

twenty years. It is form this congress that two representatives 

would be elected to the National Congress of the party; five to the 

state congress of the party. Each representative so elected shall be 

in office for one year, there is no limit on the number of terms in so 

far as the representative is duly elected. The five members will be 

in addition to the local government party chairman. The two 

national representatives will also be in addition to the state 

chairman of the party. The Chairman then, as local government 

party chairman shall direct the activities of the Congress and the 

party executive council. He supervises the activities of the local 

government party secretariat. He is also a member of the planning 

committee. 

The Executive Council should consist of the local government 

council Chairman and one supervisory Councilor from the local 

council Chairman and one Supervisory Councilor from the local 

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government council, the Chairman of the party, party secretary, 

treasurer and local director of organization. The chairman will 

preside over the meetings. 

The Secretariat of the party will be headed by the party Secretary 

who will report to his State Secretariat on a regular basis. The party 

secretary, treasurer, director of organization will be career party 

officers who cannot contest for elections unless they first relinquish 

their posts. Thus they will observe their position in the hierarchy as 

official posts. Each local government party secretariat will be under 

the jurisdiction of a state secretary of the party. 

At the state level there will equally be three main party organs viz 

that state congress consisting of five representatives from each local 

government party congress. It will be presided over by the 

Chairman elected from among the congress members. His term of 

office is five years subject to a total of two terms i.e. ten years and 

the congress will meet twice a year excluding emergency 

conventions. The governor and the deputy-governor will be exofficio 

member of the state party executive. 

The state party executive council will also be composed on the 

same basis as that of the local government executive council. This 

will consist of the governor, deputy governor, party secretary, 

treasurer, director of organization and two other party members 

who are neither in the House of Representatives nor in the state’s 

house of assembly. The state secretariat will follow the same 

pattern except that the secretary will be under the direction of the 

national secretary. The secretary, the treasurer, and the director of 

organizations shall also be career party officers. 

At the National level, the party structure will be the same. The 

Congress will be made up of two representatives from each local 

governance in the federation. The party Chairman then is to be 

elected from the Congress and will be in office for five years in the 

first instance, after the first five years he can re-apply to be party 

chairman for another three years if he still enjoys the confidence of 

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the congress. He cannot aspire to the chairman of the party again. 

He will equally chair the meetings of the executive council. The 

congress would convene once every year. 

The national executive council is to be composed along same line as 

the state executive council except that any five congress members 

on zonal basis or geographical representation would be elected as 

executive council members. They are to be in office for five years, 

and can be re-elected for as long as they win elections. The 

president and vice president will be ex-officio members of the 

multi-party executive council. Other party officials will be the 

national secretary, national treasurer and national director of 

organization. 

The party secretary will be appointed solely on merit by the party 

national executive council ratified by the congress and his is to be a 

strictly official post on contract for eight years; renewable for not 

more than four years, provided he shall not have exceeded sixty 

years old upon completion of his term, while other national, state 

and local government party officials would be career officers of the 

party. 

From my brief outline, the structure of the party has been 

demarcated from the governmental structure. The essence of these 

provisions is to insulate party officials from under influence of the 

government of the day. This will ensure again that party official 

function independently of the government, such that the party will 

not be synonymous with the government. Since party officials will 

be on top but not on tap, they would be seen but not be heard. 

The possibility of a few cabals hijacking both the party and the 

government, or the plausibility of the country being turned into the 

play pen of party oligarchs have all been mitigated against in the 

terms of relationship between the party and the government which 

I shall spell out shortly. 

RELATIONSHIP TO GOVERNEMNT INSTITUTIONS 

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The party shall be responsible for policy formulation for the whole 

country. This is to include the National Development Plans. Within 

the purview of such formulated broad policy statements and goals, 

the government would then design programmes and modalities for 

effectuating these policy goals and objectives. In other words, each 

level of government shall have it as its responsibility the fabrication 

of specific programmes geared towards the realization of the 

general, broad policy statements cum goals as enumerated by the 

party. 

In a similar vein, individual contestants and office seekers shall 

within the confines and limits outlined by the party enunciate the 

modality he feels strongly can be utilized to achieve the set goals. 

This will constitute his programme which he will now defend 

before the party congress at the relevant party level. 

All aspirants for government offices must be party members but 

not party officials. To contest for an elective government post or 

take any appointment, the party official must resign his party office 

at least six months before the election. The party would serve 

essentially as a broker and clearing house for all aspirants to 

elective government posts. Apart from this any member of the 

party congress or executive council at any level cannot be elected 

into any remunerative public office. 

Intendant councilors local government chairmen and legislators, 

for all levels must be sponsored and nominated from the cell level. 

Their nominations would be forwarded to the Congressional 

Sitting (which will be at least six months before the actual election) 

which then debated personality and programmes of the individuals 

and ratifies the nomination which is then set tot the Electoral 

Commission for final screening before he is adopted as a candidate 

for election and free to utilize party apparatus for campaign. Each 

aspirant to such elective office should appear before the Party 

Congressional Sitting to present and defend his programmes and 

policies. 

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For the governors and their deputies, nomination and sponsorship 

must have a wide geographical spread as an indication of wide 

acceptability. Each candidate must be nominated by 50 members of 

the electorate from each local government and or sponsored by at 

least 40% (i.e. two-fifth) of the party local government congresses of 

the state party. Then the party screens his sponsorships, 

programmes and personality before sending his nomination to the 

Electoral Commission for final screening after which he can be 

accepted as a candidate for election. In the same vein he is then free 

to use party apparatus for campaign (in terms of the elaboration of 

his programmes. His campaign would be funded partly by the 

Electoral Commission and the party on a pre-determined basis. A 

scrupulous account auditable by the National Electoral body will 

be kept by each person contesting an elective office. 

Aspirants to the post of presidency must chose his vice and both of 

them be nominated by at least 50 registered members of the 

electorate from each state of the federation. These must not be party 

members who are in any of the party congresses or officials. This 

would not only ensure general acceptability but will truly ensure 

that Nigeria as a whole is his constituency. Each presidential 

aspirant and his running mate must be sponsored by at least 40% of 

the state party congress. All presidential aspirants must then 

submit their candidature to the scrutiny of the National Congress 

then debates the personality and programmes of each candidate 

before referring them to the Electoral Commission for final 

screening upon which they gain the status of official party 

candidates. 

In case where there is only one candidate for any post a referendum 

should be conducted by the Electoral Commission on a yes/no 

basis, to ascertain his acceptability by the electorate. If there are 

more ‘no’ votes than ‘yes’ votes, the candidate will be declared 

unelected and the election process will start all over again and the 

incumbent remains in office for not more than six months to get the 

election through. On no condition must any candidate to any 

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public office be returned unopposed without facing an election or a 

referendum. 

From the foregoing it is obvious that the party has been clearly 

separated from the government with different men manning each. I 

must hasten therefore to allay fears about clash of personality, for 

instance between the national party chairman and the president. In 

the first place the party chairman will only be a primus inter pares in 

the executive council and congressional meetings of the party and 

would not have any veto power. Party policies would be debated 

and adopted by the congress and would be executed by the 

executive council. The possibility of a friction between the 

president and the party chairman is further reduced because they 

are both party members who must work within the party’s 

congressional decisions. 

The other possible areas of conflict is in the plausible development 

of an incongruence between party policies and the governmental 

programme. In such an instance, after both parties would have 

mutually exhausted all possible avenues for reconciliation, the 

issue should be referred to the Electoral Commission through the 

National Council of State for a nation-wide plebiscite by the 

electorate. 

Deducible from my proposals so far is that apart from separating 

the party and the government there is the need to bear in mind the 

fact that a rigid separation of two institutions could be 

dysfunctional to the extent of crippling the machinery of social 

development. It is in avoiding such a situation that I have 

constructed meeting points between the two structures by making 

local government council chairmen, Governors and Deputy 

Governors, the President and his vice members of the executive 

council of the party at their various levels. 

Perhaps it should be pointed out that the issue at stake here is 

whether we can make a one party with a modicum of 

authoritarianism (but definitely not dictatorship or tyranny) work, 

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rather than embrace a two party system that will break us up, or 

worse still, subject ourselves to the nightmarish torture of multi 

partism. For one thing, under the proposed arrangement, the idea 

of turning political parties into a private army of thugs and 

brigands would have been eliminated. Our youths who would 

have been utilized as thugs and harbingers of destruction would be 

made more social relevant as party workers at levels commensurate 

to their mental capabilities and capacities. In a nutshell we would 

have created a one party arrangement that can integrate the 

country and foster development by putting all hands on deck. 

Suffice it to add however, that what I have tried to outline briefly 

are the constitutive or structural rules of the political game. I am 

sure the resilient ingenuity of Nigerians would enable us fashion 

the regulative rules that are congruent with these constitutive rules. 

In the same vein we shall be able to elicit congruent political 

behavior from the players of the game. The need for an attitudinal 

disposition that sincerely talks of a fundamental respect for the 

rules of the game cannot be overemphasized. Since no system is 

foul proof, only our collective desires to survive as a single 

indivisible, strong and united entity can be made absolutely foul 

proof. 

THE ROLE OF THE PARTY 

Having outlined the structure of the party and its expected 

relationship to other state institutions, what do I envisage to be its 

role, that is its proper responsibility within the polity Surely as our 

veritable political machine we cannot reduce it to a clearing house 

for political aspirants, for if we do that we might as well not have 

an electoral commission. I expect the party to perform certain 

fundamental and basic roles that are deemed functional to the 

achievement of national integration and political order. As such our 

integrationist party must be involved firstly in political 

mobilization. This is the total involvement of every party member, 

in the political process through their party membership and 

activities. They can then through their activities inform, educate 

and “liberate” the generality. The party cell will provide the 

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necessary base of operation within which the individual can find 

outlet for his political aspirations. This will of course remove the 

lethargy and near political apathy especially among the rural 

dwellers. It will no longer be a question of merely attending 

election campaigns and voting at elections. The involvement of the 

individual will be expected to include attendance at party 

meetings, organization of several party activities and programmes, 

thus engendering a strong sense of commitment. 

Closely related to the above, is the high level of political education 

that increased party activities and the peaceful conduct of politics 

can bring about. Involvement in party activities will increase the 

accessibility of the individual to political information which will be 

quite instructive. Expectedly non-party members will benefit out of 

informal and formal interaction with both party officials and other 

members. This will expectedly generate an increased level of 

political awareness. Consequently the enlightened populace sees 

itself as an active participant within the political process, not just as 

someone to be called upon to confer electoral legitimacy on the 

leader and then return to his shell until another election. He now 

perceives of himself as someone capable of effecting changes when 

he feels a particular crop of leadership is becoming inept as a result 

of complacency or insensitivity. His electoral wish is respected 

because he is involved from every conceivable angle. 

Flowing from this, is the increased political socialization that the 

party will engender, since the party is expected to be involved in 

the formal and informal training of both adults and children for 

citizenship. Ipso-facto the party supplies the individual and his 

community, incentives for development. This will then increase the 

sense of commitment to the survival of the system on the part of 

every one. Plausibly there will be an increase in the political power 

base of the leadership, such that it will not be possible for a single 

individual or cohort to hijack either the state or the party 

machinery because such structure and the role of the individual 

would have been sensitized to the sensibilities of the populace and 

thereby internalized. The internalization of structures and 

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processes by the populace reduces the avenue open to politicians 

who engage in demagoguery. Political charlantans will naturally 

find it difficult to hoodwink the people, for they would have been 

given proper political responsibilities. 

Related to the above is the communication role of the party. It must 

serve as a channel of communication between the leaders and the 

population and between the center and the localities. If we recall 

the structure outlined earlier, it is seen that the flow of authority 

among members is from the bottom to the top. While that of party 

officials is from top to bottom. Additionally the direction of 

communication takes the two way flow from the top to the bottom 

and vice-versa. This involves the downward communication and 

instruction of decisions taken, programmes and tasks of each cell 

and upward in terms of securing for the leadership necessary 

information and support. 

More fundamental and important is the issue of the party serving 

as a concrete expression of the nation. This is because the party is 

everyone’s property and everyone’s concern. The party officials are 

somewhat plenipotentiary – not just in terms of possession of full 

powers, but the fact that they can be made to work in any part of 

the country. As such it would be difficult to “ethicize” party 

officials. Members and contestants have varying melting points 

within the party for example the congressional meetings etc. The 

high point, as we have noted earlier on, is that the party officials 

must remain strictly and mainly officials who must see their party 

posts as career posts. They can therefore be transferred to or made 

to work in any part of the country. This will help to reduce the 

ethnic bias or the urge to mortgage political ideals for 

particularistic concerns because he is ultimately answerable to the 

National Congress of the party for his mis-demeanours. 

The idea is to create a political machine capable of telling the 

populace much better than the government that the state is no 

longer an alien presence, it is no longer a “we-they situation, but 

that it is symbolic of an indigenous political order and therefore we 

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must obey its directives and strive hard to make it work. The 

devolution of power and authority will ensure that power can 

never be concentrated in the hands of a few since both party 

chairman and the President of the nation must seek their election 

from within the ranks and file of party officials and members. Since 

they cannot constitutionally hold office for too long it stands to 

reason, that the need to hijack office at all cost would have been 

removed. The political party should have its own code of conduct 

similar to that of public officers in the government at the three tiers 

of government and should be enforced by the Ethical Sub- 

Committee of the Executive Council of the Party at the National 

State and their Local Government level. The power of discipline of 

party members is vested in the local government party executive 

council. The decision of the National Executive Committee of the 

Party is final in any case of discipline against any member who 

may appeal beyond the local government executive council. Any 

Party organization or unit below the level of the National Congress 

can be disciplined by the National Congress on the 

recommendation of the National Executive Council. The National 

Congress has power of sanction over the National Executive 

Committee collectively and separately and such action must have a 

two-third majority vote of the Congress in a secret ballot. 

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T 

Chapter VI 

The Organs of Government 

he continuous cultivation of the broad pastures of the civil 

society by modern states brings with it an increasing 

complexity. This complexity has imposed on modern states the 

need for structural differentiation and functional specificity. This 

has formed the basis of the present day high level of institutional 

differentiation that is regarded as perhaps the strongest hall mark 

of modern states. 

At another level, the unceasing quest for the preservation of human 

liberty requires that whatever amount of political power and 

authority that exists in any society be divided and given to specific 

institutions of the state. This was the concern of political 

philosophers and theorists for a considerable time. The consensus 

appears to be that governmental powers must be expressed in three 

forms, viz: Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary. The Legislature 

is expected to make laws, while the Executive is to execute such 

laws. The Judiciary is then saddled with the responsibility of 

interpreting and applying such laws. This division of governmental 

power is so general that all states exhibit it although in differing 

degrees. 

Such is the fundamental and universalistic preponderance of this 

governmental power structure, that regardless of our conception of 

the political process, whether from the philistinic and petty 

perspective of allocation of valued objects carried out before the 

greedy eyes and grasping hands of a multitude of “antagonistic cooperators” 

or from the brutal and demonial perspective of its as 

“We against others”, the accepted approach to the political process 

is the creation of three organs of government. 

