2013-2014 Varsity Packet - Boston Debate League

2013-2014 Varsity Packet 

Cuba 

Cuba Embargo Aff 

Cuba Embargo Neg 

Tourism Bad DA 

Tourism Bad DA Aff 

Oil Drilling DA 

Oil Drilling DA Aff 

Strengthen Embargo 

CP 

Strengthen Embargo 

CP Aff 

Mexico 

Mexico Rural Dev Aff 

Mexico Rural Dev Neg 

Aid Tradeoff DA 

Aid Tradeoff DA Aff 

Remittances DA 

Remittances DA Aff 

Decriminalization and 

Treatment CP 


Treatment CP Aff 

Venezuela 

Venezuela Aff 

Venezuela Neg 

China DA 

China DA Aff 

Oil Prices DA 

Oil Prices DA Aff 

Pressure CP 

Pressure CP Aff 

Development K 

Development K Aff 

Resolved: The United States federal 

government should substantially 

increase its economic engagement 

toward Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela.

Cuba Embargo Affirmative

Cuba Embargo Affirmative 

Boston Debate League 

Varsity 

Cuba Embargo Affirmative – Table of Contents 

Summary.................................................................................................................................... 2 

Glossary ..................................................................................................................................... 3 

First Affirmative Speech 

1AC 1/6 ................................................................................................................................... 4-9 

Advantage Add-on: 

US/Latin American Relations ............................................................................................. 10-11 

Additional Evidence and Answers to Negative Arguments 

Harms - Public Health 

Answers to: Public Health is Doing Well Despite Embargo ...................................................... 12 

Answers to: Doctors Will Leave if we Lift Embargo .................................................................. 13 

Answers to: Engagement Hurts Public Health Industry ............................................................ 14 

Answers to: Food Shortages Improve Obesity Rates .............................................................. 15 

Harms - Government Repression 

Answers to: Wealth from engagement goes to regime ............................................................ 16 

Answers to: Economic engagement won’t destabilize regime.................................................. 17 

Solvency 

Answers to: No US/Cuban Trade ............................................................................................. 18 

Answers to: Cuba Controls Imports ......................................................................................... 19 

Answers to: Regime is Resilient/Benefits from Trade .............................................................. 20 

Answers to: US/Latin American Relations Resilient ................................................................. 21 

Add-On 

Answers to: Other Factors Hurt US/Latin American Relations ................................................. 22 



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Summary 

In the status quo, the United States still has its embargo on Cuba in place. This keeps Cuba from 

engaging the U.S. on an economic level. This embargo ultimately restricts Cuba’s access to medical 

information and supplies, and places their free health care system in a difficult position financially. 

Besides the fact that their entire system can fall apart, Cuba also cannot adequately supply their 

population with the life-saving medical care. 

Cuba is also still the same repressive government it was years ago, seeing that they are still abusing 

the civil and political rights of its citizens. It is the moral obligation of the United States to promote 

political change on the island. 

Therefore, the affirmative plan is to remove the embargo from Cuba. By lifting the embargo, Cuban 

suffering can be put to an end and allow for Cubans to fight for freedom from their ruling regime. 

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Glossary 

Backlash – a strong or violent reaction, as to some social or political change 

Biodiversity – the number, or abundance of different species living within a particular region 

Economic engagement – is a foreign policy strategy which seeks to increase ties between countries 

through economic interaction. 

Embargo/Sanctions – are trade restrictions put in place against target countries with the aim of 

discouraging certain behaviors like human rights violations or military build-up. 

Exploitation – the use of someone or something in an unjust or cruel manner for economic, social, 

and political gain 

Government Repression – sometimes used synonymously with the term political discrimination; 

often carried out through discriminatory policies, such as human rights violations, surveillance 

abuse, police brutality, imprisonment, involuntary settlement, stripping of citizen's 

rights, lustration and violent action to people who oppose the government and/or the general public 

Human rights – basic, fundamental rights to which every person is entitled because they are human 

beings. 

International influence/Soft Power – the ability of a nation persuade other nations to adopt changes 

by modeling good behavior, rather than the use of force or coercion. 

International relations – the relationships that dictate interactions between countries, their 

governments, and their people. 

Moral obligation – An obligation arising out of considerations of right and wrong or a sense of duty 

or priority imposed by moral standards. 

Public health – is the result of an organized effort of a society to improve the health and life-span of 

its people. 

Raul Castro – is a politician and leader of the Communist Party of Cuba. 

Regime a government in power; a mode or system of rule or government. 

Totalitarianism – is a political system in which the state holds total authority over its society and 

seeks to control all aspects of public and private affairs. 

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1AC 1/6 

Contention 1 is Inherency: 

Despite small changes, United States maintains an embargo that bars most economic activity 

with Cuba. 

Guzmán, Emmy award winning journalist, 2013 

(Sandra, “Jay-Z and Beyoncé's trip to Cuba isn't the problem, the embargo is,” CNN, May 8, Online: 

http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/07/opinion/guzman-beyonce-jay-z-cuba/index.html) 

The few but very influential pro-embargo lobby have put a stranglehold on a lucid discussion 

surrounding Cuba. Five decades of failed policy later, our nation is being held hostage unable 

to have a cogent discussion on anything Cuba-related. The U.S. embargo has not and will not 

work. Put in place in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, the policy is stuck in a time warp that 

has nothing to do with modern-day reality. The most enduring embargo in modern day history is a 

remnant of a Cold War past when the Soviet Union was the enemy and the world was on the brink of 

nuclear war. The thinking was that financial sanctions, which included a ban on travel by 

American citizens, would collapse the island economy and force people to revolt against Fidel 

Castro. Over the years, these sanctions have been eased or toughened depending on political 

winds. In 1992, disgraced New Jersey Rep. Robert Torricelli was behind one the cruelest acts 

which banned, among many things, food and medicine sales to Cuba and prevented Cuban- 

American families from sending cash to their relatives. These were tough times and seeing many 

friends and families suffer because they couldn't visit their elderly mothers more than once every 

three years, or being prevented from sending them needed supplies, was very painful. Restrictions 

have eased under President Barack Obama but there is still a major ban. Enter Jay Z and 

Beyoncé. It's 2013 and we need to debate Cuban policy earnestly. Members of Congress must 

stop the cowardice around the issue and stop humoring the delusions of passionate folks 

stuck in the 1960s for political votes and favor. The pro-embargo folks are ignoring the policy's 

epic failure and fail to recognize that U.S. policy has played into the hands of the Castro 

brothers, who have sinisterly used it to make the case to their people that if Cuba is starving 

and the island economy can't grow, it's because of this U.S. policy. 

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1AC 2/6 

Contention 2 is Public Health: 

The embargo restricts the flow of medical goods and creates financial strains that threaten to 

collapse the Cuban healthcare system. 

Xinhua News, 2012 

(“Cuban healthcare weakended by U.S. embargo,” 11/28, Online: 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/health/2012-11/28/c_132004531.htm) 

Cuban medical authorities said on Tuesday a 50-year trade embargo imposed by the United 

States has severely undermined the country's healthcare system. Cuban hospitals suffer 

restrictions in acquiring imported medical consumables and medicine, advanced medical 

technology and latest scientific information, officials said. The public Institute of Cardiology 

and Cardiovascular Surgery, where thousands of people receive free medical care every year 

from international specialists, is financially strained by the embargo. "We must find alternatives 

that sometimes include purchasing from distant markets, buying from third parties, which means 

higher prices for these products," said Director of the institute Dr. Lorenzo Llerena. He added 

some equipments were simply unattainable, "because they are manufactured in the United 

States." The embargo has caused Cuba a loss of more than 200 million dollars in the medical 

sector alone by 2011, representing a significant impact on the tiny Caribbean nation, according to 

official figures. John Rhodes, a patient, told Xinhua that Cuba had made a great effort for the benefit 

of all its citizens. "It provides us free medicine across the country, which is highly expensive around 

the world," he said, adding "due to the U.S. embargo, sometimes we do not have all the raw 

materials and tools to solve certain problems immediately." 

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1AC 3/6 

These strains contribute to massive loss of life in Cuba – we have a moral obligation to lift the 

embargo. 

Eisenberg, former Professor Emeritus of Social Medicine and Psychology at the Harvard 

Medical School, 1997 

(Leon, “The sleep of reason produces monsters – human costs of economic sanctions,” The New 

England Journal of Medicine, 336:17, pgs. 1248-1250, ProQuest) 

Thus, three unusual outbreaks of medical conditions -- neuropathy, self-inflicted disease, and 

injuries caused by rioting -- stemmed from U.S. economic sanctions. The sanctions may be 

aimed at Fidel Castro, but the victims are the ordinary citizens of Cuba. Castro looks as well fed 

as ever. Economic sanctions afflict civilians, not soldiers and not the leaders of autocratic 

societies. Yet the United States continues to employ such sanctions against dictators (or at least 

those dictators it suits present policy to condemn). When the sanctions are applied, they are allencompassing. 

The interdicted trade with Cuba includes visits by medical delegations and the 

mailing of medical journals such as this one. Whom do medical journals empower, dictators or 

doctors Can freedom be defended by suppressing information any more than by interrupting 

food supplies or drugs Iraq is an even more disastrous example of war against the public 

health. Two months after the end of the six-week war, which began on January 16, 1991, a study 

team from the Harvard School of Public Health visited Iraq to examine the medical consequences of 

sanctions imposed after the armed conflict. The destruction of the country's power plants had brought 

its entire system of water purification and distribution to a halt, leading to epidemics of cholera, 

typhoid fever, and gastroenteritis, particularly among children. Mortality rates doubled or tripled 

among children admitted to hospitals in Baghdad and Basra. Cases of marasmus appeared for the 

first time in decades. The team observed "suffering of tragic proportions. . . . [with children] dying of 

preventable diseases and starvation."5 Although the allied bombing had caused few civilian 

casualties, the destruction of the infrastructure resulted in devastating long-term effects on health. An 

international group supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) carried out a more 

comprehensive study five months later by interviewing members of households selected to represent 

the Iraqi population.6 The age-adjusted relative mortality rate among children in the eight months 

after the war, as compared with the five years before the war, was 3.2. There were approximately 

47,000 excess deaths among children under five years of age during the first eight months of 1991. 

The deaths resulted from infectious diseases, the decreased quality and availability of food 

and water, and an enfeebled medical care system hampered by the lack of drugs and 

supplies. The Cuban and Iraqi instances make it abundantly clear that economic sanctions 

are, at their core, a war against public health. Our professional ethic demands the defense of 

public health. Thus, as physicians, we have a moral imperative to call for the end of sanctions. 

Having found the cause, we must act to remove it. Continuing to allow our reason to sleep will 

produce more monsters. 

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1AC 4/6 

Contention 3 is Government Repression: 

Despite claims of progress, Castro’s government continues to violate the political and civil 

rights of Cuban citizens 

Brewer, CEO of Criminal Justice International Associates, 2013 

(Jerry, “Political Change in Cuba so that everything remains the same,” May 6, Online: 

http://www.mexidata.info/id3612.html) 

The most discussed world critique, beyond the misery and decades of economic failures of 

Castro rule and their professed world revolution, is in the well documented record of human 

tragedy and the abysmal human rights record. Since the early days of Fidel Castro's rule 

essential freedoms of association, assembly, movement and expression have been withheld 

from the people of Cuba, and many citizens who dared to take a stand against the 

revolutionary oppression have been beaten, tortured, imprisoned and/or killed. This record 

has been passed on in a sort of diabolical rite of passage to Raul Castro, who has tiptoed in 

perceived progress. Reportedly under his watch the Cuban government released "more than 125 

prisoners in 2010-2011," but since 2012 the number of political prisoners has reportedly 

increased. In January 2013 the Havana-based Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National 

Reconciliation (CCDHRN), estimated that Cuba "held at least 90 political prisoners, compared to an 

estimated 50 in April 2012, and more than 200 estimated at the beginning of 2010." What 

vociferously trumpets these charges and abuses is a report from March 2012 by Amnesty 

International, maintaining that "the Cuban government wages a permanent campaign of 

harassment and short-term detentions of political opponents to stop them from demanding 

respect for civil and political rights." It appears clear from these numbers and the record that 

the release of political prisoners in 2011 has shown no changes in the Cuban regime's human 

rights policy. What is clear, pursuant to those voices that escape censorship by this Communistrun 

island's secretive citadel of power, is a continuance of constant surveillance, intimidation, 

harassment, and acts of repudiation against citizens who dare to speak out and demand 

change. 

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1AC 5/6 

These violations are reprehensible – the United States has an obligation to promote political 

change 

Navarro, former ambassador the UN Human Rights Commission, 2002 

(Ana, “Defending Repressed Cubans,” April, Online: http://www.sigloxxi.org/Archivo/repressed.htm) 

During 2001, repression has increased in Cuba. For the last 43 years, the basic human rights of 

the Cuban people have been violated. Cubans do not have political rights because Castro and 

the Communist Party, the only legal party, have absolute power. Those who peacefully have 

tried to promote changes have ended up in prisons. For the Cuban people, there is no justice. 

The fundamental democratic precept of judicial independence is not valid. Judges are chosen by 

the Communist Party based on their political integration and commitment to the regime. Closeddoor 

and summary trials are frequently held. The common citizen has no protection against the 

regime's violence. People under arrest are held incommunicado indefinitely. The police and the 

armed forces, too, are politicized; they beat, arrest and even murder those who protest against the 

lack of rights. In Cuba, the ''Rapid Response Brigades,'' armed with sticks and iron bars and 

dressed as civilians, attack human-rights advocates to give the impression to the international 

media that ''the common people'' spontaneously clash with opposition groups. The political 

prisoners suffer the most. They are confined in cells with highly dangerous common 

prisoners who attack them, with the guards' tacit approval. Political prisoners also are denied 

medical attention as a form of punishment. Cubans are afraid to tell their suffering. Few dare 

speak out; the price is high. Dr. Oscar Elías Biscet, a dissident, has been beaten and arrested 

many times. He is still in prison. Freedom of the press is suppressed totally. All mass media 

belong to the government, and there is no possibility of expressing a dissenting opinion in the 

media. Cuban authorities brag about their education and health systems. But they fail to mention that 

students must participate in pro-government activities to be able to attend universities or technical 

schools. Or that students who don't sympathize with the government are expelled. Or that 

workers who disagree with regime policies are fired from their jobs. The repression in Cuba is 

such that distributing the Declaration of Human Rights is classified a ''counterrevolutionary 

activity,'' which is enough to earn a Cuban a beating from the police or paramilitary brigades. 

The human-rights violations perpetrated by the Cuban government are inexcusable. We, the 

countries that believe in freedom and live in democracy, should not abandon the people of 

Cuba. 

Thus, we propose the following plan: 

The United States federal government should end its embargo on Cuba. 

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1AC 6/6 

Contention 4 is Solvency: 

Lifting the embargo would alleviate Cuban suffering and allow Cubans to focus on the fight for 

liberty. 

Perez, professor of history & director of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the 

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010 

(Louis, “Want change in Cuba End US embargo,” CNN, September 21, Online: 

http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/09/20/perez.cuba.embargo/index.html) 

But if the administration really wanted to do something in the national interest, it would end 

the 50-year-old policy of political and economic isolation of Cuba. The Cuban embargo can no 

longer even pretend to be plausible. On the contrary, it has contributed to the very conditions that 

stifle democracy and human rights there. For 50 years, its brunt has fallen mainly on the Cuban 

people. This is not by accident. On the contrary, the embargo was designed to impose 

suffering and hunger on Cubans in the hope that they would rise up and overturn their 

government. "The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support," the Department of State 

insisted as early as April 1960, "is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic 

dissatisfaction and hardship." The United States tightened the screws in the post-Soviet years with 

the Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act -- measures designed, Sen. Robert Torricelli said, "to 

wreak havoc on that island." The post-Soviet years were indeed calamitous. Throughout the 

1990s, Cubans faced growing scarcities, deteriorating services and increased rationing. 

Meeting the needs of ordinary life took extraordinary effort. And therein lies the problem that 

still bedevils U.S. policy today. Far from inspiring the Cuban people to revolution, the 

embargo keeps them down and distracted. Dire need and urgent want are hardly optimum 

circumstances for a people to contemplate the benefits of democracy. A people preoccupied 

with survival have little interest or inclination to bestir themselves in behalf of anything else. 

In Cuba, routine household errands and chores consume overwhelming amounts of time and energy, 

day after day: hours in lines at the local grocery store or waiting for public transportation. Cubans in 

vast numbers choose to emigrate. Others burrow deeper into the black market, struggling to make do 

and carry on. Many commit suicide. (Cuba has one of the highest suicide rates in the world; in 2000, 

the latest year for which we have statistics, it was 16.4 per 100,000 people.) A June 2008 survey in 

The New York Times reported that less than 10 percent of Cubans identified the lack of political 

freedom as the island's main problem. As one Cuban colleague recently suggested to me: "First 

necessities, later democracy." The United States should consider a change of policy, one that 

would offer Cubans relief from the all-consuming ordeal of daily life. Improved material 

circumstances would allow Cubans to turn their attention to other aspirations. Ending the 

embargo would also imply respect for the Cuban people, an acknowledgment that they have the 

vision and vitality to enact needed reforms, and that transition in Cuba, whatever form it may take, is 

wholly a Cuban affair. A good-faith effort to engage Cuba, moreover, would counter the 

common perception there that the United States is a threat to its sovereignty. It would deny 

Cuban leaders the chance to use U.S. policy as pretext to limit public debate and stifle dissent 

-- all to the good of democracy and human rights. And it would serve the national interest. 

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Advantage Add-on: US/Latin American Relations (1/2) 

[ ] Relations with Latin America are at an all-time low – lifting the embargo on Cuba is a 

key starting point to spur cooperation on global problems. 

Perez, JD from Yale Law School, 2010 

(David, “America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the US State 

Department,” Harvard Latino Law Review, Lexis Nexis) 

In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by 

going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin 

American people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the 

problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership 

and cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to 

shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses 

heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not 

only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look 

to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5 When analyzing ecosystems, environmental 

scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size, function as 

lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is 

a keystone nation in Latin America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy 

toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, 

America's reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other 

countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to 

the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the Obama 

Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba 

litmus test of its own. n8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to 

expect other countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would 

have a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward 

creating goodwill. 

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Advantage Add-on: US/Latin American Relations (2/2) 

[ ] Strong relations with Latin America are necessary to minimize the impact of multiple 

global threats like nuclear proliferation and global warming. 

Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, 2012 

(IAD is a think tank hosting 100 leaders and experts from the US and Latin America, “Remaking the 

Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, Online: 

http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) 

In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are 

assuming enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues. 

Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important 

include: As the world’s lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to 

participate more actively in non-proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests 

do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For 

example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts 

of the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that 

context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. Many countries in 

the region give priority to climate change challenges. This may position them as a voice in 

international debates on this topic. The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate 

concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico 

already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. 

Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. 

Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in 2010. The United 

States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support 

coordination on the presumption of shared interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin 

Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become 

increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States and 

Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests and goals that 

should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the 

problem. Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important that the 

United States and the region increase their attention to reshaping regional institutions to better align 

them with current realities and challenges and to make them more effective. The hemisphere’s 

institutional architecture is in great flux, and there is growing need for decisions about 

priorities and objectives. 

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Answers to: Public Health is Doing Well Despite Embargo 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba has an outstanding healthcare system – the only obstacle to effective care is a 

lack of equipment & supplies that are unavailable due to the embargo. 

Randall, MD in internal medicine from Indiana University, 2000 

(Judith, “Does the US Embargo Affect Cuban Healthcare,” Journal of the National Cancer Institute 

92:12, Online: http://jnci.oxfordjournals.org/content/92/12/963.full) 

“These hospitals were all well staffed with very qualified physicians, highly committed and 

knowledgeable in their fields,” he said. He was pleased to find, too, that Cuban health care, 

tertiary care included, is free and available for everyone. But he also found that, because of the 

embargo, “the management of patients can be difficult” due to a lack of such items as bonemarrow 

aspiration needles and high-dose formulations of cytosine-arabinoside and shortages of 

antibiotics, equipment, current textbooks, and basic medical supplies. Variations on the above 

themes are not hard to find. Under a program called MEDICC (http://www.medicc.org), students 

working toward health sciences degrees in the United States and Canada spend 4 to 8 weeks 

in Cuba taking courses in their fields and doing clinical rotations mentored by local 

physicians. They often return from the experience to report that universal precautions are not 

observed in Cuba; for example, the precious few rubber gloves available are reserved for 

surgical procedures, and, just as cars in Cuba are likely to be vintage models, things like 

anesthesia and x-ray machines are, too. 

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Answers to: Doctors Will Leave if we Lift Embargo 

[ ] 

[ ] Doctors are already leaving – they are fed up with poor treatment. 

Garrett, Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2010 

(Laurie, “Castrocare in Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, 89:4, July/August, EBSCOhost) 

Cuba's doctors are increasingly strained. Physicians return from years abroad because they 

must, both contractually and to avoid repercussions for their relatives in Cuba. They then must 

accept whatever assignments the government gives them, including sometimes years of 

service in a remote village, a Havana slum, or a sparsely populated tobacco growing area. 

Many doctors and nurses leave the health-care system altogether, taking jobs as taxi drivers 

or in hotels, where they can earn CUCs. In February 2010, seven Cuban doctors sued the Cuban 

and Venezuelan governments, charging that the mandatory service they had performed in Venezuela 

in exchange for oil shipments to the Cuban government constituted "modern slavery" and "conditions 

of servilism for debt." Large numbers of defections among doctors, meanwhile, have caused the 

Cuban regime to cut back on physician placements to some countries, such as South Africa. 

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Answers to: Engagement Hurts Public Health Industry 

[ ] 

[ ] The embargo is comparatively worse than engagement – it punishes international 

actors that trade with Cuba and US technology is essential to health. 

Amnesty International, international organization promoting human rights, 2009 

(“The US Embargo Against Cuba,” Online: http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf) 

Even so, the U.S. embargo of food and the de facto embargo on medical supplies has 

wreaked havoc with the island's model primary health care system.”46 During the first three 

decades of the embargo, the export of medicines was allowed for “humanitarian” reasons 

only. In 1992, with the passage of the CDA, the sales of medicines were exempt from the embargo. 

However, access to medicines became virtually impossible for Cuba. Every export of medicine 

required that “the President of the USA certify, through on-site inspections approved by the 

President, that all components of a shipment of medical products to Cuba were used for the 

purpose intended.” 47 The tightening of the US embargo during the 1990s exacerbated the 

economic crisis in Cuba as the country had lost the economic support from the Soviet Union.48 This 

affected the capacity of the Cuban health system to deliver to the population the same 

standards of health care as before the economic crisis. The Resident Coordinator for the 

Operational Activities for Development of the United Nations System reported in the UN Secretary- 

General’s 2008 report on the impact of the US embargo: “Goods, services or technologies 

produced by the United States or covered by United States patents or containing any element 

produced or patented by the United States are not available to Cuba. This includes 

medicines, medical equipment and other products under the category of humanitarian 

assistance, even when such products are purchased through multilateral cooperation.” 49 

The CDA contains provisions for its enforcement outside the USA, resulting in severe 

limitations to Cuba’s access to an international supply of medicines and medical equipment. 

Furthermore, the expansion of US pharmaceutical companies in the last three decades has limited 

the number of companies able to export their products to Cuba without facing penalties from the US 

government. The Helms-Burton Act penalizes non-US companies and nationals for trading 

with Cuba. Although commercial opportunities are available to Cuba throughout the rest of 

the Americas, Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, the Helms-Burton Act has an inhibiting effect on 

non-US medical companies, therefore limiting Cuba’s access to medicines, medical 

equipment and technologies. In the health care sector in particular, Cubans are denied the latest 

generation of equipment and medicine, available in some cases only from US companies or 

at prohibitively high prices through third countries.50 For instance, the World Health 

Organization reported “lack of diagnostic materials and equipment, replacement parts, surgical 

supplies and drugs hinders the operations of emergency services and care for patients in serious 

condition. The resources for treating patients who need this type of care, adults and children alike, 

are limited. In the case of patients with psychiatric disorders, state-of-the-art drugs are 

unavailable.”51 

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Answers to: Food Shortages Improve Obesity Rates 

[ ] 

[ ] The embargo restricts free flow of agricultural goods from US – these are key to 

Cuba’s recovery from natural disasters and food shortages 

Zimmerman, fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2010 

(Chelsea, “Rethinking the Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time to Mend a Broken Policy,” A 

Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership: Papers of the 2009-2010 Center Fellows, 

Online: http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf) 

Trade levels between Cuba and the U.S. could reach $5 billion annually by removing the trade 

embargo, resulting in a boost to American agribusinesses while also helping to alleviate 

hunger among Cubans. A policy environment open to international trade and investment is a 

necessary ingredient to sustain higher rates of economic growth and to promote political freedom 

through exposure to new technology, communications, and democratic ideas (Griswold, 1; Sachs 

and Warner). Allowing Cuba to more freely import U.S. food is a means of lowering domestic 

prices and increasing incomes of the poor, food availability and domestic production. U.S. 

companies will introduce new technologies and production methods, while raising wages 

and labor standards as a result of trading with Cuba. The additional creation of wealth will 

help to advance social, political, and economic conditions independent of the governing 

authorities in Cuba. The most economically open countries today are more than three times as 

likely to enjoy full political and civil freedoms as those that are relatively closed (Griswold, 1). Lifting 

certain trade restrictions would assist Cuba in its efforts to recover from the damage caused 

by its recent hurricanes. If the U.S. exempted construction equipment and agricultural 

machinery from the Cuban trade ban through regulatory action, the Cuban people could 

benefit from the loosening of restrictions without overhauling the entire embargo. 

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Answers to: Wealth from engagement goes to regime 

[ ] 

[ ] Lifting the embargo is a prerequisite for democratization – Castro blames social 

problems on the US and economic prosperity will go directly to Cuban citizens. 

Griswold, director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, 2009 

(Daniel, The US Embargo of Cuba Is a Failure,” CATO, June 15 th , Online: 

http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-embargo-cuba-is-failure) 

Advocates of the embargo argue that trading with Cuba will only put dollars into the coffers of the 

Castro regime. And it’s true that the government in Havana, because it controls the economy, can 

skim off a large share of the remittances and tourist dollars spent in Cuba. But of course, selling 

more US products to Cuba would quickly relieve the Castro regime of those same dollars. If 

more US tourists were permitted to visit Cuba, and at the same time US exports to Cuba were 

further liberalised, the US economy could reclaim dollars from the Castro regime as fast as 

the regime could acquire them. In effect, the exchange would be of agricultural products for tourism 

services, a kind of “bread for beaches”, “food for fun” trade relationship. Meanwhile, the increase in 

Americans visiting Cuba would dramatically increase contact between Cubans and 

Americans. The unique US-Cuban relationship that flourished before Castro could be 

renewed, which would increase US influence and potentially hasten the decline of the 

communist regime. Congress and President Barack Obama should act now to lift the embargo 

to allow more travel and farm exports to Cuba. Expanding our freedom to travel to, trade with 

and invest in Cuba would make Americans better off and would help the Cuban people and 

speed the day when they can enjoy the freedom they deserve. 

16 | P a g e




Answers to: Economic engagement won’t destabilize regime 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic prosperity will erode Castro’s base – it’s a prerequisite to peaceful 

transition. 




However, Washington's policy for the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on the 

political situation (i.e., free and fair elections). This myopic approach has ignored the possibility 

of doing an end-run around Castro's political recalcitrance by simply giving the Cuban people 

(and government) an offer they can't refuse: economic success. As long as the political arena 

remains the battlefield upon which Washington and Havana wage their ideological war, there will 

always be stalemate. Transitions from other Cold War-era governments demonstrate that 

economic liberalization helped facilitate political liberalization. In Poland, the labor unions 

flourished before political parties were finally established after the fall of the Soviet Union; n54 in 

Russia, mass privatization paved the way for moderate political freedoms; n55 in Vietnam, the 

government started to embrace market-based reforms in the mid to late-1980s; n56 and finally, in 

China, an unmistakably capitalist society has emerged, although elections have still not been held. 

n57 Cuba will be no different. In early 2009, the Cuban government approved the largest land 

distribution since the revolution when it handed out 45,500 land grants to the private sector. n58 

Another reason economic reforms are likely to precede political reforms is that the population 

seems hungrier to see an economic respite after decades of austerity. This may also be a result 

of their belief that the Cuban regime will try to maintain its monopolistic grip on politics for as long as 

[*208] possible, even if it loosens its grip on the economy. When Raul Castro began his version of a 

"listening tour" around the island he also initiated a series of debates. During one of these town hall 

meetings Ricardo Alarcon, the leader of the National Assembly as of April 2009, was barraged with 

questions that focused on the economy - specifically Cuba's dual-currency system. n59 Although 

such intimate private-public participation has been rare on the totalitarian island, once the window of 

opportunity was opened, a burst of activity flowed through. Reloading the diplomatic cannon by 

encouraging economic reform, rather than focusing on political reform, would represent a 

more dynamic approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. 

17 | P a g e




Answers to: No US/Cuban Trade 

[ ] 

[ ] The financial incentive for trade and the risk of worse sanctions as a punishment will 

motivate Cuba to trade with the US. 




These first few steps would then allow the United States to begin by engaging Cuba in a multi-lateral 

framework. The model can mirror the six-party talks held with North Korea, which provide a structure 

for direct American engagement with the North Korean government. n87 The Cuban government 

will likely participate since the United States has so much to offer, including the reduction of 

sanctions, various security guarantees, the promise of normalized relations, and an eventual 

end to Cuba's isolation. Combined with these carrots, the United States will also have the stick 

of increased sanctions, and a reversion back to diplomatic isolation. 

18 | P a g e




Answers to: Cuba Controls Imports 

[ ] 

[ ] Even if money goes to the Cuban government, it encourages change in behavior. 




As discussed above, any major reform in Cuba should first begin in the economic sector, as 

opposed to the political sector. The Cuban government will likely accept foreign investment 

and introduce elements of private ownership into its economy long before it releases its 

stranglehold on politics and holds free elections. Although the first stage of economic reform has 

already begun, this stage can end at a moment's notice. Policy performance matters, and nothing 

breeds success like success. Therefore, the U.S. should design a policy that helps ensure that 

these initial reforms are successful. Success of reform will breed more reform and an 

increased demand for a different economic environment. In this way, an initial aperture's 

success will punch a hole in the Cuban government's ability to restrain economic [*235] 

activity while maintaining credibility. While Cuba introduces these financial reforms, the U.S. 

should resist calls to strengthen the economic sanctions, and should instead respond to any 

economic opening on the island with more bilateral trade opportunities. By engaging Cuba 

economically, rather than isolating it politically, the U.S. could help link an entire generation of 

Cubans to the capitalist world. 

19 | P a g e




Answers to: Regime is Resilient/Benefits from Trade 

[ ] 

[ ] Most of Cuba’s problems stem from the embargo – trade will improve conditions even 

if the regime still exists. 

Franks, South American correspondent for Reuters, 2012 

(Jeff, “Cuba says ending US embargo would help both countries,” September 20, Online: 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/20/us-cuba-usa-embargo-idUSBRE88J15G20120920) 

Both the United States and Cuba would benefit if Washington would lift its longstanding trade 

embargo against the island, but U.S. President Barack Obama has toughened the sanctions 

since taking office in 2009, a top Cuban official said on Thursday. The embargo, fully in place 

since 1962, has done $108 billion in damage to the Cuba economy, but also has violated the 

constitutional rights of Americans and made a market of 11 million people off limits to U.S. 

companies, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez told reporters. "The blockade is, without doubt, the 

principal cause of the economic problems of our country and the essential obstacle for (our) 

development," he said, using Cuba's term for the embargo. "The blockade provokes suffering, 

shortages, difficulties that reach each Cuban family, each Cuban child," Rodriguez said. He 

spoke at a press conference that Cuba stages each year ahead of what has become an annual vote 

in the United Nations on a resolution condemning the embargo. The vote is expected to take place 

next month. Last year, 186 countries voted for the resolution, while only the United States and Israel 

supported the embargo, Rodriguez said. Lifting the embargo would improve the image of the 

United States around the world, he said, adding that it would also end what he called a 

"massive, flagrant and systematic violation of human rights." 

20 | P a g e




Answers to: US/Latin American Relations Resilient 

[ ] 

[ ] US influence in the region is at an all-time low – restoring them is key to avoid multiple 

global threats 




Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's 

importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the 

issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently 

affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, 

but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation 

more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, 

Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy 

toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the 

region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban 

relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be 

pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years. Aside 

from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more 

serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed 

state are slim, the threat is nevertheless real. If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge 

into civil war, face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a 

massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new and 

comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare scenarios from 

materializing. There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that 

it will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To address 

the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs, the environment, 

trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its heavily damaged image and 

regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader. Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is 

a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new energy and credibility into America's 

image. 

21 | P a g e




Answers to: Other Factors Hurt US/Latin American Relations 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba is the key to restoring relations – it is a symbolic issue. 

The Washington Post, 2009 

(“US Urged to Relax Cuba Policy to Boost Regional Relations,” The Washington Post, May 29, 

Online: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-29/politics/36798831_1_cuba-scholar-oasmembers-travel-restrictions) 

Eliminating the Cold War-era ban would be largely symbolic, because Cuba has shown no sign 

of wanting to return to the OAS, the main forum for political cooperation in the hemisphere. But the 

debate shows how central the topic has become in U.S. relations with an increasingly 

assertive Latin America. The wrangling over Cuba threatens to dominate a meeting of hemispheric 

foreign ministers, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, scheduled for Tuesday in 

Honduras. "Fifty years after the U.S. . . . made Cuba its litmus test for its commercial and 

diplomatic ties in Latin America, Latin America is turning the tables," said Julia E. Sweig, a 

Cuba scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations. Now, she said, Latin countries are "making 

Cuba the litmus test for the quality of the Obama administration's approach to Latin America." 

President Obama has taken steps toward improving ties with Cuba, lifting restrictions on visits 

and money transfers by Cuban Americans and offering to restart immigration talks suspended in 

2004. But he has said he will not scrap the longtime economic embargo until Havana makes 

democratic reforms and cleans up its human rights record. Ending the embargo would also entail 

congressional action. Obama is facing pressure to move faster, both from Latin American allies 

and from key U.S. lawmakers. Bipartisan bills are pending in Congress that would eliminate all travel 

restrictions and ease the embargo. 

22 | P a g e





[ ] 

[ ] Lifting the embargo on Cuba is the key to improve the United States’ relationship with 

Latin America 

Goodman, editor for Bloomberg’s coverage of Latin America, 2009 

(Joshua, “Latin American to Push Obama on Cuba,” Bloomberg, April 13, Online: 

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid=newsarchive&sid=aLnOE1ib3E3Y) 

When Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba will be at the heart 

of the U.S. relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for half a 

century. While Latin American leaders split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift 

the 47-year-old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to Mexico’s 

pro-business Felipe Calderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point 

for reviving U.S. relations with the region, which are at their lowest point in two decades. 

Obama, born six months before President John F. Kennedy imposed the embargo, isn’t prepared to 

support ending it. Instead, he’ll seek to satisfy the leaders at the April 17-19 summit in Port of Spain, 

Trinidad and Tobago, with less ambitious steps disclosed by the administration today -- repealing 

restrictions on family visits and remittances imposed by former President George W. Bush. That 

would mesh with his stated goal of changing the perception of “U.S. arrogance” that he attributed to 

his predecessor in his sole policy speech on the region last May. “All of Latin America and the 

Caribbean are awaiting a change in policy toward Cuba,” Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General 

of the Washington-based Organization of American States, said in an interview. “They value what 

Obama has promised, but they want more.” The policy changes unveiled today also include an 

expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island, and a plan to allow U.S. telecommunications 

companies to apply for licenses in Cuba. Symbolically Important Cuba, the only country in the 

hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is symbolically important to the region’s 

leaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes and looked to Cuba and its 

longtime leader Fidel Castro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though most countries 

shun the communist policies of Castro and his brother, now-President Raul Castro, the U.S. alone 

in the hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with the island. “Cuba represents a 

50-year policy failure in Latin America and that’s why it’s so important for Obama to address it 

now,” says Wayne Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, who 

headed the State Department’s Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979-1982. “Unless Obama 

wants to be booed off the stage, he better come with fresh ideas.” 

23 | P a g e





[ ] 

[ ] Latin America is receptive to American influence – the plan is a step in the right 

direction. 

Grandin, Professor of History at New York University, 2010 

(Greg, “Empire’s Senescence: US Policy in Latin America,” New Labor Forum, 19:1, Winter, pp. 14- 

23) 

It is easy to imagine an improved U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America, designed not to 

advance a set of altruistic ideals but merely to defend its interests—broadly defined to mean 

stable politics and economies that are open to U.S. capital and commodities—and to achieve 

what those in the liberal wing of the foreign policy establishment have long advocated: a 

maximization of U.S. “soft power.” Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to 

get what you want through attraction rather than coercion,” through an enhanced 

understanding and utilization of multilateral institutions, mutually beneficial policies, cultural 

exchanges, and commercial relations.1 There are no immediate threats to the U.S. in Latin 

America. A majority of the region’s political elite—even most of its current governing leftists— 

share many of the same values the United States claims to embody, even more so following the 

election of the first African-American president, who is wildly popular in Latin America. As a result, 

there is no other place in the world that offers U.S. president Barack Obama the opportunity to 

put into place the kind of intelligent foreign policy that he and his closest advisors, such as 

United Nations (U.N.) ambassador Susan Rice, believe is necessary to stop the hemorrhaging of 

U.S. prestige—one that would both improve Washington’s ability to deploy its many 

competitive advantages, while removing key points of friction. 

24 | P a g e

Cuba Embargo Negative

Cuba Embargo Negative 



Cuba Embargo Negative – Table of Contents 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 2 

Advantage Answers 

Answers to: Public Health Advantage: 

Cuban Public Health System Strong Now – Focus on Prevention ................................................. 3 

Cuban Public Health System Strong Now – Free Care ................................................................. 4 

Answers to: Public Health Wrecked by Embargo ........................................................................... 5 

Lifting Embargo Hurts Healthcare System ..................................................................................... 6 

Lifting Embargo Hurts Healthcare – Healthcare Workers Leave .................................................... 7 

Lifting Embargo Hurts Public Health – Causes Obesity .............................................................. 8-9 

Answers to: Government Repression Advantage: 

Lifting Embargo Increases Government Repression ................................................................... 11 

Lifting Embargo Increases Government Repression – History Proves ........................................ 12 

Lifting Embargo Increases Government Repression – Funds Regime ................................... 13-13 

Answers to: US/Latin American Relations Advantage: 

No Impact – US/Latin American Relations Resilient .................................................................... 15 

No Impact – China Fills in for US ................................................................................................. 16 

Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – Other Unpopular Factors ...................................................... 17 

Solvency 

Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – Regime Resilient ................................................................... 18 

Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – Government Backlash ........................................................... 19 

Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – Cuba Controls Imports .......................................................... 20 

Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – No US/Cuban Trade ............................................................. 21




Glossary 

Backlash – a strong or violent reaction, as to some social or political change 

Biodiversity – the number, or abundance of different species living within a particular region 

Economic engagement – is a foreign policy strategy which seeks to increase ties between countries 

through economic interaction. 

Embargo/Sanctions – are trade restrictions put in place against target countries with the aim of 

discouraging certain behaviors like human rights violations or military build-up. 

Exploitation – the use of someone or something in an unjust or cruel manner for economic, social, 

and political gain 

Government Repression – sometimes used synonymously with the term political discrimination; 

often carried out through discriminatory policies, such as human rights violations, surveillance 

abuse, police brutality, imprisonment, involuntary settlement, stripping of citizen's 

rights, lustration and violent action to people who oppose the government and/or the general public 

Human rights – basic, fundamental rights to which every person is entitled because they are human 

beings. 

International influence/Soft Power – the ability of a nation persuade other nations to adopt changes 

by modeling good behavior, rather than the use of force or coercion. 

International relations – the relationships that dictate interactions between countries, their 

governments, and their people. 

Moral obligation – An obligation arising out of considerations of right and wrong or a sense of duty 

or priority imposed by moral standards. 

Public health – is the result of an organized effort of a society to improve the health and life-span of 

its people. 

Raul Castro – is a politician and leader of the Communist Party of Cuba. 

Regime a government in power; a mode or system of rule or government. 

Totalitarianism – is a political system in which the state holds total authority over its society and 

seeks to control all aspects of public and private affairs.




Cuban Public Health System Strong Now – Focus on Prevention 

[ ] The Cuban health care industry guarantees basic health coverage – it provides 

exceptional preventative medicine for all citizens. 



The two keys to Cuba's medical and public health achievements are training provided by the 

state and a community-based approach that requires physicians to live in the neighborhoods 

they serve and be on call 24 hours a day. In the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, more than 

one-third of Cuba's doctors fled, mostly to the United States, leaving the country with just 6,300 

physicians and a doctor-patient ratio of 9.2 per 10,000, according to the Cuban Ministry of Public 

Health. In response, Fidel Castro declared public health and doctor training to be paramount tasks for 

the new socialist state. By the early 1980s, Cuba led the socialist world -- including its patron, the 

Soviet Union -- in all health indicators. Between 1959 and 1989, Cuba's doctor-patient ratio more 

than tripled, soaring to 33 per 10,000, and health-care expenditures rose by 162 percent. Cuba 

today has the highest doctor-patient ratio in the entire world, with 59 physicians per 10,000 

people -- more than twice the ratio of the United States. Cuba is the world's only poor country 

that can rightly say that basic health is no longer an existential problem for its people. Its 

achievement in this respect is unparalleled. Cuba now boasts more than 73,000 practicing doctors 

(half of whom work in primary care), 107,761 nurses, and a total health-care work force of 566,365, 

according to government figures. About 12 percent of Cuba's adult population is employed by the 

state in the health-care sector. Because of economic exigencies that have limited Cuba's access 

to advanced technology for diagnosing and curing ailments, the Cuban health system has 

focused -- successfully -- on prevention. Between 1959 and 2000, Cuba reduced its infant 

mortality by 90 percent, and the number of mothers who died from pregnancy-related 

complications dropped from 125 per 100,000 live births to 55 per 100,000.




Cuban Public Health System Strong Now – Free Care 

[ ] Cuban health care is exceptional – everyone has access to a doctor and coverage is 

free. 

Campion, M.D. & Morrissey, Ph.D., 2013 

(Edward & Stephen, “A Different Model — Medical Care in Cuba” New England Journal of Medicine, 

Online: http://www.sld.cu/galerias/pdf/sitios/santiagodecuba/nejmp1215226_1.pdf) 

Internet access is virtually nonexistent. And the Cuban health care system also seems unreal. 

There are too many doctors. Everybody has a family physician. Everything is free, totally free — and 

not after prior approval or some copay. The whole system seems turned upside down. It is tightly 

organized, and the first priority is prevention. Although Cuba has limited economic resources, 

its health care system has solved some problems that ours has not yet managed to address. 

Family physicians, along with their nurses and other health workers, are responsible for 

delivering primary care and preventive services to their panel of patients — about 1000 patients 

per physician in urban areas. All care delivery is organized at the local level, and the patients 

and their caregivers generally live in the same community. The medical records in cardboard 

folders are simple and handwritten, not unlike those we used in the United States 50 years ago. But 

the system is surprisingly information-rich and focused on population health.




Answers to: Public Health Wrecked by Embargo 

[ ] 

[ ] Even with the costs imposed by the embargo, Cuba’s health system is exceptional 

now. 

Barry, Member of the Social Sciences Research Council for the Cuban Working Group of the 

American Council of Learned Societies, 2010 

(Paul Drain & Michele “Fifty Years of U.S. Embargo: Cuba's Health Outcomes and Lessons” Science 

Magazine, April, Online: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/328/5978/572.full) 

However, impacts of sanctions on Cuba's financial systems, medical supplies, and aggregate health 

measures appear to be attenuated by their successes in other aspects of health care. Despite the 

embargo, Cuba has produced better health outcomes than most Latin American countries, 

and they are comparable to those of most developed countries. Cuba has the highest average 

life expectancy (78.6 years) and density of physicians per capita (59 physicians per 10,000 

people), and the lowest infant (5.0/1000 live births) and child (7.0/1000 live births) mortality rates 

among 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries (11, 26). In 2006, the Cuban government 

spent about $355 per capita on health, 7.1% of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (11, 26). The 

annual cost of health care for an American was $6714, 15.3% of total U.S. GDP. Cuba also spent 

less on health than most European countries. But low health care costs alone may not fully 

explain Cuba's successes (27), which may relate more to their emphasis on disease 

prevention and primary health care, which have been cultivated during the U.S. trade 

embargo. Cuba has one of the most proactive primary health care systems in the world. By 

educating their population about disease prevention and health promotion, the Cubans rely less 

on medical supplies to maintain a healthy population. The converse is the United States, which 

relies heavily on medical supplies and technologies to maintain a healthy population, but at a very 

high cost.




Lifting Embargo Hurts Healthcare System 

[ ] Lifting the embargo leads to medical tourism which overstretches healthcare system 



Cuba's economic situation has been dire since 1989, when the country lost its Soviet 

benefactors and its economy experienced a 35 percent contraction. Today, Cuba's major 

industries--tourism, nickel mining, tobacco and rum production, and health care--are fragile. 

Cubans blame the long-standing U.S. trade embargo for some of these strains and are wildly 

optimistic about the transformations that will come once the embargo is lifted. Overlooked in 

these dreamy discussions of lifestyle improvements, however, is that Cuba's health-care 

industry will likely be radically affected by any serious easing in trade and travel restrictions 

between the United States and Cuba. If policymakers on both sides of the Florida Straits do not take 

great care, the tiny Caribbean nation could swiftly be robbed of its greatest triumph. First, its public 

health network could be devastated by an exodus of thousands of well-trained Cuban 

physicians and nurses. Second, for-profit U.S. companies could transform the remaining 

health-care system into a prime destination for medical tourism from abroad. The very 

strategies that the Cuban government has employed to develop its system into a major 

success story have rendered it ripe for the plucking by the U.S. medical industry and by 

foreigners eager for affordable, elective surgeries in a sunny climate. In short, although the U.S. 

embargo strains Cuba's health-care system and its overall economy, it may be the better of 

two bad options.




Lifting Embargo Hurts Healthcare – Healthcare Workers Leave 

[ ] Easing the embargo would cause Cuban healthcare professionals to leave the country 

– this would collapse the public healthcare system. 



According to Steven Ullmann of the University of Miami's Cuba Transition Project, if Washington 

lifts its embargo, Cuba can expect a mass exodus of health-care workers and then the 

creation of a domestic health system with two tiers, one private and one public. The system's 

lower, public tier would be at risk of complete collapse. Ullmann therefore suggests "fostering this 

[public] system through partnerships and enhanced compensation of personnel." He also argues that 

officials in both governments should "limit out-migration of scientific brainpower from the country." 

Properly handled, the transition could leave Cuba with a mixed health-care economy -- part public, 

part locally owned and private, and part outsourced and private -- that could compensate Cuban 

physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers enough to keep them in the country and working at 

least part time in the public sector. The only U.S. policy currently in place, however, encourages 

Cuban physicians to immigrate to the United States. In 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security created a special parole program under which health-care workers who defect from Cuba 

are granted legal residence in the United States while they prepare for U.S. medical licensing 

examinations. An estimated 2,000 physicians have taken advantage of the program. Although few 

have managed to gain accreditation as U.S. doctors, largely due to their poor English-language skills 

and the stark differences between Cuban and U.S. medical training, many now work as nurses in 

Florida hospitals. The Castro government, meanwhile, is in a seemingly untenable position. The 

two greatest achievements of the Cuban Revolution -- 100 percent literacy and quality universal 

health care -- depend on huge streams of government spending. If Washington does eventually 

start to normalize relations, plugging just a few holes in the embargo wall would require vast 

additional spending by the Cuban government. The government would have to pay higher 

salaries to teachers, doctors, nurses, and technicians; strengthen the country's deteriorating 

infrastructure; and improve working conditions for common workers. To bolster its health-care 

infrastructure and create incentives for Cuban doctors to stay in the system, Cuba will have to 

find external support from donors, such as the United Nations and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development. But few sources will support Havana with funding as long as the regime restricts 

the travel of its citizens.




Lifting Embargo Hurts Public Health – Causes Obesity 

[ ] Lifting the embargo will harm public health – increased food availability and shift to 

car culture will result in an obesity epidemic. 

Cassimally, med student and blog manager at Nature.com, 2013 

(Khalil, “The Only Positive Effect Of The Cuban Embargo Weight Loss,” April 19, Online: 

http://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/labcoat-life/the_only_positive_effect_of) 

Despite all the atrocity and machiavellianism that trail economic embargoes, science has 

somehow found a way to profit from the Cuban "special period." Thanks to the impressive 

Cuban healthcare system which diligently collected health data even during the "special period," 

Manuel Franco, at the University of Alcalá in Spain and colleagues from US and Cuban 

institutions, were able to analyse some of the health indicators of the time. What they found 

underlines the atrocity of the embargo on the Cuban people but does come with a surprising silver 

lining which they report in a paper published last week by the British Medical Journal (BMJ). The 

shortage of food caused by the embargo led to a population-wide weight loss of about 5.5 kg. 

The food shortage was a direct result of Cuba's inability to import anything. Physical activity 

was another important contributing factor to the weight loss. The Cuban government somehow 

got its hands on more than one million bicycles for the population. During the "special period," 

Cubans were forced to walk or cycle, sometimes for kilometres, as public transport was 

saddled due to the virtual nonexistence of petrol. Interestingly, the weight loss matched with 

declines in cases of diabetes and heart diseases. Essentially, the embargo spurred a mini 

health revolution. As the authors state in the paper: "so far, no country or regional population 

has successfully reduced the distribution of body mass index or reduced the prevalence of 

obesity through public health campaigns or targeted treatment programmes." Where 

campaigns and targeted programmes failed, the embargo succeeded. But it gets more 

interesting. After 1995, the Cuban economy started to pick up again and has risen steadily 

since—especially post-2000. Coupled to this steady economic rise was a resurgence of 

obesity, and with it diabetes and heart diseases. The resurgence was predominantly due to an 

increased energy intake from food and drinks consumed since physical activity only 

marginally decreased. Energy intake reached pre-crisis levels by 2002 and obesity rates had tripled 

that of 1995 by 2011. What the embargo tells us is that even meager loss of weight throughout a 

population, if sustained, can lead to a decline in non-transmissible diseases such as diabetes 

and heart diseases. How to achieve such sustained decline without having an embargo 

imposed however is another question. The usual strategies put forward include sensitisation 

through education and policy changes to promote physical activity, taxes on unhealthy food, etcetera.




Lifting Embargo Hurts Public Health – Causes Obesity 

[ ] The embargo has led to an overall reduction in obesity – people aren’t starving, they’re 

thriving. 

Willett, Chair of the Department of Nutrition at Harvard, 2013 

(Walter, “Weight Changes and Health in Cuba: Learning from Hardship,” BMJ Editorial, April 

9 th , Online: http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f1777) 

Changes in food supplies and reductions in physical activity are fueling increases in 

overweight and obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease worldwide.1 We have had few 

opportunities to see a reversal of this process, which is continuing inexorably almost everywhere. 

One such opportunity was provided by the well developed public health surveillance systems 

in Cuba, which were maintained during a period of serious economic hardship in the early 

1990s. In a linked study (doi:10.1136/bmj.f1515), Franco and colleagues used these systems to look 

at the effects of reduced energy intake and increased physical activity on body weight and the 

occurrence of diabetes, cardiovascular disease, cancer, and death.2 In Cuba, decreased food 

availability and increased physical activity, supported by the distribution of more than a million 

bicycles during 1991 to 1995, led to an average 5.5 kg reduction in weight over five years, 

shifting the whole population distribution of weight downwards. Predictably, a profound and 

almost immediate reduction in the incidence of diabetes occurred, and a striking decline in 

cardiovascular mortality began, with a lag of about five years. These findings are consistent with 

those of the many epidemiologic and clinical studies that have examined the incidence of diabetes, 

cardiovascular disease, and cancer.3 4 5 6 The economic crisis was followed by a slow 

recovery, increased food intake, reduction in activity, and an increase in the prevalence of 

obesity to three times higher than before the crisis. With weight regain, the trend in incidence 

of diabetes rapidly reversed, and a decade after the period of weight loss, the decline in 

cardiovascular disease had greatly slowed. Most troublesome, the continued rapid increase in 

obesity and diabetes predicts that the decline in cardiovascular disease, and thus total 

mortality, will be reversed because the full impact of diabetes on incidence of cardiovascular 

disease is not seen until several decades after diagnosis.5 The apparent lack of effect of weight loss 

on death from cancer seen in the current study is not surprising. Only some cancers are associated 

with obesity and disease latency can be decades.7 More detailed analyses by specific types of 

cancer would be useful.




Lifting Embargo Increases Government Repression 

[ ] All economic benefits of engagement would flow to the government – giving it more 

power to repress its people. 

Radosh, adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute, 2013 

(Ron, “Ron Radosh: The Time to Help Cuba’s Brave Dissidents Is Now- Why the Embargo Must Not 

be Lifted,” March 20 th , Online: http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/ron-radosh-the-time-to-helpcubas-brave-dissidents-is-now-why-the-embargo-must-not-be-lifted/) 

What these liberals and leftists leave out is that this demand — lifting the embargo — is also the 

number one desire of the Cuban Communists. In making it the key demand, these well-meaning 

(at least some of them) liberals echo precisely the propaganda of the Cuban government, 

thereby doing the Castro brothers’ work for them here in the United States. And, as we know, 

many of those who call for this actually believe that the Cuban government is on the side of 

the people, and favor the Cuban Revolution which they see as a positive role model for the 

region. They have always believed, since the 1960s of their youth, that socialism in Cuba has 

pointed the way forward to development and liberty based on the kind of socialist society they wish 

could exist in the United States. Another brave group of Cuban opponents of the regime has actually 

taped a television interview filmed illegally in Havana. “Young Cuban democracy leader Antonio 

Rodiles,” an American support group called Capitol Hill Cubans has reported, “has just released the 

latest episode of his civil society project Estado de Sats (filmed within Cuba), where he discusses the 

importance U.S. sanctions policy with two of Cuba’s most renowned opposition activists and former 

political prisoners, Guillermo Fariñas and Jose Daniel Ferrer.” The argument they present is aimed 

directly at those on the left in the United States, some of whom think they are helping 

democracy in Cuba by calling for an end to the embargo. In strong and clear language, the two 

dissidents say the following: If at this time, the [economic] need of the Cuban government is 

satisfied through financial credits and the lifting of the embargo, repression would increase, it 

would allow for a continuation of the Castro’s society, totalitarianism would strengthen its 

hold and philosophically, it would just be immoral … If you did an opinion poll among Cuban 

opposition activists, the majority would be in favor of not lifting the embargo.




Lifting Embargo Increases Government Repression – History Proves 

[ ] Past regimes have grown stronger through trade – the same is true of Cuba. 

Jorge, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, 2000 

(Dr. Antonio, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy," Institute for Cuban & 

Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers, Online: 

http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28) 

It follows, from all of the above, that a lifting of the embargo at this time would only serve the 

purpose of facilitating to Castro desperately needed resources, mainly in the form of credit 

lines extended by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 

Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and also by private banking and other financial 

institutions. This financial influx would serve to strengthen his 40-year stranglehold on the 

Cuban people. Furthermore, to those who believe that greater contacts between the United 

States and Cuba would further the cause of democratization, it should be pointed out that 

such hopes definitely have not been validated by the experience of Marxist societies from the 

inception of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, which followed the stage of War 

Communism, up to the last efforts at reforming socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. In 

these countries, trade, foreign investment, and loans led hermetic lives of their own, oblivious to 

and unaffected by the rest of society. There is no historical precedent for drawing hope from the 

Cuban experience. As a matter of fact, it could be realistically argued that the opposite has 

happened. As the Cuban regime succeeds in solidifying itself, as a result of the legitimacy 

conferred upon it by other nations and by an augmented flow of resources, its repressive 

proclivities have increased in parallel fashion. Trade and investment with totalitarian states 

have not weakened or eroded those states; rather, the contrary has always been the case. 

Castro’s regime is certainly no exception to the rule and, in fact, categorically confirms it. Only 

pressure has led Castro temporarily to implement some timid reforms that he subsequently has either 

partly rescinded or revoked altogether. Cuba has established for all to see a system of apartheid — 

which is openly and vigorously enforced — between foreigners and Cuban nationals.




Lifting Embargo Increases Government Repression – Funds Regime 

[ ] Economic engagement won’t yield regime change because the wealth from trade won’t 

trickle down to citizens. 

Lopez, former professor of political science at the University of Illinois, 2000 

(Juan, “Sanctions on Cuba Are Good, But Not Enough,” Orbis, Volume 44, Issue 3, June, 

p. 345-362, EBSCOhost) 

The engagement thesis also claims that economic development tends to promote democracy, 

an old hypothesis dating from the 1950s work of Seymour Martin Lipset.(n19) But the empirical 

evidence of the past fifty years suggests that this hypothesis is also false. Countries under 

dictatorial regimes are not more likely to experience a transition to democracy as they reach 

higher levels of economic development.(n20) Nevertheless, the idea that development 

generates democracy continues to be presented as if it were true and is one of the key 

arguments used by USA Engage to justify its opposition to the U.S. embargo. Samuel 

Huntington has also argued that economic development produces democracy by creating new 

sources of wealth and power outside state control. However, if one considers the intervening 

mechanism between development and democracy in Huntington's reasoning, one finds that, 

whatever its validity elsewhere, it does not hold up in the Cuban case. If increased wealth simply 

accrues to the state, as in Cuba, then (as Huntington himself acknowledges) the additional 

revenue merely increases the power of the state and makes no contribution to 

democratization.




Lifting Embargo Increases Government Repression – Funds Regime 

[ ] Engagement wouldn’t promote change – Castro will use US goods to maintain his 

control over Cubans. 

Jorge, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, 2000 

(Dr. Antonio, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy," Institute for Cuban & 

Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers, Online: 

http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28) 

Under the real world of Castroism, however, the answer must be a terse one: none. The embargo has 

not harmed the Cuban economy. Cooperation between the United States and Cuba would have been 

impossible from the very beginning of the Revolution for legal, political, ideological, strategic, and 

economic reasons, not to mention others of a philosophical or moral character. In other words, it was 

in the past, and continues to be at present, contrary to the United States’ national interest and 

to its fundamental foreign policy orientation and objectives to lift the embargo under Castro’s 

conditions: that is, without a firm commitment to the political democratization and market 

reforms that his regime has stubbornly opposed for the last 40 years. However, if, purely for the 

sake of an intellectual exercise, we were to assume that the embargo had never existed, its 

nonexistence would have had no effect whatsoever on the Cuban economy. Castro simply 

would have squandered U.S. instead of Soviet resources. Given Castro’s objectives and 

policies, the ultimate result for the Cuban economy could not have been any different, 

regardless of who had financed his Revolution.




No Impact – US/Latin American Relations Resilient 

[ ] US relations to Latin America are resilient and high now – we still have significant 

economic influence in the region. 

Duddy, former US ambassador to Venezuela and Mora, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

2013 

(Patrick and Frank, “Latin America: Is US Influence Waning,” Miami Herald, May 1 st , Online: 

http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html) 

While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the 

Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important 

economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we 

do not have free trade agreements. An area of immense importance to regional economies that we 

often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note 

the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute 

of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for 

U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America 

and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government 

organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of 

partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and 

the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller 

economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more 

than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Finally, one should not underestimate the 

resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture, 

values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to 

measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric 

during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas 

every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable 

relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns 

Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team 

head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region. 

We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We don’t need a new template for 

relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A 

greater commitment to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant 

to them would be appropriate. The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the 

region to play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.




No Impact – China Fills in for US 

[ ] Even if US influence declines, China will fill in – China and Latin American cooperation 

solves. 

Xiaoxia, Professor of Economics at Tsinghua University, 2013 

(Wang, “IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA,” May 6 th , 

WorldCrunch, Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-srising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/) 

In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isn’t much 

different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China 

doesn’t care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All 

China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is 

exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator 

of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United 

States. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly 

important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial 

quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "fundsfor-assets" 

transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in 

entering Latin American Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus 

inadvertently acquire political influence Or the other way round Presumably most U.S. foreign 

policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's involvement in the Latin American continent 

doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because 

China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other 

countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not 

only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded 

the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and 

to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For 

South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice 

of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s 

new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the 

United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.




Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – Other Unpopular Factors 

[ ] Cuba is only one of many obstacles to US/Latin American cooperation – the plan can’t 

solve 

Lobe, chief of Washington Bureau of the Inter Press Service, 2012 

(Jim, “U.S., Latin America Growing More Distant, Warns Think Tank,” Inter Press Service, April, 

Online: http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/04/us-latin-america-growing-more-distant-warns-think-tank/) 

Relations between the United States and Latin America have “grown more distant” in 

importance part due to the latter’s persistent disagreement with U.S. policies on immigration, 

drugs, and Cuba, according to a new report released here Wednesday on the eve of this year’s 

Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. “The United States must regain credibility in the 

region by dealing seriously with an unfinished agenda of problems, including immigration, 

drugs, and Cuba – that stands in the way of a real partnership,” according to Michael Shifter, 

president of the Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue (IAD). The 20-page report, entitled 

“Remaking the Relationship”, described current inter-American relations as “generally cordial but 

lack(ing) in vigor and purpose”. It suggested that Washington, in particular, has failed to fully come 

to terms with Latin America’s strong economic and political progress over the past two 

decades. It also concluded that the two sides “need to do more to exploit the enormous 

untapped opportunities of their relationship in economics, trade, and energy”, as well as to 

work more closely together on global and regional problems. “They need to breathe new life and 

vigor into hemispheric relations,” it stressed. “If the United States and Latin America do not make 

the effort now, the chance may slip away,” the report warned. “The most likely scenario then 

would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemisphericwide 

institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, 

and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity.”




Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – Regime Resilient 

[ ] Economic engagement historically hasn’t created regime change – Cuba has traded 

with other countries for decades without effect. 


(Juan, “Sanctions on Cuba Are Good, But Not Enough,” Orbis, Volume 44, Issue 3, June, 


The nature of the Cuban regime is such that it is unjustified to think that engagement can 

induce the Castro government to implement political liberalization.(n11) Havana is controlled 

by hardliners, led by Fidel Castro himself, who oppose any change in the status quo. There are 

no regime "softliners" (those who believe that some degree of political liberalization is necessary for 

the dictatorship to endure) with sufficient power and autonomy to conduct negotiations 

concerning political liberalization with members of the moderate opposition. Were softliners in 

fact to emerge and display a willingness to negotiate with democratic moderates, they would be 

quickly eliminated or demoted by hardliners.(n12) It is important to add that the standard 

conception of softliners in the literature on transitions to democracy involves those advocating political 

liberalization, not economic reform, because some scholars attempting to conjure up moderates in 

the Cuban ruling elite count advocates of market reforms (even if very limited ones) as softliners. But 

a cogent example demonstrating that economic reformers in Cuba are not political softliners is Carlos 

Lage, Cuba's minister of economy, who stated on September 2, 1999, that there is already a 

democracy in Cuba while at the same time advocating the influx of foreign investment.(n13) The fact 

that the U.S. embargo has been in place since 1962 and the Cuban dictatorship has endured is taken 

by critics of the embargo as an indication that the economic sanctions have failed. Those who make 

this argument disregard the fact that, for a long time, Cuba has had diplomatic and commercial 

relations with most other countries. Not only have Latin American and European countries 

engaged the Cuban government in diplomatic and trade relations, but some leaders from these 

countries have tried many times to persuade the Cuban government to take steps toward political 

liberalization without the least success.(n14) In short, the Cuban government has failed to respond 

to positive inducements. For example, Havana has not accepted the offer of the European 

Union to establish an economic cooperation agreement that would facilitate trade, 

investments, and aid in exchange for Cuba's respecting human rights and moving toward 

political liberalization.(n15) Both Fidel Castro and his brother Raul, the second in command in the 

ruling elite, have consistently rejected any negotiations to improve relations with the United 

States that would include preconditions involving Cuba's domestic policies.(n16)




Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – Government Backlash 

[ ] Trade won’t promote democracy – Cuba’s regime will crack down on dissent. 

Amnesty International, international organization promoting human rights, 2012 

(“Routine Repression,” Online: 

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR25/007/2012/en/16f0c0fe-c76b-428e-9050- 

bc9eb2ea95f7/amr250072012en.pdf) 

Cuba does not tolerate any criticism of the state outside the official mechanisms established 

under government control. Laws on “public disorder”, “contempt”, “disrespect”, “dangerousness” 

and “agression”, are used to prosecute government opponents. No political or human rights 

organizations are allowed to obtain legal status. Trade unions and bar associations 

independent from those affiliated to the Cuban Communist Party are not permited to operate 

legally and their members are subject to repressive measures. Any challenge to official policy 

invariably results in retaliatory action involving the violation of human rights. To justify their 

arsenal of repressive laws and practices, Cuban officials continue to claim that political 

opponents act under the sponsorship or the infludence of the United States government, and that 

their activities are a threat against national security, Cuba’s integrity and the revolution.




Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – Cuba Controls Imports 

[ ] Lifting the embargo won’t create change – the Cuban government will still maintain 

control over profits from trade, which deters investors. 

Suchlicki, Director of Institute for Cuban Studies at the University of Miami, 2013 

(Jaime, “What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo,” Feb 26, Online: 

http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/) 

In Cuba, foreign investors cannot partner with private Cuban citizens. They can only invest in 

the island through minority joint ventures with the government and its state enterprises. The 

dominant enterprise in the Cuban economy is the Grupo GAESA, controlled by the Cuban military. 

Most investments are done through or with GAESA. Therefore, American companies willing to 

invest in Cuba will have to partner mostly with the Cuban military. Cuba ranks 176 out of 177 

countries in the world in terms of economic freedom. Outshined only by North Korea. It ranks 

as one of the most unattractive investments next to Iran, Zimbabwe, Libya, Mali, etc. Foreign 

investors cannot hire, fire, or pay workers directly. They must go through the Cuban 

government employment agency which selects the workers. Investors pay the government in 

dollars or euros and the government pays the workers a meager 10% in Cuban pesos. Corruption is 

pervasive, undermining equity and respect for the rule of law. Cuba does not have an 

independent/transparent legal system. All judges are appointed by the State and all lawyers are 

licensed by the State. In the last few years, European investors have had over $1 billion arbitrarily 

frozen by the government and several investments have been confiscated. Cuba’s Law 77 allows 

the State to expropriate foreign-invested assets for reason of “public utility” or “social 

interest.” In the last year, the CEOs of three companies with extensive dealings with the Cuban 

government were arrested without charges.




Lifting the Embargo Won’t Solve – No US/Cuban Trade 

[ ] Cuba and the US won’t trade – there’s no market in US for Cuban goods and Cuba 

won’t abandon relationships with China and Venezuela. 




All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba has very little credit and 

is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits to Cuban 

enterprises. There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans. Cuba is not likely to buy a 

substantial amount of products in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred 

million dollars of food in the U.S. That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in 

any other country and it is not likely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, 

Venezuela, and Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S. Cuba has very little to sell in 

the U.S. Nickel, one of Cuba’s major exports, is controlled by the Canadians and exported 

primarily to Canada. Cuba has decimated its sugar industry and there is no appetite in the U.S. 

for more sugar. Cigars and rum are important Cuban exports. Yet, cigar production is mostly 

committed to the European market.

Tourism Bad Disadvantage

Tourism Bad Disadvantage 



Tourism Bad DA – Table of Contents 

Summary............................................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 4 

Tourism Bad Disadvantage 1NC ....................................................................................................... 5-6 

Impact Extension 

Tourism Hurts the Environment ............................................................................................................ 7 

Tourism Promotes Inequality in Cuba ................................................................................................ 8-9 

Tourism Hurts Public Health ............................................................................................................... 10 

Tourism Increases Government Repression ....................................................................................... 11 

Answers to Affirmative Responses 

Answers to: Cuba’s Environment is Already Exploited ........................................................................ 12 

Answers to: Cuba Already Attracts Tourists ........................................................................................ 13 

Answers to: Americans Already Travel to Cuba .................................................................................. 14 

Answers to: Lifting the Embargo Allows for Environmental Cooperation ............................................ 15 

Answers to: Human Rights Come Before the Environment ................................................................ 16 

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Summary 

Right now the United States embargo on Cuba prevents US citizens from engaging in tourist activities 

in Cuba. Even though some Americans are given permission to go to Cuba, it is allowed sparingly, 

such as for educational purposes. The disadvantage argues that if the affirmative plan is 

implemented, there will be a significant increase in the number of US tourists that visit Cuba. This 

increase in tourism will ultimately lead to the rapid development of the tourist industry, which will 

inevitably destroy the environment of Cuba, which is home to many unique species and ecosystems. 

3 | P a g e




Glossary 

Consumerism – a social and economic order that encourages the purchase of goods and services in 

ever-greater amounts 

Embargo – the partial or complete prohibition of commerce and trade with a particular country 

4 | P a g e

Cuba Embargo Negative - Off Case 



JV 

Tourism Bad Disadvantage 1NC (1/2) 

A. Uniqueness – the embargo prevents US citizens from travelling to Cuba. 

Rep. Ron Paul, former Congressional representative, 2013 

(Ron, “Why can’t we all travel to Cuba,” AntiWar.com, April 16, Online: 

http://original.antiwar.com/paul/2013/04/15/why-cant-we-all-travel-to-cuba/) 

The Obama administration has lifted some of the most onerous restrictions on travel to Cuba 

imposed under the previous Bush administration, but for the average American, travel to the 

island is still difficult if not impossible. However, even those who are permitted to go to Cuba 

are not allowed to simply engage in tourist activities — to spend their money as they wish or 

relax on a beach. The US government demands that the few Americans it allows to travel to 

Cuba only engage in what it deems “purposeful travel,” to “support civil society in Cuba; 

enhance the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people; and help promote their 

independence from Cuban authorities.” They must prove that they maintain a full-time schedule 

of educational activities, according to Treasury guidelines for “people-to-people” travel. Leave it 

to the federal government to make the prospect of visiting that sunny Caribbean island sound 

so miserable. The reason the US so severely restricts and scripts the activities of the few 

Americans allowed to travel to Cuba is that it believes travel must promote the goal of taking 

“important steps in reaching the widely shared goal of a Cuba that respects the basic rights of all its 

citizens.” 

B. Link – lifting the embargo would more than double the number of tourists in Cuba. 

Dean, Lecturer in Environmental Studies at Brown University, 2007 

(Cornelia, “Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo,” New York Times, December 25, Online: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.htmlpagewanted=all&_r=1&) 

But, he said in an interview, “an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could 

roll over it like a bulldozer” when the embargo ends. By some estimates, tourism in Cuba is 

increasing 10 percent annually. At a minimum, Orlando Rey Santos, the Cuban lawyer who led the 

law-writing effort, said in an interview at the conference, “we can guess that tourism is going to 

increase in a very fast way” when the embargo ends. “It is estimated we could double tourism 

in one year,” said Mr. Rey, who heads environmental efforts at the Cuban ministry of science, 

technology and environment. 

5 | P a g e




JV 

Tourism Bad Disadvantage 1NC (2/2) 

C. Impact - Lifting the embargo would turn Cuba into a target for tourists and business 

exploitation – this would destroy its environment. 

Lovgren, winner of the American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism 

Award, 2006 

(Stefan, “Castro the Conservationist By Default or Design, Cuba Largely Pristine,” National 

Geographic, August 4, Online: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060804-castrolegacy.html) 

So what will happen if Castro's regime falls and a new, democratic government takes root 

Conservationists and others say they are worried that the pressure to develop the island will 

increase and Cuba's rich biodiversity will suffer. Barborak said he is concerned that 

"environmental carpetbaggers and scalawags will come out of the woodwork in Cuba if there 

is turbulent regime change. "One could foresee a flood of extractive industries jockeying for 

access to mineral and oil leases," he said. "A huge wave of extraction of unique and endemic 

plants and animals could occur to feed the international wildlife market. And a speculative 

tourism and real estate boom could turn much of the coastline into a tacky wasteland in short 

order." "If foreign investments take a much firmer hold, more hotels will be built and more 

people will descend on the reefs," added Gebelein, the Florida International University professor. 

"If the Cuban government does not have a swift policy framework to deal with the huge influx of 

tourists, investors, and foreign government interests, a new exploitative paradigm will be the 

beginning of the end for some of the last pristine territories in the Caribbean." 

6 | P a g e




JV 

Tourism Hurts the Environment 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba’s environment is very healthy – it’s been protected from pollution by the 

embargo. 


Award, 2006 



Isolated in part because of the U.S. trade embargo against the island, Cuba has been excluded 

from much of the economic globalization that has taken its toll on the environment in many 

other parts of the world. "The healthy status of much of the wetlands and forests of Cuba is 

due not to political influence as much as the lack of foreign exchange with which to make the 

investments to convert lands and introduce petrochemical pesticides and fertilizers," Pearl 

said. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Cuban factories and agricultural fields have 

sat dormant. The island has had to become self-sufficient, turning to low-energy organic 

farming. It has had to scrap most of its fishing fleet because it can't afford to maintain the 

ships. Population pressure has also been a nonissue, with many Cubans fleeing the country 

for economic and political reasons. 

7 | P a g e




JV 

Tourism Promotes Inequality in Cuba 

[ ] Cuba’s tourism industry caters to racial divisions and promotes ethnics tensions. 

Sanchez and Adams, professors of political science and anthropology at Loyal University, 

2008 

(Peter and Kathleen, “Janus Faced Character of Tourism in Cuba,” Annals of Tourism Research, 

Volume 35 Number 1, Online – Free) 

In the course of three trips to Cuba, spanning nine years, the authors found that almost all workers 

at the front desks of Havana and Varadero hotels oriented towards international tourists were 

predominantly ‘‘white’’ (classification of race is different in Cuba and the United States; many 

considering themselves as white would be perceived as ‘‘black’’ by people in the United States). In a 

study of racism on the island, De la Fuente quotes a black Cuban singer as saying, ‘‘Tourism 

firms look like South African companies in the times of Peter Botha. You go there, and they are 

all white. And I wonder: Where am I, in Holland’’ De la Fuente (1998:7). In keeping with the 

findings of the authors of this paper, Cabezas also observes that ‘‘Afro-Cubans are excluded 

from front line service positions with direct customer contact’’ Cabezas (2006:513). Certainly, 

there are Afro-Cubans in the tourism industry and sometimes they occupy key positions, but 

overall, while they represent a significant segment of the local population, Afro-Cubans are 

underrepresented in the high-level and best-paying positions in the industry. Racial 

preferences in tourism-related hiring appear, then, to have exacerbated inequality and racism. 

This inequality, within a socialist system, threatens to erode domestic support for the Castro 

government. While they may fear the alternative and still view Castro positively, many citizens 

interviewed were often quite critical of the government’s policies, and also lamented their current 

paradoxical experiences and hardships. Thus, tourism has also increased ethnic divisions on 

the island. Rather than helping build and integrate the nation and strengthening the state, it 

has done the opposite in Cuba: yielding more social division and tension. 

8 | P a g e




JV 

Tourism Promotes Inequality in Cuba 

[ ] Tourism in Cuba promotes economic inequality, ethnic tensions, and corruption. 

Sanchez and Adams, professors of political science and anthropology at Loyal University, 

2008 

(Peter and Kathleen, “Janus Faced Character of Tourism in Cuba,” Annals of Tourism Research, 

Volume 35 Number 1, Online – Free) 

Tourism in Cuba has, to some extent, helped to ‘‘save’’ the economy by providing much 

needed hard currency. The Castro government in the early 90s experienced a serious crisis that 

had grave political repercussions. It introduced major economic changes in order to survive but, 

despite such efforts, in fall 1994 alone, roughly 30,000 fled the island and clashes with the police 

occurred near the Maleco´n. The government, nevertheless, survived that crisis. The economy has 

grown and, while life is still challenging, some degree of normalcy has emerged, as hard currency 

continues to enter the economy via tourism. On the other hand, the industry has created serious 

contradictions that have not been ameliorated and threaten to undermine the government’s most 

important national goals, mainly the preservation of socialism. Continuing inequality, racism, 

prostitution, and corruption threaten the survival of the Castro government. The government 

has attempted to deal with the contradictions by using tourism as a vehicle for support. But 

its attempts to lasso the industry to highlight the values of the revolution and to foster 

international support may be nothing more than window-dressing when compared with the 

deleterious effects of tourism on the government, national goals, and socialist ideology. More 

broadly, the Cuban case illustrates some of the potential contradictions that can arise in the uneasy 

marriage between tourism and nation-building for developing countries and socialist societies in 

transition. While it can certainly contribute to a country’s coffers and enhance pride in 

citizenship, tourism can also fuel or regenerate ethnic divisions, prostitution, economic 

inequalities, and corruption, all of which may undermine the authority of the state. Under 

such a scenario, the Janus-faced character of tourism may well prevent many states from 

achieving their nation-building goals. Further, nation-states that pursue social justice as one of 

their chief goals may want to more carefully weigh the decision to embrace tourism as a 

vehicle for fueling development, fostering international sympathy, and fomenting a loyal 

citizenry. 

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JV 

Tourism Hurts Public Health 

[ ] 

[ ] Lifting the embargo would allow medical tourism – this would overstretch Cuba’s 

healthcare resources. 



But a lot may change if the United States alters its policies toward Cuba. In 2009, a group of 30 

physicians from Florida toured Cira García and concluded that once the U.S. embargo is lifted, 

the facility will be overwhelmed by its foreign patients. It takes little imagination to envision 

chains of private clinics, located near five-star hotels and beach resorts, catering to the elective 

needs of North Americans and Europeans. Such a trend might bode well for Canadians seeking to 

avoid queues in Ottawa for hip replacements or for U.S. health insurance companies looking to cut 

costs on cataract surgery and pacemakers. But providing health care to wealthy foreigners would 

drain physicians, technicians, and nurses from Cuba's public system. And any such brain 

drain within Cuba might be dwarfed by a brain drain out into the rest of the world, as Cuban 

doctors and nurses leave the country to seek incomes that cannot be matched at home. 

Countries facing gross deficits in skilled medical talent are already scrambling to lure doctors, nurses, 

lab technicians, dentists, pharmacists, and health administrators from other nations. In 2006, the 

WHO estimated that the global deficit of medical professionals was roughly 4.3 million, and the figure 

can only have grown since then. As the world's population ages and average life expectancies 

rise from the United States to China, millions more patients will need complex, labor-intensive 

medical attention. And in countries with falling life expectancies and high rates of HIV/AIDS, 

donor resources aimed at combating the disease often have the unintended consequence of 

further straining meager supplies of human medical resources by drawing talent away from 

less well-funded areas of medicine, such as basic children's health care. 

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JV 

Tourism Increases Government Repression 

[ ] 

[ ] Tourism provides the Castro regime with more money to dominate Cuban citizens. 

Suchlicki, Direcotr of the Institute for Cuban Studies at the University of Miami, 2013 



Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of 

proportion to recent changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major 

reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications: Money from American tourists would 

flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. 

The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother. American 

tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are 

off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. Most 

Americans don’t speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not 

interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from 

receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. While providing the Castro 

government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban 

population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small 

quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent 

on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels 

owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the 

island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. The assumption that the Cuban 

leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal 

developments is at best naïve. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could 

be subject to harassment and imprisonment. Over the past decades hundred of thousands of 

Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more 

democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control 

apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. 

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JV 

Answers to: Cuba’s Environment is Already Exploited 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba is home to one of the most protected environments in the world. 


Award, 2006 



Though Cuba is economically destitute, it has the richest biodiversity in the Caribbean. 

Resorts blanket many of its neighbors, but Cuba remains largely undeveloped, with large tracts of 

untouched rain forest and unspoiled reefs. The country has signed numerous international 

conservation treaties and set aside vast areas of land for government protection. But others 

say Cuba's economic underdevelopment has played just as large a role. Since the collapse of the 

Soviet Union—its main financial benefactor—Cuba has had to rely mostly on its own limited 

resources. It has embraced organic farming and low-energy agriculture because it can't afford 

to do anything else. And once Castro is gone, the experts say, a boom in tourism and foreign 

investment could destroy Cuba's pristine landscapes. 

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JV 

Answers to: Cuba Already Attracts Tourists 

[ ] 

[ ] The current number of tourists would increase substantially if the embargo was lifted. 

Global Travel Industry News, 2009 

(“Is Cuba Ready for US Tourists,” Global Travel Industry News, Sep 18, Online: 

http://www.eturbonews.com/11774/cuba-ready-us-tourists) 

If the U.S. government dropped its travel restrictions entirely, rather than just for Cuban 

Americans -- and Cuba proved as big a draw for American tourists as Jamaica, the Dominican 

Republic, or Cancun, Mexico -- the island could expect more than one million additional visitors 

a year. Mere curiosity -- seeing '58 Oldsmobiles and giant Che portraits on buildings -- could lure 

many, said Damian Fernandez, a longtime Cuban policy expert and provost of Purchase College 

State University of New York. "Post-embargo, the biggest, fastest impact would be in tourism," 

he said. 

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JV 

Embargo restricts tourism 

Answers to: Americans Already Travel to Cuba 

Luxner, news editor of the Washington Diplomat, 2012 

(Larry, “Cuba Welcomes Pope, As U.S. Slams Door on Easing Embargo) 

The Washington Diplomat, Feb 29, Online: 

http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.phpoption=com_content&view=article&id=8222:cubawelcomes-pope-as-us-slams-door-on-easing-embargo&catid=1484:march-2012&Itemid=497) 

Fifty years ago, on Feb. 7, 1962, President John F. Kennedy expanded the partial embargo that 

had been imposed more than a year earlier by his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, into a 

total economic embargo against Cuba that endures to this day. That embargo, aimed at 

depriving the Castro regime of badly needed dollars, makes it impossible for average American 

tourists to frolic on the beaches of Varadero, only 90 miles due south of Key West, Fla. — even 

though U.S. law permits them to visit every other nation on Earth, including Syria, North Korea 

and Iran. 

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JV 

Answers to: Lifting the Embargo Allows for Environmental Cooperation 

[ ] 

[ ] Lifting the embargo would subject Cuba to a wave of environmental exploitation by 

American businesses. 

Dean, Lecturer in Environmental Studies at Brown University, 2007 

(Cornelia, “Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo,” New York Times, December 25, Online: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.htmlpagewanted=all&_r=1&) 

Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. That is why 

many scientists are so worried about what will become of it after Fidel Castro and his associates 

leave power and, as is widely anticipated, the American government relaxes or ends its trade 

embargo. Cuba, by far the region’s largest island, sits at the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean, 

the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Its mountains, forests, swamps, coasts and marine 

areas are rich in plants and animals, some seen nowhere else. And since the imposition of the 

embargo in 1962, and especially with the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, its major economic 

patron, Cuba’s economy has stagnated. Cuba has not been free of development, including Sovietstyle 

top-down agricultural and mining operations and, in recent years, an expansion of tourism. But it 

also has an abundance of landscapes that elsewhere in the region have been ripped up, paved 

over, poisoned or otherwise destroyed in the decades since the Cuban revolution, when 

development has been most intense. Once the embargo ends, the island could face a flood of 

investors from the United States and elsewhere, eager to exploit those landscapes. 

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JV 

Answers to: Human Rights Come Before the Environment 

[ ] 

[ ] In the context of Cuba, the environmental costs are too high to ignore – even when 

compared to human rights. 

Kozloff, writer for the Huffington Post and PhD in Latin American History from Oxford, 2010 

(Nikolas, “Left Must Fine Tune its Position on Cuba Embargo in Light of Oil Spill,” Monga Bay, May 

26, Online: http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0526-kozloff_cuba.html) 

Hopefully, the BP disaster will put a break on the oil lobby and its supporters on Capitol Hill. Yet, 

other important players have been broadly supportive of offshore oil. For its part, Havana has said it 

would welcome U.S. investment. Recently, a U.S.-Cuba Energy Summit attracted Exxon officials 

and others to a meeting in Mexico City. Participants viewed PowerPoint presentations from Cuban 

government ministries including state-owned oil company Cupet which sought to involve U.S. 

companies in the exploitation of oil and gas fields. "U.S. oil companies would love to do business 

there as soon as this thing opens up," remarked Ron Harper, an energy analyst in Houston. 

"They're looking at it quietly. They'd be short-sighted not to." The debate over Cuban offshore oil 

puts the political left in a quandary. For years, it’s been an article of faith amongst 

progressives that the U.S. ought to scrap the embargo. To be sure, economic sanctions have 

resulted in horrible economic distress for ordinary Cubans. Yet, does the left want to lift 

sanctions and open the door to yet more destructive offshore petroleum, thereby adding to 

environmental woes already unleashed by the BP spill In light of our dire ecological straits, I 

believe the left must rethink its position on this vital issue and articulate a more broad-based 

vision for the Gulf which would realistically address both economic and environmental 

concerns. 

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Answers

Tourism Bad DA Affirmative 



Tourism Bad DA Affirmative – Table of Contents 

Glossary ............................................................................................................................................... 2 

Non-Unique - Cuban Tourism Rates Already High ............................................................................... 3 

No Impact - Cuba Already Exploits its Environment – Tourism and Other Industries ........................... 4 

No Impact - Cuba Already Exploits its Environment ............................................................................. 5 

Impact Turn - Engagement Promotes Environmental Protections ........................................................ 6 

Answers to Economic Impact 

Impact Turn - Tourism Good for Cuba’s Economy ............................................................................... 7 

Impact Turn - Tourism Good for Cuba’s Economy ............................................................................... 8 

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Glossary 

Consumerism – a social and economic order that encourages the purchase of goods and services in 

ever-greater amounts 

Embargo – the partial or complete prohibition of commerce and trade with a particular country 

2 | P a g e




Non-Unique - Cuban Tourism Rates Already High 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba’s tourism rates are already growing rapidly. 

Piccone, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 2012 

(Ted, “Cuba is Changing, Slowly but Surely,” Brookings, Jan 19, Online: 

http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/01/19-cuba-piccone) 

One area where Cuba seems to be moving in a positive direction is tourism. From 1990 to 2010, the 

estimated number of tourists has risen from 360,000 to 2.66 million. In addition, thanks to 

President Obama’s decision to allow Cuban-American families to visit the island and send 

remittances as much as they want, Cubans have received over 400,000 visits and roughly $2 

billion from relatives in the United States. These are proving to be important sources of currency 

and commerce that are helping families cope with reduced subsidies and breathe life in the 

burgeoning private sector. A walk through crowded Old Havana, where construction crews are busy 

restoring one of the Americas’ great colonial treasures, offers compelling evidence that Cuba can be 

a strong magnet for Europeans, Canadians, Chinese and—some day—hundreds of thousands 

of American visitors. And Pope Benedict’s visit in late March will shine an international spotlight on 

a Cuba slowly opening its doors to the world, yes, but more importantly, to an increasingly vocal and 

confident Catholic Church intent on securing a more prominent and relevant place in Cuban society. 

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[ ] 

No Impact - Cuba Already Exploits its Environment – Tourism and Other Industries 

[ ] Cuba already exploits its environment as a tourist attraction – the centralized 

government has squandered its natural resources. 

Conell, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2009 

(Christina, “The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be Environmental Partners,” June 12, Online: 

http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/) 

For Cubans and foreigners alike, the beaches of Cuba constitute the principle tourist 

attraction in the country, but even these have not escaped wasteful government exploitation. 

The famous beaches east of Havana have been the victims of sand removal for use by the 

Cuban government in the construction industry. In addition to coastal destruction, like many of its 

Caribbean neighbors, Cuba faces deforestation, over-cultivation of land and compaction of 

soils due to the use of heavy farm machinery and strip mining. These practices have resulted 

in high salinity in soils and heavy land erosion. Furthermore, poor water quality in freshwater 

streams has affected the wildlife habitat, which is in turn influenced by runoff from agricultural 

practices, erosion due to deforestation, and sedimentation of freshwater streams. Cuba must 

act in a responsible manner to stop environmental degradation and preserve its tourist industry as an 

early step to salvage its inert economy. The environmental degradation that began during the colonial 

era has transcended time as a result of Castro’s political and economic paradigm. Only in the last 

40 years, with the development of the Commission for the Protection of the Environment and the 

Conservation of Natural Resources (COMARNA), has Cuba begun to address growing environmental 

concerns. COMARNA consolidated all of the agencies with environmental responsibilities, as a 

step towards giving them the power to influence all environmental issues. Although COMARNA 

was all-inclusive, it lacked independent authority, so its activities achieved few tangible results. 

The sad fact was that the centralized agency only succeeded in aiding the state in 

squandering resources. 

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No Impact - Cuba Already Exploits its Environment 

[ ] 

[ ] Castro already uses his authority to over-ride environmental considerations. 




In many parts of the country communism has inadequately acted as a seal to preserve elements of 

Cuba’s past as the centralized government prohibited private development by not giving special 

permission. A number of tourist resorts already dot the island, but Cuba has been largely 

exempt from mass tourist exploitation due to frozen relations with the U.S. Although the 

island remains underdeveloped, Fidel Castro has used his unchecked power to back policies, 

which have been heedless to environmental considerations, thus damaging some of the 

island’s pristine ecosystem that once defined the island. Roughly the size of Pennsylvania, Cuba 

is the largest Caribbean island, and if preservation and conservation measures are planned and 

carried out in a cognizant manner, it could become a paradigm for sustainable development at 

the global level. The Obama administration’s recent easing of travel restrictions on Cuban 

Americans visiting relatives on the island could be of immense importance not only to Cuban 

families, but also to the preservation of Cuba’s unique and increasingly threatened coastal and 

marine environments. Such a concession on Washington’s part would mark a small, but still 

significant stride in U.S.-Cuba relations, yet the travel restrictions still remain inherently 

discriminatory. The preposterous regulations that allow only a certain category of Americans into 

Cuba signify only a meager shift in U.S. policy towards Cuba. 

5 | P a g e




Impact Turn - Engagement Promotes Environmental Protections 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic engagement with Cuba is essential to protect their environment, and would 

set a model for sustainable development in other countries. 




The 50-year-old U.S. embargo against the island has resoundingly failed to achieve its purpose. 

Obama’s modifications fall short of what it will take to reestablish a constructive U.S.-Cuba 

relationship. Cuba’s tropical forests, soils, and maritime areas have suffered degradation as a 

result of harmful policies stemming from a Soviet-style economic system. Cuba’s economy 

could be reinvigorated through expanded tourism, development initiatives and an expansion of 

commodity exports, including sugarcane for ethanol. U.S. policy toward Cuba should encourage 

environmental factors, thereby strengthening U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere.An 

environmental partnership between the U.S. and Cuba is not only possible, but could result in 

development models that could serve as an example for environmental strategies throughout 

the Americas. The U.S. has the economic resources necessary to aid Cuba in developing 

effective policy, while the island provides the space where sustainable systems can be 

implemented initially instead of being applied after the fact. Cuba’s extreme lack of 

development provides an unspoiled arena for the execution of exemplary sustainable 

environmental protection practices. 

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Impact Turn - Tourism Good for Cuba’s Economy 

[ ] 

[ ] Tourism is essential to Cuba’s economy. 

Havana Journal, 2006 

( “The State of Cuban Tourism with Statistics,” Havana Journal, April 15, Online: 

http://havanajournal.com/travel/entry/the-state-of-cuban-tourism-with-statistics/) 

In the middle of a growing shortage of supplies, tourism became Cuba’s salvation thanks to 

its rapid development. When talking about the benefits of tourism, we are obliged to acknowledge 

its dynamic contributions in hard currency, its role as a major source for employment and as 

the driving force behind the activities of another group of industries. Considered as the oil of 

21st century, tourism has become the salvation for many countries’ economies, including Cuba which 

has incorporated it in its strategy for the national recovery since last decade with successful 

results. This audacious step has been rewarded by a steady increase of profits in the 90s. Today, 

tourism has become the mainstay of Cuban economy. 

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Impact Turn - Tourism Good for Cuba’s Economy 

[ ] 

[ ] Lifting the embargo to allow for tourism is essential to prevent a Cuban economic 

collapse. 

Havana Journal, 2006 

( “The State of Cuban Tourism with Statistics,” Havana Journal, April 15, Online: 

http://havanajournal.com/travel/entry/the-state-of-cuban-tourism-with-statistics/) 

Due to the economic war of US against the island along the past 45 years, Cuba’s losses are 

estimated at over $82,000m. US interventionist and extraterritorial policy has greatly affected 

socially and economically the island, a banned territory for any US citizen. “It’s true that so far 

Washington has ignored the United Nations’ call for the lifting of the blockade against Cuba, but we 

will not despair,” said Cuban Foreign Minister, Felipe Perez Roque who has talked on the progress 

Cuba would experience if the US stopped its aggressive policy. “For example, if Cuba received five 

million US tourists per year, that would represent extra income of more than $7,000m,” 

pointed out Perez Roque. Without the scourge of the US blockade, tourism in Cuba could take 

nearly $576m during the first year. In addition, the island could take another extra $70m per year 

from a half million tourists traveling by cruisers. Each seven days some 80 cruisers navigate around 

the Cuban archipelago. Tourism is vital for the revival of the island’s economy, that’s why US 

successive administrations since 1959 have implemented a number of measures and laws 

aimed to reduce Cuba’s national income. That’s why the US government has banned its 

citizens to visit the island even when this new regulation violates the US constitutional law on free 

movement. 

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Oil Prices Disadvantage

Oil Prices Disadvantage 



Oil Prices Disadvantage – Table of Contents 

Summary............................................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 4 

Oil Prices Disadvantage 1NC ............................................................................................................. 5-8 

Answers to Affirmative Answers 

Answers to: Low Oil Prices Inevitable .............................................................................................. 9-10 

Answers to: Shift Inevitable ............................................................................................................ 11-12 

US-Venezuela Oil Trade Leads to Saudi Arabia Market Flood ........................................................... 13 

New Production would lower prices ............................................................................................... 14-15 

High Oil Prices Good- Political Stability .............................................................................................. 16 

High Oil Prices Good- Government Repression ............................................................................. 17-18 

High Oil Prices Good: Saudi Stability ............................................................................................. 19-20 

High Oil Prices Good: Iranian Economy ......................................................................................... 21-22 

Answers to: Other issues with Iranian Economy ............................................................................ 23-24 

High Oil Prices Good: Venezuelan Economy ...................................................................................... 25 

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Summary 

This disadvantage argues that high oil prices are a good thing. Currently Venezuela is limited in the 

amount of oil it can produce. This helps keep the price of oil relatively high, around $100 a barrel. 

The plan would allow Venezuela to tap into one of the largest proven oil reserves in the world and 

bring that oil to market very quickly. This introduction of a new supply into the world’s oil market 

would collapse prices. High oil prices are good because they allow oil producing states like Saudi 

Arabia, Iran and Russia to afford social programs that keep their citizens happy. Happy citizens do 

not have revolutions and revolutions can quickly escalate. 

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Glossary 

CCP - Chinese Communist Party, the ruling political party in the People's Republic of China 

Chavistas - supporters of Hugo Chavez, former president of Venezuela 

Dissent - The expression or holding of opinions at variance with those previously, commonly, or 

officially held. 

Empirically - Verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment 

Flooding the market - introducing a large supply of a product into a market to artificially reduce the 

price. Usually a tactic used by large producers to prevent new entrants into a market 

Nicolas Maduro - newly elected president of Venezuela 

OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) - an organization formed in 1961 to 

administer a common policy for the sale of petroleum. Its members are Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 

Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela 

Zero Sum - a contest in which one person’s loss is equal to another person’s gain 

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Oil Prices Disadvantage 1NC (1/3) 

A. Uniqueness: Oil prices at 2013 high --- worries about supply availability and 

growing American demand are driving prices. 

Otter, writer for Barron’s, 2013 

(Jack, “Oil Prices Hit High For the Year, Energy Stocks Up,” Barron’s Stocks to Watch, 

7-6-2013 http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/07/05/oil-prices-hit-highfor-the-year-energy-stocks-up/) 

Oil prices hit a 2013 high today, driven higher by fears of unrest in the Middle East 

as well as evidence that the U.S. economy does, indeed have a pulse. Energy 

stocks, on the whole, moved higher. The Energy Select Sector SPDR (XLE) was up 

nearly 1% shortly before the market close. Oil futures closed above $103, up almost 

2% on the day and 7% on the week. The military coup in Egypt has raised fears of a 

supply disruption. There was more turmoil today and reports of shots fired in a 

confrontation between supporters of recently ousted president Mohammed Morsi and 

those who opposed his rule. In domestic news, the Labor Department announced 

that the U.S. economy added 195,000 jobs in June, beating expectations and 

adding evidence that the recovery may be picking up steam. Better growth could 

push oil prices higher. Even while the August futures contract increased, prices at 

the pump are falling, as inventories rise. The average price per gallon is $3.47 

according to AAA, down 5% in less than a month. 

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B. Link: Increases in Venezuelan production drops oil prices globally. 

Global Conflict Analysis, 2013 

("Effects of Hugo Chavez's Death on Global Oil Markets", Global Conflict Analysis, 4/19 

globalconflictanalysis.com/2013/04/effects-of-hugo-chavezs-death-on-global-oilmarkets/ 

// kdh) 

The first and most important issue is the future of the oil market in Venezuela. In 2010 

OPEC claimed “Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt contained tar sand deposits equivalent to 

around 300 billion barrels of oil– enough to fulfill current world demand for 10 years.” 

But even though Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world, Hugo 

Chavez’s dependence on PDVSA left the NOC with just US$11 billion – 9% of its 

income – to fund future operations (compared to Pemex’s 17% and Brazil’s 

Petrobras 29%). This trend, which is not expected to change despite the death 

of Chavez, is of great concern to the US and other oil exporting and importing 

countries because it could have strong implications on global oil prices . This 

is the case because despite the fact that Chavez has passed away, Chavismo is still 

alive; therefore, many analysts believe that his policy of depending on oil revenues to 

foster social programs at home and abroad will continue, leading to a continuation of a 

decrease in Venezuela’s oil production. If this is case – as is expected – global oil 

supply would decrease and oil prices would increase because demand would not 

change. This decline could have a negative impact on American and Western 

economies, since there would be less supply. This is a great opportunity for Mexico to 

step up its production and fill in the vacuum left by PDVSA’s decline because the US 

and other Western nations will need to import oil, and since the US is currently seeking 

to become energy independent in a North American context, Mexico must capitalize on 

Venezuela’s continuous expected decline. However, this potential opportunity for 

Pemex and the Mexican oil and gas industry depends on the political future of 

Venezuela – which is expected to hold elections in the next 30 days. Whatever the 

outcome, if the newly elected Venezuelan president decides to open up the market 

and allow the return of foreign companies such as Exxon-Mobil and 

ConocoPhillips, the potential for oil production increase would rise, leading to a 

higher global oil supply and lower oil prices. This could have a potential negative 

effect on Mexico’s oil exports since potential oil companies could start focusing on 

Venezuela, even though PDVSA is not going to be turned around overnight and many 

energy analysts believe the political transition will most probably lead to similar style of 

government. 

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C. Impact: All producers will collapse without high prices---causes revolutions 

across the Middle East and wreck’s Russia’s economy---also impacts Africa. 

Luft, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL 

SECURITY, 2011 

(TESTIMONY BY DR. GAL LUFT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR THE 

ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY (IAGS)ADVISER, UNITED STATES ENERGY 

SECURITY COUNCIL, Presented before, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 

AFFAIRS, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade “Changing Energy 

Markets and U.S. National Security” December 16, 2011 www.iags.org/HFC- 

Energy_Dec2011.pdf) 

The Arab Spring has exacerbated the situation. Hoping to avoid the fate of Egypt and 

Tunisia, Persian Gulf regimes of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE showered 

their subjects with gifts and subsidies which increased their budget obligations 

significantly. Saudi Arabia alone almost doubled its $154 billion 2011 budget, 

committing $129 billion in salary hikes, subsidies and increase in pensions. Given that 

the primary income of these regimes is petrodollars, the bill for keeping the 

Persian Gulf monarchies in power is now being footed by every American. 

According to the Institute of International Finance, before the recent handouts were 

announced Saudi Arabia needed oil to sell for $68.50 a barrel to keep its budget 

balanced. The expensive response to the protests increased the breakeven price the 

Saudis need in order to balance their budget to at least $110 in 2015. The premium on 

the price of oil exacted by the increase in Gulf social spending has already added in 

2011 about 35 cents to the price of a gallon of gasoline Americans had to pay at the 

pump or roughly $6 per fill up. Since oil price affects everything we buy from food to 

plastics, saving the House of Saud added roughly $1,500 annually to the expenditures 

of the average American family. At the very same time Americans are engaged in a 

heated debate about cutting entitlement programs at home, we are forced to fund 

more and more social programs aimed at keeping Middle Eastern dictators in 

power. 

The need for high oil prices is not unique to Saudi Arabia. As Russia's population 

dwindles, and the output of its newer fields fails to offset fast decline at mature deposits, 

Russia's economy will growingly depend on high prices to meet its budgetary 

obligations. Contrary to popular belief, Russia is much more of an oil exporter than 

a gas exporter. In 2010, Russia produced 10.2 million barrels a day (mbd) of oil, while 

consuming only 3.2 mbd. This means that 70% of its crude production was exported or 

processed into petroleum products, half of which were sent abroad. By contrast, when it 

comes to natural gas, most of Russia's production remains at home. In 2010, Russia 

consumed 414 billion cubic meters (bcm) of the 588 bcm it produced, leaving only 30% 

of total production for exports. This means that Russia will strengthen its 

engagement and coordination with OPEC with the aim of keeping prices 

sufficiently high. 

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Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela and Nigeria will all need a higher per barrel oil price 

as they move toward a rocky future. With a population of 73 million in Iran and 30 

million in Iraq and vast governmental sectors and social expenditures, the two countries 

need today a breakeven price of $125. By 2025 their populations will stand at 88 million 

and 45 million respectively. Where will the money come from There is a limit to the 

amount of money to be made from exporting carpets, dates and pistachio nuts. 

There is no limit to the amount of revenues to be made from oil exports. 

8 | P a g e




Answers to: Low Oil Prices Inevitable 

[ ] 

[ ]Declining production will keep prices high---magnifies the link 

BPN 8/31 

(Bunker Ports News, “Barclays' Brent Crude Oil forecast for 2013 is $125/bl; $180/bl by 

2020” www.bunkerportsnews.com/News.aspxElementId=86b8fe0d-c717-482b-9dd0- 

9686132ac0f9) 

The key difference Barclays sees between oil and most other energy markets is 

supply, where the challenge is replacing declining oil production. Demand, by 

contrast, responds to economic weakness to similar degrees across the energy 

spectrum. And with 3Q12 looking as if it will see a very significant tightening of the 

oil market, Barclays' key Global Energy Outlook recommendation is to stay 

leveraged to oil and to oil-biased equities and credits. 

“Beyond our quarterly and annual oil price forecasts, we map the longer-term 

supply/demand picture, and the signals here are stark. Oil supply from existing fields 

is falling by close to 4m bls/d per year due to natural decline; global demand is rising 

by more than 1m bls/d each year, even in the current weak environment.” the 

bank said. 

“Hence, the supply gap that needs to be filled each year from new fields is more 

than 5m bls/d. This presents a material challenge for the energy industry. While this 

long-term supply squeeze may have been less apparent in the quarter just past, 3Q12 

looks as if it will see a significant tightening of the oil market, with a 2m bls/d 

upswing in demand and falls in both OPEC and non-OPEC supply.” the Bank added in 

a special report. 

To this one can add minimal spare capacity and heightened geopolitical tensions 

in several regions. A release of US strategic reserves would provide only a slight and 

temporary respite. 

“Thus, we continue to have strong oil price conviction, and our Brent forecast for 2013 

is $125/bl. For the longer term, we expect prices to follow an inexorable, if volatile rise 

to above $180/bl before the decade closes.” Barclays predicted. 

9 | P a g e


Answers to: Low Oil Prices Inevitable 



[ ] Prices will stay high long-term because of supply concerns---the plan 

reverses that---best forecasts 

Arabian Business 2012 

(Analysts raise oil price forecasts for 2012, 2013 www.arabianbusiness.com/analystsraise-oil-price-forecasts-for-2012-2013-471309.html) 

Analysts have raised their oil price forecasts for this year and 2013 due to supply 

concerns and to expectations for a further round of monetary policy stimulus, 

which could improve prospects for economic growth, a Reuters poll found. 

The Reuters monthly oil poll, based on forecasts from 28 analysts, forecast Brent at 

an average of $109.50 a barrel in 2012, up $1.20 from the figure in the July poll. 

Brent has averaged about $112 per barrel so far this year, up from $111 in 2011. 

10 | P a g e




Answers to: shift inevitable 

[ ] 

[ ] Unleashing Venezuela’s massive oil reserves leads to collapse of global 

prices --- 2002 coup proves, this gives the Middle East not time to adjust. 

The Telegraph, 2013 

(Garry White & Emma Rowley, “Death of Hugo Chavez propels Venezuelan oil 

production into the spotlight,” The Telegraph,3-10 

http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/death-hugo-chavez-propels-venezuelan- 

160233918.html) 

It is likely that oil output could rise, should there be an easing of the country’s 

antagonism to foreign investors. Some believe this could lead to a fall in the oil price 

and a consequent boost to the global economy. “The death of Hugo Chavez may see 

oil prices fall as they did during the 2002 coup,” Gerard Lane, an oil analyst at Shore 

Capital, said. “With greater foreign investment it is foreseeable that the 30pc fall in 

Venezuelan oil production could be reversed. Indeed the scale of potential oil 

output is enough combined with on-going shale oil production growth in the USA, 

suggesting that oil prices could fall.” However, such a scenario is unlikely just yet. 

“Venezuela’s massive oil reserves will not be unleashed on global oil markets 

anytime soon, while the near-term impact on prices will be limited,” Ole Hansen, head 

of commodity strategy at Saxo Bank, noted. “The state oil company PDVSA has 

increasingly been handing over its income to fund various government programmes, 

leaving it with negative cash flows for the past five years,” Mr Hansen added. “The 

result of this has been a lack of investments as old fields matured and new ones were 

not explored, hence the drop in output.” Mr Hansen believes reforms and the reintroduction 

of foreign investment will not happen overnight, possibly not for a few 

years. “But once it does another source of increased supply will further help to alleviate 

some of the worries about future supply not keeping up with an increase in demand, 

especially from emerging economies,” Mr Hansen said. Should production eventually 

rise, which seems likely, the main loser is likely to be Canada. Venezuela positioned its 

oil industry away from the US to the more “friendly” nationals of China and Russia. Oil 

exports to the US are about 900,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd), down 

from a high of 1.4m boepd in 1998. This has benefited Canada, which has seen exports 

to the US double. “Venezuela’s oil is of the heavy crude variety, which is also what the 

Canadians produce around Alberta,” Mr Hansen noted. “Companies operating in Alberta 

will be able to export their know-how, which is good for the companies. However, this 

may be less so for the overall economics around Alberta, with Venezuelan heavy crude 

being much cheaper to extract.” However, the Canadian need not worry that the 

Venezuelans will get their act together quickly. This seems unlikely to happen for some 

11 | P a g e




time. Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS-PB - news) managed to sum up the consensus view, 

saying that Mr Chavez’s death should have “limited impact on the nation’s oil production 

in the short term” while a “change of leadership may foster longer-term investment and 

boost output.” Venezuela needs foreign oil companies to boost this output. Once it 

accepts this, and invites the oil majors to use their skills, global oil prices should 

see some relief. 

12 | P a g e




US-Venezuela Oil Trade Leads to Saudi Arabia Market Flood 

[ ] 

[ ] Competition is increasing – increased U.S. involvement with Venezuelan 

oil will incline Saudi Arabia to flood the market lowering prices. 

Wall Street Journal, 2012 

(Benoît Faucon, Sarah Kent and Hassan Hafidh, “U.S. Oil Boom Divides OPEC”, Wall 

Street Journal, 5/27/2012, 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323855804578508871186460986.html, 

) 

The American energy boom is deepening splits within the Organization of the 

Petroleum Exporting Countries, threatening to drive a wedge between African and 

Arab members as OPEC grapples with a revolution in the global oil trade. OPEC 

members gathering on Friday in Vienna will confront a disagreement over the impact of 

rising U.S. shale-oil production, with the most vulnerable countries arguing that the 

group should prepare for production cuts to prop up prices if they fall any lower. 

"We are heading toward some problems," said a Persian Gulf OPEC delegate. African 

OPEC members such as Algeria and Nigeria—which produce oil of similar grade to 

shale oil—are suffering the worst effects from the North American oil boom. Nigeria Oil 

Minister Diezani Alison-Madueke deemed U.S. shale oil a "grave concern." Gulf 

countries, notably Saudi Arabia, pass relatively unscathed—and are the only 

OPEC members with the flexibility to cut production. But they are unlikely to let 

that happen at Friday's meeting, several OPEC delegates said. That would deepen 

power struggles that have dominated the organization in recent years. Iran, Venezuela 

and Algeria, who need high oil prices to cover domestic spending and offset 

falling production, have regularly clashed with Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia, 

who have the financial strength to withstand lower prices. OPEC has overcome 

past rivalries to rally against an external threat, most notably in 2008 when it agreed to 

a production cut of more than four million barrels a day to stem a price crash 

during the financial crisis. But the uneven impact of the North American supply surge 

makes a collective response—such as a coordinated production cut to support prices— 

more difficult, said delegates on both sides of the divide. 

13 | P a g e




New Production would lower prices 

[ ] 

[ ] Venezuela’s huge reserves will go untapped now, the plan unleashes an 

immense amount of oil onto the world market. 

New York Times, 2013 

("Dwindling Production Has Led to Lesser Role for Venezuela as Major Oil Power", 3/8 

www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/world/americas/venezuelas-role-as-oil-powerdiminished.htm 

// ) 

Venezuela has huge reserves, including its Orinoco heavy oil belt, which the United 

States Geological Survey estimates to have 513 billion barrels of recoverable oil 

— enough potentially to make Venezuela one of the top three world producers. 

But foreign oil companies have been wary of investing. Jose Valera, a Houston 

energy lawyer, said that if Nicolás Maduro, Mr. Chávez’s vice president until he was 

sworn in as president on Friday, or another member of the Mr. Chávez’s movement was 

elected president in a special election “it is reasonable to expect continuity of a 

substantial portion of the policies.” But as for Venezuela’s economy, he argued, “the 

situation right now is not sustainable and it’s only a matter of time before some 

significant changes will have to be instituted.” 

[ ] Small changes in prices influence the global marketplace 

Hill , Chief Economic Correspondent at Washington Times, 2013 

(Patrice, “Major changes from oil revolution”, Washington Times, 2/3/2013, 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/4/sea-changes-from-oil-revolution/, 

JKahn) 

“The region keeps erupting into one kind or another of violence or instability. So we 

have to be present,” he said on Platt’s Energy Week. “Oil is fungible. There is one 

international oil market. [If] prices go up because of shortages in one area, they 

are going to go up in every other area, even in the United States, even if we 

import from safer areas or produce it ourselves. “Even more importantly, at the 

very core of America’s security relationship since World War II has been 

guaranteeing supplies of oil and gas to our friends and allies. Even if we are 

independent in energy, most of our friends in East Asia and certainly in Europe, 

and elsewhere in the world are not.” Mr. Kingston sees another major question 

arising from the changing oil dynamics: “Why does the U.S. need to hold so much oil in 

the Strategic Petroleum Reserve if its import dependence is plummeting” he asked. 

President George W. Bush undertook to fill the reserve to a record 727 million barrels, 

often at prices of more than $100 per barrel. Yet the oil has rarely been used, even 

14 | P a g e




though the U.S. from time to time has been threatened with oil shutdowns because of 

wars and embargoes in countries such as Iraq, Libya, Venezuela and Iran. The reserve 

contains enough crude to cover 90 days of imports at the current, reduced rate of 

consumption, Mr. Kingston said. Oil analysts expect that political leaders will be tempted 

to sell some of the oil in the reserve in the future either for political or budgetary 

reasons, to help at least temporarily reduce the budget deficit. 

15 | P a g e




High Oil Prices Good- Political Stability 

[ ] 

[ ] All producer states need high prices for political stability---the alternative 

is revolution 

Taylor, editor of a magazine that provides background to current events, 2009 

(Rupert, is the "The Geopolitics of Oil: High Oil Prices Tend to Create Global Stability" 

Jun 2 2009 suite101.com/article/the-geopolitics-of-oil-a122340) 

High Oil Prices Bring Political Stability 

Several Persian Gulf States, Russia, former Soviet Central Asian Republics, 

Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Nigeria depend heavily on high oil prices. The 

income from oil supports whatever political and social stability these countries 

have. But, in the spring of 2000, most of the nations listed were pretty shaky even with 

oil prices flirting with historical highs of $30 U.S. a barrel. 

By the summer of 2008, oil was five times that price and talk of instability in oilproducing 

countries became very muted. 

Oil Companies not in the Democracy Business 

Few things can cause people in the boardrooms of international corporations to break 

out in a cold sweat more than political instability. If the certainty and stability that keeps 

executives calm is achieved through authoritarian governments, so be it. As far as 

corporations are concerned, their business generally is not promoting democracy. 

Looking at the world’s major oil producers more than a few of them have nondemocratic 

governments. In fact, the list is almost a roll-call of authoritarian regimes. 

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. Kazakhstan is a dictatorship. Brunei (absolute 

monarchy); Turkmenistan (dictatorship); Libya (dictatorship); Iran (theocracy); Iraq (warravaged); 

Kuwait (absolute monarchy), and on, and on. 

High Oil Prices Good for Security 

Having really tough governments in place tends to ensure stability - for a while. 

But, the repression worries the people whose job it is to be anxious about global 

security. As they sit in their universities, and departments of strategic studies and suck 

on the ends of their pencils they visualize a world with low oil prices, and most of them 

don’t like what they see. 

The conventional thinking is that a steady flow of oil wealth keeps the lid on 

revolution. Oil-rich dictators and monarchs can toss a few goodies to the masses 

in the form of hospitals and schools. This keeps them from agitating for freedom and 

democracy. 

The New York Times reported on March 28, 1999 on the effects of low oil income: “In 

Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela, Algeria, and even in the world’s largest oil producer, 

Saudi Arabia, shrunken budgets are straining social and political cohesion.” 

16 | P a g e




High Oil Prices Good- Government Repression 

[ ] 

[ ] Collapse of state budgets causes waves of repression that wreck internal 

stability of producer states 

Hulbert, analyst at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2012 

(Matthew is an "The political perils of low oil prices" European Energy Review, July 9 

2012 

www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.phpid=3796&id_mailing=295&toegang=49 

182f81e6a13cf5eaa496d51fea6406) 

Fair enough, but what everyone wanted to know, and especially Iran, Venezuela, 

and Algeria, was how far and how fast Saudi was going to make cuts and 

'balance' the market. With Brent prices regularly dipping well below $100 and WTI 

prices considerably lower, OPEC hawks are getting very nervous. Non-OPEC 

producers in Russia and Central Asia even more so. Assuming demand side dynamics 

don't drastically pick up in Asia, we can expect three things to sequentially happen. 

The first is an international price war across all producer states to force Saudi 

Arabia to take assertive action to tighten the taps and raise prices. That will be a 

difficult process given Riyadh has its own strategic objectives to want a sustained 

period of moderate prices, well below $100/b. 

Secondly, if petro-hawks lose this price war, their political bluster will subside, and a 

far 'cruder' trend will emerge. They will have to cut back on domestic spending, 

which is bound to lead to a new round of protests, and more importantly 

sharpened domestic repression. 

Given repression is no longer the 'effective' tool it once was for producer states, that 

could well lead us to a third, and far more daunting prospect: any price floor will be 

set by producer states folding under the weight of political pressure when new crises 

hit. The flat price of crude will be influenced more by political unrest clipping 

production than by active supply restraint. 

17 | P a g e




High Oil Prices Good- Government Repression 

[ ] 

[ ] Tight budgets due to oil price downturn force repression in producer 

countries worldwide. 

Hulbert, analyst at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2012 

(Matthew is an "The political perils of low oil prices" European Energy Review, July 9 

2012 

www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.phpid=3796&id_mailing=295&toegang=49 

182f81e6a13cf5eaa496d51fea6406) 

But it's only once you translate these abstract numbers into political realities 

that the scale of the producer challenge becomes clear. It's also where 

sharpened repression kicks into the equation once petro-hawks realise that a 

price war with Saudi Arabia can't be won. This isn't just a case of increasingly 

expensive social spending programmes petro-states need to appease restive 

populations, you have to price in bungs to bureaucrats, oligarchs, security services, 

and most importantly, on-going support of the military to politically sure things up. 

Just like in 2008/9, rather than engaging in constructive 'reform to preserve', petrostates 

are likely to turn to repression. 

The key lesson most petro-states took from the Arab uprising is make sure you've 

paid off the right institutions to cover your back. Beyond the obvious ploy of 

tightening his grip over the resource sector, President Putin has already passed a 

law 'banning' protests; Algeria purged its state oil company; the 'Nasty Stans' 

across Central Asia pushed through snap elections, with Kazakhstan taking 

majority control of any new pipeline developments. Hugo Chavez is pulling out all the 

stops for a 'lifelong' Presidency in Venezuela. If Iran can't galvanise broad based 

support through its nuclear programme, it has no problem quelling the streets 

of Tehran by whatever means necessary. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia made clear 

that revolution wasn't going to work in Bahrain; Kuwait proved very effective in 

drowning domestic dissent; the UAE drafted in a private military company for 

'counterterrorism' and internal security purposes, just in case their own soldiers 

refused to open fire. And even where recent elections have taken place, the 

underlying role of the military remains an omnipotent presence, be it in Egypt, 

Nigeria or Indonesia. The tighter budgets get, the more likely it is these types 

of coping mechanisms kick in. Military hardware remains (in some cases) the 

first, but in all cases, the last line of resort. 

18 | P a g e




High Oil Prices Good: Saudi Stability 

[ ] Saudi stability depends on high oil prices --- Arab Spring magnifies risk 

of conflict. 

Allam, Staff Writer Financial Times, 2012 

(Abeer, “Saudi Arabia: in a restless realm,” Financial Times Analysis, 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/59c7492e-e07b-11e1-9335- 

00144feab49a.html#axzz2YkfkIhpW) 

Meanwhile the most urgent regional crisis – Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear programme 

and its perceived desire to dominate the Gulf – has intensified. The failure of 

Tehran’s negotiations with world powers has heightened the prospect of Israeli 

attacks that would further unsettle the region. As a result, Saudi Arabia today 

faces one of its most difficult periods since it was founded 80 years ago. The 

domestic situation compounds the problems. An ageing monarchy resistant to 

political change must focus on appeasing a young population – increasingly 

connected to the outside world – concerned about transparency in government 

decision-making; the distribution of the country’s resources, including oil wealth and 

land; and a dearth of jobs. Oil prices, currently above $110 a barrel, have provided 

Saudi Arabia with a fiscal cushion. The central bank’s net foreign assets rose to a 

record $591bn in June from roughly half that level five years ago. The International 

Monetary Fund’s 2012 economic growth forecast is 6 per cent, a contrast with the 

outlook for struggling western states. But the country is still heavily dependent on 

oil; non-oil exports represented only 12 per cent of the total last year. “Saudi 

Arabia has faced several challenges throughout its history, but after the Arab spring 

these challenges have become greater,” says Hassan al-Mostafa, a Saudi writer. 

“This is an extraordinary internal and external situation but they are trying to 

control it [by] using the oil bonanza and by ensuring a smooth transition of power.” 

19 | P a g e


High Oil Prices Good: Saudi Stability 



[ ] Saudi Arabian instability leads to global economic turmoil --- experts 

agree. 

Sambidge, staff writer Arabian Business, 2011 

(Andy, “S&P says Saudi unrest could have adverse global impact,” Arabian Business, 4- 

23-13, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/s-p-says-saudi-unrest-could-have-adverseglobal-impact-395636.html) 

The global economy could be severely affected if the current wave of political 

uprisings spread to Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil producer, ratings agency 

Standard's & Poor's said in its GCC Q1 Outlook report. While S&P analysts said they 

saw upheaval in the kingdom as "unlikely", they added that the impact would have a 

"tangible adverse economic impact" on oil importers and the global economy. 

Kai Stukenbrock, a credit analyst, said in the report that the oil price "could rise 

beyond historical peak level" should serious uprisings take hold in Saudi 

Arabia. Oil peaked at just below $148 a barrel in the summer of 2008 and is currently 

trading above the $120 mark as other Middle East and North African countries continue 

to struggle amid political unrest. "If there were to be political upheaval in Saudi Arabia, 

a scenario which we currently consider unlikely, the ramifications, both geopolitical 

and well as geo-economical, could be severe," Stukenbrock added. "Depending on 

the nature of such hypothetical events in Saudi Arabia, the oil price could rise beyond 

historical peak levels, and if sustained, would have a tangible adverse economic impact 

on oil importers and the global economy," he said in the report. 

20 | P a g e




High Oil Prices Good: Iranian Economy 

[ ] Low oil prices crush the Iranian economy 

Farzanegan, Professor – Dresden University of Technology, 2009 

Mohammad Reza, “The effects of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy”, Energy 

Economics, 31(1), Science Direct, Deech) 

The Iranian economy is highly vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. This paper 

analyzes the dynamic relationship between oil price shocks and major macroeconomic 

variables in Iran by applying a VAR approach. The study points out the asymmetric 

effects of oil price shocks; for instance, positive as well as negative oil price shocks 

significantly increase inflation. We find a strong positive relationship between 

positive oil price changes and industrial output growth. Unexpectedly, we can only 

identify a marginal impact of oil price fluctuations on real government expenditures. 

Furthermore, we observe the ”Dutch Disease” syndrome through significant real 

effective exchange rate appreciation. Oil and gas revenues play strategic roles in 

the structure of the Iranian economy. Holding 10% of the world's total proven oil 

reserves and as the second largest producer (after Saudi Arabia) within the 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (see OPEC, 2005), Iran both affects 

the international oil market and is broadly affected by it. Iran's economy relies 

heavily on crude oil export revenues, representing about 90% of total export 

earnings and, on average, 60% of government revenues in annual budgets 

(Central Bank of Iran, 2008). The share of oil value added in the GDP of Iran averaged 

about 20% between 1970 and 2006. In this situation, any shock to global oil markets 

can have a tremendous effect on the government budget and the structure of the 

economy. Fig. 1 (source: Central Bank of Iran (2008) and IFS-Database) illustrates the 

co-movement of the Iranian GDP per capita with fluctuations of real oil prices 

since 1970. We can observe that the former variable is linked to trend of the latter. The 

unique role of oil revenues in the structure of government budgets and social 

security programs distinguishes the Iranian economy from others. Despite higher 

oil prices and revenues in recent years, the Iranian government budget deficits are still a 

challenging issue, in part due to the large scale of state subsidies on energy and 

comestible goods. Possible sources of financing the annual budget deficits include 

issuing state bonds, foreign borrowing, privatization, and withdrawals from the Oil 

Stabilization Fund (OSF). The shares of various sources of financing the budget deficits 

in Iran over 2005 to 2007 are presented in Table 1. As is evident from this table, more 

than 90% of annual budget deficits in Iran is financed through withdrawals from OSF. 

This is like spending oil revenues directly and has strong inflationary effects through 

increasing money supply in the economy. Considering the high rigidity of current 

government expenditures in Iran, any significant negative oil price shocks will 

worsen the budget deficit of the government and create inflationary pressures for 

the whole economy. 

21 | P a g e




High Oil Prices Good: Iranian Economy 

[ ] Economic downturn causes Iranian lash out --- triggers a broader conflict 

Fishman, staff writre Y Net news, 2012 

(Alex, “Beware Iranian desperation,” Y Net News, 1-17, 

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4176675,00.html) 

Everybody talks about the spring, because everyone is convinced that Israel will be 

striking Iran at that time, a move that will ignite the Middle East. The scenario is 

rather banal and emerges in every defense panel in the global media: This year, the 

Iranians will complete the task of moving their nuclear project deep underground, and 

from that moment an aerial strike would be much less effective. Hence, a strike appears 

to be required as soon as is possible. However, there is another possibility that is 

much more realistic, much closer to materializing, and unrelated to an attack on 

Iran’s nuclear sites. This scenario asserts that the ones to first pull the trigger will be 

the Iranians, against the backdrop of Tehran’s economic chokehold and growing 

global isolation. Iran is starting to be pushed into a corner in the face of existing 

pressure, and more so as result of pressures to be exerted very soon. Tehran’s 

economic collapse is already around the corner. The regime sees the thousands 

standing in line at banks these days in order to exchange the local currency for dollars – 

but there are none. On the black market, the gap already stands at 60%. Nobody can 

predict the breaking point that would prompt Ahmadinejad to act desperately; the 

point where the ayatollahs feel threatened enough to resort to a military 

provocation that would bully the world and exact such high price as to prompt the 

international community to lift the chokehold. 

22 | P a g e




Answers to: Other issues with Iranian Economy 

[ ] And --- only higher oil prices maintain growth in the Iranian economy. 

Blas, Correspondent – Financial Times, 2012 

(Javier, “High oil prices shield Iran from sanctions”, Financial Times, 4-17, Proquest, 

Deech) 

High oil prices are insulating Iran from the full impact of US and European 

sanctions on the sale of its crude, providing Tehran with breathing space as it 

prepares for a new round of nuclear talks with western nations next month. The Centre 

for Global Energy Studies (CGES), a London-based think-tank, estimates that Iran 

will earn $56bn selling its crude this year - its third-highest earnings ever - even 

after factoring in the loss of roughly a third of its export volume due to sanctions. 

However, analysts point out that Tehran is finding difficulties in repatriating the funds 

due to the sanctions on its central bank. Hellenic Petroleum, a Greece-based refiner, 

recently stopped importing Iranian oil as it was unable to transfer its payments. The 

Iranian rial has weakened significantly against the US dollar since December - a sign 

that Tehran faces difficulties obtaining hard currency. 

[ ] Emperical evidence proves that high oil prices support the Iranian 

economy. 

Aliyev, Analyst Ankara Strategic Institute, 13 

(Bayram, B.A. – Qafqaz University, M.A. – Siegen University, Research Assistant –, 

“Basic Characteristics of Iranian Economy”, Independent Political Analysis, 5-10, 

http://www.politicalanalysis.info/basic-characteristics-of-iranian-economy.html, Deech) 

Naturally, Iran’s Economy mostly based on energy because of its rich oil and 

natural gas resources. Namely, Iran’s proven oil resources are fourth in the world 

after Saudi Arabia, Canada and Venezuela, while it has second biggest natural gas 

reserves after Russia. Iran holds 137 billion barrels oil, with a 9. 3% percent of total oil 

reserves of World and 1.046 trillion cubic feet natural gas, which forms 15.7% percent of 

total natural gas reserves in the world. The approximate income per capita of country is 

$ 13.000 and according to data of World Bank, Iran is in the “high-middle-income 

countries” group. The revenues from Energy Sector (Oil and Gas) provided increasing 

of national income per capita around $ 7.000 to over $ 13.000 in 2012. In compare with 

other countries, according to above-mentioned data, Iran is seen such a “developed 

country economically” country. However, if we take into account that Iran holds very rich 

resources, then income and welfare level of society should be more than these 

indicators. Considering that the 70% of the revenue from the energy sector is 

transferred to the state budget, thus living conditions of society are expected to be more 

comfortable. However, the current image of country is seen opposite to this profile. A 

population of Iran is approaching 79 million and it has rich resources, however, it is 

seen that these labour and energy potential of country cannot be transformed 

23 | P a g e




opportunity for the country. During Power of Rafsanjani and Khatami, planned economic 

reforms have been applied and it was reached to 6% of economic growth rate during 

those years. In fact, stable growth of economy during 2002-2008 was mostly 

related with rising of oil prices. Iran’s economic growth rate has fallen gradually since 

2008 to these days, because of the effect of sanctions that has been started. 

24 | P a g e




High Oil Prices Good: Venezuelan Economy 

[ ] 

[ ] Oil price slide wrecks the Venezuelan economy 

Mander, staff writer at Financial Times, 2012 

(Benedict Mander, Financial Times "Venezuela more prone to oil price jitters" July 15 

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/415985c2-7a88-11e1-8ae6- 

00144feab49a.html#axzz24lgnWrjK) 

With fewer than 100 days to go until the October 7 presidential election, the issue of 

Venezuela’s growing “oil dependency” and the government’s record of economic 

mismanagement has come to the fore as recent polls show Mr Chávez in a statistical 

tie with opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski. 

“There is no question about it. Venezuela is not only more dependent on oil, but it is 

more dependent on the price of oil, as production has not increased,” says Jorge 

Piñon, a research fellow at the University of Texas. 

The rise in oil prices since Mr Chávez came to power in 1998 has been a boon in 

many ways, allowing him to bolster his popularity by splurging oil revenues on 

social programmes, in to which state-owned oil company PDVSA funnelled some 

$53bn between 2006 and 2010. 

The problem, however, is that PDVSA has neglected to invest in its core business, 

causing production to decline: it spent just $1bn in exploration activities over the same 

period. Venezuela produced 2.72m barrels a day in 2011, according to BP’s annual 

statistical review, versus 3.48m bpd in 1998 when Mr Chávez was first elected. This has 

made the economy more dependent on oil prices staying high. 

“Oil prices are the Achilles heel of the Venezuelan economy,” added Mr Piñon. 

Venezuelan oil prices fell to a low of $86.17 a barrel last month, after peaking at 

$116.85 a barrel in March. Despite Mr Chávez’s wishful prediction recently that oil 

prices should stabilise at around $100, fears that prices will continue to slide have 

triggered concerns about Venezuela’s $340bn economy, which relies on oil for 95 

per cent of export earnings. 

25 | P a g e


Affirmative

Oil Prices Disadvantage Affirmative 



Oil Prices Disadvantage - Table of Contents 

Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................... 2 

Uniqueness Answers 

Non Unique: Low Oil Prices Inevitable ......................................................................................................... 3 

Non Unique: Oil Market Shift Inevitable ........................................................................................................ 4 

Link Answers: 

Answers to: Saudi Arabia floods market ....................................................................................................... 5 

Impact Answers: 

Impact Turn: High Oil Prices Bad: Economy ................................................................................................ 6 

Impact Turn: High Oil Prices Bad: Food Prices ........................................................................................... 7 

Impact Turn: High Oil Prices Bad: War ......................................................................................................... 8 

Answers to: Saudi Arabia instability .............................................................................................................. 9 

Answers to: Iranian Economy Impact ......................................................................................................... 10 

1 | P a g e




Glossary 

Chavistas- supporters of Hugo Chavez, former president of Venezuela 

Dissent- The expression or holding of opinions at variance with those previously, commonly, or 


Empirically- Verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment 

Flooding the market- introducing a large supply of a product into a market to artificially reduce the 

price. Usually a tactic used by large producers to prevent new entrants into a market 

Nicolas Maduro- newly elected president of Venezuela 

OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)- an organization formed in 1961 to 



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Non Unique: Low Oil Prices Inevitable 

[ ] 

[ ] Low prices are inevitable – increased supply and decreased demand 

Barron’s, 2013 

("Falling Oil Prices: What, Me Worry", Barron's, 6/13 

online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748704878904578543721313773576.htmlmod=rss_barr 

ons_most_viewed_day#articleTabs_article%3D1 //kdh) 

Only a few years ago, it seemed we were running out of oil. Now it seems we're bathing in it. 

However, plentiful supply from new drilling techniques and weaker demand in the U.S., Europe 

and China suggest that oil prices will moderate. The U.S. benchmark could drop from $96.66 

per barrel to $85 over the next year. Brent crude, the international benchmark trading at about $104 

per barrel, could fall below $95 in the year ahead, if the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries doesn't rein in members, says Ed Morse, head of global commodities research at Citigroup. 

While a geopolitical blowup could certainly send oil prices soaring, saber-rattling in the Middle 

East, namely the constant threat that Iran poses to Israel and the region, seems largely factored 

in. "Prices are likely to edge downward," Morse says. "Commercial inventories of crude and 

refined product are at 80-year highs in the U.S. Producer stocks are high in places like Saudi 

Arabia. The market believes demand will pick up in the second half, but no one believes 

demand is particularly strong, partly because Europe is weak, and partly because China's 

economy has faltered." The U.S. oil boom, the result of hydraulic fracturing in shale formations, is 

boosting North American oil inventories and could be embraced internationally. Moreover, tepid 

economic growth and increased auto fuel efficiency are pressuring demand. And natural gas is 

emerging as a fuel substitute. Internationally, energy supplies are "coming from an increasing 

diversity of sources," according to a BP Statistical Review of World Energy released this week. All 

these supply and demand fundamentals point to lower oil prices. However, some energy stocks 

should prosper even if prices should fall moderately. One is Cameron International (ticker: CAM), a 

global oilfield equipment maker whose technology, margin improvements and growing market share 

position it well for the long term. Another is explorer Canadian Natural Resources (CNQ), which 

should benefit from regional improvements in oil delivery and pricing. 

3 | P a g e




Non Unique: Oil Market Shift Inevitable 

[ ] 

[ ] Oil market dominance will shift from Middle East inevitably, already happening now. 

Jaffe, director of the Baker Institute Energy Forum at Rice University, 2011 

(Amy Myers Jaffe is and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Americas, Not the Middle 

East, Will Be the World Capital of Energy”, October 2011, 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_americas_not_the_middle_east_will_be_the_wo 

rld_capital_of_energypage=0,0) 

For half a century, the global energy supply's center of gravity has been the Middle East. This 

fact has had self-evidently enormous implications for the world we live in -- and it's about to 

change. By the 2020s, the capital of energy will likely have shifted back to the Western 

Hemisphere, where it was prior to the ascendancy of Middle Eastern megasuppliers such as Saudi 

Arabia and Kuwait in the 1960s. The reasons for this shift are partly technological and partly 

political. Geologists have long known that the Americas are home to plentiful hydrocarbons 

trapped in hard-to-reach offshore deposits, on-land shale rock, oil sands, and heavy oil formations. 

The U.S. endowment of unconventional oil is more than 2 trillion barrels, with another 2.4 

trillion in Canada and 2 trillion-plus in South America -- compared with conventional Middle 

Eastern and North African oil resources of 1.2 trillion. The problem was always how to unlock 

them economically. 

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[ ] 

Answers to: Saudi Arabia floods market 

[ ] Financial constraints on Saudi Arabia prevent production increases of the past. 

Ergo, global intelligence and advisory firm, 2012 

(“The Waning Era of Saudi Oil Dominance”, February, 2012, Ergo, 

http://www.ergo.net/ErgoSpecialReport_Saudi_Oil_Feb2012.pdf, JKahn) 

While Saudi Arabia has benefited from higher oil prices in 2011 and from additional revenues 

earned by compensating for Libya’s production shortfall, over the long term Saudi Arabia 

faces growing financial constraints. Saudi budgets have steadily increased over the past 

decade, and are expected to continue to do so in light of the various energy and EOR initiatives 

described above, as well as the prospect of future social spending to quell domestic unrest. This will 

require a consistently high price of oil. Just a decade ago the Kingdom’s break-even price was 

$25/barrel. In 2009 it increased to $68/barrel, and stands at $88/barrel in 2011. In January Saudi oil 

minister Abdullah al Naimi announced that the Kingdom would target $100/barrel in 2012. A recent 

study conducted by Riyadh-based Jadwa Investments forecasts a requirement for a $320/barrel oil 

price by 2030. The Kingdom’s ability to reduce its budget is increasingly constrained by the 

amount of spending it must undertake to quell political discontent or provide for rapid 

population growth in a welfare state. Even though the Kingdom retired a large amount of its debt in 

2010, an Ergo source who is a former advisor to the Saudi Ministry of Commerce warns that “a few 

bad years could crucify the Saudis.” 

[ ] Saudi Arabia will not flood the market. Largest oil production increase in US history 

didn’t trigger impacts. 

Wall Street Journal, 2013 

Keith Johnson and Russell Gold, “U.S. Oil Notches Record Growth,” WSJ, 6/12 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324049504578541601909939628.html) 

U.S. crude-oil production grew by more than one million barrels a day last year, the largest 

increase in the world and the largest in U.S. history. In the latest sign of the shale revolution 

remaking world energy markets, crude production in the U.S. jumped 14% last year to 8.9 million 

barrels a day, according to the newly released Statistical Review of World Energy, an annual 

compilation of industry trends published by BP BP.LN -0.16% PLC for more than six decades. The 

wave of new crude, flowing in oil fields from North Dakota to south Texas, helped keep the global 

market adequately supplied and helped markets weather declining oil production elsewhere in 

the world. "The growth in U.S. output was a major factor in keeping oil prices from rising 

sharply, despite a second consecutive year of large oil supply disruptions," said BP Chief Executive 

Bob Dudley. 

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Impact Turn: High Oil Prices Bad: Economy 

[ ] 

[ ] High oil prices hurt the global economy, historical record proves. 

Rubin chief economist and chief strategist at CIBC World Markets , 2012 

(Jeff,.“How High Oil Prices Will Permanently Cap Economic Growth”, Bloomberg News, 09/23/2012, 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-23/how-high-oil-prices-will-permanently-cap-economicgrowth.html) 

Oil provides more than a third of the energy we use on the planet every day, more than any other 

energy source. And you can draw a straight line between oil consumption and gross-domesticproduct 

growth. The more oil we burn, the faster the global economy grows. On average over 

the last four decades, a 1 percent bump in world oil consumption has led to a 2 percent 

increase in global GDP. That means if GDP increased 4 percent a year -- as it often did before the 

2008 recession -- oil consumption was increasing by 2 percent a year. At $20 a barrel, increasing 

annual oil consumption by 2 percent seems reasonable enough. At $100 a barrel, it becomes 

easier to see how a 2 percent increase in fuel consumption is enough to make an economy 

collapse. Fortunately, the reverse is also true. When our economies stop growing, less oil is needed. 

For example, after the big decline in 2008, global oil demand actually fell for the first time since 1983. 

That’s why the best cure for high oil prices is high oil prices. When prices rise to a level that causes 

an economic crash, lower prices inevitably follow. Over the last four decades, each time oil prices 

have spiked, the global economy has entered a recession. Consider the first oil shock, after 

the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ Arab 

members turned off the taps on roughly 8 percent of the world’s oil supply by cutting shipments 

to the U.S. and other Israeli allies. Crude prices spiked, and by 1974, real GDP in the U.S. had 

shrunk by 2.5 percent. The second OPEC oil shock happened during Iran’s revolution and the 

subsequent war with Iraq. Disruptions to Iranian production during the revolution sent crude 

prices higher, pushing the North American economy into a recession for the first half of 1980. A 

few months later, Iran’s war with Iraq shut off 6 percent of world oil production, sending North 

America into a double-dip recession that began in the spring of 1981. 

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Impact Turn: High Oil Prices Bad: Food Prices 

[ ] 

[ ] High oil prices cause massive food shortages , promotes production of biofuels. 

Timilsina et al, is Senior Research Economist for the World Bank 2011 

(Govinda R. Timilsina, “World Oil Price and Biofuels: A General Equilibrium Analysis”, June 2011, 

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/06/02/ 

000158349_20110602161941/Rendered/PDF/WPS5673.pdf) 

An increase in oil price would impact food supply in several ways. First, it diverts food 

commodities that are suitable as biofuel feedstock (e.g., corn, sugar, wheat) towards biofuel 

production. Second, it reallocates lands used for the cultivation of food commodities that are 

notsuitable as biofuel feedstocks (e.g., rice) and pasture needed for animal grazing towards 

biofuel feedstock commodities (e.g., corn, sugar cane). Third, higher oil price could reduce 

demand for food that is reflected in the supply as demand and supply are balanced in the market 

equilibrium. Figure 6 presents the impacts of oil price changes on food supply. The reductions in 

food supply are significant. For example, a 25% increase in oil price would reduce global food 

supply, including processed foods, by 0.7% in 2020. If the price of oil doubles from its baseline level, 

it would reduce global food supply by 2.8% in 2020. 

[ ] High oil prices decrease global food supply 

Timilsina et al, is Senior Research Economist for the World Bank 2011 

(Govinda R. Timilsina, “World Oil Price and Biofuels: A General Equilibrium Analysis”, June 2011, 

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/06/02/ 

000158349_20110602161941/Rendered/PDF/WPS5673.pdf) 

The study first estimates the share of biofuels (i.e., ethanol and biodiesel) in total liquid fuel 

consumption for road transportation (hereafter referred to as „biofuel penetration‟). This is followed by 

assessment of the impacts of increased oil prices on biofuel penetration, agricultural outputs, landuse 

change and food supply. The study finds that biofuel production very much affected by 

changes in oil price -- a 65 percent increase in oil price in 2020 from the 2009 level would increase 

the global biofuel penetration to 5.4 percent in 2020 from 2.4 percent in 2009. A doubling of oil price 

in 2020 from its baseline level, or a 230 percent increase from the 2009 level, would increase the 

global biofuel penetration in 2020 to 12.6 percent. The impacts are highly sensitive to the 

substitution possibility between biofuels and their fossil fuel counterparts. At the global level, 

aggregate agricultural outputs drop due to oil price increase, however the drop is small in major 

biofuel producing countries as the expansion of biofuels would partially offset the negative impacts of 

oil price increase on agricultural outputs. However, increases in oil price would significantly 

reduce global food supply. 

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Impact Turn: High Oil Prices Bad: War 

[ ] 

[ ] High oil prices funnels money to revolutionary governments causes massive wars 

Colgan, assistant professor of International Relations at American University, 2012 

(Jeff, “Regulating the Resource Curse”, Foreign Policy, AUGUST 27 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/27/regulating_the_resource_cursepage=0,0 

But the SEC ruling is not just beneficial to developing countries -- it is also in the interests of the 

United States and its allies. If oil money is not managed well -- and it rarely is -- it can get 

channeled into civil and interstate conflicts that threaten the United States or its interests. 

Research shows that oil-producing states led by revolutionary governments like that of ousted 

Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi are more than three times as likely to instigate militarized 

international conflicts as a typical state. Oil income makes these petrostates aggressive, 

emboldening them to pick fights they might not otherwise attempt -- think Iraq's 1991 invasion of 

Kuwait or Libya's armed conflicts with Chad that lasted over two decades. And with 16 developing 

countries about to become new oil exporters, the likelihood of petro-fueled conflict is only 

getting higher. Among those that have recently uncovered oil reserves are Liberia, Mali, 

Sierra Leone, and Uganda -- all of which were recently entangled in civil or interstate war, or 

both. Providing these governments with oil income -- especially without transparent financial 

procedures and political institutions -- is an invitation to disaster. 

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Answers to: Saudi Arabia instability 

[ ] 

[ ] Saudi Arabia can withstand price dips without a revolution. 

LeVine, writer for Foreign Policy, 2012 

(Steve, writer for Foreign Policy, June 20, 2012, “Why oil prices are keeping Putin up at night”, 

http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/20/why_oil_prices_are_keeping_putin_up_at_night 

) 

In an email exchange, Verleger pointed me to an interview he did a few days ago with Kate 

Mackenzie at the Financial Times. First, he explains, the Saudis are out for blood when it comes 

to fellow petro-states Russia and Iran, the former for failing to help calm the fury in Syria, and the 

latter for refusing to go to heel and give up its nuclear ambitions; in both cases, the Saudis think lower 

prices will produce a more reasonable attitude. In addition, Saudi Arabia is terrified of a current 

U.S. boom in shale oil; it is hoping that lower prices will render much of the drilling in North 

Dakota's Bakken Shale and Canada's oil sands uneconomical. Finally, the Saudis are well 

aware that low oil prices helped to turn around the global economic downturn in 1998 and 

1999, and they hope to help accomplish the same now, and perhaps win new affection from the 

world's leading economies. Meanwhile, though, Verleger thinks that oil prices will crash. Markets 

overshoot when one is trying only to fine-tune them, as the Saudis are, he argues -- which is the 

basis for his forecasts of $40-a-barrel oil and $2-a-gallon gasoline by November. To the degree that 

such fire-sale prices are long-lived, they could cause mayhem among petro-rulers. While Verleger 

thinks that the Saudis can maneuver prices back up when they want, the very nature of a crash 

demonstrates that markets can be uncontrollable. But the Saudis are willing to suffer the 

consequences, knowing that their own financial reserves (some $700 billion) give them staying 

power. "The Saudis are able to look at the long term," Phil Flynn, an analyst with Pricing 

Futures Group, told me. 

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Answers to: Iranian Economy Impact 

[ ] 

[ ] Iranian economy will drop- chronic mismanagement. 

Valinejad and Peterson, correspondent and staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor, 2012 

(Afshin, “US Sanctions Crush Iran Economy - Iranians Blame Ahmadinejad”, The Truth Pursuit, 10- 

17, http://thetruthpursuit.com/top-story/us-sanctions-crush-iran-economy-iranians-blameahmadinejad/11359, 

Deech) 

The US-led sanctions are just one target of blame for the hardship. More and more, lawmakers and 

ordinary Iranians blame the high inflation and unemployment as much on the government's 

mishandling of the oil revenue windfall of recent years as on sanctions. Even supreme leader 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei admitted this Oct. 10, acknowledging that while the sanctions may cause 

problems, "mismanagement may even increase these problems." As an oil exporter during a 

period of high oil prices, Iran should be flush with cash from pre-embargo sales that it could use to 

shield Iranians from the worst of the adverse effects of the sanctions. Instead, the government's 

spendthrift ways on costly projects and cash handouts have left little protective buffer. Some 

102 parliamentarians have signed a letter demanding a chance to question President Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad on his economic policies, and more than half of the elected body voted to reexamine his 

landmark subsidy reforms. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani – long a political rival of the president – 

has said mismanagement accounted for 80 percent of Iran's financial woes. 

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Embargo CP 



Embargo Counterplan 

1 | P a g e

Embargo CP 



Embargo CP-Table of Contents 

Summary ......................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary .......................................................................................................................... 4 

Strengthen the Embargo Counterplan 1NC ..................................................................... 5 

Solvency: 

Embargo Solves – Promotes Civil Unrest ....................................................................... 6 

Embargo Solves – Bargaining Chip for Changes ............................................................ 7 

Embargo Solves – History Proves More Effective than Engagement .............................. 8 

Embargo Solves – Embargo Good for Public Health – Prevents Obesity .................. 9-10 

Answers to: Embargo Strengthens Cuban Regime ....................................................... 11 

Answers to: US Wealth Promotes Change .................................................................. 122 

Answers to: US Wealth Promotes Change .................................................................. 133 

Answers to: Embargo Failed in Past ........................................................................... 144 

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Embargo CP 



Summary 

This counterplan advocates strengthening the embargo on Cuba rather than lifting it. In 

the status quo, Cuba is facing economic troubles that could result in an economic 

collapse. The negative argues that even though Cubans already face a great deal of 

hardships under the Castro regime, that an economic collapse in Cuba would make life 

unbearable enough that it would spur a revolt against the Cuban government. If the 

regime falls, the negative team believes a democratic revolution in Cuba will happen 

guaranteeing civil liberties, improved health care, and a better life. 

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Embargo CP 



Glossary 

Embargo- A governmental order to cut commercial trade/relations with another 

country/region. The United States has had an embargo on Cuba since the Cold War. To 

this day, relations with Cuba have been cut. 

Regime- The government that is in power 

Totalitarian- An individual will complete rule over the government of a country. 

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Embargo CP 



Strengthen the Embargo Counterplan 1NC 

We advocate the following counterplan: 

The United States federal government should strengthen its embargo on Cuba, 

specifically including a restriction on travel and tourism. 

This is the best way to solve for government repression – economic pressure will 

spur civil unrest and regime change. 

International Policy Digest, 2013 

(“Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo,” May 9, International Policy Digest, Online: 

http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cubanembargo/utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+internationalpolicydig 

est+(International+Policy+Digest) 

However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a 

wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who 

possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate. Lifting the trade 

embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will 

increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban 

people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo. No doubt, it has been a fruitless 50 years 

since the embargo was enacted. Little has changed as far as democracy and human rights are 

concerned. To maintain control, Cuba has “managed to offset much of the effects over the years in large 

part because the Soviets subsidized the island for three decades, because the regime welcomed 

Canadian, Mexican and European capital after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and because Venezuela is 

its new patron,” according to Llosa. However, Venezuela is now undergoing a political 

transition of its own with the recent death of Hugo Chávez, its president for the past 14 

years, and the controversial election of Nicolás Maduro. Despite being Chávez’s handpicked successor, 

Maduro only won by a narrow margin and will likely be forced to cut spending on social programs and 

foreign assistance in an effort to stabilize Venezuela’s dire economic problems. Therefore, now is the 

ideal time to take action. Without Venezuela’s support, the Cuban government will 

assuredly face an economic crisis. Strengthening the embargo to limit U.S. dollars 

flowing into Cuba would place further pressure on the Cuban government and 

has the potential to trigger an economic collapse. A change in the Cuban political 

climate is within reach. According to U.S. Senator Robert Menendez, “Tourism to 

Cuba is a natural resource, akin to providing refined petroleum products to Iran. It’s 

reported that 2.5 million tourists visit Cuba – 1.5 million from North America…1 

million Canadians…More than 170,000 from England…More than 400,000 from Spain, Italy, 

Germany, and France combined – All bringing in $1.9 billion in revenue to the Castro regime.” 

This behavior undermines the embargo, which is why the U.S. should urge other nations 

to adopt similar policies toward Cuba. A strong and unyielding embargo, supported by the 

U.S. and its allies, is necessary to incite political change. Furthermore, Sen. Menendez 

argues, “Those who lament our dependence on foreign oil because it enriches regimes in 

terrorist states like Iran, should not have a double standard when it comes to enriching a brutal 

dictatorship like Cuba right here in our own backyard.” If the policy of the U.S. is to 

challenge these behaviors, then it must also stand up to Cuba. It would be a 

disservice to squander the progress of the past 50 years when opportunity is 

looming. 

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Embargo CP 



Embargo Solves – Promotes Civil Unrest 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic decline promotes public backlash against the Cuban regime. 


(Juan, “Sanctions on Cuba Are Good, But Not Enough,” Orbis, Volume 44, Issue 3, 

June, 


This growth of civil society is not due to the implementation of enclave capitalism 

in Cuba. Members of independent groups are routinely fired from their jobs in 

state institutions or enterprises, cannot obtain employment in joint ventures, and 

are denied licenses to operate as individual entrepreneurs. Activists depend for 

their subsistence on family members, friends, and support from abroad. Survey 

data show widespread dissatisfaction with microeconomic conditions, which is 

leading to louder criticism of the government.(n56) Many activities of opposition, 

including food riots, have arisen spontaneously from civil society as people have 

reacted to deprivation. Neighborhood residents have joined together to demand that 

the government provide them with resources to alleviate critical shortages of 

food, water, medical supplies, or other essential needs.(n57) Government 

workers, as well as self-employed individuals, have resorted to collective action 

to defend their economic interests from government abuses.(n58) 

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Embargo CP 



Embargo Solves – Bargaining Chip for Changes 

[ ] 

[ ] The embargo is a key bargaining chip – it should only be lifted once Cuba 

implements serious changes. 