But then, pragmatism and commonsensical approach to 

government demands that modern government should not and 

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must not be a tug of war between these governmental trinity, 

rather, the norm has been that of a co-operative and co-ordinated 

effort. This shall instruct my examination and propositions on these 

organs in this chapter of the book. 

THE EXECUTIVE 

Reference to the Executive arm of the government broadly connotes 

the aggregate of totality of all functionaries and agencies that are 

concerned with the executive of the state’s will as formulated and 

expressed in laws. This has of course made the executive the hub of 

government. This has precipitated a remarkable growth in the 

power of the executive in some case at the expense of the 

legislature. Although such a development is usually associated 

with politics of totalitarianism, it has undeniably become a 

discernible feature of all democratic stats. This has been made all 

the more inevitable because modern politics require a quick and 

alert sense of duty at the level of decision making. As such the 

nature of modern government requires a leadership that is 

continuous and acknowledged, concentrated and co-coordinating, 

adequately informed and equipped. This is deemed essential if the 

unpredictable and unsure terrain of political administration is to be 

treated with necessary confidence. 

It is therefore natural that among the newer emergent states the 

scale appear to be tilting in favour of a singular non-titular and 

monosepalous executive, as against the collegial executive 

dependent upon a parliamentary majority for its continuation in 

office. The thinking behind this choice is the belief and conviction 

that a single executive can muster the security of unity and 

singleness of purpose, energy and promptness in the making of 

decisions. While the collegial executive can muster the security of 

unity and singleness of purpose, energy and promptness in the 

making of decisions. While the collegial executive is despised 

because of its impaired unity of control and divided responsibility. 

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It was therefore not surprising that in 1979 the consensus of 

opinion was our rejection of the bicephalous executive as both 

unsuitable, meaningless and impractical, at least in Nigeria. The 

C.D.C. in Vol. 2. P. 67 of its report, while recommending the 

Presidential system insisted that the Chief Executive must perform 

and be seen as performing the following functions: 

(a) That of being a symbol of national unity, honour and 

prestige 

(b) That of being a National Father figure; i.e. as a political 

leader in his own right 

(c) That of being an able executive; i.e someone capable of 

giving responsible leadership and a clear cut sense of 

direction. 

The idea was to make the executive as symbolized by the 

presidency the centre piece of our public life. But then, the 

understandable fears that the presidency might becomes so 

powerful as to arrogate more and more power to itself, and bearing 

in mind the warning that power corrupts, and absolute power 

corrupts absolutely, led to the emergent structural arrangement 

wherein the legislature, the judiciary and consultative bodies like 

the National Council of State, constitute procedural and substantive 

restraints upon the abuse of executive powers of the presidency. 

Operationally, the systemic device is the institution of checks and 

balances that are intricately woven into our governmental relations 

and the conduct of public affairs. As noted elsewhere, our 

constitution has been described as being modeled after that of the 

United States. To the extent that we opted for an executive 

presidency and separation of powers, it did indeed derive 

inspiration from that remarkable document. But in essential 

respect, ours was Nigerian, taking cognizance of peculiarly 

Nigerian factors. 

We chose to have an executive presidency principally because our 

first constitution modeled on the British parliamentary system led 

to confusion and conflict between the authority of the president, 

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who reigned and the prime-minister who ruled. Further, Nigerian 

culture by and large admits of only one chief or king to reign and 

rule. Again the multi-national character of our society impose the 

need to ensure that no “tribal baron” can become the leader of the 

nation. 

These provisions plus a lot more that I cannot rehash here because 

of the constraints of time and space I still endorse. However 

enjoying the benefit of hindsight there are slight modifications that 

I want to propose. These modifications. I am convinced will allow 

for congruence between the party system and the governmental 

structure. Further it will remove the possibility of hijacking the 

presidency by greedy insatiable power mongers. 

EXECUTIVE POWER 

Section 5(a) of the 1979 Constitution makes the President of the 

Federation the reservoir of executive power. This implies the power 

to make meaningful in concrete terms, the laws of the country; that 

is, the power to execute laws. This power was supposed to be 

exercised either directly or through the vice president, the 

ministers, or through public officers in the public service of the 

Federation. Ordinarily the presidency as created by the constitution 

was really a dignified and august office. The powers appear 

considerable and sufficient to enhance performance by incumbents. 

However in order to enhance effective productivity, it is only 

natural that the extent of executive powers be outlined. This will 

prevent the emergence of an unsavoury situation wherein a 

powerful personality occupying the office might unwittingly 

arrogate more powers to himself than he is entitled to. Or instances 

where the president might in a whiff of political and prejudicial 

inclination modify certain acts such as President Shehu Shagari’s 

modification of the Public Order Act of 1979, to transfer the powers 

to grant permits for public meetings and processions from the 

Governor to State Police Commissioners. This action typified an 

instance of a purely politically motivated move. In order to prevent 

the subjection of our political process to the vagaries of such an 

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existence, the President should be obliged to seek and possibly 

follow the advice of consultative bodies especially constituted for 

such purpose and that in instances where issues involved are very 

sensitive the president should be compelled to appoint persons 

who would act on his behalf. 

This is why the National Council of State must be given more 

constitutional responsibilities. My suggestion is that the National 

Council of State be made responsible for the following issues: 

(a) Census 

(b) Honours and awards 

(c) National Electoral Commission 

(d) Code of Conduct Bureau 

(e) Judicial Service Commission 

(f) Review of the implementation of Fundamental Objective 

and Directive Principles of State Policy 

The Rationale is to remove other vital issues from the nexus of 

partisan politics and to ensure that the appointment of members to, 

for instance the Code of Conduct Bureau, is left to the National 

Council of State such that instances like the appointment of people 

who are not particularly qualified would be averted. For instance 

during the second Republic President Shagari appointed Alhaji Isa 

kaita as the Chairman of the Code of Conduct Bureau, but his 

appointment was subsequently mollified by the court because he 

was eight years above the constitutionally specified age limited of 

60 years. More so, since these are special consultative bodies vital to 

the conduct of good governance it is only natural that the selection 

of its members be left in the hands of a relatively impartial body 

like the National Council of State. Again, it has been observed that 

the National Council of State. Again, it has been observed that the 

National Council of State is most active during military regimes, 

whatever reason may be adduced I feel there is no reason why this 

should not be the case during the civilian era. The National Council 

of State should be made up of all former Presidents and heads of 

state; all former Chief Justices of Nigerian, and incumbent 

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President. These would be regarded as permanent members of the 

National Council of State. The Permanent members would then 

select the other members who shall be members of the National 

Council of State for a term of five years that is non-renewable. 

These non per manent members shall be seven traditional rulers 

representing broad geographical area, that is, Nigeria shall be 

divided into seven zones of three states each. Each zone shall have 

a traditional ruler selected into the Council of State for five years. 

The selection shall be rotational. 

The Permanent members will also select seven other eminent 

persons from industry, the professions, academia, etc. 

The Council shall then be chaired by the earliest serving surviving 

president or head of state. If there is no surviving former president 

of head of state, then the earliest surviving Chief Justice of Nigeria 

shall preside. Thus, the incumbent president would be an ordinary 

member of the council. Finally, the decision of the council shall be 

regarded as binding and final except where it is purely advisory. 

In order that the neutrality of the National Council of State be 

reinforced and sustained, such that whatever is done by the 

Council would be purely in the national interest I feel strongly that 

any member of the Council who by previous appointment or by 

selection is a member of a political party must immediately 

relinquish his party affiliation and membership. Failure to comply 

with this will result in automatic loss of his seat in the National 

Council of State. Such letters of resignation must be addressed to 

the Chairman of the Council of State, while an advance copy is to 

be sent to the national Chairman of the Party. But then this specific 

proviso will not apply to the incumbent President who is ipso facto a 

member of the Council. 

The National Council of State may invite the Party Chairman or the 

President to address or advise it on any subject of its deliberation. 

Similarly the National Council of State may invite the speaker of 

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the National Assembly to address or advise it on any subject of its 

deliberation. 

The National Council of State may also deliberate, advise of take 

decisions on any matter that the President of the county may bring 

before it. The National Council of State shall also undertake a 

periodic review of the achievements cum implementation of the 

fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy as 

enshrined in the constitution, on the basis of its review it shall then 

make recommendations to the government concerning the 

implementation and or execution of the provision. In addition to 

the functions of the National Council of State, the Council should 

specifically constitute the code of conduct bureau and monitor its 

activities. The bureau should be answerable only to the council. 

One of its members is to head the bureau. This will enable the 

bureau seize the bulls by the horns, as it relates to dealing with the 

issue of corruption. Ethics and what should be the Nigerian 

character have to be agreed upon and be incorporated into the code 

of conduct. What level of gift if at all should a public officer accept 

What should be the relationship between contractor/suppliers and 

the public officers and their families How many years after 

leaving public office must have passed before a public officer can 

accept gifts or appointment from individuals and institutions with 

whom he had direct dealings while in public officers The bureau 

should be made to set up a monitoring unit. This unit shall be 

responsible for the evaluation and publication of the assets of all 

public office holders and that of their immediate families. 

Assets are to be declared by all elected public office holders not 

later than the twenty first day of assumption of office. Such 

declared assets must not only published in a government gazette, 

but may also be published in newspaper with wide circulation 

throughout the country. The assets must be declared and published 

at the end of office and yearly thereafter for three years after the 

exit of such an official from the public spirited individuals who 

contest the veracity and authenticity of such publications. While 

such individuals must naturally be assured and given protection 

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against spin-offs such as victimization, intimidation and threat, 

they must be reasonably sure of their facts and no public officer 

should be held to ridicule or embarrassment by frivolous minds. 

The Bureau’s monitoring units shall be constituted to cover the 

various categories of public officers both elected and non elected 

including civil servants, police, customs, the armed forces etc. 

A law must be enacted that would enable two or more monitoring 

officers of the bureau in possession of evidence of corruption 

against a public officers to prosecute such officer. The onus of proof 

must be on such an accused officer. He must be presumed guilty 

until he has been able to prove otherwise. The Prosecution must 

take place in a specially constituted tribunal headed by a retired 

Justice of the Supreme Court and a jury of five drawn randomly 

from the public. These must be transparently honest individuals 

whose background can be vouchsafed. The need to avoid the 

sabotaging of the intent of the tribunal by ‘smart attorneys’ require 

that a time limited of one month be placed on each case. But then, 

the concomitant need to avert a perversion of the cause of justice 

and to ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done, such 

an accused officer shall be free to appeal against the verdict of the 

tribunal if and when he feels that such a verdict has been grossly 

unfair and a deliberate attempt at undermining his personal 

integrity. He can appeal to the Supreme Court, the appeal and the 

ruling must be resolved within ninety working days. In a similar 

vein the monitoring unit of the bureau can appeal against the 

verdict of the tribunal to the Supreme Court if it feels that the 

verdict of the tribunal has not done justice to its case. 

This appears to be the only proper antidote that can be used to 

arrest the cancerous growth of corrupt enrichment and practices of 

public officials in Nigeria. Although I have to confess that the 

fertility of human mind means that it can conceive of several 

grandiose and beautifully grafted means of circumventing these 

provisions. Also related to this is the question of who is to protect 

us against the protector That is the monitoring unit of the bureau 

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in particular and the bureau in general. Especially since the 

possibility of a collaborationist posture between the public officers 

and the bureau officials cannot be ruled out. The most plausible 

option to my mind is to include retired, responsible honest, and 

well cultivated civil servants, police officers and private 

organization employees in key position of the monitoring unity of 

the bureau. 

More than anything else, I am aware that an obsession with 

material aggrandizement and acquisitive dispositions can make 

even men of high caliber condescend to any level in order to 

consummate their perfidy. The most effective antidote therefore 

lies in the re-orientation of the masses through the political process 

and the mobilizing forces of the party. New values must be 

inculcated that extol virtues of hardwork, thrift modesty, honesty, 

integrity, respect, concern for others, moderation and selflessness. 

Wealth creation must be encouraged but corruption and corruptly 

acquired wealth must be condemned as criminal and economic 

sabotage. The massed must then see it as their own avowed civic 

responsibility, political duty and an irrevocable uncompromisable 

and non negotiable right and duty to expose without compunction 

such corrupt individuals. It is only when this is done that resources 

would be available to minimize the vagaries of collective poverty. 

We must develop clear and unambiguous attitude of condemnation 

of doubtful sources of wealth and ostentatious and selfish use of 

wealth. This attitude must not be compromised. It is only within 

such a context that a sanitization of the social milieu can be 

envisioned. 

At the national level, there is also the need for another consultative 

body which I regard as very vital. The concern of this body will be 

with key security and economic issues. The essence is to harness 

our available human resources for the securitization and effective 

co-ordination of National economic development programmes and 

policies. The idea is to have security issues, and the economic issues 

discussed within the same context of essential privacy and with the 

knowledge of all who are deemed necessary to be privy to such 

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discussions. This is why we should have a National Security and 

Economic Council. The National Security and Economic Council 

will be composed of the President as the chairman, the vicepresident, 

the Speaker of the National assembly, heads of military 

and security organizations, state governors, economic ministers i.e. 

finance, planning, trade, industries, agriculture, petroleum. It must 

also include defence minister, the minister responsible for police 

affairs, internal affairs minister, external affairs minister, and the 

national chairman of the party. 

The council will formulate and deliberate on policies. Take 

decisions, give directives and execute policies and decisions on 

national security and national economy. The council will also act as 

the national economic planning council or commission. 

Under the Presidency there will be a Defence Committee. This 

committee will be composed of the President, as the chairman, vice 

President, the minister of defence, and the minister of external 

affairs, Chief of defence staff, (if there is one,) chiefs of staff of the 

Army, Navy and Airforce and the head of the security 

organization. Its functions will be the organization, planning and 

operation of military defence of the country and provisioning for it. 

The functioning of this committee should not be seen as conflicting 

with that of national security and economic planning council. This 

is because the committee will be responsible, answerable and 

report only to the president. The underlying need to make military 

and or strategic discussions the exclusive privilege of those directly 

concerned necessitated the creation of this particular committee as 

distinct from the economic and Security Council. 

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 

The President should feel free to appoint as his ministers persons 

from within and outside of the National Assembly. However, the 

appointment must be in conformity with principles like the cabinet 

reflecting the federal character, promotion of national unity and 

national loyalty, avoiding predominance of persons from a few 

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states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups. These appointees 

must be ratified by the National Assembly. Those who are 

members of the National Assembly automatically lose their original 

status and become ex-officio members of the National Assembly. 

Their seats in the National Assembly will be filled in a bye election. 

The ministers are to be responsible to the President and be 

answerable when necessary to the National Assembly. However 

the President should feel free to dismiss any of his ministers he 

feels he is no longer able to have in his cabinet. It is not to be a 

collegiate arrangement as they must to all intents and purpose 

remains as his appointees. 