(Jaime, “What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo,” Feb 26, 

Online: http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travelban-and-the-embargo/) 

If the travel ban is lifted unilaterally now or the embargo is ended by the U.S., what will 

the U.S. government have to negotiate with a future regime in Cuba and to encourage 

changes in the island These policies could be an important bargaining chip with a 

future regime willing to provide concessions in the area of political and economic 

freedoms. The travel ban and the embargo should be lifted as a result of 

negotiations between the U.S. and a Cuban government willing to provide 

meaningful and irreversible political and economic concessions or when there is 

a democratic government in place in the island. 

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Embargo CP 



Embargo Solves – History Proves More Effective than Engagement 

[ ] 

[ ] The entire premise of the affirmative is flawed – economic engagement 

will only strengthen Cuba’s regime. The hardships imposed by an embargo are 

prerequisites to generate change. 



June, 


The debate over the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo on Cuba has paid little 

attention to the scholarly literature on economic sanctions and transitions to 

democracy. One consequence is that critics of the embargo base their arguments 

on hypotheses that are empirically wrong or that misconstrue scholarly findings. 

Supporters of the embargo, in turn, do a poor job of exposing the flaws in the antiembargo 

arguments. But in fact, the hypotheses used by engagement advocates to 

criticize the U.S. embargo are untenable. There is strong historical evidence that 

economic development does not lead to democracy. Foreign investors in Cuba 

are more likely to become supporters of the dictatorship rather than agents of 

political change. Foreign capitalists at the time of the transition to democracy will 

face legal and political problems that will likely entail considerable financial 

losses and impair their ability to continue to do business in Cuba. And the desire 

of some American firms to establish businesses in Cuba now, seeking to get a hold on 

the market in preparation for the post-transition period, is shortsighted and apparently 

based on misunderstandings of the economic and political factors involved. Given the 

nature of the Cuban dictatorship, neither engagement nor the embargo by itself will 

move the Castro government toward political liberalization. But unilateral economic 

sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of 

democracy and justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting 

a change of regime. The U.S. sanctions impose serious economic costs on the 

Castro dictatorship, and the deterioration of the Cuban economy in the 1990s can be 

clearly linked both to the marked development of independent groups that challenge the 

government and to the increase in overt opposition on the part of the general 

population. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic problems have 

generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres, 

including military officers. 

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Embargo CP 



Embargo Solves – Embargo Good for Public Health – Prevents Obesity 

[ ] Strengthening the embargo will increase public health – increased food 

availability and shift to car culture would result in an obesity epidemic. 

Cassimally, med student and blog manager at Nature.com, 2013 

(Khalil, “The Only Positive Effect Of The Cuban Embargo Weight Loss,” April 19, 

Online: http://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/labcoat-life/the_only_positive_effect_of) 

Despite all the atrocity and machiavellianism that trail economic embargoes, 

science has somehow found a way to profit from the Cuban "special period." 

Thanks to the impressive Cuban healthcare system which diligently collected health 

data even during the "special period," Manuel Franco, at the University of Alcalá in 

Spain and colleagues from US and Cuban institutions, were able to analyse some 

of the health indicators of the time. What they found underlines the atrocity of the 

embargo on the Cuban people but does come with a surprising silver lining which they 

report in a paper published last week by the British Medical Journal (BMJ). The 

shortage of food caused by the embargo led to a population-wide weight loss of 

about 5.5 kg. The food shortage was a direct result of Cuba's inability to import 

anything. Physical activity was another important contributing factor to the 

weight loss. The Cuban government somehow got its hands on more than one million 

bicycles for the population. During the "special period," Cubans were forced to walk 

or cycle, sometimes for kilometres, as public transport was saddled due to the 

virtual nonexistence of petrol. Interestingly, the weight loss matched with declines 

in cases of diabetes and heart diseases. Essentially, the embargo spurred a mini 

health revolution. As the authors state in the paper: "so far, no country or regional 

population has successfully reduced the distribution of body mass index or 

reduced the prevalence of obesity through public health campaigns or targeted 

treatment programmes." Where campaigns and targeted programmes failed, the 

embargo succeeded. But it gets more interesting. After 1995, the Cuban economy 

started to pick up again and has risen steadily since—especially post-2000. 

Coupled to this steady economic rise was a resurgence of obesity, and with it 

diabetes and heart diseases. The resurgence was predominantly due to an 

increased energy intake from food and drinks consumed since physical activity 

only marginally decreased. Energy intake reached pre-crisis levels by 2002 and 

obesity rates had tripled that of 1995 by 2011. What the embargo tells us is that even 

meager loss of weight throughout a population, if sustained, can lead to a decline 

in non-transmissible diseases such as diabetes and heart diseases. How to 

achieve such sustained decline without having an embargo imposed however is 

another question. The usual strategies put forward include sensitisation through 

education and policy changes to promote physical activity, taxes on unhealthy food, 

etcetera. 

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Embargo CP 



Embargo Solves – Embargo Good for Public Health – Prevents Obesity 

[ ] The embargo has led to an overall reduction in obesity – people aren’t 

starving, they’re thriving. 

Willett, Chair of the Department of Nutrition at Harvard, 2013 

(Walter, “Weight Changes and Health in Cuba: Learning from Hardship,” BMJ 

Editorial, April 9 th , Online: http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f1777) 

Changes in food supplies and reductions in physical activity are fueling 

increases in overweight and obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease 

worldwide.1 We have had few opportunities to see a reversal of this process, 

which is continuing inexorably almost everywhere. One such opportunity was 

provided by the well developed public health surveillance systems in Cuba, which 

were maintained during a period of serious economic hardship in the early 1990s. 

In a linked study (doi:10.1136/bmj.f1515), Franco and colleagues used these systems to 

look at the effects of reduced energy intake and increased physical activity on body 

weight and the occurrence of diabetes, cardiovascular disease, cancer, and death.2 In 

Cuba, decreased food availability and increased physical activity, supported by the 

distribution of more than a million bicycles during 1991 to 1995, led to an average 5.5 

kg reduction in weight over five years, shifting the whole population distribution 

of weight downwards. Predictably, a profound and almost immediate reduction in 

the incidence of diabetes occurred, and a striking decline in cardiovascular 

mortality began, with a lag of about five years. These findings are consistent with 

those of the many epidemiologic and clinical studies that have examined the incidence 

of diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancer.3 4 5 6 The economic crisis was 

followed by a slow recovery, increased food intake, reduction in activity, and an 

increase in the prevalence of obesity to three times higher than before the crisis. 

With weight regain, the trend in incidence of diabetes rapidly reversed, and a 

decade after the period of weight loss, the decline in cardiovascular disease had 

greatly slowed. Most troublesome, the continued rapid increase in obesity and 

diabetes predicts that the decline in cardiovascular disease, and thus total 

mortality, will be reversed because the full impact of diabetes on incidence of 

cardiovascular disease is not seen until several decades after diagnosis.5 The apparent 

lack of effect of weight loss on death from cancer seen in the current study is not 

surprising. Only some cancers are associated with obesity and disease latency can be 

decades.7 More detailed analyses by specific types of cancer would be useful. 

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Embargo CP 



Answers to: Embargo Strengthens Cuban Regime 

[ ] 

[ ] Just because the embargo failed in the past, doesn’t prove it won’t work 

now – Cuba’s current economic crisis makes in uniquely weak to a democratic 

transition. 



June, 


A corresponding observation exists in the literature on transitions to democracy, which 

indicates that dictatorships tend to fall when faced with crises, including economic 

ones.(n33) In a cross-national statistical study involving 139 countries from 1950 

to 1990, the authors found that dictatorships are more likely to survive when their 

economies grow and more likely to be destabilized when they face economic 

distress.(n34) Another study found that in a data set of twenty-seven dictatorships, 

twenty-one experienced economic decline prior to transitions to democracy. All 

communist dictatorships in the set (Poland, Nicaragua, Romania, Hungary, and 

Czechoslovakia) experienced economic deterioration or stagnant, low rates of 

growth in the years before the demise of the dictatorships.(n35) A widespread 

observation among scholars of Eastern European politics is that a key factor underlying 

the pressures leading to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe was economic 

deterioration. A declining standard of living decreased people's tolerance for the 

regimes. As their situations grew worse, the populations became more aware of 

the failure of their own regimes to provide an acceptable level of prosperity.(n36) 

The connection between deterioration of economic performance and transitions 

to democracy has also been observed in Latin America, where decreases in 

standards of living preceded the wave of democratization during the 1980S.(n37) 

Poor economic performance contributes to the demise of dictatorships by provoking 

latent or active opposition to the regime among citizens and groups within civil 

society who blame the government for their poverty. It also reduces the benefits 

enjoyed by active supporters of the regime and its coalition allies.(n38) Even in 

cases where economic crises are not the main source of factional conflicts within the 

ruling elite, deterioration of economic performance tends to widen cleavages 

among the rulers.(n39) 

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Embargo CP 



Answers to: US Wealth Promotes Change 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic engagement won’t improve living conditions because the 

Cuban government receives all of the profits. 

Jacoby, former columnist for The Urban Globe and JB from Urban University, 

2010 

(Jeff, “Lift Embargo on Cuba Not So Fast,” The Patriot Post, August 26, Online: 

http://patriotpost.us/opinion/6926) 

The transformative power of free trade is not to be denied, but trade with Cuba isn’t 

free. There is no Cuban parallel to the economic openness and flourishing private 

sector that has transformed China. Jerry Haar, a dean of business administration at 

Florida International University, observes in the Latin Business Chronicle that one 

unavoidable fact of life faces exporters to Cuba: "The entire distribution chain is 

in the hands of the Cuban military and intelligence services." Foreign investors 

are compelled to deal with the state and its subsidiaries, since they control the 

"hotels, foreign trade operations, equipment sales, and factories." As long as the 

Castros maintain their stranglehold on the Cuban economy, enriching that 

economy enriches — and entrenches — them. The travel ban and embargo have 

not ended Cuba’s misery, but lifting them unilaterally will only make that misery 

worse. Rewarding the dictators who keep Cuba in chains is not the way to set 

Cubans free. 

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Embargo CP 



Answers to: US Wealth Promotes Change 

[ ] 

[ ] Lifting restriction on trade and tourism will strengthen the existing 

totalitarian government. 

Azel, Institute for Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, 2008 

(Jose, “Cuba: Snuff out the Embargo,” Bloomberg, February, Online: 

http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2008/02/cube_snuff_out.html) 

The embargo is not the cause of the catastrophic state of Cuba’s economy. 

Mismanagement and the fact that “command economy” models don’t work lie at 

the root of Cuba’s economic misery. Despite the existence of the embargo, the U.S. 

is Cuba’s sixth-largest trading partner and biggest food supplier. Moreover, U.S. 

tourism will not bring democracy to Cuba. For years, hundreds of thousands of 

tourists from Canada, Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere have visited the 

island. Cuba is no more democratic today. On what mystical grounds do 

opponents of the embargo offer that American tourists will do the trick There 

are many negative unintended consequences to unilaterally lifting the embargo 

without meaningful changes in Cuba’s political and economic model. Most 

important of all, it would ensure the continuation of the current totalitarian regime 

by strengthening state enterprises that would be the main beneficiaries of 

currency inflows into business owned by the Cuban government. 

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Embargo CP 



Answers to: Embargo Failed in Past 

[ ] 

[ ] Past failures only prove the embargo needs to be strengthened – it would 

be especially effective now that Venezuela has withdrawn support. 

International Policy Digest, 2013 

(“Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo,” May 9, International Policy Digest, Online: 

http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cubanembargo/utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+inte 

rnationalpolicydigest+(International+Policy+Digest) 

When thinking of U.S.-Cuba relations, the trade embargo, or el bloqueo, is first and 

foremost on people’s minds. In 2009, President Barack Obama eased the travel ban, 

allowing Cuban-Americans to travel freely to Cuba, and again in 2011, allowing students 

and religious missionaries to travel to Cuba, as recently demonstrated by American pop 

culture figures, Beyoncé and her husband Jay-Z. Despite a history of hostile 

transgressions, the U.S. is inconsistent with its implementation of the embargo, 

which sends mixed signals to Havana and displays our weak foreign policy 

regarding Cuba. Undoubtedly, Cuba is capitalizing on this weakness by using the 

embargo as a scapegoat for all of its woes without any immediate fear of 

reinstated restrictions. Because the goal is to promote Cuban democracy and 

freedom through non-violent and non-invasive means while refraining from providing 

any support to the current oppressive Cuban government, the current legislation 

regarding the embargo and travel ban against Cuba needs to be modernized and 

strengthened. The need for an embargo has never been more important or 

potentially effective, even considering the current human rights and economic 

arguments against the embargo. 

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Embargo CP Affirmative 



Embargo Counterplan 

Affirmative 

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Embargo CP Aff Answers - Table of Contents 



Glossary .......................................................................................................................... 3 

Solvency Turn: 

Embargo Strengthens the Regime ............................................................................... 4-5 

No Solvency: 

American Wealth and Ideals Promote Change ............................................................... 6 

American Wealth and Ideals Promote Change ............................................................... 7 

Embargo Failed in Past ................................................................................................... 8 

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Glossary 



Totalitarian- An individual will complete rule over the government of a country. 

Regime- The government that is in power 

Embargo- A governmental order to cut commercial trade/relations with another 

country/region. The United States has had an embargo on Cuba since the Cold War. To 

this day, relations with Cuba have been cut. 

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Solvency Turn: Embargo Strengthens the Regime 

[ ] 

[ ] The embargo has categorically failed – it only functions as a lightning rod 

that secures Castro’s popularity. 

Chapman, columnist for the Chicago Tribune, 2013 

(Steve, “It's Time to End the U.S. Embargo of Cuba,” Reason.com, April 15, Online: 

http://reason.com/archives/2013/04/15/its-time-to-end-the-us-embargo-of-cuba) 

The U.S. embargo of Cuba has been in effect since 1962, with no end in sight. 

Fidel Castro's government has somehow managed to outlast the Soviet Union, 

Montgomery Ward, rotary-dial telephones and 10 American presidents. The boycott 

adheres to the stubborn logic of governmental action. It was created to solve a 

problem: the existence of a communist government 90 miles off our shores. It 

failed to solve that problem. But its failure is taken as proof of its everlasting 

necessity. If there is any lesson to be drawn from this dismal experience, though, 

it's that the economic quarantine has been either 1) grossly ineffectual or 2) 

positively helpful to the regime. The first would not be surprising, if only because 

economic sanctions almost never work. Iraq under Saddam Hussein Nope. Iran 

Still waiting. North Korea Don't make me laugh. What makes this embargo even 

less promising is that we have so little help in trying to apply the squeeze. Nearly 

200 countries allow trade with Cuba. Tourists from Canada and Europe flock there in 

search of beaches, nightlife and Havana cigars, bringing hard currency with them. So 

even if starving the country into submission could work, Cuba hasn't starved and 

won't anytime soon. Nor is it implausible to suspect that the boycott has been the 

best thing that ever happened to the Castro brothers, providing them a scapegoat 

for the nation's many economic ills. The implacable hostility of the Yankee 

imperialists also serves to align Cuban nationalism with Cuban communism. 

Even Cubans who don't like Castro may not relish being told what to do by the 

superpower next door. 

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Solvency Turn: Embargo Strengthens the Regime 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic isolation only helps the Castro regime. 

Johnson, former staff director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, 2010 

(Andrew, “End the Embargo of Cuba” Third Way Publications, September 16, Online: 

http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_- 

_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf) 

The US has had normal trade relations with many countries just as problematic, if 

not more so, than Cuba, including China, Vietnam (President Clinton lifted the 1975 

trade embargo in 1994), and even the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.8 In an 

era of global economic integration, maintaining strong economic relations with 

other countries is vital to growing the economy. The rest of the world has 

recognized that Cuba does not pose a threat and has normalized trade relations, 

leaving the US alone in its imposition of the embargo. As long as other countries 

are willing to supply Cuba with all of its needs, the US embargo will never be effective 

and will only hurt the US economy. Furthermore, by blaming the US for Cuba’s lack 

of economic prosperity and using the embargo as a scapegoat, Cuba’s leadership 

has eluded responsibility for the poor standard of living on the island and 

routinely portrays the US as an oppressor of the Cuban people. Cuba has the 

potential to be a sizeable market for US goods should the embargo come to an 

end. Despite all of the trade restrictions, the US exported $710 million worth of 

food to Cuba in 2008, making the US Cuba’s largest food supplier.9 A March 2010 

Texas A&M University study found that expanding agricultural trade and travel 

between the US and Cuba could result in $365 million in increased sales of US 

goods in Cuba and create 6,000 new jobs in the US.10 

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No Solvency: American Wealth and Ideals Promote Change 

[ ] The embargo is a failed policy – trade would spread American wealth and 

ideals, promoting change. 

Griswold, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 

2005 

(Daniel, “Four Decades of Failure: The US Embargo against Cuba,” Cato Institute, 

October 12, Online: http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/four-decades-failure-usembargo-against-cuba) 

Instead of the embargo, Congress and the administration should take concrete 

steps to expand America’s economic and political influence in Cuba. First, the 

travel ban should be lifted. According to U.S. law, citizens can travel more or less 

freely to such “axis of evil” countries as Iran and North Korea. But if Americans want to 

visit Cuba legally, they need to be a former president or some other well-connected VIP 

or a Cuban American. Yes, more American dollars would end up in the coffers of the 

Cuban government, but dollars would also go to private Cuban citizens. Philip Peters, 

a former State Department official in the Reagan administration and expert on Cuba, 

argues that American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent 

rooms, drive taxis, sell art, and operate restaurants in their homes. Those dollars 

would then find their way to the hundreds of freely priced farmer’s markets, to 

carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food venders, and other entrepreneurs. Second, 

restrictions on remittances should be lifted. Like tourism, expanded remittances 

would fuel the private sector, encourage Cuba’s modest economic reforms, and 

promote independence from the government. Third, American farmers and 

medical suppliers should be allowed to sell their products to Cuba with financing 

arranged by private commercial lenders, not just for cash as current law permits. 

Most international trade is financed by temporary credit, and private banks, not 

taxpayers, would bear the risk. I oppose subsidizing exports to Cuba through agencies 

such as the Export-Import Bank, but I also oppose banning the use of private 

commercial credit. Finally, the Helms-Burton law should be allowed to expire. The 

law, like every other aspect of the embargo, has failed to achieve its stated 

objectives and has, in fact, undermined American influence in Cuba and alienated 

our allies. Lifting or modifying the embargo would not be a victory for Fidel 

Castro or his oppressive regime. It would be an overdue acknowledgement that 

the four-and-a-half decade embargo has failed, and that commercial engagement 

is the best way to encourage more open societies abroad. The U.S. government 

can and should continue to criticize the Cuban government’s abuse of human rights in 

the U.N. and elsewhere, while allowing expanding trade and tourism to undermine 

Castro’s authority from below. We should apply the president’s sound reasoning on 

trade in general to our policy toward Cuba. The most powerful force for change in 

Cuba will not be more sanctions, but more daily interaction with free people 

bearing dollars and new ideas. How many decades does the U.S. government 

need to bang its head against a wall before it changes a failed policy 

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No Solvency: American Wealth and Ideals Promote Change 

[ ] 

[ ] Embargo hurts reform efforts – it prevents us from offering assistance to 

the Cuban people. 

Hanson, economics research at the American Enterprise Institute, 2013 

(Daniel, “It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba,” January 16 th , 

Forbes, Online: http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-toend-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/) 

Repealing the embargo would fit into an American precedent of lifting trade and 

travel restrictions to countries who demonstrate progress towards democratic 

ideals. Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were all offered normal trade 

relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms even though they were still in 

clear violation of several US resolutions condemning their human rights 

practices. China, a communist country and perennial human rights abuser, is the 

U.S.’s second largest trading partner, and in November, trade restrictions against 

Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a fifty year history of genocide and 

human trafficking propagated by its military government. Which, of course, begs 

the question: when will the U.S. see fit to lift the embargo If Cuba is trending towards 

democracy and free markets, what litmus test must be passed for the embargo to be 

rolled back The cost of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar 

and moral terms, but it is higher for the Cuban people, who are cut off from the 

supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because of an antiquated Cold 

War dispute. The progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help 

of American charitable relief, business innovation, and tourism. A perpetual 

embargo on a developing nation that is moving towards reform makes little 

sense, especially when America’s allies are openly hostile to the embargo. It 

keeps a broader discussion about smart reform in Cuba from gaining life, and it 

makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go. 

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No Solvency: Embargo Failed in Past 

[ ] The embargo has failed to create change - diplomatic strategies through 

engagement would be more effective. 

Cuba Study Group, 2013 

(Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba 

February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serveFile_id=45d8f827- 

174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032) 

Seventeen years after its enactment, the Helms-Burton Act—which further codified the 

sanctions framework commonly referred to as the U.S. embargo against Cuba and 

conditions its suspension on the existence of a transition or democratic government in 

Cuba—has proven to be a counterproductive policy that has failed to achieve its 

stated purposes in an increasingly interconnected world. Helms-Burton has failed to 

advance the cause of freedom and prosperity for the Cuban people, to encourage free 

and democratic elections in Cuba, to secure international sanctions against the 

Cuban government, or to advance the national security interests of the United 

States.1 It provides a policy framework for U.S. support to the Cuban people in 

response to the formation of a transition government in Cuba; yet, the all-or-nothing 

nature of its conditions for suspension undermine that very framework by effectively 

placing control over changes to embargo sanctions in the hands of the current Cuban 

leadership. Simply stated, it is an archaic policy that hinders the ability of the United 

States to respond swiftly, intelligently and in a nuanced way to developments on the 

island. Worst of all, the failures of Helms-Burton have more recently produced a tragic 

paradox: Policies once designed to promote democratization through isolation are 

now stifling civil society, including an emerging class of private entrepreneurs 

and democracy advocates whose rise represents the best hope for a free and open 

society in Cuba in more than 50 years. 

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Mexico Rural Development 

Affirmative

Mexico Rural Development Affirmative 

Mexico Rural Development Affirmative – Table of Contents 



Summary............................................................................................................................................... 2 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 3 

Mexico Rural Development 1AC ....................................................................................................... 4-9 

Advantages 

Add-Ons: 

Deforestation Add-On Adv ............................................................................................................. 10-11 

US Drug Consumption Add-On ........................................................................................................... 12 

US Economy Add-On .................................................................................................................... 13-14 

Drug Violence Advantage 

Impact Extension: Latin American Instability ....................................................................................... 15 

Answers to: Drug Production Shifting Elsewhere ................................................................................ 16 

Answers to: Demand for Drugs Makes Trafficking Inevitable .............................................................. 17 

Poverty Advantage 

Answers to: Mexican Economy Growing ............................................................................................. 18 

Answers to: Drug Production Profitable .............................................................................................. 19 

Answers to: Corporate Competition Hurts Farmers ............................................................................ 20 

Solvency 

Solvency – Rural Assistance Solves Drug Production and Poverty .................................................... 21 

Solvency Extension – Aid Reduces Drug Violence ............................................................................. 22 

Solvency Extension – Aid Helps Farmers ........................................................................................... 23 

Answers to: Mexican Farmers Can’t Compete ............................................................................... 24-25 

Answers to: Not Enough Water ........................................................................................................... 26 

Answers to: Aid Dependence Turn ................................................................................................ 27-28 

Answers to: War on Drugs Good – Violent Backlash in Mexico .......................................................... 29 

Answers to: War on Drugs Good – Cartels Splintering into Small Groups & Arrests Fail ................... 30 

Answers to: War on Drugs Good – Price Spikes Benefit Cartels ........................................................ 31 

Answers to: War on Drugs Good – Prohibition Empirically Not Feasible ............................................ 32 

Answers to: Colombia Proves Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 33 

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Summary 

This affirmative argues that the United States should send more aid to small rural farmers in Mexico 

in the form of money, equipment and supplies, and technical training. This is because rural farmers in 

Mexico have fallen behind under the North American Free Trade Agreement, which has dumped lots 

of cheap American agriculture, like corn, in the Mexican market. 

There are several advantages to this policy: 

First and foremost is drug violence. As farmers start to go out of business, they look elsewhere to 

make money – and the two most profitable options are to start producing drugs like marijuana and 

cocaine or to start working for drug cartels as drug traffickers or contract killers. The plan would help 

make legitimate farming profitable again, undermining the presence of drugs that has created a wave 

of violence in Mexico. 

Second is poverty. As farmers go out of business, they can no longer afford food or living expenses. 

The plan would help them make enough money to get by - an ethically worthwhile goal. 

Third is deforestation. Many of the poor rural farmers in Mexico have a hard time farming because 

they live on rocky or low-nutrient soil. To find arable land, they often slash-and-burn forests to make 

new plots for the farming operations, which puts a strain on the earth’s ecological integrity. With 

additional technical training and the right equipment and supplies this could be prevented through 

better farming practices. 

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Glossary 

DTO: Drug Trafficking Organization or drug cartel; a large and sophisticated gang that produces and 

distributes drugs. 

Enrique Peña Nieto: The current President of Mexico. 

Felipe Calderon: The former President of Mexico who completed his term in November 2012. 

Mérida Initiative: The program through which the US is currently providing a substantial amount of 

aid and security assistance to the Mexican government. 

NAFTA: The North American Free Trade Agreement was a deal between the US, Mexico and 

Canada negotiated in the mid-1990’s that made is easier for companies to ship goods across the 

borders but also had a variety of negative effects on average people. 

War On Drugs: A policy by the United States Federal Government that gives foreign military aid to 

foreign countries in aims to identify and fight drug cartel/organizations to destroy the illegal drug 

trade. 

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JV 

Mexico Rural Development 1AC (1/6) 

Contention 1 is Inherency: 

The United States has gutted development aid to Mexico and instead sends billions to 

Mexico’s military to fight the War on Drugs. 

Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, 2011 

(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, Briefing Paper, 

Number 11, http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf) 

But the U.S. government’s foreign policy response to the causes of immigration matches its 

domestic policy: an overwhelming focus on security and law enforcement.14 Within the U.S. 

government’s Latin America assistance portfolio, Mexico has traditionally been a low-priority country 

because of its status as a middle-income nation. Until 2008, Mexico and Central America received 

16.2 percent of foreign assistance funds directed toward Latin America. This typically 

amounted to $60-70 million per year for Mexico, with more than half of that directed to assist 

Mexico’s fight against international drug trafficking. Mexico received about $27 million per year in 

foreign assistance for all nonsecurity programs prior to 2008.15 In an effort to combat Mexico’s 

narcotic trafficking organizations, U.S. assistance was dramatically increased in 2008 through the 

Mérida Initiative, a multi-year $1.8 billion program focused on law enforcement assistance to 

Mexican (and, to a lesser extent, Central American) security agencies. Through this program, U.S. 

assistance to Mexico increased from $65 million in fiscal year 2007 to almost $406 million in fiscal 

year 2008.16 In 2009, total State Department assistance to Mexico was $786.8 million. Of this total 

assistance package, $753.8 million—96 percent of U.S. funds to Mexico—was directed toward 

military and drug enforcement assistance. Although it’s dwarfed by the $10 billion annual border 

enforcement budget, the Mérida Initiative dominates U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico.17 In 2009, 

U.S. development assistance that could be directed toward job-creation projects that reduce 

migration pressures totaled $11.2 million, or .01 percent of total U.S. assistance (see Table 1 on 

next page). The Mérida Initiative increased total U.S. assistance to Mexico but decreased the 

importance of economic development in the overall Mexican foreign assistance agenda.18 There are 

U.S. government agencies other than the United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID) and the State Department that focus on poverty reduction and rural development in 

Latin America, but within the entirety of U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico, poverty reduction 

and economic development remain a low priority.19 USAID’s lack of emphasis on supporting 

rural Mexico—where poverty and migration are concentrated— is part of a global foreign assistance 

trend beginning in the 1980s that de-emphasized agricultural development.20 In spite of the growing 

interest, discussion among U.S. policymakers and practitioners on migration and development has 

largely been theoretical. 

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JV 

Contention 2 is Drug Violence: 


The War on Drugs has strengthened drug trafficking organizations in Mexico – violent 

measures have increased rural poverty, forcing poor farmers to produce illegal crops or join 

ranks with cartels to survive. 

Gautreau, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, 2012 

(Ginette Léa, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on 

Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 61–83, 

http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau_-Human_Security_and_War_on_Drugs.pdf) 

In its effort to eradicate drug trafficking, the War on Drugs threatens the economic security of 

thousands of individuals in Colombia and Mexico who depend on the illegal but profitable drug 

industry for their livelihoods. As Peterson (2002, 437) explains, attempts to implement crop 

substitution programs through alternative development initiatives in Colombia have been met with 

numerous geographical, ecological, and climate-related obstacles. Many villages are too far 

removed from market access points, a situation made worse by the mountainous topography, 

making it difficult to sell alternative crops, and there are few profitable types of legal crops that 

can grow in the rocky soil of the Andes. Conversely, coca plants can grow very easily—they 

become productive within two years—and the expertly established drug trafficking channels allow 

products to move very quickly (ibid., 428, 437). Plan Colombia failed to take these factors into 

account in its crop eradication campaigns and many drug-producing regions in Mexico continue 

to lack sufficient funding for alternative development initiatives. As such, the cultivation of 

illicit crops and the salaries of sicarios (cartel hit men) continue to be very attractive in the face of 

unemployment and poverty (Kelly, Maghan, and Serio 2005; Hill 2010). However, as Wells (2006, 

57) indicates, “this does not necessarily imply that the US should support these industries . . . [rather,] 

they should be aware of the extent to which people’s economic security is linked to drug cultivation 

and . . . the importance of offering them [viable] alternative economic opportunities.” In this light, it is 

clear that drug policies should focus more on economic security by addressing problems of 

poverty, inequality, and unemployment. By maintaining a narrow perspective on the drug 

industry as a threat to state security, rather than a problem related to underdevelopment or 

socioeconomic conditions, the War on Drugs continues to neglect the roots of the drug 

industry. Writing about the Mexican context, Vanda Felbab-Brown (2010, 7) supports this 

reconceptualization of security: “Addressing the socioeconomic needs of the marginalized areas 

of both the northern urban belt as well as southern rural areas is critical for reducing the 

recruitment pool for the DTOs, severing the bonds between marginalized communities and 

criminal elements, and resurrecting the hope of many Mexican citizens that the Mexican State 

and legal behavior can best advance their future.” FelbabBrown also underscores one of the most 

important factors in Mexico’s strategy: the bulk of the anti-drug activities are taking place in northern 

Mexico’s troubled states, but little action is being addressed in the southern states or poorer 

communities of the country. A similar situation occurred in Colombia, where security conditions 

improved in major cities, but rural communities— particularly in the Puntomayo region—have seen 

little progress. 

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JV 


If no action is taken, the presence of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico will result in 

more violence and spread across the region. 

Shirk, Prof of Political Science at the University of San Diego and Director of the Trans‐ Border 

Institute, 2011 

(David A., The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council Special Report No. 60, 

March 2011) 

Third, Mexican stability serves as an important anchor for the region. With networks stretching 

into Central America, the Carib- bean, and the Andean countries, Mexican DTOs undermine the 

security and reliability of other U.S. partners in the hemisphere, corrupting high-level officials, 

military operatives, and law enforcement personnel; undermining due process and human 

rights; reducing public support for counter-drug efforts; and even provoking hostility toward 

the United States. Given the fragility of some Central American and Caribbean states, expansion of 

DTO operations and violence into the region would have a gravely destabilizing effect. Fourth, 

the unchecked power and violence of these Mexican DTOs present a substantial humanitarian 

concern and have contributed to forced migration and numerous U.S. asylum requests. If the 

situation were to worsen, a humanitarian emergency might lead to an unmanage- able flow of people 

into the United States. It would also adversely affect the many U.S. citizens living in Mexico. 

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JV 


Contention 3 is Poverty: 

Mexican farms have been stretched to the breaking point by free trade and the War on Drugs – 

forcing millions of people into poverty and starvation. 

Watt, Lecturer in Hispanic Studies at the University of Sheffield, 2010 

(Peter, “NAFTA 15 Years on: The Strange Fruits of Neoliberalism”, State of Nature, 

http://www.stateofnature.org/p=6369#sthash.7JzbMAGf.dpuf, Winter) 

Thus, if corn, bean or coffee farmers can no longer scrape together a living as a result of a 

policy into which they never had any input, that’s not free-trade’s problem. There being no 

alternative – at least in the orthodox thought of what Herman dubs ‘Marketspeak’ – GATT, the WTO 

and NAFTA were introduced to the world as solutions to poverty, rather than its exacerbators. ‘Future 

historians’, Mark Weisbrot observes, will certainly marvel at how trade, originally a means to obtain 

what could not be produced locally, became an end in itself. In our age it has become a measure of 

economic and social progress more important even than the well-being of the people who produce or 

consume the traded goods. [8] As free-market ideology contrasted with peoples’ lived experience, 

only a constant barrage of information and commentary on the wonders of the new socio-economic 

model would ensure that those with stakes in maintaining it would be immune to challenge. For 

journalist and author Carlos Monsiváis, the role of the Mexican media is to ‘persuade and dissuade 

Public Opinion, to neutralise “unorthodox inclinations”, to parody expressions of free thought and to 

convince of the inexistence of alternatives’. [9] Trade agreements such as NAFTA were pushed 

through by underlining a sense of inevitability, ‘the inexistence of alternatives’ and although the 

public had no say, free-trade was soon to become a reality whether Mexicans wished it or not. 

If businesses and farmers failed or ran into debts as a result, this was explained as their failure 

to modernise, to adapt to the new realities of the global market. Countering this sense of 

inevitability is a major challenge, because it is this sense that allows for the unthinkable to become 

acceptable, or at least tolerable. On this, journalist John Gibler comments that, Ideology serves to 

normalise horrid social relations. With the magic of a well-placed word or two, duly impregnated with 

ideology, the most absurd and unacceptable of situations are made to seem natural. Ideology 

tells us that when the Mexican police routinely kill and torture, well, it is part of the rule of law; 

if twenty million Mexicans live in hunger, their children dying of diarrhoea, well, that is the sad 

reality of poverty; as nearly half a million Mexicans cross the border into the United States 

every year seeking their own labour exploitation just to keep their families alive, they are 

looking for a better life, hence they migrate; if Mexico’s twelve million indigenous people live on 

the margin of the state, constantly subject to massacres, everyday racism, and the ravage of 

hunger, well, the indigenous were always like that, even before the Spanish came, that’s the 

indigenous past. [10] 

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Poverty kills millions of people a year – it is a moral travesty that must be rejected. 

Gilligan, Director of the Center for the Study of Violence, 1996 

(James, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes.. P. 191-196) 

The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously, rather than sporadically, 

whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a 

time. *Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acts; independent of 

individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may nevertheless have 

lethal consequences for others. *Structural violence is normally invisible, because it may appear 

to have had other (natural or violent) causes. The finding that structural violence causes far 

more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited to this country. Kohler and Alcock 

attempted to arrive at the number of excess deaths caused by socioeconomic inequities on a 

worldwide basis. Sweden was their model of the nation that had come closes to eliminating structural 

violence. It had the least inequity in income and living standards, and the lowest discrepancies in 

death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall life expectancy in the world. When they 

compared the life expectancies of those living in the other socioeconomic systems against Sweden, 

they found that 18 million deaths a year could be attributed to the “structural violence” to which 

the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected. During the past decade, the discrepancies 

between the rich and poor nations have increased dramatically and alarmingly. The 14 to 18 million 

deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from 

armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of 

those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million 

military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide—or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), 

the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two 

million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 

(232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which 

continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die 

because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year 

period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, 

thermonuclear [war], or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every 

decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral 

violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war 

and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or 

behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related 

to each other, as cause to effect. 

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Thus we offer the following plan: The United States federal government should substantially 

increase its economic development assistance to small farmers in Mexico. 

Contention 4 is Solvency: 

United States aid to Mexican small farmers can address the rural poverty that fuels drug 

violence - the plan represents a radical shift in the status quo framework of engagement 

toward Mexico. 




Mexico’s countryside is one of the most promising environments to invest in rural 

development to reduce migration pressures. Mexico has the 14th largest economy in the world, but it 

is also extraordinarily unequal.22 Depending on the measure, between one third and half of 

Mexicans are considered poor and up to 18 percent live in extreme poverty, unable to meet 

their basic food needs.23 Reducing migration pressures will require development and job creation 

throughout Mexico, but poverty and international migration are particularly concentrated in the 

countryside. Although about a quarter of all Mexicans live in rural areas, 60 percent of Mexico’s 

extreme poor are rural and 44 percent of all of Mexico’s international migration originates in rural 

communities (see Figure 2).24 This means that more than half of rural Mexicans live in poverty and 

25 percent live in extreme poverty.25 As one expert states, “Rural poverty is one … of the principal 

“pushfactors” in Mexican migration to the United States” and thus should be the primary focus of 

development efforts aimed at reducing migration pressures.26 After decades of declining support 

among international assistance agencies,27 agriculture and rural development is now reemerging 

as a vital development focus. The World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report 

states, “Agriculture continues to be a fundamental instrument for sustainable development 

and poverty reduction.”28 Research has also found that agriculture is one of the best returns 

on investment in terms of poverty-reduction spending.29 For example, each 1 percent increase 

in crop productivity in Asia reduces the number of poor people by half a percent. This correlation 

also holds for middle-income countries such as Mexico.30 Among the options for agricultural 

development, support for smallholder farmers is the most promising path for poverty 

reduction. The World Bank states, “Improving the productivity, profitability, and sustainability of 

smallholder farming is the main pathway out of poverty in using agriculture for 

development.”31 And smallholder farmers in Mexico are especially in need of assistance. After 

decades of declining support from the Mexican government and increased competition from 

subsidized U.S. producers under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), small- 

Mexican farmers have found it increasingly difficult to make a living. 

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Mexico Rural Assistance Affirmative 


JV 

Deforestation Add-On Adv 

[ ] Rural underdevelopment combined with drug demand is a primary cause for 

deforestation 

Woodgate, Senior Lecturer in Environmental Sociology at the Institute for the Study of the 

Americas, University of London, 2011 

(Graham, Climate Change, Forests and Rural Development in Highland Mexico, May 23, 

http://www.intercambioclimatico.com/en/2011/05/23/climate-change-forests-and-rural-developmentin-highland-mexico/#sthash.6hKUBJcD.dpuf) 

The struggle for survival in the countryside leads people to engage in illegal logging, with 

individual trees fetching US$ 100 and more. The clandestine nature of this activity means, that in 

order to avoid detection, people come into the forest for short periods, cutting just a few of the larger 

trees, often with no more than hand tools. Along with a warming climate, illegal logging might also 

contribute to the increasing numbers of insect pests, such as pine bark beetles, which are attracted 

by chemicals released when trees are injured. In particular, Mexico is seeing a significant loss of 

forest cover due to infestation by Dentroctonus spp. – the ‘tree killers’. These beetles bore in through 

the bark to excavate egg galleries. An early sign of infestation are the resin tubes that form on the 

bark at the entrance to the beetle’s tunnels. When the eggs hatch the larvae begin to devour the living 

tissue, destroying the trees’ ability to transport water and nutrients, ultimately resulting in premature 

death. In addition to illegal logging and beetle infestation, the Nevado’s forests are also being 

degraded by the activities of livestock farmers. At the end of each dry season farmers burn off the 

dead vegetation beneath the forest canopy in order to encourage earlier and more nutritious grass 

growth for their sheep and cattle. Although many species of pine growing at high altitude require 

periodic fires to release seed from cones for the regeneration of the forest, this burning destroys any 

young seedlings that may have been established during the previous spring and summer. In concert, 

illegal logging, beetle infestation and forest fires all add up to a very alarming rate of forest 

degradation and have almost certainly caused the forests of the Nevado Toluca to shift from 

being net carbon sinks to net emitters, providing further positive feedback into the climate 

change equation. It must also be recognised that illegal logging and forest fires are ultimately a 

result of poor people’s struggles to make ends meet. Thus, if policies such as the UNFCCC’s 

REDD+ strategy are to achieve the desired results, close attention must be focused on 

mechanisms that can provide realistic and reliable alternative incomes for otherwise 

marginalised rural people. 

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Deforestation Add-On Adv 

[ ] Deforestation is a serious threat to humanity 

Watson, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, 2006 

(Captain Paul Watson,. 9/17/06, ìThe Politics of Extinction.î http://www.ecoaction.org/dt/beerswil.html) 

The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 

percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the 

foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an 

exponentially greater number of animal species -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for 

each type of plant eliminated. Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in 

extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for 

faunal biological diversity to re-establish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological 

diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. 

Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that 

after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The 

present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature. Like a run-a-way train, 

civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of 

extinction. 

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JV 

US Drug Consumption Add-On 

[ ] Drug use in the US costs the economy billions of dollars and hurts people’s health – it 

is essential to stop drugs at the source to prevent a spiral into addiction. 

US Department of Justice, 2011 

(“Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use on American Society,” Online: 

http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44731/44731p.pdf) 

Taken together, these costs total $193,096,930, with the majority share attributable to lost 

productivity. The findings are consistent with prior work that has been done in this area using a 

generally comparable methodology (Harwood et al., 1984, 1998; ONDCP, 2001, 2004). It is 

important to note that there is no double-counting among the cost components identified 

above. In cases where a component involves incapacitation (as with drug-induced 

incarceration, specialty treatment, and hospitalization), society essentially pays twice: once to 

deal with the problem behavior of an individual and again because after the behavior has been 

dealt with, the individual becomes nonproductive. (b) Incarceration and homicide components of 

Productivity included in Crime. As noted above, some elements of productivity costs may be viewed 

as crime costs. In column (b) lost productivity attributable to illicit-drug-induced incarceration and 

illicitdrug-induced homicide are treated as crime costs. This causes crime costs to increase from 

$61,376,694 to $113,277,616 and productivity costs to decrease from $120,304,004 to $68,403,082. 

The total remains unchanged. Comparison of Drug Coststo Other Societal Costs The estimates 

presented above place illicit drug use on par with other serious chronic health problems in the 

United States. A recent study conducted by the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive 

and Kidney Diseases (2008) estimated that diabetes costs the United States more than $174 

billion each year. As was the case here, that study included both direct costs (medical care and 

services) and indirect costs (short-term and permanent disability as well as premature death). 

Finkelstein et al. (2009) report that medical costs associated with obesity totaled more than $147 

billion in 2008. This is driven largely by the fact that obese Americans spend approximately 40 

percent more on medical services (an average of $1,429 per year) than those whose weight is in the 

healthy range. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report that between 1995 and 

1999, smoking caused an estimated 440,000 premature deaths each year and was responsible for at 

least $157 billion annually in health-related economic costs (CDC, 2002). The approach taken by the 

CDC authors was similar to the approach taken here and was based upon estimates of annual 

smokingattributable mortality, years of potential life lost, smoking-attributable medical expenditures 

for adults and infants, and lost productivity for adults. Heart disease exacts perhaps the highest toll. 

During 2010 alone, it cost the United States an estimated $316 billion. This includes the costs of 

health care services, medications, and lost productivity (CDC, 2010). Illicit drug use is not like 

other health problems in that its consequences may include criminal sanctions. Since it is well 

known that illicit drug use sometimes progresses from experimentation to recreational use 

and eventually to abuse or dependence, it is relatively easy to draw inferences from the findings 

presented above. It is important that illicit drugs be made as difficult and costly to obtain as 

possible. This points to the value of law enforcement efforts. It is best if illicit drug use not be 

initiated at all. 

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JV 

US Economy Add-On (1/2) 

[ ] Further drug related violence in Mexico would significantly harm the US economy 

Shirk, Prof of Political Science at the University of San Diego and Director of the Trans-Border 



March 2011) 

The United States has much to gain by helping strengthen its southern neighbor and even 

more to lose if it does not. The cumulative effects of an embattled Mexican state harm the 

United States and a further reduction of Mexican state capacity is both unacceptable and a clear 

motivation for U.S. preventive action. First, the weaker the Mexican state, the greater difficulty the 

United States will have in controlling the nearly two-thousand-mile border. Spillover violence, in which 

DTOs bring their fight to U.S. soil, is a remote worst-case scenario.3 Even so, lawlessness south of 

the border directly affects the United States. A weak Mexican government increases the flow of both 

illegal immigrants and contraband (such as drugs, money, and weapons) into the United States. As 

the dominant wholesale distributors of illegal drugs to U.S. consumers, Mexican traffickers are also 

the single greatest domestic organized crime threat within the United States, operating in every state 

and hundreds of cities, selling uncontrolled substances that directly endanger the health and safety of 

millions of ordinary citizens. Second, economically, Mexico is an important market for the United 

States. As a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it is one of only 

seventeen states with which the United States has a free trade pact, outside the General Agreement 

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The United States has placed nearly $100 billion of foreign direct 

investment in Mexico. Mexico is also the United States’ third-largest trade partner, the thirdlargest 

source of U.S. imports, and the second-largest exporter of U.S. goods and services— 

with potential for further market growth as the country develops. Trade with Mexico benefits the 

U.S. economy, and the market collapse that would likely accompany a deteriorated security 

situation could hamper U.S. economic recovery. 

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JV 

US Economy Add-On (2/2) 

[ ] US economic decline undermines our ability to maintain global peace – it would force 

US military withdrawal. 

Duncan, Chief Economist at Blackhorse Asset Management and analyst for Bloomberg, 2012 

(Richard, The New Depression, pg. 129) 

The political battle over America’s future would be bitter, and quite possibly bloody. It cannot be 

guaranteed that the U.S. Constitution would survive. Foreign affairs would also confront the United 

States with enormous challenges. During the Great Depression, the United States did not have a 

global empire. Now it does. The United States maintains hundreds of military bases across 

dozens of countries around the world. Added to this is a fleet of 11 aircraft carriers and 18 nucleararmed 

submarines. The country spends more than $650 billion a year on its military. If the U.S. 

economy collapses into a New Great Depression, the United States could not afford to maintain 

its worldwide military presence or to continue in its role as global peacekeeper. Or, at least, it 

could not finance its military in the same way it does at present. Therefore, either the United States 

would have to find an alternative funding method for its global military presence or else it would have 

to radically scale it back. Historically, empires were financed with plunder and territorial 

expropriation. The estates of the vanquished ruling classes were given to the conquering generals, 

while the rest of the population was forced to pay imperial taxes. The U.S. model of empire has been 

unique. It has financed its global military presence by issuing government debt, thereby taxing future 

generations of Americans to pay for this generation’s global supremacy. That would no longer be 

possible if the economy collapsed. Cost–benefit analysis would quickly reveal that much of America’s 

global presence was simply no longer affordable. Many—or even most—of the outposts that did not 

pay for themselves would have to be abandoned. 

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JV 

Impact Extension: Latin American Instability 

[ ] Latin American instability would spawn a host of global dangers. 

Manwaring, Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, 2005 

(Max G., venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub628.pdf) 

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most 

dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in 

general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, 

insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian 

disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve 

criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as 

Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do 

not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These 

means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, 

starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, 

trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic 

cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined 

and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict. 62 Peru’s Sendero 

Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed 

propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere 

call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be 

taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 

21st century. 63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and 

operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively 

lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern 

and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically 

and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that 

context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack 

of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. 

Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic 

issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of 

subverting or destroying such a government are real. But failing and failed states simply do not go 

away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the 

best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a 

consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, 

narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s 

democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to 

provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer 

dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more 

they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity. 

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JV 

Answers to: Drug Production Shifting Elsewhere 

[ ] 

[ ] Mexico is the lynchpin – drug use and trafficking have almost doubled. 

Villagran, correspondent for Christian Science Monitor, 2013 

(Laura, Jan 25, 2013, “As Mexico's traffickers ship drugs north, they leave addicts in their wake” 

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0125/As-Mexico-s-traffickers-ship-drugs-north-theyleave-addicts-in-their-wake) 

Exponential growth in the trafficking of drugs through Mexico – destined for the large 

consumer market to the north – is leaving a growing number of addicts in its wake. Heroin, 

crack cocaine, and methamphetamines were once unheard of in Mexico, but today rehabilitation 

centers are filled with addicts. Being the top supplier of illegal drugs to the US has made Mexico 

a consumer nation, too, as cartels have sought to expand the local market over the past 

decade. Illegal drug use in Mexico – still well below levels in the United States – rose 87 

percent between 2002 and 2011, according to the latest national survey of addictions. In the survey, 

1.5 percent of respondents reported having consumed illegal substances in the previous year, 

compared with 0.8 percent in 2002. And drug rehabilitation professionals caution that higher 

levels of use may exist, given that the data is self-reported. They also note that an alarming 

increase in drug use among women and adolescents between 2002 and 2008 has persisted, 

although the survey suggests overall illegal drug use has plateaued since 2008. “The reality is that 

… in the organizations and institutions that work directly with this population, we see that 

[addiction] is on the rise, and that the adolescents who come here are younger and younger,” 

says Blanca Ferreyra, who coordinates addiction treatments at the Love Life Foundation, a Mexico 

City nonprofit. “By 14 years old, they’ve got a two- or three-year-old addiction.” 

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JV 

Answers to: Demand for Drugs Makes Trafficking Inevitable 

[ ] 

[ ] They have it backwards – drug production is extremely prevalent because of 

widespread rural poverty. 





Both Colombia and Mexico bear high levels of poverty, unemployment, and economic 

inequality. These socio-economic conditions, along with weak political and judicial institutions, 

foster an environment in which drug cultivation and trafficking are not only possible, but for 

many have become attractive or necessary options to meet basic needs. It is estimated that over 

80,000 Colombian families rely on illicit crop cultivation for their livelihoods (UNODC 2011a). The 

economic incentive is clear: “[A]s long as the price for coca leaves is ten times as high as that 

for cocoa, coffee, and rice for Andean farmers, they will continue to cultivate it” (Diego Garcia 

Savan in Wells 2006, 60). In this sense, drug trafficking effectively provides economic security, 

simply defined in the UNDP report as “assured basic income” (UNDP 1994, 25). Those without 

economic security often accept any work they can find, including informal work, badly paid, 

or unproductive work. Informal employment could be as high as 50 per cent in Colombia and 30 

per cent in Mexico (World Bank 2012), which undoubtedly leads to increased economic 

insecurity and related problems such as criminal activity and migration. 

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JV 

Answers to: Mexican Economy Growing 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic growth in Mexico has left small farmers behind – development aid is key to 

close the gap. 




The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the culmination of the economic 

liberalization that began in the 1980s. NAFTA was touted as a Mexican job-cre ation program that 

would slow immigration. But NAFTA’s policies reinforced support for large, export-oriented 

producers at the cost of small farmers, and rural employment continued to diminish. Between 

1991 and 2007 Mexico lost 20 percent (2.1 million) of its agricultural jobs. The loss of rural jobs 

and the inability to generate income impacted family farms in particular: non-salaried agricultural 

family employment declined 58 percent between 1991 and 2007. Many of these displaced farmers 

ended up in the United States, sometimes working in U.S. agriculture as field laborers. After NAFTA, 

the operation of the Mexican small family farm became the vocation of older Mexicans, while youth 

migrated to the cities or the United States. Almost a quarter of rural Mexicans ages 15-24 in 1990 had 

left by 2000. Throughout 30 years of increasing emigration, the Mexican government also has done 

little to slow the exodus. Its leading program for small agricultural producers—PROCAMPO—does 

not target areas of high migration. Although the Mexican government is primarily responsible for 

addressing the country’s rural poverty, the United States can provide critical support for 

programs that address migration pressures at their source. Because of its potential for long-term 

impact, such a strategy requires commensurate, sustained policy attention and resources. 

Furthermore, by supporting economic development projects with rural Mexican organizations, 

Mexican government agencies—particularly at the local and regional levels—can be drawn into 

development projects that reduce migration pressures. A comprehensive, smallholder-based 

approach to development would by its very nature generate rural employment. Without 

support for Mexico’s small and medium farmers, the country’s rural economy will continue to 

be increasingly dependent on migration and remittances. While the link between supporting 

smallholder farmers and poverty reduction is proven, the next logical step with respect to its impact 

on migration pressures is less recognized. 

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JV 

Answers to: Drug Production Profitable 

[ ] 

[ ] Poverty is still prevalent – even if some farmers succeed by producing drugs, others 

deserve a chance to succeed with US aid. 




The 1980s saw falling wages, a decline in living standards, job displacement, and lowered prospects 

for economic mobility The impact on small farmers was particularly harmful. In addition to a reduction 

in state support, small and mediumsized producers faced the cumulative impact of long-term drought, 

multiple economic crises, increased competition from U.S. producers, falling agricultural commodity 

prices and increases in the price of agricultural inputs, and reduced access to credit. Mexico’s rural 

population decreased from 58 percent in 1950 to 25 percent in 2005. While many of the rural poor 

migrated to Mexico’s overcrowded cities, others opted for the United States.33 The 1994 North 

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the culmination of the economic liberalization that 

began in the 1980s. NAFTA was touted as a Mexican job-creation program that would slow 

immigration. But NAFTA’s policies reinforced support for large, export-oriented producers at 

the cost of small farmers, and rural employment continued to diminish. Between 1991 and 2007 

Mexico lost 20 percent (2.1 million) of its agricultural jobs. The loss of rural jobs and the inability to 

generate income impacted family farms in particular: non-salaried agricultural family 

employment declined 58 percent between 1991 and 2007. Many of these displaced farmers 

ended up in the United States, sometimes working in U.S. agriculture as field laborers.34 After 

NAFTA, the operation of the Mexican small family farm became the vocation of older Mexicans, while 

youth migrated to the cities or the United States. Almost a quarter of rural Mexicans ages 15-24 in 

1990 had left by 2000. Throughout 30 years of increasing emigration, the Mexican government 

also has done little to slow the exodus. Its leading program for small agricultural producers— 

PROCAMPO— does not target areas of high migration.35 Although the Mexican government is 

primarily responsible for addressing the country’s rural poverty, the United States can provide 

critical support for programs that address migration pressures at their source. Because of its 

potential for long-term impact, such a strategy requires commensurate, sustained policy 

attention and resources. Furthermore, by supporting economic development projects with 

rural Mexican organizations, Mexican government agencies—particularly at the local and 

regional levels—can be drawn into development projects that reduce migration pressures. A 

comprehensive, smallholder-based approach to development would by its very nature 

generate rural employment. Without support for Mexico’s small and medium farmers, the 

country’s rural economy will continue to be increasingly dependent on migration and 

remittances. While the link between supporting smallholder farmers and poverty reduction is 

proven, the next logical step with respect to its impact on migration pressures is less 

recognized.36 

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JV 

Answers to: Corporate Competition Hurts Farmers 

[ ] 

[ ] With assistance Mexican farmers can compete even against low US food prices 

Wise, Director of Policy Research at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment 


(Timothy A., Growing Out of the Food Crisis: Mexican Smallholders Key to Food Sovereignty, 

October 10, 2012, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GC50Oct12Wise.pdf) 

Since prices spiked in 2007-8, policy-makers have rediscovered small-scale farmers. Where the 

Washington Consensus treated them as unproductive, an anachronism in the modernizing global 

economy, suddenly they were once again “stewards of the land.” Raising their productivity, closing 

the “yield gap” – the difference between current and attainable yields using readily available 

technologies – became one of the pillars of the global response to the new food crisis. In theory, 

anyway. In our new study, we documented that this is an attainable goal. We showed that smallscale 

Mexican corn farmers can close a yield gap estimated at 43% or more, and they can do 

so relying on existing technologies by investing in good old-fashioned farmer-led extension 

services. This would eliminate Mexico’s 10 million ton annual deficit, which it now fills with $4 billion 

worth of imports from the United States. And it would improve resource use while increasing 

resilience to climate change. Rising agricultural prices, combined with growing import dependence, 

have driven Mexico’s food import bill over $20 billion per year and increased its agricultural trade 

deficit. The current drought in the United States is making this situation worse, with maize prices 

setting new record highs. Three million producers grow most of the country’s white maize, which is 

used primarily for tortillas, and more than 59 native maize landraces that are basic ingredients of 

nearly 600 food preparations. Yield gaps are estimated at 43% on rain-fed land, compared to just 

10% on the country’s larger irrigated farms. Most of the country’s small to medium-scale maize 

farmers are operating at less than 50% of potential 

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JV 

Solvency – Rural Assistance Solves Drug Production and Poverty 

[ ] 

[ ] Rural development assistance is key to solve the incentive for drug production and 

shift towards a focus on poverty alleviation 





To effectively combat drug crime within their borders, Colombia and Mexico also need to broaden 

and diversify their national strategies. Given the success in reducing crime in Colombian cities, a 

continuation of multifaceted action, including the establishment of a national research, analysis, and 

strategic bodies, such as the Government of Colombia’s Dirección de Justicia, Seguridad y 

Gobierno, to better understand DTOs and the drug trade, could contribute to safer cities in Mexico 

and be replicated in different settings in Latin America. To avoid the balloon effect, whereby drug 

production and violence are merely displaced to other territories, military efforts must be 

matched with national socio-economic policies along the lines of improvements in 

education, economic productivity, small-scale agriculture, and employment opportunities, all 

well-known concerns in Mexican society. By addressing issues of economic and food security 

and improving standards of living and capacity building in rural communities, there will be 

fewer incentives to be or get involved in criminal activities, and personal and community 

security will improve. For instance, investments in crop substitution, smallscale farming, and 

the elimination of aerial spraying campaigns could help prevent the future growth of the drug 

trade. Moreover, the Colombian and Mexican governments need to continue their efforts to combat 

corruption and better address problems of impunity and human rights violations by adopting a 

human security approach to drug policies. The establishment of effective judicial reforms 11 to 

bring crimes to justice create a stronger sense of confidence, trust, and security across those 

countries. 

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JV 

Solvency Extension – Aid Reduces Drug Violence 

[ ] Rural development will help alleviate several causes of rural poverty – drastically 

undercutting the basis for drug trafficking and violence. 





Furthermore, accessing markets to sell crops is complicated by distance and inadequate 

infrastructure, such as a lack of communications technology and poor road conditions. Rather 

than investing in crop eradication, the government should increase investment in 

infrastructure development that facilitates access to markets and health care, as well as 

increase investment in social safety nets, alternative development programs, and local 

agriculture that together enhance economic, environmental, health, and food security. By 

threatening environmental, health, and food security, the War on Drugs threatens livelihoods and 

exacerbates problems of poor market access, poverty, and internal displacement. Therefore, crop 

eradication as promoted by the War on Drugs cannot be divorced from economic security. By 

stopping crop eradication policies, particularly with toxic herbicides such as glyphosate, governments 

can support these essential forms of security and ensure a healthier environment for various 

communities. By prioritizing these forms of human security over the unsustainable destruction 

of illicit crops, governments can focus on developing real, long-term alternatives based on 

licit crop cultivation and better market access. By improving livelihoods, countries would 

have fewer families relying on or turning to the drug trade for subsistence, thus abating the 

intensity of the drug conflicts. To this day, the state security approach has failed to generate such 

results. 

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JV 

Solvency Extension – Aid Helps Farmers 

[ ] US aid can help small farmers by supporting irrigation projects and providing 

essential technologies. 

Broughton, Green party candidate and Director of Canada’s Wilderness Committee, 2013 

(Robert, “How the US can help Mexico,” DailyKOS, June 10, Online: 

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/06/10/1215167/-How-the-US-can-help-Mexico) 

The effect of this on Mexico's economy has been devastating. (It's been even more devastating 

for Guatemala, a much poorer country that is also dependent on corn imports.) This isn't in the best 

interest of either the US or Mexico. When rural Mexicans can't feed themselves, they move to 

cities, and often on to the US. Draining Mexico's rural areas of people makes these areas more 

vulnerable to the narco-terrorists. Cultivation of corn began in Mexico, and corn has a cultural 

value as well as a food value. There are 60 varieties of corn grown in Mexico, and the geneticallyaltered 

versions from Monsanto are a solution looking for a problem. So, why can't Mexico grow 

enough corn to feed its population, and what can the US do to help One problem is 

infrastructure. Rural farmers have problems getting their products to markets. However, 

Mexico has been doing a better job than the US has of improving infrastructure over the past few 

years, so the US can be of no help on this one. The Mexican government initiated a program called 

MasAgro in 2011. It is an agricultural extension service, and intends to assist small farmers in 

Mexico to test and use better maize and wheat varieties, and to promote conservation 

agriculture cropping practices and other technologies that raise their yields and incomes 

while reducing costs, risks, and environmental impacts. The Mexican government also initiated 

another extension service, the Strategic Project for High-Yield Maize (PROEMAR), in 2008. It 

features basic soil analysis and precision fertilizer application. It has demonstrated dramatic results 

when implemented in conjunction with a strong, accountable farmer organization. Mexico can also 

increase crop yields by improving and increasing irrigation. Mexico was actually promised 

public investment in irrigation in the run-up to the NAFTA agreement. This promise wasn't 

kept. There is less irrigated corn-growing land now than there was prior to NAFTA. So, the 

Obama administration could start by revisiting the irrigation issue, and provide resources that 

the US Department of Agriculture already has. As for MasAgro and PROEMAR, the Department of 

Agriculture and land-grant universities in every state know a few things about agricultural extension. 

In addition, the Peace Corps has a long history of recruiting agricultural extension volunteers. So, the 

US has the resources to do some good here, and improve its image in Latin America. All that's 

needed is a commitment; put those land-grant university graduates to work. 

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JV 

Answers to: Mexican Farmers Can’t Compete 

[ ] 

[ ] Mexico can close the trade gap with technical assistance 

Wise et al., Director of Policy Research at Tufts University’s Global Development and 

Environment Institute, 2012 

(Antonio Turrent Fernández, Timothy A. Wise, and Elise Garvey, Achieving Mexico’s Maize Potential, 

GDAE Working Paper 12-03, October 2012, 

http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/MexMaize.html) 

To what extent could Mexico close this yield gap, using proven technologies widely employed 

in the country, to regain its lost self-sufficiency in maize Based on a close examination of 

productivity gains and potential in Mexico’s diverse maize-producing sectors – irrigated and rain-fed, 

industrial scale and small scale, using hybrid seeds and native varieties – authors Antonio Turrent, 

Timothy A. Wise, and Elise Garvey find that Mexico has the potential to regain self-sufficiency in 

maize relatively quickly based on existing technologies and without relying on controversial 

transgenic maize varieties. Specifically: Evidence suggests that within 10-15 years Mexico could 

increase annual production on current lands from 23 to 33 million tons, meeting the current deficit of 

10 million tons. Irrigation and infrastructure projects in the southern part of the country could add 

another 24 million mt/year. This would be more than enough to meet Mexico’s growing demand for 

maize, estimated to reach 39 million mt/year by 2025. Such investments in new water resources, 

combined with public investments in more efficient water-use in irrigation systems in the semi-arid 

northern parts of Mexico, are urgently needed as climate change threatens to make water more 

scarce, undermining agricultural production. Mexico’s current push to expand the use of transgenic 

maize is unnecessary and ill-considered. Its yield potential is limited, particularly for smaller scale 

producers, and its risks are high for a country with Mexico’s rich diversity of native maize varieties. 

Mexico’s highly touted MasAgro Program, with its focus on smallholders and resource conservation, 

has laudable goals, but the program has too small a budget and focuses on strategies – improved 

seeds and “no till” practices – that are poorly suited to small-scale farms and marginal lands. A pilot 

program in farmer-led extension services has proven the most promising, raising yields 55-70% in a 

project carried out in several states by a farmer organization. The project promoted precision 

application of inputs on both high-quality and marginal lands, improving conservation without relying 

on new hybrids nor transgenic seeds. Such programs build on Mexico’s rich maize diversity, an 

asset that will become increasingly valuable as climate change challenges existing growing 

conditions. Such findings are consistent with the prevailing international consensus around 

the “sustainable intensification” of small-scale production. Public investment should go 

where the yield gaps are the greatest, among small-to-medium-scale farmers. 

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JV 

Answers to: Mexican Farmers Can’t Compete 

[ ] 

[ ] Farmers can’t compete because of technology and development practices which the 

plan can fix 

Melendez, Journalist at The Monterey County Herald, 2008 

(CLAUDIA, Mexican farmers struggle to survive, 12/10/08, 

http://www.montereyherald.com/ci_7616170) 

"In our country we still find farmers who use oxen to pull carts to farm," said Congresswoman 

Susana Monreal Avila, who represents one of the largest agricultural states in Mexico. "This is what 

they use because they don't have the access to other tools and that places (them) at a 

disadvantage." Speaking to a group of U.S. activists and students touring Mexico with Food First, a 

Berkeley-based advocacy group that promotes policies to eradicate hunger, Monreal Avila said she's 

heading a group lobbying to renegotiate the agricultural provisions of NAFTA, which she blames for 

the deterioration of Mexico's agrarian industry. Former Mexican President Vicente Fox defends 

NAFTA as a program that has brought progress to the country and increased agricultural trade with 

the United States. "We are now exporting more than ever," Fox told The Herald during a recent 

visit to Monterey County. "Maybe those who didn't modernize couldn't compete. 

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JV 

Answers to: Not Enough Water 

[ ] 

[ ] The plan can make farmers competitive and self-sufficient even with coming water 

problems 

Wise et al., Director of Policy Research at Tufts University’s Global Development and 

Environment Institute, 2012 

(Antonio Turrent Fernández, Timothy A. Wise, and Elise Garvey, Achieving Mexico’s Maize Potential, 

GDAE Working Paper 12-03, October 2012, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/12- 

03TurrentMexMaize.pdf) 

Mexico now runs a production deficit of roughly 10 million mt/year and an import bill for maize of 

more than $2.5 billion/year. This review has demonstrated that Mexico has the potential to regain 

self-sufficiency in maize relatively quickly based on existing technologies and without relying 

on controversial transgenic maize varieties. Turrent’s surveys remain the most comprehensive guide 

to Mexico’s maize potential, suggesting that within 10-15 years Mexico could increase annual 

production from current lands to 33 million/mt; irrigation and infrastructure projects in the southern 

part of the country could add another 24 million mt/year. This would be more than enough to meet 

Mexico’s growing demand for maize, estimated to reach 39 million mt/year by 2025 (FAPRI 2011). 

Additional research confirms the viability of these estimates. Following the prevailing international 

consensus, public investment should go where the yield gaps are the greatest, among small-tomedium-scale 

farmers. This is also where private investment is scarce and where market failures are 

prevalent. Indeed, the most promising improvements identified in this review came from the 

provision of basic farmer-led extension services on rain-fed lands using existing 

technologies. Such programs do not rely on the introduction of new improved seeds and they have 

been proven to improve resource use and promote conservation. In fact, researchers recently 

published in Nature a study estimating that closing yield gaps through improved nutrient and 

water management could increase production by 30% while reducing inefficient use of inputs 

(Mueller, Gerber et al. 2012). 

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JV 

Aid Makes Farmers Self-Sufficient 

[ ] 

[ ] There is no link to their turn – the kind of assistance we provide will make farmers selfsufficient 

and reduces aid dependency 

ActionAid, an international charity for children’s education, 2012 

(Real Aid: Ending Dependency, https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/real_aid_3.pdf) 

The kind of aid that helps support dramatic decreases in aid dependence is what ActionAid 

calls real aid – that’s aid which empowers poor women and men to realise their rights, and 

reduces inequality. It might do this directly, by supporting smallholder farmers, empowering 

women or building schools. Or it might do it indirectly, by supporting tax systems, better 

governance or economic development. It is accountable, transparent from beginning to end, and 

gets the most out of every dollar spent. It supports developing countries to make their own 

decisions. Substandard aid, however, does not do this – and there’s still a lot of it out there. 

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JV 

[ ] 

Aid Makes Farmers Self-Sufficient 

[ ] And we reduce dependence on remittances, money sent home by people forced to go 

to other countries for work 

Cohen, Professor of Anthropology at Pennsylvania State University, 2001 

(Jeffrey H., Transnational Migration in Rural Oaxaca, Mexico: Dependency, Development, and the 

Household, American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Dec., 2001)) 

Two models (dependency and development) have dominated the debate over the outcomes of 

migration and remittance use (Brettell 2000:104). Dependency models focus on the 

socioeconomic costs of migration, while development models point toward the economic growth 

that can come from the careful use of remittances. Dependency models argue that migration 

exacerbates local socioeconomic inequalities, increases economic dependency, and 

drives unproductive consumption within peasant households while creating pools of cheap labor 

waiting to be exploited (Reichert 1981). In this scheme, rural communities become little more 

than nurseries for the young (future mi-grants) and "homes" for the elderly (those no longer 

able to migrate). The outcome of this process is the social disintegration of sending 

communities as the able-bodied are siphoned away by the pull of job opportunities and the 

disruption of local practices as remittances are wasted (see Brana-Shute and Brana-Shute 1982; 

Didiz Briquets 1991; Guidi 1993; Martin 1991; Papademetriou 1991; Ruben- stein 1992). 

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JV 

War on Drugs Failed – Violent Backlash in Mexico 

[ ] 

[ ] The War on Drugs has failed in Mexico – military force causes cartel backlash, cartels 

are resilient, government corruption, and police desertion rates. 

Colonel Chase, director of strategy research on the Southern Border, 2012 

(David, “Military Police: Assisting in Securing the United States Southern Border,” December 3, 

Online: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocLocation=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA561048) 

These efforts by the Mexican government have met with some success especially with the targeting, 

capturing and killing of DTO leadership. However, there are fears that little real positive effect has 

been achieved and some belief that Mexico’s war on drugs is proving to be futile altogether. 

Critics claim that any attempts at progress has been slowed and hampered by several 

problems. First, the strong response from the Mexican government is one factor in the 

increased violence as DTOs fight back in response. Second, even as DTO leadership has been 

arrested or killed the organizations themselves have proven very resilient by becoming more 

adaptive, less vertical in organizational structure and by becoming multi-nodal. Other problems cited 

include the fact that the Police are generally viewed as corrupt, brutal and susceptible to bribes 

despite purges of senior police leadership and intensive retraining efforts. As recently as 

August 2010 a purge of the federal police force was conducted and resulted in more than 3,000 

officers being fired for being corrupt. Even the Mexican military is facing problems. Ever since 

becoming involved in the crackdown on DTOs the Mexican Army has been continually charged 

with human rights violations to include rape, killings, disappearances and torture. As recently 

as 2010 there were over 1,200 human rights complaints against the Army.28 Another problem 

that the Army faces is a very high desertion rate, particularly among soldiers sent to fight the 

DTOs. 29 Exacerbating the problems with the security forces is the lack of effective rule of law 

highlighted by a judicial system that is ineffective and corrupt itself. A recent study has found 

that of all the numerous cases brought before Mexican courts the conviction rate is only around 

one percent with known criminals routinely being released. 

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JV 

War on Drugs Failed – Cartels Splintering into Small Groups & Arrests Fail 

[ ] 

[ ] Cartels have fractured into over 300 trafficking groups, arresting the head of the Zetas 

achieves nothing more than good publicity. 

Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009 

(Ted, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States” Cato 

Institute, Online: http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubled-neighbor-mexicos-drugviolence-poses-threat-united-states) 

Since Calderón took office in 2006, the Mexican government has for the first time given the 

military a lead role in combating the traffickers. Approximately 36,000 troops are now involved in 

that effort, in addition to several thousand federal police officers. The principal outcome of that 

strategy, however, has been an even greater level of violence, with military personnel 

increasingly becoming targets. The military also has now been exposed to the temptation of 

financial corruption that had previously compromised Mexico’s local and federal police forces 

so thoroughly. Decapitation Strategies Don’t Work The belief that neutralizing Mexican drug 

kingpins will achieve a lasting reduction in drug trafficking is the same assumption that U.S. 

officials made with respect to the crackdown on the Medellín and Cali cartels in Colombia during the 

1990s. Subsequent developments have shown that assumption to be erroneous. Indeed, an October 

2008 report by the Government Accountability Office found that while opium poppy cultivation and 

heroin production in Colombia had declined since the start of Plan Colombia, coca cultivation 

and cocaine production (the country’s principal drug export) had actually increased by 15 

percent and 4 percent, respectively. 51 The elimination of the Medellín and Cali cartels merely 

decentralized the Colombian drug trade. Instead of two large organizations controlling the trade, 

today some 300 smaller, loosely organized groups do so. More to the point, the arrests and 

killings of numerous top drug lords in both Colombia and Mexico over the years have not had 

a meaningful impact on the quantity of drugs entering the United States. Cutting off one head 

of the drug-smuggling Hydra merely results in more heads taking its place. Indeed, one might 

wonder how serious Mexico’s anti-drug campaign will be in the long run. U.S. leaders held out hopes 

that Calderón’s predecessor, Vicente Fox, would disrupt the trade. Similar hopes were invested in 

earlier Mexican administrations, but a noticeable pattern emerged in all of those cases. Early on, new 

Mexican presidents typically went out of their way to impress on U.S. policymakers that they 

were serious about cooperating with Washington and taking on the drug lords. Then, within a 

few years, the efforts dwindled into futility marked by official corruption. 

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JV 

War on Drugs Failed – Price Spikes Benefit Cartels 

[ ] 

[ ] The War on Drugs increases cartel profits - they can justify jacking up prices to 

compensate for risk of punishment. 

Becker, professor of economics and sociology at the University of Chicago, 2013 

(Gary and Kevin M. Murphy, professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of 

Business, “Have We Lost the War on Drugs,” Wall Street Journal, Jan 4, Online: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324374004578217682305605070.html) 

Prices of illegal drugs are pushed up whenever many drug traffickers are caught and 

punished harshly. The higher prices they get for drugs help compensate traffickers for the 

risks of being apprehended. Higher prices can discourage the demand for drugs, but they also 

enable some traffickers to make a lot of money if they avoid being caught, if they operate on a 

large enough scale, and if they can reduce competition from other traffickers. This explains 

why large-scale drug gangs and cartels are so profitable in the U.S., Mexico, Colombia, Brazil 

and other countries. 

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JV 

War on Drugs Failed – Prohibition Empirically Not Feasible 

[ ] 

[ ] Boosting drug prices just increases black market profits --- no serious reduction in 

demand. 

Williams, columnist for Psychology Today, 2011 

(Ray, “Why ‘The War on Drugs’ Has Failed,” Psychology Today, June 6, Online: 

http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wired-success/201106/why-the-war-drugs-has-failed) 

At least 500 economists, including Nobel prize winners Milton Friedman, George Akerlof and 

Vernon Smith have concluded that reducing the supply of marijuana though interdiction 

without reducing the public demand, causes the price and therefore the profits of drug cartels to 

rise. Despite over $7 billion spent annually towards arresting and prosecuting nearly 800,000 people 

for marijuana offenses in the U.S. in 2005, according to the FBI, the federally-funded Monitoring the 

Future Study reported that 85% of high school seniors found marijuana "easy to obtain." Numerous 

experts have criticized The War on Drugs as the wrong approach to deal with the problem. 

They argue that by favoring domestic law endorsement in instead of treatment, the 

government has focused on enforcement instead of dealing with treatment as a social 

problem. In addition, by making drugs illegal rather than regulating them, The War on Drugs 

creates a highly profitable black market, and increasing levels of violent crime. Prohibitionist 

policies based on eradication, interdiction and criminalization of consumption simply have not 

worked. Violence and the organized crime associated with the drug trade are getting worse, not 

better, despite the current policies. The alarming power of the drug cartels leads to a criminalization 

of politics and a politicization of crime. And the corruption of the judicial and political system is 

undermining the foundations of democracy in several Latin American countries. 