TENURE OF OFFICE 

The President should be in office for a period of six year, barring 

developments such as war, incapacity or impeachment. The 

president should not be allowed to succeed himself. That is once he 

has been elected into office he cannot present himself for re-election 

into office immediately, he can only succeed his successor. This 

would mean that there would be no need for any incumbent 

President to seek self perpetuation in office. An incumbent 

President may be impeached from office if a simple majority of the 

National Assembly passes a resolution to the Supreme Court 

asking the Court to determine if his offence is an impeachable 

offence. The decision of the Supreme Court in this instance requires 

a simple majority vote of the Justice of the Court. After this, a twothird 

majority of the National Assembly vote is necessary for 

impeachment. If it is obtained then the decision is to be conveyed to 

the National Council of State for mere ratification. 

The order of succession to the President is: the Vice-President, the 

Speaker of the National Assembly, the Deputy Speaker of the 

National Assembly and the Chief Justice of the Federation. 

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 

The novel device of electing the Vice-President spelt out in section 

131 of the 1979 constitution would suffice. In which case, the 

presidential candidate must nominate his running mate, and that 

the success of the presidential candidate is synonymous with that 

of his running mate. 

The essence of the vice-presidency is to avoid a vacuum in case the 

office of the president becomes vacant by reason of death, 

resignation or removal in accordance with the provisions of the 

relevant sections of the constitution. The vice-president upon 

assumption of office as the President for the unexpired period of 

his predecessor, must nominate his vice-president who must be 

approved by the National Assembly within seven days. 

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTY 

The president must be a member of the party and his candidature 

must have been approved by the party. 

Upon assumption of office as the President, he automatically 

becomes a member of the executive council of the party, but he is 

just an ordinary member as the executive council will be presided 

over by the chairman of the party. He cannot appoint any party 

officials into government post, since these are career officers of the 

party. This would also event a situation whereby in party officials 

might become prejudiced in the execution of their duties because of 

the promise of prestigious government appointments. Once the 

president leaves office he automatically loses his membership of 

the executive council of the party. In the same vein the vicepresident 

must also be a member of the executive council of the 

party until he ceases to be vice-president. 

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STATE EXECUTIVE 

The executive power of the state must also be vested in the office of 

the Governor of each state. It is then the responsibility of the 

governor to appoint anyone he wishes as his commissioner 

provided such a person is eligible for election into office as an 

assembly man. He can choose his commissioners from either within 

the state house of assembly or outside of the house. If the person so 

appointed is a member of the house, he loses original status and 

seat as an assembly man and becomes an ex-officio member of the 

assembly like the other commissioners. But then the commissioners 

are responsible to the Governor and answerable when necessary to 

the State House of Assembly. But they are strictly the appointees of 

the governor. The governor upon assumption of office becomes a 

member of the executive council of the state branch of the party, 

along with his deputy governor. 

ELECTION AND TENURE OF OFFICE 

The governor must be nominated for election by at least 50 party 

members and registered electorate from each of the local 

government in the state. These nominators must not be party 

officials, congressional members, current members of the house of 

assembly, councilors of local governments council chairman and 

state party chairman. He must also name his running mate before 

submitting his candidature for screening by the party. He must be 

sponsored by 40% of the local government party congresses within 

the state. Upon election he shall be in office for four years, barring 

incidences like impeachment, incapacity of death. He can succeed 

himself only up to a total of three terms i.e twelve years. After this 

he cannot contest election as governor again. The governor may be 

impeached from office. But then a simple majority of the State’s 

House of Assembly is needed to pass the case to the Court of 

Appeal in the jurisdiction of the state to determine whether or not it 

is an impeachable offence. If the Court of Appeal finds the offence 

impeachable, a two-third majority of the House of Assembly will be 

needed to carry out the impeachment. 

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The governor is expected to consult his executive council and 

deputy governor regularly and may assign any business of the 

government of the state or administration of a department of 

government to any of them. His regular consultations with both the 

deputy governor and the commissioners should be geared towards 

determining the general direction of policies and for co-ordinating 

their activities. The governor would then regard this as a necessity 

and not in the Machia Vellian precept that ‘a prince ought to take 

counsel but only when he wishes but not when others wish’. This 

should as much as possible be discouraged and our constitutional 

lawyers should devise the necessary technical language to couch 

this general idea. 

STATE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CONCIL 

In consonance with the structure at the national level, there will be 

in existence a State Security and Economic Council. The Council 

will comprise of the state governor as chairman, the deputy 

governor, chairman of the state assembly, state party chairman, 

heads of military and security organizations in the state, local 

government chairman economic commissioners i.e. finance, 

planning, trade, industries and agriculture. 

To all intents and purposes, its power functions and responsibilities 

are similar to the of the National Security and Economic Council, 

but only that its jurisdiction shall remain within the confines of the 

state’s territory. 

THE LEGISLATURE 

Without exception all modern states in the world vest law making 

power in the legislature. This is usually referred to as the legislative 

power, Our 1979 Constitution in section 4(1) vests this power in the 

National Assembly, which comprised of both the senate and the 

house of representatives, thus giving us a bicameral legislature. But 

then Bicameralism has been with us since the first Republic. Our 

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adoption of the bicameral arrangement as opposed to unicameralism 

was hinged on certain assumptions. First is the 

argument that Nigeria being a federal set up, it is imperative that 

we have a second chamber that will give representation to the 

states as states. The argument here is that since the House of 

Representative is constituted on a population basis, it is only 

natural that we have a second chamber constituted on equality 

basis, such that both small and large states would have an 

opportunity of operating on an equal footing as it relates to the 

process of law making. Moreso the small state would not feel 

asphyxiated by their smallness. Much as the arguments appear 

tenable and the logic almost impeccable, it should be borne in mind 

that equal representation can be achieved without the unnecessary 

financial burden of a second chamber of the legislature. 

Invoking the worn maxim of “penny wise pound foolish”., 

proponents of the second chamber have insisted that relying on 

only one chamber would rob us of the vital check against hasty and 

ill-conceived legislations that might result in the waste or 

enormous resources. However, like John Stuart Mills in his 

Representative Government argued, the check which a second 

chamber can apply on democracy which is otherwise unchecked is 

not of much value, because few will then be disposed to listen to its 

opinion. A part form this the Nigerian experience is one is which 

the pattern of voting in both houses has never been significantly 

different. Infact the tendency is for the legislators to vote along 

party line. More importantly the process of passing a bill into law is 

usually a long process of discussion and analysis. Moreso an 

effective utilization of the committee system guarantees the 

necessary care in legislation. 

Again, it has been suggested that to check against the despotism of 

a single chamber, the second chamber must be created. The latter 

argument, it is suggested, must have induced the Romans to have 

had two consuls such that one would act as a check on the 

tendency or susceptibility of the corrupting influence of undivided 

power. However, the realty of modern politics convinces us that 

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other checks against such despotism of the single chamber exists, 

than the recourse to a second chamber with its attendant 

duplication and expenses. Infact with the suspense veto power of 

the executive, the call for a second vote in the same single chamber 

after an interval, political thinkers like Abbe Sieyes have 

emphasized the superfluity of the second chamber by describing 

the dilemma of the second chamber thus: “if the second chamber 

disagrees from the first, it is mischievous if it agrees with the first 

chamber it becomes superfluous if it agrees with the first chamber 

if becomes superfluous.” 

This is why the strain of conceiving an Upper House of the 

legislature that will not compete with the lower House but will in 

the same vein be constituted in such a way that it will attract men 

of wisdom and talent will be rather overbearing for a developing 

country like ours. One could proffer a series of lengthy arguments 

against the necessity of a second chamber especially for a 

developing and young society such as ours. The bottom line 

however, is my strong conviction that the bicameral legislature is 

one luxury we can and should dispense with at this period of our 

development especially in a one-party situation where the party 

forms a strong check. For one thing we cannot continue to waste 

money, time and energy in a blind copying of extant European 

political culture without taking into consideration the exegesis of 

our present situation. It is quite instructive to note that in the four 

years and three months, i.e. between 1979-1983 the National 

Assembly did not pass more than six laws! In the first place having 

a second chamber meant an unnecessary duplication of the law 

making process. In the second place the size of the House of 

Representative was rather large and that is why I now propose that 

we adopt as a matter of exigent pragmatism, a unicameral 

legislature. 

It is my suggestion therefore, that the legislature be made to consist 

of only one house. The single house should have three hundred 

and fifty members. Out of these three hundred and fifty, each state 

should elect seven legislators, while the Federal Capital Territory 

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would elect one. The remaining figure of two hundred and two 

should then be shared among the states on the basis of their 

population sizes. The distribution of course would be worked out 

by the Electoral Commission. All the members of the National 

Assembly should be elected for a four year term of office, only 

subject to recall by the constituency of the legislator. Recall should 

be carried out by 30% signature of the number of voters for the 

legislator at the election subject to ratification by a simple majority 

of the councilors in his local government area (s). 

LEGISLATIVE POWERS AND RELATIONS TO THE 

EXECUTIVE 

Section 4 (2) of the 1979 constitution empowers the National 

Assembly to make the laws for the peace, order and good 

government of the federation or any part of it, with a proviso that it 

must have legislative competence on the subject on which it wants 

to make laws. The items of the subjects were then divided into two 

lists viz: Exclusive legislative list, as contained in Section 4 (3) gives 

the National Assembly exclusive jurisdiction on all the subjects 

listed hterin. While the concurrent legislative list in Section 4 (4) 

contain items which both the National Assembly and the State 

Assemblies have power to make laws on. But Section 4 (5) says in 

case of any inconsistency between the state House of Assembly 

shall to the extent of its inconsistency be void and the National 

Assembly’s law shall prevail. These powers of the legislature plus 

others conferred on the legislature, such as finance and control over 

public funds, ratification of the appointment of the auditor –general 

investigative powers, etc. one would consider both considerable 

and adequate. However, those aspects that placed the ratification of 

the appointment of certain public office holders in the senate would 

have to be altered to read “subject to the approval of the National 

Assembly”. 

As I have noted earlier on, I strongly subscribe to the view that 

modern government should be a co-operative, co-ordianted effort 

and not tug-of-war between the principal organs of government. 

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AS such I am an ardent believer in close co-operation between the 

executive as symbolized by the presidency and the legislature as 

symbolized by the national assembly. While ministerial 

accountability appointment should not be directed to the president 

alone, responsibility i.e. the power to sack an errant or ineffective 

minister should be the President’s prerogative. The president 

should be free to choose his ministers from either the National 

Assembly or outside of the assembly. All ministers so chosen and 

approved by the National Assembly become non-voting’ members 

of the National Assembly. My use of ‘ex-officio” should be seen in 

an operational sense; i.e. the ministers can sit in the National 

Assembly, may contribute to debates, may address the National 

Assembly but, shall not have any voting power in the National 

Assembly. Also once a legislator is chosen as a minister he 

automatically forfeits his original membership of the House and 

becomes a non-voting member and a fresh election takes place to 

fill his seat in the assembly. 

Again while the president should still retain his power of veto, it 

should be made overturnable by a two-third vote of the current 

members of the national assembly. The emphasis on the powers of 

the legislature in its relation with the executive should be that of 

support rather than censure. This is why a procedure must be 

evolved that would enable the legislature make contributions to 

executive actions while it is still in its formative stages through 

dialogue with the ministers who should be present when the 

National Assembly is considering bills or debating public issues 

pertaining to their portfolio, either specifically invited by the 

legislature or when they feel like informing the legislature on any 

aspect of their responsibility. 

One of the functions of the House Committees should be that of 

assisting in the creation and maintenance of a fruitful and close cooperation 

between the President and the National Assembly. 

While the idea of the impeachment of the president and members 

of the National Assembly was included in the 1979 Constitution 

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with the good intention of preventing flagrant misconduct, public 

impropriety and corrupt tendencies during the second Republic 

was that of a gross abuse of this power. The situation in Kaduna 

State easily lends credence to this view. Such was the incredulous 

abuse of this provision that one is tempted to suggest that it be 

expunged in future constitutional practices. 

However, I feel that with the President and the members of the 

National Assembly belonging to the same party, we will achieve a 

higher degree of political decency and decorum in its usage. This 

will further enhance the possibility of close and regular contact 

between the executive and the legislature. Such that unnecessary 

emphasis on supervisory conduct by the legislature is reduced. 

Although, it can be argued that adoption of a co-operative and 

collaborative stance by the National Assembly towards the 

presidency is a question of attitudinal disposition. In which case 

what we have outlined would amount to mere behavioural 

expectation on the part of the National Assembly members. To an 

extent I might agree, but I should point out that since we shall be 

operating a one-party system, the question of party differences 

between assembly members and the president creating a gulf and 

negative disposition towards the president by the assembly 

members would have been removed. Again since the ministers 

would be ex-officio members of the national assembly, possible 

areas of friction would have been identified and smoothened out 

before escalation to the level of a public debate. 

While the number of ministries at the federal or at the state levels 

should not be made a constitutional issue, proliferation of 

ministries should be a matter to be avoided. At the federal level a 

figure of about fifteen ministries should adequately cope with the 

functions and responsibilities of the government. A figure of about 

ten ministries should do a similar job at the state level. 

With privatization, the number of parastatals at the federal and 

state levels should begin to decline. The declining process should 

be maintained and under no circumstances should it be reversed. 

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But privatization should not be overdone to the detriment of 

services within the community. Water supply for instance may not 

easily lend itself to privatization without dire consequences for the 

society. 

STATE LEVEL 

The unicameral legislature at the centre would be very much in 

harmony and congruence with our past tradition of unicameralism 

at the component unit level. As such I will suggest that each state 

should have a House of Assembly. The size of the members should 

be two and a half times the number of such states representative in 

the national assembly. This membership would be 50% elected on 

the basis of population distribution. While the remaining 50% 

would be on the basis of equal representation from each local 

government in the state. The relationship between the National 

Assembly and the executive at the federal level should apply 

mutatis mutandis to the relationship between the state House of 

Assembly and the state’s chief executive. 

THE JUDICIARY 

The judicature with the Supreme Court acting as the judicant is 

usually regarded as the last hope of the common man against all 

forms of administrative tyranny and governmental abuse. “There is 

no better test of excellence of a government than the efficiency of its 

judiciary” wrote James Bryce in 1921 in his Modern Democracies. 

The proper duty of the judiciary is the interpretation and 

application of laws to individual case. Effective execution of this 

would mean a good balancing of the scales between the citizens 

and the government, or between one private citizen and another. 

Such is the importance of the judiciary in any nation that the need 

to make it more secure, independent and fearless has become a 

passionate concern of men in the discourse of public affairs. The 

main concern usually center around constitutional provisions that 

would ensure that the judges are not unnecessarily “cashiered”, 

thereby hindering their ability to approach their onerous 

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responsibility with fearlessness and candour. Another concern has 

been the vital need to find and choose people of high moral 

decorum and decency, men and women of honesty, of impartiality, 

in dependence and with a soundly reverberating legal knowledge 

to be judges. 

The primary concern in all instances has been to secure the 

independence of the judiciary such that it would not be hampered 

in the discharge of its vital functions. That is the freedom from the 

influence of both the legislature and the executive. It is only under 

such circumstances that justice can be done and be seen to be done. 