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JV 

[ ] 

Answers to: Colombia Proves Effectiveness 

[ ] They’re misconstruing the facts – the War on Drugs was effective, but only because 

the US gave aid to Colombian farmers. Our aff is an essential piece of the puzzle. 

Shirk, Prof of Political Science at the University of San Diego and Director of the Trans‐ Border 



March 2011) 

Despite the major differences between Mexico and Colombia, U.S. efforts to support Mexico 

can draw some lessons from its efforts in Colombia. U.S. antidrug assistance through Plan 

Colombia greatly bolstered the capacity of the Colombian state to combat DTOs and make 

long-term gains in citizen security. Although Plan Colombia exhibited many flaws—including 

human rights violations and unresolved problems of violence and internal displacement—intense 

binational cooperation, intelligence sharing, and joint tactical operations provided a decisive 

advantage against both DTOs and insurgent threats. Military and law enforcement assistance 

was only part of the equation. Robust economic assistance, averaging $200 million a year over 

the past five years, has consolidated security gains in Colombia. Furthermore, this aid facilitated 

the transformation of Colombia’s urban slums into resilient communities and helped decrease 

unemployment from 15 percent to 11 percent. 

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Mexico Rural Development 

Negative

Mexico Rural Development Negative 



Mexican Rural Development Negative – Table of Contents 

Summary............................................................................................................................................... 2 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 3 

Advantage Answers 

Answers to: Drug Violence Advantage 

No Harms – Violence Declining ............................................................................................................ 4 

Answers to: US Drug Consumption Add-On ......................................................................................... 5 

Answers to: Drugs Hurt the US Economy ............................................................................................. 6 

Answers to: Poverty Advantage 

No Harms – Economy Growing Now .................................................................................................... 7 

Status Quo Solves – Mexican Government Increasing Poverty Reduction Efforts ............................... 8 

Status Quo Solves – Drug Production Profitable .................................................................................. 9 

Turn - Aid Hurts Small Farmers .......................................................................................................... 10 

Answers to: Deforestation Advantage 

No Harms – Deforestation Rates Declining ........................................................................................ 11 

No Harms – Trends Show RE-forestation is Occuring ........................................................................ 12 

Status Quo Solves – Mexico Receives Aid to Reduce Deforestation .................................................. 13 

Status Quo Solves – Mexican Laws have Reduced Deforestation ..................................................... 14 

Solvency 

No Solvency – Drug Production Shifting Elsewhere ........................................................................... 15 

No Solvency – Drug Demand Makes Production Inevitable ................................................................ 16 

No Solvency – Farmers Can’t Compete ......................................................................................... 17-18 

No Solvency – Insufficient Water ........................................................................................................ 19 

Answers to: Aid Trains Farmers to Deal with Water Shortages .......................................................... 20 

No Solvency – Assistance Will Fail ..................................................................................................... 21 

Dependency Turn 1NC ....................................................................................................................... 22 

Impact – Aid Doesn’t Go to Farmers ................................................................................................... 23 

Impact – Elites Maintain Problems to Get More Aid ............................................................................ 24 

War on Drugs Solves – Specifically in Mexico .................................................................................... 25 

War on Drugs Solves – Proven in Colombia ....................................................................................... 26 

War on Drugs Solves – Increased Cost of Drugs Deters Buyers ........................................................ 27 

War on Drugs Solves – Key Arrests Made Recently ........................................................................... 28 

War On Drugs - Answers to: Cartels Splintering/Price Increases Fund Cartels .................................. 29 

War On Drugs - Answers to: Cartels Backlash Against Enforcement ................................................. 30 

War On Drugs - Answers to: Prohibition Fails ..................................................................................... 31 

1 | P a g e




Summary 

This negative contains several answers to the fundamental arguments of the rural assistance 

affirmative. Here you can find arguments to answer the affirmative’s advantages like: 

 

 

 

Drug violence is declining now, which means the status quo is sufficient to solve the problem 

Mexico’s economy is growing – so farmers aren’t as poor as they used to be 

Deforestation is declining now 

You can also find more substantial arguments against the rural assistance affirmative like: 

 

 

The War on Drugs policy has been successful and should continue – this is a defense of the 

status quo that proves the affirmative is an unnecessary step to combat drug violence. 

Foreign aid creates cycles of dependence – this argument states that governments that 

receive aid are more likely to become corrupt and reliant on aid to function. 

2 | P a g e




Glossary 

DTO – Drug Trafficking Organization or drug cartel; a large and sophisticated gang that produces and 

distributes drugs. 

Enrique Peña Nieto – The current President of Mexico. 

Felipe Calderon – The former President of Mexico who completed his term in November 2012. 

Mérida Initiative – The program through which the US is currently providing a substantial amount of 

aid and security assistance to the Mexican government. 

NAFTA – The North American Free Trade Agreement was a deal between the US, Mexico and 

Canada negotiated in the mid-1990’s that made is easier for companies to ship goods across the 

borders but also had a variety of negative effects on average people. 

War On Drugs – A policy by the United States Federal Government that gives foreign military aid to 

foreign countries in aims to identify and fight drug cartel/organizations to destroy the illegal drug 

trade. 

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No Harms – Violence Declining 

[ ] 

[ ] Violence in Mexico has been declining 

Castañeda, foreign minister of Mexico during the administration of President Vicente Fox, 12 

(Jorge, CATO Institute Economic Development Memo, No. 16 • September 24, 2012, 

http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/edb16.pdf) 

Time for an Alternative to Mexico’s Drug War False Premises for Launching the Drug War First 

false premise: violence in Mexico had been increasing, and something had to be done about it. 

Absolutely false. Violence in Mexico had been declining by any indicator, mainly the most 

important and reliable one: willful homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants. From the 

early 1990s through 2007, violence in Mexico declined from around 20-odd willful homicides 

per hundred thousand a year to about 8 per year in 2006 and 2007. That is still higher than the 

rate in United States, but it is one-third the rate in Brazil, one-tenth of what Colombia saw in 

its worst years, and one-third of what we have in Mexico today. Violence in Mexico had been 

declining for 20 years, but then spiked from 2007 onward. The year 2011 saw violence in Mexico 

reach Brazilian levels. 

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Answers to: US Drug Consumption Add-On 

[ ] 

[ ] Legal prescription medicine is just as harmful in terms of addiction and lost economic 

output – reducing drug trafficking won’t get rid of drug abuse. 

Renick, writer from Bloomberg News, 2011 

(Oliver, “Prescription Drugs Cause More Overdoses in U.S. Than Heroin and Cocaine” Jul 7, 2011 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-07/prescription-drugs-cause-more-overdoses-in-u-s-thanheroin-and-cocaine.html) 

Accidental drug overdoses from prescription pills have more than doubled in the past decade 

as deaths from illegal drugs decreased, a Florida study found. Prescription medications were 

implicated in 76 percent of all overdose deaths in Florida between 2003 and 2009, while illicit 

drugs like cocaine and heroin were present in 34 percent of deaths, according to data compiled 

by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. Ten percent of overdoses came from a 

mix of both illegal and prescription drugs. Unintentional poisoning is the second leading cause of 

injury death in the U.S. after automobile accidents, accounting for 29,846 deaths nationwide in 2007, 

the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, said. In 2007, the U.S. government began the 

Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, a $9 million program that provides state funding for recording 

and monitoring prescription drug use. “By 2009, the number of deaths involving prescription 

drugs was four times the number involving illicit drugs,” the report said. “These findings indicate 

the need to strengthen interventions aimed at reducing overdose deaths from prescription drugs.” 

The number of annual deaths from lethal concentrations of prescription medicines increased 

84 percent from 2003 to 2009, while deadly overdoses of illegal drugs fell 21 percent. Deaths 

from the narcotic painkiller oxycodone and anxiety medicine alprazolam, sold under the brand name 

Xanax, more than tripled. Availability “The sense is that the widespread availability of 

prescription drugs is causing people to switch from illicit drugs like cocaine and heroin,” 

Leonard Paulozzi, a medical epidemiologist at CDC’s Injury Center, said in a phone interview. 

Paulozzi said most prescription overdoses were in men between the ages of 45 and 54. Heroin 

death rates dropped 62 percent in the period. Cocaine overdoses increased until 2007, and 

declined in 2008 and 2009, researchers found. Methadone rates rose 79 percent, the study said. 

The federal government spent $15.1 billion on the so-called War on Drugs in 2010, according to the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy. Efforts to combat illegal drug use included prevention, 

treatment, law enforcement and interdiction. 

5 | P a g e




Answers to: Drugs Hurt the US Economy 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic decline decreases the risk of international aggression and war. 

Tir, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, 2010 

(Jaroslav, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of 

Politics, Volume 72: 413-425, Project MUSE) 

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor 

economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is 

significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the 

findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 

5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use 

force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s 

attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus 

reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and 

Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, 

Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized 

democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and 

Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a 

significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that 

economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, 

Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and 

DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor 

economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases 

the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow 

growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some 

significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) 

find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic 

minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent 

findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 

thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic 

growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond 

with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) 

than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. 

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[ ] 

No Harms – Economy Growing Now 



[ ] The Mexican economy is developing now and jobs are becoming available 

Flannery, Latin America focused analyst and writer, 2013 

(Nathaniel Parish, 6/24/2013, Investor Insight: Is Mexico's Drug War Doomed To Failure, 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2013/06/24/investor-insight-is-mexicos-drugwardoomed-to-failure/2/) 

In spite of the violence, Mexico’s economy has continued to move forward, even though foreign 

investment and GDP growth are both starting to slow. Every day one million people and more than 

one billion dollars worth of goods cross the border. Gruesome drugwar violence tends to 

dominate the public debate on Mexico, but along the U.S.-Mexico border, the most important 

bonds between the two countries are economics. In her book Two Nations Indivisible Shannon 

O’Neil explains that “Integration with Mexico has allowed giants such as General Motors, Johnson & 

Johnson, General Electric, and Hewlett Packard to lower costs and compete in global markets where 

they would otherwise be excluded—creating more exports and jobs for both the United States and 

Mexico in the process.” Chrysler, GM and Ford have all invested billions of dollars and hired 

thousands of workers in Mexico, a fact that helped these companies earn a combined US$12.7 

billion in 2012. Despite the benefits of cross-border cooperation, a number of companies also face 

serious challenges when in comes to managing their operations in Mexico.Nissan and Pepsi both 

suffered attacks against their facilities and HSBC has seen its reputation severely damaged as the 

result of a cartel money laundering scandal. 

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Status Quo Solves – Mexican Government Increasing Poverty Reduction Efforts 

[ ] 

[ ] The Mexican government is substantially increasing their poverty alleviation efforts 

Fox News 2011 

(Mexico's Peña Nieto vows to reduce poverty, Sept 11th, 

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/09/11/mexico-pena-nieto-vows-to-reducepoverty/#ixzz2XqGXcKZK) 

President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto said in an address to political and business leaders that he 

planned to focus on reducing the poverty that afflicts 52 million Mexicans and to boost gross 

domestic product growth, which has averaged 2.4 percent annually over the past three decades. 

The president-elect told the approximately 300 movers and shakers from the worlds of business and 

politics who attended the annual Lideres Mexicanos magazine dinner on Monday that he was aiming 

to produce positive results. The 46-year-old Peña Nieto, who will take office on Dec. 1, said his 

administration would aim to create 1 million jobs annually and restore Mexico's status as a 

world leader. Existing social assistance programs that only "give money away" will be changed, 

with new policies being implemented to help families get involved in productive activities, Peña Nieto 

said. Tax, energy, labor and security reforms will be implemented to boost economic growth, 

the president-elect said. The economy has tremendous growth opportunities and Mexico is 

part of the MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) group, which is similar to the BRIC 

(Brazil, Russia, India and China) group of fast-growing emerging economies, Peña Nieto said, citing 

analysts. "Mexico has a great opportunity to project itself in the world and gain the confidence of 

capital to promote its economic growth," Peña Nieto said. 

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Status Quo Solves – Drug Production Profitable 

[ ] Drug trade solves widespread poverty --- small farmers who cultivate drugs stay afloat. 

Keefer and Loazya, research economists at the World Bank, 2008 

(Philip and Norman, The World Bank, “The Development Impact of the Illegality of Drug Trade,” The 

World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, March, WPS4543) 

Repression of the drug trade naturally reduces the wealth of agriculture workers in poor 

countries that grow poppy seeds (Afghanistan) and coca leaves (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru). Their 

welfare losses are usually considered insignificant relevant to evaluations of prohibition, 

precisely because their farming activity is either criminal in and of itself, or contributes to criminal 

activity in other countries. There are four reasons to take these welfare losses more seriously. First, 

the cultivation of poppy seeds and coca has not been historically criminalized, nor is it everywhere 

criminalized; these farmers are therefore not criminals in the usual sense nor in their own perception. 

Second, they are poor and the welfare losses caused by economic setbacks are proportionally 

greater. Third, the benefits of prohibition seem to be scant, such that even the lightly-weighted 

welfare losses that prohibition imposes on cultivators may be relatively large. The fourth reason is 

perhaps the most important: the losses that farmers incur may arise in part because 

criminalization leads to a transfer of rents from them to drug traffickers. 

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Turn - Aid Hurts Small Farmers 

[ ] Aid introduces farmers to the international food market – they’ll get crushed by 

corporations and driven off their land. 

Ewelukwa, Fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 2005 

(Uche U. " Centuries of Globalization; Centuries of Exclusion: African Women, Human Rights, and the 

"New" International Trade Regime" Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice 20 Berkeley J. Gender 

L. & Just. 75) 

Ultimately, the unregulated influx of cheaper goods from the North could significantly displace 

local production, lead to the loss of traditional market domain of small farmers, and threaten 

the livelihood of millions. While data is not currently available to demonstrate the effect of dumping 

on farmers in rural communities in Africa, the problem in Mexico is replicated in many communities 

around the globe. As the IATP report rightly notes, the displacement of farmers as a result of 

agricultural dumping "is happening around the world, in places as far apart as Jamaica, Burkina Faso 

and the Philippines." 337 A second problem with dumping is that Third World farmers who venture 

to sell their product to exporters "find their global market share undermined by the lower-cost 

competition." 338 Additionally, dumping has important implications for a nation's food security. 339 

Trade liberalization also triggers changes in the supply and distribution of produce that privilege largescale 

producers and suppliers. Trade liberalization in services opens doors for foreign investors 

to establish large grocery stores in place of the traditional open-air markets that are prevalent 

in Africa. As large grocery stores spring up, the tendency would be for the stores to turn to 

agro-businesses for their supply of produce because local farmers lack the capital and the 

know-how to meet the quality standards the grocery stores demand. In Africa, the Food and 

Agricultural Organization of the United Nations ("FAO") reports that small farmers risk being swept 

out of agriculture by a wave of supermarket expansion. 340 The FAO reports that the wave of 

supermarket expansion is not limited to major cities but has spread to rural towns. FAO's Kostas 

Stamoulis predicts that "the onslaught of supermarkets will improve the quality and safety of food sold 

locally as farmers strive to meet supermarket's quality standards for the domestic market," 341 and 

argues that supermarkets [*130] could provide "a stable, dependable market for farmers' produce 

and may boost employment in cities and surrounding areas by providing jobs in transport and 

distribution." 342 The impact on small farmers is likely to be catastrophic. For example, giant 

corporations could institute new quality and safety standards in order to wipe out local 

competition. 

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[ ] 

No Harms – Deforestation Rates Declining 



[ ] Deforestation is slowing 

REUTERS in 06 

(Reuters 18/10/06. “Brazil declares Amazon not for sale” Carbon Offset Projects > Brazil 

reforestation >Project-related news. http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspxarticleID=448 

Thursday, 19 October 2006) 

The Brazilian government says it wants foreign help to preserve the Amazon but rejected any sell 

off of what it described as the heritage of the Brazilian people. Environment minister said the Amazon 

was “not for sale” and the country had its own plan for Amazon conservation which it would 

table at the annual UN climate convention conference in Nairobi next month. It’s believed the 

government wants an international loan fund set up that is tied specifically to action to 

prevent native forests being cut down. Silva added that Al Gore would be asked to support the 

Brazil plan. The climate campaigner and global warming film-maker and author is in Brazil promoting 

his book, based on the film An Inconvenient Truth. The rate of Amazon rainforest loss has 

slowed in recent years but large areas continue to disappear each year to make way for agriculture. 

Between July 2004 and August 2005, 18,900 square kilometres of forest were destroyed, an area 

almost half the size of Switzerland. 

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[ ] 

No Harms – Trends Show RE-forestation is Occuring 

[ ] Reforestation is actually occurring globally. 

Beef Myths.org, 2007 

(Beef Myths, 2007, “Amazon Rainforest Deforestation and U.S. Beef Consumption” 

http://www.beefmyths.org/beefmyths/amazonrainforestdeforestation/) 

To understand the issue of tropical rainforests and destruction we have to look at the big 

picture, i.e. total forest destruction. According to current estimates, on an annual basis, 0.38 

percent of the world’s forests were converted to other land uses during the 1990s. To partially offset 

this loss, large areas reverted to forest during this same time leaving a net deficit of 0.22 percent per 

year.[1] The world’s temperate-zone forests are actually expanding due to reforestation by 

affluent countries and reduced losses caused from fires and pests. The rate of tropical forest 

loss was 0.8 percent, with the greatest losses occurring in Africa and South America, though the 

greatest rate of loss occurred in Asia.[1] Since 1990 the rate of loss has been decreasing. America 

had its own surge of tree-clearing in the late 19th century. We cut huge tracts of Eastern forest to fuel 

small pig-iron smelters. After the advent of coal-fired steel furnaces, virtually all of the forest 

was allowed to regrow. According to 1996 government statistics, we actually have 14 million 

more acres of forest land than we did in 1920.[2] 

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[ ] 

Status Quo Solves – Mexico Receives Aid to Reduce Deforestation 



[ ] Mexico is already receiving a significant amount of aid targeted directly at 

deforestation 

Latino Daily News 2012 

(Mexico To Fight Deforestation With $15 Million Loan, November, 

http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-news/details/mexico-to-fight-deforestation-with- 

15-million-loan/19938/) 

Mexico will receive $15 million in financial and technical assistance to support climate change 

mitigation efforts. The program will create a dedicated financing line, accessible by communities 

and ejidos or their members, for identified low carbon projects in forest landscapes in five of the 

states with the highest levels of net forest loss: Oaxaca, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Jalisco and 

Campeche. The program is sponsored by the Forest Investment Program (FIP) under the 

Strategic Climate Fund, which supports governments in their efforts to reduce emissions from 

deforestation and degradation, promote sustainable forest management and enhance forest carbon 

stocks. Mexico’s Investment Plan under the FIP was approved in October, 2011. The program 

includes a $10 million loan for financing projects that must reconcile economic profit for the 

communities and generate environmental benefits through reducing the pressure on forests 

and promoting enhancement of carbon stocks. Through the dedicated financing line, the program 

will attend one of the underlying economic causes of deforestation and forest degradation by 

removing the obstacles that limit access to credit by offering the financial terms and conditions 

required for these projects. A $5 million grant will provide additional financial and technical 

assistance to support the viability of the individual projects. The grant will strengthen the technical, 

financial and management skills at the ejido and community level for conducting low carbon 

strategies. The program is a pilot project that will permit obtaining lessons for its replication in 

other key geographic areas in Mexico, demonstrating a viable business models that promotes 

reduction of deforestation and degradation while increasing economic returns, and the 

corresponding financial structures that are required. 

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[ ] 

Status Quo Solves – Mexican Laws have Reduced Deforestation 



[ ] Mexico is making substantial progress against deforestation now 

Gardiner and Pichardo, vice president of the Global Legislators Organization and president of 

GLOBE Mexico and a former deputy in the Mexican Parliament, 2012 

(Barry and Ignacio, Mexico sets global benchmark on tackling deforestation, Daily Times, 

http://www.illegal-logging.info/item_single.phpit_id=6607&it=news&printer=1) 

Below the global radar, a major victory was secured in Mexico on Tuesday, April 24, in the 

worldwide battle to prevent deforestation and forest degradation, which are collectively the world’s 

second largest sources of greenhouse emissions. A set of legal amendments was approved by 

the Mexican Parliament that sets a powerful global precedent for empowering local 

communities to address deforestation. In so doing, the vote also positions Mexico as the first 

country in the world to legislate in support of efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 

degradation (the so-called REDD+ agenda). This is a crucial development, and is of global 

importance for several reasons. Up until now, debate on REDD+ has predominantly been within the 

UN climate convention and the executive branch of governments across the world. However, 

approval of these legal amendments by a domestic legislature (the Mexican Congress) highlights an 

important transition towards engraining the approach within national legal frameworks. In addition to 

this shift in focus, this Mexican package of legal reforms takes a critical step towards ensuring 

that local communities who sustainably manage their forests receive the economic benefits 

derived from any future carbon payment scheme. By enshrining this in national legislation, the 

Mexican Congress is building a groundbreaking, forward-looking legal framework that supports the 

concept that forests should be worth more alive than dead. As important as the Mexican precedent is, 

however, this argument now needs to be won across a critical mass of other countries if global 

deforestation is to be truly addressed – and its contribution to global warming arrested. Although 

Brazil has made headlines in recent years for reducing its deforestation rates, a report published by 

the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in late 2011 showed that the global net loss of 

forests between 1990 and 2005 was 72.9 million hectares. This is unsustainably large, even though 

the net rate of loss is slowing. 

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No Solvency – Drug Production Shifting Elsewhere 

[ ] 

[ ] Mexico is no longer the global hotspot for drugs – it’s shifting to Honduras and Central 

America. 

Tico Times, 2012 

(“Central America replaces Mexico as front line for drug trafficking, UN says” 

http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/Central-America-replaces-Mexico-as-front-line-fordrug-trafficking-UN-says_Sunday-September-30-2012 

Tico Times) 

Central America is replacing Mexico as the top front for drug trafficking from South America 

to the United States. The change is inciting an increase in regional violence, according to a report by 

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "The implementation of the Mexican security 

strategy (beginning in 2006) increased the importance of Central American links (with the 

traffickers) that had begun many years ago," said the study released last week. The study cites 

an increase of direct major drug shipments from Central America to the United States and a 

decrease in shipments from Mexico to the United States. Drug trafficking has undoubtedly 

contributed to the increase of violence in Central America, which has reached "extreme" levels, the 

study said. However it notes that gangs or "maras" remain a major cause of violent deaths in urban 

parts of the region. Honduras maintains the highest homicide rate in the world with 92 killed 

per 100,000 in 2011. El Salvador has a homicide rate of 69 per 100,000 citizens and Guatemala has 

a rate of 39 murders per 100,000. Costa Rica has the lowest homicide rate on the isthmus with 10.3 

murders per 100,000. For comparison, the United States homicide rate was 4.2 per 100,000 in 2010, 

according to the most recent statistics. According to the UNODC, Central American countries play a 

key role in the transit of cocaine from South America, but "Honduras is now the most popular entry 

point for cocaine." "Approximately 65 of the 80 tons transported by air toward the United 

States lands in Honduras," where authorities found 62 secret airstrips between February and March 

2012. The activity of drug trafficking in that country increased "dramatically" after the 2009 coup 

against former President Manuel Zelaya, as "law enforcement fell into disarray, resources were 

diverted to maintaining order, and counternarcotics assistance from the United States was 

suspended," the report adds. The Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas has expanded its presence into 

Guatemala, by operating in local cells made up of ex-members of elite military corps. "It is said that 

Los Zetas traveled to Guatemala and created a local faction around 2008. Since then, the group 

has played a prominent role in the violence in that country," the UNODC report said. In 2010, 

330 tons of cocaine entered Guatemala for the United States, according to official U.S. figures cited in 

the report. As for El Salvador, authorities say minimal cocaine passes through the country, which is 

confirmed by "radar data suggesting very few shipments go directly from South America to El 

Salvador." However, the official figures could be underestimating the size of the cocaine flow, the 

report added. Drug trafficking from Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama, while still minor 

compared to Honduras or Guatemala, also has increased "significantly" in the past years, the 

document said. 

15 | P a g e




No Solvency – Drug Demand Makes Production Inevitable 

[ ] 

[ ] Production of drugs is inevitable because of US demand – drug trade remains too 

profitable. 

Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009 

(Ted Galen, Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States, 

POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 631, February 2, 2009, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs- 

/pdf/pa631.pdf) 

Robust Consumer Demand Makes Victory Impossible That sobering reality has ominous 

implications for the strategy that advocates of a “war on drugs” continue to push. Their strategy has 

long had two major components. The first is to shut off the flow of drugs coming from drug-source 

countries, through various methods of drug crop eradication, developmental aid to promote 

alternative economic opportunities, interdiction of drug shipments, and suppression of moneylaundering 

activities. The second component is to significantly reduce demand in the United 

Statesthrough a combination of criminalsanctions, drug treatment programs, and anti-drug 

educational campaigns. At best, efforts at domestic demand reduction have achieved only modest 

results, and the supply-side campaign has been even less effective. Moreover, with global demand 

continuing to increase, even if drug warriors succeeded in their goal of more substantially reducing 

consumption in the United States, it would have little adverse impact on trafficking organizations. 

There is more than enough demand globally to attract and sustain traffickers who are willing 

to take the risks to satisfy thatdemand. And since the illegality of the trade creates a huge 

black market premium (depending on the drug, 90 percent ormore of the retail price), the potential 

profits to drug trafficking organizations are huge. 66 Thus, the supply-side strategy attempts to 

defy the basic laws of economics, with predictable results. It is a fatally flawed strategy, and 

Washington’s insistence on continuing it causes serious problems of corruption and violence for a 

key drug-source and drug-transiting country such as Mexico. Thus, the notion that the solution to 

the violence in Mexico is to win the war on drugs is asmuch a chimera asthe othertwo so-called 

solutions. Given the healthy state of global demand, there is no prospect of ending—or even 

substantially reducing—the trade in illegal drugs. There is only one policy change that would have a 

meaningful impact. 

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No Solvency – Farmers Can’t Compete 



[ ] 

[ ] Farmers can’t compete with subsidized American goods – no amount of aid can 

incentivize people to remain farmers 

Hesson, MA at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, 2010 

(Ted, Oaxaca Trip: NAFTA and Mexico’s Small Farmers, January 21, 

http://www.longislandwins.com/index.php/blog/post/oaxaca_trip_nafta_and_mexicos_small_farmers/) 

Then came NAFTA in 1994, which hit the Mexican agricultural sector hard. As part of the 

agreement, Mexico had to eliminate all tariffs on agricultural imports by 2008 (from what I 

understand, there are no longer any tariffs on agricultural goods). That meant that small Mexican 

farmers wouldn’t be able to compete with subsidized U.S. imports, including corn. According to a 

2002 article in Business Week, the average Mexican farmer then received $722 in annual subsidies, 

while U.S. farmers stand to collect $20,800 per year. From 1990 - 2000, the market price for corn 

decreased 58.3 percent and and market price for beans decreased 45 percent. Decreased subsidies 

hurt Mexican agriculture, but there are other NAFTA-related factors that affected this sector of the 

economy, as well. Support to small farmers from the Mexican government has declined by 31.26 

percent since NAFTA came into effect, and the Mexican government has not enforced pre-NAFTA 

quota rules, which would limit agricultural imports. In a country where 10 million people—a quarter of 

the workforce—live off the land, the inability to compete has increased poverty and forced more 

people to consider migrating, either to the U.S. or other parts of Mexico. Since NAFTA was enacted, 

2 million people have been displaced from the agricultural sector while the rural poverty rate has 

climbed to 85 percent. Here’s what the Witness for Peace information packet has to say about the 

change: “Because [small farmers] can no longer produce food that is cheap enough to compete 

with U.S. imports, an increasing number of Mexican farmers have been forced to abandon the 

countryside. This is disrupting the social and cultural fabric of rural Mexico. It is not unusual for a 

small Mexican town to have lost half its population to migration over the past twelve years.” In 

the small villages across the state of Oaxaca, the history of corn cultivation goes back thousands 

of years. But with rapidly growing Mexican imports—1/5 of corn consumed by Mexicans is now 

imported—those traditions seem headed for extinction. 

17 | P a g e


No Solvency – Farmers Can’t Compete 



[ ] 

[ ] There is not profit in farming – everyone is shifting to other types of work 

Paley, an editor-member of the Media Co-op, 2013 

(Dawn, March 11th, Corn on the Border – NAFTA & Food in Mexico, 

http://dawnpaley.ca/2013/03/11/corn-on-the-border-nafta-food-in-mexico/) 

“NAFTA created a disloyal competition, because the United States and Canada continued to 

subsidize agricultural producers, and we pulled the subsidies,” said Herrera, who has worked in 

Mexico’s agricultural sector for over 30 years. “It became impossible for small and medium 

producers to compete with producers from Canada and United States.” Agricultural subsidies in 

Mexico chalk in much lower than they do in Canada, which according to a 2005 estimate provided 

$3.7 billion to farmers, and the US, which paid out $19.1 billion in the same year. Mexican farmers, 

the majority of whom farm plots smaller than five hectares, receive between $78 and $102 per 

hectare per harvest cycle in government support, according to Herrera. “The peasants are often so 

poor that what they receive from [PROCAMPO, the federal assistance program for farmers], they use 

to satisfy their basic consumption needs,” he said. A 2011 study showed that for small farmers in 

Mexico to produce a kilogram of corn it cost $3.72, compared to $1.67 per kilo in commercial farms. 

Both groups sell their product at a loss and rely on state support and other income to survive. “I have 

a hectare that’s maybe a quarter planted, and it gives me a ton (of corn per harvest),” said Pedro 

Viafuerte, who has land in Mexico State, but who works as a custodian in Mexico City in order to earn 

an income. “We use it for our personal consumption… and to fatten our livestock, because it doesn’t 

fetch the price it should.” Because it is so difficult to turn a profit growing traditional foods, 

according to a report published by the Agriculture, Society and Development journal last year, most 

Mexican peasants no longer grow corn and beans as a means of economic survival. Instead, 

“most of the production that peasants obtain from their land plots (maize, beans, kidney beans, 

etc.) is for self-consumption … the greater part of monetary income is obtained from other 

activities linked to the land (fruit, flower or vegetable production) or of another type (commerce, 

paid work in factories or construction in Mexico or the USA).” 

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No Solvency – Insufficient Water 

[ ] 

[ ] Droughts and climate change make farming in Mexico unsustainable 

Tegel, GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America, 2012 

(Simon, Mexico’s drought turns farms to dust, July, 

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/-americas/mexico/120716/drought-farms-climatechange) 

The lack of rain is forcing the region’s farmers to draw ever more heavily on the aquifers lying 

below their fields. Yet that is no solution either. The aquifers’ sole source of replenishment is 

the rain itself. And just 3 percent of the precipitation that falls here ever makes it to the 

aquifers. Most of the rest evaporates. As a result, the farmers are having to dig their wells deeper 

and deeper into the rocky ground. Rafael Armendariz, 65, is president of the community of Benito 

Juarez, a few miles from Constitucion. He says that wells, which a generation ago produced water 

from a depth of 250 feet, now have to be excavated, at great cost, to around 800 feet. To make 

matters worse, CONAGUA, the national water commission, has not done any hydrological studies of 

the local aquifer. No one in Benito Juarez knows how close they are to the aquifer running dry. “We 

don’t know what else to do,” says Armendariz, as he predicts that the current generation could be the 

last in Benito Juarez to work the land. “Farming is the only thing we have ever done. That is why we 

keep at it.” And the costs of deeper wells go beyond their excavation. Alejandro Rodriguez, 46, uses 

three wells to irrigate his 338-acre peach and apple farm on the outskirts of Chihuahua city. His 

monthly electricity bill for pumping that water from an aquifer 350 feet down can reach almost 

$10,000. As the wells go deeper, the electricity required increases exponentially. The regional 

government talks about climate change but has done little, says Martin Bustamente, of the Chihuahua 

branch of El Barzon. “We have never learned to live in the desert and now that climate change 

has arrived, we are finally going to have to catch up or face disaster,” he warns. He is calling 

for government support for farmers to acquire more efficient, state-of-the-art irrigation systems and for 

no aquifer to be used unsustainably. He is also pushing for a way to have thirsty urban areas pay the 

region’s farmers, who, effectively, manage the natural watersheds that supply the cities’ water. 

Above all, he wants existing laws to be enforced so that the amount of water actually withdrawn from 

aquifers does not exceed the concessions authorized by CONAGUA. Outside observers may think 

northern Mexican governments are overburdened trying to contain drug war violence. But for 

residents like Armendariz, water is the real security issue. “Violence If the rains don’t come, it 

will only get worse because more people will be out of work. You cannot fix that problem if 

you don’t secure the water.” 

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Answers to: Aid Trains Farmers to Deal with Water Shortages 

[ ] 

[ ] Increasing droughts will doom farming efforts. 

Rush, writer for the Executive Intelligence Review, 2013 

(Cynthia R., Mexico's Drought Demands, 'NAWAPA-Plus' Infrastructure Projects, June 2013 

http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2013/4024mex_nawapa_plus.html) 

"Our country is now suffering the consequences of desertification, at the same time that 

drought and water scarcity are affecting worrisome [land] extensions due to over-exploitation 

of aquifers," Conafor said in a late-May statement. "The North of the Country Is Dying of Thirst," 

read a May 21 Televisa headline. According to Arturo Osornio Sánchez, Undersecretary of Rural 

Development at Mexico's Agriculture Ministry, 18 of Mexico's 32 states are "collapsed" due to 

both drought and frosts. The National Meteorological Service had forecast that rainfall for May 

would be only half the average rainfall as measured for that month over the past 40 years. Looming 

food shortages pose a national security threat, warned Benjamín Grayeb, president of the 

National Agricultural Council on May 3. Agricultural production could drop by as much as 20% 

this year, he added, with a particularly dangerous decline in grain production. 

20 | P a g e




No Solvency – Assistance Will Fail 

[ ] 

[ ] Assistance to farmers won’t reduce violence and may even make things worse 

Felbab-Brown, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, 2011 

(Vanda, Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of 

Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies, September 2011) 

It is important that social interventions are designed as comprehensive rural development or 

comprehensive urban planning efforts, not simply limited social handouts or economic 

buyoffs. The latter approaches have failed – whether they were conducted in Medellín as a part 

of the demobilization process of the former paramilitaries (many of whom have returned as bandas 

criminales)15 or in Rio de Janeiro‟s favelas.16 The handout and buyoff shortcuts paradoxically 

can even strengthen criminal and belligerent entities. Such buyoff approach can set up 

difficult-to-break perverse social equilibria where criminal entities continue to control 

marginalized segments of society while striking a let-live bargain with the State, under which 

criminal actors even control territories and limit State access. 

21 | P a g e


Dependency Turn 1NC 



[ ] The plan creates a dependency on US assistance which makes development problems 

worse and undermines the government 

Bräutigam, Professor in the School of International Service at American University, 2000 

(Deborah, Aid Dependence and Governance, http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdfs/swap- 

/swap404.pdf) 

This study analyzes the political economy of aid dependence. Large amounts of aid delivered over 

long periods, create incentives for governments and donors that have the potential to undermine 

good governance and the quality of state institutions. These incentives are not always acted on, 

but when they are, large amounts of aid may reduce local ownership, accountability and 

democratic decision-making, while fragmenting budgets and lowering tax effort. Large 

amounts of aid, delivered to countries with weak institutions create some of the institutional problems 

that lead to ineffectiveness. In aid dependent countries, donor agencies and foreign experts often 

take over many of the critical functions of governance: substituting their own goals for an absent 

leadership vision, using foreign experts and project management units in place of weak or decaying 

public institutions, and providing finance for investments whose operation and maintenance is neither 

planned for nor affordable. In these countries, aid has been part of the problem. And longterm 

dependence on aid creates disincentives for both donors and governments to change the 

rules of their engagement. 

22 | P a g e


Impact – Aid Doesn’t Go to Farmers 



[ ] Aid creates a large bureaucracy that destroy the effectiveness of the plan even before 

it gets to the farmers and actually reduces development 



/swap404.pdf) 

The goal of governance reforms is primarily to increase the quality of public institutions and to reduce 

corruption. Yet large amounts of aid and technical assistance enable bureaucracies to continue 

functioning without at the same time creating any incentive for them to cooperate with efforts 

to increase meritocratic appointments, reduce corruption in procurement and provision of services, 

or cut back on unsustainable numbers of public employees. In addition, aid dependence 

means that countries are deeply exposed to some of the most criticized practices in the aid system: 

by-passing instead of building capacity, poaching talented staff from government offices, providing 

unnecessary and unwelcome technical assistance. This directly affects the institutional context 

within which bureaucracies operate, and has created some significant barriers to the 

development of more effective states. Finally, high levels of aid tend to lessen pressures that 

might push the development of bureaucratic accountability. In aid dependent countries, 

accountability for the funding is valued most highly by those who provide the bulk of the funds: the 

donors. Many aid dependent countries have not developed the capacity to carry out extensive audits. 

Instead, donors substitute their own accountants and reporting, creating an enclave of accountability 

that rarely grows beyond its borders. 

23 | P a g e


Impact – Elites Maintain Problems to Get More Aid 



[ ] And this turns the case – political elites will prevent success because they want to 

keep getting money from the US 



/swap404.pdf) 

Political elites also have little incentive to change a situation in which large amounts of aid 

provide exceptional resources for patronage, and many fringe benefits (vehicles, study tours, 

etc.) that would not otherwise be available to officials in low-income countries. A senior 

planning officer in Mauritius, a country that has never been aid dependent by our measure, once 

described his “thankless” task as “asking the nasty questions,” about proposed projects, questions 

that ensured that he and his colleagues “will not win any popularity contest…with [our] political 

overlords” (Bheenick, 1986: 53). With aid given outside of budget constraints, planning officers 

and political overlords alike are spared the need to justify their aid requests. 

[ ] And this leads to bad practices in the government which makes underdevelopment 

worse 



/swap404.pdf) 

Budgets in many aid dependent countries have collapsed under the weight of many hundreds 

of projects and policy conditions. Yet aid dependence itself inhibits the budget restructuring 

required by economic crisis. Aid dependence tends to exacerbate problems of budget 

fragmentation, repetitive budgeting, and cash flow management. Budgets that are essentially 

aggregates of donor projects are divorced from planning and policy objectives. Continued provision 

of large amounts of aid over long periods of time removes the hard budget constraint from 

government calculations of what is affordable and sustainable in policy choices, and 

genuinely hard budget constraints are essential for keeping government commitments at sustainable 

levels. Finally, countries that are heavily dependent on aid tend to have lower levels of tax effort, 

suggesting that large amounts of aid may serve to reinforce inadequate revenue collection 

efforts. 

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War on Drugs Solves – Specifically in Mexico 

[ ] The War on Drugs is succeeding – criminalization has weakened cartels and aid has 

strengthened Mexico’s military. 

Poiré, director general at the Center for Intelligence and National Security, 2011 

(Alejandro, “Can Mexico win the war against drugs,” Americas Quarterly, Vol. 5 No. 4, Fall 2011, 

ProQuest) 

Addressing this escalation of crime and insecurity required not only a plan for domestic 

action, but also recognition of the transnational dimension of the problem. That recognition has 

been the key to our comprehensive, multifaceted approach. The National Security Strategy, 

launched in 2006, rests on three main tenets: severely weakening criminal organizations; 

massively and effectively reconstructing law enforcement institutions and the legal system; 

and repairing the social fabric through, among other things, enhancing crime prevention 

policies. To date, there have been significant achievements. Our enhanced intelligence 

capabilities and close collaboration with U.S. agencies have allowed us to arrest or kill 21 of 

the 37 most-wanted leaders of major criminal organizations. Moreover, Mexican authorities 

have seized over 9,500 tons of drugs that will never reach U.S. or Mexican children, and captured 

more than 122,000 weapons since 2006-most of which were bought in the United States. At the same 

time, the professional caliber of Mexico's Federal Police force has improved significantly 

through strict recruitment, vetting and extensive training-even as the force has grown nearly sixfold to 

35,000 federal policemen. But it is not just a question of numbers; police intelligence capabilities 

have been reinforced by the recruitment of an additional 7,000 federal law enforcement intelligence 

personnel from top-level universities. A new judicial framework is in place, thanks to the 

introduction of legal reforms designed to strengthen due process guarantees, provide fuller protection 

to victims and increase the efficiency and transparency of trials. Much of this has been the result of 

the introduction of oral procedures in the federal court system, which is expected to be fully 

implemented in 2016. We have also achieved significant success in dismantling criminal 

financial networks. Authorities have confiscated a record amount of cash from the drug 

cartels-although more can still be done-and special investigative units are spearheading a 

national effort to combat money laundering. Currently, Congress is working on passing a bill 

aimed at increasing the capacity of the federal government to investigate and prosecute money 

launderers. To improve Mexico's social fabric, we have focused on the economic and social roots 

of crime and addiction since Calderón took office. We consider drug addiction to be a public health 

problem. Accordingly, national legislation has decriminalized personal consumption of drugs, 

while directing drug users to proper medical help. Also, public spending devoted to 

addiction/prevention programs has more than doubled during the first five years of Calderón's 

administration. 

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War on Drugs Solves – Proven in Colombia 



[ ] 

[ ] The War on Drugs is essential to dismantling trafficking organizations and reducing 

violence – it worked in Colombia. 

Walser, Senior Policy Analyst on Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, 2009 

(Ray, “U.S. Drug Policy in Latin America,” Testimony before the Committee on the Foreign Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, of the United States House of Representatives, December 7, 

Online) 

The vast majority of Colombia's paramilitaries have been demobilized and the FARC has 

suffered serious reverses. Heartening news indicates that coca production has finally begun 

to decline in Colombia, realizing one of the most significant long-term benchmarks for success in 

Plan Colombia. These are not the signs of a failed war on drugs, but indicators that a capable 

Colombia is increasingly able to meet the internal challenges posed by the drug trade. The Obama 

Administration has demonstrated its confidence in Colombia and the government of President 

Alvaro Uribe by moving forward to deepen its strategic ties under a new Defense Cooperation 

Agreement that will utilize facilities in Colombia in order to monitor trafficking over land and at 

sea and gather valuable intelligence needed to advance the fight against traffickers. Colombia 

and the U.S. are pressing forward with this agreement despite the distorted misrepresentations and 

threats issued against Colombia by Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and his allies. Likewise another 

indication of strong cooperation was the August 2009 renewal of the Air Bridge Denial On the other 

hand, the picture elsewhere is not as rosy. Coca production appears to be on the rise in Bolivia and 

Peru. Earlier this year, Washington was deluged with anxious expressions of concern regarding the 

threat Mexico drug cartels posed to the stability of our closest neighbor. The names of dreaded and 

emboldened drug organizations -- the Gulf and Sinaloa Cartels, La Familia Michoacana, and the 

lethal drug soldiers Los Zetas have become far too familiar to the public in the U.S. Ciudad Juarez, 

across from El Paso, has become the epicenter for Mexico's narco-carnage. Again, the Obama 

Administration, like the Bush Administration before it, recognizes the gravity of the situation and is 

continuing to deliver promised assistance under the Merida Initiative. It has regularly expressed its 

readiness to back Mexico's President Calderón in the drug fight. Professionals throughout the U.S. 

government recognize the urgency of their mission in cooperating with Mexico and the importance of 

delivering swift and targeted help. Congress can also help by streamlining the disbursal of assistance, 

cutting down on red tape, and by following through with the provision of the $450 million requested in 

the FY2010 State Department budget in order to demonstrate sustained legislative support for this 

critical program. Likewise, the new Administration, with the Departments of Homeland Security 

and Justice in the lead, has added additional teeth and stronger missions through the 

updating of its National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and with the assignment 

of additional law enforcement personnel to the border. It is moving ahead to block the 

southward movements of arms and bulk cash into Mexico, using the ample authority already 

granted by existing gun legislation. Vigilance and security on the U.S.-Mexican border along 

with active cooperation with Mexico's law enforcement are the watchwords for success in 

defeating Mexico's dangerous cartels. 

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War on Drugs Solves – Increased Cost of Drugs Deters Buyers 

[ ] 

[ ] The War on Drugs drives up drug prices by adding risk to trafficking and production – 

these costs deter consumers. 

Calukins and Lee, 2012 

(Jonathan - Professor of Operations Research at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College and a 

consultant with RAND's Drug Policy Research Center, and Michael - drug-policy researcher at 

Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College, “The Drug-Policy Roulette,” National Affairs, Number 12, 

Summer, Online: http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-drug-policy-roulette) 

What makes illegal drugs so expensive is precisely the fact that their production is prohibited, 

and that this prohibition is often strictly enforced. One factor is what economists call 

"compensating wage differentials," or compensation for taking risks. Suppliers of illegal drugs court 

real dangers, including arrest, imprisonment, physical injury, even death. Thus, in addition to 

seeking wages that compensate for their time and allow for normal profits, people employed in drug 

distribution also seek compensation for assuming these risks — much as coal miners and deepsea 

divers typically earn higher wages than people performing similar jobs under less hazardous 

circumstances. Another factor is the inefficiency that stems from having to operate covertly. The 

precautions required to evade detection make the production of drugs very labor intensive. 

Grocery-store cashiers, for instance, are more than 100 times as productive as retail drug sellers in 

terms of items sold per labor hour. Similarly, hired hands working for crack dealers can fill about 100 

vials per hour, whereas even older-model sugar-packing machines can fill between 500 and 1,000 

sugar packets per minute. This labor intensity of drug production, combined with the high 

wages demanded for that labor, are what drive up the costs of drugs; by comparison, materials 

and supplies — glassine bags, gram balances, and even guns — are relatively cheap. How would 

these dynamics — and, with them, drug prices — be altered if drugs were legalized To begin, 

legalization would cut production costs in source countries. Cultivators and preparers would 

no longer fear crop eradication; the need to employ only manual labor would disappear. 

Production could expand and mechanize, becoming more efficient and therefore less 

expensive. 

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War on Drugs Solves – Key Arrests Made Recently 

[ ] 

[ ] Mexican marines have arrested the leader of the Zetas, one of the most powerful 

cartels in Mexico – this is the first step in a new War on Drugs operation that will crack down 

on cartels. 

Associated Press, 2013 

(“US federal official: Top leader of Mexico’s brutal Zetas drug cartel captured” Associated Press, 

Monday, July 15 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-federal-official-leader-of- 

mexicos-zetas-drug-cartel-captured/2013/07/15/85376a4c-edab-11e2-bb32- 

725c8351a69e_story.html) 

MEXICO CITY — Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, the notoriously brutal leader of the feared Zetas 

drug cartel, has been captured in the first major blow against an organized crime leader by a 

Mexican administration struggling to drive down persistently high levels of violence, a U.S. 

federal official confirmed. Trevino Morales, known as “Z-40,” was captured by Mexican Marines in 

Nuevo Laredo, the Mexican media reported. The U.S. official who confirmed the media reports was 

not authorized to speak to the press and asked not to be identified. Trevino’s capture removes the 

leader of a corps of special forces defectors who splintered off into their own cartel and 

spread across Mexico, expanding from drug dealing into extortion and human trafficking. 

Along the way, the Zetas authored some of the worst atrocities of Mexico’s drug war, 

slaughtering dozens, leaving their bodies on display and gaining a reputation as perhaps the most 

terrifying of the country’s numerous ruthless cartels. The capture of Trevino Morales is a 

public-relations victory for President Enrique Pena Nieto, who came into office promising to drive 

down levels of homicide, extortion and kidnapping but has struggled to make a credible dent in 

crime figures. 

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Answers to: Cartels Splintering/Price Increases Fund Cartels 

[ ] 

[ ] The existing War on Drugs approach is the only way to beat cartels – if you take away 

drugs, they’ll resort to other black market activities. They have to be dismantled – and the US 

successfully destroyed 612 trafficking organizations last year. 

Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2012 

(Gil, “Drug Policy in the Americas,” CSIS, Online) 

This Administration condemns the gruesome drug-related violence and is committed to 

partnering with the Mexican government to disrupt the cartels that commit such brutality. 

These organizations pose a significant challenge—they don’t just prey on citizens through 

drug distribution, but diversify their operations through human trafficking, contraband 

smuggling, financial fraud, and extortion, spreading violence, corruption and terror wherever 

they operate. These groups are in business for money and power and there is no limit to the 

schemes they will employ to extract illegal proceeds from our societies. In an interview with PBS in 

May, Alejandro Junco, the head of Grupo Reforma, put it well: “Once the dominating cartel 

establishes territorial control, it turns the most profitable part of its business—selling 

protection. Kidnappings, extortion, piracy, contraband, sale of organs, prostitution—cartels 

will turn to anything illegal that makes money. The profitability of drugs is actually quite low 

compared to the profitability of these other areas.” The United States takes our responsibility to 

disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking groups operating within our borders very seriously. Last 

year, U.S. law enforcement agencies disrupted or dismantled 612 drug trafficking 

organizations on the Attorney General’s Target list, which focuses on the major drug trafficking and 

violent criminal organizations operating within the United States. We have interagency task forces 

operating in every part of our country to identify and disrupt major drug distribution networks within 

the United States. We welcome a dialogue on the best tactics to address the threat posed by 

transnational criminal organizations. We recognize that it is appropriate to examine what 

works best. But we also recognize that transnational criminal networks would not disappear if 

drugs were made legal. Transnational criminal organizations don’t derive all their revenue 

from drugs, as I just mentioned. They would not simply disband if drugs were legalized. They 

are diversified businesses, profiting from human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, intellectual 

property theft, and other crime. Institutions like CSIS play an important role in helping develop a 

rational, balanced approach to the international drug issue. Too often, we face a polarized 

debate—legalization at one end of the spectrum and a “war on drugs” at the other. The Obama 

Administration is committed to a third way forward. Legalization is not our policy, nor is 

locking every offender up. Our approach focuses on the public health challenge of drug 

consumption and science of addiction and tackling the international security challenge posed 

by transnational criminal organizations. There are no simple answers to the global drug issue. It is 

complex and threatens the health and security of people everywhere, regardless of citizenship. I’m 

grateful for the opportunity to provide some insight into the global policy landscape and this 

Administration’s approach. Thank you. 

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Answers to: Cartels Backlash Against Enforcement 

[ ] 

[ ] The War on Drugs is key – it’s the only approach that punishes crime, which creates a 

disincentive to participate in cartels. 

Rios, fellow in inequality and criminal justice at Harvard’s school of government, 2013 

(Viridiana, “How to win the Mexican drug war,” Huffington Post, April 12, Online: 

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-12/opinions/38492205_1_cartels-drug-violencetrafficking) 

Because trafficking is a business and fighting is a business strategy, drug cartels choose to fight 

whenever war brings more benefits than costs. And the cost that governments can more 

efficiently impose on a criminal entrepreneur is prison. Cartels have chosen to fight in certain 

areas of Mexico because it makes business sense. South of the U.S. border, only 6 percent of all 

homicides produce a trial and judgment. As such, killing trafficking enemies to take over their 

territory, and potentially increase illegal earnings, is profitable. In short, war pays in Mexico. So the 

right way to fight a drug war in Mexico is not to aim at eliminating criminal organizations, as 

many have assumed, but rather to create conditions in which war does not pay. This will not be 

achieved with the strategy Washington has embraced. Even if all criminal organizations were 

eliminated, new ones would emerge as long as profits could be made from cocaine. A war against 

drug organizations is an endless war. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto plans to hold a national 

forum Tuesday with academics, laypeople and others to discuss how the country can best achieve 

peace. Now is the time for Mexico to choose the right direction. Mexico must craft a system of 

incentives, using arrests, sentencing and imprisonment, so that criminal organizations cannot 

find it profitable to kill. Rather than help Mexico fight an unwinnable war against criminal 

organizations, the United States must help its neighbor battle impunity. Ours must be a war to 

make sure those who kill face consequences; a war to improve Mexico’s justice system, because 

only 31 percent of the population believes it would be punished after committing a crime; a war 

against the sort of outbreaks where, in one day, more than 130 prisoners escape a jail near the Texas 

border. The goal must be to make violent crime a risky endeavor, rather than a discretionary 

choice made by criminal businessmen. A war against impunity can be won. A war against drugs 

cannot. 

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Answers to: Prohibition Fails 

[ ] 

[ ] Prohibition is a necessary first step - plan cannot succeed without first having security 

from violence. 

Felbab-Brown, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, 2011 

(Vanda, Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of 

Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies, September 2011) 

Counterinsurgency or anti-organized crime policies that focus on directly defeating the 

belligerents and protecting the population tend to be more effective than policies that seek to 

do so indirectly by suppressing illicit economies as a way to defeat belligerents. Efforts to limit the 

belligerents‟ resources are better served by a focus on mechanisms that do not harm the wider 

population directly, even though such discriminate efforts are difficult to undertake effectively because 

of their resource intensiveness. In sum, counternarcotics policies have to be weighed very carefully, 

with a clear eye as to their impact on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Seemingly quick fixes, 

such as blanket eradication in the absence of alternative livelihoods, will only strengthen the 

insurgency and compromise state-building, and ultimately the counternarcotics efforts themselves. 

Effectiveness in suppressing illicit economies is critically predicated on security. Without 

constant and intensive State presence and security, neither the suppression of illicit economies 

nor alternative livelihoods programs have been effective. 

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Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage

Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage 



Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage - Table of Contents 

Summary ......................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary .......................................................................................................................... 4 

Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage 1NC ................................................................................... 5-6 

Answers to Affirmative Arguments 

Answers to: Cuts to AIDS Prevention Now ...................................................................... 7 

Answers to: US Sends Aid to Mexico Now ...................................................................... 8 

Answers to: Private Donors Fund Programs ................................................................... 9 

2NC Link Extensions 

Link Extension – Aid Budget Set for 2014 ..................................................................... 10 

Link Extension – USAID Budget is Tight ....................................................................... 11 

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Summary 



The Aid Tradeoff DA argues that the United States has set its foreign aid budget for the 

year and that in order to fund its AIDS prevention initiative, “PEPFAR,” it reduced its aid 

to Mexico. If aid to Mexico was increased to fund rural farmers it would take away 

funding from its AIDs prevention initiative. If these programs collapsed, prevention 

programs, like the ones producing would fail and we would see an increase in the 

prevalence of AIDS, which kills millions worldwide, including thousands upon thousands 

of Mexican citizens. 

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Glossary 



HIV/AIDS – a disease that inhibits the ability of the human body to defend itself against 

infection. It has become more prevalent over the past decade, and the US devotes a 

substantial amount of foreign aid to fighting its spread. 

PEPFAR – the name of President Obama’s program designed to reduce the rates of 

HIV/AIDS infection and mortality. 

Food prices – refers to the average cost of food in a country. Food prices can go up or 

down depending on the cost of food production, shipping, or scarcity due to natural 

disasters. 

Remittance – refers to the money that immigrants send back to their home country. 

4 | P a g e




Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage 1NC (1/2) 

A. Uniqueness and Link: Budget cuts have slashed aid to Mexico and farming 

programs – the plan would be funded through a trade off with research for an 

AIDS cure. 

Dr. Shah, Administrator of the US Agency for International Development, 2012 

(Rajiv, “Testimony By USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah Before The Senate 

Committee On Foreign Relations On The Fy 2013 Budget Request,” March 6, Online: 

http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/testimony-usaidadministrator-dr-rajiv-shah-senate) 

While foreign assistance represents less than one percent of our budget, we are 

committed to improving our efficiency and maximizing the value of every dollar. 

American households around the country are tightening their belts and making 

difficult tradeoffs. So must we. Even as we face new challenges around the world, 

our budget represents a slight reduction from fiscal year 2012. We've prioritized, 

focused and concentrated our investments across every portfolio. In global health, 

we propose to close out programs in Peru and Mexico as those countries take 

greater responsibility for the care of their own people. We've eliminated Feed the 

Future programs in Kosovo, Serbia and Ukraine and reduced support to Europe, 

Eurasia, and Central Asia by $113 million to reflect shifting global priorities and 

progress over time by some countries toward market-based democracy. And 

we're keeping our staffing and overall administrative costs at current levels, even in the 

midst of a major reform effort. It is through that effort that I spoke about last year-USAID 

Forward-that we've been able to deliver more effective and efficient results with our 

current staffing profile and operating budget. Our budget prioritizes our USAID 

Forward suite of reforms. That funding allows us to invest in innovative scientific 

research and new technologies. Last year, our support of the AIDS vaccine 

research through PEPFAR led to the isolation of 17 novel antibodies that may hold 

the key to fighting the pandemic. And we're working with local scientists at the 

Kenyan Agricultural Research Institutes to develop new drought-resistant seed varieties 

of sorghum, millet and beans, as well as a vitamin-A rich orange-fleshed sweet potato. 

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Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage 1NC (2/2) 

B. Impact: Current foreign aid funding allocation is key to the implementation of a 

widespread AIDS cure that would save millions of lives. 

Dr. Shah, Administrator of the US Agency for International Development, 2012 

(Rajiv, “TESTIMONY BY USAID ADMINISTRATOR DR. RAJIV SHAH BEFORE THE 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE FY 2013 BUDGET 

REQUEST,” March 6, Online: http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressionaltestimony/testimony-usaid-administrator-dr-rajiv-shah-senate) 

Thanks in large part to the bipartisan support we've had for investments in global health, 

we're on track to provide life-saving assistance to more people than ever before. 

Although this year's request of $7.9 billion for the Global Health Initiative is lower than 

FY 2012 levels, falling costs, increased investments by partner governments, and 

efficiencies we've generated by integrating efforts and strengthening health systems will 

empower us to reach even more people. That includes PEPFAR, which will provide 

life-saving drugs to those around the world afflicted with HIV and expand 

prevention efforts in those countries where the pandemic continues to grow. We can 

expand access to treatment and lift a death sentence for six million people in total 

without additional funds. We're also increasingly providing treatment for pregnant 

mothers with HIV/AIDS so we can ensure their children are born healthy. And 

because of breakthrough research released last year, we know that putting people on 

treatment actually helps prevention efforts-treatment is prevention. All of these efforts 

are accelerating progress towards President Obama's call for an AIDS-free 

generation. Our request also includes $619 million for the President's Malaria Initiative, 

an effective way to fight child mortality. In country after country, we've shown that if we 

can increase the use of cheap bed nets and anti-malarial treatments, we can cut child 

death-from any cause, not just malaria-by as much as 30 percent. In Ethiopia, the drop 

in child mortality has been 50 percent. Last year, we commissioned an external, 

independent evaluation of the Presidential Malaria Initiative's performances. That report 

praised the Initiative's effective leadership for providing "excellent and creative program 

management." And we will continue to fund critical efforts in maternal and child 

health, voluntary family planning, nutrition, tuberculosis and neglected tropical diseasescost-effective 

interventions that mean the difference between life and death. 

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[ ] 

Answers to: Cuts to AIDS Prevention Now 



[ ] AIDS prevention funding has increased to other organizations under the 

2014 budget – programs are still functional, but on the brink. 

Aziz, policy research coordinator at the Center for Global Health Policy, 2013 

(Rabita, “Obama 2014 budget: continued support for Global Fund, paired with PEPFAR 

cut leave Blueprint goals in question,” Center for Global Health Policy, April 10, Online: 

http://sciencespeaksblog.org/2013/04/10/cut-to-pepfar-support-for-global-fund-inobama-2014-budget-leave-blueprint-goals-in-question/) 

“We applaud maintaining funding for critical Global Fund programs as an important 

step. But reaching the President’s promise of an AIDS Free Generation means 

implementing his analysis that spending now will save billions in the long run by halting 

new infections, and this budget does not do that,” said Matthew Kavanagh, Senior 

Policy Analyst for Health GAP. “To reach the tipping point in the epidemic we need 

to expand programs in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and 

many other countries, but now PEPFAR will not have the funds to do so.” The 

budget also requests $2.6 billion for USAID global health programs, which includes 

$330 million for HIV/AIDS programs, a drop from the $350 million enacted in FY 12. 

According to the Kaiser Family Foundation tuberculosis programs under USAID will 

receive $191 million, a massive cut from FY 12 levels and amounts already diminished 

by recent sequestration cuts. Global health programs under the Department of 

Health and Human Services budget request will receive $393 million, of which 

$132 million will be available for global HIV/AIDS through September, 2015. This is 

a significant increase from the $348 million received under the FY 2012 budget, 

and the $350 received under the FY 2013 CR. Allaying concerns voiced by research 

advocates at Monday’s rally in Washington D.C., the President’s proposal includes a 

boost of $472 million for the National Institutes of Health over the FY 12 request. 

The institutes’ Office of AIDS Research gets $312 million of that, a boost of $46.0 

million. 

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[ ] 

Answers to: US Sends Aid to Mexico Now 



[ ] USAID has substantially cut aid to Mexico to focus on capacity building – 

and existing aid is funded by the military. 

State Department, 2013 

(Transcript of budget briefing, “Senior State Department and USAID Officials on 

President’s FY2014 Budget Proposal,” State Department’s Bureau of International 

Information Programs, April 10, Online: 

http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/04/20130410145570.html#axzz 

2ZIppqda2) 

QUESTION: Thank you for being so forthcoming. I didn’t expect an answer at all. 

(Laughter.) I expected the usual answer, which is not what I got, so that’s good. Just on 

the Latin American drug initiative, Merida and Plan Colombia, and their legacies -- 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah. QUESTION: -- is there any – 

are those still left SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: They are. But 

they – the programs in Mexico and Colombia are on sort of a downward glide path, 

because – for two reasons. One, the assistance to those countries in the past 

have been very, very high, and they were driven largely by big military equipment, 

which are very sort of expensive. Now we’re sort of normalizing those programs to 

be much more in a capacity training types of programs. So you’re going to see – 

there are decreases in our budget compared to 2012 with Mexico and Colombia, 

but we’re also – but we’re increasing our accounted drug efforts in the Caribbean, 

where things seem to be moving in terms of drug trafficking and crime. So 

programs like our regional Central America security initiative go up. QUESTION: Do 

you have a breakdown of how much they’re – they will be decreasing next (inaudible) 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yes. Let me just get my notes here. 

Hang on one second. Yeah. It’s right here. Yeah. Mexico, we’re providing $205 

million, which is about $124 million decrease from 2012. And Colombia, we’re 

providing $323 million, which is a $61 million decrease. 

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[ ] 

Answers to: Private Donors Fund Programs 



[ ] Private groups can’t replace federal funding – they aren’t prepared for 

disaster response. 

Vorozhko, staff writer for Voice of America news, 2013 

(Tatiana, “Budget Cuts hit US Foreign Aid Programs,” Voice of America, April 3, Online: 

http://www.voanews.com/content/budget-cuts-hit-us-foreign-aidprograms/1633892.html) 

Still, these efforts can not close the entire gap in aid provided by the US 

government -- especially in the area of health and disaster assistance. "The 

private sector is not going step in and provide the medical care, the food, the 

water that is required when you have humanitarian crisis," noted Ingram. 

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Link Extension – Aid Budget Set for 2014 



[ ] USAID’s budget is set for 2014 – they can’t afford new programs, any new 

spending will have to trade off with existing priorities. 

Morales, staff writer at Devex – an international aid think tank, 2013 

(John, “USAID chief defends budget in Congress,” devex, April 25, Online: 

https://www.devex.com/en/news/usaid-chief-defends-budget-in-congress/80790) 

Why will 45 percent of food aid budget be spent to buy locally-produced food in crisis 

areas Will cuts in HIV/AIDS funding erode progress in the fight against the desease 

Why is the U.S. reducing its aid budget for Latin America and Caribbean How far 

the USAID Forward reform truly moving forward These were a few of the hardline 

questions American lawmakers posed to USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah faced 

Congress on Wednesday to defend President Barack Obama’s budget proposal for 

the agency in fiscal 2014. Appearing before the House appropriations and Senate 

foreign relations committees, Shah churned out hard data and narrated anecdotes to 

defend the proposed 6 percent cut in the United States foreign aid budget for next year. 

“The FY 2014 request for USAID managed or partially managed accounts is $20.4 

billion, six percent below the total enacted funding for FY 2012,” Shah said at one 

point. “In this tough budget environment, USAID is committed to maximizing the 

value of every dollar. We have made tough choices so that we are working where 

we will have greatest impact, and shifting personnel and funding resources 

towards programs that will achieve the most meaningful results.” 

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Link Extension – USAID Budget is Tight 



[ ] The USAID budget is tight – there’s no room for new programs, the plan 

WILL trade off with existing projects. 

Dr. Shah, Administrator of the US Agency for International Development, 2013 

(Rajiv, “USAID Forward PROGRESS REPORT 2013,” 

Online:http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/2013-usaid-forwardreport.pdf) 

Like any robust reform process, we face significant challenges across a 

spectrum of efforts. Designing country strategies was more time and labor 

intensive than originally anticipated, particularly because a large number of 

partners were engaged in the process to determine tough trade-offs. In the year 

ahead, we will continue to prioritize the development of country strategies and 

enable better coordination with our partners to reconcile competing priorities and 

focus on areas where we each have a comparative advantage. Our effort to focus 

our assistance programs has been successful for the past two years either because 

we successfully exited from sustainable projects or because our programming was too 

minimal to have a true impact. As we look ahead, we must continue to make tough 

choices and use each country’s strategy as the backbone for decision-making 

to ensure the greatest development impact. 

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Answers

Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage Affirmative 

Aid Disadvantage Affirmative-Table of Contents 



Glossary .......................................................................................................................... 2 


Non Unique: AIDs Program Will Be Cut .......................................................................... 3 

Non Unique: Cuts to AIDS Prevention Now ................................................................. 4-5 

Link Answers 

No Link: Private Donors Fund Disease Programs ........................................................... 6 

No Link: Private Donors Fund Democracy Programs ...................................................... 7 

Impact Answers 

No Impact: Spread of AIDs Declining. .......................................................................... 8-9 

No Impact: AIDs Related Deaths Are Declining ............................................................ 10 

1


Glossary 



HIV/AIDS – a disease that inhibits the ability of the human body to defend itself against 

infection. It has become more prevalent over the past decade, and the US devotes a 

substantial amount of foreign aid to fighting its spread. 

PEPFAR – the name of President Obama’s program designed to reduce the rates of 

HIV/AIDS infection and mortality. 

Food prices – refers to the average cost of food in a country. Food prices can go up or 

down depending on the cost of food production, shipping, or scarcity due to natural 

disasters. 


2


Non Unique: AIDs Program Will Be Cut 



[ ] President Bush’s HIV prevention program is scheduled to expire at end of 

the year 

Wadman, 2013. [ Meredith Wadman, writer for Nature.com’s News Blog, “Report 

recommends devolution for US global AIDS relief programme”, February 20 th , 2013, 

http://blogs.nature.com.proxy.brynmawr.edu/news/2013/02/report-recommendsdevolution-for-us-global-aids-relief-programme.html.] 

The huge, ten-year-old US programme that provides HIV treatment and prevention 

in dozens of developing countries needs to begin shifting to host-country 

ownership of the programme, according to an advisory report released today. 

The 700-page report, from the US Institute of Medicine, also says that the 

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which spent more than 

$38 billion between 2004 and 2011, needs to increase its emphasis on HIV 

prevention, particularly through sexual transmission. “There really needs to be an 

emphasis on looking at the prevention portfolio, on sexual transmission,” says Ann 

Kurth, a member of the authoring committee who is executive director of the New York 

University College of Nursing-Global. Jen Kates, a committee member who is the 

director of HIV Policy at the Kaiser Family Foundation, a health policy-focused nonprofit 

in Washington DC, adds, “The critical issue for the future is how to sustain what’s 

been done.” Transferring ownership of PEPFAR programmes, which were launched in 

2003 under US President George W. Bush as an emergency response to a global 

epidemic, will not be simple, given the diverse constituent countries and their range of 

health infrastructures and capabilities. “The authors are stuck not knowing what to 

suggest in terms of transitioning from US funded and run programmes to local 

ones,” said Roger Bate, a health economist who specializes in malaria and HIV/AIDS at 

the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington DC think tank. He adds that 

Republicans in Congress are less likely to support funding health systems — where 

progress is difficult to measure — than the handing out of drugs and condoms. The 

2008 law that last authorized PEPFAR expires at the end of the 2013 fiscal year. It 

required the IOM assessment released today. Congressionally-authorized 

programmes can, and often do, continue to operate in the absence of authorizing 

legislation if Congress is willing to fund them in its annual spending laws. A related 

commentary by the authoring committee chairman, Robert Black of the Johns Hopkins 

University Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland, appears in the 

Lancet today. 

3


[ ] 

Non Unique: Cuts to AIDS Prevention Now 



[ ] Multiple disease programs hurt by cuts already 

Aziz, staff writer at Science Speaks – a medical news outlet, 2013 

(Rabita, “Congress finalizes FY 2013 budget with PEPFAR cut, Global Fund boost,” 

Science Speaks, March 26, Online: http://sciencespeaksblog.org/2013/03/26/congresscuts-pepfar-boosts-global-fund-as-fy-2013-finalized/) 

The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief took a hit while the Global Fund to 

Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria got a boost last week when the House and 

Senate passed a Continuing Resolution bill to avoid a government shutdown and 

continue funding the government through Oct. 1, the end of fiscal year 2013. The 

House voted 318-109 to approve a version of the resolution that was passed by the 

Senate earlier this month. For the first half of FY 2013, Congress had funded most 

federal programs at FY 2012 levels, with an end date of March 27. Under the 

resolution, PEPFAR is slated to receive $4.067 billion, a $176 million – 4 percent — 

cut from the FY 2012 level of $4.243 billion. An additional 5 percent cut from the 

automatic across-the-board budget cuts known as sequestration, means 

PEPFAR’s total is $3.863 billion — $380 million below FY 2012 spending and the 

lowest funding level since FY 2007. 

4


Non Unique: Cuts to AIDS Prevention Now 



[ ] 

[ ] Multiple cuts have been made – destroys AIDS and other disease 

eradication efforts 

Aziz, staff writer at Science Speaks – a medical news outlet, 2013 

(Rabita, “Congress finalizes FY 2013 budget with PEPFAR cut, Global Fund boost,” 

Science Speaks, March 26, Online: http://sciencespeaksblog.org/2013/03/26/congresscuts-pepfar-boosts-global-fund-as-fy-2013-finalized/) 

The National Institutes of Health saw an increase of $71 million over FY 2012 

funding, but will still be subject to the 5 percent sequestration cut. This will cause 

substantial spending reductions at the National Institute on Allergies and Infectious 

Diseases—home to significant investments in HIV and TB research. HIV clinical trial 

networks will take a significantly larger hit than 5 percent, with potential adverse 

impacts on both HIV and TB clinical trials. Earlier this month, amfAR, the Foundation 

for AIDS Research, outlined the human toll of global health sequestration cuts in 

this brief. According to the brief, 162,200 people will lose access to HIV/AIDS 

treatment, potentially leading to 37,000 more AIDS-related deaths, and 72,800 

more children becoming orphans. AmfAR estimates that 63,400 fewer HIV-infected 

pregnant women will receive prevention of mother-to-child transmission services, 

leading to more than 12,000 infants becoming infected with HIV. 35,300 TB 

patients will also lose treatment, leading to 4,200 more deaths from TB. 

5


[ ] 

No Link: Private Donors Fund Disease Programs 



[ ] Private donors fund AIDS prevention programs regardless of the federal 

budget. 

Vorozhko, staff writer for Voice of America news, 2013 

(Tatiana, “Budget Cuts hit US Foreign Aid Programs,” Voice of America, April 3, Online: 

http://www.voanews.com/content/budget-cuts-hit-us-foreign-aidprograms/1633892.html) 

Raj Kumar is President of Devex, an organization that researches and reports on 

international aid. He thinks that people with HIV-AIDS might suffer the most. "We are in 

a world with 30 million people living with HIV, for example. Many of them are 

dependent on US foreign assistance," he said. One bright spot in the aid picture 

is the increasing role of private philanthropies, like the Bill and Melinda Gates 

Foundation. And corporations are also becoming involved in development -- in 

communities where they do business and want people to be able to afford their 

products. 

6


[ ] 

No Link: Private Donors Fund Democracy Programs 



[ ] Private donors will fill the gap in aid that promotes regional stability. 

McInerney, Executive Director of the Project of Middle East Democracy, 2011 

(Stephen, “THE LOGIC OF THE DONOR COMMUNITY: AMERICAN DONORS,” 

POMED, May, Online: http://pomed.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/EMHRF-paper-the-logic-of-the-donor-community-Americandonors.pdf) 

Private foundations and nonprofit institutions can be a valuable complement to 

U.S. government donors, and there are some important comparative advantages 

that such private institutions may have over their governmental counterparts. It is 

also true, however, that with the economic recession that began in late 2007, the 

budget and economic climate among private foundations is also weaker than it 

may have been a year or two ago. Charitable giving, grant-making, and corporate 

support for American nonprofit groups declined in both 2008 and 2009. The Chronicle 

of Philanthropy reported in October 20103 that giving to the United States’ 400 largest 

charities fell by 11% during 2009, the worst such decrease in 20 years. Nonetheless, 

in many cases, private foundations have more flexibility and fewer bureaucratic 

hurdles than government institutions, and may be better equipped to react 

quickly to the dramatic events of the past few months. It appears that private 

donors are leery of becoming involved in uprisings that are still underway, but eager to 

provide support in response to local demand in countries like Egypt and Tunisia 

where the ruler has been overthrown. In an op-ed in February4 , Open Society 

Foundations Chairman George Soros declared that his foundations were prepared 

for “establishing resource centers for supporting the rule of law, constitutional 

reform, fighting corruption and strengthening democratic institutions in those 

countries that request help in establishing them, while staying out of those 

countries where such efforts are not welcome.” Since the revolutions in Tunisia and 

Egypt, it appears that numerous private foundations are rapidly exploring 

opportunities for providing support during the period of transition. 

7


No Impact: Spread of AIDs Declining 



[ ] Studies show that the spread of AIDs is declining. 

Newman, 2006. [Maria Newman, reporter for the New York Times, “Spread of AIDS Is 

Slowing, U.N. Report Finds”, New York Times, May 30 th , 2006, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/health/30cnd-AIDS.html_r=0]. 

The report estimated that at the end of 2005, some 38.6 million people worldwide 

were living with the H.I.V. virus, up more than 6 percent from the United Nations 

estimate of 36.2 million in 2003. "The numbers of people living with H.I.V. have 

continued to rise, due to population growth and, more recently, the life-prolonging 

effects of antiretroviral therapy," the report noted. South Africa's AIDS epidemic, 

which the report called one of the worst in the world, showed no evidence of decline. It 

estimated that in 2005, some 5.5 million people there were living with H.I.V., or 18.8 

percent of all adults. In 2004, almost one in three pregnant women who attended public 

antenatal clinics were infected with the virus, the report said, and "trends over time 

show a gradual increase in H.I.V. prevalence." The report also said that there are more 

new H.I.V. infections each year than AIDS-related deaths, and that the virus continues 

to spread in China, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa and Vietnam. It found 

that 1,800 children a day, mostly newborns, become infected with H.I.V., and that only 

20 percent of all people who need treatment have access to anti-retroviral drugs. But 

the report also held some encouraging news. H.I.V. prevalence is decreasing in 

Kenya and Zimbabwe, it noted, and in 8 of 11 countries studied in sub-Saharan 

Africa, the percentage of young people having sex before the age of 15 declined and 

condom use increased over five years. In the capital cities of 6 of the 11 African nations 

most heavily infected by H.I.V., declines of 25 percent or more were reported in the 

prevalence of the virus among 15- to 25-year-olds. "The majority of epidemics appear 

to be leveling off," the report said. 

8


No Impact: Spread of AIDS Declining 



[ ] 

[ ] The spread of AIDS has leveled out since its peak in the past. The 

affirmative’s plan will not increase the spread of AIDs 

World Health Organization, 2011. [World Health Organization; UNAIDS; 

UNICEF. Global HIV/AIDS response: epidemic update and health sector progress 

towards universal access: progress report 2011. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO; 

2011. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241502986_eng.pdf.] 

In 2010, an estimated 2.7 million [2 400 000– 2 900 000] people were newly 

infected with HIV, 15% fewer than the 3.1 million [3 000 000–3 300 000] people 

newly infected in 2001 and more than one fifth (21%) fewer than the estimated 3.4 

million [3 100 000–3 600 000] in 1997, the year when the number of people newly 

infected with HIV peaked (Fig. 2.1–2.4). Between 2001 and 2009, the incidence of 

HIV infection has declined in 33 countries, 22 of them in sub-Saharan Africa. In that 

region, which continues to have the majority of the people newly infected with HIV, an 

estimated 1.9 million [1 700 000–2 100 000] people became infected in 2010. This was 

16% fewer than the estimated 2.2 million [2 100 000 2 400 000] people newly infected 

with HIV in 2001 and 26% fewer than the annual number of people newly infected in 

1997 (when the overall HIV incidence in sub-Saharan Africa peaked). In South and 

South-East Asia, the estimated 270 000 [230 000–340 000] people newly infected 

with HIV in 2010 were 40% fewer than the 470 000 [410 000– 530 000] people 

estimated to have acquired HIV infection in 1996, when the epidemic in that 

subregion peaked. 

9


[ ] 

No Impact: AIDs related Deaths are Declining 



[ ] Less People die from AIDs now than ever before. 

World Health Organization, 2011. [World Health Organization; UNAIDS; 

UNICEF. Global HIV/AIDS response: epidemic update and health sector progress 

towards universal access: progress report 2011. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO; 

2011. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241502986_eng.pdf.] 

The annual number of people dying from AIDS-related causes worldwide is 

steadily decreasing from a peak of 2.2 million [2 100 000–2 500 000] in 2005 to an 

estimated 1.8 million [1 600 000–1 900 000] in 2010 (Fig. 2.6). AIDS-related mortality 

began to decline in 2005–2006 in sub-Saharan Africa, South and South-East Asia and 

the Caribbean and has continued subsequently. Two signal developments have caused 

this decline: first, the increased availability of antiretroviral therapy, as well as care and 

support, to people living with HIV, especially in sub-Saharan Africa; and second, fewer 

people newly infected with HIV since the late 1990s. The effects of antiretroviral therapy 

are especially evident in sub-Saharan Africa, where an estimated 460 000 (or 30%) 

fewer people died from AIDS- related causes in 2010 than in 2004, when access to 

antiretroviral therapy began to be dramatically expanded (Fig. 2.6). 

10

Remittances Disadvantage

Remittances Disadvantage 



Remittances Disadvantage - Table of Contents 

Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary ......................................................................................................................................... 4 

Remittance Disad 1NC ............................................................................................................. 5-7 

Uniqueness 

Answers To: Remittances Falling Now ..................................................................................... 8 

Answers To: Immigration Rates Declining ............................................................................... 9 

Link 

Link---Farmers ............................................................................................................................ 10 

Link---Farmers ............................................................................................................................ 11 

Answers To: Plan Wouldn’t Stop All Migration ...................................................................... 12 

Answers To: Immigration Not Key The Remittances ....................................................... 13-14 

Impacts 

Answers To: Remittances Cause Dutch Disease ........................................................... 15-16 

Answers To: Remittances Cause Moral Hazard ................................................................... 17 

Answers To: Remittances Cause Labor Shortages ............................................................ 18 

Answers To: Remittances Cause Human Trafficking ...................................................... 19-20 

Answers To: The Affirmative Helps The Mexican Farmers ........................................... 21-22 

Remittances Good- Mexican Economic Growth- Extension ............................................... 23 

Remittances Good- Poverty ................................................................................................ 24-25 

Remittances Good- US Mexico Relations ........................................................................ 26-27 

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Summary 

The Remittances Disadvantage argues that although currently there is a large flow of 

remittances, i.e., money sent back home by Mexican immigrants in the United States to 

Mexico, that the Affirmative’s plan, in reducing immigration and thus the remittances 

that these immigrants would have sent home, will destroy the Mexican economy and 

lead to increased drug-related crime, as well as hurt US security. 

Although some regions depend on remittances more than others it is true that 

remittances are now Mexico’s second highest source of income. With 1% of Mexican’s 

surviving on remittances alone and with millions more using it as a way to invest in a 

more stable future through education and small-business investment, it is hard to 

discount its impact on Mexican life. Further, the future potential of Mexican’s using 

remittances to imagine an economic reality for themselves that is not controlled by a 

corrupt government or greedy multinational companies should not be discounted. 

Investing in the plan, although it would make life appear to be more bearable in Mexico, 

will not solve the larger economic issues in Mexico - Mexican’s can earn a day’s wage 

in one hour of work in the US. Plans that prevent immigration to the US, however well 

intentioned, will not only lack the ability to solve poverty better than the status quo but in 

actually push more people into poverty and/or to the drug trade and other illegal job 

opportunities, increasing drug-related violence and the power of drug trafficking 

organizations. These drug trafficking organizations because of their ability to transport 

illegal materials and undocumented people across the border pose one of the greatest 

security risks to the United States. For the right price, what or who might these 

organizations, who are actively being attacked by combined Mexican and US drug 

enforcement programs, allowed to pass over our border The potential size of this 

impact could be enormous and cannot be ignored; think 9/11 or bigger. 

3 | P a g e




Glossary 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the value of all legal goods and services created by 

a country within a year. 

NAFTA – A trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States that is 

controversial for eliminating taxes on corn from the US in Mexico. The eliminating of a 

tax on imported corn (aka a tariff), made corn, which is made cheap through 

government support in the US, even cheaper than Mexican corn, destroying the ability 

of small, Mexican farmers to make a living. 


Standards of Living – this term refers to how comfortably a population is perceived as 

living. For instance if people in country X have access to fresh food and water, 

affordable housing, and quality health care and education then many people would say 

that people in country X have a high standard of living. On the other hand, if people in 

country Y were eating but, access to quality food was unstable and very few people had 

access to an education beyond the 8 th grade many would consider this a lower standard 

of living. As this term only refers to material wealth it is often considered a subjective 

term, open to a variety of interpretations. 

World Bank – an international organization that gives loans to country’s with the goal of 

reducing poverty. 

4 | P a g e




Remittances Disad 1NC(1/3) 

A. Uniqueness and Link. Slow economic growth and poverty provide 

incentives for immigration to the US, the remittances that follow are critical 

to Mexico’s economy 

Villagran, Smart Planet Correspondent Mexico City, 2013 

(Lauren , February 27, 2013, “Slow U.S. growth, zero immigration hurt remittances to 

Mexico”, www.smartplanet.com/blog/global-observer/slow-us-growth-zero-immigrationhurt-remittances-to-mexico/9904) 

While the number of families heavily dependent on remittances comprise only 

about 1 percent of the Mexican population, some regional economies do depend 

disproportionately on income from remesas. (These tend to be states such as 

Michoacan, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and others that send the highest number of immigrants 

north.) A drop in the cash sent home can seriously injure a state’s economy. 

Although Mexico’s economy recovered from the recent recession far more rapidly 

than that of its northern neighbor, the country’s economies are inextricably tied, 

and sluggish growth in the U.S. inevitably holds Mexico back. As the U.S. 

economy improves, so should remittances –- eventually. BBVA Bancomer expects 

remittances in 2013 to remain flat. The wild card in the equation may be U.S. 

immigration reform. Will lawmakers give educated immigrants –– especially 

professionals in math and science fields –– preference in obtaining a green card, as has 

been proposed What will become of the low-wage workers in agriculture and the 

service industry, many of whom send cash home to Mexico Importantly, will 

undocumented immigrants be given the same rights as others, to bring their families to 

the U.S. “People send remittances here because there are still links,” said Antonio de 

la Cuesta, director of political analysis with CIDAC, a Mexico City-based think tank. 

If Mexican immigrants bring their families to the U.S., they won’t have a reason to send 

remittances. But any assumption that immigration has permanently slowed would be 

premature, said De la Cuesta. The conditions that pressure Mexicans to migrate north 

haven’t disappeared in Mexico. While Mexico’s economy is providing greater 

opportunity for people here than in the past, economic hardship is still 

widespread. Mexico’s social development agency said some 13 million Mexicans 

were living in extreme poverty at last count. Roughly half the population lives 

below the poverty line, according to the United Nations. And wages are stagnant. 

While that has attracted foreign investment, particularly in manufacturing, many 

Mexicans know that what they earn in a day here amounts to an hour’s wage 

north of the border. “There are still incentives to migrate,” said De la Cuesta. 

“The situation in Mexico remains difficult.” 

5 | P a g e




Remittance Disad 1NC(2/3) 

B. Internal Link- Remittance levels are tied to immigration rates, a decrease in 

immigration would limit the amount of money sent back to Mexico. 

Mandelman, Research economist and assistant policy adviser at the Atlanta 

Federal Reserve, 2008 

(Frederico, “Remittances Ebb and Flow with the Immigration Tide”, Econ South. Vol 10, 

No. 3, Third Quarter, 

http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/econsouth/econsouth_vol_10_no_3_remittances_ebb_an 

d_flow_withimmigration_tide.cfm ) 

Latin America has some of the highest levels of remittances, both in aggregate and per 

capita, according to the World Bank report. Mexico, for example, received $25 billion, 

or approximately 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), in remittances 

during 2007. These financial flows are particularly large in Central America and the 

Caribbean. In 2007, remittances made up 25.6 percent of total gross domestic product 

in Honduras, 24.3 percent in Guyana, and 21.6 percent in Haiti.These high levels of 

remittances to Latin America are clearly related to the rate of immigration from 

the region. The World Bank's 2007 report, titled Close to Home: The Development 

Impact of Remittances in Latin America, estimates that Latin American migrants 

(both documented and undocumented) in the United States increased from 8.6 

million in 1990 to about 16 million in 2000, nearly 10 million of whom were 

Mexican. About one-third of El Salvador's natives live abroad, mostly in the United 

States, and almost 50 percent of Grenada's population has migrated to a foreign 

country. 

C. Impact - A decline in remittances would destroy growth and development in 

Mexico. 

Lizarzaburu, contributor BBC Spanish American service, 2004 

(Javier, "Mexican migrants' growing influence" BBC 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3582881.stm 

Despite the relative stagnation of the US economy, this flow of money keeps growing, 

according to recent data. In 2003 it increased by 35% - the total amount sent that year 

to Mexico was more than $13bn. Remittances from Mexicans in the US have 

become one of Mexico's most important sources of income - second only to oil and 

surpassing the traditional tourism industry. According to Roberto Suro, director of 

the Pew Hispanic Center in Washington "remittances have probably benefited 

Mexico more than NAFTA" (the North American Free Trade Agreement between 

Canada, the US and Mexico).The flow of money from the US to Latin America largely 

exceeds the money from foreign aid that the region receives. For many, 

remittances have become a form of foreign aid that helps the families back home 

to alleviate poverty, spur investment and achieve higher standards of living. 

6 | P a g e




Remittance Disad 1NC(3/3) 

A Mexican economic collapse would create a failed state run by drug gangs 

turning the case and threatening the security of the United States. 

Roberts and Walser, Research Fellow and Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America 

at The Heritage Foundation, 2009. 

(James A, and Ray “Growing Instability in Mexico Threatens U.S. Economy and Border 

Security” Feb 12 09 www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/02/growing-instability-inmexico-threatens-us-economy-and-border-security) 

In addition to the drug violence and corruption, Mexico is also suffering from 

economic turbulence. For instance, remittances sent home by Mexican emigrants in 

the U.S., which are "Mexico's second-largest source of foreign income after oil, 

[sank] 3.6 percent to $25 billion in 2008 compared to $26 billion for the previous year 

… and central bank official Jesus Cervantes said the decline will likely continue this 

year."[5] Furthermore, Mexico's large and important automotive sector has been 

slammed by the same economic woes facing Detroit.[6] Mexico's economy is now 

forecast to shrink by as much as 1.8 percent in 2009.[7] And the peso has weakened 32 

percent against the dollar over the past six months-the second-worst performance 

among the world's major currencies after Brazil's real-on concern the economy will sink 

into recession as demand in the U.S. falters for Mexican exports.[8] Consequently, the 

Central Bank has been forced to intervene in an "extraordinary" way to prop up 

the peso.[9] Adding to the economic gloom, Mexican government revenues (more 

than one-third of which come from PEMEX, the state-owned monopoly oil company[10]) 

are declining steadily. This revenue drop is the result of lower oil prices and declining 

output due to longstanding PEMEX mismanagement and inefficiency. Major political 

and economic reforms are needed now,[11] yet recent economic turmoil has made 

the political price of such reforms considerably higher. All of these developments 

are severely impacting the price Mexican businesses and governments must pay to 

borrow money. Unfortunately, current ratings of Mexican debt and the attendant risk 

premiums probably do not fully reflect Mexico's dire straits. Potential foreign investors 

should beware. A Vital American interest Mexico's ongoing political stability and 

economic health are critical to the prosperity and national security of the United 

States. The Obama Administration must make confronting the many challenges 

facing our southern neighbor both a foreign and a domestic policy priority. In 

order to realize this vital American interest, the current Administration should do the 

following: 

7 | P a g e




Answers to: Remittances Falling now 

[ ] Remittances will increase now. 

Harrup, writer at the Wall Street Journal, 2013 

(Anthony,.“UPDATE: Mexico's February Remittances Down 11% on Year” April 1,. Wall 

Street Journal , http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130401-706541.html) VP 

MEXICO CITY--Mexicans living abroad transferred home $1.59 billion in February, 11% 

less than in the same month a year earlier, the Bank of Mexico reported Monday. It was 

the eighth consecutive month of declines in remittances, which are a significant source 

of foreign-currency inflows, ahead of tourism and occasionally exceeding foreign direct 

investment. February's remittances brought the total for the first two months of the year 

to $3.06 billion, a decline of 7.1% from the first two months of 2012. Continued 

weakness in employment among Mexican migrant workers in the U.S. and peso gains 

against the U.S. dollar are among likely causes of the decline in remittances, which had 

reached a record $26.1 billion in 2007. A stronger peso tends to discourage Mexicans 

from sending money home, as the recipients receive fewer pesos for each dollar, 

although the peso was little changed against the dollar in February, averaging 

MXN12.72 compared with MXN12.79 a year earlier and MXN12.69 in January of this 

year.Banorte-Ixe said in a report that the leap year in 2012, when February had 29 

days instead of 28, was the principal cause of the double-digit drop in remittances 

in February of this year. The bank said recent data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 

Statistics suggest a rise in the number of Mexican migrant workers in the U.S., 

after a decline in the second half of 2012, and that coupled with improvement in 

the U.S. labor market, it expects remittances to start rising in May. "Although 

remittances will continue slowing substantially in the first quarter, we consider 

that flows will recover significantly in the second half of the year," Banorte-Ixe 

said, adding that migrant workers who aren't U.S. citizens tend to send more 

money back than those who have U.S. citizenship 

[ ] Remittances are stable now. 

KITROEFF, writer at New York Times, 2013 

(NATALIE, “Immigrants Pay Lower Fees to Send Money Home, Helping to Ease 

Poverty”, www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/us/politics/immigrants-find-it-cheaper-to-sendmoney-home.htmlpagewanted=all&_r=0) 

The lower costs may be one reason that remittances have held steady even as 

fewer immigrants from Mexico have come to the United States and the recession 

has cut into incomes. Overall remittances to Mexico declined during the global 

recession but picked up again after 2009. 

8 | P a g e




Answers to: Immigration Rates Declining 

[ ] 

[ ] This argument doesn’t assume the rising flow of immigrants fleeing drug 

violence in Mexico over the past year. 

Darby, FBI agent and columnist, 2013 

(Brandon, “Immigration Discussion Remiss to Ignore Cartel Violence,” Breitbart, April 

27, Online: http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/04/27/Immigration-Discussion- 

Remiss-to-Ignore-Cartel-Violence) 

Another significant concern in relation to illegal immigration began to become 

visible around 2006: Mexican drug cartels. Since that time, thousands have been 

killed as cartels battle each other, along with any public official or private citizen who 

attempted to interfere with their operation or territorial control. Entire police forces 

have either been disbanded for helping the cartels or have fled for the lives of 

themselves and their families after refusing to be corrupted. Some of the cartels, 

most notably the Los Zetas, have crossed the line from being a criminal enterprise into 

being an armed insurgency, having more power and control in many regions than 

the Mexican government. In one instance, the Los Zetas forcibly entered the town 

of Ciudad Mier and caused thousands to flee for their lives. Many of the town's 

8,000 civilians were driven away from their homes and communities. Many of them 

found their way across the border and into Texas. They could arguably be 

catalogued as war refugees or asylees. The Mexican government’s refusal to admit a 

state of civil war exists in their own territory complicates any effort to properly aid these 

victims and properly classify them. The US government, as of yet, has not made an 

honest assessment of the incompetent neighboring government. Instead, these victims 

simply become classified as illegal aliens. There has been an increase in Mexican 

citizens requesting political asylum in the United States, according to Fox News 

Latino. Though the numbers are currently relatively small in comparison with such 

requests from citizens fleeing nations like China, they are growing. The Miami Herald 

reports that three times the number of Mexican citizens won political asylum in the 

US in 2012 than from six years earlier, reaching a 2012 total of 130. The Herald also 

references a 2012 US Department of Justice report revealing 9,206 Mexican citizens 

applied for political asylum in the US. 

9 | P a g e




Link---Farmers 

[ ] Many of the migrants sending remittances are farmers from rural areas 

Hossain, UCSD Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, 

2005 

(Angel , “Recent Developments in Labor Migration and Remittances to Mexico”, The 

Journal of International Policy Solutions, irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5380.pdf) 

There are several profiles of migrants who make the decision to improve their lot in life 

by crossing the border into the United States. The typical immigrant is a young, 

unmarried man from a rural area of Mexico; often with a connection for a job 

opportunity in the United States. Recently, more women have migrated with the 

intention of either providing for their families via remittances, or someday 

reunifying their families in the United States. Regardless of the migrant’s social status, 

Mexican nationals residing in the United States remain tied to their home villages and 

cities. These ties are responsible for the multi-million dollar remittance market 

that US commercial banks and money-transfer institutions are eagerly trying to 

infiltrate. Interestingly, there is a culture to the Mexican border towns that encourages 

immigration to the United States; whether it is teenagers sneaking across for fun, or 

"commuters" legally crossing each day for work or shopping.5 Many Mexican 

agricultural workers who are now legal US residents reside for some part of the 

year in Mexico and another part in the United States. Their cyclical pattern of 

migration increases the social contacts of young men in Mexican villages and makes it 

easier and cheaper for their friends and relatives to cross the border with them.6 It is 

likely this pattern of migration will continue to increase as older immigrants 

become established in ethnic enclaves and facilitate the entrance of newer 

immigrants. 

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Link---Farmers 

[ ] Rural farmers are a major source of remittances to Mexico. 

Hossain, UCSD Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, 

2005 

(Angel , “Recent Developments in Labor Migration and Remittances to Mexico”, The 

Journal of International Policy Solutions, irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5380.pdf) 

III. Effect of Remittances to the United States and Mexico 

a. Contribution to Rural Economies 

Remittances represent the largest economic impact of migration on receiving 

areas of rural Mexico. Remittances can empower new groups, such as women 

or the landless, and they can provide a way for migrants to fulfill social and 

financial obligations to their families and households. 14 Although it is nearly 

impossible to calculate the exact amount of annual remittances since it often 

flows through undocumented channels, there is no dearth of economic 

models designed to estimate the impact of remittances to rural economies. A 

fundamental assumption in interpreting the effect of remittances to rural parts of 

Mexico, revolves around the migrant’s household. Family members who remain 

behind may reorganize their consumption and production activities in response to the 

migrant’s 14 Taylor, 3 10departure; or in anticipation of receiving the migrant’s 

remittances. There is an optimistic potential for the effect of remittances to 

reduce poverty in rural areas. Assuming the decision to migrate originates in a 

poor household, remittances may reduce poverty in migrant-sending areas by 

raising the incomes of the household or by facilitating production of goods and 

services in the community where the household participates.15 By adopting the 

household model for sending village communities, a predictable increase of 

economic growth occurs, linking economic growth of the household to the growth of 

the surrounding community. In a study of a typical Mexican migrant-sending village, 

estimated "remittance multipliers" from migration were found to be equal to 1.78. 

16 That is $1.00 of a migrant’s remittances generated $1.78 in additional village 

income, (an additional 78 cents on top of each dollar remitted). 17 The 

additional income was created by expenditures from remittance-receiving households, 

which 11generated demand for locally produced goods and services, contributing to 

the income of others in the village. 

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Answers to: Plan Wouldn’t Stop All Migration 

[ ] 

[ ] Mexican poverty is a major incentive for unauthorized immigration to the 

US. Increasing growth would drastically reduce immigration. 


(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, 

Briefing Paper, Number 11, http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf) 

U.S. spending on immigration enforcement increased from $1 billion to $15 billion 

between 1990 and 2009. During thistime the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population 

increased from 3 million to almost 12 million. 4 Experts recognize that given the pull of 

higher wages in the United States, it would take unrealistic amounts of personnel and 

funding– not to mention the use of lethal force–to stop unauthorized immigration 

through Mexico. The enforcement-only approach to migration is ineffective 

because it ignores some of the principal causes of unauthorized migration to the 

United States: poverty and inequality in Latin America, particularly in Mexico. 6 

Although every migrant has his or her own story, most of those stories include the 

inability to find work or earn enough money in their homeland. In a 2010 case study of 

an immigrant-sending community in Mexico, 61 percent of male migrants 

reported that economic opportunities–higher wages and more jobs–were the 

primary motivating factor for migration to the United States. 7 As the 2009 United 

Nations Human Development Report stated, migration “largely reflects people’s need to 

improve their livelihoods.” 8 In order to address immigration pressures directly, the 

United States must consider a more balanced development agenda toward 

Mexico and other migrant-sending countries in Latin America. This includes elevating 

the importance of poverty reduction and job-creation projects targeted to 

migrant-sending communities—particularly in rural Mexico, where poverty and 

migration are concentrated. Building sustainable livelihoods in migrant-sending 

communities not only has the potential to reduce a major cause of immigration to 

the United States but could also contribute to the fight against violence and lawlessness 

in Mexico. While the reasons for the violence are complex, poverty and a lack of 

economic opportunity for Mexican youth certainly facilitate involvement in illicit activity 

along with out-migration. 10 

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Answers to: Immigration not key the Remittances(1/2) 

[ ] 

[ ] Immigration rates drive remittances to Mexico. 

Mandelman, Research economist and assistant policy adviser at the Atlanta 

Federal Reserve, 2008 

(Frederico, “Remittances Ebb and Flow with the Immigration Tide”, Econ South. Vol 10, 

No. 3, Third Quarter, 

http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/econsouth/econsouth_vol_10_no_3_remittances_ebb_an 

d_flow_withimmigration_tide.cfm ) 

Latin America has some of the highest levels of remittances, both in aggregate and per 

capita, according to the World Bank report. Mexico, for example, received $25 billion, 

or approximately 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), in remittances 

during 2007. These financial flows are particularly large in Central America and the 

Caribbean. In 2007, remittances made up 25.6 percent of total gross domestic product 

in Honduras, 24.3 percent in Guyana, and 21.6 percent in Haiti. These high levels of 

remittances to Latin America are clearly related to the rate of immigration from 

the region. The World Bank's 2007 report, titledClose to Home: The Development 

Impact of Remittances in Latin America, estimates that Latin American migrants 

(both documented and undocumented) in the United States increased from 8.6 

million in 1990 to about 16 million in 2000, nearly 10 million of whom were 

Mexican. About one-third of El Salvador's natives live abroad, mostly in the United 

States, and almost 50 percent of Grenada's population has migrated to a foreign 

country. 

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Answers to: Immigration not key the Remittances (2/2) 

[ ] 

[ ] Immigration rates are a key driver of remittances 

Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari, Assistant Professor of Economics at San Diego 

State University & Assistant Professor of Economics at University of California 

Irvine 11 

(Catalina and Francesca, "The Effects of Legalization on Migrant Remittances" 

Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, 2011, Part 3, 113-132, Springer) 

However, as some developing economies have grown accustomed to remittances, 

policy-makers have become increasingly worried about the potentially transitory versus 

permanent nature of international money transfers. This concern has been aggravated 

by recent news regarding the drop in migrant remittances for some economies, as is the 

case with Mexico (4).1 A variety of factors are likelyto affect the temporary versus 

long-lasting character of remittance inflows, such as changes in the cost of 

remitting funds, changes in the composition and magnitude of migration flows, 

and changes in the characteristics of the existing immigrant stock. As a result, 

US immigration policy, via its impact on both the immigration inflows and the 

immigrant stock, can have a significant impact on the volume of remittances. 

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Answers to: Remittances cause Dutch Disease (1/2) 

[ ] 

[ ] Remittances have a real economic impact beyond short term 

consumption, long term ripples. 

Balderas & Garcia-Contreras, Assistant Professor of Economics, Sam Houston 

State University & PhD in International Studies from the University of Denver, 

2009 

(J. Ulyses ,"The effects of remittances and relative price variability on inflation: evidence 

from 32 Mexican States" Indian Journal of Economics and Business, Dec, 2009) 

The money Mexican migrants send back to their communities has reached 

unprecedented levels and has become a source of essential economic support 

for more than 1.4 million households (1) in the country. According to information 

released by the Mexican Central Bank, Mexico received $16.6 billion in 2004, an 

increase of 24 per cent over the same period in 2003. (2) In a recent study, Zarate- 

Hoyos (2004) estimated that on average a family receives $476 per month from 

remittances. Although most of these dollars are spent on current consumption, 

remittances also have some multiplier effects that have a positive impact on 

different sectors of the economy. Balderas (2009) found that remittances have a 

positive impact on gross capital formation in Mexico, meaning that remittances 

do constitute an input of the productive process to the point that they have a 

larger impact than the impact foreign direct investment has over the gross domestic 

product of the country. While discussing the effects of remittances on foreign direct 

investment and gross capital formation, Balderas argues that the difference in 

magnitudes is explained by the stability remittances have experienced over the last 

several years, compared to the high volatility associated with foreign direct investment. 

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Answers to: Remittances cause Dutch Disease (2/2) 

[ ] Remittances are necessary to reduce poverty and all for sustainable 

growth in Mexico that can withstand shocks from globalization. 

Singer ,Assistant Professor of Political Science at M.I.T., 2008 

(David Andrew , “Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing 

World”, , Prepared for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association annual 

meeting, April 3-6, 2008, http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/singer.pdf 

Over the past two decades, migrant remittances have emerged as a significant source 

of external finance for developing countries. Remittances—which arise when migrant 

workers send money back home to their families—constitute a steady stream of 

foreign exchange that helps to alleviate poverty and stimulate economic growth in 

migrants’ countries of origin. Remittances are an important lifeline for some of the 

poorest countries in the world, but also constitute a sizable share of GDP for 

emergingmarket countries. In countries such as El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and 

Jordan, inflows of remittances exceed 15 percent of GDP. In 2004, a total of 34 

developing countries had remittances inflows greater than 5 percent of GDP. The World 

Bank estimates that total recorded flows of remittances reached $167 billion in 2005; 

this is a staggering sum that dwarfs other financial sources, such as official 

development assistance, bank lending, and private investment. Annual flows of 

remittances even exceed foreign direct investment (FDI) for the majority of developing 

countries.1 The rise of remittances challenges our understanding of the influence of 

global finance on national policy choices in the developing world. Remittances are 

“unrequited”: they do not result in claims on assets, debt service obligations, or 

other contractual obligations (Brown 2006; Kapur 2005). In contrast to purchases of 

financial or productive assets, which can be liquidated and repatriated, remittances 

cannot be withdrawn from a country ex post. Moreover, flows of remittances tend to 

increase during economic downturns as migrants send more funds back home to 

cushion their families. The contrast between remittances and other capital flows is 

remarkable. International bank lending, sovereign bond investment, and FDI are 

highly procyclical in their reaction to the state of the domestic economy. For 

example, bank lending will dry up if a country experiences a financial crisis, thereby 

exacerbating the subsequent recession. Similarly, bond investors will withdraw their 

funds from countries experiencing high inflation and fiscal difficulties, while FDI will 

decline sharply in reaction to a downturn in economic growth (Mosley 2000, 2003; 

Jensen 2006). It is these types of capital flows that scholars have in mind when they 

argue that financial globalization generates insecurity and income volatility for domestic 

businesses and individual citizens (e.g., Garrett 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2004). 

Remittances, in contrast, actually smooth the incomes of domestic residents and 

shield policymakers from the vagaries of the global economy. In short, financial 

transfers from migrant workers are a form of insurance for developing countries 

against exogenous shocks (Kapur 2005; Lopez-Cordova and Olmedo 2005; Lucas 

and Stark 1985; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Yang and Choi 2007). 

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Answers to: Remittances cause moral hazard 

[ ] 

[ ] Non-Unique- Remittance spending on education, health and other public 

services already dwarfs spending from the Mexican government. 

Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari, Assistant Professor of Economics at San Diego 

State University & Assistant Professor of Economics at University of California 

Irvine 11 

(Catalina and Francesca, "The Effects of Legalization on Migrant Remittances" 

Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, 2011, Part 3, 113-132, Springer) 

How much of these potential losses would result in lower investments in Mexico 

Researchers have found that remittances are primarily used to pay for daily 

expenses, such as food and rent, with the rest being used to improve housing 

conditions, education, and health, along with other purposes. For instance, Durand et 

al. (22) found that about 76% of Mexican remittance receivers use the funds for 

consumption purposes, 14% spend them on housing, and about 10% use remittances 

for productive purposes––a figure that coincides with the one reported by Amuedo- 

Dorantes and Pozo (15) and Amuedo-Dorantes (forthcoming) for Mexico. Likewise, 

Suro (23) reports that, for Mexico, about 9% of remittances are either invested or saved, 

with up to 7% being used for educational purposes. Therefore, using these lower-bound 

estimates, about $289 million in investment funds and $225 million in education 

could be lost per year. How significant are these sums for Mexico To serve as a 

reference, we compare the estimated figures to government funds dedicated to 

investment and education purposes in Mexico. In an International Food Policy Research 

Institute’ report, Skoufias (24) discusses one of the investment programs promoted by 

the Mexican government, FONAES (National Social Enterprise Fund), which promotes 

employment and income opportunities by financing productive projects. In 2000, this 

program had a budget of $80 million, a much smaller sum compared to the $289 

million in investment funds that would be lost with the reduction in remittance 

inflows. 

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Answers to: Remittances cause Labor Shortages 

[ ] Immigration boosts remittances which are key to the economy – wage 

levels, capital accumulation, small business investment, and education all benefit 

from remittances. 

Martin, chair of Comparative Immigration and Integration Program at UC Davis, 

2003 

(Philip,. “Mexico-US Migration” 2003. Institute for International Economics, 

http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/332/08iie3349.pdf) VP 

Mexican immigration has a positive impact on wage levels in Mexico. 14 Economic 

studies suggest that during 1970-2000, Mexican immigration to the United States 

helped raise average Mexican wages by about 8 percent. Upward pressure on 

Mexican wage levels especially benefited Mexican workers with higher education 

levels.15 Moreover, Mexican immigration plays a pivotal role in raising the level of 

remittances, which in turn help encourage Mexican capital accumulation, small 

business investment, and educational attainment.In 2003, Mexican immigrant 

remittances reached nearly $13 billion, equivalent to about 2 percent of Mexican 

GDP (Hanson 2005). 

[ ] Remittances have a multiplier effect throughout the Mexican economy 

Canas et al, business economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2012 

(Jesus, “The Vulnerability of Mexican Temporary Workers in the United States with H-2 

Visas” from Migration and Remittances from Mexico: Trends, Impacts, and New 

Challenges edited by Alfredo Cuecuecha and Carla Pederzini, 2012.) VP 

Because remittances have become a major source of income for many developing 

countries, there is a large, and growing economics literature on the determinants and 

effects of remittances. Most of these studies concentrate on the economic impacts that 

such flows have on receiving or home countries.For Mexico, a, growing body of 

research examines the effect of remittances on poverty, schooling, labor force 

participation, inequality, and the financial sector. We begin by briefly summarizing 

the expected economic effects of remittances from a theoretical point of view and then 

what empirical research reveals about the effects of remittances in Mexico. From 

a theoretical standpoint, remittances can have both positive and negative economic 

consequences. Households that receive remittances are made better off because 

they have higher income, which boosts either their consumption or savings or 

both. These households may be able to make investments that they previously 

could not, including sending children to school.Both of these effects should spur 

economic development. Investment helps secure households future income stream 

while higher consumption usually.generates multiplier effects throughout the 

economy that help all households, not just those receiving remittances. 

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Answers to: Remittances cause Human Trafficking (1/2) 

[ ] 

[ ] Immigrant remittances are too small scale to be used by criminal or 

terrorist networks to finance their activities, criminal groups will use other 

sources. 

Logan, director of Souther Pulse Network Intelligence, 2006 

(Sam, "Remittances and Money Laundering in Mexico" International Relations and 

Security Network, Nov 27, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/ots783= 

4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=52697 

Money laundering efforts are largely initiated by Mexican actors, so it would seem 

that remittances play an important role in hiding the origination of illegal wealth. But 

money launderers prefer to employ bulk cash transfers. Cash packages are taped 

to human smugglers, who easily walk across the border from the United States to 

Mexico. In other cases, smugglers shovel cash into 40-foot containers, sending it 

back to Mexico on flatbed trucks. Of the many methods used to launder money 

earned by the sale of cocaine and other drugs inside the United States, cash 

remittances are not the top choice for money laundering experts according to the 

treasury department. “The vast majority of illicit funds we see flowing from the United 

States to Latin America via remittances tend to be laundered proceeds,” US Treasury 

Department spokesperson Molly Millerwise told ISN Security Watch, adding that “while 

remittances can be used by bad actors to move money, they are generally not an 

efficient method for laundering.” Commenting on the formal financial sector’s other 

worry, terrorism finance, Millerwise said: “While there is believed to be terrorist 

financing in Latin America, remittances from the United States to Latin America 

are not a prevalent means for financing terrorism in the region.” 

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Answers to: Remittances cause Human Trafficking (2/2) 

[ ] 

[ ] Remittances can flow through legal channels even if the earners are here 

illegally. 

Federation for American Immigration Reform, 2009 

("Remittances to Mexico", www.fairus.org/issue/remittances-to-mexico) 

Even as the federal government expands its criminal investigation of companies 

hiring illegal aliens, it has been helping those same workers send money home 

cheaply. In 2001, Presidents George Bush and Vicente Fox devised programs to 

reduce the cost of sending remittances abroad, as part of the Partnership for Prosperity 

Program, an initiative to promote economic development.1 New remittance programs, 

such as Directo a Mexico, aim to bring Mexican migrants into the mainstream U.S. 

financial system, regardless of immigration status. Directo a Mexico, allows 

customers without Social Security numbers to wire money through the Federal 

Reserve System to Mexico's central bank at little cost. About 27,000 transfers are 

made through the program each month.2 Banks and other financial institutions 

eager for Hispanic customers have joined in. Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and 

Harris Bank, have launched initiatives to capture a larger share of the Latino immigrant 

market. U.S. banks have lowered transfer fees, accepted the matricula consular 

(Mexican consulate-issued ID cards) as identification, acquired stakes in Mexican 

banks, and established cooperative arrangements to facilitate remittances.3 

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Answers to: The affirmative helps the Mexican farmers (1/2) 

[ ] 

[ ] Comparatively remittances do more to eliminate poverty and build 

economies than direct aid. 

Hathaway, Dean Melbourne Law School, 2008 – 

(James C., Fall, 2008, “The Human Rights Quagmire of "Human Trafficking",” Virginia 

Journal of International Law, 49 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, p. lexis 

More generally, the transnational criminalization of human smuggling per se should 

raise important concerns for the human rights community. In at least some contexts, 

(nonabusive) human smuggling - as contrasted with human trafficking - may actually 

enhance respect for human rights. n198 Kyle and Koslowski conclude, for example, that 

there is often a symbiotic relationship between smugglers and migrants that challenges 

absolutist assumptions. n199 There is, in particular, mounting evidence that 

remittances from migrants are the single most effective tools of economic and 

social rights empowerment, dwarfing the impact of official foreign aid programs. 

As World Bank senior economist Dilip Ratha concludes, "Remittances are large, 

counter-cyclical, and pro-poor. They are better targeted to the needs of the poor 

than official aid or foreign direct investment." n200 Lant Pritchett has determined 

that if wealthier countries allowed an increase in immigration equivalent to just three 

percent of their labor force, the citizens of less developed countries would gain about $ 

300 billion per annum n201 - three times more than the direct gains that would accrue 

from abolishing all remaining trade barriers, four times more than the foreign aid now 

given by [*35] governments, and one hundred times more than the value of debt relief. 

n202 As such, any holistic analysis of the human rights consequences of seeking 

to prohibit simple smuggling should take real account of the critical role in global 

wealth redistribution played by migration (which is in turn dependent on smuggling), 

not to mention the real and immediate enhancement of life possibilities for the persons 

smuggled into more prosperous and less threatening states. n203 It is too simplistic to 

assume that all, or even most, smuggling is rights diminishing. 

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Answers to: The affirmative helps Mexican famers (2/2) 

[ ] 

[ ] Direct aid is a poor development model since it encourages recipients to 

recreate the conditions of poverty that triggered the aid in the first place. 

Williamson, Professr of Economics at Appalachian State, 2009 

(Claudia R. “Exploring the failure of foreign aid: The role of incentives and information”, 

Review of Australian Economics, July, 23:12-33, 

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11138-009-0091-7.pdf) 

Not only do the governments of countries receiving foreign not exhibit 

incentives to promote efficient usage but also special interest groups and 

individual citizens within these countries also face incentives that can contribute 

to the failure of aid. For example, similar to the moral hazard situation facing 

government is the “Samaritan’s Dilemma” facing citizens. Buchanan (1975) not 

only identified that foreign aid may prop up brutal regimes but also that aid created 

the Samaritan’s Dilemma. By giving foreign aid, the “Samaritan”, or the donors, 

alters the incentives faced by those receiving it. If the recipients believe that 

future poverty will increase the likelihood of more foreign aid, aid could actually 

worsen incentives to invest. Instead of saving and investing, citizens now face an 

even stronger incentive to consume and become dependent on the donors; 

hence, the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Boone (1996) empirically supports the existence 

of this dilemma. In his analysis, foreign aid has zero effect on investment. Instead, 

individuals chose to consume. Thus, aid finances consumption rather than 

investment, supporting Buchanan’s prediction. Coyne (2008) provides an example of 

the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Prior to the collapse of the Barre regime in Somalia, foreign 

aid accounted for more than 70% of Somalia’s budget. The aid actually created a 

dependency that has made change in recent years more difficult. 

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Remittances Good- Mexican Economic Growth- Extension 

[ ] Remittances key to the Mexican Economy growth by directing money to 

local producers and businesses. 

Taylor, professor of agricultural and resource economics, University of California, 

Davis, 1999 

(J. Edward, , "The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in 

the Migration Process", onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2435.00066/pdf NP) 

“Macro” economy-wide effects of migrant remittancesIf migrant remittances 

contribute positively to incomes, they may have a multiplier effect on incomes, 

employment, and production in migrant sending Tailor economies. Households 

and firms are linked together through markets.expeiditure linkages transmit the 

impacts of remittances from the remittance receiving households to other households 

and production firms in the economy.economy-wide modelling techniques can be 

used to trace how remittances influence income and production as they work 

their way through the migrant ending economy. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, 

such models have not made their way into the migration-and-development literature, at 

least at the macro level. The few studies that employ economy-i&modelling 

techniques study remittance impacts generally produce optimistic findings. For 

example, AdeLman and Taylor (1990) found that, for every dollar sent or brought 

into Mexico by migrants working abroad, Mexico’s gross national product (GNP) 

increased by somewhere between 2.69 and $3.17, depending n which household 

group in Mexico received the remittances. Remittances reduced the largest income 

multipliers when they flowed into rural house olds, whose consumption and 

expenditure patterns favour goods produced domestically, with relatively 

labour-intensive production technologies and few imports. When migrant 

remittances go to urban households, more of the money leaks out of the country in the 

form of import demand.These estimates also reveal that migrant remittances have 

an equalizing effect on the distribution of income among socioeconomic groups 

in Mexico. In the first instance, they favour relatively poor and middle-income 

rural and urban flimilies. In the second instance, they create second-round income 

linkages that also favour the poor. As a result, $1 in remittances translates into a $029 

to SO.38 increase in small4àrrner and rural-worker incomes and a $1.11 increase in 

the income of urban worker households, despite the fàct that most remittances do not 

flow into the latter group. In other words, many of the benefits of remittances accrue 

to households other than the ones that receive the remittances. 

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Remittances Good- Poverty 

[ ] Remittances prevent the deaths of millions of people by lifting them out 

of poverty. 

Wainer, Senior Immigration Policy Analyst, Bread for the World Institute, 2012 

(Andrew, 10/24, , “Remittances and Immigration”, 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-wainer/remittances-andimmigration_b_2010873.html) 

Today, remittances are mostly used for survival--they prevent millions of families 

from falling into (deeper) poverty, but they don't change the economic status quo. It 

seems to be that remittances' greatest potential - fueling productive investment 

that generates jobs and income and reduces immigration pressure - is untapped. 

It could be better employed by U.S. development agencies and regional governments to 

provide alternatives to unauthorized migration for the next generation of Central 

Americans. There's scant evidence that border enforcement has impacted 

undocumented immigration to the United States. The poverty rates in El Salvador, 

Guatemala, and Honduras are 38 percent, 51 percent and 59 percent respectively. 

Poverty and the lack of economic opportunity will drive immigrants north no 

matter how high we make the border walls. Remittances can't solve Central 

American poverty itself, but they can be part of the solution for providing 

opportunity to would-be immigrants. Northern Triangle governments need a national 

framework for investing remittances into productive enterprises. Remittance recipients 

need training and support on how to invest in sustainable enterprises. Without 

collaboration between the diaspora, U.S. development agencies, and regional 

governments, the impact of remittances will remain limited. U.S. development 

agencies are well positioned to facilitate the productive use of remittances into its 

development agenda to better harness remittances for development in Central 

America. There are U.S. development programs like this in Africa, but their 

implementation in Mexico and Central America - the source of more than 80 

percent of all unauthorized immigration to the United States - is lagging. 

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Remittances Good – Poverty Extensions 

[ ] Remittances reduce poverty and increase education 





Turning to empirical evidence, remittances appear to reduce poverty among 

recipient households in Mexico. Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda (2007) report that 

receiving remittances reduces a household’s probability of being in poverty by about 6- 

10 percentage points, a sizable reduction given poverty rates that range from 16 

percent to 44 percent of households, depending on how poverty is measured. Lopez- 

Cordova (2004) shows that the fraction of households receiving remittances is 

negatively associated with the poverty rates across all Mexican municipalities in the 

year 2000. Most research on Mexico finds evidence of a positive effect of 

remittances on educational outcomes. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) suggest that 

living in a household with a U.S. migrant increases years of schooling among girls 

whose parents have low education levels. Remittance inflows raise household 

income and relax credit constraints which perhaps enables families to pay school 

fees and delay girls’ entry into the labor force. Borraz (2005) finds a positive but 

small effect of remittances on schooling, with the impact only occurring for children 

living in cities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants and whose mothers have a very lowlevel 

of education. Lopez-Cordova (2004) shows that the fraction of households 

receiving remittance income is posi-tively associated with school attendance rates and 

negatively associated with child illiteracy rates across Mexican municipalities in year 

2000. 

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Remittances Good- US Mexico Relations (1/2) 

[ ] Remittances are a critical part of US Mexico relations---they solidify 

economic ties 

Fossett, writer for the Inter Press Service, 2013 

(Katelyn , Apr 30 2013, “In U.S.-Mexico Relations, a Shift from Security to Economy”, 

www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/) 

“President Obama having a visit [early in his second term] symbolises the 

importance of Mexico to the U.S.,” Chris Wilson, an associate at the Mexico Institute, 

a think tank here, told IPS. The United States is Mexico’s largest trading partner, 

and the two countries engaged in nearly 500 billion dollars worth of trade in 2012. Much 

of that trade is in what are known as intermediate inputs, referring to semi-finished U.S. 

goods that are finalised with Mexican resources, a process seen as increasing the 

competitiveness of both countries. Remittances sent home from Mexican 

immigrants living in the United States are also a substantial factor in the 

countries’ economic ties, totalling more than 20 billion dollars last year. 

The upcoming summit’s focus on economics squares with a narrative gaining 

traction in media coverage and academic circles in recent years that paints a 

picture of an economically booming Mexico.“During the administration of Calderon, 

the perception of Mexico in the media was largely one of drugs and violence – the 

headlines about Mexico were about drugs and trafficking, organised crime, 

gruesome violence,” Wilson recalls.“But the new [Mexican] administration has come in 

at a time when economic growth is pretty robust. They are trying their best to shift 

the narrative of Mexico by talking more about these economic issues: the reforms 

that are happening in Mexico that will promote growth, new investments coming 

into Mexico that will promote growth.” 

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Remittances Good- US Mexico Relations (2/2) 

[ ] US Mexico relations are vital to environmental protection 

Mumme and Sanchez-Rodriguez, Professor of Political Science at Colorado State 

University & Emeritus professor of Environmental Sciences at UC Riverside., 

2010 

(Stephen, and Roberto, Emeritus professor of Environmental Sciences at UC Riverside. 

“Environmental Protection and Natural Resources” 2010. 

http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11636.pdf) VP 

The bilateral framework for addressing shared environmental challenges along 

the U.S.-Mexico border is today crafted around a triptych of agencies and programs 

with distinct missions whose role and functions have become increasingly 

complementary in the NAFTA era. The oldest of these, with particular relevance to 

the management of border water resources, is the International Boundary and Water 

Commission, United States and Mexico (IBWC), whose mandate is found in the 1944 

U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty. The IBWC oversees the allocation treaty water 

resources, hydropower operations on the Rio Grande River, and flood control 

infrastructure on both the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo and Colorado Rivers in their boundary 

reach. It also has a hand in the management of sanitation and water quality along 

the border. The 1983 U.S.-Mexico Border Environment Cooperation Agreement, 

popularly known as the La Paz Agreement, provides the basis for binational 

dialogue and programs addressing water quality, urban and industrial 

environmental problems, biodiversity protection, environmental education, 

environmental enforcement, and environmental justice. Complementing the La Paz 

framework and contributing to its implementation, the Border Environment 

Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank 

(NADB), established in 1994, provide leadership, technical support, and financing 

for needed border environmental infrastructure projects along the border. While 

these are the leading agencies and programs guiding binational cooperation on 

environmental matters, other agencies, the Border Health Commission (BHC) and the 

Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), also established in 1990’s, enrich 

the institutional mix and contribute to binational capacity for environmental 

protection along the international border. 

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Answers

Remittances Disadvantage Affirmative 



Remittances Disadvantage Affirmative - Table of Contents 

Glossary..................................................................................................................................... 3 

Non-Unique 

Remittances Falling Now ........................................................................................................ 4-5 

No Link 

Immigration not key to Remittances ........................................................................................... 6 

Impact Turns/No Impact 

Remittances Hurt Mexican Economy- Dutch Disease ................................................................ 7 

Remittances Hurt Economy- Moral Hazard ................................................................................ 8 

Remittances Hurt Economy- Labor Disincentives .................................................................. 9-10 

Remittances Cause Human Trafficking .............................................................................. 11-13 

Answers to: Mexican Economy Impact---Alternate Causalities ..................................................14 

Answers to: US-Mexico Relations ...................................................................................... 15-16 

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Glossary 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the value of all legal goods and services created by 

a country within a year. 

NAFTA – A trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States that is 

controversial for eliminating taxes on corn from the US in Mexico. The eliminating of a 

tax on imported corn (aka a tariff), made corn, which is made cheap through 

government support in the US, even cheaper than Mexican corn, destroying the ability 

of small, Mexican farmers to make a living. 


Standards of Living – this term refers to how comfortably a population is perceived as 

living. For instance if people in country X have access to fresh food and water, 

affordable housing, and quality health care and education then many people would say 

that people in country X have a high standard of living. On the other hand, if people in 

country Y were eating but, access to quality food was unstable and very few people had 

access to an education beyond the 8 th grade many would consider this a lower standard 

of living. As this term only refers to material wealth it is often considered a subjective 

term, open to a variety of interpretations. 

World Bank – an international organization that gives loans to country’s with the goal of 

reducing poverty. 

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Remittances Falling Now 

[ ] Remittances are continuing to decline 

EFE, Spanish language news agency, 2013 

(Leading Spanish language news agency and the fourth largest news agency in the 

world.“Remittances to Mexico fall over 13 pct in May” July 1, 

2013.http://www.laprensasa.com/309_america-in-english/2116540_remittances-tomexico-fall-over-13-pct-in-may.html) 

VP 

Mexico City, Jul 1 (EFE).- Remittances sent by Mexicans living abroad fell 13.2 

percent to $2.03 billion in May, compared to the same month in 2012, the Bank of 

Mexico said Monday.May marked the 11th consecutive month that remittances 

have fallen, the central bank said. The average remittance totaled $286.81 in May, 

down from the $329.81 registered in May 2012, the central bank said in its monthly 

report. A total of 7.1 million transactions, the majority of them electronic funds transfers, 

were registered in May, the Bank of Mexico said.Remittances totaled $22.44 billion in 

2012, down 1.57 percent from 2011. Remittances sent by Mexicans living abroad are 

the country's second-largest source of foreign exchange and help cover the living 

expenses of millions of people. 

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Remittances Falling Now- Extensions 

[ ] 

[ ] Remittances and immigration are low 

Villagran, Smart Planet Correspondent Mexico City, 2013 

(Lauren , February 27, 2013, “Slow U.S. growth, zero immigration hurt remittances to 

Mexico”, www.smartplanet.com/blog/global-observer/slow-us-growth-zero-immigrationhurt-remittances-to-mexico/9904) 

The U.S. recession, then slow U.S. economic growth over the past two years, plus 

tighter border security and anti-immigrant laws at the state level have conspired 

to either drive immigrants back to Mexico or convince people here to sit tight. 

Deportations have increased as well. Meanwhile, drug violence along the border 

and cartels’ targeting of migrants has also deterred immigration north. Together 

those trends have put a dent in the dollars Mexicans wire home. 

Both remittances and foreign direct investment are well off the highs reached 

before the recession, $26 billion in 2007 and $27 billion in 2008, respectively. 

The cash sent back to Mexican families totaled just $22.4 billion in 2012, down 1.6 

percent in dollar terms from the previous year (partly due to an appreciating peso), 

or up less than 1 percent in pesos adjusted for inflation. By comparison, foreign direct 

investment last year isn’t likely to reach the $20 billion mark, compared with $20.4 billion 

a year earlier. In Latin America’s second-largest economy, income from 

remittances ranks just below what Mexico earns from petroleum, tourism and the 

automotive industry –- yet remittances account for only 2.3 percent of the GDP. 

“The effect of remittances is felt mainly in the homes that receive them,” said Juan 

Luis Ordaz Diaz, senior economist with BBVA Bancomer. “They’re a salary for those 

homes –- probably larger than the salary they would receive here.” 

In other words, according to Ordaz Diaz, remittances don’t have the power to 

sway the Mexican economy on their own. Their real impact on the Mexican economy 

comes in terms of consumption, he said. Nearly 1.4 million families in Mexico depend 

heavily on what their relatives earn in the U.S.; the average remittance is about $290 

per month. 

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[] 

Immigration not key to Remittances 

[ ] Migration rates not linked to remittances, a number of factors dictate how 

much money is sent back to Mexico, for example where is an immigrants family 

located. 

Cortina and Ochoa-Reza, , Dept of Poli Sci at U of Houston and Facultad de 

Derecho UNAM, 2008 

(Jeronimo Enrique, Facultad de Derecho UNAM, "More Migration and Less 

Remittances",policydialogue.org/files/events/Cortina_Ochoa- 

Reza_More_Migration_Less_Remittances.pdf) 

Conventional wisdom argues that the relationship between migration and 

remittances is positive and reinforcing. The basic idea is that as the number of 

migrants in a host country in period one grows, the level of remittances sent to 

the home country will increase in period two, ceteris paribus. Likewise, as the 

level of remittances received in the home country increases in period two, the 

level of migration to the host country will increase in period three. These 

phenomena could be summarized in a nutshell as "more migration, more 

remittances". Although there is substantial evidence to prove that this dynamic 

is true, we will argue in this paper that the relationship between migration and 

remittances is not always positive and could be negative depending on 

demographic, banking and immigration policies that are seldom analyzed 

comprehensively by scholars or policy makers. In this paper we will present 

evidence to show that an obvious factor molding the relationship between 

migration and remittances is the demographic composition of the migratory 

flow, which could be an unintended byproduct of immigration policies in host 

countries. A migration flow of children and women, following family 

reunification policies, will potentially lead to a significant reduction of both the 

supply and demand of remittances. As the money will now stay in the host 

country, this will result in a counterintuitive dynamic: more migration, but fewer 

remittances. In short, remitters will become savers. In order to show how this 

dynamic operates we will analyze the case of Turkish and Polish migration to 

Germany and of Mexican migration to the United States. 

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Remittances Hurt Mexican Economy- Dutch Disease 

[ ] Dutch disease- easy money from remittances prevents long term 

investments in building the economy 

Yu, undergraduate student at the University of Alberta. 2013 

(Tim, “The Significance of the U.S.-Mexican Remittance Corridor”, —Progressive 

Economics Forum Student Essay Contest May 3, 2013, http://www.progressiveeconomics.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Yu-Essay.pdf, 

Callahan) 

Dutch Disease’ and Remittance Transfers: The large and sustained inflow of 

remittances has fuelled speculation about whether a remittance-driven 

appreciation in real exchange rates could emerge. Empirical evidence from the 

World Bank (2009) has suggested that a positive relationship between remittances 

and real exchange rate appreciations could exist. Changes in the equilibrium 

exchange rate have had several effects on the distributional impacts of 

remittance inflows, comparative competitiveness of the traded and non-traded 

good sector, and long-term economic development via ‘Dutch Disease’ 

effects.119 If ‘Dutch Disease’ is found to be present, it could indicate that the shortterm 

effects of remittance inflows may come at the expense of reduced long-term 

economic growth, particularly in the manufacturing and traded good sectors. 

Other economists, however, have sought to downplay such fears about a remittancedriven 

‘Dutch Disease’ in recipient countries. DilipRatha argues that ‘Dutch Disease’ 

effects of remittance inflows are unlikely to have similar effects as natural resource 

windfalls.120 This has been supported in a separate study on eleven remittancereceiving 

countries conducted, which found that higher remittance receipts was not 

linked to slower economic growth or ‘Dutch Disease’ effects in the manufacturing 

sector.121 

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Remittances Hurt Economy- Moral Hazard 

[ ] Remittances create a moral hazard that reduces the need to enact policy 

reforms in Mexico to fix the real problems in the economy. 




Callahan) 

Governance Issues: Several scholars have suggested that remittances could pose 

the moral problem of reducing government incentives to enact policy reforms.122 

Compensatory remittances have the ability to help offset adverse economic shocks, 

but may postpone (or, even worse, discourage) policies that could be crucial to 

longterm growth.123 Remittances that behave ‘counter-cyclically’ could have the 

effect of reducing the political will amongst Mexican households to pressure 

governments to facilitate necessary investments in public and physical 

infrastructure, or ensuring tighter controls over fiscal discipline.124 By serving as 

a ‘buffer’ between recipient households and the governments that serve them, 

remittances can delay much-needed reforms by not only reducing public 

pressure, but also decreasing the likelihood of a political crisis that would make 

such reforms mandatory. Government initiatives, such as the ‘3x1’ Program, 

therefore, may be altruistic and well-meaning in nature, but could encourage poor fiscal 

discipline and divert attention away from more pressing issues. 

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Remittances Hurt Economy- Labor Disincentives 

[ ] Labor disincentives- remittances will reduce the incentive for many to 

find jobs or invest wisely with easy money coming from America. 




Callahan) 

Labour Disincentives: Remittance inflows can have the adverse effect of reducing 

labour incentives amongst recipient households. As Ratha writes in a separate 

article for The Economist, “there may also be an economic cost associated with 

reliance on remittances. Like any unearned wealth, they may foster idleness among 

those who benefit.”125 The net effectiveness of remittance receipts can be offset 

by household labour decisions, particularly if remittance-recipients decide to: (1) 

reduce their labour market effort, due to a reduced desire to work; or, (2) make 

poor investments (i.e., spending funds in areas that would normally invested 

towards subsistence needs) and depending upon remittances as a primary 

source of income.126 This may result in Yu 30 lower productivity levels, and lead 

to a reduction in the available labour supply within local communities in Mexico. 

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Remittances Hurt Economy- Labor Disincentives- Extension 

[ ] Remittances can reduce labor and make consumption more expensive 

long term. 





On the downside, remittance-receiving households may reduce their labor 

supply because they now have a source of funds other than their own labor 

income, hence they can consume more leisure. Remittance inflows and the 

associated higher consumption levels can lead to priceincreases and exchange 

rate movements that further undo some of the positive economic effects. Such 

price and exchange rate changes affect consumption not only among households 

that receive remittances but also among those who do not. Remit-tances can 

exacerbate income inequality by widening' gaps between those households that 

receive funds and those who do not. Income inequality may be ameliorated, 

however, if remittances lead to improvements in employment and earnings among 

non-recipient households. Whether remittances boost economic development on net 

thus depends on a host of factors. In addition, short-run effects may differ from longrun 

effects. 

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Remittances Cause Human Trafficking (1/3) 

[ ] Remittances in unstable areas are used to fund human trafficking. 

Financial Action Task Force, 2010 

(Inter-governmental body developing policies to combat money laundering and terrorist 

financing. “Money Laundering through Money Remittance and Currency Exchange 

Providers” June 2010. http://www.fatfafi.org/media/fatf/ML%20through%20 

Remittance%20and%20Currency%20Exchange%20Providers.pdf) VP 

Note: MR=Money Remittance 

MR services offer widespread and legitimate services to immigrants. They serve the 

unbanked, provide a convenient, efficient and cost-effective means to send money to 

an immigrant’s home country and often can reach remote areas and locations beset 

by political instability that are otherwise outside the networks of the international 

banking system. However, investigations in some countries have shown that the 

services provided by some MR businesses have also been linked to human 

trafficking and the repayment of “human trafficking agents”. As an example, in 

certain trafficking cases, money remittance providers have been used to pay 

mules, intermediaries, airplane tickets, etc. 

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Remittances Cause Human Trafficking (2/3) 

[ ] Trafficking enables all aspects of terrorism 

Keefer, Colonel U.S. Army War College, 2006 

(Sandra, “HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY FOR 

THEUNITED STATES.” http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDocLocation=U2&doc= 

GetTRDoc.pdf &AD =ADA448573) 

Is there a link between terrorism and human trafficking According to Christine 

Dolan, panelist at the recent “Terrorism Nexus” seminar hosted by The World Affairs 

Council of Washington, DC, the answer is a definitive, yes.14 

Trafficking and terrorism are linked. Terrorists use the transportation networks of 

smugglers and traffickers to move operatives. In many parts of the world, profits 

from drug trading provide funds for terrorism, and in certain regions of the world 

trafficking is a large and significant component of that economy. Examples of this 

include the Balkans, Southeast Asia, Philippines and parts of the former Soviet Union. 

In the Balkans, trafficking is a major source of profits for organized crime groups which 

have links to terrorists. In Southeast Asia and the Philippines, trafficking is significant 

enabling potential terrorists to move their money easily through the channels of 

the illicit economy. 15 The national and international enforcement environment 

changed significantly after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Today the conditions 

could be right for terrorist and human smugglers to join forces. Emphasis is now 

being placed on targeting alien smuggling organizations that present threats to our 

national security. This emphasis recognizes that terrorists and their associates are 

likely to align themselves with specific alien smuggling networks to obtain 

undetected entry into the United States. Three factors have created an environment 

in which terrorists and smuggling enterprises may combine their criminal efforts to pose 

a significant national and international threat. These factors include the fact that the 

criminal organizations involved are growing in volume and sophistication; and those 

same organizations’ developing the ability to exploit public corruption; and lax 

immigration controls in source and transit countries.16 

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Remittances Cause Human Trafficking- (3/3) 

[ ] Remittances are used to finance human trafficking and other criminal 

activities. 

Financial Action Task Force, 2011 

(, Inter-governmental body developing and promoting policies to combat money 

laundering and terrorist financing. “Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in 

Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants” July 2011. http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trafficking%20in%20Human%20Beings%20and 

%20Smuggling%20of%20Migrants.pdf) VP Note: THB-Trafficking in Human Beings, 

SOM-Smuggling of Migrants Criminals involved in THB and the SOM are primarily 

using cash transfers both directly and through the use of cash to acquire goods and 

services. From the evidence obtained and also according to the OSCE report 

“Analysing the Business Model of Trafficking in Human Beings to Better Prevent the 

Crime” reviewed, three patterns emerge on THB that could be applied to SOM: 

money sent back to the country of origin of the traffickers where it is often invested 

in legal businesses such as restaurants, bars, or properties such as apartments or 

houses; 

support a lavish lifestyle for those involved; 

legitimate activities in the destination country. 139. Because of the predominance of 

cash handling/transactions those involved are great users of: 

businesses (money remitters); 

system); 

selling); 

(e.g., casinos). 140. Although the information obtained from the private sector was 

limited in extent, and the NGO Stop the Traffik is working with the sector to raise the 

profile of THB and SOM, financial activity unusual for the business types has 

been used to identify human trafficking activity (e.g., multiple ongoing payments to 

internet classified advertising services). 4. To inform law enforcement agencies on the 

laundering of funds coming from human trafficking/smuggling 140. Conclusions from 

the answers to the questionnaire were that information relating to ML arising from 

human trafficking or migrant smuggling is often generated from operational 

investigations. What is clear however is that to-date the focus has been much more on 

the crimes themselves and not on the laundering of the proceeds of those crimes141. 

From the literature and the case studies there is evidence of links between human 

trafficking, the smuggling of migrants and other forms of organised crime.Those 

being trafficked are often used as drug couriers.There are also identified links 

between the proceeds of THB and SOM with corruption and terrorist financing. 

Information provided at the Cape Town workshop by GIABA showed that in West 

Africa, there is often a link between THB/SOM and corruption, and information provided 

in respect of the activities of terrorist organisations in Ireland linked THB/SOM to 

terrorist financing. 

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Answers to: Mexican Economy Impact---Alternate Causalities 

[ ] Alternate causalites – labor reforms – those are critical to the productivity 

of Mexico’s economy 

Ringley, Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation, 2013 

[Drew, “Mexico Poised to become an ‘Aztec Tiger’,”, 2/19/13, 

http://blog.heritage.org/2013/02/19/mexico-poised-to-become-an-aztec-tiger/] 

It is long overdue. According to the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, published by The 

Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, Mexico ranks below the world 

average in labor freedom, and Mexico’s powerful special interests have made 

sure previous reforms were watered-down and ineffective.As the Index notes, an 

inflexible labor code makes it difficult for employers to terminate employees who, 

for whatever reasons, are not cutting it at work. The result: lower productivity and 

reduced profit margins for firms to sustain themselves during tough times. 

Mexico’s teachers union—the largest in Latin America with nearly 650,000 members— 

provides an example of how entrenched special interests create these inefficiencies. 

The union promotes teachers based on loyalty and seniority—not merit. The 

Mexican labor code also fails to hold educators accountable for the quality of 

their instruction. In the end, these policies only hurt the students that educators say 

they are trying to help. 

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Answers to: US-Mexico Relations (1/2) 

[ ] 

[ ] Relations are high now 

Guilamo-Ramos, Director, Doctoral Program at NYU School of Social Work, 2013 

(Vincent , 5/28, , "The U.S. and Mexico Have Much to Learn from Each Other", 

www.huffingtonpost.com/vincent-guilamoramos/us-mexico-relations_b_3347068.html) 

Barack Obama's recent visit to Mexico, the fourth of his presidency, represented 

an important, deliberate attempt to shift the focus of Mexico-U.S. relations from 

security to economic improvement.But it also represented much more -- a chance 

to allay the public's profoundly negative conceptions of Mexico by shifting the 

conversation to education, labor, environment, and other human-scale issues 

that are truly vital to the future of both countries. While much media coverage 

focuses on Mexican immigration battles, drug wars and narco-trafficking, the 

relationship between the U.S. and Mexico has been evolving in complex and 

positive ways.That is really not so surprising when one considers that the Latino 

population in the U.S. surpassed 50 million not too long ago, and people of 

Mexican ancestry account for more than 60 percent of this total. Mexico's 

economy and middle class are growing. And there is Obama's pivotal "100,000 

Strong in the Americas" initiative, launched in 2011 to expand study-abroad 

exchange opportunities between the U.S. and Latin America. Increasing student 

exchange, and building understanding through higher education, offers at least 

the potential to help offset the tarnished public perception of bilateral relations. 

Not incidentally, this cross-border tradition contributes heavily to both countries' 

economies. 

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Answers to: US-Mexico Relations (2/2) 

[ ] The environment is resilient and can recover from pollution quickly 

without human intervention. 

McDermott, reporter citing research done at the Yale University School of 

Forestry and Environmental Science, 2009 

(Matt, Tree Hugger.Com,” Good news: most ecosystems can recover in one lifetime 

from human induced or natural disturbance”, 

http://www.treehugger.com/files/2009/05/most-ecosystems-can-recover-fromdisturbance-in-one-lifetime.php) 

There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists: New research 

done at the Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Science 

reinforces the idea that ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from 

pollution and environmental degradation. Published in the journal PLoS ONE, the 

study shows that most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a 

single lifetime, if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done: Forests 

Take Longest of Ecosystems Studied The analysis found that on average forest 

ecosystems can recover in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean 

bottom to recover. If an area has seen multiple, interactive disturbances, it can take on 

average 56 years for recovery. In general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from 

human-induced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes. To reach 

these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peer-reviewed 

studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem recovery once the source 

of pollution was removed. Interestingly, the researchers found that it appears that the 

rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition: 

Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and 

organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest. 

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Treatment Counterplan

Decriminalization and Treatment Counterplan 



Decriminalization and Treatment Counterplan- Table of Contents 

Summary ....................................................................................................................... 2 

Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 3 

Decimalization and Treatment Counterplan 1NC ....................................................... 4-6 

Solvency: Decriminalization Solves ............................................................................ 7-8 

Answers to: Gangs Fight Over Shrinking Illegal Market ................................................. 9 

Answers to: Legalizing Marijuana is Insufficient ........................................................... 10 

Answers to: Decriminalization won’t be a model ..................................................... 11-12 

Decriminalization and Treatment Solves – Lowers Demand for Drugs and Violence .. 13 

Answers to: Decriminalizing Marijuana is Insufficient ................................................... 14 

Answer to: increase teens uses .............................................................................. 15-16 

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Summary 

The counterplan advocates for both the decriminalization of marijuana in the United 

States and for the US to invest in drug treatment programs as a way to reduce drug 

violence. 

Currently, The United States is being supplied with illegal marijuana from a variety of 

countries. One of the major suppliers of marijuana to the United States is the drug 

cartels in Mexico, who have created drug violence in their country. 

This counterplan argues that making marijuana decriminalized in the United States 

would deplete the market for drug cartels in Mexico. With the drug cartels losing their 

market, they would lose their power in Mexico. Ultimately, the collapse of drug cartels 

will decrease the violence in the country. 

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Glossary 

Drug Cartel- organizations that aim to control and monitor drug trafficking 

DTOs- Drug Trafficking Organizations 

Peña Nieto- President of Mexico 

Criminalization- legal penalties for drug users and dealers 

Decriminalization- reduction of penalties(charges) for drug users while keeping 

penalties for drug dealers 

Cannabis- plant of marijuana 

Adolescents- growing to adulthood or teen 

Legalization- reduction of penalties(charges) for drug users and drug dealers 

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Decimalization and Treatment Counterplan 1NC (1/3) 

Text: The United States Federal Government should decriminalize marijuana and 

substantially increase its national investment in prevention and treatment 

programs for all drugs. 

US strategies are the critical first step to solving drug violence; criminalization is 

failing. 

Weissman, Distinguished Professor of Law; University of North Carolina School 

of Law, 2013 (Deborah M., Remaking Mexico: Law Reform as Foreign Policy, April, 

http://ssrn.com/abstract=-2246126) 

Perhaps the most significant reforms at odds with the Mérida rule of law program relate to the 

very heart of the U.S. approach to drug trafficking and drug violence, that is, the “war on drugs.” 

As noted above, the Mérida Initiative’s rule of law program calls for an expanded criminalized 

response to drug-related crime.252 Many Mexicans, however, have rejected this approach as 

having failed to end the drug-related violence.253 Mexican human rights activists have 

expressed strong support for the consideration of decriminalization strategies 

as a means to address the crisis in Mexico. They have made the link between 

drug prohibition and human rights violations and urged that “rethinking the criminalization 

of drug use would be a very important long-term strategy to improving the 

serious human-rights situation that Mexico is facing today.”254 Mexican grassroots 

movements against the militarization of the drug war have also called for a legalization approach.255 

Public opinion surveys have indicated that U.S. crime and imprisonment requirements are rejected by 

Mexicans as useless dogma, and further believe that U.S. strategies have exacerbated the problems.256 

Public discourses call for solutions more consistent with Mexican history and culture.257 These 

popular sentiments are reflected within the report findings issued by the 2009 

Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (the Commission) headed by 

Ernesto Zedillo, the former president of Mexico together with former presidents of 

Brazil and Colombia—all countries with a history of problems with drug cartels. 258 The 

report called for a new paradigm to address drug-related problems.259 More specifically, it calls 

for an end to the U.S. model of war-on-drug policies and punitive drug laws after concluding that 

such strategies have done little to diminish drug-related crime or improve public health 

outcomes.260 The report emphasizes public health and social policy strategies 

instead of reliance on harsh criminal penalties, and garnered significant popular 

support.261 The Latin American Commission was followed by the formation of a Global 

Commission on Drug Policy, which also included notable Mexican politicians and scholars.262 It 

issued similar findings that criticized U.S. drug policies for failing to resolve drug 

violence while noting the horrific consequences of U.S. strategies.263 The report 

identified Mexico as an example of drug law enforcement practices that served to 

increase the violence and corruption associated with the drug trade: The available 

scientific evidence suggests that increasing the intensity of law enforcement 

interventions to disrupt drug markets is unlikely to reduce drug gang violence. 

Instead, the existing evidence suggests that drug-related violence and high homicide 

rates are likely a natural consequence of drug prohibition and that increasingly 

sophisticated and well-resourced methods of disrupting drug distribution networks may unintentionally 

increase violence.264 

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And treatment and prevention is the most cost effective way to reduce demand 

for drugs in the long term 

Mercille, School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Policy, University 

College Dublin, 2011 

(Julien, Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony The political economy of the ‘war on 

drugs’ in Mexico, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 9, 2011, pp 1637–1653) 

Third, in addition to stopping the flow of firearms south, the findings of drug policy 

research should be applied. Whereas mainstream authors call for overseas drug 

control operations, interdiction and enforcement to tackle the narcotics problem, 

research has consistently found that such methods are ineffective, while the most 

effective methods to reduce drug consumption are treatment of addicts and 

prevention. Indeed, a widely cited RAND report calculated that ‘treatment’ was the 

most effective method for reducing cocaine consumption in the US and that 

targeting ‘source countries’ like Mexico was 23 times less cost-effective, 

‘interdiction’ 11 times less cost-effective, and ‘domestic enforcement’ seven times less 

cost-effective.54 The Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democ- racy, 

conceived by ex-presidents Cardoso of Brazil, Gaviria of Colombia and Zedillo of 

Mexico, agrees and stated that: ‘The long-term solution for the drug problem is to 

reduce drastically the demand for drugs in the main consumer countries’, the US 

and Europe.55 But the US has rejected the consensus on drugs policy, allocating 

64 per cent of the drug control budget to interdiction and to arresting, 

prosecuting and incarcerating drug offenders, including the arrest of about 750 

000 each year for possession of small amounts of marijuana. Only 36 per cent of 

the budget is reserved for treatment and other demand reduction activities. 

Nonetheless, the US has one of the highest levels of drug use in the world, while 

many European countries adopting softer approaches have significantly lower 

usage levels. In short, the solutions are known, but have not been fully 

implemented.56 

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Furthermore, reducing demand of marijuana would significantly reduce violence 

caused by cartels 

McArdle, a writer for the Atlantic, 2011 

(Megan, JUN 23, Legalizing Marijuana Could Save Thousands of Lives, 

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/06/legalizing-marijuana-could-savethousands-of-lives/240905/) 

Like cartels, it's probably true that Apple has a lot of other activities that represent profit 

centers, and they would be unlikely to "close up shop" in the event of losing the iPhone 

market. But it is a far walk from here to concluding that their "power and influence" (or 

whatever the comparable measures are for a legal company, maybe market cap) 

would not be severely weakened. I guess my question for Longmire is this: if a 60% 

decline in revenues wouldn't represent a significant blow to the power and influence of 

cartels, what percentage would 70% 90% Another important way cartels are similar 

to Apple is that there likely economies of scope and scale for cartels. A decrease in 

marijuana revenues will take away resources they were using to build their 

distribution networks and buy political and legal influence, both of which 

probably exhibit economies of scale and are inputs for cartels in the production 

of their other elicit goods. This means a decrease in marijuana revenue should 

decrease raise costs and thus decrease profits in their other markets. This is in the 

same way that if the iPhone went away it would hurt Apple's sales of it's computers and 

software, and generally diminish its brand. Longmire ends her piece by listing reasons 

why marijuana should be legalized: "We need to stop viewing casual users as criminals, 

and we need to treat addicts as people with health and emotional problems. Doing so 

would free up a significant amount of jail space, court time and law enforcement 

resources. What it won't do, though, is stop the violence in Mexico." Say the higher end 

estimate of marijuana revenues from the Rand corporation is correct, and legalizing 

would reduce cartel revenue by 26%, or that the 60% number is correct and they will 

make back an implausibly high 50% of their lost revenue in other activities. This means 

something like a 30% decrease in lost revenues. If this leads to a proportional 

decrease in long-run drug related murders in Mexico, then based on the 15,273 

drug related deaths in 2010, there would be 4,580 fewer deaths each year. That's a 

huge gain in welfare even if it falls short of the quixotic goal of "killing the 

cartels". The end of alcohol prohibition in the U.S. did not mean an end to the mafia, 

but it did lead to a significant decline in murders and in their power. Longmire has not 

presented a convincing case that the same would not be true in Mexico. 

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Solvency: Decriminalization Solves 

Decriminalization solves-Portugal proves that decriminalization helps solve drug 

related issues 

Vastag, 2009. [Brian Vastag, science reporter for the Washington Post, “5 Years After: 

Portugal's Drug Decriminalization Policy Shows Positive Results”, Scientific 

American.com, April 7th, 2009, 

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfmid=portugal-drug-decriminalization]. 