Although there have been cases of extreme bravery on the part of 

the judges in trying to assert their independence of mind and 

decision, one instance that readily comes to mind is the case of 

Justice Coke, who alongside three other judges gave a judgement 

that was most unfavourable to the power of King James I in 1611. 

Although he faced the worst consequence, his bravery in the face of 

adversity is a tribute to his forthrightness and remains most 

inspiring. I am confident that a more than cursory study of the 

development of the judiciary the world over, would reveal men of 

similar courage, fortitude and incorruptible integrity. While it is 

undeniable that it is only bold judges such as this that inspire and 

sustain the confidence of the people in the judiciary, it is 

nonetheless imperative that conditions need be created that will 

enable the judges realize the best that is in them. For one thing, we 

have transcended the era of the Blackstonian theory which insists 

that judges only find the law, they never make it, Instances abound 

where judges deliberately fill the gaps in law thereby performing 

the same function as the legislator. Inspite of the enormous and 

onerous responsibility of judges, the judiciary still remains in the 

words of Hamilton the weakest wing of the government’. Since it 

has neither the power of the sword nor the power of the purse; it 

has, so to speak, only the judgment. But must this mean the 

complete susceptibility of the judiciary to the whims and caprices 

of the executive or the legislature I sincerely do not believe this 

should happen. Even without the much acclaimed powers of the 

sword and purse, sagacity and judicious rendering of judgments 

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would continue to enhance the confidence of the people in the 

judiciary the people in the judiciary such that executive and 

legislative strong headedness and excesses would definitely bow to 

judicial wisdom and independence. But then it should be borne in 

mind that the independence of the judiciary is a direct function of 

the degree of insulation from the untoward influence the judiciary 

is constitutionally provided with. This can be instituted through 

effective structural arrangement, modalities for selecting the 

judges, securing of tenure and mode of paying their perquisites. Let 

us briefly examine the specificities of the Nigerian judicial system. 

The Courts under the Nigerian judiciary are broadly categorized 

into two viz: the federal courts and the state courts. Under the 

federal courts are the Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, 

and the Federal High Court, Categorized as State Courts are the 

State High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal of a state, Customary 

Court of Appeal of a state. Magistrate Courts, and Customary 

Court and Sharia Court (where applicable), 

At the Apex of the judicial pyramid is the Supreme Court. The 

Supreme Court is constitutionally given original and appellate 

jurisdiction by the Constitution. Section 212 (1) gives the Supreme 

Court original jurisdiction in any dispute between the federation 

and a state, or between states. While Section 213 (1) invest the court 

with appellate jurisdiction in the determination of Appeals. Section 

215 gives finality of determination of cases to the Court without 

prejudice to the prerogative of mercy power of either the President 

or the Governor. 

Certain basic observations are in order here. Firstly the Nigerian 

judicial structure is divided into two. Again the levels of courts 

created are rather unwieldy and somehow bordering on 

superfluity. For instance the Federal High Court and State High 

Court run parallel to each other as such there could be and have 

been problems of jurisdiction. Superfluity has also been given by 

men and women of law as what is against maintenance of federal 

and state high courts. 

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Given the above, the kind of changes that I would like to see, which 

I am convinced will improve and enhance the independence and 

confidence of judges and the efficiency of the system area s follows: 

Since the Federal High Courts perform more or less the same 

functions with the State High Courts in the matters before them, it 

is superfluous and I strongly feel is should be dispensed with, and 

their functions passed on to the State High Courts. At another level, 

it has been observed that by and large the deal High Court more 

often than not deal with revenue cases. Since states too have similar 

cases it is only reasonable to suggest that the revenue functions of 

the court be invested in a particular high court in each state. Such a 

high court should be designated by the Chief Judge of the state. 

The Sharia Courts and the Sharia Courts of Appeal should be left 

inact in States which so desire them. While the Customary Court of 

Appeal should also be created in the States which also desire such. 

But then the Magistrate Courts and the customary courts should be 

brought within the purview of the local government structure. In 

which case the establishment f such courts shall be the prerogative 

of the local government council and the local government planning 

council acting in concert. However the appointment and removal of 

its officers should be the responsibility of the judicial service 

commission. Ordinarily one could have suggested a somewhat 

quasicentralization of the judicial system, but for the usual feeling 

in some quarters that federal appointment might result in the 

exclusion of their qualified people. To avoid the generation of such 

negative feelings and the consequent multiplier effect on the 

judicial process and the people’s perception of relation with and 

reaction to the system, I feel the idea of centralization is not 

opportune. Although this is an idea that still has a strong attraction 

to me. But then once we can achieve a desirable level of national 

integration, the idea would no longer remain plausible, but feasible. 

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APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES 

On the appointment of judges the discernible trend in most modern 

states can be conveniently broken into three, viz: Election by the 

people, as it is done in some states in America and some Swiss 

Cantons. This modality is quite suspect, out of the thirty-eight 

America states where this is the vogue only three, according to Ogg 

and Ray have given any form of satisfactory feeling. The second 

method is that of election by the legislature, as is the practice in 

Switzerland and the Soviet Union. The backlash of this modality 

lies in the exposure of the judges to political influence and 

manipulation, such that the judgements emanating from such 

courts, cannot but be politically motivated and structured. The 

other method, and by far the most popular is the nomination by the 

executive, this is the practice in Germany, U. S.A. Britain, India, 

Australia, Nigeria, to mention but a few. The emphasis here should 

be on the phrase nomination by the executive, such nominations are 

still subject to ratification by other bodies. Even then in most cases 

the nomination is done after consultation with a body sufficiently 

versed in legal knowledge. 

With the present arrangement the 1979 Constitution under section 

211 (1) empowers the President to appoint the Chief Justice of 

Nigeria at his discretion but subject to the ratification of the senate. 

The other justices of the Supreme Court and the President of the 

Federal Court of Appeal are to be appointed on the advice of the 

federal Judicial Service Commission by the President but subject to 

the approval of the senate. 

At the state level, the Governor is responsible for the appointment 

of the Chief Judge of the state high court, the grand Khadi of the 

State Sharia court and the president of the customary court on the 

advice of the State Judicial Service Commission subject to the 

approval of the House of Assembly via a simple majority as 

provided for in S.235 (1) of the 1979 Constitution But the Judges of 

the High Court, Khadis of the Shaira Court and judges of the 

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customary courts are to be appointed by the Governor of the state 

acting on the recommendation of the State Judicial Service 

Commission. In this case the Governor cannot use his discretion 

but must act on the advice of the State Judicial Service commission. 

Magistrates, judges and members of the area courts and the 

customary courts are to be appointed, disciplined and where 

possible dismissed by the State Judicial Service Commission. 

Certain fundamental issues concerning the independence of the 

judiciary is at stake in the constitutional provisions as regards the 

appointment of the judiciary. 

Firstly the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Federation is 

placed at the discretion of the President subject merely to the 

ratification of the senate. Arguably the occupier of the helm of 

affairs at the apex of Nigerian judiciary has been unwittingly 

thrown open to the vagaries of partisan political consideration. It 

then becomes indisputable within the range of physical possibilities 

that a powerful President with a considerable following and 

support in the legislature can appoint his crony as the Chief Justice 

of the country, or turn the exalted office to part of his largesse to be 

doled out to manipulate individuals. Even where he appoints an 

individual to the office based on the person’s merits, it is doubtful 

if the person would be able to rise above board when crucial 

fundamental issues akin to the American Watergate scandal arises. 

Ipso-facto the erosion of the independence of the judiciary is given a 

free rein and thus the perversion of the course of justice is 

enhanced. 

To militate against the vagaries of such an existential reality, and in 

view of the changes that we have proposed, it appears reasonable 

that the appointment of the Chief Justice of Nigeria be done by the 

National Council of State, based on the President’s 

recommendation. This would not only enhance judicial 

independence, it would block possible avenue of intimidation. 

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From our earlier discussion the President is supposed to appoint 

Justices of the Supreme Court on the advice of the Federal Judicial 

Service Commission. Dr. Hari Chand writing in his Nigerian 

Constitutional Law has argued forcefully on the use of the word 

advice in the appointment of the Justices of the Federal Court of 

Appeal, the Chief Judge and the Judge of the Federal High Court as 

against the use of the word recommendation. For one thing an 

advice is merely a suggest without any connotation of its being 

binding. In which case the advice can be ignored and not complied 

with since the constitutional provision would be deemed to have 

been complied with once the advice is sought. This gives a 

dangerous leeway and enough room for manoeuvre to the 

President. This equally encroaches upon the independence of the 

Judiciary. Even though the word recommendation might be 

regarded as somewhat more binding than advice the President is 

not under any obligation to accept such recommendations. Thus a 

possible deadlock might arise. The way out of this avoidable 

quagmire I suggest is to leave the appointment of Justices of the 

Supreme Court and Justice of the Appeal Court, in the hands of the 

Judicial Service Commission which must do this in consultation 

with the President. Deadlocks can be resolved by referring such 

instances to the National Council of State. 

Appointment of the Judges of the State High court, the Grand 

Khadi of the Sharia Court. President of the Customary Court of 

Appeal, should be placed in the hand of the State Judicial Service 

Commission, in consultation with the Governor of the state. In the 

same vein the appointment of Khadis of the Sharia Court and 

Judges of the Customary Court formerly placed in the hands of the 

Governor based on the recommendation of the State Judicial 

Service Commission should be placed in the hands of the State 

Judicial Commission in consultation with the Governor and on the 

advice of the Chairman of the Local Government concerned. 

Apparently this arrangement makes the State Judicial Service 

Commission quite significant as it relates to the appointment of the 

judges. For these two bodies i.e Federal and State Judicial Service 

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Commission to exhibit behavioural patterns much in conformity 

with our expectations, the bodies must be filled with men of high 

moral probity whose situations in life would not prejudice their 

decisions. 

The remuneration and upkeep of all judges and of equivalent 

judicial officers of high court judge and above appointed by the 

Judicial Service Commission should be assumed by the Federal 

Government. 


Perhaps the strongest preservation of judicial independence is the 

question of job security on the part of the judges. Infact so crucial is 

the question of security of tenure of office that it has been 

suggested that judges should hold office for life. This has been 

interpreted to mean that judges should hold office during good 

behavior, that is to say that, in so far as they are not guilty of any 

crime known to law. This, it has been argued, would mean that the 

judges are quite independent of the pleasure of the executive. 

Under the 1979 Constitution, S.25 states that a judicial officer may 

retire upon attaining the age of sixty years and shall retire at sixtyfive. 

While S. 256 outlines the grounds for removal of both federal 

and state judges as well as the methods for removal. Towards this 

end all judicial officers in the country (i.e both state and federal) are 

placed in two different categories. The Chief Justice of Nigeria, 

Chief Judges of High Courts of the states, Grand Khadis of Sharia 

Courts and the President of Customary Courts of the states 

constitute one category. While the other consists of all Justice of the 

Supreme Court, Justices of the Federal Court of Appeal, President 

of the Federal Court of Appeal, Chief Judge of the Federal High 

Court, Khadis of the Sharia Courts and Judges of the Court of 

Appeal. 

The constitution further stipulated that to effect a removal of the 

Chief Justice of Nigeria an address supported by a two-third 

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majority of the senate must be obtained. While for the others twothird 

majority of the house of assembly is expected to support 

before the removal can be effected. The effect of this on the 

independence of the judiciary would be better appreciated when 

cognizance is taken of the fact that the constitution does not grant 

the judges any form of protection from a political critique of the 

actions of a judge. For instance when a judge is handling a case 

which involves the National Assembly he might be wary of passing 

a fearless judgement, since he can be summoned to the assembly 

and tried for contempt, his refusal to condescend so low in front of 

the House might incense the law makers who might in a fit of fury 

and passion at an injured ego effect his dismissal. During the 

second Republic there were specific instances where the executive 

and the legislature (especially in those states where the same party 

was in control of both the executive and the legislature) attempted 

to manipulate the judiciary and or make it pander to their whims 

and caprices. In some cases this took the form of placing the chief 

judge of the state on the same salary with the Chief Justice of 

Nigeria at other instances it took the form of intimidation and or 

blackmail of judges when cases were brought against the state. This 

is why it is vital that the appointment and dismissal of the judges 

be made the exclusive prerogative of the Judicial Service 

Commission that appoint them acting in concert with the Security 

and Economic Council appropriate to their appointment. Another 

observation is the Federal Judicial Service Commission 

membership. Scholars have argued strongly that the inclusion of 

this judicial officer in the commission is a gross violation of the 

fundamental rules of natural justice. The position is hindged on the 

fact that the commission is constitutionally empowered to effect the 

dismissal of the President of Federal Court of Appeal among the 

judicial posts. It is a canon of natural justice that one should not 

preside as a judge in one’s own case. Infact Aliyu and Joye. M. 

commenting in “The New Nigerian Constitution”, a paper 

presented at the National Conference on Return to Civil Rule at 

Zaria in 1980 argued forcefully that if the President of the Federal 

Court of Appeal is friendly with other members of the commission, 

the possibility of his removal from office regardless of his 

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misdemeanor is seriously in doubt. Such a situation is tantamount 

to a perversion of the natural cause of justice and a big check on the 

independence of the judiciary. In the same vein one can extend 

these contraction to the composition and functioning of the state 

judicial service commissions. 

It seems that the logical thing to do is to visualize a modality for 

not only changing the composition of the Judicial Service 

Commission, but also the appointment of its members. 

To avoid the unsavoury effect of creating a constitutional 

Frankenstein’s monster and the possibility of allowing the Judiciary 

to cripple itself, I suggest that the Judicial Service Commission be 

made to consist of the Chief Justice as the Chairman, two earliest 

retired Justices of the Supreme Court or in case of no surviving 

ones, two earliest retired Justices of the Federal Court of Appeal. 

Two lawyers of not less than twenty years post call to bar 

experience, one of whom must have held the post of Attorney 

General of the Federation, from a list of four such lawyers and two 

other persons who not being lawyers must remain men and women 

and women of unquestionable moral probity and character. 

The only possible way of carefully circumventing this and to 

reinforce the independence of the judiciary is to make the 

impeachment of the Chief Justice of Nigeria possible through a 

combined execution of Legislative and Executive powers. 

To impeach the Chief Justice, the National Assembly with a simple 

majority vote should set up a committee to investigate and 

recommend if it is an impeachable offence. Thereafter a two-third 

majority of the National Assembly is then required to impeach the 

Chief Justice. This decision is then sent to the National Security and 

Economic Council for approval. 

As regards other justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court 

of Appeal, impeachment should be based on the recommendations 

of the Judicial Service Commission. It should be subject to the 

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ratification of a two-third majority of the National Assembly. The 

impeachment of the Chief Judge of a State must be initiated by the 

Governor at the State Assembly. A two-third vote is required in the 

State Assembly to send it to the Federal Judicial Service 

Commission for ratification. Other State High Court Judges or their 

equivalent will follow the same step for impeachment except the 

ratification will be by the State Judicial Service Commission. 

Impeachment of other Judicial officers appointed by the State 

Judicial Service Commissions will be carried out by the State 

Judicial Service Commission with the ratification by the State 

Security and Economic Council. 