In the face of a growing number of deaths and cases of HIV linked to drug abuse, the 

Portuguese government in 2001 tried a new tack to get a handle on the problem—it 

decriminalized the use and possession of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, LSD and 

other illicit street drugs. The theory: focusing on treatment and prevention 

instead of jailing users would decrease the number of deaths and infections. Five 

years later, the number of deaths from street drug overdoses dropped from 

around 400 to 290 annually, and the number of new HIV cases caused by using 

dirty needles to inject heroin, cocaine and other illegal substances plummeted 

from nearly 1,400 in 2000 to about 400 in 2006, according to a report released 

recently by the Cato Institute, a Washington, D.C, libertarian think tank. "Now instead 

of being put into prison, addicts are going to treatment centers and they're 

learning how to control their drug usage or getting off drugs entirely," report 

author Glenn Greenwald, a former New York State constitutional litigator, said during a 

press briefing at Cato last week. Under the Portuguese plan, penalties for people 

caught dealing and trafficking drugs are unchanged; dealers are still jailed and 

subjected to fines depending on the crime. But people caught using or possessing small 

amounts—defined as the amount needed for 10 days of personal use—are brought 

before what's known as a "Dissuasion Commission," an administrative body created by 

the 2001 law. Each three-person commission includes at least one lawyer or judge and 

one health care or social services worker. The panel has the option of recommending 

treatment, a small fine, or no sanction. Peter Reuter, a criminologist at the University of 

Maryland, College Park, says he's skeptical decriminalization was the sole reason drug 

use slid in Portugal, noting that another factor, especially among teens, was a global 

decline in marijuana use. By the same token, he notes that critics were wrong in their 

warnings that decriminalizing drugs would make Lisbon a drug mecca. "Drug 

decriminalization did reach its primary goal in Portugal," of reducing the health 

consequences of drug use, he says, "and did not lead to Lisbon becoming a drug tourist 

destination." 

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Solvency: Decriminalization Solves 

Decriminalization decreases the number of drug users -Portugal proves 

Blackstone, 2012. [Samuel Blackstone, Business Insider, “ Drug decriminalization in 

Portugal decreases number of addicts”, Global Post News, July 18 th , 2012, 

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/120718/drugdecriminalization-portugal-addicts]. 

On July 1, 2001, Portugal decriminalized every imaginable drug, from marijuana, to 

cocaine, to heroin. Some thought Lisbon would become a drug tourist haven, others 

predicted usage rates among youths to surge. Eleven years later, it turns out they were 

both wrong. Over a decade has passed since Portugal changed its philosophy 

from labeling drug users as criminals to labeling them as people affected by a 

disease. This time lapse has allowed statistics to develop and in time, has made 

Portugal an example to follow. First, some clarification. Portugal's move to 

decriminalize does not mean people can carry around, use, and sell drugs free from 

police interference. That would be legalization. Rather, all drugs are "decriminalized," 

meaning drug possession, distribution, and use is still illegal. While distribution and 

trafficking is still a criminal offense, possession and use is moved out of criminal courts 

and into a special court where each offender's unique situation is judged by legal 

experts, psychologists, and social workers. Treatment and further action is decided in 

these courts, where addicts and drug use is treated as a public health service rather 

than referring it to the justice system (like the US),reports Fox News. The resulting 

effect: a drastic reduction in addicts, with Portuguese officials and 

reports highlighting that this number, at 100,000 before the new policy was 

enacted, has been halved in the following 10 years. Portugal's drug usage rates 

are now among the lowest of EU member states, according to the same report. 

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Answers to: Gangs Fight Over Shrinking Illegal Market 

[ ] War on drugs reason for drug trafficking 

Grudgings 2009 (Stuart, Rueters, Latin America ex-leaders urge reform of US drug 

war, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN11358345) 

RIO DE JANEIRO, Feb 11 (Reuters) - The war against drugs is failing and the U.S. 

government should break with "prohibition" policies that have achieved little more than 

cram its prisons and stoke violence, three former Latin American presidents said 

on Wednesday. The respected former presidents urged the United States and 

Latin American governments to move away from jailing drug users to debate the 

legalization of marijuana and place more emphasis on the treatment of addicts. 

Former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria said there was no meaningful debate over 

drugs policy in the United States, despite a broad consensus that current policies had 

failed. "The problem today in the U.S. is that narco-trafficking is a crime and so any 

politician is fearful of talking about narco-trafficking or talking about policies because 

they will be called soft," he said. Gaviria has joined with former Brazilian President 

Fernando Henrique Cardoso and former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo to try to 

change the debate on drugs in Latin America, where trafficking gangs have killed 

tens of thousands of people and weakened democracies through corruption. 

From Mexico's gang wars to the drug-funded FARC guerrilla group in Colombia 

and daily shoot-outs between gangs and police in Rio de Janeiro's shantytowns, 

much of the region is scarred by drug violence and many believe U.S. policies 

have failed. A United Nations meeting in Vienna next month will frame international 

drugs policy for the next 10 years, and the three former presidents, whose group is 

called the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, said it is time for 

change. They pointed to falling street prices for cocaine and still high levels of consumption in 

the United States despite decades of policies focused on punishing users and cutting supplies 

from Latin American countries such as Colombia. 'PREJUDICES, FEARS' The presidents' 

commission released a report calling on governments to refocus policies toward treating users, 

move toward decriminalizing marijuana, and invest more in education campaigns. It said 

current policies were rooted in "prejudices, fears and ideological visions" that inhibited 

debate. Even as the group met in Rio on Wednesday, police arrested 51 people in a 

major operation in the city and other states against a suspected drug smuggling ring 

that sent cocaine to Europe and brought back synthetic drugs like Ecstasy. Organized 

crime has flourished around drugs and is now threatening the stability of Mexico, 

where a spiraling war between rival gangs killed more than 5,700 people last year. 

Cardoso, one of Latin America's most respected figures, said U.S. leadership was 

essential to break the cycle of drug-related crime and violence. "It will be almost 

impossible to solve Mexico's problems and other countries' problems without a 

more ample, comprehensive set of policies from the U.S. government," he said. 

Despite winning power on broad promises of change, drugs policy featured little in U.S. President Barack 

Obama's election campaign and there are few indications that he will embark on a major overhaul. 

Gaviria said Washington appeared increasingly isolated in its repressive approach as Latin America and 

Europe move toward treating drug abuse as a health problem rather than a crime. (Editing by Raymond 

Colitt and Kieran Murray) 

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Answers to: Legalizing Marijuana is Insufficient 

[ ] 

[ ] Legalizing marijuana will help solve and is an essential first step 

Castañeda, foreign minister of Mexico during the administration of President 

Vicente Fox, 2012 

(Jorge, CATO Institute Economic Development Memo, No. 16 • September 24, 2012, 

http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/edb16.pdf) 

Why push for legalization Because we cannot do it alone. If the Americans do not 

do it, we cannot do it. Prices are set in the United States, not in Mexico, so 

legalizing just in Mexico will not really reduce the cartels’ profits because those come 

from the illicit business in the United States. If the United States does not legalize, and 

Mexico does, all we will do is get in trouble with the Americans and not really make a 

dent in the cartels’ finances. Mexico, together with Colombia, perhaps one day with 

Brazil and Peru, should make advocacy for legalization in the United States its main 

task in foreign policy. Mexico today certainly has the moral authority, and President 

Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia certainly has the moral authority, to come to the 

United States and say: “Look guys, we did this for 40 years, like you have. We’ve put up 

55,000 bodies, we’ve spent a fortune, we’ve destroyed our image in the world, we’ve 

knocked down tourism, we have done everything you can humanly do and it doesn’t 

work, so we have to do something else.” It is very important, of course, for former 

presidents with the prestige of Cardoso and his colleagues to do this. But it is even 

more important for sitting presidents to do so—especially the presidents of Mexico and 

of Colombia today, who for personal reasons have the prestige to do so. If we 

worked along these three lines—combating violence, not drug trafficking; building a 

national police and pulling the army back; and fighting for legalization, even if we 

cannot do it overnight with all drugs—we will have the beginning of an alternative 

policy that can work. 

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Answers to: Decriminalization won’t be a model 

[ ] 

[ ] Mexico Will Decriminalization Marijuana Following the United States, 

which will drastically reduce drug violence. Drug cartels will lose their market 

both in the U.S and in Mexico. 

Shoichet, 2013. [ Catherine E. Shoichet, reporter for CNN News, “Former Mexican 

president pushing for pot legalization”, CNN News, May 31, 2013. 

http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/30/us/washington-marijuana-fox.] 

(CNN) -- A former Mexican president who once led a military crackdown on drug 

cartels now has a new pitch: creating a legal system to produce, distribute and 

tax marijuana. Vicente Fox is joining a group of entrepreneurs in Seattle this week 

to discuss that possibility, six months after voters in Washington state approved 

a ballot measure allowing recreational marijuana use. As president, Fox launched 

Operation Safe Mexico, which sent soldiers and federal police to eight cities across the 

country in 2005 as drug cartels expanded their reach. But since leaving office in 2006, 

he's taken a significantly softer stance. For years, he's pushed for drug legalization. 

Using military force to fight cartels doesn't work, he argues, but legalization would. "With 

this we will avoid the violence," Fox told CNN's Wolf Blitzer on Thursday. "We will 

control the criminals and reduce their income, and at the same time it would become a 

transparent, accountable business in the hands of businessmen." Speaking to reporters 

earlier Thursday, Fox praised Washington State’s efforts to legalize marijuana and 

"change the paradigm." "In Mexico we welcome this initiative," he said, "because 

the cost of the war in the case of Mexico is becoming unbearable, too high for 

Mexico, Latin America and the rest of the world." Legalization measures, he 

argued, ultimately topple the foundations of organized crime. "We must get out of 

this trap, and here is the opportunity,' Fox said."Now this group here is moving 

accordingly from words into plans, and from plans into action, and from action into the 

arena. To play the real game this group must understand the need to make good, safe, 

and legal use of these new laws, for the benefit of the people and the common good." 

As Fox spoke, Jamen Shively nodded in agreement. The former Microsoft executive is 

heading up a new business venture that aims to create the first national brand of retail 

cannabis in the United States. Fox told CNN he was not involved in Shively's venture, 

but sat beside him because he supports the push to move to put the drug trade in the 

hands of businessmen, not criminals. "By making cannabis illegal, we have instead 

turned it into a tool for violence, exploited by criminals and organized crime, spanning 

many countries," Shively said. "Ladies and gentlemen, this is a unique moment in 

history. The Berlin Wall of the prohibition of cannabis is weak, and it is crumbling 

as we speak. And just as happened in Berlin in 1989, the old guards who used to 

protect the wall of cannabis prohibition are laying down their weapons and 

walking away." 

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[ ] 

Answers to: decriminalization won’t be a modeled 

[ ] Decriminalization would reduce revenue flows to cartels – and other 

countries would model US policy. 

Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato 


(Ted Galen, Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United 

States, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 631, February 2, 2009, 

http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa631.pdf) 

The only feasible strategy to counter the mounting turmoil in Mexico is to 

drastically reduce the potential revenue flows to the trafficking organizations. In 

other words, the United States needs to de-fund the cartels through the legalization of 

currently illegal drugs. If Washington abandoned the prohibition model, it is very 

likely that other countries in the international community would do the same. 

Atthat point,the profitmargins for the drug trade would be similar to the margins for 

other legal commodities, and legitimate business personnel would become the 

principal players. That is precisely what happened when the United States ended 

its quixotic crusade against alcohol in 1933. To help reverse the burgeoning 

tragedy of drugrelated violence in Mexico, Washington needs to adopt a similar course 

today. 

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Decriminalization and Treatment Solves – Lowers Demand for Drugs and 

Violence 

[ ] Decriminalization decreases demand for drugs 

Stonebraker, associate professor of economics at Winthrop University, 2013 

(Robert, “Supply-Side Drug Policy: Will it Ever Work,” The Joy of Economics: Making 

Sense out of Life Section II-C: Crime, June 4, Online: 

http://faculty.winthrop.edu/stonebrakerr/book/supplysidedrugs.htm) 

Legalization A more radical approach is legalization. Although quite controversial, 

legalization does offer potential gains. Much of the current drug-related crime occurs as 

rival suppliers battle for turf and market share both within the U.S. and along supply 

routes throughout Central and South America and Asia. In a legal market, suppliers are 

likely to enforce contracts by recourse to law rather than violence. Moreover, law 

enforcement officials, free from having to chase down drug offenders, could reallocate 

their time and efforts to reducing other types of criminal activity. Drug safety might also 

improve. Retail stores that offer branded products meeting government-certified 

standards could replace back-alley vendors who offer drugs of unknown purity. 

Legalization also might create financial benefits. In addition to the potential tax revenues 

states might collect on the sale and use of controlled substances, billions of dollars now 

being spent on drug enforcement and prisons could be saved. Legalization certainly 

would increase the supply of currently illegal substances and bring down prices. The 

interesting question is what might happen to demand. Opponents are convinced 

that legalization would cause the demand for drugs to soar as hordes of new users 

"experiment." Since many of these might subsequently become addicted, the costs to 

society would quickly multiply. On the other hand, proponents contend that quantities 

consumed will not rise significantly. Stripped of their illicit cloak, drugs would be 

less alluring to rebellious youth. If so, the demand for drugs might actually 

plummet. And, if we fear that lower prices will push usage up, governments can 

raise those prices by imposing appropriate taxes. Moreover, alcohol can be a 

substitute for products such as marijuana or cocaine. If so, an increase in drug usage 

might create a similar decrease in the consumption of alcohol and its related costs. 

Since 2001, Portugal has used a novel, but related, approach. While possession 

and use of drugs remains officially illegal, they have been "decriminalized". The 

police can stop anyone they find using illegal substances and confiscate the drugs but, 

instead of imposing criminal penalties, they send the users to "dissuasion 

commissions" that offer therapy. There are no fines and no prison sentences. The 

initial results have been encouraging. Usage rates for most substances seem to 

have fallen or remained constant and, with the fear of prosecution removed, the 

numbers of users seeking treatment has risen significantly.9 Similarly, Uruguay has 

much lower rates of drug usage than the U.S. despite the fact that possession of 

drugs for individual use in that country never has been illegal. several other Latin 

American countries now are considering similar policies.10 Although several U.S. 

states recently have moved to decriminalize marijuana, at least for medical purposes, 

the approach remains controversial. 

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Answers to: Decriminalizing Marijuana is Insufficient 

[ ] 

[ ] decriminalizing marijuana would destroy black market infrastructure 

Kain, Forbes Contributor, 2011 

(Erik, Would Legalizing Marijuana Stop the Drug Violence in Mexico, 6/24, 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/06/24/would-legalizing-marijuana-stop-thedrug-violence-in-mexico/) 

So if you legalize marijuana you hit the black market infrastructure where it hurts. 

Suddenly people are buying their marijuana from the grocery store or a dispensary 

instead of from a dealer, and the ability of dealers to push other harder drugs becomes 

greatly diminished. People who want to get high are suddenly able to do so legally so 

long as they stick to marijuana, making the risk-gap between using marijuana and other 

drugs suddenly much wider. In other words, legalizing marijuana fundamentally 

alters the landscape of the black market in ways that would make it harder for 

drug traffickers to access the market in the first place, creating fewer consumers 

and potential consumers almost overnight. This means that even if marijuana 

makes up much less than 60 percent of the cartels’ profits (Ozemik cites numbers 

around 26%) removing marijuana from their product line would cut into profits all 

across the board. This would significantly weaken the cartels and would – at 

some point – lead to a decrease in violence both in Mexico and here in the United 

States. We should always be skeptical, and crime organizations may indeed move into 

other areas of business, but legalizing marijuana would hurt the cartels much more than 

the current war on drugs. 

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[ ] 

Answer to: increase teens uses 

Decriminalization declines adolescents usage Colorado proves 

Ferner 12 ( Matt Ferner is the Denver editor for the Huffington Post; 09/07/2012 ; 

Marijuana Usage Down Among Colorado Teens, Up Nationally: Study Shows ; 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/07/marijuana-usage-down-in-t_n_1865095.html 

) 

A recent study suggested that teens who routinely smoke marijuana are at risk for a 

long-term drop in their IQ that marijuana users 18 and older do not experience. The 

researchers were quick to point out that the findings are not definitive, but do line up 

with other signs that marijuana use can harm a young, developing brain. Fortunately in 

Colorado, it appears that teen marijuana use is in decline while national use has 

gone up during the same period, according to data from the Youth Risk Behavior 

Surveillance System (YRBS) report compiled by the Center for Disease Control and 

Prevention. The drop in use by Colorado teens, a drop below the national average, 

coincides with the same period that the medical marijuana industry developed in 

the state, between 2009 and 2011. "To put it simply, teen marijuana usage has 

been going down in Colorado since the passage of our comprehensive medical 

marijuana regulatory model," Mike Elliott, executive director of the Medical 

Marijuana Industry Group, told The Huffington Post. "This is exactly the opposite of 

what opponents of medical marijuana predicted. Colorado’s teen marijuana usage 

rate is going down because this regulatory model has taken control away from the 

black market and given it back to our school districts, local and state 

governments, and the citizens of Colorado." 

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Answer to: increase teens uses 

[ ] Decriminalization of Marijuana Usage Rates for adolescents 

Altieri 13 (Erik Altieri Communications Director With Liberalized Laws, Young Adult 

Marijuana Use Plummets ; http://blog.norml.org/2013/08/05/with-liberalized-laws-youthmarijuana-use-plummets/;) 

According to polling data released this week by Gallup, 38% of Americans admit to 

having smoked marijuana in their lives. This rate remains relatively unchanged from 

Gallup’s previous surveys on this question. 34% responded in the affirmative when 

asked in 1999 and 33% in 1985. What is significant about this data is that, while total 

use had risen very slightly, use among 18-29 year olds has fallen 20% since 1985. In 

1985, 56% of 18-29 year olds admitted to having tried marijuana, which dropped 

to 46% in 1999 and is now down to 36%. This decrease has occurred while twenty 

states approved medical marijuana legislation, sixteen states have decriminalized 

possession, and two states have fully legalized marijuana. The threats of 

skyrocketing young adult use seem incredibly unfounded when it appears the 

current trajectory towards marijuana legalization has had the opposite effect. 

Gallup found use rates among 50 to 64 year olds has gone from 9% in 1985 to 44% 

today. These findings seem to show that as those who came of age in the 1960′s and 

70′s get older they are continuing or returning to their cannabis use. 

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Treatment Counterplan 

Affirmative

Decriminalization and Treatment CP 



Decriminalization and Treatment CP Aff Answers-Table of 

Contents 

Glossary ................................................................................................................ 2 

Turn 

Turn: Decriminalization Increases Violence ...................................................... 3-4 

Solvency 

No Solvency: Decriminalization Won’t Kill Cartels – Diverse Business Ventures . 5 

No Solvency: Decriminalizing Marijuana Not Enough ........................................... 6 

No Solvency: Decrmininalization Won’t be Modeled ............................................. 7 

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Glossary 

Drug Cartel- organizations that aim to control and monitor drug trafficking 

DTOs- Drug Trafficking Organizations 

Peña Nieto- President of Mexico 

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Turn: Decriminalization Increases Violence – Gangs Fight Over Shrinking 

Illegal Market 

[ ]Decriminalization fails- Gangs would still sell drugs illegally and 

would become more violent in an attempt to control their shrinking marketshare. 

Felbab-Brown, senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, 

2012 

(Vanda, “Organized Criminals Won't Fade Away” August 2012 The World Today 

Magazine http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/drugs-crime-felbabbrown) 

Although frequently portrayed as an effective solution to the problem of 

organized crime, mere legalization of illicit economies, particularly of drugs, is no 

panacea. Proponents of legalization as a mechanism to reduce organized crime make at 

least two arguments: it will severely deprive organized crime groups of resources. It will also 

free law enforcement agencies to concentrate on other types of crime. A country may have 

good reasons to want to legalize the use and even production of some addictive substances 

and ride out the consequences of greater use. Such reasons could include providing better 

health care to users, reducing the number of users in prison, and perhaps even generating 

greater revenues and giving jobs to the poor. Yet without robust state presence and 

effective law enforcement, both often elusive in parts of the world such as Latin 

America or Africa, there can be little assurance that organized crime groups 

would be excluded from the legal drug trade. In fact, they may have numerous 

advantages over legal companies and manage to hold on to the trade, perhaps even resorting 

to violence to do so. Nor does mere legalization mean that the state will suddenly 

become robust and effective. Persistent deficiencies in the state explain why 

there is so much illegal logging alongside legal logging, for example, or why 

smuggling in legal goods take place. Organized crime groups who stand to be 

displaced from the drug trade by legalization can hardly be expected to take the 

change lying down. Rather, they may intensify their violent power struggles over 

remaining illegal economies, such as the smuggling of other contraband or 

migrants, prostitution, extortion, and kidnapping. To mitigate their financial losses, 

they may also seek to take over the black economy, which operates outside the tax 

system. If they succeed in organizing street life in this informal sector, their political 

power over society will be greater than ever. Nor does legalization imply that 

police would be freed up to focus on other issues or become less corrupt: The 

state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy. 

Additionally, a grey market in drugs would probably emerge. If drugs became 

legal, the state would want to tax them – to generate revenues and to 

discourage greater use. The higher the tax, the greater the opportunity for 

organized crime to undercut the state by charging less. Organized crime groups 

could set up their own fields with smaller taxation, snatch the market and the profits, 

and the state would be back to combating them and eradicating their fields. Such grey 

markets exist alongside a host of legal economies, from cigarettes to stolen cars. 

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Turn: Decriminalization Increases Violence – Gangs Fight Over Shrinking 

Illegal Market 

[ ] 

[ ] A Shrinking Demand for Drugs Would Intensify Drug-related 

Violence 

Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institue, 2010 

(Vanda, Why Legalization in Mexico is Not a Panacea for Reducing Violence and 

Suppressing Organized Crime, September 23, 2010, 

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/09/23-mexico-marijuanalegalizationfelbabbrownrssid=mexico&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_c 

ampaign=Feed%3a%2bBrookingsRSS%2ftopics%2fmexico%2b(Brookings%3a 

%2bTopics%2b-%2bMexico) 

But, even if legalization did displace the DTOs from the marijuana production 

and distribution market in Mexico, they can hardly be expected to take such a 

change lying down. Rather, they may intensify the violent power struggle 

over remaining hard-drug smuggling and distribution. (Notably, the 

shrinkage of the U.S. cocaine market is one of the factors that precipitated 

the current DTO wars.) Worse yet, the DTOs could intensify their effort to 

take over other illegal economies in Mexico, such as the smuggling of 

migrants and other illegal commodities, prostitution, extortion, and 

kidnapping, and also over Mexico’s informal economy – trying to franchise who 

sells tortillas, jewelry, clothes on the zócalo -- to mitigate their financial losses. 

They are already doing so. If they succeed in franchising the informal 

economy and organizing public spaces and street life in the informal sector 

(40% of Mexico’s economy), their political power over society will be greater 

than ever. 

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No Solvency: Decriminalization Won’t Kill Cartels – Diverse Business 

Ventures 

[ ] 

[ ] Drug cartels won’t be harmed by Decriminalization of marijuana 

Longmire, a former officer and investigative special agent in the Air Force, 2011 

(Sylvia, Legalization Won’t Kill the Cartels, June 18, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/opinion/19longmire.html_r=1) 

Unfortunately, it’s not that easy. Marijuana legalization has many merits, but it 

would do little to hinder the long-term economics of the cartels — and the violent 

toll they take on Mexican society. For one thing, if marijuana makes up 60 

percent of the cartels’ profits, that still leaves another 40 percent, which includes 

the sale of methamphetamine, cocaine, and brown-powder and black-tar heroin. 

If marijuana were legalized, the cartels would still make huge profits from the 

sale of these other drugs. Plus, there’s no reason the cartels couldn’t enter the 

legal market for the sale of marijuana, as organized crime groups did in the 

United States after the repeal of Prohibition. Still, legalization would deliver a 

significant short-term hit to the cartels — if drug trafficking were the only activity 

they were engaged in. But cartels derive a growing slice of their income from 

other illegal activities. Some experts on organized crime in Latin America, like 

Edgardo Buscaglia, say that cartels earn just half their income from drugs. 

Indeed, in recent years cartels have used an extensive portfolio of rackets 

and scams to diversify their income. For example, they used to kidnap rivals, 

informants and incompetent subordinates to punish, exact revenge or send a 

message. Now that they have seen that people are willing to pay heavy ransoms, 

kidnapping has become their second-most-lucrative venture, with the 

targets ranging from businessmen to migrants. Another new source of cartel 

revenue is oil theft, long a problem for the Mexican government. The national 

oil company, Pemex, loses hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of petroleum 

every year to bandits and criminal gangs who tap into pipelines and siphon it off. 

Now the cartels are getting involved in this business, working with associates 

north of the border to sell the oil to American companies at huge markups. 

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No Solvency: Decriminalizing Marijuana Not Enough 

[ ] 

[ ] Decriminalizing marijuana fails – it would take the legalization of all 

drugs to stop the drug cartels 

Caulkins and Lee, Carnegie Mellon University, 2012 

(Jonathan P. Caulkins Michael Lee, Legalizing Drugs in the US: A Solution to 

Mexico’s Problems for Which Mexico Should Not Wait, 

http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/legalizing-drugs-us108-124.pdf) 

The political landscape in the US is not amenable to drug legalization, with the 

exception of marijuana. To achieve a noticeable decrease in Mexican 

violence, legalizing marijuana would not be enough. The US would have to 

legalize hard drugs as well. However, as Keith Humphreys notes (2011; 

elsewhere in this volume), the probability of legalizing hard drugs in the US 

is essentially zero. Congress and the American people simply don’t want it. 

The body of this paper explains why that reticence can be grounded in a 

perfectly rational aversion to irreversible risky gambles, not necessarily from 

ignorance or lack of imagination. 

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No Solvency: Decriminalization Won’t be Modeled 

[ ] Decriminalization won’t be modeled – Mexico will maintain it’s 

police and military crackdown. 

Kozloff, PhD in Latin American History from Oxford, 2013 

(Nikolas, “How the Latin American Drug War Will End,” TruthOut, Feb 12, Online: 

http://truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/item/17800-how-the-latin-americandrug-war-will-end) 

Despite this political pressure in both the U.S. and Mexico, the 

establishment has waffled on marijuana. Earlier this summer, Peña Nieto 

said that he would welcome a debate on drug legalization in Mexico. However, 

the President has continued to deploy the military on to the streets while 

battling the cartels. Nieto furthermore has avoided holding major press 

conferences about the drug war, hoping that perhaps he can buy time or at 

least distract the public. Over at The Nation magazine, Tom Hayden reports 

that the U.S. pressured Nieto to continue a military policy prior to the election. 

Fundamentally, writes alternet columnist Phillip Smith, “neither incoming 

Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto nor the Obama administration are 

showing many signs they are willing to take the bold, decisive actions -- 

like ending drug prohibition -- that many serious observers on all sides of the 

spectrum say will be necessary to tame the cartels.” Faced with such inertia at 

the top, legalization advocates may face a long slog ahead. Moreover, as they 

cultivate unusual cross-border alliances, activists may confront a significant 

obstacle in the counter-narcotics establishment. If the ban on marijuana is lifted, 

then certain agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration would lose a 

lot of their budget and overall legitimacy. Psychologically, it may be difficult for 

the counter-narcotics apparatus to admit defeat after investing literally 

billions of dollars repressing the marijuana trade as well as other drugs. 

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Venezuela Engagement 

Affirmative

Venezuela Engagement Affirmative 



Venezuela Engagement Affirmative – Table of Contents 

Summary............................................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 4 

1AC ................................................................................................................................................. 5-10 

Stability Advantage 

Answers to: Venezuelan Economy Stable .......................................................................................... 11 

Answers to: Venezuelan Government Stable...................................................................................... 12 

Answers to: Venezuelan Economy – Alternate Causality ................................................................... 13 

Answers to: Oil Production Stable ....................................................................................................... 14 

Answers to: Oil Investment Now ......................................................................................................... 15 

Answers to: Latin American Stability Defense..................................................................................... 16 

Answers to: Iran Venezuela Alliance is not a threat ............................................................................ 17 

Venezuelan Instability Spills Over ....................................................................................................... 18 

Oil Shocks Add On 

Oil Shocks Add On 1/1 ........................................................................................................................ 19 

Answers to: Venezuela won’t cut off the US ....................................................................................... 20 

Answers to: Venezuela oil has no effect on US .................................................................................. 21 

Answers to: Venezuela does not effect economy ............................................................................... 22 

Relations Add-On 

Relations Add-On ......................................................................................................................... 23- 26 

Answers to: Tensions Inevitable ......................................................................................................... 27 

Answers to: Relations Resilient ........................................................................................................... 28 

Answers to: Relations Low Alternate Causality .............................................................................. 29-30 

Answers to: Investment hurts relations ............................................................................................... 31 

Solvency 

Appeasement Good- Instability ........................................................................................................... 32 

Appeasement Good- Leverage ........................................................................................................... 34 

Appeasement Good- Hardliners .......................................................................................................... 35 

Appeasement forces Maduro to back down ....................................................................................... 36 

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Appeasement Answers: Instability prevent democracy in Venezuela ................................................. 37 

Appeasement Answers: Oil industry promotes democracy ................................................................. 38 

Answers to: Venezuela would say no- Political Move ......................................................................... 39 

Answers to: Venezuela would say no- Hardliners ............................................................................... 40 

Answers to: Takes too Long ................................................................................................................ 41 

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Summary 

This Affirmative argues that the United States should increase economic engagement with Venezuela 

by investing in their oil industry. 

For the past 14 years Venezuela has been run by Hugo Chavez , a leftwing populist prone to 

bashing the United States, and spending the nation’s oil wealth on the citizens of the country through 

many social programs. Chavez died in March . His handpicked successor, Nicolas Maduro, was 

elected President in a Special election in April. Maduro comes to power in a very pivotal time for 

Venezuela. The country’s economy is in shambles, his election victory is questioned by the 

opposition party, and his own party is filled with former Chavez supporters who would like his job. 

The affirmative case claims one advantage. Instability in Venezuela should be avoided. A new 

Presidency gives the United States a chance to start working with a new government to help improve 

the situation in Venezuela. Right now the country is dependent on oil for most of its economic 

earnings and growth. However, there has been little investment in the infrastructure of the oil industry 

so production cannot be increased and hard to reach oil cannot be extracted from the ground. The 

lack of economic growth will doom Maduro’s government and he will turn to drug cartels, Cuba, Iran 

and other enemies of the United States for support to stay in power. None of these alliances would 

be beneficial to US security interests. Continued instability would also prevent Venezuela from 

reforming into a democracy and limit the effectiveness of regional organizations to promote peace in 

South America. If he is unable to retain power, Venezuela will be swept into a Civil War that could 

spill over into other parts of South America. US investment in the oil industry would provide the boost 

Venezuela needs to stabilize their economy and government and survive the transition. 

The Oil Shocks Add-On- argues that instability and civil war in Venezuela will cut off the supply of oil 

to the United States. This will cause a major shock to oil prices by lowering the available supply. 

These shocks will harm the US and world economy since Venezuela is a major oil producer for the 

United States. 

The Relations Add On argues that the US can reset relations with Venezuela through engagement. 

Relations with Venezuela are necessary. The economic situation in Venezuela puts the country in a 

unique situation to be open to restarting relations with the US. Strong relations with Venezuela are 

key to broader relations and influence with Latin America. Broader Latin America relations are 

crucial to solving a host of issues . 

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Glossary 

Black Swan Theory-The black swan theory or theory of black swan events is a metaphor that 

describes an event that is a surprise (to the observer), has a major effect, and after the fact is often 

inappropriately rationalized with the benefit of hindsight 

Hybrid- A thing made by combining two different elements; a mixture 

Nicolas Maduro- newly elected president of Venezuela, former forieign minister, ally of Chavez 

Orinoco Belt- large deposit of tar sands in Venezuela that the state oil company does not have the 

resources to extract crude oil from 

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1AC 1/6 

Observation 1: Inherency 

Venezuela’s economy is centered around oil production, but years of poor government 

planning have left a crumbling infrastructure that cannot increase oil production or oil 

revenues to pay for social services. 

Nagel, blogger for Transitions, 2013. 

(Juan, Forgein Policy Transitions is the group blog of the Democracy Lab channel, a collaboration 

between Foreign Policy and the Legatum Institute. “Is Venezuela becoming a failed state” Foreign 

Policy[http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/is_venezuela_becoming_a_failed_state]) 

Being an oil producer, Venezuela can earn money in two ways: by sustaining high prices, or by 

increasing production. (Obviously, if it can do both things, it has hit the jackpot). Fracking 

threatens the first, and the country has seriously failed on the latter. 

Venezuela produces less oil now than it did in 1999, the year Hugo Chávez first came to 

power. Worryingly, the IEA sees few prospects for increased production. For example, in spite of 

increasing investment to $22 billion last year, Venezuelan production barely budged. State oil giant 

PDVSA vows to increase production by 3 million barrels per day in the next six years, but the IEA 

believes that a combination of the company's inefficiency and its heavy debt burden means the 

increase will actually be a tenth of that amount. 

Two other developments conspire against the future viability of Venezuela's oil industry. The country 

is increasing sales of crude oil to China, as part of a geo-strategic move the Chávez 

administration embarked on many years ago. The problem is that the oil being shipped has 

already been paid for, and the government has also already spent the money. 

The other issue is Venezuela's creaking refining infrastructure. Last year, following several 

accidents at its refineries, Venezuela became a net importer of gasoline and other refined 

products. In the last part of the year alone, PDVSA bought refined products for $1.5 billion, only to 

turn around and give it away for practically nothing, thanks to the heavy subsidies that characterize its 

internal market. 

The consensus is that Venezuela needs high oil prices just to stay afloat. But if the fracking oil 

boom results in low oil prices, what does the future hold for the South American country 

Sadly, Venezuelans have nothing else to fall back on. Its private industry is a shambles, and 

the country is even importing toilet paper. Years of populism have left the state crippled and 

heavily in debt. The public deficit reached a whopping 15 percent of GDP last year, even in the 

context of high oil prices. Most of the spending came in the form of entitlements and 

subsidies that will not be easily eliminated. Furthermore, the country's current power clique seems 

particularly inept in dealing with the complicated economic and political conditions it has inherited. 

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1AC 2/6 

Observation 2: Venezuelan Stability 

Increased production capacity and oil revenues are necessary for Venezuela to maintain 

political stability and avoiding a civil war. 

Nagel, blogger for Transitions, 2013. 

(Juan, Forgein Policy Transitions is the group blog of the Democracy Lab channel, a collaboration 

between Foreign Policy and the Legatum Institute. “Is Venezuela becoming a failed state” Foreign 

Policy[http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/is_venezuela_becoming_a_failed_state]) 

A long period of low oil prices spells doom for Venezuela's political sustainability. Without 

high oil revenues, basic services would practically disappear, and the potential for instability 

would be enormous. Already the country is stuck in a state of undeclared in civil war, and there 

are claims that drug smuggling has permeated the higher echelons of the government. 

Venezuela has so far avoided the fate of its neighbor Colombia, a country still deep in a long 

civil war with Marxist guerrillas and drug cartels. This is largely due to the deep pockets oil has 

afforded the government, which allowed for state presence even in the most remote corners of 

the country. It is hard to see how that presence could be maintained if oil rents were to dry up 

significantly, and for a prolonged period. This could lead to the type of problems that have 

bedeviled Colombia, or even poorer neighboring failed states such as Haiti. Even though its 

problems are of its own making, the thought of a large, failed state in the heart of the Western 

Hemisphere should trouble the continent's leaders. 

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1AC 3/6 

Collapse of political stability will force President Maduro to seek assistance from drug cartels, 

Iran, Cuba and other groups that run counter to American interests to maintain power. These 

alliances will create uniquely dangerous security issues for the United States. 

Shinkman, national security reporter for U.S. News & World Report, 2013. 

(Paul D. “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond” US News 

and World Report , 4/23 [http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narcoterrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respondpage=2]) 

The situation in the South American nation remains dire amid skyrocketing inflation, largely 

due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize private industry and increase social benefits. Maduro's 

immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to remedying widespread blackouts and 

food shortages. One expert on the region says the new leader may need to tap into a shadow 

world of transnational crime to maintain the stability his countrymen expect. "Venezuela is a 

really nice bar, and anybody can go in there and pick up anybody else," says Doug Farah, an expert 

on narco-terrorism and Latin American crime. He compares the country to the kind of 

establishment where nefarious actors can find solutions to a problem. Anti-American groups 

can find freelance cyber terrorists, for example, or potential drug runners can make 

connections with the FARC, the Colombian guerilla organization, he says. "Sometimes it creates a 

long-term relationship, and sometimes it creates a one-night stand," says Farah, a former Washington 

Post investigative reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment 

and Strategy Center. Under Chavez, Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for 

decades has navigated treacherous financial waters and desperate economic straits, all while 

dodging U.S. influence. But the help Venezuela receives is not limited to its own hemisphere. 

Farah produced a research paper for the U.S. Army War College in August 2012 about the "growing 

alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents and other anti-American groups in Latin 

America, including the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. This alliance with Iran uses 

established drug trade routes from countries in South and Central America to penetrate North 

American borders, all under a banner of mutual malevolence toward the U.S. 

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1AC 4/6 

Venezuela instability is disastrous for United States interests. It destroys any hope of 

establishing a democracy in Venezuela, broader Latin American cooperation efforts, and 

allows drug trafficking to flourish. 

Duddy, senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador 

to Venezuela, 2012 

(Patrick D., “Political Unrest in Venezuela”, Council on Foreign Relations, 09/2012, 

http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936) 

Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote 

democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic 

interests in the region. Democracy promotion: The United States has worked for decades to 

promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become 

increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to 

the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States 

should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela’s democracy as a 

setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a 

compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in 

Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives 

advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and 

technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred 

thousand barrels of oil per day. Regional cooperation: The United States has an interest in 

nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the Organization of 

American States (OAS), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United 

States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with 

democratically elected 5 governments participate. A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in 

Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the 

organization both in the region and in the United States. How the United States manages its 

relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with 

others in the hemisphere, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts 

badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that 

characterized the hemisphere’s efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to 

U.S. relations with the region. Counternarcotics: Venezuela does not cooperate with the United 

States on counternarcotics, except at the most minimal level. Drug trafficking has, 

consequently, surged. A number of Venezuelan military officers, including the current minister of 

defense, have been plausibly accused by the U.S. Treasury of cooperating with the Colombian 

insurgent group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and facilitating drug 

shipments through Venezuela, especially from Apure State. Venezuelan recalcitrance in 

counternarcotics clearly undermines other regional efforts to combat the drug trade. Even low 

levels of violence would create new opportunities for the FARC and other drug traffickers to 

retrench and extend their reach. 

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1AC 5/6 

Plan: The United States federal government should increase financial investment toward 

Venezuelan oil production infrastructure. 

Observation 3: Solvency 

New US investment in petroleum infrastructure increases oil production, provides stability 

and bolsters relations between the US and Venezuela. 

Fillingham, Managing Editor and Asia Analyst for Geopolitical Monitor, 2013. 

(Zachary, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw” Geopolitical Monitor, 3-10 

[http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/]) 

And by all indications, Venezuela’s finances aren’t going to hold out for very long. The country is 

currently running a deficit of over 20 percent, and its national inflation rate fluctuates between 20 and 

30 percent. Though it presides over one of the world’s largest oil reserves and is a card-carrying 

member of OPEC, Venezuela’s oil yields have been dropping throughout the Chavez era due to 

a lack of foreign investment. The same is true of Venezuela’s food industry. A lack of foreign 

investment, inefficiency, and costly subsidies have stunted overall output, resulting in food shortages 

that are now showing themselves in the huge lineups spilling out of government food depots 

nationwide. A reoccurring theme of Chavez’s economic policy was a willful ignorance regarding the 

creation of infrastructure and social capital that could drive economic growth beyond the era of direct 

government handouts. Given the structural challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces, 

challenges that will preclude the government’s ability to continue Chavez-era patronage ad 

infinitum, a Maduro government will inevitably be faced with an economic reckoning of sorts. 

In the aftermath of this economic reckoning, there will be an opportunity for both domestic 

opposition forces within Venezuela, and American foreign policy to make inroads. Just to 

recap: what we are likely to see is a Maduro win, followed by a politico-economic crisis that ushers in 

either a return to credible multi-party democracy or a descent into conspicuous authoritarianism. But 

how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations Given its precarious economic situation, 

Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future. And while some would say that China 

is best suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will 

actually come to pass. First of all, The Chinese Development Bank has already provided a huge 

amount of money to the Chavez government, about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, 

if Venezuela were to be faced with a default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the 

line. Any debt renegotiations would surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the Venezuelan 

public. After all, there have already been agreements reached between Venezuela and the Chinese 

state-owned company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of 

mineral rights over to foreign companies. In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense 

from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a preponderance of Chinese 

economic influence. Now that the “Bolivarian Revolution” is all but discredited, and countries like 

Brazil have proven that it’s possible to alleviate poverty through trade and keep US influence at arm’s 

length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible. However, authorities in Washington will 

likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in Venezuelan domestic 

politics before their window of opportunity presents itself. 

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1AC 6/6 

Foreign investment in oil infrastructure is critical to accessing the largest untapped oil reserve 

in the world located in the Orinoco belt. 

Sanchez, Writer for the Associated Press, 2013 

(Fabiola, Associated Press, “Outlook Grim in Venezuela's Essential Oil Industry,” ABC News, 

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/outlook-grim-venezuelas-essential-oil-industry- 

19108842singlePage=true#.UY67xKLktX8) 

The oil flowing from the El Palito refinery sells for more than five times what it cost when President 

Hugo Chavez took office in 1999. Yet when Chavez died in March he left Venezuela's cash cow, 

its state-run oil company, in such dire straits that analysts say $100-a-barrel oil may no longer 

be enough to keep the country afloat barring a complete overhaul of a deteriorating petroleum 

industry. The situation is more urgent than ever, analysts say. The price of crude has slumped in 

recent weeks and Chavez's heir, Nicolas Maduro, appears to have done little to address 

declining production, billions in debt and infrastructure deficiencies that have caused major 

accidents including a blaze that killed at least 42 people at Venezuela's largest refinery last year. 

Maduro has retained Chavez's oil minister and the head of state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela 

S.A., Rafael Ramirez. And he appears intent on continuing to send cut-rate oil to members of the 18- 

nation Petrocaribe alliance, for which Venezuela is hosting a summit on Saturday. Ramirez said 

Friday that Maduro would use the meeting to propose creating a special economic zone for group 

members. PDVSA, which accounts for 96 percent of the country's export earnings, no longer 

"generates enough income to cover all its costs and finance its commitments," said Pedro Luis 

Rodriguez Sosa, an energy expert at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Administration in Caracas. 

He said that "you can see PDVSA is in trouble" at the $100-a-barrel level because of the many 

millions lost to gasoline subsidies and spending on domestic social spending and PDVSA's use as a 

"geopolitical tool" to maintain regional alliances. Venezuela has the world's largest oil reserves 

but PDVSA's production, earnings and income all appear to be on a downward slide and its 

debts to suppliers rose 35 percent. Its debt to the Central Bank of Venezuela reached $26.19 billion 

last year, a nearly eight-fold increase in two years. The government makes no apologies. It says it is 

employing the country's most important natural resource for the good of the people and promises 

increased production and revenues in the immediate future. Ramirez said that PDVSA's efforts 

remained focused on developing the remote Orinoco belt, site of the world's biggest oil 

reserves, with the aid of oil firms from China, Russia, the U.S., Italy, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan and 

Spain. Venezuela hopes to lift overall production to some 3.32 million barrels a day, 200,000 

more than last year. "We're in a process of trying to attract investment in dollars other than 

ours," Ramirez said, assuring reporters that PDVSA would work with private investors to not 

take on more debt to make new investment. 

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Answers to: Venezuelan Economy Stable 

[ ] 

[ ] Venezuelan economy declining due to falling oil production 

O’Neil, Senior Fellow of Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 

(Shannon K., “Venezuela’s Economy and Future”, Council on Foreign Relations, 6/25, 

http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/06/25/venezuelas-economy-and-future/)//mm 

Many Venezuela watchers have been waiting for the other proverbial economic shoe to drop 

(see here, here, and here), and for the country to fall into serious crisis. Others, such as Mark 

Weisbrot co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, question this 

premise, arguing in his Guardian column that Venezuela has and will continue to make progress 

using its own economic model. So where does the nation stand 

Those supportive of the Chávez and now Maduro government point to Venezuela’s 2012 GDP 

growth, which topped 5 percent (due largely to government spending). Over the last decade GDP per 

capita more than doubled and the poverty rate (using the World Bank’s national poverty line 

measurement) fell from over 60 percent of population in 2003 to some 30 percent in 2011. Inequality 

declined as well, and the United Nations publicly recognized the governments’ efforts in halving the 

number of citizens suffering from malnourishment. Moreover Venezuelans in general seem quite 

happy—reporting a life satisfaction rating of 7.5 (out of 10), higher than the global average of 5.5. But 

the underlying fundamentals question how long this can last. Oil production and exports have 

bankrolled most of these social programs, pumping hundreds of billions of dollars into government 

coffers over the last twelve years. Having spent all this money (and even augmented it with billions 

of dollars of debt), one can question the efficiency of Venezuela’s social programs. One also 

should worry about their sustainability, as the institutions to deliver services—from health care 

to basic electricity—are weak and in some cases deteriorating. And the flows of oil money behind 

all of it are increasingly fragile. Though Venezuela has almost 300 billion barrels in proven 

reserves, PDVSA’s own production figures show stagnation. Independent estimates (such as 

BP’s) reveal falling production. Whichever is true, there is a real question as to whether the country 

can keep supporting the current array of programs. The rest of the economy has been hollowed 

out over the last decade. While in the 1990s nearly a quarter of exports were non-oil products— 

foods, agricultural materials, and manufactured goods—today it is less than 5 percent. To put this into 

perspective, oil makes up 16 percent of Mexico’s total exports, 11 percent of Brazil’s, and some 89 

percent of oil giant Saudi Arabia’s—still less than Venezuela’s 97 percent. For day to day life, 

inflation—estimated at between 20 and 35 percent (compared to 3 percent inflation in Colombia, or 

6 percent in Brazil)—erodes the purchasing power of average Venezuelans, and hits the poorest 

the hardest. Fueling this spiral is Venezuela’s penchant to print money to fund its social programs 

and to pay for its imports—according to Reuters, in 2011 new currency topped $17 billion, more than 

any other Latin American country. To fight inflation, the government has imposed price caps, 

leading to shortages of basic goods—from toilet paper to milk, electricity to communion wine. In 

fact, the Venezuelan Central Bank’s scarcity index hit 21 percent, meaning that one out of five basic 

goods in Venezuela can be considered in short supply 

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Answers to: Venezuelan Government Stable 

[ ] 

[ ] Investment in oil infrastructure necessary for Maduro to retain power 

Goldwyn, former Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs for the State 

Department, 2013 

(David L., “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: 

Opportunities for Cooperation,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere; “Energy Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean” 4/11/2013 

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD- 

20130411.pdf, JMP) 

In the wake of Hugo Chavez’s death, many questions remain about whether political change is 

possible in Venezuela itself. Indeed, the opposition candidate in the April 14 election to succeed 

Chavez, Henrique Capriles, is a vocal adherent of the Brazilian model that many say is gaining 

regional traction. Yet it is widely assumed that Chavez’ handpicked successor, Vice President Nicolas 

Maduro, will win the election. Several divergent prognostications have been made regarding what a 

Maduro Presidency would entail for the U.S. While some perceive Maduro as a pragmatist who 

may be amenable to normalizing bilateral ties, others believe that he will be eager to prove his 

Bolivarian credentials to Chavez’s constituency and reject any U.S. entreaties to reengage. Still 

others doubt whether he will be able to retain the Presidency at all should the economic 

situation deteriorate further. Diosdado Cabello, a fellow Chavez adherent who is President of the 

National Assembly and is reported to be a popular figure among the Venezuelan Armed Forces, is 

commonly cited as an individual capable of seizing the Presidency, potentially through forcible 

means, should an opportunistic situation present itself. 

The manner in which the next Venezuelan President manages Venezuela’s oil wealth will have 

significant implications for international oil markets, which remain fairly tight due to supply disruptions 

in geopolitical hotspots Iran, South Sudan, Yemen, and Syria. In February 2012, the Economist 

estimated that international markets have lost 1.25 million barrels per day as a result of these and 

other recent supply disruptions.28 Venezuela is an even more significant player in international 

markets; EIA estimates that it exports around 1.7 million barrels of crude per day.29 The impacts on 

Venezuela’s own economy will also be very profound, as Venezuela’s economy is far from 

diversified and remains nearly entirely dependent on the oil sector. In recent years, PdVSA’s 

exploration and production capital expenditures have not been sufficient to reverse production 

declines in the country’s mature conventional fields or to harness the country’s massive oil sands 

reserves in the Orinoco Belt. These unconventional resources are thought to account for around 90% 

of Venezuela’s remaining proven oil reserves. In order to maintain production at a reasonable 

clip, the next Venezuelan President will have to improve the country’s oil and gas investment 

regime to attract international firms with expertise in enhanced oil recovery techniques in 

conventional fields and in the unique, challenging technical requirements for producing the extra 

heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Belt, and that also have the resources to alleviate massive 

infrastructure bottlenecks that plague the oil sands production. 

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Answers to: Venezuelan Economy – Alternate Causality 

[ ] 

Venezuela’s economy is on the brink of collapse due to their declining oil sector. 

Naím, former Venezuela minister of Trade, 2013 ( 

(Moisés, “An Economic Crisis of Historic Proportions,” Jan 8, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/03/venezuela-postchavez/chavez-will-leave-behind-an-economic-crisis) 

Last month, Jorge Botti, the head of Fedecámaras, Venezuela's business federation, explained that 

unless the government supplies more dollars to pay for imports, shortages -- from food to medicine -- 

would be inevitable. "What we will give Fedecámaras is not more dollars but more headaches," 

replied acting president Nicolas Maduro, the heir apparent to the Chavista regime (and Hugo 

Chávez's vice president). Venezuela is consuming more than it is producing. This is due to 

enormous government spending, mounting foreign debt and the mismanagement of its oil 

industry. Maduro is correct. Crushing headaches will soon be inevitable across the country, 

including within the private sector but especially among the poor. President Chávez has 

bequeathed the nation an economic crisis of historic proportions . The crisis includes a fiscal 

deficit approaching 20 percent of the economy (in the cliff-panicking United States it is 7 percent), a 

black market where a U.S. dollar costs four times more than the government-determined exchange 

rate, one of the world's highest inflation rates, a swollen number of public sector jobs, debt 10 times 

larger than it was in 2003, a fragile banking system and the free fall of the state-controlled oil 

industry, the country's main source of revenue. Oil-exporting countries rarely face hard 

currency shortages, but the Chávez regime may be the exception. Mismanagement and lack of 

investment have decreased oil production. Meanwhile oil revenue is compromised partly because 

of Chávez’s decision to supply Venezuelans with the country's most valuable resource at heavily 

subsidized prices. Thus a large and growing share of locally produced oil is sold domestically at the 

lowest prices in the world (in Venezuela it costs 25 cents to fill the tank of a mid-sized car). Another 

share of the oil output is shipped abroad to Cuba and other Chávez allies, and to China, which bought 

oil in advance at deeply discounted prices (apparently the revenue from China has already been 

spent). Most of the crude left to be exported at market prices is sold to Venezuela's best client, and, 

ironically, Chávez's main foe: the United States. Yet, as a result of America's own oil boom, U.S. 

imports of Venezuelan oil have recently hit a 30-year low. Moreover, due to an explosion in its main 

refinery, Venezuela is now forced to import gasoline. The Financial Times reckons that for each 10 

barrels of crude it sells to the US, it has to import back (at a higher price) two barrels of oil refined 

abroad. Meanwhile, the nation's total imports have jumped from $13 billion in 2003 to over $50 billion 

currently. Paying for those imports and servicing its huge debt requires more hard currency 

than Venezuela's weakened economy can generate. Yes, huge headaches are looming. 

13 | P a g e




Answers to: Oil Production Stable 

[ ] 

[ ] No improvements coming to Venezuela’s energy sector --- domestic and foreign 

investment are low 

Saefong, MarketWatch reporter based in San Francisco, 2013 

(Myra P., “Post-Chavez Venezuela: oil’s next Saudi Arabia” Market Watch, 3/6/2013 

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/post-chavez-venezuela-oils002Dnext-saudi-arabia-2013-03- 

06link=MW_story_popular, JMP) 

And it’s well known that the nation’s oil industry suffered under the leadership of Chavez, who died 

Tuesday after a two-year battle with cancer. Read Commodities Corner from early January: What 

happens to oil if Chavez goes 

His presidency was built on diverting cash from state-owned oil and natural-gas company 

Petroleos de Venezuelas, or PDVSA, to social spending, said Clinton Carter, associate vice 

president for Latin America at Frontier Strategy Group. “Little was invested in expanding 

production and maintaining output.” 

Chavez’s politicization of PDVSA also led to an exodus of talent, and political risk in the nation 

kept foreign investment in energy low. 

Now that the president is gone, big improvements in the energy sector won’t happen any time 

soon. “Venezuela’s declining output is unlikely to be reversed for years to come,” Carter said. 

[ ] Oil production will remain a disaster in the near term. 

Laskoski, senior petroleum analyst for GasBuddy.com , 2013 

(Gregg, “Chavez's Death Presents Venezuela With Oil Boom Opportunity,” US News and World 

Report, 3/14/2013, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/on-energy/2013/03/14/chavezs-deathpresents-venezuela-with-oil-boom-opportunity, 

JMP) 

Many remain uncertain. One oil industry veteran, Terri Ignozzi-Little, of Merlin Petroleum, Westport, 

Conn., says that "if the government remains the same, it will be as much of a disaster as it has 

been for the last 16 years. Chavez did his best to undermine the efficiency over the past 

decades and cause tremendous disruptions in supply." She said Venezuela may not see 

discernible change until after Castro dies in Cuba. "Remember, Venezuela holds the cards for 

crude oil which is supplying the rest of Latin America and Argentina, which is getting natural gas 

supplies from them." 

14 | P a g e




Answers to: Oil Investment Now 

[ ] 

[ ] Venezuela won’t make changes to boost investment or improve oil production 

Landers, staff writer Dallas Morning News, 2013 

(Jim, “Crumbling Venezuelan oil sector expected to remain hostile to U.S. investment,” 3/7/2013 

http://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/20130306-crumbling-venezuelan-oil-sector-expected-toremain-hostile-to-u.s.-investment.ece, 

JMP) 

HOUSTON — Hugo Chávez is gone, but his political allies and alliances are not expected to 

make major changes in the weak development of Venezuela’s enormous oil reserves. 

Venezuela’s constitution requires presidential elections within 30 days, and the country has been 

almost evenly divided between Chávez loyalists and opponents. Chávez was re-elected in October 

although never inaugurated due to illness. 

For now, his handpicked vice president, Nicolás Maduro, is acting president and the most likely 

candidate to lead Chávistas in any election. 

Oil analysts here for IHS CERAWeek 2013, the energy industry’s big annual conference, blame 

Chávez’s socialist policies for a decline in Venezuela’s oil industry over the past 14 years. Despite 

having more oil reserves than any other country, production peaked in 1997 and is down by a fourth 

since Chávez took power in 1998. 

“Venezuela is one of the countries with the largest hydrocarbon [oil and gas] endowments in the 

world,” said Enrique Sira, IHS’s director of Latin American energy research. 

“Maybe because of that, it is so hard to understand why today there is electric power rationing in 

some parts of the country, a deficit of natural gas supply across the whole country, and a productive 

oil capacity that is way below the actual potential that the country has.” 

U.S. refiners import more than 1 million barrels a day of Venezuelan oil, which made the country 

second only to Canada last year among U.S. foreign oil suppliers. Much of that oil went to Citgo 

Petroleum Corp., which is owned by PDVSA, Venezuela’s national oil company. Citgo has three U.S. 

refineries, including one in Corpus Christi, and more than 6,100 gas stations across the country. 

Copious reserves 

Venezuela has more oil reserves than any other country thanks to massive deposits of asphalt-like 

crude in what’s called the Orinoco oil belt. Development of these deposits is both technology- and 

capital-intensive. 

Chávez’s push for more national control over the oil sector in 2007 led Exxon Mobil Corp. and 

ConocoPhillips Co. to abandon big Orinoco projects. Other international companies stayed, 

including firms from Russia, China and Vietnam, and the Orinoco now accounts for about 20 percent 

of Venezuela’s oil production. 

Mark McNabb, director of the Emerging Markets Research Center at UTD’s Naveen Jindal 

School of Management, said in a phone interview that he expects U.S. firms will remain on the 

outside looking in. 

“We’re kind of frozen out for the next three to five years,” he said. 

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Answers to: Latin American Stability Defense 

[ ] 

[ ] Instability in Latin America spills over and escalates, past instances prove. 

Blanco & Grier, Department of Economics University of Oklahoma , 2009 – 

(Luisa & Robin, “Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Political Instability in Latin America”, 

2009, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45 Issue 1, 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220380802264788#.Uc3p_j7wJa8)//MJ 

Political instability can be contagious since revolutionary groups and ideologies can cross 

borders. Countries in “bad neighborhoods” might suffer from neighboring instability, 

especially if that instability causes a flood of refugees into the country or if guerilla armies 

use a country as a base from which to attack their home country. Goldstone et.al. (2004) find 

that countries with four or more political unstable neighbors are more likely to experience 

political instability, while Schatzman (2005) finds that political instability in neighboring 

countries increases the probability of a country experiencing collective protests.15 We 

create a variable that is equal to the number of neighbor countries that experienced political 

instability during each five-year period. We follow Goldstone et.al.’s approach and consider a 

country as politically unstable if there was either an ethnic conflict or a revolutionary war during the 

year, since these are the types of instability that are most likely to affect neighboring countries. 

Figure 1 illustrates the “bad neighborhoods” in Latin America and shows that countries in trouble 

tend to be clustered in the same region. There are two main blocs: the first is in Central America 

and includes Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; the second is in northwestern South America 

and includes Colombia and Peru. 

16 | P a g e




Answers to: Iran Venezuela Alliance is not a threat 

[ ] 

[ ] Iran is a threat and expanding their influence in the Western Hemisphere. 

Cárdenas associate with the consulting firm VisionAmericas, 2013 

(José , “Soft-Pedaling the Iranian Threat in the Americas” – Foreign Policy Magazine’s Blog: Shadow 

Government – June 28th – http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/12823) 

The State Department's assertions come in a two-page unclassified annex to a long-awaited 

classified report to Congress mandated by the bipartisan Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere 

Act, signed into law by President Barack Obama late last year. It directs the secretary of state to 

"conduct an assessment of the threats posed to the United States by Iran's growing presence and 

activity in the Western Hemisphere and submit to the relevant congressional committees the results 

of the assessment and a strategy to address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity in the 

Western Hemisphere." Granted, the bulk of the report is classified, but it is not difficult to conclude 

that its tone is unlikely to diverge much from the unclassified annex -- and that is deeply 

disturbing. Especially when just last month an Argentine prosecutor added to the growing 

paper trail on Iran's nefarious activities in the Americas by releasing a 500-page report 

detailing how Iran has systematically built a clandestine intelligence network throughout the 

region "designed to sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks." The prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, 

who investigated the notorious 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, 

provides compelling evidence of covert Iranian activity in numerous countries, including Brazil, 

Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname. Undoubtedly, 

the Nisman report will be a focus of attention when the House Homeland Security Committee holds a 

hearing on July 9 on the State Department report. Already, Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-S.C.), who 

sponsored the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act and is chairing the hearing, has 

expressed his displeasure with the unclassified annex. He said in a statement, "I believe that the 

Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran's presence here at home." Ironically, 

one of the objectives of Duncan's legislation was to foster better interagency cooperation on 

addressing the Iranian presence in the hemisphere. I attended the CSIS forum with General Kelly and 

can unequivocally say he gave no impression that his concerns about Iran in the hemisphere were 

"waning." He quite rightly pointed out how easy it is for anyone wishing to do the United States harm 

to meld with the criminal networks that can move anything to the United States' borders within days or 

hours: drugs, people, contraband, anything.... By this time, the penetration of the Western 

Hemisphere by Iran -- and its proxy, Hezbollah -- should be a subject beyond debate, 

especially after the assessment by the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, following the 

2011 Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, D.C., "that some Iranian 

officials -- probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei -- have changed their calculus and are 

now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. 

actions that threaten the regime." In this light, there remains no defensible reason for the State 

Department to continue to soft-pedal the issue, whether the department believes for some reason 

that it complicates negotiations over Iran's illegal pursuit of nuclear weapons or because it offends the 

sensitivities of some Latin American governments. Congress is right to demand accountability on the 

matter. Iran is playing for the highest stakes; it is high time the United States did as well. 

17 | P a g e




Venezuelan Instability Spills Over 

[ ] 

[ ] Instability in Venezuela spills over to rest of the region 

Shifter, vice president for policy at the Inter-American Dialogue2003 

(7/16/2003, Michael, “Why Venezuela Matters,” http://nationalinterest.org/article/why-venezuelamatters-2388page=1, 

JMP) 

For the United States, Venezuela is not just another Latin American country in turmoil. It is, 

after all, the fourth largest oil supplier to the United States, accounting for 15 percent of its oil 

imports. Senior US officials point to oil as the overriding interest in Venezuela. In the wake of US 

military action in Iraq, and the tremendous uncertainty in the Middle East, one would think that 

Venezuela would acquire even greater urgency for the United States. Oil works both ways, however. 

Shrewdly, the Chavez government allows the oil to flow precisely to avoid antagonizing foreign 

operations and, especially, the United States. 

Oil aside, there are other key U.S. interests at play in Venezuela, though these are less widely 

recognized. Regional stability and security top the list. The five countries that make up the 

Andean region of South America are particularly convulsed. Continued chaos and escalating 

violence in Venezuela would not only inflict damage on the country itself, but could well 

undermine the ability of neighboring countries to achieve and maintain social peace. 

In this regard, Colombia deserves special mention. The United States has long sought to 

bolster the Colombian government's efforts to extend state authority and control. Since 1999, 

Colombia has received some $2.5 billion in security aid from the United States, making it the largest 

beneficiary outside of the Middle East. Yet, there has been increasing violence on the 

Colombia/Venezuela border involving Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces - and even 

Venezuela's armed forces. Should the Venezuelan crisis become a military conflagration, the 

resulting instability would be detrimental to longstanding US policy objectives. The 

conditions are combustible, and the risks are growing. 

18 | P a g e




Oil Shocks Add On 1/1 

Loss of Venezuelan oil exports cause prices to spike, which triggers an economic recession 

GAO, US Government Accountability Office, 2006 

(“Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production,” June 2006, 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06668.pdf) 

Political strife within Venezuela and political tension between Venezuela and the United States 

have caused concern about the stability of Venezuelan oil production and exports to the 

United States. The election of Hugo Chavez as President of Venezuela in 1998 signaled a major 

change in how the Venezuelan government views the country’s oil industry. For example, the 

government took steps to shift managerial authority for Venezuela’s oil resources from PDVSA to the 

Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. The government also changed the way it deals with 

foreign companies—it raised the maximum royalty rates paid by foreign oil companies from 16-2/3 to 

30 percent, established a new “extraction tax,” raised income taxes for those companies, and 

instituted provisions requiring joint ownership structures with majority shares for PDVSA. Opposition 

to the new government culminated in a general strike that lasted from December 2, 2002, until 

February 2, 2003, and virtually shut down the oil sector of the economy. This strike temporarily 

decreased world oil supplies by about 2.3 million barrels per day, or about 3.0 percent of total world 

daily oil supply, and reduced oil exports to the United States by about 1.2 million barrels per day— 

equivalent to about 11 percent of total U.S. oil imports at the time. More recently, in April 2006, 

Venezuela seized two oil fields operated by two foreign oil companies because the companies did 

not comply with new rules unilaterally imposed by the Venezuelan government. 

Instability in Venezuela’s oil sector exists in a broader context of a tightening global oil 

supply and demand balance. Surplus global oil production capacity—the amount by which oil 

production could be increased immediately without additional investment—was as high as 5.6 

million barrels per day in 2002, but has since decreased to only about 1 million barrels a day; Saudi 

Arabia provides most of this surplus capacity. Meanwhile, demand for crude oil is growing rapidly in 

China and other countries. Market tightness, along with the fact that much of the world’s 

supply of oil is in relatively unstable regions, may make the global oil market increasingly 

susceptible to short-term disruptions and lead to higher and more volatile oil prices. In this 

context, instability of oil supply from any significant individual oil-producing country can 

create oil price volatility, which can cause an economic slowdown. Studies of past oil supply 

disruptions indicate that sudden increases in oil prices can contribute to inflationary 

pressure and economic slowdowns. In extreme cases, such as the large oil price increases 

associated with the Arab oil embargo and Iranian revolution in the 1970s, these high prices were 

associated with severe economic recessions. 

19 | P a g e




Answers to: Venezuela won’t cut off the US 

[ ] 

[ ]Venezuelan oil stability key to global markets 

Dutram, Exchange traded fund analyst, 2013 

(Eric, “Venezuela: The Next Black Swan for Oil ETFs,” Jan 4, 

http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/89708/Venezuela-The-Next-Black-Swan-for-Oil-ETFs) 

Still, the country does have one thing going for it; oil. By some estimates, the nation’s Orinoco 

Belt has more than half a trillion ‘technically recoverable’ barrels of oil, making it one of the largest 

deposits of fossil fuels in the world (see Crude Oil ETF Investing 101).While the oil isn’t exactly of the 

highest grade, and much of it is locked away in harder-to-recover shale, it still represents a massive 

source of wealth for the nation both now and well into the future. This is especially true considering 

the relatively small population for Venezuela, as just over 28 million people live in the country, 

suggesting a massive amount of oil per capita.In fact, the country is already exporting over 1.8 million 

barrels per day, putting it ahead of huge oil producers like Mexico, while its total production hits the 

2.3 million barrel mark, leaving it ahead of the entire EU based on this metric.Thi sallows Venezuela, 

much like many Middle East countries, to play a bigger role on the world stage than it 

otherwise would if it had not been blessed with such impressive hydrocarbon reserves. 

Additionally, investors should remember that the oil market is very shaky thanks to a tight 

supply and demand balance, so any possible disruption in the flow of oil could increase the 

volatility in global pricesfor the important commodity, so political upheaval in such a key oil 

producer could roil markets.How to PlayBeyond a few broad Latin America ETFs like (ILF - ETF 

report), as well as some worried neighbors in Colombia ((GXG - ETF report) and (COLX - ETF 

report)), investors should probably focus in on the commodity itself over the next few weeks. This can 

easily be done by looking at any of the many oil ETFs that follow crude futures (read Why Colombia 

ETFs May Continue to Rise).The PowerShares DB Oil Fund (DBO - ETF report) is easily the most 

popular, but the iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Index ETN (OIL - ETF report), and the United States 12 

Month Oil Fund (USL - ETF report) which spreads out exposure across the futures curve are also 

intriguing options. Beyond that, investors have a number of leveraged ETF plays in the space 

including (UCO - ETF report) for long exposure and then (SCO - ETF report) for the short side of 

crude.Bottom LineETF investors who target crude oil may be in for a rough ride over the next few 

weeks. Venezuela is an important player in the hydrocarbon marketand it is hard to tell what their 

political situation will be by the end of the month.Multiple reports suggest that Chavez will be unable 

to continue as president—even if he lives—so there could be a fight for the presidency and a 

constitutional crisis in short order. This could very easily spook the oil market but as of right now it is 

hard to say how things will play out (read Time to Buy the Oil Equipment ETFs).One thing is for 

certain though; this looks to be a delicate time for Venezuela, and the chance for a ‘black 

swan’* event taking place in the market could be higher. Investors saw some serious worries 

creep up on oil prices thanks to the prospect of a wider Arab Spring last year, so some sort of 

‘Venezuelan Spring’ could definitely throw a wrench into oil prices too as we push further into 

2013. 

20 | P a g e




Answers to: Venezuela oil has no effect on US 

[ ] 

[ ] A failure to maintain Venezuela’s level of production would threaten energy security 

around the world 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2006 

(“US Energy Security: Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production” GAO 

Draft Report, May 2006http://www.vcrisis.com/index.phpcontent=letters/200606230333) 

In recent years, U.S. oil companies have not sought assistance from the U.S. government with 

issues in Venezuela because the companies do not believe that federal agency intervention would 

be helpful at this time. To mitigate short-term oil supply disruptions, the U.S. government could 

attempt to get oil producing nations to increase their production to the extent possible or could 

release oil from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. While these options can mitigate short-term 

oil supply disruptions, long-term reductions in Venezuela’s oil production and exports are a 

concern for U.S. energy security, especially in light of current tight supply and demand 

conditions in the world oil market. If Venezuela fails to maintain or expand its current level of 

production, the world oil market may become even tighter than it is now, putting further 

pressure on both the level and volatility of energy prices. Venezuela is the world's eighthlargest 

oil exporter and among the top ten countries in total proven oil reserves. Venezuela 

also supplies about 11 percent of current U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products 

and wholly owns five refineries in the United States. Consequently, Venezuela is a key player 

in the future energy security of the United States and the world. The current global oil market is 

tight and may be more susceptible to short-term supply disruptions and higher and more volatile 

prices. Recently, tension between Venezuela and the United States has caused concern about the 

stability of Venezuelan oil supplies. On several occasions, Venezuela’s President has threatened to 

stop exporting oil to the United States or to close Venezuela’s U.S.-based refineries. 

21 | P a g e




Answers to: Venezuela does not effect economy 

[ ] 

[ ] Venezuelan oil key to global economy 

Hellinger, Professor of Political Science at Webster University, 2012 

(Daniel C., Global Security Watch – Venezuela, August 31, 2012 p. 172) 

Despite significant new finds of oil and gas in the hemisphere, Venezuela will remain a key player 

in the hemispheric and global oil market. Should Venezuelan oil be removed from the world 

market, the impact will be great on the global, not just the U.S. economy. Conversely, though 

Venezuela has been diversifying its market and sources of investment in oil, being cut off from the 

U.S. market would be severely detrimental to its economy. The reality is that the two countries 

continue to trade with one another. Although Venezuela arguably depends more on the United States 

than vice versa, access to the Venezuelan subsoil is an important factor in the global and U.S. 

economy. Venezuela, with or without Chavez, will seek to attract foreign capital to extractive 

activities in the chain of oil production. The questioin is, under what terms will the extraction take 

place Here Venezuelas and U.S. inter-ests are at odds, but just as in any relationship between 

landed property (here excersized as territorial sovereignty) and capital can be negotiated, so too can 

this one. As long as Chavez is present, an agreement will have to be negotiated multilaterally, with 

OPEC involvement, not bilaterally. 

[ ] Venezuela is a critical oil hub – can trigger industry collapse and take America’s 

economy down with it 

Council on Foreign Relations, 2009 

(Cesar J Alvarez and Stephanie Hanson “Venezuela’s Oil-Based Economy” Backgrounder, 2/9/09 

http://www.cfr.org/world/venezuelas-oil-based-economy/p12089) 

The World Bank's Frepes-Cibils says “Venezuela will continue to be a key player in the U.S. 

market.” He argues that in the short term it will be very difficult for Venezuela to make a significant 

shift in supply from the United States. Nevertheless, Chavez has increasingly made efforts to diversify 

his oil clients in order to lessen the country’s dependence on the United States. The GAO report says 

the sudden loss of Venezuelan oil in the world market would raise world oil prices and slow 

the economic growth of the United States. 

22 | P a g e




Relations Add-On 1/4 

[ ] Reforming US policy toward Venezuela is vital.to preventing a collapse of US regional 

leadership, loss of oil exports, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. A strategy of economic 

engagement is vital to usher in an era of healthy relations and avoid these outcomes. 

LeMaster, Lieutenant Colonel – US Army, 2009 

(Lieutenant Colonel Dennis P., “U.S. Policy Options Mitigating Venezuelan Sponsored Security 

Challenges,” United States Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDocAD=ADA497699) 

Increased engagement is the second policy option. An engagement policy seeks a 

cooperative relationship with Venezuela that achieve interests vital to both nations. Its hallmark 

would be communication. The central themes would be to reassure Venezuela that the US is not 

contemplating the assassination of Chavez. This assurance encourages the respect to the 

Venezuelan people because it affirms US approval of their democratic process, to include their choice 

of President. Ideally, this message would soften the perception of Venezuelans that the US is a 

bullying nation whose dominant behavior on the international arena is unilateral. Finally, 

engagement would include reestablishment of economic programs and military relationships. 

The recent change in US administrations makes engagement highly feasible. A new 

administration provides a logical juncture to usher in a new era of cooperation. President 

Obama has stated that the US will operate from a multilateral platform in the international system. 

This sends a clear message to hemispheric countries that the US will abandon from unilateral 

methods. This validates visions and values that promote security, economic growth, and democratic 

processes. Implementation will require increased resources and commitments across the spectrum of 

national power because there will be heightened activity between the US and Venezuela, as well as 

other Latin American nations. The confidence levels of both nations would be high as engagement 

builds on rekindled relationships established long ago. 

Acceptability and suitability are as alluring as feasibility. Healthy relations with Venezuela are 

desirable for US businesses, particularly energy companies with their large investments in 

Venezuela. Economic growth would benefit the entire hemisphere. Engagement supports our 

interests as the prevailing nation in the Western Hemisphere. It is doubtful that an engaged 

Chavez Administration will as aggressively court our competitors such as China, Russia, and 

Iran. He also will probably abandon foreign policies designed to block or diminish US 

influence in the region. Finally, the suitability of engagement improves our counter-terrorism 

and illegal drug programs. 

Engagement is a low-risk policy option. Reaching out and entering into dialogue with the Chavez 

administration may alter the perception of a future US-led regime change. Much of Chavez’s 

posturing seeks to increase his power and to generate solidarity among South American 

states to resist US influence. As these efforts subside, there is a substantial reduction in risk 

for conflict and an increase in the possibility for economic growth. Engagement promotes 

regional harmony and guarantees US influence. 

23 | P a g e





The economic situation in Venezuela creates a critical moment where the United States can 

jump start relations with oil sector investment. 

Inter Press, 2013 

(Jared Metzker, staff writer, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations,” 

6/17/2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuelarelations/, 

JMP) 

Maduro’s legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his 

selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to “emulate” his 

predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable. 

Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from 

Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages 

and high inflation. 

Oil economy 

Over half of Venezuela’s federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also 

accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of 

black gold are the largest of any nation in the world. 

Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which 

imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela. 

Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez 

further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk 

of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards 

aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies. 

While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for 

gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement 

of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company. 

The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents 

stemming from faulty infrastructure. 

In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes 

one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to 

develop new extraction sites. 

“The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic 

situation is deteriorating,” explained Shifter. “They know they need foreign investment to 

increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out.” 

If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United 

States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerry’s 

recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open 

arms. 

“Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time,” Diana 

Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, “and 

we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests.” 

24 | P a g e





Strong relations with Venezuela are key to broader relations and influence with Latin America 

Smilde, senior fellow at the Washington Office at Latin America, 2012 

(David, “Obama’s Second Term Provides an Opportunity to Reset Relations with Venezuela,” 

November 2012, http://venezuelablog.tumblr.com/post/35618113768/obamas-second-term-providesan-opportunity-to-reset) 

And on November 6, Barrack Obama was elected to a second term as president. A second term is a 

time in which U.S. presidents can be bolder in their foreign policy as they think about their legacy 

rather than reelection. Of course the demands on a recently re-elected president are many, as 

multiple issue-specific publics demand attention. But there is a good case to be made that 

reconstructing Latin America policy merits priority. 

Latin America as a region is the United States’ second largest trading partner and with Europe 

in crisis, is more important than ever for U.S. economic recovery. Regional dynamics have 

changed, with the emergence of Brazil as a major economic player; opposition to U.S.- 

oriented free trade strategies; the emergence of “post neoliberal” governments; and the 

creation of alternative multilateral institutions such as the Union of South American Nations 

(UNASUR) and the Council of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The United States 

neither can nor should seek to return to a 20th Century relationship with the region. If the U.S. 

government wishes to pursue legitimate national interests, it needs to repair relations with the 

region, and a more functional relationship with Venezuela would be a cornerstone of such an 

effort. In the region the antagonistic relationship with Venezuela is perceived as symbolic of 

an overly ideological U.S. posture. Venezuela is also a big exporter of oil and big importer of U.S. 

goods. 

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Relations Add On 4/4 

Latin American relations key to solve proliferation, climate change, and insure economic 

growth. Only engagement solves. 

Zedillo, et al, Former President of Mexico, 2008 

(Ernesto Zedillo, et al, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a 

Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, 

November 2008, 

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partn 

ership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF, ENDI File] 

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors 

will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, 

the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to 

grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper 

safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will 

take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through 

more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the 

United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that 

lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including 

the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, 

and access valuable resources. 

It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean 

equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large 

and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international 

cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and 

solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic 

and political capacities to generate shared benefits. 

Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and 

necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other 

countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate 

change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and 

deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. 

Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common 

stake in the future. 

For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely 

across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian 

problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered 

through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of 

which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The 

process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a 

hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different 

degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing 

alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among 

the hemisphere’s countries. 

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Answers to: Tensions Inevitable 

[ ] 

[ ] Tensions are only inevitable in a world where the US refuses to engage with 

Venezuela, investment in oil infrastructure will fundamentally reset the relationship. 

Inter Press, 2013 

(Jared Metzker, staff writer, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations,” 

6/17/2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuelarelations/) 

Over half of Venezuela’s federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also 

accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven 

reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world. Despite a troubled political 

relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a 

day from Venezuela. Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, 

and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government 

took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would 

always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies. While these 

measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, 

critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de 

Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company. The same critics also point to 

increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty 

infrastructure. In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major 

loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with 

Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites. “The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – 

production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating,” explained Shifter. “They know 

they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated 

Maduro to reach out.” If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to 

embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in 

the world. Kerry’s recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be 

waiting with open arms. “Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at 

the same time,” Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington 

think tank, told IPS, “and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our 

interests.” Indeed, Negroponte said she was “optimistic” about the possibility of rapprochement 

between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a “troika” of issues on which the 

United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and 

assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels. 

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Answers to: Relations Resilient 

[ ] 

[ ] Relations are delicate—Maintaining economic ties is key to success 

O’Neil, Senior Fellow of Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. 

(Shannon is, “New era for US-Venezuela relations” 3/16, [http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/03/06/newera-for-u-s-venezuela-relations/] 

With Chavez’s death, some have hoped for a change in the US-Venezuela relationship. But just 

because Chavez is gone it doesn’t mean the tensions in bilateral relations will ease. The U.S. is too 

useful and tempting a foil for papering over internal disagreements in Chavez’s party and for rallying 

loyal supporters for the upcoming presidential election to expect any abrupt change. Heir apparent 

and now interim President Nicolas Maduro’s speech right before Chavez’s death shows this. In it he 

expelled two U.S. diplomats and even accused the U.S. of causing Chavez’s cancer. But in the 

longer term, trade, commercial relations and personal ties could shift U.S.-Venezuelan relations for 

the better. First and foremost are the economic ties between the two nations. Despite the rhetorical 

animosity of the last decade, trade continued. The U.S. remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan 

oil—some 40 percent percent of Venezuelan oil exports (and oil makes up over 90 percent of the 

country’s total exports). In turn, the U.S. has continued to send machinery and cars, and even 

increased exports of natural gas and petroleum products to the South American nation. The hard 

currency and goods are vital to the functioning of Venezuela’s economy, government and society, 

and may become even more so through the anticipated tough economic times ahead. Despite the 

increased government management of the economy through price controls and the nationalization of 

hundreds of private companies over the last decade, many well- and lesser-known U.S. companies 

still work in Venezuela, providing not just goods but ongoing links with the United States. In addition 

to these commercial links, the more than 200,000 Venezuelans living in the U.S. and the hundreds of 

thousands more that have ties through family, friends and colleagues, could also bring the two 

countries together. Finally, as subsequent Venezuelan governments look to adjust their economic 

policies in the coming months and years, the experience of their neighbors provide incentives to forge 

a more amicable bilateral relationship. Colombia, Brazil, Peru, along with other Latin American 

nations, have opened up to the U.S. and the world more broadly in recent years and in the process 

have benefited tremendously. In the last set of hemispheric elections, a “third way” combining open 

markets, balanced fiscal accounts, and socially inclusive policies—most closely identified with former 

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva—became an almost mantra for incumbent and 

opposition party candidates alike (including Chavez’s 2012 rival, Henrique Capriles Radonski). These 

nations and leaders illustrate a real and positive path forward, not just economically but also 

diplomatically. Today Venezuela faces significant political uncertainty, as Mr Maduro works to unite 

the many factions within Chavez’s party. He does so without Chavez’s charisma nor the deep-seated 

loyalty he inspired. The next administration also will confront growing economic and fiscal problems, 

making governing all the harder in the months to come. Still, in most of Latin America anti-U.S. 

rhetoric is fading, which suggests it can in Venezuela too. 

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Answers to: Relations Low Alternate Causality 

[ ] 

[ ] Expanding U.S. investment and partnership with Venezuela oil industry will revive 

relations 

Clarke, Associate Editor of America The National Catholic Review, 2013 

(3/25/2013, Kevin, “Chavez Death Brings New Chance For U.S.-Venezuela Engagement,” 

http://americamagazine.org/issue/chavez-death-brings-new-chance-us-venezuela-engagement, JMP) 

The passing of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela unleashed an epic outpouring of grief among 

his supporters in Venezuela, the likes of which may only be eventually paralleled with the passing of 

another larger-than-life figure in Latin American socialism, Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Matthew Carnes, 

S.J., assistant professor of government at Georgetown University, said Chávez will be 

remembered as a leader who had an “outsized impact in Venezuelan politics.” Father Carnes said 

Chávez’s passing offers an opportunity for the United States, politically and economically, to 

revive its relationship with Venezuela. Occasionally “capricious and doctrinaire,” Chávez was 

“someone the United States had a hard time negotiating with,” according to Father Carnes. Whether 

his designated political heir, Vice President Nicholas Maduro, or an opposition candidate, most likely 

Henrique Capriles Radonski, governor of the Venezuelan state of Miranda, is elected to replace 

Chávez, Father Carnes expects a more pragmatic and less confrontational leadership to 

emerge. That could mean improved ties not just with Venezuela but throughout the region, he said, 

and a possible opening for renewed U.S. investment and partnership with the Venezuelan 

state oil industry. Despite Chávez’s notorious distaste for U.S. political leaders, under his 

leadership Venezuela remained one of the largest suppliers of oil to the United States. This is 

likely to continue. 

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Answers to: Relations Low Alternate Causality 

[ ] 

[ ] Strong relations with Venezuela are key to broader relations and influence with Latin 

America 

Smilde, senior fellow at the Washington Office at Latin America, 2012 

(David, “Obama’s Second Term Provides an Opportunity to Reset Relations with Venezuela,” 

November 2012, http://venezuelablog.tumblr.com/post/35618113768/obamas-second-term-providesan-opportunity-to-reset) 

And on November 6, Barrack Obama was elected to a second term as president. A second term is a 

time in which U.S. presidents can be bolder in their foreign policy as they think about their legacy 

rather than reelection. Of course the demands on a recently re-elected president are many, as 

multiple issue-specific publics demand attention. But there is a good case to be made that 

reconstructing Latin America policy merits priority. 

Latin America as a region is the United States’ second largest trading partner and with Europe 

in crisis, is more important than ever for U.S. economic recovery. Regional dynamics have 

changed, with the emergence of Brazil as a major economic player; opposition to U.S.- 

oriented free trade strategies; the emergence of “post neoliberal” governments; and the 

creation of alternative multilateral institutions such as the Union of South American Nations 

(UNASUR) and the Council of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The United States 

neither can nor should seek to return to a 20th Century relationship with the region. If the U.S. 

government wishes to pursue legitimate national interests, it needs to repair relations with the 

region, and a more functional relationship with Venezuela would be a cornerstone of such an 

effort. In the region the antagonistic relationship with Venezuela is perceived as symbolic of 

an overly ideological U.S. posture. Venezuela is also a big exporter of oil and big importer of U.S. 

goods. 

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Answers to: Investment hurts relations 

[ ] 

[ ] [ ] Status quo is uniquely worse for US interests—Energy engagement is the only 

hope at mitigating anti-americanism in the region 

Fite, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012. 

(Brandon, , “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: “The Impact of Latin America, Africa and 

Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII- 

Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf] 

Iran’s closest relationship is with Venezuela. Although both countries have very different guiding 

ideologies and political structures, they are bound by a common rejection of US leadership in 

the international system and by their significant petroleum exports, signified by their dual 

membership in OPEC. The State Department has determined Venezuela to be “not 

cooperating fully United States antiterrorism efforts” since 2006. Distinct from the designation 

of “state sponsor of terrorism”, this classification nevertheless resulted in an US arms embargo, 

which was extended in May 201118 . In the past decade Tehran and Caracas have engaged in a 

broad spectrum of commitments ranging from mutual diplomatic support to military exchange. 

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has shown himself to be committed to Iranian sovereignty— 

supporting Iran’s nuclear program at the IAEA—and to Iran’s vision of an anti-Western coalition of 

developing states. As long as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez—or some successor with a 

similar ideology and hostility to the US—continues to define his role as one of opposition to the 

US, Washington has little hope of bettering its political position with Caracas or diminishing 

Iran’s close affiliation. That being said, US-Venezuelan commercial ties are strong and provide 

links between both countries which help maintain an undercurrent of stability in the relationship. At 

present, the US need not be too concerned about this Iran-Venezuelan relationship, despite the 

threatening language used by both presidents. Mutual US-Venezuelan energy dependence 

mitigates the possibility of a more serious breach in relations. 

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Appeasement Good- Instability 

[ ] 

[ ]Any loss of Maduro’s power will result in an unstable government 

Renuncio, , senior associate and analyst for RiskAdvisory 2013 

(Irenea “Venezuela: Strategic Risk Outlook for 2013” 

http://news.riskadvisory.net/index.php/2013/06/venezuela-strategic-risk-outlook-for-2013/ Risk 

Advisory 6/19/13) 

While hardship protests are increasing on the back of inflation and food shortages, Maduro 

has remained a weakened president since the April election. Aside from his waning popularity 

and despite being head of state, Maduro lacks full control of the country’s institutions and the 

ruling PSUV party. The party and the state institutions are loosely divided between Maduro’s 

supporters and those who support Diosdado Cabello, a former lieutenant who was very close to 

the late Hugo Chávez and who retains control of the armed forces. Ever since Chávez designated 

Maduro as his appointed successor, Cabello has sworn loyalty to Maduro, but both men are 

currently governing in what appears to be an informal power sharing agreement. Rumours of 

deep divisions between the two men were publicly confirmed for the first time on 20 May, 

when the opposition leaked a recording of a conversation between influential state TV presenter 

Mario Silva, a government supporter, and a Cuban military officer working for Maduro’s government 

in Venezuela. In the audio recording, Silva talks about the split between Maduro and Cabello, 

saying Cabello wants to remove defence minister Diego Molero ‘to be able to take the armed 

forces and put pressure on Maduro to behave as they please or to pull a coup d’etat’. Silva has 

denied the leak, describing it as a plot by the CIA and Mossad, but our local sources tell us the leak 

does appear to be a real recording of the two alleged participants. Furthermore, a reliable source 

with links to the government tells us that the fight for power between Maduro and Cabello is 

widely known within government circles, but that this is the first time that these divisions have 

spilled over into the public domain. Silva has subsequently resigned on health grounds, with rumours 

in Venezuela over his possible future arrest or exile. The audio recording seems to support our wider 

analysis that despite the apparent unity displayed by Maduro and Cabello, the government 

seems to lack the stability it had under Chávez. In particular, it shows the extent of Cabello’s 

power within the government, which is independent to that of the president. This has significant 

implications for policy implementation, as Maduro effectively shares power and decision making 

with Cabello. According to the audio, Cabello runs a parallel budget through control of CADIVI, the 

government body that administers legal currency exchange in Venezuela, and SENIAT, the national 

tax and revenue office, which is led by Cabello’s brother, José David. Meanwhile, Cabello controls the 

legislature as head of the national assembly and dominates SEBIN, the Bolivarian intelligence 

agency, and the DIM, the department of military intelligence. Our sources in Venezuela have 

corroborated this information, which is also supported by independent reports in the usually reliable 

online news sites TalCualDigital, El Universal and El Nacional. 

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A 

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Appeasement Good- Leverage 

[ ] 

[ ] Utilizing energy & economic ties is the only chance at maintaining leverage over 

Venezuela and getting the country to change policies. 

Walser, Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America @ Heritage . 2013. 

(Ray “Beware of Venezuela’s Paranoid Anti-Americanism” Heritage Foundation, 3/18 

[http://blog.heritage.org/2013/03/18/beware-of-venezuelas-paranoid-anti-americanism/] 

Attacks on the U.S. are integral to the strategy of Maduro and the inner Chavista circle. Their 

current course aims to inflame the nationalistic militancy of Chavez’s followers. It is a 

calculated effort to distract Venezuelan voters from grave violations of the constitutional order 

and stark domestic challenges—inflation, fiscal deficits, devaluations, crime, and increasing food 

shortages—that have worsened since Maduro took de facto control of the government in early 

December 2012. Governability and stability in Venezuela before and after the elections could 

become a major challenge. The Miami Herald’s veteran Venezuela watcher Andres Oppenheimer 

suggests that the April 14 elections will be neither fair nor genuinely free. Maduro’s wild 

accusations also lower expectations for swift improvement in relations with the U.S. The 

limited leverage that the U.S. still poses over Venezuela resides in its commercial, financial, and 

energy links and in the frayed democratic consensus in the inter-American community. Like it 

or not, the Obama Administration finds itself drawn into Venezuela’s growing crisis of governability 

caused by the increasingly irresponsible behavior of Chavez knock-offs like Maduro. 

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Appeasement Good- Hardliners 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic engagement can disempower Venezuelan hardliners by supporting the 

nation’s citizens – this can promote stability, democracy, and relations 

Graves, Major – U.S. Army, 2006 

(Gary R., “Venezuela: An Effects-Based Strategy for the 21 st Century,” Joint Advanced Warfighting 

School, April 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA452240) 

In as much as Dr. Vego has expressed concerns over the aspects of a SoSA, it is 

also acknowledged that there may be issues, at the national–strategic level, concerning 

the overall strategy proposed for Venezuela. It could be argued that the strategy detailed 

here could be seen as a reward or moral victory for President Chávez because of the 

amount of proposed monetary investment and recommended fiscal programs, especially 

during a time when he has hurt the U.S. economy by contributing to the rise in the price 

of petroleum by influencing OPEC. He has also publicly advocated anti–U.S. rhetoric, 

and allowed U.S.–Venezuelan relations to deteriorate. Furthermore, some would contend 

that because of President Chávez’s affiliation with Cuba’s Fidel Castro and other 

countries with questionable affinity towards terrorism and extremism that the solution for 

Venezuela lays within the realm of harsh military or economic venue. All of these 

opinions may be recognized as having merit, but as seen below, would be ill–advised 

based on regional stability, humanitarian assistance, military involvement, economic/financial 

considerations, and most importantly U.S. policy objectives. 

First, this strategy is not an actual fiscal reward for President Chávez, but instead 

an assortment of programs designed to assist Venezuela and its populace “in their efforts 

to develop, restructure, and reinforce democratic institutions,”ccxlviii while enhancing 

Venezuela’s humanitarian and civic action capacities.ccxlix It is clear that Venezuela’s 

economic, humanitarian and security problems are inexorably liked and must be 

addressed in a proactive manner, an aspect that this strategy accomplishes through its 

recommended DIME means. Furthermore, although this strategy could be seen as a 

short–term moral victory for President Chávez, the United States must avoid becoming 

fixated on this egocentric aspect. It is the long–term desired effects, a safe, secure, stable 

and U.S.–friendly Venezuela, on which the United States must focus. 

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Appeasement forces Maduro to back down 

[ ] 

[ ] Maduro is in NO position to maintain aggression against the US once help is extended 

Baverstock, Foreign Correspondent for Christian Science Monitor, 2013. 

(Alasdair,“Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” Christian Science Monitor, 

5-17 [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on- 

Washington-s-recognition][MG] 

Others are less convinced by Maduro’s bluster, seeing a politician weakened by his lack of mandate 

at home. “He’d definitely like the US to recognize him,” says Gerardo Munck, a professor of 

international relations at the University of Southern California. “There’s nothing he can do to 

pressure the US, but to be seen as having been duly elected would put him in a far stronger 

position both at home and internationally.” With neither side showing any inclination toward 

compromise, the standoff between the two countries also shows no sign of ending. But 

Maduro’s long-term challenges are looming. Inflation in the socialist country is nearing 30 

percent, there is public anger over the chronic shortages of basic goods, and the ballooning 

murder rate exceeds Europe and the United States’s combined. “Maduro is going to have to 

tackle these problems if he’s going to last as president,” says Mr. Munck. “[U]nless there’s some 

change in the way he handles the situation, the US isn’t going to budge.” 

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Appeasement Answers: Instability prevent democracy in Venezuela 

[ ] 

[ ] Venezuelan political instability destroys US efforts at democracy. 

Duddy, senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador 

to Venezuela, 2012 

(Patrick D., “Political Unrest in Venezuela”, Council on Foreign Relations, 09/2012, 

http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936) 

Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote 

democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic 

interests in the region. Democracy promotion: The United States has worked for decades to 

promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become 

increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to 

the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United 

States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela’s 

democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military 

junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence 

in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives 

advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and 

technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred 

thousand barrels of oil per day. 

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Appeasement Answers: Oil industry promotes democracy 

[ ] 

[ ]Oil promotes Venezuelan democracy --- encourages competition. 

Hidalgo Professor of Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, 2007 

(Manuel, “A Petro-State: Oil, Politics and Democracy in Venezuela,” Real Insituto Elcano, 6-11-2007, 

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/WP2007/WP49-2007_Hidalgo_Petro- 

State_Venezuela.pdf) 

Oil was the most important structural factor in promoting democracy. But one must not ignore 

others such as the role of political leaders, who, with projects aimed at modernisation, gave a 

central role to the State in economic and social life and in the political realm. It was a 

centralised State. Once the democratic regime was established, political parties were the main 

players, not just because of the programmes they pushed, organisational development and 

establishment of links with the main social organisations, but also because having access to a 

State with abundant external revenue put them in a privileged position. From that position they 

controlled a weak civil society that would grow under the protection of the State. The State also 

relied for many years not only on people’s widespread acceptance of elections as a ‘democratic 

ritual’ (Maingón & Sonntag, 1991), but also on neo-corporative practices that gave priority to 

certain interest groups and sectors, facilitating money-seeking behaviour. At the same time, 

government policy was to hire lots of civil servants, grant heavy subsidies and apply extensive 

controls and strong protectionist measures. 

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Answers to: Venezuela would say no- Political Move 

[ ] 

[ ] Maduro will say yes—creating economic zones for foreign investment and modeling 

Chinese economic liberalization 

Mallett-Outtrim , writer for MSNBC International, via VenezuelaAnalysis .2013 

(Ryan, “Maduro plans Economic reform, reform of currency exchange, and special economic zones in 

Venezuela,” nsnbc international, 4/26/13, http://nsnbc.me/2013/04/26/maduro-plans-economicreform-reform-of-currency-exchange-and-special-economic-zones-in-venezuela/) 

Ryan Mallett-Outtrim (VA),- The Venezuelan government hopes to encourage more foreign 

investment and a better relationship with the business community, President Nicolas Maduro 

stated yesterday. Announcing the creation of a “National Savings Fund for Foreign Exchange”, 

Maduro said the government hopes to make currency exchange easier not only for businesses, but 

also “travellers, students” and Venezuelans living abroad. In a meeting with business leaders in Zulia 

state, Maduro indicated that changes to current currency controls are needed not only to “overcome 

the parallel dollar”, but also address a backlog of currency exchange applications. According to 

Maduro, there are pending applications for currency exchanges at the government rate dating back to 

2011. He also invited the private sector to work more with the government to contribute to the 

“development of the productive forces and the country’s economy”, and announced plans to 

create “Special Economic Zones” in some regions. These zones would be granted special tax 

conditions, as well as other incentives to encourage foreign investment. Although he gave few 

details, Maduro indicated that they would be modeled on those that developed during China’s 

trade liberalisation of the 1980′s. Maduro stated that more details will be announced soon, and 

Finance Minister Nelson Merentes will hold a series of meetings with business leaders across the 

country from 2 May. The meetings will focus on issues related to currency exchange, though Maduro 

also stated that the government will prioritise tackling inflation. “We are in a transition process 

towards building a socialist economic model that merits the promotion of a special plan of a 

productive economic revolution, and that includes the participation of different sectors,” he 

said. Maduro described the private sector as having the financial and political freedom to 

participate in an “economic revolution” to raise productivity and self sustainability. “We have 

a strong and powerful domestic market with purchasing capacity, because we have a population with 

job security, good income and strong wages…Now we need a production system to respond to 

this,” he said. 

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Answers to: Venezuela would say no- Hardliners 

[ ] 

[ ] Will empirically yes on oil trade issues --- Maduro willing to compromise 

Kapper, wirter for NBC, 2013 

(Bradley “US seeking renewed Venezuela ties after Chavez,” NBC, 01-09-13, 

http://nbclatino.com/2013/01/09/us-seeking-renewed-venezuela-ties-after-chavez/) 

With Venezuela, the U.S. is hoping to start with stronger counter-narcotics coordination, a challenge 

given that the Venezuelan government includes officials subject to U.S. drug “kingpin” sanctions. 

Other American priorities include energy cooperation and stronger enforcement of sanctions against 

Iran. The U.S. also fears Iranian efforts to use Venezuela as a base for terrorist or other activity in the 

Western Hemisphere against American interests. Maduro and other insiders in Chavez’s 

government also seek rapprochement, but want to start with the first exchange of ambassadors 

between the two countries since 2010. The U.S. Embassy in Caracas has been without a top envoy 

since Chavez rejected Obama’s nominee and accused him of making disrespectful remarks about 

Venezuela’s government. That led Washington to revoke the visa of Venezuela’s ambassador. 

Speaking last week, Maduro stressed that the U.S. and Venezuela have “great ideological and 

political differences.” But he held out the possibility of normalized relations based on mutual 

respect. Despite Chavez’s tirades against the U.S. and what he sees as its attempts to bring down 

his government, and U.S. criticism of Venezuela’s lax efforts against drug traffickers, the two 

countries have maintained economic relations. The U.S. gets about 10 percent of its oil from 

Venezuela and remains the Latin American country’s top purchaser. 

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Answers to: Takes too Long 

[ ] 

[ ] Must take the long view with Venezuela. US policy should support sustainable 

economic growth for Venezuela and reducing the nation’s poverty and anti-American 

sentiment. 

Bryant, Management Consultant, 2012 

(Dane, “Chávez or Not, It's Time to Rethink the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship,” World Politics Review, 

September 28, 2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12380/chavez-or-not-its-time-torethink-the-u-s-venezuela-relationship) 

This is why the second plank of Washington’s Venezuela policy must emphasize sustainable 

economic growth. Regardless of next week’s election outcome, any serious response to the 

challenges that Venezuela poses to U.S. regional interests must address the country’s socioeconomic 

inequalities, which Chávez has depended upon for popular support throughout his 

political career. Solving the widespread social exclusion and poverty that fuel the Bolivarian 

movement, if only incrementally, will be critical if the United States is to make any inroads in 

what could be a vital partnership. 

For the past decade and a half, the U.S.-Venezuela relationship has been singularly defined by the 

Chávez obsession -- in both Caracas and Washington. After the upcoming election, regardless of 

whether Chávez wins or loses, it will be time to begin playing a new game in Venezuela 

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Venezuela Engagement 

Negative

Venezuela Engagement Negative 



Venezuela Engagement Negative - Table of Contents 

Summary............................................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 4 

Stability Advantage 

Venezuela Economy is Stable .............................................................................................................. 5 

Oil Production Stable ............................................................................................................................ 6 

Government stable now ........................................................................................................................ 7 

Oil Investment Now ............................................................................................................................... 8 

Venezuela Economy- Alternate Causality ........................................................................................ 9-10 

Answers to: Iran Venezuela Alliance ................................................................................................... 11 

Answers to: Cartel-Venezuela Alliance ............................................................................................... 12 

Answers to: Drug Trafficking Impact ................................................................................................... 13 

Oil Shocks Add On 

Venezuela won’t cut US off ................................................................................................................. 14 

Venezuelan Oil cut off has no effect on United States ........................................................................ 15 

No economic impact of oil shocks ....................................................................................................... 16 

Relations Add-On 

Relations are resilient ......................................................................................................................... 17 

Relations Low- Alternate Causality ................................................................................................ 18-19 

Investment hurts relations ................................................................................................................... 20 

Solvency 

1NC Appeasement Turn ..................................................................................................................... 21 

Appeasement Turns Stability .............................................................................................................. 22 

Appeasement Turns Democratic Signals ............................................................................................ 23 

Oil appeasement hurts democracy ................................................................................................ 24-25 

Answers to: Appeasement spurs democracy……………………………………………………………….26 

Venezuela would say No—Political Move ...................................................................................... 27-28 

Venezuela would say No- Hardliners ............................................................................................. 29-30 

Solvency takes too long ...................................................................................................................... 31 

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Summary 

Case arguments for the Venezuela Affirmative have been divided by advantage area. 

Stability Advantage Answers: Arguments include: Venezuela is stable now. The economy, 

government and oil production are all functioning now. International investment is pouring into oil 

industry now. Venezuela’s economy has multiple other problems besides lack of investment in the oil 

industry, In addition, there are defensive arguments to each of the impacts of the advantage. 

Oil Shocks Add-On: Three arguments- Venezuela won’t cut off the United States from oil; loss of 

Venezuela’s oil won’t affect the United States, and oil shocks don’t impact the larger economy 

Relations Add-On: Arguments include relations are resilient between the United States and 

Venezuela and Latin America, Relations with Latin America are low for a number of other reasons, 

finally an offensive argument that investments in Venezuela will hurt relations with Latin America as it 

appears the US is trying to buy off poorer countries. 

Solvency Arguments: A set of Appeasement arguments challenge the fundamental thesis of the 

affirmative that engaging the government of Venezuela is the best way to influence policy there. 

Appeasement instead argues that engaging with the government will result in supporting an antidemocratic 

government who actively opposes the United States. Venezuela will take the gift of oil 

investment from the United States and then turn around and do all of the bad things the affirmative 

worries about. However, more likely, Venezuela will not even accept our assistance. The 

government is based in Anti-US policy and would not take a hand out from the United States. Finally, 

getting new oil production online in Venezuela will take a very long time. 

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Glossary 

Appeasement - to bring to a state of peace or quiet 

Bolivars- the money issued by the Venezuelan government 

Caracas- capital city of Venezuela 

Cartel - A combination of independent business organizations formed to regulate production, pricing, 

and marketing of goods by the members. 

Hardliner - a person who is reluctant to accept changes and new ideas 

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Venezuela Economy is Stable 

[ ] Venezuela is not on the verge of collapse-- economy is stabilizing now 

Rindebro, analyst for BN Americas,2013 

(Ulric, “Venezuela's Maduro showing signs of more moderate course” 6/20, 

[http://www.bnamericas.com/news/banking/venezuelas-maduro-showing-signs-of-more-moderatecourse][MG] 

Two months into his administration, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is giving signs of 

pursuing a much more moderate course for Venezuelan policies than that of the late and 

former President Hugo Chávez, said Bank of America Merrill Lynch in a report. "These signs are 

particularly evident in economic and foreign policy, although they are also beginning to 

emerge in the domestic policy arena," said BofA Merrill Lynch. Greater policy moderation 

reduces policy uncertainty and implies a greater degree of security of property rights, 

including those of bondholders, the US investment bank noted. "In the meantime, the 

government has continued to implement a drastic macroeconomic adjustment program 

through spending and import cuts. It has also begun to reduce subsidized loans to other 

countries. These decisions significantly strengthen the country's capacity to service debt 

obligations," the report reads. The investment bank also states that economic policy appears to be 

firmly under the control of pragmatist finance minister Nelson Merentes, who has made a point of 

frequently meeting with private sector representatives and international investors. Economic policies 

in Venezuela are far from optimal, but at least there is a strong indication that the government 

"cares about its relationship with the private sector, in sharp contrast to the generalized 

perception during the Chávez years." 

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Oil Production Stable 

[ ] New investment now that will boost oil production, there is no need for the spending 

of the plan. 

UPI, 2013 

(5/30/2013, “Chevron, PDVSA shoot for higher production,” 

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/05/30/Chevron-PDVSA-shoot-forhigher-production/UPI-86761369912958/, 

JMP) 

WASHINGTON, May 30 (UPI) -- A $2 billion investment in onshore oil developments in 

Venezuela will help a recovery in production levels, Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez 

said. 

The Venezuelan Embassy in Washington said U.S. supermajor Chevron committed to a $2 billion 

investment in a joint venture with state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, known also as 

PDVSA. 

The investments target joint venture Petroboscan, formed to operate the Boscon oil field in western 

Venezuela. 

Ramirez described the commitment as "an excellent arrangement for all of our joint ventures." 

Ramirez is president of PDVSA. His country has some of the largest oil deposits in the world, leading 

the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 

Ramirez said the joint venture between Chevron and PDVSA aims to increase oil production at 

Boscon from 107,000 barrels of oil per day to 127,000 bpd. The financing is part of an overall initiative 

by PDVSA to increase oil production by more than 60 percent to 6 million bpd by 2019. 

"With this financing, we're going to recover production and then work to take maximum 

advantage of the remaining reserves," Ramirez said. 

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Government stable now 

[ ] The coup isn’t a threat, Chavez party will retain power. 

Bilbao, director of the magazine América XXI, 2013 

(Luis, “Venezuela: Coup attempt defeated by counter-coup 'All must engage in this battle' Luis Bilbao 

is, and was a founding participant of the PSUV. Combined translation by Gloria La Riva, Miguel 

Hoffman and Machetera, 5/13. http://www.pslweb.org/liberationnews/news/venezuela-coupattempt.html) 

Despite the escalation, the general situation is normal. And Maduro is in energetic official 

activity, taking advantage of every occasion to exemplify the attitude of firmness against the 

extortionist threat of a coup. He announced that a national march planned by the opposition for 

April “will not enter Caracas. We will not allow another April 11 [the day a march and violence by the 

right-wing was organized as a prelude to the April 11, 2002, military coup].” Maduro added that the 

opposition is in a situation from which it is unable to extricate itself. There are three governors 

of the opposition who, if they continue with the position adopted by the ultra-rightwing command, will 

find themselves facing a direct response: “I do not recognize a governor who does not recognize me; 

I do not recognize a coup governor. The budget they receive I will give to the people.” Maduro also 

denounced the United States government as responsible for the escalation toward a coup and 

said that proof of its direct involvement through the local fascist leadership will be forthcoming. 

Defeated once more, the imperialist conspiracy will continue. It is the task of every revolutionary 

in the world to contribute to the building of a very broad front in defense of the Bolivarian Socialist 

Revolution. This is where the correlation of forces will be determined, between the United 

States, and the peoples and governments seeking to liberate themselves from its oppression. 

All must engage in this battle. 

[ ] Maduro is moderating to attract foreign investment now. 

Rindebro, analyst for BN Americas,2013 

(Ulric, “Venezuela's Maduro showing signs of more moderate course” 6/20, 

[http://www.bnamericas.com/news/banking/venezuelas-maduro-showing-signs-of-more-moderatecourse][MG] 

] 

NO NEW EXPROPRIATIONS AND POTENTIAL NEW FOREIGN FRIENDS BofA Merrill Lynch adds 

to its case for a more positive view on Venezuela that no prominent expropriations have been 

reported during the six month period in which Maduro has been in charge of the government. 

During his 14 years in office, Chávez oversaw the expropriation of no less than 1,600 firms, according 

to estimates from the private sector industry chamber Conindustria. Also in contrast to his mentor 

(Chávez), Maduro has recently visited countries that are not known to be strong allies of 

Venezuela, like Portugal, Italy, France and even the Vatican. BofA Merrill Lynch also points to 

the constructive meeting earlier this month between Venezuelan foreign minister Elias Jaua 

and his US counterpart John Kerry, which was the first such meeting in more than eight years. 

This meeting is expected to eventually lead to the countries once again sending ambassadors 

to their respective capitals. 

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Oil Investment Now 

[ ] Market pressures will solve the case. Venezuela will be forced to seek international 

investment to save oil industry. 

González and Vyas, 2013 

( Angel and Kejal, “Unlocking Venezuela’s vast energy potential; Revival of the country’s oil sector 

post-Chávez on standby,” 4/4/2013, http://www.businesswithoutborders.com/topics/ 

opportunities/unlocking-venezuelas-vast-energy-potential/) 

But declining oil output and rising shale-oil production in the U.S., Venezuela’s main market, 

may force a redirection. Barring any new political or military shocks in the Middle East, global oil 

prices look like “a balloon with a slow leak,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, executive director for energy 

and sustainability at the University of California-Davis. The Venezuelan government can’t count on 

high oil prices to match rising public spending, she added. 

Anticapitalist rhetoric heated up in the days leading to Mr. Chávez’s death. Venezuelan Acting 

President Nicolás Maduro accused Chevron Corp., the No. 2 U.S. oil company by market value 

behind Exxon, of aggression against Ecuador in a multibillion-dollar environmental lawsuit pitting the 

company against Ecuadorean plaintiffs. 

Analysts said they were surprised by the comments, as Chevron, the only major U.S. oil company to 

remain in Venezuela, was considered by Mr. Chávez as a key investor, and is lending Venezuela $2 

billion to increase output at a joint-venture oil development. A spokesman for Chevron declined to 

comment on Mr. Maduro’s assertion. 

Despite the posturing, Mr. Chávez’s death presents an opportunity for a new administration to lift 

some of the burdens heaped on PDVSA, which has supplied billions of dollars in cheap oil to Cuba 

and other friendly foreign governments, said Carlos Jordá, a Houston-based oil consultant who was 

once a senior manager at the oil company. 

To reach its full potential, Venezuela´s entire oil industry sector needs to be reinvented, something 

that is unlikely, said Luis Pacheco, a former PDVSA executive fired during the oil strike of 2003 along 

with 20,000 other employees who opposed Mr. Chávez. 

In 2000, Mr. Chávez signed its first oil deal with Cuba, providing the communist island with 53,000 

barrels a day of cut-rate oil, a sum that has risen to 110,000 barrels now. In return, the Cuban 

government has sent some 40,000 doctors and experts to support the popular social programs 

developed by Mr. Chávez. 

Mr. Jordá, who called those oil deals unsustainable, said that domestic fuel prices, the world’s lowest 

at around 6 cents a gallon, will also have to rise at some point. The cost to the country of the 

domestic fuel subsidies has also increased because refinery accidents forced the government to 

import growing quantities of gasoline, according to the EIA. The Venezuelan government denies it 

imports fuel. 

Worsening fiscal conditions will also prompt Mr. Chávez’s successors to improve relations 

with foreign investors—and eliminate bottlenecks created by the deceased leader’s highlypersonal, 

hands-on management style, said Jim Loftis, a partner with Vinson & Elkins LLC’s 

international arbitration practice. 

The country also needs to increase oil production to pay for tens of billions of dollars in 

Chinese loans it undertook to finance large social projects and a big boost in election spending last 

year. 

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Venezuela Economy- Alternate Causality 

[ ] Economic problems due to government monetary policy and deep subsidies. Maduro 

cannot reform these programs. 

Nagel, Professor of Economics at the Universidad de los Andes, 2013 

(Juan, “Why is the Venezuelan economy Nicolás Maduro’s weakness”, 

http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/why-venezuelan-economy-nicol%C3%A1smaduro%E2%80%99s-weakness, 

April 16) 

In a time of high commodity prices, why is one of the world’s top oil exporters facing such 

dire straits 

A lot of it has to do with Hugo Chávez’s socialist legacy. 

For years, Venezuela has had a fixed exchange-rate regime. The Chávez administration, eager 

to control every aspect of life in Venezuela, decided who got how many dollars, and at what 

prices. Currently, the fixed exchange rate is 6.3 bolívars (BsF) per dollar. A parallel “auction” system 

is selling dollars at BsF 12, and the black-market rate currently hovers around BsF 23 per dollar. 

These deep distortions are the reason why Venezuelans are suffering some of their worst 

shortages in years. Long accustomed to subsidized greenbacks for importing nearly 

everything, Venezuelans now find dollars harder to come by. However, the government has 

other priorities: oil production is stuck or declining, and with the nation’s refineries in bad shape, 

Venezuela needs to import refined products such as gasoline, which the government practically gives 

away for free. 

Importers lucky enough to access dollars at the BsF 6.3 rate find it very tempting to sell the 

same dollars at the black market rate instead of using them for their intended use—importing 

basic staples. That is one of the main reasons why Venezuelans´ shelves are empty. 

Untangling this economic crisis will require the skills of a deft politician—something Maduro 

clearly is not. Likewise, doing away with the regressive gasoline subsidies that threaten to 

bring down the state’s finances will require a national consensus that seems impossible right 

now. Meanwhile, generating enough confidence to spruce up private investment is simply not 

in the cards for Venezuela. 

Mr. Maduro is likely to find that Mr. Capriles and the pot-banging opposition are the least of 

his problems. 

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Venezuela Economy- Alternate Causality- Extension 

[ ] 

[ ] Venezuelan economic instability inevitable 

Lees , editor of the comparative politics blog, Suffragio.org , 2013 

[April 15, 2013. Kevin Lees is an attorney in Washington, D.C., and the. “Venezuela's Controversial 

Election Results Are Only the Start of Its Troubles” The New Republic. 

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112920/venezuela-elections-2013-close-results-are-defeatchavismo#] 

Meanwhile, the more acute economic problems continue, and may well accelerate, given that 

government policy for the past six months has been designed merely to get Maduro to the finish 

line of Sunday's election. Venezuela remains one of the few countries that still sets an official 

currency, and it devalued the bolívar in February by nearly one-third of its value to 6.3 bolívares to 

the dollar. Only chumps pay that, though. Not even the government pays it anymore, in fact. In a 

move to get more dollars into the hands of Venezuelan importers, the government last month 

created a new auction system for dispersing dollars, and although it hasn't released the price, it's 

reported that the government paid a rate of between 10 to 15 bolívares per dollar, making it a sort of 

second unofficial devaluation. There's a floating rate for dollars, and it's rumored to be up to 

three or four times the official rate. No one openly discusses it because that's technically illegal, but 

any number of Twitter accounts announce the going market rate—one favorite, until March, stated the 

price of "fresh avocados," and another stated the price of "green lettuce." The "green lettuce" people 

actually got into the scam of trading dollars themselves, until they disappeared in March, their racket 

exposed as a Ponzi scheme. It also makes changing U.S. dollars—or euros or Canadian dollars—into 

local currency quite an adventure, and it's one of the reasons why a tropical paradise that boasts the 

highest waterfall in the world is one of the world's least friendly tourist destinations. But it's even 

more tragic for a country where day-to-day life has grown increasingly dependent upon 

imports for basic staples, even fresh produce and refined oil products. Keeping the official 

rate so high has been a way for the government to subsidize dollars—the cheapest dollars went 

to the insiders who won the auctions and who could sell the dollars on the black market for a quick 

profit. So as demand for imports rise, the dollar system has exacerbated shortages in 

supermarkets, which have become more commonplace. In the short run, the devaluations have 

been great for the government in two regards. First, they get more bolívares in the treasury as 

the official rate slowly moves toward the market rate. But it also reduces the country's growing 

public debt—the International Monetary Fund estimates Venezuela's debt (including the debts of 

PDVSA, the state-owned oil company) at around 51 percent of GDP. In the run-up to last year's 

presidential election, Chávez ran a budget deficit of up to 17 percent of GDP, much of it financed by 

China. But China's now starting to balk at lending more to Venezuela, and it's widely believed 

that the devaluation followed China's decision to cut off Venezuela's credit. But despite the immediate 

gains, devaluation looks like a painful long-run solution. The inflation rate, which was already 

high (22 percent last year), is expected to get even worse. During the campaign, both Maduro 

and Capriles promised to raise the minimum wage by 40 percent, which could raise prices even 

more, threatening to cause inflation to spiral out of control. 

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Answers to: Iran Venezuela Alliance 

[ ] 

[ ] Iran doesn’t have sinister activities in Venezuela. 

Goodman, Reporter on Latin America for Bloomberg, 2013 

(Joshua , Internally citing a report from the US State Department – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin 

America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26th – 

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-statedepartment-says) 

The U.S. stepped up its monitoring of Iran’s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the 

country over its nuclear program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties 

with anti-American allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. While Iran’s outreach 

bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, 

senior policy director at the Council of the Americas. “It’s a shame that in such a dynamic 

hemisphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that for some -- especially Congress -- 

attention to the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges about Iranian infiltration,” 

Sabatini said via e-mail. Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Latin America after taking office in 

2005, most recently to Caracas to attend Chavez’s funeral in March and the inauguration of his 

successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month later. 

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Answers to: Cartel-Venezuela Alliance 

[ ] 

[ ] Venezuelan government is already deeply ingrained with the drug trade, engagement 

only props up these officials. 

Noriega, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, , 2013 

(Roger, “Why is the State Department obsessed with legitimizing the Venezuelan narco-state”, 6-14 

http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/06/why-is-the-state-department-obsessed-with-legitimizing-thevenezuelan-narco-state/) 

Although President Obama has refused to recognize the legitimacy of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás 

Maduro, the career diplomat who handles Latin American affairs seems to be convinced that 

holding talks with representatives of the Venezuelan narcostate is the right way to promote 

our values and interests in the region – despite the fact that such a dialogue bestows de facto 

recognition on an undemocratic, criminal regime. 

The charge d’affaires of Venezuela in Washington and staunch critic of the United States, Calixto 

Ortega, revealed recently that a meeting had been scheduled with Assistant Secretary Roberta 

Jacobson to improve relations between the two countries. Ironically, Ortega has been one of the most 

intransigent inquisitors against the democratic opposition in Venezuela. And now he is Ms. 

Jacobson’s new best friend. 

That the State Department accepted the appointment of Ortega as Venezuela’s envoy in 

Washington is disgraceful and inconsistent with what President Obama has expressed publicly. 

But one wonders, how are our economic interests with petroleum-rich Venezuela advanced by 

a dialogue with the regime that has politicized, looted, and bankrupted the Venezuelan state 

oil company, PDVSA How are our concerns about terrorism addressed by throwing a lifeline 

to the best friend of Iran and Hezbollah in the Americas How will these clever US diplomats 

advance our counternarcotics agenda with a state whose senior security officials have been 

implicated personally and directly in narcotrafficking by US authorities 

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Answers to: Drug Trafficking Impact 

[ ] 

[ ] US Venezuela cooperation won’t solve drug trafficking—it’s too embedded 

Washington Post , 2013 

(“Venezuela gets a lifeline from the United States” 6/11/2013, 

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-11/opinions/39896975_1_henrique-capriles-two-u-smilitary-attaches-regional-group-unasur) 

What did Mr. Maduro do to earn this assistance from Mr. Kerry Since Mr. Chávez’s death in March, 

the Venezuelan leader has repeatedly used the United States as a foil. He expelled two U.S. 

military attaches posted at the embassy in Caracas, claiming that they were trying to destabilize 

the country; he claimed the CIA was provoking violence in order to justify an invasion; and he 

called President Obama “the big boss of the devils.” A U.S. filmmaker, Timothy Tracy, was 

arrested and charged with plotting against the government — a ludicrous allegation that was backed 

with no evidence. Though Mr. Tracy was put on a plane to Miami on the day of the Kerry-Jaua 

encounter, Mr. Kerry agreed to the meeting before that gesture. There’s nothing wrong, in principle, 

with diplomatic meetings or even in dispatching an ambassador to a country such as Venezuela. 

The State Department has also been meeting with senior opposition leaders and has yet to say it 

recognizes the presidential election results. But Mr. Kerry’s words amounted to a precious 

endorsement for Mr. Maduro — and the Obama administration appears bent on cultivating him 

regardless of his actions. Perhaps the increasingly desperate new leader has secretly promised 

concessions to Washington on matters such as drug trafficking. But with senior government 

and military officials involved in the transhipment of cocaine to the United States and Europe, he 

is unlikely to deliver. In short, this looks like a reset for the sake of reset, launched without 

regard for good timing or the cause of Venezuelan democracy. 

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Venezuela won’t cut US off 

[ ] 

[ ] Venezuela won’t cut off the U.S. --- leverage is declining and it is importing U.S. 

gasoline 

Financial Times, 2012 

(Javier Blas, “US net imports of Venezuelan oil hit 30-year low,” 12/13/2012, 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ef9e0fa-44f8-11e2-858f-00144feabdc0.html, JMP) 

Not so long ago, Hugo Chávez, the leftist Venezuelan leader, almost every month would threaten 

the US that he would shut down his country’s oil exports. Each time, Washington took the 

threats seriously because of the importance of Caracas for US energy supplies. 

Not any longer. The US dependence of Venezuelan net crude and oil products exports 

(including the US Virgin Islands, which largely refined Venezuelan crude to export into the US) has 

dropped to levels last seen nearly 30 years ago. 

The sharp drop is due to three factors. Overall US oil imports are down on the back of the shale 

boom. In addition, the closure of a large refinery in the US Virgin Islands co-owned by Petróleos de 

Venezuela (Pdvsa) has further reduced imports of Venezuelan-origin oil products. And more recently, 

Venezuela has started to import large amounts of US-made gasoline to offset a local shortage. 

The reduction in US imports of Venezuelan-origin crude and oil products has been going on 

for the last five years. The new factor is the surge in US exports of oil products into 

Venezuela. In September, US refiners shipped a record of 196,000 b/d of gasoline and other oil 

products to Caracas. 

The International Energy Agency, the western countries’ oil watchdog, associates the surge in US 

exports to outages in Amuay and El Palito refineries in Venezuela. 

The Amuay plant, part of the 955,000 b/d giant Paraguana Refining Center – the world’s second 

largest after the Jamnagar refinery in India – suffered an explosion and fire in August that killed nearly 

50 people and injured more than 150. Although Caracas has said several times the refinery is 

returning to full production, the surge in oil products from the US suggests the contrary. 

The jump in US gasoline exports to Venezuela means that for each 10 barrels of crude that 

Caracas ships to the US, two return to Venezuela as products. The US oil product exports 

accounted in September for roughly 20 per cent of Venezuelan domestic oil consumption of 

about 1m b/d. 

The combination of lower Venezuelan oil exports – both from the country itself and the US Virgin 

Islands – and higher US gasoline exports reduced in June US net imports of Venezuelan-origin oil to 

685,000 barrels a day, the lowest since March 1984, according to Financial Times’ estimates based 

on data from the US Energy Information Administration. US net imports of Venezuelan-origin oil 

recovered a bit in September – the last data available –, reaching 839,000 b/d. 

Mr Chávez, who is undergoing cancer treatment in Cuba, may threaten an oil embargo in the future, 

as he did during the recent presidential elections. But his menace will no longer worry Washington. 

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Venezuelan Oil cut off has no effect on United States 

[ ] 

[ ] No impact to oil cut off from Venezuela. The international market can easily meet US 

demand. 

Laten, Analyst at Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010 

(Grant, “Venezuelan Oil Embargo Wouldn’t Impact American Energy Security,” 8/3, 

http://csis.org/blog/venezuelan-oil-embargo-wouldn%E2%80%99t-impact-american-energy-security) 

Should Venezuela cut off oil exports to the United States, the American market would need to 

replace roughly one million barrels per day. Propitiously, current supply and demand 

conditions are such that the market could easily adjust to prevent significant economic or 

political disruptions. With a daily surplus of roughly five million barrels, the worldwide oil market 

vis-à-vis OPEC (which does not participate in member countries’ embargos) is more than capable 

of replacing Venezuelan exports to the US. This is especially true because spot demand for oil is 

zero-sum, meaning that with one million extra barrels of Venezuelan oil flowing into the 

Chinese market daily, China would need to purchase one million fewer barrels on the world 

market. This would free up supply for the United States and maintain the five million barrel 

surplus, since global oil production and consumption would remain unchanged (PDVSA 

market adaptation issues notwithstanding). 

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No economic impact of oil shocks 

[ ] No shocks---macroeconomic policy and fundamental rebalancing of the global 

economy shield against them 

Decressin, Senior Advisor in the IMF's Research Department, 2012 

(Jorg, "Global Economy Learns to Absorb Oil Price Hikes" May 25 2012 

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/NUM052512A.htm) 

Despite a fourfold increase in oil prices over the past decade, the world has absorbed the 

price hikes with relatively little disruption due to fundamental changes in the workings of the 

global economy, and the use of macroeconomic policy to mitigate the effects of rises. 

During the current economic downturn, the price of oil hit over $100 a barrel, and prices rose close 

to levels only seen in the 1970s. But the increases have not triggered global recessions as they 

did in the 1970s and 80s. 

In new research, IMF economists attribute this resilience to five underlying factors: 

1. Stronger demand 

The reason for the current price hikes differs from the past. Increases in the 1970s and 1980s were 

caused largely by sharp disruptions to world supply. In contrast, a prime reason for the increases 

since 2000 has been stronger-than-expected demand from emerging market economies. 

The strong growth of emerging markets has benefited both them and the global economy: 

raising living standards and increasing their demand for products made abroad. 

A side-effect of this may have been an increase in oil prices, but this has not derailed the benefits of 

increased growth. 

2. Central bank policies 

Central banks and economies have become more adept at dealing with price shocks. In the 1970s 

and 1980s, oil price rises triggered fears of inflation, and workers would try to protect themselves by 

demanding higher nominal wage increases. This had the effect of setting off wage-price spirals. 

Now, greater awareness of the impact of high wage increases—including lost employment and 

reforms to labor markets—have led to more job-friendly wage setting. Central banks have become 

more adept at convincing workers that oil price increases will not feed through into inflation. 

Today, headline inflation temporarily increases after an oil price increase, but nominal wages hardly 

respond. Workers have grown to expect this rise in headline inflation, and anticipate that it will 

be temporary. 

Given the experience of the past, more recently many oil-importing economies with strong central 

banks have experienced little impact on core inflation and wage increases, despite oil price rises. 

This has allowed central banks to be more supportive of promoting recovery in the economy 

after an oil price increase, rather than having to raise interest rates to dampen inflationary 

expectations. 

3. Recycling the benefits of oil profits 

The revenues from oil exports are flowing back to oil-importing economies. This helps bring down 

interest rates for households and firms, and so supports investment and growth in these economies. 

4. Greater efficiency 

Oil price shocks do not have the same impact as in the past because economies have become more 

efficient in the use of energy. The amount of energy it takes to produce a dollar of income has been 

steadily declining for 40 years. This decline in energy intensity is expected to continue. 

16 | P a g e




Relations are resilient 

[ ] U.S. influence and relations in Latin America are inevitable 

Alvarado, former diplomat in the Mission of Venezuela to the Organization of American States, 


(Liza Torres, “The U.S. Must Re-evaluate its Foreign Policy in Latin America,” 5/31/2013 

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/lng=en&id=164370, JMP) 

Although there has been a decline in U.S. influence in the region, its presence is still there. In 

Venezuela, for example, U.S. oil companies have seen their actions limited, yet they still 

operate there. The United States is Venezuela’s top commercial partner, as Venezuela supplies 

12 percent of U.S. oil imports. 

Relations between the United States and Latin America have experienced cyclical ups and 

downs. Geographically, the United States and Latin America are linked and have a natural 

shared market, so there will always be a relationship of one sort or another. The United States 

will continue to seek to exert its influence over the region, whether through future plans for 

the placement of military bases or the promotion of bilateral trade agreements. 

[ ] Oil ties make relations with Venezuela resilient 

New York Daily Sun, 2013 

(1/29/2013, “Venezuela Open To Discussion On Improving Ties With The US,” 

http://www.newyorkdailysun.com/venezuela-open-to-discussion-on-improving-ties-with-the-us/, JMP) 

Despite the strained relationship of the US and Venezuela due to ideological differences, the 

two countries can’t help but keep their ties due to oil-trading. 

To date, the US is Venezuela’s largest importer, with the US taking forty per cent of Venezuela’s 

crude oil exports. On the other hand, Venezuela provides about 5.8 per cent of the US’ oil demands. 

17 | P a g e




Relations Low- Alternate Causality 

[ ] Can’t solve relations without addressing immigration, drugs and Cuba 

Inter-American Dialogue, the leading U.S. center for policy analysis, exchange, and 

communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, 2012 

(“Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” , An Inter-American Dialogue 

Policy Report, April, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) 

US Reversals—Over the last decade, the United States has suffered important setbacks in its 

regional and global standing. It has waged draining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has 

suffered the 2008 financial crisis brought on by a lack of fiscal discipline and poor economic 

management. It has seen a widening gap between its rich and its poor and more acute social 

problems. The country’s politics have become increasingly dysfunctional, making it harder to 

develop sensible and effective foreign policies except in situations of great urgency. 

Taken together, these developments have serious implications for US-Latin American relations. 

There are ample opportunities for deeper engagement and more productive cooperation but, before 

moving to anything resembling a genuine partnership, it will be necessary to deal more 

effectively with the long-standing challenges on the inter-American agenda. That is the only 

way the United States will be able to establish full trust and credibility. 

Agenda for a New Relationship 

An end to the current distancing and distraction in US-Latin American relations will require 

Washington and other governments in the hemisphere to refocus and deal more effectively with 

an array of difficult issues. Three long unresolved problems that cause strain and frustration 

in inter-American affairs—immigration, drugs, and Cuba—demand especially urgent attention. 

Three other issues—economics and energy, democratic governance, and global and regional 

cooperation—stand out as opportunities for broader coordination among all nations of the 

hemisphere. To be sure, the nature and relevance of these challenges vary from country to country. 

In an increasingly differentiated hemisphere, it is risky to refer in general terms to relations between 

the United States and Latin America. 

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Relations Low- Alternate Causality- Extensions 

[ ] Too many other factors hurt US-Latin American relations—Venezuela doesn’t even 

start to cover it 

Grandin, History Instructor at NYU, 2011 ( 

Greg, “Obama's Latin America Policy: Renewal or Further Decline” March 16, The Nation, 

http://www.thenation.com/blog/159256/obama-latin-america-renewal-or-further-decline) 

Barack Obama heads to Latin America tomorrow, bringing with him little more than a winning smile 

and the hope that the afterglow of his election, which Latin Americans celebrated with great cheer, 

still warms. The trip is meant to show that his administration has not let crises, domestic and foreign, 

prevent a proactive engagement with the region. In reality, Obama will be playing catch-up, trying 

to slow down China’s inroads into what used to be the United States’s backyard, shore up an 

alternative to the so-called “bad left” countries of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and sometimes 

Ecuador and Argentina, and win back Brazil. With its $6 trillion economy, Brazil has helped lead what 

Ecuador’s president Rafael Correa recently called the “second and definitive independence” of Latin 

America, opposing Washington on issues ranging from climate change to trade, Palestine to 

Honduras. Having been early critics of the militarism (most Latin American countries opposed the 

“War on Terror” broadly and the invasion of Iraq in particular) and extreme neoliberalism that 

crashed the United States, they believed he would help them create a new hemispheric 

framework, leaving behind the old failed orthodoxies and finding a way to cooperatively deal 

with transnational problems like poverty, inequality, crime, migration and climate change. At the 

very least, they thought he would finally end the US cold war against Cuba. But despite getting 

off to a good start at the Summit of the Americas shortly after his inauguration, Obama has largely 

disappointed. His administration’s shameful legitimizing of the June 2009 Honduran coup was a 

symbolic turning point, but the disenchantment has been widespread. An expected alliance 

with Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva didn’t pan out; immigration reform is off the table, as is a 

renewal of the assault rifles ban that might stem the flow of the weapons into Mexico; the 

United States refuses to lower its multibillion-dollar subsidy and tariff program that floats 

corporate giants like ADM and Monsanto; Cuba remains a pariah, if only in Washington’s eyes. 

As Obama quickly learned, obstacles to an effective hemispheric diplomacy were not to be found 

in the “bad left" countries but much closer to home: it’s the NRA, the anti-Castro Cuban lobby, 

agro-industry, anti-Latino jingoism, as well as the State and Commerce departments (along 

with the Office of the US Trade Representative) stuffed with holdovers from the Clinton and Bush 

administrations, that prevent much-needed movement on any number of issues: migration, Cuba, gun 

smuggling into Mexico, tariffs (the last Congress renewed a 54 cent tariff on each gallon of imported 

Brazilian ethanol—so much for “free trade”), and poverty reduction. As a result, Obama succumbed 

to inertia, carrying on a disastrous war on drugs and pushing an economic agenda as if 2008 

(or 2002 in Argentina, the worst recorded economic collapse in history) never happened. 

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Investment hurts relations 

[ ] U.S. resource investment in Latin America hurts relations – broad protests prove 

Grandin, professor of history at New York University ,2010 

(Greg, “Muscling Latin America,” The Nation, January 21, 2010, 

http://www.thenation.com/article/muscling-latin-america#axzz2XLnn95pN)//SS 

Responding to criticism from South America on the Colombian deal, the White House insists it merely 

formalizes existing military cooperation between the two countries under Plan Colombia and will 

not increase the offensive capabilities of the US Southern Command (Southcom). The Pentagon 

says otherwise, writing in its 2009 budget request that it needed funds to upgrade one of the 

bases to conduct “full spectrum operations throughout South America” to counter, among 

other threats, “anti-U.S. governments” and to “expand expeditionary war fare capability.” 

That ominous language, since scrubbed from the budget document, might be a case of hyping the 

threat to justify spending during austere times. But the Obama administration’s decision to go 

forward with the bases does accelerate a dangerous trend in US hemispheric policy. In 

recent years, Washington has experienced a fast erosion of its influence in South America, 

driven by the rise of Brazil, the region’s left turn, the growing influence of China and 

Venezuela’s use of oil revenue to promote a multipolar diplomacy. Broad so cial 

movements have challenged efforts by US- and Canadianbased companies to expand 

extractive industries like mining, bio fuels, petroleum and logging. Last year in Peru, 

massive in digenous protests forced the repeal of laws aimed at opening large swaths of 

the Amazon to foreign timber, mining and oil corporations, and throughout the region similar 

activism continues to place Latin America in the vanguard of the anticorporate and antimilitarist 

global democracy movement. 

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1NC Appeasement Turn 

[ ] The plan’s unconditional nature turns the entirety of Affirmatives solvency-Venezuela 

will use renewed relations with the US to obscure corruption that prevents economic growth s 

and maintain ties with US adversaries 

Walser, Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America @ Heritage, 2013. 

(Ray, “Buyer Beware: Secretary Kerry and Venezuela” 6/7, [http://blog.heritage.org/2013/06/07/buyerbeware-secretary-kerry-and-venezuela/] 

[MG]) 

Regrettably, Secretary Kerry and his Department of State colleagues are succumbing to 

Diplomat’s Syndrome, a form of optical illusion or mental disorientation that mistakes talk for action 

and assigns friendly gestures equal weight with actual deeds. That top diplomats of the U.S. and 

Venezuela talked is no big deal. President Obama made nice with President Chavez in April 2009 

and relations continued to deteriorate. What really matters is whether Venezuela’s populist 

authoritarian leadership is genuinely ready to modify behaviors that clash with important U.S. 

interests and values. Beginning with the death of Chavez on March 5, the Maduro regime has 

engaged in virtually non-stop anti-American diatribes. It arrested U.S. citizen and filmmaker Tim 

Tracy on farcical charges of espionage. His recent release is a long overdue and little more than a 

concession to reality. Since March, President Maduro and company have repeatedly blocked efforts 

to obtain a fair review of voting irregularities in the April 14 elections and threatened and assaulted 

members of the democratic opposition, including a brutal attack on opposition legislators on the floor 

of the National Assembly. Maduro and company have also spoken of punitive reprisals against U.S. 

ally Colombia, because Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with defeated opposition 

candidate Henrique Capriles. Maduro and Jaua clearly hope that Secretary Kerry and the Obama 

Administration will finally recognize the outcome of the April 14 elections and legitimate Maduro’s 

presidency while openly throwing the democratic opposition under the bus. Kerry’s statement 

equating Maduro’s mouthpiece Jaua with Venezuela is disconcerting. The offensive of Maduro 

and Jaua is aimed at undercutting the diplomatic offensive of the opposition. They also hope 

to keep the systemic failures of their Cuban-inspired socialism and economic mismanagement 

out of the discussion and obscure their ties with Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. Therefore, the bar 

for genuine improvements in U.S.–Venezuela relations should remain high. It should include a 

serious commitment by the Maduro regime to not only respect the rights of the democratic 

opposition but to enter into an actual dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and preserving 

fundamental political and economic rights. It will also require a major reversal in persistent anti- 

Americanism coupled with genuine cooperation to combat illicit drug trafficking and terrorism 

and adherence to all Iran and Syria sanctions. Without progress on these keys themes, Kerry 

and company will falter when it comes to changing the dynamic with post-Chavez Venezuela 

and legitimate authoritarian rule in Venezuela. 

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Appeasement Turns Stability 

[ ] 

[ ] Engagement with the country actively contributes to instability and collapse regional 

cooperation 

Wilson, President of Americans for Limited Government, 2011. 

(Bill Wilson. “Obama’s Appeasement to the South.” [http://netrightdaily.com/2010/12/obamasappeasement-to-the-south/][MG] 

Of course, at some point, appeasement begins to look like approval. The silence has been 

inexcusable, but the statement by U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua Robert Callahan that the 

communist state was now a candidate for U.S. foreign aid via the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

is an insult. And Valenzuela’s handshake with Ortega a week after the invasion began is a crime 

against liberty. Making matters worse, Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega has stacked that country’s 

Supreme Court simply so it could rule he is eligible to run for reelection — even though he is termlimited 

by the constitution. Clearly, Ortega has taken a page from Manuel Zelaya, who attempted a 

similar coup in Honduras to stay in power for life. Moreover, the Sandinistas have seen fit to “reprint” 

the Nicaraguan constitution to allow term-limited officials, including Supreme Court justices and 

election magistrates, to stay in power indefinitely, undoubtedly to solidify Ortega’s hold on power. This 

is the same regime responsible for the murder of thousands of Nicaraguans in the 1980’s as it waged 

its revolution. Weakness invites aggression, and it is clear that the ineptitude of the Obama 

Administration has not gone unheeded in the region. In the last week of the year, Chavez expelled 

U.S. envoy Palmer for his comments about Venezuela’s proxy war against U.S. ally Columbia. 

Columbia, like Costa Rica, is in danger from these insurgent forces seeking to topple freedom 

in the region. Venezuela has unsurprisingly refused to condemn the Nicaraguan invasion of 

Costa Rica in the Organization of American States, and itself has a horrendous record of 

suppressing opposition in its country. Chavez has made himself dictator-for-life and has 

eliminated privately-run press organizations. And Barack Obama has done nothing, and his stooge, 

Valenzuela, since being appointed to his post continues to project a weak U.S. posture in the region. 

That won’t be changing any time soon, and certainly not in time to save nations like Nicaragua from 

once again falling into the grips of an authoritarian regime. Freedom will not long endure in the 

Americas without U.S. leadership, and under the Obama Administration, Central and South 

America are becoming less free. 

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Appeasement Turns Democratic Signals 

[ ] 

[ ] Recognition of Maduro in any form will undermine democratic signals to the entire 

region 


(Alasdair, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” Christian Science Monitor, 

[http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on- 


The US’s reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the heavy crude 

is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US refineries, a trading relationship 

upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil 

prices. In fact, many believe the US’s reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more 

than a message to other regional observers. “Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela,” 

says Mark Jones, professor of political science at Rice University in Texas. “The US’s refusal to 

recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduro’s win sends a signal to 

other Latin American countries that these elections didn’t meet minimum democratic 

standards.” 

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Oil appeasement hurts democracy 

[ ] Obama’s investment in Venezuela will lead to a non-democratic regime. 

Christy, senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative, 2013 

(Patrick “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela,” 3/15, 

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encouragedemocratic-venezuela) 

In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obama administration seeks, in Secretary Kerry's 

words, "an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the 

[Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" – let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any 

substantive change in Maduro's behavior. To be sure, Caracas's recent release of jailed American 

filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges of 

espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks with the United States, a shameful move 

reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook. [See a collection of political cartoons on defense spending.] 

While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of 

human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region 

gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power 

during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the 

April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary 

Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary 

session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week. For Venezuela's opposition, 

the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. 

Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee 

hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal 

charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United 

States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give 

further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining 

institutions. The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's government come as the 

region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with 

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution 

urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María 

Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings 

in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on 

power. Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take 

a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution 

or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is 

that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity 

is plummeting, and various public scandals – especially those related to institutional 

corruption – could further erode public confidence in the current government. By resetting 

relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez 

protégé's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition 

efforts to sustain and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink 

this hasty reset with Maduro. 

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Oil appeasement hurts democracy 

[ ] 

[ ] The Venezuelan oil sector bolsters autocratic rule --- suppresses dissent. 

Urgelles, Master’s degree in political science New York University, 2010 

(Thaelman “The Price of Venezuelan Oil Democracy,” PolicyMic, 

http://www.policymic.com/articles/1523/the-price-of-venezuelan-oil-democracy) 

. Today, President Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela works in a strikingly similar fashion. His so-called 

“Socialism of the 21st Century” has been a long campaign to expropriate and take over the 

private businesses of Venezuela’s weak bourgeoisie. He has utilized gigantic oil revenues in 

order to finance the government without the need for tax revenues or the private sector. 

Chavez has systematically expropriated agricultural land from the hands of private producers 

(some of them very efficient) in a crusade to give the land to the peasants. He has propagated a myth 

using socialist rhetoric in which the government must redistribute the country’s land in order to protect 

landless peasants from being exploited by greedy landlords. This narrative feeds off a 19th century 

vision of Venezuelan society — where most of the land was monopolized by military and oligarchic 

landlords — that no longer exists now that the country has become a mainly oil producing economy. 

This was a process that began decades ago with Venezuela’s oil industry, but Chavez has taken it 

to its ultimate extreme, resulting in the destruction Venezuela’s capacity to feed itself by decimating 

the country’s agricultural sector. As a result, Venezuela now depends more than ever on foreign 

imports, especially from Colombia and Argentina, and the average Venezuelan depends on imported 

food purchased with oil revenues. High government spending has led to the highest inflation in Latin 

America and the almost complete demise of national production. Contrary to common sense, 

Chavez’s officials defend this policy as the primary establisher of national autarchy. Venezuela’s 

catastrophic economic situation doesn’t end with the agricultural sector. Chavez has expropriated 

other important branches of national industry, like steel and aluminum, sugar, electricity, and the 

biggest telephone corporation, which has followed these companies into bankruptcy. His socialist 

ideology has resulted in an economy that depends more than ever on oil prices. Chavez's 

strategy to have a tight control of the only real source of wealth in the country makes 

complete sense if he plans to rule for life. It has made him the indisputable, strongest and 

wealthiest politician in Venezuela, by leaving the private sector subservient to the central 

government and the civil society weak and demoralized in front of an all-pervasive civil 

bureaucracy. Venezuela’s woes fit the pattern of other oil-rich countries which have also 

become rentier economies controlled by repressive regimes. These governments use oil 

wealth to bolster their popularity by buying off important segments of the population with 

social programs, as well as suppressing dissent, which is exactly what Chavez has been doing 

for more than a decade now. 

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Answers to: Appeasement spurs democracy 

[ ] 

[ ] Maduro is shoving democracy aside—the US must oppose his rise to power. 

Washington Post 4-16-13 

(Washington Post Editorial Board; “Nicolas Maduro shoves aside democracy in Venezuela”; 4-16, 

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-16/opinions/38584114_1_nicolas-maduro-recount-mr) 

THE ATTEMPT by the followers of Hugo Chavez to install a successor to the dead caudillo through a 

one-sided election is faltering. Now the Venezuelan regime appears to be preparing to maintain 

itself in power through brute force — and the oil-producing country is headed for a crisis that 

demands the attention of the United States and Latin America’s democracies. On Tuesday, 

Nicolas Maduro, the former bus driver and Cuban protege who was designated as Mr. Chavez’s 

successor, went on national television to announce that he would “not permit” a march 

Wednesday called by the opposition to support its call for a recount of votes in Sunday’s 

election. Promising to use “a strong hand” — a hoary phrase from Latin America’s history of 

dictatorship — Mr. Maduro spoke of protesters “filling [Caracas] with death and blood,” words that 

rang like a threat. The government said that seven people already had been killed in post-election 

clashes and claimed that a coup was being prepared. In fact, if anyone is preparing a coup, it is Mr. 

Maduro and his Cuban advisers. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski has put forward a 

peaceful and reasonable demand: that an audit be undertaken of the suspect presidential vote count. 

Mr. Maduro himself said Sunday that he would agree to a recount — but on Monday the electoral 

commission he controls abruptly ratified a result that gave him a margin of 260,000 votes out of 

14.8 million cast. The narrow outcome clearly shocked the Chavistas, who had already installed Mr. 

Maduro in the presidency by unconstitutional means; they expected that their domination of the media 

and orchestration of voting by state employees would produce an easy “victory” and legitimize the 

regime’s continuation. In fact a majority of Venezuelans, including many former Chavez supporters, 

appear to be fed up with a “revolution” that has produced double-digit inflation, severe shortages of 

power and staple foods and one of the world’s highest murder rates. Mr. Maduro has offered no 

answers to these problems — only ludicrous claims that they are the product of conspiracies 

by the opposition and the United States. Amid signs that his movement may be splintering, Mr. 

Maduro appears to be preparing repressive measures that should be intolerable to members 

of the Organization of American States, who are bound by treaty to resist violations of 

democratic order. Fortunately the Obama administration, which until recently was prematurely 

and unwisely courting Mr. Maduro, has questioned the quick certification of the election and 

supported the call for the recount; so has the government of Spain and OAS Secretary General 

José Miguel Insulza. The administration should begin coordinating with Mexico, Chile and other 

important Latin American democracies to prevent Mr. Maduro from killing his way into power. 

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Venezuela would say No—Political Move 

[ ] Maduro will say no to appear more hardline against the U.S. 


(Alasdair, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” Christian Science Monitor, 

[http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on- 


“ 

A lot of Venezuelans seem to think that a close election is not a valid election, so this leaves 

room for Maduro’s critics to question it,” says Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy 

research, an independent think-tank in Washington. Mr. Weisbrot says he thinks the US is trying to 

take advantage of this situation. Far from putting a dent in Maduro’s credibility, other 

observers believe that continued tensions between Venezuela and the US serve as a positive for 

a president whose supporters have come to expect belligerence towards “las imperialistas.” 

“In many ways John Kerry is doing Maduro a favor by not recognizing him,” says Jones. “The 

US’s refusal to cooperate plays into the socialists’ broader narrative that the US is conspiring 

to defeat Venezuela’s revolution.” 

[ ] Maduro won’t engage with the US 

Shinkman, National Security Reporter at U.S. News & World Report, 2013 

(Paul, “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond”, US News 

and World Report, April 24 th , http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsorednarco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respondpage=2) 

[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and 

corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, 

a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money." "Most criminalized elements of the 

Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be 

as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez. U.S. officials might 

try to engage the new Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties 

between the two countries. But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in 

his home country, and will likely adopt a more confrontational approach to the United States to 

prove his credentials to these Bolivarian elites. "Maybe if he were operating in different 

circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I don't think he can be a pragmatist 

right now." 

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Venezuela would say No- Political Move- Extensions 

[ ] 

[ ] Political conditions prevent Maduro from being pragmatic 

Meacham, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 2013 

(4/16/2013, Carl, “Venezuela Post-Election: Can Maduro Govern” 

http://csis.org/publication/venezuela-post-election-can-maduro-govern, JMP) 

Maduro's narrow victory also dashes any expectations that he might turn pragmatic when 

dealing with such issues as the Venezuelan economy. Maduro’s first goal will likely be to 

show himself in charge and to satisfy Chavistas. This will likely lead to a doubling-down of 

Chávez’s policies and to profligate spending on social programs within Venezuela. 

Q4: What does the current situation mean for U.S.-Venezuela relations 

A4: These results likely bode ill for U.S.-Venezuela relations as well. Maduro will likely be 

forced to play the anti-United States card to placate Chavismo’s most ardent supporters and 

show himself to be a Chavista to the core. 

Conclusion: Sunday’s result has changed the dynamics of Venezuela’s transition to its next president. 

The close showing signifies political uncertainty and potential conflict in the short term, as more 

Venezuelans seem to be tiring of the growing corruption, crime, and inflation that defined the later 

years of Chávez’s presidency. One thing is certain: while Maduro campaigned on inheriting the 

mantle from Chávez, the Venezuelan people will not overlook Venezuela’s problems as they did for 

the former president. Maduro described himself as the “son of Chávez,” while campaigning – but one 

has to believe Chávez would have been deeply disappointed with Sunday’s outcome. 

[ ] Maduro says no to the United States 

Neuman and Archibold, writers at the New York Times, 2013 

(WILLIAM and RANDAL C, Kerry Meets With Official of Venezuela to Set Talks, New York Times, 

6/5/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/world/americas/venezuela-frees-tim-tracy-jailed-usfilmmaker-and-expels-him.html_r=0) 

Mr. Maduro, who is struggling with economic problems and faces great pressures from within 

Mr. Chávez’s movement and from a re-energized opposition, has repeatedly used the United 

States as a political punching bag and accused it of ties to purported plots to undermine or 

overthrow his government. 

Last month, Mr. Maduro called Mr. Obama “the big boss of the devils” and said Mr. Obama 

planned to provoke violence in Venezuela to have an excuse to intervene. 

On the day Mr. Chávez died, Mr. Maduro expelled two military attaches at the American Embassy, 

saying they were trying to destabilize the country. He has speculated that the United States may have 

found a way to cause Mr. Chávez’s cancer. 

28 | P a g e




[ ] Hard-liners won’t accept the plan 

Venezuela would say No- Hardliners 

Meacham, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 2012 

(Carl, 6/21, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela Relations ”, 

http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations, 6/21/2013) 

Conclusion: In short, relations between the United States and Venezuela have a rocky track 

record that recent headlines cannot obscure. And while there are undoubtedly members of the 

Venezuelan government who want to improve relations, it’s difficult to see their argument 

winning over the more hardline Chavistas in the government, who would likely see any steps 

to building ties as betraying the cause. Venezuela has time and again proven to be unwilling 

to work with the United States, making it difficult for the United States to gauge any real 

intentions of change. In order to move ahead and legitimize this new relationship, the United States 

must make a decision regarding Maduro’s legitimacy: does the United States recognize Maduro’s 

election sans a proper audit 

[ ] Maduro says no – Upsets the Chavistas and hand outs from America make him look 

weak. 