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 

The local government is usually referred to as grassroot 

government. The efficacy of such epithet lies in the one sentence 

conveyance of a vivid imagery of the proper responsibility of this 

third tier of government. 

While the National government will concern itself with issues of 

national significance and global importance, and the state might be 

pre-occupied with issues relating to the general governance and 

administration of the state as a whole, the local government cannot 

but, concern itself with the specificities of the communities within 

its areas of jurisdiction. The importance of the duties, imposes an 

onerous responsibility on the shoulders of this level of government 

that the vogue over the years have been that of a consistent 

clamouring for an increase in the autonomy of the local 

government viz-a-viz the state government. The basic and 

propelling basis of this demand is found in the argument that it is 

the only tier of government properly located to make the people 

feel the impact of government. As such the local government is 

concerned with basic welfare programmes and projects like market 

development, health development programmes, road maintenance, 

agriculture, schools, etc. In essence, the local government as the last 

tier of government must be allowed an unrestrained autonomy in 

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the formulation and execution of welfare and employment 

programmes in its areas of jurisdiction. 

Within my proposed party structure, it is obvious that the local 

governments alongside the community development committees 

are going to be so vital in the functioning of both party and 

government to the extent of becoming the hub of government. The 

motivating force behind such a proposal is my unshakable 

conviction that development is for the people. As such, we must 

strive as strongly as possible to give the people at the grassroots 

level increase participation so as to short circuit the potential ability 

of these segment to opt out or exit from the political process. At the 

same time the concern should be a strong and undauntable desire 

to socialize and sensitize the political process to their sensibilities. 

While simultaneously utilizing the local government to concretize 

the development policies in practical terms. That is through the 

execution of welfare programme and job creating programmes. 

This would give the people something with which they can relate 

and identify. 

The important point to note is that such programmes must neither 

be planned nor executed without the knowledge, involvement, 

intimacy and confidence of the communities to be affected. To do 

otherwise would be to rob the planners of invaluable and 

elucidatory fundamental knowledge of the ecological, 

topographical, cultural and social features of the area concerned. 

It is with this at the back of my mind that I have suggested the 

community development committees at the community level, and 

the local government planning council at a macro level. I am 

convinced that the implementation of this structure would in the 

first instance create room for a greater involvement of the people in 

state planning and administration. Flowing from this the apparent 

attitude of lethargy and fatalistic submissive posture of the people 

would be tantalized. As such, an increasing cultivation of the 

support of the people can be engendered. The overall benefit lies in 

the obliteration of the conception of government as an alien 

149


institution. These innumerable benefits I am sure we cannot 

honestly afford to throw overboard, if we are to catapult out society 

as a whole to the elite club of societies with citizen as against 

societies with subjects. 

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHAIRMAN: ELECTION AND 


The local government chairman shall be the chief executive of the 

local government. Intendant aspirants for the post of local 

government chairman must be nominated and sponsored by at 

least 40% of the local government party congress. The congress 

screens his sponsorship, programmes and personality before 

sending his nomination to the Electoral Commission for final 

screening after which he can be adopted as candidate for election. 

Like gubernatorial aspirants he is then free to utilize party 

apparatus for campaign (in terms of the elaboration of his 

programmes). Expectedly his campaign shall be funded party by 

the Electoral Commission and the party on a pre-determined basis. 

But then like the other aspirants to elective offices, candidates must 

keep a scrupulous account auditable by the Electoral Commission. 

Upon election, the chairman is expected to be in office for three 

years. He can be re-elected and he can succeed himself for a total of 

five terms i.e fifteen years. 

Apart from the local government council which consists of all local 

government councilors and which tackles the execution of local 

government programmes it is vital that we have a body responsible 

for policy planning and formulation yet concerned with other 

crucial issues of development administration at the local 

government level. It is with this at the back of my mind that I have 

proposed that there must be established at the local government 

level’ a local government planning council. 

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THE LOCAL GOVENREMNT PLANNING COUNCIL 

It will comprise of the chairman of the local government council as 

chairman, all councilors, local government party chairman, all 

community development committee9s) chairmen and all party 

cells’ chairmen. 

The planning Council will deliberate and take decisions on 

security, welfare and the general situation in the local government 

area. It will deliberate, advice or take decisions on any matter 

brought before it by the chairman of the local government council 

and the local government party chairman. 

The president of the local council-where there is one-may attend 

the meeting of the planning council and may address the council, 

Except on ceremonial occasions like reception of dignitaries, formal 

opening or inauguration of a new council, formal closing of the life 

of council and traditional occasions, when the president of the local 

government council may preside, the chairman of the local council 

will always preside. The planning council would remain as the 

corollary of the state’s security and economic council. Like I noted 

earlier in this chapter the desire is to have three distinct tiers of 

government but in four layers. The fourth layer of government is 

the Community Development Committees. 

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES 

These committees will be made up of the cell chairman, five cell 

members and a community development officer. The community 

development officer is essentially a government official attached to 

the Committee by the government mainly because of his formal 

training and exposure as it relates to community development. But 

then the committee must be presided over by a chairman who must 

be elected by a concurrent ‘Yes’ vote of all the five cell members on 

the committee. He is to hold office for a period of two years. He can 

stay in office as long as he is re-elected every two years through the 

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same procedure. On no condition must the community 

development officer stand for election as chairman. 

The cell members of the committee would be elected at the cell 

level by a full meeting of the party cell. Each must be nominated by 

at least ten cell members. The nominee is then subject to the 

scrutiny of the cell after which a vote is cast. They shall be in office 

for two years, there is no limit on the number of terms. The election 

of members of the development of committees will not be handled 

by the Electoral Commission. 

The main duty of the committee is that of initiating self help 

development projects, and supervising its execution. It will also 

concern itself with the supervision of government initiated projects 

in it locale. It is the added responsibility of the committee to ensure 

that contractors handling government projects complete their 

project and also that such projects are properly executed. All 

contracts will stipulate that non-completion or poor workmanship 

of a project within a community by a contractor may lead to 

prosecution by the committee members acting in concert with the 

law enforcement agents. 

What is clear from my discussions above is that the local 

government structure we have outlined would have its own 

legislature and executive (so to speak). My suggestion is that the 

magistrate courts and the customary courts be brought within the 

purview of local government structure to serve as its judicial wing. 

This will complete the total transference of governmental impact to 

the grassroots. This is made more important because these are the 

two courts mos frequented by the grassroots people. Such a 

structural arrangement might give ample room for the drastic 

reduction of the corrupt practices and curb the excesses of the 

magistrates who usually capitalize on the ignorance of most 

litigants to pervert the course of justice. Even then, there is an 

overriding need to protect tenure of these judges (both magistrates 

and area court/customary court judges) and to handle their 

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appointments, discipline and depositions through the state judicial 

service commission. 

To complete the autonomy of the local government as the third tier 

of government and as a vital tier, it is most imperative and in 

consonance with the trend of my discussions so far that a local 

government service commission be created. The commission shall 

be responsible for hiring and firing all local government staff. Its 

powers shall be on the same level as that of the civil service 

commission in terms of scope and modality of exercise of these 

powers. The terms of appointment, the conditions of service and 

gradations should be patterned along the lines of the civil service. 

The local government commission should also be responsible for 

the hiring and firing of the community development officers who 

are to work in the community development committees. 

REVENUE ALLOCATION 

Here I must proceed from the premise that all revenue generated 

are for the services of the three tiers of government in carrying out 

their functions. The fact that a particular revenue is collected by a 

particular tier of government does not mean that the tier of 

government concerned has absolute right to its utilization unless it 

is so declared and agreed in the constitution. The collection of 

revenue as distinct from its allocation must be seen in terms of costeffectiveness 

so that the best agent collects on behalf of all. 

Allocation is another exercise. 

The functions given to each tier of government must be the main 

deciding factor in determining the level or quantum of revenue 

allocation from the distributable pool. Secondly, the quantum of 

revenue which each tier can collect and keep must also be a factor. 

We are concerned here mainly with what is available to each tier of 

government. We believe that sharing out within a tier of 

government what is collectively available to that tier should be a 

function of other factors such as population, duties and 

responsibility, efficiency and self-help in revenue generation and 

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collection. Derivation especially where the derogation of the 

environment accompanies the exploitation process must be given 

special consideration. Distributable pool should be allocated as 

follows: 

Local Governments – 18% 

State Government – 32% 

Federal Government -48% 

Special (Environment and disaster) – 2% 

While I believe that we must put an end to the perennial exercise of 

state creation, the genuine concern of states like Bendel whose 

revenue allocation on the basis of equality of states has gradually 

diminished from one of four to one of twelve and one of nineteen to 

one of twenty-one must be addressed through he allotment of 

greater weight to derivation and population or any such formula. 

Similar concerns which need redressing have been expressed by 

Imo and Anambra states, and large state like Kano and Oyo. 

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T 

Chapter VII 

Fundamental Objectives and Directive 

Principles of State Policy 

he pervasive feeling during the “Great Debate” that informed 

the fashioning of the 1979 Constitution was the ostensible dire 

need to give Nigeria a systematic, irreversible and progressive 

ideological commitment. But then my predecessor in office, the late 

general Murtala Muhammed observed in his inaugural address to 

the Constitution Drafting Committee (C.D.C.) “We cannot build a 

future for this country on a rigid political ideology, such an 

approach would be unrealistic. The evolution of a doctrinal concept 

is usually predicated upon the general acceptance by the people of 

a national political philosophy and consequently, until all our 

people of a national political philosophy and consequently, until all 

our people or a large majority of them have acknowledged a 

common ideological motivation, it would be fruitless to proclaim 

any particular philosophy or ideology in our Constitution”. 

Essentially therefore such a rigid commitment had to be expunged 

from the Constitutional proposals that metamorphosed into the 

1979 Republican Constitution. Perhaps, as a “middle of the road” 

stance between the outright repudiation of an ideological 

commitment and the need for practical and result oriented 

provisions the Constitution Drafting Committee (C.D.C) at its very 

first meeting resolved that an incorporation of a statement of the 

national objectives and directive principle of state policy in its 

proposals was most imperative and inescapable. According to the 

Vol. 2, pp 37 and 39 of the C.D.C. report the Constitutions of 

Franco-phone African Countries, Pakistan and India served as 

sources of inspiration. Thus, sections 14-22 of the Constitution came 

to state these principles and objectives of state policy. 

155


For the dual purpose of brevity and clarity, I shall discuss these 

provisions under three main sub headings viz: 

i) POLITICAL 

ii) SOCIAL 

iii) ECONOMIC 

To aid a proper and clearer discussion, it is necessary for us to 

understand the thinking that precipitated the specific statements of 

these objectives and principles for the first time in the history of 

Constitutional development in Nigeria. In Vol. 1 of its report the 

C.D.C. observed that “…power offers the opportunity of a lifetime 

to rise above the general poverty and squalor that pervade 

society…” As such unless the goals and fundamental attitudes and 

values that should inform the behavior of its members and 

institutions are clearly stated and accepted, a new nations is likely 

to find itself rudderless, with no sense of purpose and direction. By 

defining the goals of society and prescribing the institutional forms 

and the procedures for pursuing them, a statement of fundamental 

objectives and directive principles in our Constitution seeks to 

direct and concert the efforts and actions of the people towards 

achievement of those goals…” If the fundamental objectives and 

directive principles are enshrined in the constitution then this may 

make them appear less of political slogans, investing them with the 

quality of constitutional, (Albeit non-justiciable) norms; and thereby 

making it easier for political leaders and public function arise to 

establish and show the desired identification with them…” (Vol. 1 

Report 3. 2-3). 

Quite naturally, and expectedly too, there was no unanimity as to 

the objectives and the principles. Perhaps that was to be the 

precursor of the attendant furors it generated even in the report of 

the committee. Let us turn now to the provisions of the constitution 

under the subheadings that I listed earlier. 

POLITICAL: The political objectives and directive principles of the 

state policy as contained in S.15 of the 1979 Constitution can be 

156


summed up in two words, viz: National Integration. Towards a 

realization of this lofty goal and ideal of national development the 

constitution imposes a duty upon the state to foster a feeling of 

belonging and involvement among the people such that the loyalty 

to the nation overrides sectional loyalties. To complement this, the 

state shall secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of 

the federation and encourage inter-tribal marriage etc. Perhaps 

more interesting and fundamental is the provision that the 

composition of the federal government or any of its agencies and 

the conduct of their affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as 

to recognize the federal character of Nigeria and the need to 

promote national unity and to command loyalty. 

Such is the fundamental nature of these political objectives and 

directive principles that it is copiously repeated in several portions 

of the Constitution. For instance S. 135 (30 and S. 173 (2) makes 

reference to S. 14 (3) and S. 14 (4) respectively. The overriding 

desire is the achievement of national cohesion and integration. 

Then, as I observed elsewhere, our efforts at national integration 

and instilling of the spirit of patriotism and nationalism must go 

beyond the recitation of the national pledge and the chanting of the 

national anthem which must here be encouraged. We must strive to 

give such Constitutional provisions serious and concrete 

manifestations. Only then can the attitudinal disposition of the 

peoples be one of pax Nigerian based on an unalloyed patriotism. 

Let me take some hypothetical cases. A man from Gongola State 

working for the Nigerian Railways in Abeokuta and whose 

children cannot secure places for school in his place of work and 

where he pays his tax, just because he is not an indigene of the 

State, where he works, will find it almost inconceivable to see 

himself as a Nigerian. Rather he must feel his primordial loyalties 

and primary ties more relevant to his social reality. He would 

sincerely find it difficult to make the great sacrifice for Nigeria. The 

consequent internalization of this ill feeling will undoubtedly be 

passed on to his children who are victims of these estranging acts 

by state or local governments in Ogun State even though, those 

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children were born in Ogun State. These children will be further 

ensnared in the destructive throes of ethnicism if on being sent to 

Gongola State they obtain admission to schools without much ado 

and just because their father is an indigence of Gongola State. 

The same feeling will be held by an indigene of Anambra State 

working for NITEL in Sokoto who cannot obtain admission to 

school for his children in Sokoto mainly because he is regarded as a 

stranger in Sokoto, which is merely an administrative unit cum 

division in hi country. A Kanuri man who is a timber seller in Ilorin 

who has to pay 400 to 500% of what his friend and colleague, an 

indigene of Kwara State, is paying for his son in Kwara College of 

Technology will not easily embrace Nigeria with unflinching and 

unbending patriotic zeal as much as he will embrace a Maiduguri 

or Borno State. 

This is why national integration firmed upon the rock of equality, 

equity justice and fair play, must be the basis of our collective 

efforts to inculcate patriotism and nationalism in the citizenry. This 

is the more reason why we should not invert and pervert the 

federal character concept that has been enshrined in our 

constitution. 

Indisputably a multi=ethnic society like Nigeria, in the early stage 

of nation building, geographical representation or federal character 

must be ensured in our national representative appointments, but 

then merit based on track record of performance must not be 

completely sacrificed on the alter of federal character. If it is done, 

the effect would be counter-productive, divisive and demoralizing 

and moreso, if the recipient of such seemingly undue favour is 

arrogant, disrespectful, over bearing, immodest and uncooperative 

with his fellow workers or colleagues he is brought to supersede 

and supervise federal character must be practiced but its 

application must be judicious and not extolled to the detriment of 

patriotism and nationalism. 

158


The man who gets a contract or any other similar favour mainly 

because he comes form the same state, town or village with the 

man in authority or official in charge and without any other merit 

whatsoever may feel happy, but is he likely to be patriotic or 

nationalistic Infact the tendency is for him to be more ethnic or 

“statist” knowing fully well that he will get what he does not merit 

on the basis of village or township tie. 

Over the years a lot has been made on the issue of disadvantaged 

areas. If an area is disadvantaged, other areas must not be 

oppressed of suppressed to conform to the disadvantaged area, 

rather special actions must be initiated to shore up the 

disadvantaged area so as not to lag too far behind the rest of the 

country. We did this on the issue of the educationally backward 

areas. Each state that fell within the criteria established to 

determine relative backwardness in education was granted special 

vote to build and run schools of basic studies to perform remedial 

work for students of those areas for admission to post secondary 

institutions. That was atypical instance of building up rather than 

pulling down: it took cognizance of deferral character without 

enthroning quota; it was an effort at integration rather than 

disintegration. Quotas will kill incentive, competition and 

competence. Judicious application of federal character, with 

discipline and good manners among our people will not. Above all 

it is pertinent to agree that great disparity in economic and social 

development between one part of the country and another will not 

make for national integration, peace and stability; just as great 

injustices real or perceived will be inimical to national unity and 

stability efforts. 

At the same time we msut ensure that access to resources are fairly 

and evenly distributed without obstruction. There is the persistent 

feeling in some quarters that there exists a grand design to 

perpetually exclude some group from political eladership because 

the group to be so excluded has economic ascendancy. Honestly I 

find this notion most unacceptable, maybe because I have not been 

a victim or lsot our in competition. However I must confess it is 

159


quite dangerous and most destructive to parcel the country into 

political ruling group, economic controlling group and military 

dominating group,. This notion must be killed and buried before it 

assumes a larger than life image. Biafranization of the country 

might sound so distant and forgotten but it is a remote possibility. 

Those who harbor strongly this feeling of political disadvantage 

must be made to see things for what they really are and if there is 

no grand design which they claim, they must be so persuaded and 

so educated to hold a contrary view to what they have held in the 

past. Those who erroneously believe that head starts or preeminence 

in Western education is an indication of special 

endowment of intelligence and intellect must persuade and 

convince themselves that geniuses are not limited to any 

geographical location in Nigeria if opportunities are equal. 

SOCIAL OBJECTIVES AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES 

In a nutshell, section 17 of the constitution states plainly that the 

Nigerian social order is established on the social and political ideals 

of freedom, equality and justice. As such it grants recognition to the 

sanctity of human life and dignity. The essence of course is to 

ensure that all Nigerians are given a decent life chance. To this end 

section 17 (3) (A) deals specifically with the creation of adequate 

facilities for leisure, social, religious and cultural life. Health, safety 

and welfare of persons in employment is contained in section 17 (3) 

(c). While S. 17 (3) 9G) specifies that children, young persons and 

the aged are to be protected against exploitation, moral or material 

neglect S. 18 directs the government to eradicate illiteracy, to 

promote science and technology and when practicable, the 

government should provide compulsory and universal free 

primary, secondary, university and adult education. 

However, the major concern of most people on these constitutional 

provisions has been the question of non justiciability of these 

objectives and directive principles of state policy. Most critics are 

wont to argue that the non-justicability of these provisions has 

reduced them to an empty platitude. As such it should either be 

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removed or given more bite by making it enforceable in the law 

courts. This trend actually pervaded the debates of the CDC and as 

the report shows it actually structures its thinking and there was no 

unanimity on the question. However like Vol. 1 Report 3.3. of the 

C.D.C noted:” By their nature, the provisions relate to policy goals 

or directions rather than to the existence or extant of legal rights 

vested in any individual or group normally subject to the 

jurisdiction of courts of law. It is a field in which professional 

lawyers who preside over the courts of law are not necessarily the 

most competent (of) judges.” 

In essence therefore the C.D.C. reasoned that the provision amount 

to no more than a “Yard Stick for judging the performance of any 

government ….a Constitutional directive to the organs of state to 

guide their actions…. a reminder to Government functionaries that 

their position is one of trust involving powers as well as duties…” 

and in Vol. 2, P. 38 that it has a “pre-eminently educative, emotive, 

and psychological value for the governors as well as the governed.” 

Also that by spelling out the principles and objectives in the 

Constitution, such issues have been removed from the realm of 

political sloganeering and controversies. Thus future debates and 

discourse on public affairs will focus as it were on the practical 

implementation and timing of policies, and the ability of the 

government to effectively concretize same in physical terms. 

More importantly these objectives and principles are goals and 

targets towards which government must strive in its development 

march. Finally, in a country as vast and as heterogeneous as 

Nigeria such objectives and principles will serve as a constant 

reminder and guide to successive governments to maintain a sense 

of unity. The C.D.C.’s emphasis was on the need for such 

constitutional proposals in view of the ever widening gap between 

the rich and the poor, the growing cleavage between social 

grouping all of which combine to confuse the nation and bedevil 

the march of progress. In essence only provisions such as these set 

out the parameters of government and inform its policies and 

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actions are capable of generating a spirit of co-operation peace, 

unity and progress. 

More fundamentally however the C.D. sought to draw a strong line 

of demarcation between these objectives and principles on one 

hand and the fundamental human rights on the other. The 

argument of the CDC in a nutshell is that the objectives and 

principles which include a list of social and economic rights of 

Nigerian is that the report of the CDC might help in putting these 

arguments in clearer relief: 

By their nature, they are rights which can only come into existence 

after the government has provided facilities for them. Thus, if there 

are facilities for education or medical services one can speak of the 

“right” to such facilities. On the other hand, it will be ludicrous to 

have “right”, to education or health where no facilities exist. Most 

of the fundamental rights are in a sense natural rights vested in 

every individual and to which he is entitled without any obligation 

or duty on the part of the government to provide facilities for their 

enjoyment… To insist that the right to freedom of expression is the 

same kind of “right” as the “right” to free medical facilities and can 

be treated alike in a constitutional document is, the majority of us 

feel, basically unsound… (Report 4-2 Vol. 1). 

Perhaps one should add that any insistence contrary to the 

proposals is not only unsound but very naïve and myopic. The 

present economic realities have without doubt erased all our 

illusions about the infinities and limitless nature of our resources. 

Much as one may be willing to concede that the provisions of 

welfare services by government is a non-negotiable issue, it must 

equally be pointed out that it is a function of resources. Again like a 

commentator observed: “How to provide for the welfare of the 

citizen in the most effective manner is necessarily not a matter of 

law but of politics, and this is not to deny the responsibility; it is 

merely to place it where it is most appropriate. From the above, 

obviously, the level of misinformation and ignorance about the 

actual nature of these provisions is the motivating factor behind the 

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strident chorus of making them justiciable. For one thing the fact of 

non justiciability of these fundamental objectives and principles 

does not necessary mean that cognizance would not be taken of 

them by the court while interpreting the constitution. In the first 

place the constitution addresses the objectives and directives to all 

legislative or judicial powers. As such judicial officials are expected 

to conform, observe and apply these provisions as stated in section 

13 of the Constitution. 

Again, it must be pointed out that the Constitution make it both 

explicitly and implicitly clear that if any of the principles and 

objectives are cited or referred to in any portion of the Constitution 

other than in Chapter II sections 14 to 22 they become justiciable 

and as such enforceable in law courts. A typical instance is section 

135 (3) which state that the president is constitutionally bound to 

reflect the federal character in the composition of his cabinet. This 

is to conform to S.17 (3) of the Constitution, which state inter alia 

that the composition of the government of the federation or any of 

its agencies and the conduct of its affairs must be done in such a 

manner as to “reflect the federal character of Nigeria”. In a similar 

vein is section 173 (2) which stipulates that the governor of a state 

shall conform to the provisions of section 14 (4) of the constitution 

in the appointment f his commissioners. Section 14 (4) state in clear 

and unmistakable terms that the conduct of the affairs of the state 

government or local council “shall be carried out in such a manner 

as to recognize the diversity of the people within the area. ”Failure 

to comply with this provision is justiciable in the court. This in itself 

shows the true nature of these objectives and principles such that to 

insist on their non justiciability is simply to miss the point. 

Perhaps the only addition that need be made is the question of 

making primary education the exclusive and permanent 

responsibility of the local governments and communities in the 

country. This of course must be complemented by an adequate 

funding of the local government to ensure that qualitative 

education is made accessible to all Nigerians at the primary and 

junior secondary levels. 

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In the same vein, the state governments school be made to handle 

technical and secondary education. The Federal government while 

freeing itself from other educational responsibilities then be 

charged with the adequate funding and financing of tertiary 

education. Again the issue of standardization, especially in 

certification at secondary and tertiary level must bear in mind be 

the responsibility of the federal government. Only we must bear in 

mind that social objectives and directive principles have to remain 

at the level of a guide and target and as such categorically nonjusticiable 

and devoid of dragging government to court. 

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES 

The CDC in Vol. 1 P.V. of its reports posed an interesting dialogue 

thus “What to do we want for the generality of Nigerians in the 

foreseeable future The answer must surely be that we seek to 

enhance the welfare of the individual through the provision of 

better educational facilities, housing, health facilities, more jobs and 

a rising standard of living for the people as a whole. “The primacy 

of economic condition meant in effect that it is the bottom line of 

every other dream as regards welfare. 

To this end, section 16 of the 1979 Constitution outlines the 

objective principle at the level of the economic. The Constitution 

adopts as a primary economic objective the “mixed economy” and 

the concept of a welfare state. By this, the state shall have control of 

the national economy in such a way as to secure the maximum 

welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of 

social justice and equality of state and opportunity. 

As a follow up, section 16 (2) provides that the state shall manage 

and operate the major sectors of the economy. 

Our adoption of the “mixed economy” as the fundamental 

objective and directive principle of state economic policies in 1979 

was neither serendipitous nor was it a foreign ideology induced or 

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imposed on the country. If we recall, in the address of General 

Mohammed to the assembly he had pointed out the unacceptability 

of a strict ideological commitment of the nation at this 

state of our development. In addition to this, I am fully convinced 

that our culture, societal values and responsibilities, our stage of 

progress, our economic development, strategy, direction and 

philosophy must as a matter of relevance and necessity include 

some ingredients of capitalist economic practice and some 

ingredients of socialist economic practice. These ingredients are 

neither to develop a work culture that cares. For instance nonpublic 

ownership and workers participation in ownership should 

discourage prodigality and waste while encouraging social 

responsibility, increased productivity, savings and re-investment. 

As such the never ceasing arguments of the choice between 

socialism and capitalism should be laid to rest. Advocates of 

socialism must accept that wealth must first be created before it is 

distributed. Raising hopes and expectations of the people before it 

can be fulfilled, would only create a situation of rising expectation 

and rising frustration. Socialist economies are not the most efficient 

in the world. We can only substitute collective poverty for our goal 

of prosperity if we kill personal and corporate initiative and 

enterprise. The only crux of our economic development is for us to 

be clear sighted about a number of vital points viz: 

(a) Man must be at the centre of our economic development. 

(b) Private initiative must be encouraged for the creation of 

wealth but must not be left absolutely unrestrained. 

(c) Welfare and well-being of the staff, the workers and the 

citizens at large must not be sacrificed on the altar of 

profit at all cost. 

(d) Appropriate technology must be sought and devised for 

our development programmes with appropriate 

manpower training. 

(e) Our economic development must imply more than 

economic growth and our indicators must be so 

designed. 

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(f) Self-reliance must be the watch-word of our economic 

development. 

(g) Export must be aggressively pursued but not at the risk 

of suffering inadequacy at home. 

(h) Economic policy co-ordination must be improved and 

enhanced and made more coherent. 

My focus on these vital points require that we move in concerted 

and joint manner towards the increasing socialization of nature for 

the benefit of all Nigerians. The dichotomization of the Nigerian 

economy into two sectors viz public sector and private sector I 

honestly do not share. For one thing such a differentiation gives 

one the impression of two economics. As for me I see only an 

intergraded economy, the Nigerian economy with one sector, the 

Nigerian sector, with three operative areas namely: 

(a) Administrative areas; 

(b) Productive areas; 

(c) Service areas. 

My own thinking is that that government is and should continue to 

be involved in the administrative area to provide peace, security, 

stability and other pre-requisites for a healthy development of the 

economy by those individuals and corporate entities who function 

in the productive area. Those in government service for 

administrative area of the economy should understand that it is 

through such improved and increased production by those in the 

productive sector that wealth can be created to sustain growth and 

development and the well-being of all. This is why they must see 

their function as helping production and those in the productive 

area. The service area which ministers mainly to the productive 

area will be almost evenly shared out in terms of participation 

between the productive and administrative areas. 

Again those in the productive and administrative or service areas 

who utilize capital, labour, land and management to create wealth 

should not fritter it away in conspicuous consumption and obscene 

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luxury, rather they should regard it as incumbent upon them to 

utilize whatever they create in the production of more wealth 

through continuous re-investment and modernization. We 

consume to exist but in a fast developing world, existence alone is 

not enough. We have existed in one from or other since we were 

created. We must invest to develop and grow. 

It is no gainsaying that good management of the economy in these 

areas must be accomplished before we can claim to any significant 

progress and before we can win the confidence of outsiders to 

genuinely co-operative with us. At this stage of our development 

the administrative area has to lead, guide and direct while the other 

two areas follow closely or walk side as partners. No one of these 

areas should be neglected or ignored. Consultation, interaction and 

collaboration between them must be regular, formalized and 

compulsory. There must also be the interchangeability of personnel 

because it is the only way we can have unanimity of purpose and 

ears of the world about the potential. 

At the risk of repetition I must insist that political insecurity, 

instability and lack of confidence are not the favourable conditions 

for economic progress. We need political stability, social security 

and economic confidence as the basis for assured economic 

progress. We equally require consistency and continuity of policies 

and programmes. Investors both foreign and local are hard headed 

calculators. They need a congenial atmosphere for the gestation of 

their enterprise. Consistency and continuity of policies and 

programmes. (after a general consensus) must be maintained, no 

matter the change in personnel. We should and must encourage the 

accumulation of experience and wisdom. This can be effectively 

done within the context of the structural arrangements that I have 

outlined in the previous chapters. Political order begets economic 

order, economic order beget prosperity and well being. We cannot 

afford to do less. 

Let me linger a little further the only way we can honestly hope to 

achieve our set goals of economic prosperity and political stability 

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is to ensure that there is a congruence between our economic 

structure and political arrangement. My proposals for an effective 

political structure, requires that we seek to curb excessive 

governmental derigism in the economic sphere. That is, by 

continuously limiting government participation in the economy to 

the administrative role I outlined earlier. A further step is the need 

to concretize our present move to divest government of its holdings 

in the economy. These holdings include government owned 

corporations that have become the veritable haven of ludicrous 

corrupt practices. If the government as much as possible relieves 

itself of such holdings, the beginning of the sanitization of political 

competition would have been started. The idea would be to 

effectively reduce the pecuniary attraction that governmental posts 

hold for public office seekers. As such, it is common knowledge 

that the state can no longer serve as the context of primitive 

accumulation, pillaging of state resources would have been 

removed, thereby leaving market forces substantially to effect the 

allocation of resources. In that way, the desire to secure elective 

office would have to be tutored and informed by an irreconcilable 

desire to serve. 

But then I must hasten to add that whatever economic policies we 

pursue in our bid to create a workable formula, must not reverse 

the modest gains of our indigenization scheme. To do that would 

be to take us back of pre 1960 economic era. Again whatever we 

evolve, must be nurtured and informed by a milk of human 

kindness. This is not to deny the inevitability of a readjustment of 

our obvious economic excesses and conspicuous consumption that 

our delusions of economic grandiosity has best owed on us. 

Definitely any process of change must produce its victims and 

beneficiaries. Such that we can beat our chest in self congratulations 

for having structurally readjusted ourselves, at the super structural 

and sub structural levels. 

These laudable political, social and economic objectives and 

directive principles, although not justifiable, there must be a 

respected body that can review the progress being made and make 

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considered periodic pronouncement of their implementation. The 

National Council of State has been assigned the responsibility. 

THE ROLE OF THE PRESS 

Is the system being proposed, the press has a very important role to 

play. The watch dog role of the press must be carried out with great 

responsibility and the objective of national integration in mind. 

Publications to inform educate and entertain must be based on 

ascertained facts not on rumours and fabrications. The press must 

not enjoy any more freedom than entrenched in the constitution for 

freedom of expression. Rather the emphasis should be on freedom 

of ownership of all aspects of the mass media. Government should 

not monopolise ownership of any aspect of the mass media. 

Government should bring forth clear legislation on the 

establishment and operation of any media outfit. 

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY 

On a final note, let me comment on an issue that has lately 

generated a lot of discussion and debate. This is the question of 

outlawing coups. Coups are by their nature outlawed. An 

unsuccessful coup is treason which is punishable by death. But if it 

succeeds the coup leader or whoever is appointed by him moves 

from the barrack into government house. Good government – and 

that is not easily defined – is the antidote against coups. But for 

what it is worth, we may include Art 21 of the UN Universal 

Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 into our Constitution: “the 

will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, 

this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 

shall provide choice of programme and personalities and which 

shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 

vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” The piece in italics is 

my addition to ensure that choices are provided. 

The more frivolous coups become, the more discredited the 

military as an institution becomes. My concern is that the military 

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will more and more lose the ability to perform its traditional role of 

the defence of our territorial integrity. The more affluent and 

comfortable soldiers become, the less inclined they are to make the 

great sacrifice. The government house and the ministers quarters, 

may not be good breeding grounds for courageous soldiers. The 

lure of these official residences for the military must be discouraged 

by both the politicians and the soldiers. 

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M 

Chapter VIII 

Conclusion 

y analyses so far have shown that the constitution of any 

society is not only the fundamental laws structuring the 

governance of such a society, but also as the definite ideas of the 

rulership. As such governmental practices are in the main culture 

bound, historical and socially specific. In essence, political systems 

are autochthonous to societies. Any contrary situation creates the 

antinomies of structural organization and administrative 

complexity. At the best it will engender what Friedrick Riggs calls 

the prismatic society. A backdrop of history has confirmed the 

Sophia of our traditional political system with its complex and 

intricately woven systems of checks and balances. This was the 

motif force behind the existence and persistence of these system 

before the imperialist foragers came with their disequilibrating 

imposition. S noted earlier, mine is not just a romanticization with 

an arcadian past but rather a demonstration of the functioning of 

autochthonous societies. At the same time I have attempted to 

show how the sophistry of the imperialist induced and imposed 

system of governance has proven incapable of allowing us rule 

ourselves in an atmosphere devoid of bitter recriminations, rancor, 

centrifugal and divisive forces . The cumulative effect has been our 

seeming cultivation of a knack for group antagonism and animosity 

such that bellicose and belligerent political competition has become 

the hallmark of our two attempts at democratic self governance. 

With out ship of state floating a drift in the seas of state craft. The 

big question is: have we left the state of nature If the answer is yes, 

we have, (which I suppose it should be); do we honestly know 

where we are going 

Doubtlessly, the most urgent and pressing need is to avoid our ship 

of state being ship wrecked on the rocks of political instability 

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which is a recurring decimal on our navigational chart. As a 

corollary of this in practice we need to effectuate a massive rearrangement 

and re-organization of our elements of social relations 

and our societal dynamics if we are to leapfrog out of the present 

situation of uncertainty and circumnavigation. To achieve this goal, 

the nature and composition of our political chessboard must be 

changed. The present arrangement in which there is a surfeit of 

kings and queens on the board reduces every move to a dangerous 

adventure. 

The first and send Republics have demonstrated beyond all 

reasonable doubt that the triadic political game-set is innately 

dysfunctional. The attenuating spinoffs is aggravated by the zerosum 

game approach to political competition. The cumulative effect 

has been the constant ignition and conflagration of our very 

combustible political pen-house in both Republics. 

We have rightly, I believe, blamed participants for failing to adhere 

to the rules of the game. While this is quite true, it is also true that 

systems contribute to successes and failures. A properly prepared 

balance sheet of our two experiments at democracy may prove no 

less. In effect my contention remains that the political systems we 

are practicing is informed by an alien political culture, as such the 

workability is hampered. Like Lipman observed some fifty years 

ago that discussing politics without reference to human beings 

doest the deepest error to our political thinking. The gist is to 

identify the typology of political animal in us as a people. Aristole 

in his POLITICS remarked on the necessity of fitting the 

Constitution of a city state to the character of the people. Thomas 

Hobbes, writing in the LEVIATHAN dealt with the issue of 

national character and the personality of the Nation. John Stuart 

Mills also observed that “Political machinery does not act in itself 

as it is first made, so it has to be worked by men and even by 

ordinary men. It needs their active participation and must be 

adjusted to that capacities and qualities to the just men available.” 

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In essence, the political personality of a nation is the product of two 

basic factors, viz: the organic foundation of the physical make up, 

the social intelligence reflexes, drives and temperaments and 

secondly, the social political environment. This is why the national 

political personality is seen as the dynamics of organization within 

the nation or those psychological and physical and institutional 

structure that determine this personality in adjustment to the 

environment. Obviously therefore, the political behavior of a nation 

is a function of the environment or situation in which the people 

are located plus the psychological predispositions with which the 

people relate to the situation. 

In essence if the national political environment is such that 

encourages belligerent, instinct ridden and intolerant political 

behavior, it is only natural that the innate bellicosity of man reign 

supreme. The only effective antidote against such a return to the 

state of nature is the creation of structures and processes that will 

enable men remain within the civil societies and exhibiting the 

idiosyncrasies of the civil man. It would be most unfair to 

categorize Nigerians among the most intolerant of people or the 

most pugnacious of people. Our existence as a corporate entity over 

the years easily attenuates such a wrong headed conception. The 

crux of my argument is that our structural arrangements must 

neither hinge on behavior expectations nor on structures that 

encourage fratricidal political competition. 

All nations of the world have political structures that are in 

consonance with their political temperaments and attitudinal 

dispositions. The important point to note is that these structures 

have been evolved out of their desire to create an harmonious 

society. The patterns and attitude found in different political 

cultures are different and in the same vein the structural 

arrangements are different. 

The Americans are said to have a political culture heavily 

characterized by participant culture, in that they participate in 

political decisions and belong to associations and are always 

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effectively involved in politics emotionally. But the emphasis is on 

participation and not allegiance and not much latitude is given to 

authority. It is best suited to them. The British on the other hand are 

said to have deferential attitude towards authority. He emphasis is 

not on participant but on a subject role, hence their parliamentary 

two party democracy is best suited to them. 

The Italians have a political system and habit said to be dominated 

by an alientated political culture. Thus they are low in moderate 

open partisanship politics, political trust is equally seen as very 

low. The Mexicans are equally reported as having a political culture 

characterized by alientation and aspiration. Their political structure 

is constructed to accommodate same. The Germans are said to be 

characterized by political detachment and do not really influence 

policies of government by demonstrations, sending delegations to 

government etc. Their structural arrangements take cognizance of 

this. This is why I must insist that we sieve through the usually 

regurgitated pitfalls of one party system especially in Africa. I 

make bold to say without any fear of contradiction that the one 

party system has proved dysfunctional only in those countries 

where the party is symbolized by one person, the life president of 

the party, and where the thin line of demarcation is virtually 

imperceptible. Again like I noted earlier, the presidency must be 

guarded against the personalization and hijacking of the office by 

greedy and insatiable politicians. Once this is complemented with a 

democratization of the political process we can heave a sigh of 

relief and usher in an era of what Benjamin Constant calls the 

constitutionalization of politics. This will bestow on us as a nation a 

peaceful and orderly succession system. I am of the opinion that 

once we provide meaning choice of personality and programme in 

an election we have satisfied the basic norms of democratic 

institution and rulership. We must ensure fundamental human 

rights and freedom of expression. There will be no need to bother 

with the charade of two party democracy. 

The consensus of opinion among scholars of Nigerian politics is 

that the failure of both republics was due to the obstinacy of the 

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political game players as regards adherence to the rules of the 

game. Interestingly little or no attention was paid to the fact that 

the success of the system was hinges on behavioural expectations. 

That is, the players were expected to display behaviours 

conformable with the system they are operating. This in itself 

constitutes an inbuilt crisis generating mechanism. For one thing it 

is generally agreed that individuals do not mould society. 

Individual impact on society is normally not as great as the effects 

of the society on individuals to conform with certain norms 

through the various institutions. The gist of my argument is that 

where mechanisms exist that will reduce considerably the marginal 

propensity to disregard, the rules, the game player has no choice 

but to conform else he becomes a social outcast and a misfit. This is 

why military coup appears inconceivable in certain countries, 

principally because the institutional, social, and conventional 

mechanisms exist that will nip such a move in the bud. 

If we have a party system that allows for both horizontal and 

vertical competition among the players and the party system 

functions both as an instrument of resource mobilization and social 

integration, it becomes quite difficult to adopt pugnacious posture 

in political competition. Thus it is not enough to just phantom a 

political system, the system must be synchronized and sensitized to 

societal sensibilities. The ordination of a dyad as a supposed 

improvement over our triad is a clamour for government and 

opposition, such a situation then demands behavioural expectation 

that must conform with political structures to ensure system 

survival. Thus giving the leeway for a divergence between 

structural arrangements and attitudinal disposition. 

The consequence of course, is to reduce political participation to a 

supra gladiatorial one between office seekers, and spectatorial one 

among the masses. That of course means we are back to square 

one. The obvious way out is to evolve a structural arrangement that 

will lift the masses from their position as subject to the 

participatory category that military intervention in political power 

game and authority will be rebuffed by the masses who will be 

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effectively conscious of themselves as active participants within the 

process. Any attempt at rebuffing or jeopardizing their status will 

open a can of chaotic worms. The price we have been paying is the 

high level of discontinuity at the level of the political. There is no 

denying it that our political socialization is highly discontinuous. 

This of course contributes to our inability to achieve political 

mobilization of the people. 

Again the brigand nature of political competition suggests that 

power is seem as an end in itself, the transient nature of power and 

the fact that it is to be held in trust for the people is blatantly 

ignored. This is why is it imperative that we evolve a modality for 

the weakening of political power such that condign power will no 

longer be the context of conflict resolution in the country. This 

demands that we evolve an economic arrangement that is 

congruent with the political system. That is an arrangement that 

removes the state as the context of primitive accumulation, 

essentially because political power would no longer be seen as a 

means to economic power. In other words the state and electoral 

offices would no longer hold pecuniary attraction for the 

individual. The need for fratricidal struggle for political power 

would have been removed. The plausible way of achieving this is 

the drastic reduction of excessive governmental derigism and a 

corresponding encouragement of private initiative in economic 

activities. 

Obviously our pre-occupation with the chronic ailments of 

governmental instability and political uncertainty has diverted our 

attention from the concrete and more enduring issues of total and 

integrated economic development. 

Most certainly the negative spin off of this has been that even the 

most minor of our economic problems have gradually snowballed 

into near insurmountable hurdles. This, undeniably is the precursor 

of our present economic stagnation. We can marvel in the 

stupendous wonder at the phenomenon of the economic miracle of 

the Asia –Pacific region. But then, I make bold to say that they have 

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to a large extent been able to wrest themselves away from the 

odious and noxious attenuating impositions of underdevelopment 

because of their effective resolution of the political question, 

because of agreements on the fundamentals of socio-political 

existence like succession, domestication of politics, political 

quietism etc 

While we have unwittingly saddled ourselves with the dissipation 

of energy on pedagogical, ideological and polemical issues of 

governance, Japan has emerged out of the ruins of the second 

world war as an economic super power. South Korea, Taiwan, 

Singapore and Hong-Kong –(countries with which Nigeria can be 

legitimately compared) have all battled with the odds of ‘third 

worldism” to stun even the most cynical of Western observers and 

commentators. Yet we seem content with our spectatorial stance as 

the world moves into the twenty first century with a collective 

resolve to jettison any structural impediment in the ways of 

economic progress. 

Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost is aimed at the goal of 

economic reform and so are the varying spate of reforms in China, 

Eastern and Western Europe. The locus of civilization is changing 

again, with our resources, both human and material we are more 

favourably placed than most other countries to seize it, internalize 

it and write the name of this great nation into its rightful place in 

the history of world civilization. We have a most favourable 

climate, extensive spread of arable land, a vast array of mineral 

resources. Nigeria is one of the most endowed nations in the world. 

The optimization of our natural resources definitely requires 

certain inputs not readily available within the confines of our 

shores. It is therefore expedient that we consider as a viable idea 

the need to attract favourable foreign investment. The only way we 

can effectively do this is to take the provision of conditions for 

foreign investment from the context of policy pronouncements and 

concretize same in the realm of constitutional provision. The idea is 

to give foreign investors the necessary confidence and the business 

gusto required to bring the much needed technology and capital to 

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our shores. This is why I will suggest that it be enshrined in the 

Constitution specifically that there should be a non appropriation 

of foreign investment. It is within this context that a special 

responsibility is devolved on our universities as our intellectual 

power house. As noted elsewhere, while our universities remain 

societies within the larger society, the social relevance of the 

universities lies in their collective ability to serve as a guide, a 

pathfinder and a beacon of light and hope in a seemingly confused 

society like ours. This is why the proper social responsibility of the 

universities is essentially that of identifying the basic and enduring 

parameters of a just social order and the simultaneous and un 

wavering sensitization and socialization of the parameters to the 

larger society. It would be most dysfunctional and defeatingly 

asphyxiating for the universities to reflect the only negative 

idiosyncratic of the larger society. 

In the same vein, for our universities to immerse themselves in the 

discussion of mundane ideological polemics, abstract theorization 

(which recent world developments have shown as irrelevant,) I 

have to say, would amount to a betrayal and a shirking of their 

proper responsibilities. Like Gavin Williams observed the problems 

confronting Nigeria like most countries are no respecters of the 

conventions and conveniences of the academic and one needs to go 

beyond the critique of specific neo-colonial formations in order to 

appreciate neo-colonialism as a phase of development. My own 

supplement to this, is that in analyzing Nigerian politics, there is no 

framework to assume until the terrain is in surface. 

For now the terrain is in surface, the topography of the landscape is 

discernible. The modality for an optimization of the land is 

identifiable, it then becomes incumbent upon us to march forward 

and seize the bull by the horn. We will fall under a far reaching 

condemnation at the bard of history if in our various walks we 

refuse to prove ourselves equal to the challenges of the hour. 

More specifically I believe that if our national development effort 

is to be morally, materially and politically sustainable, it must 

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endeavour to provide for a pattern of economic growth which 

would significantly diminish within a reasonable time frame the 

present wide disparities in the living standard in the country of our 

people. Whatever may be the underlying causes, it must be 

abhorrent to men and women who starve and live below poverty 

level inspite of our collective resources and ingenuity. Actions to 

resolve our economic crisis must not be confined to contractional 

measures which may gain some respite but do not solve the hard 

issues and problems of attitude, orientation and mentality where 

real adjustments are most needed. 

Personal fear and ambition of political leaders are always hidden 

under the cover of state security. To me personal security and 

political survival of the leaders in general must be seen in terms of 

political accommodation, development and social justice. 

Development implies the constant improvement of the well-being 

of the whole of the population of the country; it must also involve 

the full participation of all sectors of the population in the 

development process as well as a fair distribution of the benefits. 

The pursuit of security through expenditures on arms and 

armament at the expense of development is destabilizing and leads 

to further insecurity. Expenditures on arms and development must 

be seen as being in a competitive relationship not only in terms of 

resources but also in terms of attitudes and perceptions. While 

peace and security remains a necessary condition for development 

in a country like ours, socio-economic problems arising from 

inadequate allocation of resources to development are conversely a 

very important source of tension, instability and insecurity. 

The problematic of our existential reality which has been imposed 

on us by in-auspicious planning, has robbed us of an effective 

socialization of our vital resources, or else why has it taken us so 

many years of national planning and economic development to 

realize the dire need for a comprehensive and integrated plan of 

action for the rural dwellers. One must point out that the rural 

areas are not a monolithic entity and as such care must be taken to 

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see that rural development programmes are executed in such a way 

and at such a level that the target group (the rural poor) are the real 

beneficiaries of these programmes. In the same vein it should be 

noted that execution of the programmes must not be allowed to 

effectuate economic and social disequilibrium that might elicit 

negative reactions from the rural dwellers. While the rural areas 

must be transformed it should not be done at the cost of urban 

neglect, it has to be pursued simultaneously, it is the only way to a 

balanced and healthy national development. The utility of an 

effective rural and urban development lies in the destruction of the 

rural residual economic of affection and the short circulation of the 

potentiality of certain segments of the populace to exit or opt out of 

the political process. The general idea will be to make all Nigerians 

properly speaking members of the civil society. The ensuring that 

the phoney feeling of intense paranoia on the part of our occupiers 

of political posts will be removed. 

Above all our economic policy goals must be such that will induce 

strength in the present while hoping for the best in the forceable 

future. This is why the present unprecedented brain drain has to be 

stemmed at all cost. At this stage of national development even the 

least educated Nigerian is a vital resource that we cannot 

discountenance. I sincerely feel it is wrong to escape the problem 

by labeling the emigrating Nigerian as unpatriotic. Unless we 

continue to provide conditions that will make the people realize the 

best that is in them we cannot lay any serious claim to the mental 

resources embedded in their brains. For our generation to have any 

form of social and historical relevance to the up and coming 

generation it is incumbent upon us to proffer economic policies that 

will make the youths look into the future with zeal and an even 

keel. I am sure we do not want to conquer ethnic and political 

differences only to be confronted with a generational and class 

welfare. This is why our goal must be the need to hand over an 

enduring and worthwhile economic social and political legacy. 

180


APPENDIX I 

PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 

THE 

EXECUTIVE 

NATIONAL 

COUNCIL OF STATE 

THE 

EXECUTIVE 

THE 

LEGISLATURE 

CHAIRMAN 

NATIONAL 

CONGRESS 

PARTY 

EXECUTIV 

THE 

PRESIDENT 

THE NATIONAL 

ASSEMBLY 

PARTY 

SECRETARIAT 

SECURITY AND 

ECONOMIC 

COUNCIL 

COUNCIL 

OF 

MINISTER 

THE 

SPEAKER 

NATIONAL 

LEVEL 

STATE 

CONGRESS 

THE 

GOVERNOR 

STATE 

ASSEMBLY 

STATE LEVEL 

CHAIRMAN 

PARTY 

EXECUTIVE 

SECURITY AND 

ECONOMIC COUNCIL 

COUNCIL OF 

COMMISSIONER 

STATE 

SPEAKER 

PARTY 

SECRETARIAT 

LOCAL 

GOVERNMENT 

CONGRESS 

LOCAL 

GOVERNMENT 

CHAIRMAN 

LOCAL 

GOVERNMENT 

COUNCIL 

LOCAL 

GOVERNMENT 

LEVEL 

PARTY 

CHAIRMAN 

PARTY 

EXECUTIVE 

PLANNING 

COUNCIL 

PORTFOLIO 

COUNCILIORS 

STATE 

CONGRESS 

PARTY 

SECRETARIAT 

PARTY CELL 

COMMUNITY 

DEVELOPMEN 

T COMMITTEE 

COMMUNITY LEVEL 

KEY 

The Self-effacing nature of 

The National Council of State 

Indirect line of relationship 

Direct line of authority 

181


APPENDIX II 

KEY PARTY POSTS (ELECTIVE) 

TERM OF OFFICE 

1. Cell Chairman Two year term no limit as 

to number of terms 

2. Cell Representative Two year term, no limit as 

to number of terms 

3. Local Government Party Five year term, up to a 

total of four 

4. State Party Chairman 

5. National Party Chairman Five year term, up to two 

terms i.e. ten years. 

Five years for first term, 

Re-Election for three 

years only. 

NONE ELECTIVE 

BY APPOINTMENT 

1. Nation Director Career Party Officer 

Of Organization 

2. Director of Organisation ditto 

3. Treasurer ditto 

4. State secretary ditto 

5. Treasurer ditto 

6. Director of Organization ditto 

7. National Secretary On Contract for eight year 

Renewable for another 

four years provided he 

shall not be older than 

sixty years on or before the 

expiration of his contract. 

8. National Treasurer Contract 

9. Local Government Party Career Party Officer 

Secretary 

182


GOVERNMENT OFFICES (ELECTIVE) 

POST 

TERMS OF OFFICE 

1. President One six year term. He can 

Succeed others but not himself. 

2. Vice-President ditto 

3. Governor Four year term, up to three terms 

i.e twelve years. 

4. Deputy Governor Same as for Governor 

5. Local Government Chairman Three year term, can be re-elected 

Up to a total of five terms i.e. fifteen 

years. 

6. Local Government Councillors Two year term, can hold office for as 

long as he is re-elected. 

7. Chairman Development Two year term, can hold office for as 

Committee 

long as he is re-elected every two 

years. 

8. Members – Community Two years – no limit on number of 

Development Committee terms 

9. Legislator- Members of Four years – no limit on number of 

the National Assembly terms 

10. Members State House of Four years – no limit on number of 

Assembly 

terms 

11. Speaker National Assembly Four years – no limit on number of 

terms 

12. Speaker State House of Four years – no limit on number of 

Assembly 

terms 

13. Non-Permanent members of Five years non-renewable 

Council of State 

183


Index 

A 

Abayomi, Kofo 51. Code of Conduct Bureau, 90-91 

Abubakar, Imam 45. 

Constitution: 

Acephalous 29 Content of, 9-31 

Action Group 46-47, 52-53, 72 History of, 8. 

Adjudications 15 Meaning of, 7-8 

Afigbo, A. E., 26 Sources of, 13-16 

Ahmadu, bello, 44 1954, 48-50 

Alagoa, E J., 30, 60. 

1979.1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 11,13-15,89,99-100 Aliyu and 

Toye, M. 108. 104 -107 

Alkali, 19, 20 Constitutive Rules, 83. 

Amanene 34. Constitutionalism, 71. 

Amendment Procedure, 9,12-13,78 Constitutionalization of Politics, 36. 128. 

American Constitution, 8, 13. Coups, 125. 

Anene, J. C. 27 

Aristotle, 7, 127 

D 

Asantehene 34. 

Asanti 32 De St. Croix, F.W., 38. 

Asanti Kingdom, 34-35 Defence Committee, 94 

Asia-Pacific Region, 130. Democratization, 78, 128. 

Asset Declaration, 91-93 Dialogue of the Deaf, 74. 

Australia, 8, 12-13, 104 Development, 4, 132. 

Authoritarianism, 88 Documentary Constitutions, 17. 

Awka, 28 

Awolowo, 45, 46 

E 

B Edo, 60 

Balewa, Tafawa Abubakar, 46 Efiks, 18, 30-32. 

Barker, Rodney, 70. Egbe Omo Oduduwa, 52 

Basorun Gaha, 24 Eight Point Programme, 47 

Belligerent, 127 Ekpe Society, 31-32 

Biafranization, 117. Enahoro, Anthony, 46, 54. 

Bicephalous Executive, 88. 

Bini Kingdom 22, 25. 

F 

Biroms of Plateau, 27 Federal Character, 4, 116. 

Blackstonian theory, 102 Federal Constitution, 10. 

Bornu Youth Movement, 54 Federal Principle, 48. 

Bourdillon, Benard, 45 Freedom, 73. 

Bryce, James, 13, 101. French Revolution, 8. 

Bura of Bauchi, 27. Fundamental Human Rights, 10 

Burke, Edmund. 70. 

G 

C 

Calabar, 30 G.N.P.P. 72 

Calabar – Ogoja-Rivers 9COR), 54 Galbraith, Kenneth, 42 

C. D.C. 88, 114-121. Generational Conflict, 61-62. 

Centralized Hierarchical Monarchy, 25 Germans, 128 

Centralized Monarchy, 18 Ghana, 32. 

Centralized Societies, 17 Gorbachev, M. 130, 

Checks & Balances, 17, 88, 126. 

Chukwu at Arochukwu, 28. H. 

Classical One-Party System, 3 Hausa-Fulani Society, 19. 

Clifford Constitution, 44. Hegel, 70 

Hobbes, Thomas, 29, 127. 

N 

Horizontal Integration, 3-4 N.C.N.C. 45-46, 52-54, 69,72 

184


House of Commons, 16. N.N.D.P., 51 

Hyden. Goran. 65 N. P. C. 53-54, 72. 

I N.P.P., 72 

N.P.N., 72 

Ibibio, 28. N.Y.M., 51 

Ibn Khaldun. 51. National Assembly, 94, 98-101 

Ibo, 18, 27-29, 33, 60. National Council of State, iii, 2-3 

Ifeka, 25. 76, 88-93. 

Igala, 60. 

National Economic & Security Council, 

Igbafe, 25 93-94, 109 

Indigenization Scheme, 124 National Character, 127 

Indirect Rule, 37. National Integration, 67, 69, 76-77 

Ikelegbe, 25, 27 83, 104, 115-116 

J. Non-Centralized Societies, 18, 26. 

Non-justifiability, 118, 120 

Jami – yar Mutanen Arewa 52 Noah. Effiong, 30, 31 

Judges 107 – 109 Nyerere Julius. 65. 

Judicial Service Commission, 107-109 

Judiciary, 101-109. 

O 

Justice Coke. 102 

Oba of Bini, 25, 71. 

K Obon. 31. 

Ogboni. 23 

Kano Riots, 47 Oha ne Eze, 27-28. 

Karamojong, 32-34. One-Party System, 3. 74-77 

King Eyo Honesty, 30. Opposition, 1, 71. 

King James 1, 102. Oyediran, Oyeleye, 48, 49, 

Koma Village, 63. Oyo Empire, 18, 22-24, 34, 39 

Oyomesi, 22 39. 

L. Organic Foundation, 127. 

Organic Laws, 14. 

Legislative Lists, 10, 48-49 Organs of Government, 87-114 

Legislature, 97-99. 

Liberalism, 73. 

Life Presidents, 76, 128 P. 

Lockean Theory of Rebellion, 26 

Lugard, 37, 44. P.R.P. 72 

Lyttleton, Oliver, 48. Paine, Thomas , 11 

Parliament, 10 

Participatory Democracy, 78 

Pecuniary attraction, 124, 130. 

M. Perham, Magery, 37, 52. 

Policy formulation, 81. 

Macaulay, Herbert, 51. Political Bureau, 4 

Machiavellian, 96 Political Education, 84. 

Macpherson, John, 46 Political mobilization, 83. 

Magistrate Courts, 112. Political socialization, 84. 

Mexicans 128 Political Repression, 71 

Military, 1, 117, 124-125, 129 Plato, 70 

Mills, John Stuart, 70, 73, 97, 127. Presidential system, 88. 

Mixed Economy, 121 Primary education, 120 

Monocephalous Executive, 88 Primitive accumulation, 124, 130. 

Mpande, 36 

Muhammed, Murtala, 114, 121. 

185


Q V. 

Quiet Politics, 71 Vertical integration. 3-4 

Quorum, 79 Veto power 82, 98, 100. 

Qualitative education, 120. 

R. W 

Regionalization, 48 Williams, Gavin, 63, 131 

Republican Constitution, 9 Wheare, K. C. 8. 

Residual economy, 65, 133. Whitaker, Jr., 18 

Revenue allocation. 113. Wright, C.F. 38 

Richards Constitution, 52 Written documents 14. 

Roman Empire, 8. 

Rousseau, J.J. 29, 70. Y. 

Rural-Urban Dichotomy, 62-65 Yoruba nationalism, 52 

S. Z 

Sanitization, 93. 124 Zero-sum game, 127. 

Sardauna, 44, 47 Zik, 52-53 

Sartori, Giovani, 71 Zolberg, Aristide. 75 

Seers, Dudley, 56 Zulu, 32, 35-37 

Separation of powers, 9. 

Shehu of Borno. 71 

Shugaba, Abdul Rahman, 10 

Simmons, Donald, 30. 

Single Chamber, 96-97. 

Socialist economies, 122. 

Stability, 77 

State centralized societies, 17 

State of Nature, 26, 29. 

Statist, 117. 

Sultan of Sokoto, 19-20, 71. 

T. 

Tivs, iii, 27, 29-30 

Thirdworldism, 130 

Triadic game set, 126 

Turbulent politics 71. 

Two party system, 2. 

U. 

U. M. B. C., 54. 

U.P.N., 72 

Uganda, 32. 

Ultima ratio regum, 22 

Underdevelopment, 3, 56. 

Unitary Constitution, 10 

Unitary System, 19 

United National Independence party, 54. 

Urban neglect. 132. 

186

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