Shifter, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, President of the Inter-American Dialogue 

2013, 

(Michael, “A ‘Bolivarian dream’ deferred ”, Gulf News, 7/3/2013, 

http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/a-bolivarian-dream-deferred-1.1205058,) 

It makes sense for Venezuela to reach out to the US, but at least in the short term, Maduro will 

have a tough time holding back on his strident, anti-American rhetoric. For political survival, 

he needs to prove his Chavista bona fides to the base that brought him to the presidency. 

Whatever happensabroad, Maduro will be increasingly consumed by Venezuela’s staggering 

problems at home.Madurobut is hardly in a position to lead the kind of broad ideological 

movement that Chavez was able to cobble together in his glory days. his own country’s 

stunning decay raises questions about how much longer his poor imitation of Chavez can 

carry him. 

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Venezuela would say No- Hardliners- Extension 

[ ] 

[ ] Maduro says no – must demonstrate his leadership by standing up to America. 

Scicchitano, staff writer at Newsmax, 2013 

(Paul, “Ambassador Reich: Maduro Shows 'False Manhood,' Wants to be Chavez” Newsmax, 7/6 

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/reich-maduro-venezuela-snowden/2013/07/06/id/513588) 

Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela Otto Reich tells Newsmax that Venezuela’s offer of 

asylum for NSA leaker Edward Snowden is an attempt by President Nicolas Maduro to flex his 

“false manhood” and be more like his predecessor — the late dictator Hugo Chavez. “Venezuela 

has nothing to gain. Maduro has a lot to gain,” Reich said in an exclusive interview on Friday. 

“Maduro gains that macho bravado that he has lacked so far. He’s really been a laughing stock 

in Venezuela because of things like his statement that Chavez came to him as a little bird and 

spoke to him. People have been making fun of that for months. He’s just not taken seriously. 

What better show of false manhood than to stand up to the great American empire — stand up 

to the Americans. This is what he’s doing.” 

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Solvency takes too long 

[ ] The oil sector in Venezuela faces too many problems to turn around in the near term. 

Securing international investment would only be a drop in the bucket. 

Ladislaw and Verrastro, senior fellow with the Energy and National Security Program at CSIS, 

and Chair for Engergy and Geoplotics at CSIS, 2013 

(Sarah O. and James R., “Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan Oil Production”, March 6, 

http://csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oil-production) 

Even under the best of circumstances, reform in the energy sector will take a long time to 

emerge. The damage that has been done to not only PDVSA but to the institutions of the state 

and civil society could take years to rehabilitate. A few key reasons for this include: 

revenue from the oil and gas sector that is diverted for political purposes and not reinvested in 

a way that will drive new production will be hard to direct back to useful investment in the 

sector, 

much of the private sector has been driven away from investment in Venezuela and may be 

reluctant to return, or for the companies in country to re-invest in the short-term given their 

experience in the 2000s, 

oil field mismanagement and damage may have likely occurred over the last decade and it will 

take time and investment to revitalize, 

many of Venezuela’s core assets are in technologically complex and capital-intensive heavy 

oil projects that take time and resources to develop and must now be viewed in light of the 

global array of upstream options that are now on the table for international oil investors as 

compared to a decade ago, 

some of Venezuela’s current commercial relationships on the upstream or export side may 

have to be revisited in light of a more commercially-based hydrocarbon policy, 

Venezuela’s energy sector is dominated by the state’s decisions and management and it will 

take time to replace the managerial competency that once existed, 

highly subsidized oil is a key feature of Venezuelan society and the political will to reform the 

entire energy sector into one that is more market-based and open to private investment will 

necessarily have to feed into the domestic demand-side of that equation. 

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China Disadvantage

China Disadvantage 



China Disadvantage - Table of Contents 

Summary............................................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 4 

China Disadvantage 1NC................................................................................................................... 5-8 

Answers to Affirmative Answers 

Answers to: US Investing in Venezuela now ......................................................................................... 9 

Answers to: Venezuela Oil not key ..................................................................................................... 10 

Answers to: Trade is not Zero Sum ................................................................................................ 11-12 

Answers to: Latin America Not Key to Chinese Growth ...................................................................... 13 

Answers to: Engagement Bad - Environment ..................................................................................... 14 

Answers to: Engagement Bad – Latin America Economy ................................................................... 15 

Answers to: Engagement Bad – Latin American Governments .......................................................... 16 

Answers to: Chinese Growth provide regional stability in Asia............................................................ 17 

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Summary 

Currently, China needs oil to keep its economy running and over a billion of its citizens happy living in 

a dictatorship. To do this, they work out deals with countries who can supply oil. Right now they 

import a lot of oil from Venezuela. The negative team argues that the affirmative’s plan boosts 

relations and trade between the United States and Venezuela which means more oil will go to the US. 

This, in turn, takes away the oil that goes to China. A shortage of oil will cause an economic 

slowdown in China and risk a collapse of the government. A collapse of the Chinese government 

would mean government crackdowns on citizens, massive refugee flows across borders and a war 

involving most of Asia and many other great powers. 

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Glossary 







price; usually a tactic used by large producers to prevent new entrants into a market 






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China Disadvantage 1NC (1/3) 

A. Uniqueness: China’s investment in Venezuela increasing now. 

PLNA, Presna Latina News Agency, 2013 

(5/17/2013,“Venezuela, China Strengthen Cooperation in Oil Sector,” 

http://www.energytribune.com/76932/venezuela-china-strengthen-cooperation-in-oilsector#sthash.8RLoHoEy.dpbs, 

JMP) 

China’s Vice President Li Yuanchao and Venezuelan Minister of Oil and Mining 

Rafael Ramirez today ratified their will to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the 

hydrocarbons field. In statements made from an oil extraction deposit of Sinovensa 

joint venture, in the Orinoco Oil Belt (OOB), the Chinese vice president said that the 

goal is to jointly produce 40 million tons of oil annually in the coming years. 

The Chinese government is willing to back the investment projects and also work in 

other aspects, such as the protection of the environment and the local population, said 

the visitor during a visit to oil extraction areas. 

B. Link: US oil engagement with Venezuela trades off with China.. 

Luft,06 - PhD and Co-Director for the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (Gal, 

“Challenge or Opportunity China’s Role in Latin America”, United States Government 

Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG- 

109shrg28258.htm)//VP 

Energy is today perhaps the main driver of China's recent international behavior. 

Many of China's foreign policies in the Middle East, East China Sea, Central Asia, and 

Africa are shaped by its energy expediencies, often at the detriment of the United 

States. China's recent effort to drive the United States out of Central Asia and in support 

of terrorist-sponsor regimes like Iran and Sudan just because it needs their oil are the 

latest testimonies of this trend. With global reserves of cheaply recoverable oil and 

gas being depleted, China is already competing with the United States over the 

same oil reserves in some of the world's most unstable areas. When it comes to 

Latin America, China's demand for oil has resulted in a series of deals with a 

number of countries, primarily Peru, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 

and Venezuela, which is America's fourth largest oil supplier. 

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China Disad 1NC (2/3) 

C. Internal Link: Continued access to oil from Latin America key to Chinese 

economic growth. 

Xiaoxia, 13 – Economic Observer (Wang, “In America’s backyard: China’s Rising 

Influence in Latin America”, Worldcrunch, 5/6, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/inamerica-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policytrade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)//VP 

Initially, China’s activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By 

providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt 

diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then, with China's 

economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has gradually become a 

problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are 

endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the 

demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 

years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the 

world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends 

on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is 

inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production 

capacity naturally became a destination for China. 

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China Disad 1NC (3/3) 

D. Impact: Sustained economic growth prevents collapse of the ruling party – that 

would lead to government crackdowns, refugee flows and wars across Asia. 

Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull ,2001 

[Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence 

Serewicz, Autumn, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm] 

Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in 

danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect 

entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of 

general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The 

effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic 

collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came 

with a bang or a whimper. 

PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and 

more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of 

the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet 

further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates 

at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change 

[erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 

1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. 

But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the 

affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of 

the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments 

deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting 

traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social 

cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child 

is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of 

young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males 

are unlikely to be a source of social stability. 

Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. 

Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily 

trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps 

openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in 

turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. 

If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a 

more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated 

between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. 

Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to 

conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, 

but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the 

"fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] 

If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil 

unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing 

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across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different 

countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to 

major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might 

try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries. 

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Answers to: US Investing in Venezuela now 

[ ] 

[ ] China increasing economic involvement in L.A. now – infrastructure and 

energy cooperation 

Fei, web editor at Xinhua, 2013 

(Xu, “Xi's Trip Opens New Horizon for Ties with Latin America”, CRJ English, June 7 

2013, http://english.cri.cn/6909/2013/06/07/195s769020.htm)//CB 

China and Latin America have expanded pragmatic cooperation in recent years, 

delivering tangible benefits to both sides. 

With two-way trade reaching 261.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2012, China has become the 

second largest trading partner of Latin America and the Caribbean, which witnessed the 

world's fastest growth in exports to China. 

By investing nearly 65 billion dollars so far in Latin America and the Caribbean, 

China has helped create much-needed jobs in the region. 

However, both sides are fully aware that there is potential to be tapped. China's 

development offers great opportunities for Latin America. 

As the world's second biggest importer, China will buy goods worth over 1 trillion dollars 

over the next five years and its overseas investment will exceed half a trillion dollars. 

As Xi has mentioned in his speech at the Mexican Senate, China is confident in 

maintaining steady economic expansion, which would create more business 

opportunities for the world including Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Latin America needs Chinese investment and participation in infrastructure 

construction. The region's products such as farm produce and energy need the 

Chinese market. 

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Answers to: Venezuela Oil not key 

[ ] 

[ ] China’s calculations have changed and will now actively compete with 

the US for oil from Venezuela.. 

Tania, Master of Science (M.Sc.), International Relations and Affairs from the University 

of Amsterdam, 2012 

[Maxime, “China’s energy security strategy towards Venezuela,” July 1, 

http://epa.iias.asia/files/Maxime%20Tania%20- 

%20Chinas%20energy%20security%20strategy%20towards%20Venezuela%20- 

%20Transnationalization%20and%20the%20geopolitical%20impact%20of%20the%20S 

ino-Venezuelan%20relationship.pdf] 

In scrambling for energy resources, both China and the U.S. as the world’s major 

powers want to project their influence on the world’s geopolitical regions. 

Although Latin America may be the backyard of the U.S., for both China and the 

U.S. Latin America is turning into another geopolitical region. China’s relations 

with Latin American countries in general and Venezuela in particular, have 

primarily emphasized on their economic relations in terms of trade and 

investments. Along these lines, China could be reducing U.S.’ opportunity to have 

trade relations and make investments in the region instead. The fact that China’s 

military relations with countries would affect the U.S., could be construed as an 

upcoming threat to U.S. national security. Although China’s power projection on the 

world can generally be characterized as ‘soft power’, China is also growing security 

relations with its international partners. China claims that its militarization in these 

countries is a natural consequence of the need it has to protect its interests from 

potential rivals. It is hard to tell whether or not the U.S. should be keeping a close 

eye on this, still, minor threat to preserve its national security. Also, the consolidation 

of China’s political relations with U.S. opposing parties, fuels tensions between 

the U.S. and China whether this is justified or not. 

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Answers to: Trade is not Zero Sum 

[ ] 

[ ] US action on oil crowds out China – Brazil proves. 

Cerna, Staff at China Research Center, 2011. 

[Michael, , "China's growing presence in Latin America: Implications for US and 

Chinese presence in the region" China Research Center -- Vol 10 No 1 -- 

www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-sand-chinese-presence-in-the-region/] 

As it stands, the Chinese are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that 

directly competes with the United States. China is strictly concerned with 

commodities, including oil. U.S. President Barack Obama recently signed an 

agreement with Brazil’s Petrobras that will allow the oil company to drill in the 

Gulf of Mexico. This symbolic move could cause tensions to increase as the 

world’s two largest oil consumers battle over rights to Brazilian oil. In that regard, 

the competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and move into the 

realm of fighting for political influence. It is odd to think that the United States 

would need to compete for hemispheric dominance with a country on the other 

side of the globe, but China’s actions and increasing integration into the region 

tell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the proximity and 

importance of Latin America to the United States, this region could be the 

symbolic battle that best measures the continued hegemony of the U.S. versus 

China. 

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Answers to: Trade is not Zero Sum 



[ ] Close oil linkages to Latin America are necessary for Chinese energy 

security 

Economic Observer 13 [“IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE 

IN LATIN AMERICA”, http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyardchina-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investmentsenergy/c9s11647/, 

May 6] 

Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the 

most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the 

world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. 

More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the 

instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America 

and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for 

China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple 

role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum 

industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American 

countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also 

focused on its energy sector. 

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Answer to Latin America Not Key to Chinese Growth 

[ ] 

[ ] Latin America key to Chinese economy – dependent on export growth 

Jenkins, 13 - Professor of development economics with an particular interest in Latin America, 

13 (Rhys, “Latin America and China- A New Dependency,” 6/11, 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2012.691834#.UbphhvlQFsk)//V 

P 

Nevertheless, the trend over the past decade has been for the USA’s share in both 

Latin American imports and exports to decline while that of the EU has remained 

roughly constant and China’s has increased significantly. The Economic 

Commission for Latin America has projected, based on data for 16 Latin 

American countries, that, by 2020, China will have overtaken the EU as both an 

export destination and as a source of imports for the region, and will have 

narrowed the gap with the USA. In 2020 it is projected that China will account for 

almost a fifth of Latin American exports and a sixth of imports. In terms of FDI 

China’s role in the region continues to be marginal. Despite the significant recent growth 

of Chinese investment, in 2010 China accounted for less than 0.3% of the total stock of 

foreign capital in the region and its share of FDI inflows in that year was only 0.8%.47 

Even though the official figures may underestimate the true extent of Chinese FDI and a 

number of major new investments were made in 2010, the role of Chinese firms in the 

region remains very limited. As they continue to expand globally, their presence in 

Latin America is likely to become more significant in the future. Nevertheless 

Chinese FDI is starting from such a low base that it will be some time before it achieves 

levels comparable to that of US or EU FDI in the region. The global financial crisis 

provides a good test of the extent to which China has emerged as a key driver of 

economic growth in Latin America, making the region less vulnerable to fluctuations in 

the US economy. The crisis had a major impact on Latin American exports in 2009, with 

a decline in value of 23% compared to 2008.48 Exports to the USA fell by 26% and to 

the European Union by 28%. In stark contrast Latin American exports to China 

continued to increase in 2009, by 7.5%, reflecting the continued growth of the Chinese 

economy through the crisis (see Table 10). This has led ECLAC to claim that ‘China’s 

economic dynamism has come to the rescue of Latin America and the 

Caribbean’s exports’ 

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Answers to: Engagement Bad - Environment 

[ ] 

[ ] Chinese investment is environmentally friendly, the latest studies prove. 

Rowling , Journalist at trust.org, 2013 

(Megan, “Chinese investors become responsible in Latin America – study”, Thomson 

Reuters Foundation, May 9, 2013, http://www.trust.org/item/20130509101558-oi5aw/, 

Daehyun 

LONDON (Thomson Reuters Foundation) - Chinese investors in Latin America are 

showing greater awareness of the social and environmental impacts of their 

business activities, and have started applying standards to make trade more 

sustainable, a research report said on Thursday. 

The study from the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) 

looked at investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises in Peru, Brazil and 

Chile, in the mining, agriculture and forestry sectors. China is expected to overtake 

the European Union to become Latin America's second-largest trade partner next year, 

after the United States, it noted. 

“While Chinese companies have often been accused of performing worse in terms 

of sustainability than their foreign and domestic counterparts, evidence for this is 

far from conclusive,” said Emma Blackmore, the report’s lead author.“Chinese 

investors face steep learning curves with respect to local practices and the 

contexts in which they are operating – both cultural and regulatory. But they are 

showing signs of increased recognition of the importance of sustainability in 

informing investment decisions and in building long-term relationships and 

China’s reputation in the region," she added. 

The main benefits for Latin America include economic growth, job creation and 

infrastructure development, such as roads or soy processing plants, the report 

said. "But there is a vital need to balance economic growth with improvements of 

livelihoods of the poor as well as protection of increasingly scarce natural resources," it 

emphasised.Development experts have made similar recommendations about China's 

huge investments in Africa, but the report did not touch on this region. 

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Answers to: Engagement Bad – Latin America Economy 

[ ] 

[ ]Chinese influence helps prop up Latin American economies 

Delgado, political and economic consultant, 2011 

(Federico, “Is China Threatening U.S. Interests in South America”, Real Clear World, 

4-16-11, 

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/04/16/is_china_threatening_americas_inter 

ests_in_south_america_99478.html)//KG 

To be clear: billions of dollars and the likes of brand new stadiums are, well, still 

billions of dollars and a brand new stadium. More importantly, China's involvement 

in Latin America is very positive for both parties and the United States. After all, it 

would be unnerving if the world's second largest economy isolated itself and did 

not seek out global markets - particularly economies as buoyant as Latin 

America's. 

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Answers to: Engagement Bad – Latin American Governments 

[ [ 

[ ] Chinese influence is vital to Latin American stability 

Ellis,professor of national security studies at Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 

2005 (R. Evan, “U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 

OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA,” SSI, 

June,http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf)//SMS 

China’s interest in securing access to the resources of Latin America through 

trade and investment give it a vested interest in the stability of the region. On its 

face, such interest is counterintuitive; given China’s traditional alignment with anti-status 

quo third world movements, constructing a secure supply chain requires governments 

that are stable enough to extract, process, transport, and export those goods that China 

requires to fuel its economic expansion. The vested Chinese interest in stable, exportoriented 

Latin American governments has the potential to create a number of policy 

contradictions or dilemmas. For example, China has a vested interest in leveraging and 

deepening its relationship with the populist Chávez regime in Venezuela both because 

of Chávez’s ideological sympathy with China, and because of Venezuelan petroleum 

products and other resources. But China also has an interest in access to the 

resources of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Thus attempts by the Chávez regime to 

spread its Bolivarian revolution to these countries by promoting radical 

indigenous movements ultimately could cause China to begin to see Chávez as a 

net liability to its interests in the region. 

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Chinese Growth provide regional stability in Asia 

[ ] Strong Chinese growth key to solve Asian stability, North Korean 

proliferation, and terrorism. 

Krawitz, Visiting Senior Fellow @ NDU, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 2010. 

(Howard M., , “China’s trade opening and implications for regional stability” The 

People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition – National Defense University Press -- 

http://www.scribd.com/doc/3099389/the-peoples-liberation-army-and-china-in-transition) 

A strong services sector, and the millions of jobs it will create, would not only 

support a real middle class but also slow growth in China’s chronically unemployed 

underclass, a worrisome source of destabilizing social pressure. China must place 

over 10 million new workers into the economy every year. It must also find jobs for an 

estimated 150 million unemployed migrants, a number expected to swell by at least 5 to 

6 million a year. Again, domestic stability is the issue. Domestic stability in China 

benefits America. Comfortable, prosperous Chinese citizens are more likely to share 

concerns similar to those Americans have and be more willing to cooperate on the 

range of issues relating to such concerns. For example, China already shows 

increased interest in working with U.S. officials and private experts on 

environmental problems (for example, pollution, hazardous waste, and 

transportation), drug trafficking, medicine, and public health. These are now issues of 

real concern for Chinese citizens in more prosperous areas of the country. They are 

also issues that transcend borders and have the potential to draw China into the 

international arena as a nation with a stake in making cooperation work. Dialogue on 

matters of mutual interest promotes communication, increased cooperation, and, 

ultimately, trust. A wealthy, stable China can serve U.S. regional security interests. 

A China that risks tangible loss from aggressive and confrontational behavior 

should be less likely to favor precipitous action and conflict. It should be more 

likely to be interested in preserving regional peace and stability, more open to 

consulting with Pacific Rim neighbors, and more willing to cooperate on regional security 

issues, strategies, and disputes. Speaking from a vantage point of growing economic 

strength and military capability would give Beijing the respect, prestige, and 

diplomatic stature it craves, making it easier for China to see itself as a player whose opinion is 

given serious weight by peers. This could calm Chinese fears of being marginalized or 

contained, making it easier for China to find common cause with the United 

States, Japan, and others in the region in maintaining calm and promoting 

dialogue on Korean Peninsula security issues, combating international terrorism 

and piracy, and perhaps even becoming more involved in curbing the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

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Affirmative

China Disadvantage Affirmative 



China Disadvantage Affirmative-Table of Contents 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 2 


Non Unique: US Investing in Venezueala Now ..................................................................................... 3 

Link Answers 

No Link: Venezuela Oil not key ............................................................................................................. 4 

No Link: Trade is not Zero Sum ............................................................................................................ 5 

Impact Answers 

Impact Turn: Chinese Engagement Bad - Environment ........................................................................ 6 

Impact Turn Chinese Engagement Bad- Latin America Economic Growth ........................................... 7 

Impact Turn Chinese Engagement Bad- Latin American Government Stability ................................... 8 

No Impact: Latin America not key to Chinese Growth ........................................................................... 9 

No Impact: Chinese Economic Decline ............................................................................................... 10 

Answers to: Regional Stability Impact ................................................................................................. 11 

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Glossary 






Nicolas Maduro - newly elected president of Venezuela 


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Non Unique: US Investing in Venezueala Now 

[ ] US investment in Venezuela high now. 

Alvarado, former Venezuelan Diplomat to the Organization of American States -2013 

[Liza Torres, , "The U.S. Must Re-evaluate its Foreign Policy in Latin America" Diplomatic Courier -- 

www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/latin-america/1457-the-us-must-re-evaluate-its-foreignpolicy-in-latin-america, 

5-13] 

Although there has been a decline in U.S. influence in the region, its presence is still there. In 

Venezuela, for example, U.S. oil companies have seen their actions limited, yet they still 

operate there. The United States is Venezuela’s top commercial partner, as Venezuela supplies 

12 percent of U.S. oil imports 

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No Link: Venezuela Oil not key 

[ ] China doesn’t care about Venezuelan oil. 

Dominguez, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, 2006. 

[Jorge, Professor @ Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, "China's Relations With 

Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes" Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper -- June -- 

www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf] 

China has an interest in diversifying its sources of petroleum imports. This explains its interest in 

the Venezuelan energy sector. In fact, the main surprise is how slow China has been in 

developing its energy sources in Venezuela. In December 2004, President Hu Jintao’s 

triumphal tour included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba—not Venezuela. As a Chinese 

government official explained, “the political conditions in Venezuela were too unstable and 

uncertain to permit a presidential visit.” In fact, Venezuela was more stable in late 2004 than it 

had been in years, which suggests a high level of Chinese government risk aversion. The 

Chinese position regarding why there is so little Chinese investment in Venezuela is, 

“There is too much risk for little return.” The Chinese government is aware of the economic 

costs of addressing the technical obstacles, noted above: “Venezuela’s oil business deals with the 

United States are more lucrative than any possible oil business deal with China because of the 

heavy costs entailed.” That is why China buys so little Venezuelan oil, focusing mainly on 

purchases of Orimulsion (a special emulsion used as a power station fuel in heavy industry and 

as boiler fuel). Venezuela offered China the option of buying 120,000 barrels of fuel oil per day but 

China has so far declined: “We don’t need it; we have other sellers.”74 

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No Link: Trade is not Zero Sum 

[ ] Latin America isn’t zero sum- China and US can both make gains 

Feinberg, Professor of International Political Economy, 2011 

(Richard Feinberg, professor of international political economy, “China, Latin America, and the United 

States:Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence” 2011, Latin American Research Review volume 

46 number 2 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/latin_american_research_review/v046/46.2.feinberg.html) 

In China's and India's Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat, the various 

contributors—World Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in 

international trade—come down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the 

neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely 

accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce 

mutually beneficial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast 

to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished 

losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese 

economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China 

sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and 

other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which 

Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in 

third markets (e.g., demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase 

more Latin American products at higher prices). 

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Impact Turn: Chinese Engagement Bad - Environment 

China economic engagement bad – speeds up deindustrialization and exploits 

environmentally sensitive areas 

Gallagher, professor of international relations at Boston University, 2013 

(Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University and a research fellow at 

the Global Development and Environment Institute, “Latin America playing a risky game 

by welcoming in the Chinese dragon” 5/10/2013, 

http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/2013/05/30/5464/) (JN) 

While the Chinese do not attach policy conditions to their loans, they have required that 

borrowers contract Chinese firms, buy Chinese equipment, and sometimes sign oil sale 

agreements that require nations to send oil to China in exchange for the loans instead 

of local currency. 

Chinese investment accentuates the deindustrialisation of Latin America. Large 

scale, capital intensive commodities production is not very employment-intensive, 

nor does it link well with other sectors of an economy. Dependence on 

commodities can cause a "resource curse" where the exchange rate appreciates 

such that exporters of manufacturing and services industries can't compete in 

world markets – and thus contribute to deindustrialisation and economic vulnerability. 

Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental 

risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's 

most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the 

Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and 

sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades. 

In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental 

guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when at China's stage of 

development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century standards 

for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when 

environmental concerns are at an all-time high. 

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Impact Turn: Chinese Engagement Bad- Latin America Economic Growth 

[ ] Chinese influence in Latin America is bad – US economic engagement is 

comparatively superior 

Shaiken et al, Professor in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley, 


[Harley, and Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at the University of 

Miami. And Adrian Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional 

Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: 

China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8] 

However, closer ties to China also have significant disadvantages for both Latin 

America and the United States: Growing trade deficits. Latin American leaders 

who sign trade and investment deals with the PRC have noticed that China's 

exports are more affordable than their own goods, which contributes to trade deficits. 

Chinese goods are made by laborers who work for one-third of the wages of Latin 

American counterparts and who tolerate worse working conditions. Officials in 

Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have signaled their unease about trade with such a hot 

competitor. In September 2005, Mexican President Vicente Fox made it clear to visiting 

President Hu Jintao that dumping electronics and clothing was unacceptable. For 

every dollar that Mexico makes from exports to China, the PRC makes $31 from 

exports to Mexico.[9] Disinterest in economic reform. Some analysts believe that 

the commodities-based trade model used by China will undermine the progress 

that Latin America has made toward industrialization. While countries like Chile and 

Brazil have moved beyond raw materials exports, others with powerful presidents or 

ruling oligarchies may be tempted to fall back on plantation economics. Income gaps 

between the rich and poor may widen as a result. Moreover, such narrowly 

focused economies are vulnerable to downturns in commodity prices. Some 44 

percent of Latin Americans already live below the poverty line. If these countries fail to 

adopt reforms, social inequality and political instability could depress U.S. 

exports to the region and increase migration problems. Scramble for resources. 

To obtain commodities, China offers tempting investments in infrastructure. In 

contrast, the United States cannot offer direct tie-ins to state industries and can 

only offer development aid, now in decreasing amounts. Chinese competition may 

make Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) money a less effective incentive to 

democratize governments and liberalize markets. The one-to-two year lead time 

from proposal to disbursement of MCA aid gives volatile governments a chance 

to back away from market-oriented performance requirements. 

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Impact Turn: Chinese Engagement Bad- Latin American Government Stability 

[ ] Chinese demand in Latin America is bad – corrupts governments and 

unbalances economies 

Gallagher, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, 2012 

(Kevin P. Gallagher, professor at Boston University IR Department and an expert on: 

Economic Development, “Capitalizing on the China Cycle: Time is Running out for Latin 

America”, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherCapitalizeChinaCycle.pdf) (JN) 

Even if commodities prices remain high, they may not lead to prosperity for the region. 

Chinese trade and investment have been concentrated in six Latin American 

countries and a handful of sectors, chiefly in primary commodities. Research 

shows that development has remained elusive 

for commodity-dependent countries because they become subject to the 

resource curse. Demand tends to attract investment toward certain commodities at the 

expense of 

others. 

Such trade and investment can strengthen a nation’s currency as well, making it 

even harder for firms outside of the extractive sector to export their products. 

Demand also attracts speculative investment in commodities, associated 

currencies, and public debt. Such investment is highly volatile and can make a 

nation prone to crises. It is also said that natural resources development spurs 

corruption, making it hard for governments to be disciplined enough to channel 

the profits of commodity exports into productive development. The result can be 

de-industrialization, an erosion of noncommodity (and often employment-intensive) 

economic sectors, and costly environmental degradation. 

These trends eventually can lead to increased imports and decreased exports, 

creating balance-of-payments problems, and leading to poor economic performance. 

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Impact Turn: Latin America not key to Chinese Growth 

[ ] Domestic commerce key to Chinese economy – not exports 

Weihua,writer for ChinaDaily citing IMF official, 3/14/13 

(Chen,, “Domestic Demand Holds Key to Chinese Growth”, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2013-03/14/content_16307121.htm) (JN) 

A top International Monetary Fund official warned on Tuesday of the need for Chin 

a to followthrough on plans to shift its economy from an investmentdriven 

model to one that relies on domestic consumption. 

Zhu Min, one of the IMF's three deputy managing directors, said the key to this transiti 

on is economic reform and the quality, rather than the rate, of growth. 

Chinese GDP grew 7.8 percent in 2012, higher than the government's adjusted forecast 

of 7.5percent. Although it was China's slowest rate of economic expansion since 1999, 

theperformance was among the strongest in the world. This year, GDP is expected to gr 

ow 8 to8.25 percent. 

Zhu pointed out that China's economy has been moving from a longestablished 

focus on 

exports to investment. However, the 48 percent of Chinese GDP that investment acco 

unted forlast year was far too high, he told a seminar at Johns Hopkins University's Paul 

H. Nitze Schoolof Advanced International Studies in Washington. 

Overcapacity is a major challenge in China, where utilization of manufacturing resource 

s hasdropped to 60 percent, a level Zhu described as risky. 

"Over-investment is a big concern and the quality of growth is a big concern," he said. 

Zhu, who assumed his current post in July 2011, blamed overinvestment 

for constraining thewages of Chinese workers. Household income remains a 

very small share of the country'seconomy, he said. 

To maintain growth at or near current levels, China needs to keep moving toward 

consumption as its key economic driver, the IMF official said. 

This goal is stressed in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011- 

15), as well as the Government WorkReport delivered last week by Premier Wen Jiabao 

at the National People's Congress. 

The transition has sparked heated debate in China, and Zhu said on Tuesday that how 

peopletalk about it is important. 

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No Impact: Chinese Economic Decline 

[ ] Economic decline won’t collapse the Chinese government 

Pei, senior associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace 2009 

(Minxin Pei is a, 3-12-09, “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis” 

Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinesecommunist-party-survive-the-crisis) 

With no end to the global crisis in sight, many are wondering how long China's 

economic doldrums will last and what the political impact of stagnation will be. The 

conventional wisdom is that low growth will erode the party's political legitimacy 

and fuel social unrest as jobless migrants and college graduates vent their frustrations 

through riots and protests. Although this forecast is not necessarily wrong, it is 

incomplete. Strong economic performance has been the single most important source 

of legitimacy for the CCP, so prolonged economic stagnation carries the danger of 

disenchanting a growing middle class that was lulled into political apathy by the 

prosperity of the post-Tiananmen years. And economic policies that favor the rich have 

already alienated industrial workers and rural peasants, formerly the social base of the 

party. Even in recent boom years, grass-roots unrest has been high, with close to 

90,000 riots, strikes, demonstrations, and collective protests reported annually. Such 

frustrations will only intensify in hard times. It might seem reasonable to expect that 

challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, 

and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If 

those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's 

longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to 

happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking 

political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's 

capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social 

unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the 

party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, 

Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and 

police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal 

economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the 

regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already 

demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest 

and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed 

Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's 

secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a 

vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of 

information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly 

to end the dissemination of dangerous news. 

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Answers to: Regional Stability Impact 

[ ] 

[ ] Chinese economy is not the driving factor for stabilizing influence in the 

region. Previous downturns prove. 

Blackwill, former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government, 2009 – 

(Robert, RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A 

Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf) 

Next, China. Again, five years from today. Did the recession undermine the grip of 

the Chinese Communist Party on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) No. Again, 

as Lee Kuan Yew stressed in the same recent speech, “China has proven itself to be 

pragmatic, resilient and adaptive. The Chinese have survived severe crises—the 

Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—few societies have been so 

stricken. These are reasons not to be pessimistic.” Did the crisis make Washington 

more willing to succumb to the rise of Chinese power because of PRC holdings of U.S. 

Treasury Bonds No. Did it alter China’s basic external direction and especially its 

efforts, stemming from its own strategic analysis, to undermine the U.S. alliance system 

in Asia No. Did it cause the essence of Asian security to transform No 

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Oil Drilling Disadvantage

Oil Drilling Disadvantage 



Oil Drilling Disadvantage-Table of Contents 

Summary............................................................................................................................................... 2 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 3 

Oil Drilling Disadvantage 1NC ............................................................................................................ 4-7 

Uniqueness: 

Answers to: Cuba is Already Drilling ..................................................................................................... 8 

Link: 

Answers to: Engagement Promotes Safe Drilling Practices .................................................................. 9 

Answers to: Embargo Prevents Response to Oil Spills ....................................................................... 10 

Impact 

Answers to: Oceans are Resilient ....................................................................................................... 11 

Answers to: Human Rights Come Before the Environment ................................................................ 12 

External Impact: Ocean Biodiversity Loss Risks Extinction................................................................. 13 

Add-on: Middle East Oil Dependence Good .................................................................................. 14-16 

Answers to: Cuban Oil Won’t Reduce Dependence on Middle East ................................................... 17 

Answers to: Dependence on Middle East Oil Undermines US Leadership ......................................... 18 

Answers to: Oil Dependence Causes Violence ................................................................................... 19 

Add-on: Civil War ................................................................................................................................ 20 

Add-on: Florida Economy.................................................................................................................... 21 

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Summary 

Currently, the Cuban embargo restricts all forms of economic engagement between the United States 

and Cuba. In particular, the embargo restricts U.S. oil companies from access to Cuban land to drill 

for oil. In the status quo, these companies have a strong desire to drill near Cuba. 

The negative team argues that by uplifting the Cuban embargo, these companies have access to drill 

near Cuba. By allowing offshore drilling, the environment and biodiversity of Cuba is at risk from 

pollution and potentially large oil spills, like the British Petroleum Oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 

These potential spills put the biodiversity of Cuba in existential danger. If biodiversity is lost, several 

negative consequences could arise. 

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Glossary 

Offshore Drilling – the process of companies drilling through the seabed for oil 

Biodiversity – variation of species within a given area/biome 

3 | P a g e




Oil Drilling Disadvantage 1NC (1/4) 

A. Uniqueness: U.S Oil Companies Have Desire to Drill In Cuba, but currently, the embargo 

prohibits their access to the area 

Claver-Carone, director of the US-Cuba Democracy PAC, 2008 

(Mauricio, “How the Cuban embargo protects the environment,” The New York Times, July 25, 

Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/opinion/25iht-edcarone.1.14793496.html) 

For almost a decade now, the Castro regime has been lauding offshore lease agreements. It has 

tried Norway's StatoilHydro, India's state-run Oil & Natural Gas Corporation, Malaysia's Petronas and 

Canada's Sherritt International. Yet, there is no current drilling activity off Cuba's coasts. The 

Cuban government has announced plans to drill, then followed with postponements in 2006, 

2007 and this year. Clearly, foreign oil companies anticipate political changes in Cuba and are 

trying to position themselves accordingly. It is equally clear they are encountering legal and 

logistical obstacles preventing oil and gas exploration and development. Among the 

impediments are well-founded reservations as to how any new discovery can be turned into 

product. Cuba has very limited refining capacity, and the U.S. embargo prevents sending 

Cuban crude oil to American refineries. Neither is it financially or logistically viable for partners 

of the current Cuban regime to undertake deep-water exploration without access to U.S. 

technology, which the embargo prohibits transferring to Cuba. The prohibitions exist for good 

reason. Fidel Castro expropriated U.S. oil company assets after taking control of Cuba and has never 

provided compensation. Equally important, foreign companies trying to do business with Cuba 

still face a lot of expenses and political risks. If, or when, the Cuban regime decides again to 

expropriate the assets of these companies, there is no legal recourse in Cuba. 

4 | P a g e





B. Link: Uplifting the embargo allows U.S oil companies to drill in the area. 

Benjamin-Alvarado, Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, 2010 

(Jonathan, Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, Brookings Institute 

publication) 

It also stands to reason that the lion’s share of the financial burden of upgrading Cuba’s energy 

infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. Changes in U.S. policy to allow 

investment and assistance in Cuba’s energy sector are a precondition for international entities 

to make significant investments, yet this change implies a large American footprint. Trade and 

investment in the energy sector in Cuba have been severely constrained by the conditions of 

the embargo placed on the Cuban regime. These constraints also affect foreign firms seeking 

to do business in Cuba because of the threat of penalties if any of these firms use technology 

containing more than 10 percent of proscribed U.S. technologies needed for oil and gas exploration 

and production. American private investment and U.S. government assistance will constitute a 

large portion of the needed investment capital to undertake this colossal effort. The longer that 

work is delayed, the higher the cost to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into the returns 

from such undertakings. 

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C. Internal Link: offshore drilling is inherently dangerous – it creates pollution and risks 

massive oil spills. 

Gravitz, director of policy and legislation at the Marine Conservation Institute, 2009 

(Michael, Statement at the Department of Interior Hearing On Offshore Ocean Energy Development 

in Atlantic City, New Jersey, April 6, Online: 

http://www.environmentamerica.org/reports/ame/department-interior-hearing-offshore-ocean-energydevelopment-atlantic-city-new-jersey) 

Based on the Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) and a crude measure of marine productivity that 

your own department uses, the New England, Mid Atlantic and South Atlantic planning areas are 

all very environmentally sensitive and highly productive. The South Atlantic planning area and 

Mid Atlantic have the first and third most environmentally sensitive coastlines, respectively, of 

all 22 MMS planning areas. New England comes in at #11. The South Atlantic and Mid Atlantic are 

ranked first and second respectively in terms of primary productivity among all the planning 

areas with North Atlantic being #12. There are 14 submarine canyons between Massachusetts and 

Virginia that slice through the continental shelf (See attached list). Submarine canyons, some with a 

mouth as wide as eight to ten miles and 30-40 miles long, are important because they shelter unusual 

species, provide hard bottoms and sidewalls for creatures to attach to or burrow in, provide nursery 

areas for many commercially important fish and bring nutrients from the deep ocean up to 

more shallow waters. Sea life in these canyons is unusually diverse which is why drilling in or 

near submarine canyons with their risk from spills and chronic pollution from production 

would be a very bad idea. There are a number of important underwater plateaus and reefs off 

the eastern seaboard which serve as fish baskets, places of unusual marine productivity 

where very high populations of fish reproduce and grow. Often these are called ‘banks’ or ‘reefs’ 

with names like Georges Bank, Stellwagen Bank, Gray’s Reef or Occulina Bank. Some of these 

areas of the ocean are shallow enough to allow sunlight to penetrate to the seafloor and nutrients 

from the deeper ocean feed a richer abundance of life. These banks and reefs sometimes offer the 

only hard substrate for creatures to attach in a wide area. . Drilling in biological hot spots like 

these and jeopardizing productive commercial and recreational fisheries would make no 

sense. 

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D. Impact: The costs of oil spills on the environment irreparable and impossible to quantify 

– they must be avoided at all costs. 

Malik, Masters in Philosophy at Oxford University, 2010 

(Stephanie, “Ethical Questions Surrounding the BP Oil Spill,” Practical Ethics, June 29, Online: 

http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2010/06/ethical-questions-surrounding-the-bp-oil-spill/) 

Conspicuously absent from Obama’s address was genuine acknowledgment of the sheer magnitude 

of the damage the spill will have for years to come on the wildlife in the Gulf and the ecosystem 

generally. Some of the immediate effects of a spill are obvious – there is no shortage of gutwrenching 

images of wildlife doused in oil and seabirds suffocating while frantically and frivolously 

preening themselves. But some types of ecological damage are hard to measure and can take 

years to document. The miles long underwater plumes of oil will likely poison and suffocate life 

across the food chain, with damage that according to scientists could endure for a decade or 

more. Many of the creatures that die will sink to the bottom, making mortality estimates 

difficult. Damage to the reproduction rate of sea turtles may take years to play out. Unique to 

the Deepwater Horizon spill is not only how deep it is, but also the huge quantity of chemical 

dispersants sprayed on the surface and at the leak on the seafloor. The problem with dispersants 

is two-fold in that oil is not only directly toxic to many of the creatures in the Gulf like pelicans, sea 

turtles, fish, and dolphins, but also microbes in the water that eat the oil suck oxygen out of the water 

at a massive rate, with levels of oxygen depletion that could be lethal to many other creatures in the 

water. Moreover the dispersants that are used to fight the oil are also consumed by the microbes— 

speeding up the rate of oxygen depletion in the Gulf even further. What is especially worrying is 

that on top of this dangerously low levels of oxygen are already a concern as, according the 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, huge numbers of fish, dolphins, and even sharks, are already 

crowding into exceptionally shallow waters near the shores of Alabama and Florida in order to 

escape the oil. There's also little scientific understanding of how the dispersants might affect the 

deep-water ecosystem. Legal protection of wildlife in the Gulf is thin. There are no laws that exist 

simply to protect animal interests. U.S. law protects animals as property. That means laws designed 

to protect animals exist only to protect the interests of their owners or the public. “Most of the 

wild animals affected by the BP spill do not have any legal protections at all, and there is no penalty 

that can be imposed for suffocating them with oil, destroying their habitats and otherwise 

harming them,” said Justin Goodman, a representative of PETA. 

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Answers to: Cuba is Already Drilling 

[ ] 

[ ] Current drilling operations are extremely small in scale – companies are interested, 

but the embargo imposes too many hurdles. 

New York Times, 2012 

(“Cuba’s prospects for an oil-fueled economic jolt falter with departure of rig,” New York Times, 

November 9, Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/americas/rigs-departure-to-hampercubas-oil-prospects.html_r=0) 

The best-case scenario for production, according to some oil experts, would be for Cuba to 

eventually become a medium-size producer like Ecuador. But as the three dry holes showed, 

far more exploration effort would be needed, and that presents a challenge for a country with 

limited resources and the hurdle of American sanctions. There are many offshore areas that are 

competing with Cuba for the attention of oil companies, particularly off the coasts of South America 

and East and West Africa. In Cuba’s case, the American embargo makes it far more difficult for 

companies seeking to explore Cuban waters. The Scarabeo 9, the rig set to depart, is the only 

one available that is capable of drilling in deep waters and complies with the embargo. To get 

it built, Repsol, the Spanish oil giant, was forced to contract an Italian operator to build a rig in 

China to drill exploration wells. 

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Answers to: Engagement Promotes Safe Drilling Practices 

[ ] 

[ ] Offshore drilling technology is inherently faulty – political solutions will inevitably fail 

and can at best minimize the damage. 

Pravica, Professor of Physics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2012 

(Michael, “Letters: Science, not profit, must lead deep water drilling,” USA Today, April 24, Online: 

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/letters/story/2012-04-24/Ted-Danson-oil-Deepwater- 

Horizon/54513946/1) 

There are a few critical points not mentioned in the USA TODAY editorial on the BP oil spill that 

should have been addressed ("Editorial: 2 years after BP spill, lower risks"). First of all, deep water 

drilling represents a "brave new world" of oil exploration and novel technology as humans 

probe depths of water, oil and rock that sustain thousands of atmospheres of pressure. At 

these levels, the technology used to drill and extract oil can easily fail as we approach the 

yield strengths of many of the confining materials subjected to extreme conditions. There is 

also a high chance of significant fracture of the cean/sea floor in drilling and hole erosion 

from gushing, hot and high pressure oil (along with particulates and other mineral-rich fluids) that 

could make repair nearly impossible and could permanently poison our waters. The greatest 

lesson from the BP oil spill is that politicians and businessmen cannot solve problems 

created by our advanced technology. Only scientists and engineers can. We must listen to them 

and adopt a more rational approach to drilling that places safety above profit. 

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Answers to: Embargo Prevents Response to Oil Spills 

[ ] 

[ ] An oil spill off the Cuban coast would be impossible to manage, even for experienced 

American spill response teams and advanced technology. 

Bert and Clayton, Captain in the US Coast Guard and Fellow for Energy Security at the Council on 

Foreign Relations, 2012 

(Captain Melissa and Blake, “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 15, March, Online: http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-riskcuban-oil-spill/p27515) 

Deepwater drilling off the Cuban coast also poses a threat to the United States. The 

exploratory well is seventy miles off the Florida coast and lies at a depth of 5,800 feet. The 

failed Macondo well that triggered the calamitous Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010 had 

broadly similar features, situated forty-eight miles from shore and approximately five thousand feet 

below sea level. A spill off Florida's coast could ravage the state's $57 billion per year tourism 

industry. Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba's unseasoned oil 

industry to address a spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding 

of how to prevent an offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where 

the first wells will be drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to operate in. 

Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico, the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling 

move at a brisk three to four knots, which would bring oil from Cuba's offshore wells to the 

Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or burning the oil may not be feasible in such 

fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective method to respond to a spill would be 

surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not applied close to the source within 

four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt, or skimmed, which would 

render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective. 

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Answers to: Oceans are Resilient 

[ ] 

[ ] Their evidence doesn’t assume the unique ecological features in Cuba – it’s especially 

susceptible to oil pollution. 

Gravitz, director of policy and legislation at the Marine Conservation Institute, 2009 

(Michael, Statement at the Department of Interior Hearing On Offshore Ocean Energy Development 

in Atlantic City, New Jersey, April 6, Online: 

http://www.environmentamerica.org/reports/ame/department-interior-hearing-offshore-ocean-energydevelopment-atlantic-city-new-jersey) 

Depending on depth, penetration of light, type of bottom (i.e., muddy, sandy, pebbles, boulders) and 

other factors, the ocean’s floor is teaming with diverse communities of plants, invertebrates, 

shellfish, crustaceans and fish. Numerous kinds of fish live on the bottom. Other fish swim above 

the bottom in the water column at different levels. Thousands of types of phytoplankton, zooplankton 

and larvae at the base of most food chains ‘float’ around. Marine mammals, sea turtles and sea birds 

spend most of their time at or near the surface of the ocean. All of these creatures are sensitive 

to the impacts of oil and pollution from oil and gas drilling; some are more sensitive than 

others. But none are immune to the short or long term effects of oil. With this as background, 

it is important to recognize the special places in the ocean that are unique, especially 

sensitive to pollution or those that are especially productive. These include: submarine canyons 

cutting across the continental shelf; deep water coral gardens; plateaus where the floor of the ocean 

rises and becomes unusually productive because deeper nutrient rich waters come closer to the 

warmer temperatures and light of the surface; migratory pathways for marine mammals and sea 

turtles; and areas where fish aggregate to spawn or where larval stages of animals are 

concentrated. Finally, the margins of the ocean: beaches, bays and marshes are often unusually 

sensitive to oil pollution. 

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Answers to: Human Rights Come Before the Environment 

[ ] 

[ ] In the context of Cuba, the environmental costs are too high to ignore – even when 

compared to human rights. 

Kozloff, writer for the Huffington Post and PhD in Latin American History from Oxford, 2010 

(Nikolas, “Left Must Fine Tune its Position on Cuba Embargo in Light of Oil Spill,” Monga Bay, May 

26, Online: http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0526-kozloff_cuba.html) 

Hopefully, the BP disaster will put a break on the oil lobby and its supporters on Capitol Hill. Yet, 

other important players have been broadly supportive of offshore oil. For its part, Havana has said it 

would welcome U.S. investment. Recently, a U.S.-Cuba Energy Summit attracted Exxon officials 

and others to a meeting in Mexico City. Participants viewed PowerPoint presentations from Cuban 

government ministries including state-owned oil company Cupet which sought to involve U.S. 

companies in the exploitation of oil and gas fields. "U.S. oil companies would love to do business 

there as soon as this thing opens up," remarked Ron Harper, an energy analyst in Houston. 

"They're looking at it quietly. They'd be short-sighted not to." The debate over Cuban offshore oil 

puts the political left in a quandary. For years, it’s been an article of faith amongst 

progressives that the U.S. ought to scrap the embargo. To be sure, economic sanctions have 

resulted in horrible economic distress for ordinary Cubans. Yet, does the left want to lift 

sanctions and open the door to yet more destructive offshore petroleum, thereby adding to 

environmental woes already unleashed by the BP spill In light of our dire ecological straits, I 

believe the left must rethink its position on this vital issue and articulate a more broad-based 

vision for the Gulf which would realistically address both economic and environmental 

concerns. 

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External Impact: Ocean Biodiversity Loss Risks Extinction 

[ ] Ocean biodiversity loss will result in a domino effect that threatens human survival. 

McCarthy, award winning environmental journalist & editor, 2011 

(Michael, “Oceans on the brink of catastrophe,” The Independent, June 21, Online: 

http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/oceans-on-brink-of-catastrophe-2300272.html) 

The world's oceans are faced with an unprecedented loss of species comparable to the great 

mass extinctions of prehistory, a major report suggests today. The seas are degenerating far 

faster than anyone has predicted, the report says, because of the cumulative impact of a 

number of severe individual stresses, ranging from climate warming and sea-water acidification, to 

widespread chemical pollution and gross overfishing. The coming together of these factors is 

now threatening the marine environment with a catastrophe "unprecedented in human 

history", according to the report, from a panel of leading marine scientists brought together in Oxford 

earlier this year by the International Programme on the State of the Ocean (IPSO) and the 

International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The stark suggestion made by the panel is 

that the potential extinction of species, from large fish at one end of the scale to tiny corals at 

the other, is directly comparable to the five great mass extinctions in the geological record, 

during each of which much of the world's life died out. They range from the Ordovician-Silurian 

"event" of 450 million years ago, to the Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction of 65 million years ago, which 

is believed to have wiped out the dinosaurs. The worst of them, the event at the end of the Permian 

period, 251 million years ago, is thought to have eliminated 70 per cent of species on land and 96 per 

cent of all species in the sea. The panel of 27 scientists, who considered the latest research from all 

areas of marine science, concluded that a "combination of stressors is creating the conditions 

associated with every previous major extinction of species in Earth's history". They also 

concluded: * The speed and rate of degeneration of the oceans is far faster than anyone has 

predicted; * Many of the negative impacts identified are greater than the worst predictions; * 

The first steps to globally significant extinction may have already begun. 

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Add-on: Middle East Oil Dependence Good (1/3) 

[ ] Lifting the embargo would offer a way to shift away from dependence on Middle 

Eastern oil. 

Fesler, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2009 

(Lily, “Cuban Oil: Havana’s Potential Geopolitical Bombshell,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, June 

11, Online: http://www.coha.org/cuban-oil-havana%E2%80%99s-potential-geo-political-bombshell/) 

Desperate to end U.S. dependence on oil from the Middle East, United States’ officials are 

certainly aware of Cuba’s oil-producing potential. In its 2004 assessment, the U.S. Geological 

Survey found that Cuba has 5 billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has 

20 billion . Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with Colombia or Ecuador, while 20 billion 

barrels would make Cuba’s oil capacity comparable to that of the United States’ and place it among 

the top 15 oil reserves nations in the world. Either way, Cuba’s oil is attracting the attention of oil 

companies from around the globe. At the moment, Spain’s Repsol, Brazil’s Petrobras, and 

Norway’s StatoilHydro are overseeing exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. India, Malaysia, 

Vietnam, and Venezuela also have signed deals with Cuba. Havana has publicly stated that it 

welcomes American investment, but U.S. companies are incapable of proceeding without an 

official go-ahead from Washington. As Juan Fleites, vice president of Havana’s state oil company 

Cubapetroleo, said, “We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and 

services.” U.S. oil tycoons have shown definite interest, but Kurt Glaubitz, a spokesman for Chevron, 

explained, “Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in Cuba. 

Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there’s 

interest.” The aforementioned foreign companies already have contracted for 21 of the 59 offshore 

Cuban drilling blocks, and another 23 blocks are currently under negotiation by other foreign nations, 

including Russia and China. It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba’s nascent oil 

output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has 

been no major oil discovery off the island. Repsol struck oil in 2004, but not enough to sell 

commercially. Several other foreign firms are currently using seismic testing, which assesses the oil 

content of potential deposits, after which they will probably begin exploring in 2010 or 2011. The 

exploration manager for Cubapetroleo, Rafael Tenreyro Pérez, has called the incoming results from 

seismic testing in Cuba’s reserves “very encouraging.” After lifting the embargo, U.S. oil 

companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its 

reserves with nearby holdings of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba’s oil 

even after all of the contracts have been signed. This could appreciably save transportation costs, 

because U.S. companies wouldn’t have to go halfway around the world in search of oil refineries, with 

Cuba only 90 miles away. 

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[ ] Independence from Middle Eastern oil supplies undermines America’s influence, 

which is built on economic exchange and trade with Gulf states. 

Hulbert, senior fellow at the Clingendael International Energy Programme, 2012 

(Matthew, "America Will Deeply Regret Its Fixation On Energy Independence," Forbes, August 19, 

Online: www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/19/why-america-will-deeply-regret-us-energyindependence/4/) 

We all know the U.S. is no longer dependent on Middle East supplies; it hasn’t been for a long 

time given it sources less than 15% of its oil from the sand. But we also know that the decision to 

underwrite MENA supplies is nothing to do with U.S. consumption – and everything to do with 

retaining a dominant global geopolitical role. Ensure that hydrocarbons globally flow to the 

East and West, and much else follows as the geo-economic and geo-political lynchpin of the 

world. Lose it, and you’ll be geopolitically downgraded quicker than credit analysts can get stuck 

into Greek debt. That’s before we consider where Gulf States decide to recycle their 

petrodollars in future. No security, no $ It’s certainly a question for the U.S. to ponder – not only in 

terms of who they are going to sell their Treasuries to, but what currency oil is priced in. Hence the 

bottom line for the U.S.; Middle East energy isn’t about oil for America, it’s ultimately about 

power. If the U.S. wasn’t part of the Gulf energy game, it would hold zero sway with Saudi, no 

powers of persuasion over Iranian nukes, no say in the Arab Awakening, or how Gulf 

Monarchies handle critical succession problems in future. Let alone shaping vested interests 

to promote and extend U.S. influence across the globe. 

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[ ] US global leadership is vital to protecting the globe from wars 

Khalilzad, US ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and UN under President Bush, 2011 

(Zalmay, “The Economy and National Security; If we don’t get our economic house in order, we risk a 

new era of multi-polarity,” National Review, February 8, Online: 

http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) 

We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. 

Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, 

demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this 

could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multipolar 

world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a 

question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between 

the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, 

increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut 

our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of 

escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great 

powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been 

unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among 

the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American 

retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, 

regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this 

scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other 

crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, 

weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile 

states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. 

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Answers to: Cuban Oil Won’t Reduce Dependence on Middle East 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba could import a massive amount of oil per day. 

Zimmerman, fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2010 

(Chelsea, “Rethinking the Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time to Mend a Broken Policy,” A 

Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership: Papers of the 2009-2010 Center Fellows, 

Online: http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf) 

Lifting the trading ban with Cuba could directly benefit the U.S. by providing an additional 

supplier of oil, gas and ethanol only ninety miles from its coast. Cuba petroleo, the state oil 

company, claims that Cuba has 20 billion barrels of recoverable oil in its offshore waters (Reuters, 

October 16, 2008). If efforts to develop more offshore wells proceed as planned, Cuba could 

produce as much as 525,000 barrels per day of oil, most of which could be exported to the 

United States if the trade embargo was lifted (Reuters, June 12, 2008). 

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Answers to: Dependence on Middle East Oil Undermines US Leadership 

[ ] 

[ ] Dependence on oil gives the US the ability to blackmail produces – it’s a key factor in 

diplomacy. 


(“An Ode to Oil,” Wall Street Journal, November, Online: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.htmlmod=googlenews_wsj) 

Instead, the dependency of foreign oil producers on their customers plays straight into 

America's strategic hands. Washington is conceivably in a position to hold producers to 

ransom by threatening to accelerate a drive to develop or implement alternative fuels, realizing 

the warning once uttered by Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the former Saudi oil minister who pointed 

out that "the Stone Age did not end for lack of stone." Back in 1973, as they protested at 

Washington's stance on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Middle East producers were in a position to impose 

an oil embargo on the Western world. But a generation later, technological advances, and the 

strength of public and scientific concern about global warming, have turned the tables. 

The United States has powerful political leverage over producers because it holds the key to 

future oil supply as well as market demand. The age of "easy oil" is over, and as fears grow 

that oil is becoming harder to get, so too will the dependency of producers on increasingly 

sophisticated Western technology and expertise. 

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Answers to: Oil Dependence Causes Violence 

[ ] 

[ ] Fears of high oil prices deter conflict between countries. 


(“An Ode to Oil,” Wall Street Journal, November, Online: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.htmlmod=googlenews_wsj) 

Oil can also act as a peacemaker and source of stability because many conflicts, in almost 

every part of the world, can threaten a disruption of supply and instantly send crude prices 

spiraling. Despite the recent price falls, the market is still vulnerable to sudden supply shocks, 

and a sharp increase would massively affect the wider global economy. This would have potentially 

disastrous social and political results, just as in the summer many countries, including France, 

Nepal and Indonesia, were rocked by violent protests at dramatic price increases in gasoline. 

Haunted by the specter of higher oil prices at a time of such economic fragility, many 

governments have a very strong incentive to use diplomacy, not force, to resolve their own 

disputes, and to help heal other people's. This is true not just of oil consumers but producers, 

which would also be keen not to watch global demand stifled by such price spikes. 

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Add-on: Civil War 

[ ] Oil-export driven economies are more likely to descend into violent, long-term civil 

wars. 

Karl, Professor of Political Science at Stanford, 2007 

(Terry, “Oil-Led Development : Social, Political, and Economic Consequences,” Center on 

Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Working Papers, January, Online: http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/21537/No_80_Terry_Karl_-_Effects_of_Oil_Development.pdf) 

Secessionist wars are statistically more frequent in oil-exporters than in non-oil exporters. 

Where secessionist movements are present, the likelihood of conflict is especially high because the 

promise of oil wealth appears to make viable a secession that might not seem possible in poorlyendowed 

areas. Not surprisingly, where oil is regionally concentrated and where benefits accrue 

to the nation while most adverse effects are local, secessionist wars are more likely. Examples 

abound. In the Sudan, war was triggered by President Numeiry’s decision to place newly discovered 

oil fields in the country’s Christian South under the control of the Muslim north. In Indonesia, the Aceh 

Freedom Movement has denounced the government for stealing Aceh’s oil and natural gas resources 

as a main reason for its separatist struggle, and it has used the analogy of Brunei to convince its 

followers that Aceh could be equally as rich. In Nigeria, Biafra’s move to secede only occurred after 

the government had made fiscal decisions treating oil as a centralized, rather than a regional, asset. 

In this way, fights over oil revenues may become the reason for ratcheting up levels of preexisting 

conflict in a society. Oil dependence is associated with particularly intense conflict. 

Because petroleum is so technologically sophisticated and requires so much capital, it is not 

easily extracted and transported; it is not “lootable” like drugs or gems. This means that it is 

difficult for rebels or generally unskilled groups to exploit, but governments can use this 

wealth to attempt preemptive repression. This is the case in Sudan, for example, where the 

government tried to forcibly clear entire populations away from the oilfields and the pipelines. 

Oil rents paid for the destruction of crops and razing of houses as well as for widespread terror 

against the local population. Oil’s non-lootability also means that separatist conflicts (like that 

of the Sudan) may be especially bloody and intractable where petroleum deposits coincide with 

the presence of minority groups. Where more straightforward fights over the distribution of oil rents 

between groups can be resolved by a new pattern of distribution, this is often not the case in 

separatist wars. But where oil is involved, such struggles are generally only resolved by the 

seizure of control of oil fields by rebels and a subsequent declaration of autonomy, or by the 

government’s total defeat of the minority located near the oil fields. Finally, oil dependence, 

like that of other mineral resources, is associated with civil wars of long duration. Wars are 

expensive to pursue, and both governments and rebels can use oil rents to finance their 

armies. Because petroleum is transported generally through pipelines, it can be easily disrupted, and 

pipelines are an invitation to extortion. In Colombia, for example, oil revenues support the 

government’s battle against rebel movements, but because petroleum must be transported to 

the coast through two pipelines that are both over 400 miles long, there are almost unlimited 

opportunities for rebels to extract “protection rests” and other forms of resources from oil 

companies. In 2000 alone, the pipelines were bombed 98 times and kidnappings for ransom were 

frequent; according to one estimate, rebel groups have managed to earn an estimated windfall of 

$140 million annually. 

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Add-on: Florida Economy 

[ ] The spill would be devastating for the environment as well as Florida’s economy. 

Sutton, correspondent on Cuban affairs for Reuters, 2012 

(Jane, “Florida Lawmaker Wanrs of Damages if Cuba Oil Drilling Spills,” Insurance Journal, Jan 30 th , 

Online: http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2012/01/30/233323.htm) 

Since the United States couldn’t stop Repsol from drilling for oil off Cuba’s coast, it should make the 

Spanish oil giant pay dearly for damages from any spill that threatens neighboring Florida, a 

congressional Republican said on Monday. “We need to figure out what we can do to inflict 

maximum pain, maximum punishment, to bleed Repsol of whatever resources they may have if 

there’s a potential for a spill that would affect the U.S. coast,” Rep. David Rivera, a Florida 

Republican, told a congressional subcommittee that oversees the U.S. Coast Guard. The House of 

Representatives subcommittee met at a Florida hotel with a panoramic view of the waves breaking 

over an Atlantic beach dotted with sunbathers, to conduct a hearing on the potential impact on 

Florida’s 800-mile (1,290-km) coastline from the first major oil exploration in Cuban waters. 

Repsol is working on the project in partnership with Norway’s Statoil and ONGC Videsh, a unit of 

India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp. The oil rig leased for the project, the Scarabeo 9, arrived off 

Cuban waters earlier this month and is expected to begin drilling any day now. The rig is 60 miles 

(97 km) from the Cuban coast and 80 miles (129 km) from Florida, in a spot where the 

Gulfstream and other powerful ocean currents could rush any spilled oil to Florida beaches 

within five to 10 days. “The significance of these strong currents is that they can move oil very 

quickly, potentially up to 70 to 80 nautical miles (130 to 148 km) in a 24-hour period,” said 

oceanographer Debbie Payton, who heads the emergency response division of the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration. A spill would have catastrophic effects on Florida tourism, 

which accounts for a third of the state’s economy, and on its fisheries, panelists said. Such an 

accident would devastate the state much as BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico 

in 2010 devastated other coastal areas. Those powerful currents would make it harder to contain 

and burn or scoop up any oil on the water’s surface, but they would make oil dispersants more 

effective by mixing them up with the water, panelists said. Booms and the anchors needed to hold 

them in place would likely do more harm to Florida’s fragile coral reefs than the oil itself, they 

said. 

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Answers

Oil Drilling Disadvantage Affirmative 



Oil Drilling Disadvantage Affirmative-Table of Contents 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 2 

Uniqueness: 

Non-Unique: Cuba is Already Drilling for Oil ......................................................................................... 3 

Link: 

Link Turn: Embargo Prevents Response to Oil Spills ........................................................................... 4 

Link Turn: Engagement Promotes Safe Drilling Practices .................................................................... 5 

No Link: Businesses Don’t Want to Drill Around Cuba .......................................................................... 6 

Impact: 

No Impact: Oceans are Resilient to Disasters....................................................................................... 7 

Cuban Oil Won’t Reduce Dependence on Middle East ......................................................................... 8 

Dependence on Middle East Oil Undermines US Leadership ............................................................... 9 

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Glossary 

Offshore Drilling – the process of companies drilling through the seabed for oil 

Biodiversity – variation of species within a given area/biome 

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Non-Unique: Cuba is Already Drilling for Oil 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba is already drilling for oil – companies from Russia and Norway are circumventing 

the embargo. 

Orsi, Associated Press correspondent in Cuba, 2012 

(Peter, “Oil Rig Arrives off Cuba for New Exploration,” Dec 15, Online: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oilrig-arrives-cuba-new-exploration) 

A Norwegian-owned platform arrived in waters off Cuba's north-central coast for exploratory 

drilling by the Russian oil company Zarubezhneft, authorities said Saturday, renewing the 

island's search for petroleum after three failed wells this year. Drilling is to begin "in the 

coming days" and take six months, according to a notice published by the Communist Party 

newspaper Granma. The depth of the project was given as 21,300 feet (6,500 meters). Staterun 

oil company Cubapetroleo said in the announcement that the Songa Mercur rig, owned by 

Songa Offshore of Norway, was inspected to make sure it contains less than 10 percent U.S.- 

made parts. That allows the companies involved in the drilling to avoid sanctions under the 

50-year-old U.S. embargo against Cuba. 

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Link Turn: Embargo Prevents Response to Oil Spills 

[ ] 

[ ] The embargo stands in the way of effective disaster management – it prevents spill 

technologies and experts from being mobilized. 

Bert and Clayton, Captain in the US Coast Guard and Fellow for Energy Security at the Council on 

Foreign Relations, 2012 

(Captain Melissa and Blake, “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 15, March, Online: http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-riskcuban-oil-spill/p27515) 

An oil well blowout in Cuban waters would almost certainly require a U.S. response. Without 

changes in current U.S. law, however, that response would undoubtedly come far more slowly 

than is desirable. The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced 

manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. 

offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely 

operated submersibles, and other vital technologies. Although a handful of U.S. spill responders 

hold licenses to work with Repsol, their licenses do not extend to well capping or relief drilling. 

The result of a slow response to a Cuban oil spill would be greater, perhaps catastrophic, 

economic and environmental damage to Florida and the Southeast. Efforts to rewrite current law 

and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its government, could antagonize 

groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They might protest any decision 

allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory. 

However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban 

waters would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba. For years, 

Washington has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely 

coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat 

illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms. 

The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil 

spill poses to the United States. They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they 

would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba. Cuba 

will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. 

Defending against a potential oil spill requires a modicum of advance coordination and 

preparation with the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. 

Without taking these precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this 

time from Cuba. 

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Link Turn: Engagement Promotes Safe Drilling Practices 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba is already making plans to drill oil – US engagement is key to ensure 

environmental safety. 

Pinon, research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, 2010 

(Jorge, and Robert Muse, “Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why US-Cuba Environmental Co-operation 

is Critical,” Brookings Institute, May 18, Online: 

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/5/18%20oil%20spill%20cuba%20pinon/ 

0518_oil_spill_cuba_pinon) 

While the quest for deepwater drilling of oil and gas may slow as a result of the latest calamity, it 

is unlikely to stop. it came as little surprise, for example, that Repsol recently announced plans 

to move forward with exploratory oil drilling in Cuban territorial waters later this year.1 As 

Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas reserves, the consequence to the 

United states of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban waters moves from the theoretical to the 

actual. The sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of American coastline 

and do profound harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative and proactive planning 

by Washington and havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important is the planning 

necessary to prevent and, if necessary, respond to incidents arising from this country’s oil industry 

that, through the action of currents and wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines. While 

Washington is working to prevent future disasters in U.s. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, its 

current policies foreclose the ability to respond effectively to future oil disasters—whether 

that disaster is caused by companies at work in Cuban waters, or is the result of companies 

operating in U.s. waters. 

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No Link: Businesses Don’t Want to Drill Around Cuba 

[ ] 

[ ] The bureaucratic nature of the Cuban government deters prospective drilling 

operations. 

White, JD from the University of Colorado School of Law, 2010 

(Jonathan, “Drilling in Ecologically and Environmentally Troubled Waters: Law and Policy Concerns 

Surrounding Development of Oil Resources in the Florida Straits,” Colorado Journal of International 

Environmental Law & Policy, Summer, LexisNexis) 

Additionally, Cuba's ability to cultivate a flourishing oil industry depends on Havana's 

willingness to reduce bureaucratic obstacles to investment on the island. Writing in the 

Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Daniel Erikson of the Washington, 

D.C., policy organization The Inter-American Dialogue describes the sizeable institutional and 

bureaucratic hurdles facing foreign investment in Cuba: Cuba remains a rigid communist 

state with a centrally controlled economic structure, a workforce with uncertain habits, low 

per capita income, and high levels of external debt. Canadian and European investors in Cuba 

cite numerous difficulties related to red tape, arbitrary treatment by Cuban regulators, 

interference in hiring decisions, and questionable labor practices. Accordingly, while Cuba's 

potential oil reserves have drawn willing investors, the extent to which drilling in Cuban 

waters thrives depends upon overcoming these infrastructural, administrative, and 

bureaucratic obstacles. China's recent replacement of Havana's relic "camel" buses may 

provide the best analogy of what is required to update and expand the infrastructure 

necessary for drilling. The example suggests that Cuba lacks the means or initiative 

necessary to expand and modernize existing infrastructure on its own, but welcomes foreign 

capital to accomplish those objectives. Whether that capital arrives is, at this stage, 

speculative. 

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No Impact: Oceans are Resilient to Disasters 

[ ] 

[ ] Oceans are resilient and can recover from damage imposed by humans. 

Kennedy, professor of environmental science at Maryland, 2002 

(Victor, “Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change,” Online: 

http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm) 

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental 

change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are 

tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental 

change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic 

variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change. 

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Cuban Oil Won’t Reduce Dependence on Middle East 

[ ] 

[ ] Cuba doesn’t have enough oil to alter US dependence on Middle East oil supplies – 

there’s only a risk lifting the embargo will result in technological exchanges that improve 

safety. 

Benjamin-Alvarado, Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, 2010 

(Jonathan, Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, Brookings Institute 

publication) 

At present Cuba possesses an estimated 4.6 million barrels of oil and 9.3 TFC (total final 

consumption) of natural gas in North Cuba Basin.4 This is approximately half of the estimated 

10.4 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil in the Alaska Natural Wildlife Reserve. If viewed in 

strictly instrumental terms—namely, increasing the pool of potential imports to the U.S. market 

by accessing Cuban oil and ethanol holdings—Cuba’s oil represents little in the way of absolute 

material gain to the U.S. energy supply. But the possibility of energy cooperation between the 

United States and Cuba offers significant relative gains connected to the potential for 

developing production-sharing agreements, promoting the transfer of state-of-the art technology and 

foreign direct investment, and increasing opportunities for the development of joint-venture 

partnerships, and scientific-technical exchanges. 

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Dependence on Middle East Oil Undermines US Leadership 

[ ] 

[ ] Oil dependence undermines strategic US leadership. 

Electrification Coalition, a nonpartisan group of energy industry leaders invested in policy change, 

2009 

(“ELECTRIFICATION ROADMAP: REVOLUTIONIZING TRANSPORTATION AND ACHIEVING 

ENERGY SECURITY,” Electrification Coalition Report, November, p. 30.) 

The importance of oil in the U.S. economy has given it a place of prominence in foreign and 

military policy. In particular, two key issues related to oil affect national security. First, the 

vulnerability of global oil supply lines and infrastructure has driven the United States to accept 

the burden of securing the world’s oil supply. Second, the importance of large individual oil 

producers constrains U.S. foreign policy options when dealing with problems in these nations. 

A crippling disruption to global oil supplies ranks among the most immediate threats to the 

United States today. A prolonged interruption due to war in the Middle East or the closure of a 

key oil transit route would lead to severe economic dislocation. U.S. leaders have recognized 

this for decades, and have made it a matter of stated policy that the United States will protect the free 

flow of oil with military force. Still, policy alone has consistently fallen short of complete deterrence, 

and the risk of oil supply interruptions has persisted for nearly 40 years. To mitigate this risk, U.S. 

armed forces expend enormous resources protecting chronically vulnerable infrastructure in 

hostile corners of the globe and patrolling oil transit routes. This engagement benefits all 

nations, but comes primarily at the expense of the American military and ultimately the American 

taxpayer. A 2009 study by the RAND Corporation placed the ongoing cost of this burden at between 

$67.5 billion and $83 billion annually, plus an additional $8 billion in military operations. 33 In 

proportional terms, these costs suggest that between 12 and 15 percent of the current defense 

budget is devoted to guaranteeing the free flow of oil. Foreign policy constraints related to oil 

dependence are less quantifiable, but no less damaging. Whether dealing with uranium enrichment in 

Iran, a hostile regime in Venezuela, or an increasingly assertive Russia, American diplomacy is 

distorted by our need to minimize disruptions to the flow of oil. Perhaps more frustrating, the 

importance of oil to the broader global economy has made it nearly impossible for the United 

States to build international consensus on a wide range of foreign policy and humanitarian 

issues. 

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Pressure Counterplan

Pressure Counterplan 



Pressure Counterplan – Table of Contents 

Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 3 

Glossary ............................................................................................................................................ 4 

1NC Venezuela Pressure Counter Plan ............................................................................................ 5 

Answers to Affirmative 

Answers to: Pressure fails Maduro .................................................................................................... 6 

Answers to: Pressure fails in the case of Venezuela ......................................................................... 6 

Answers to: Pressure fails in the case of Venezuela ......................................................................... 8 

Answers to: Must Recognize Maduro ................................................................................................ 9 

Answers to Maduro says No .......................................................................................................... 100 

Answers to: Cooperation is key ................................................................................................ 111-12 

Answers to: Permutation “Do Both” .......................................................................................... 133-14 

The Counterplan solves Appeasement Turns .......................................................................... 155-16 

Answers to: Counterplan doesn’t solve oil industry ....................................................................... 177 

Answers to: Counterplan doesn’t solve the economy .................................................................... 188 

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Summary 

The Pressure Counterplan takes the opposite strategy as from the Affirmative on how to get 

Venezuela to change policies. People often use the analogy of a carrot or a stick to describe these 

approaches. If you want a horse to pull a wagon to market you can put a carrot in front of its face and 

lead it forward with an enticement or you can hold a stick and threaten to hit the animal if it does not 

move. The affirmative offers a carrot of oil investment in the hopes that a stable Venezuela will 

become friendly with the United States and align with our policy goals (Democracy, regional stability, 

free markets to encourage growth). The counterplan is one of the biggest diplomatic sticks the US 

can carry. Reform your government and host free elections or the US will impose trade sanctions on 

you. Since the US is Venezuela’s largest trading partner this would have huge effects on the 

economy in the country. The best net benefit to this counterplan is the appeasement turns on case. 

Since the counterplan would result in a stable Venezuela without keeping the anti-US and antidemocracy 

government in power. Either disad could also be a net benefit since the counterplan 

would not alter the amount of oil available for the world market or China. 

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Glossary 







price; usually a tactic used by large producers to prevent new entrants into a market 






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1NC Venezuela Pressure Counter Plan 

Text: The United States federal government should threaten to implement 

economic sanctions if the government of Venezuela does not implement election 

and anti-corruption reforms. 

The counterplan competes engagement and sanctions are distinct strategies to 

persuade Venezuela to change its internal policies, one offers economic 

opportunity one denies access to those opportunities.. 

The net benefit is the appeasement turns on case. 

Economic engagement fails absent a demand for election reform—only the 

counterplan solves relations in the long-term 

Christy, Senior policy analyst at the Foreign policy Initiative, 2013 

(Patrick, “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela” US News, , 

3/15/13 http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blo/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-usmust-encourage-democratic-venezuela) 

What's perverse is how the Obama administration's move to "reset" relations with 

Maduro is doing more to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela's presidency 

than to resuscitate relations between the two governments. The move showed 

itself to be even more naive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to 

poison Chavez shortly after the strongman's death. [Check out our editorial cartoons on 

President Obama.] Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will 

not ensure a renewed and improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize 

this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in the months ahead, 

but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition. 

The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy 

towards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should: Pressure Caracas to 

implement key election reforms. Venezuela's opposition faces formidable obstacles. 

Interim President Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of public airwaves, 

its established networks of political patronage and last-minute public spending programs to 

bolster his populist agenda. Washington should stress publicly and privately that any attempts 

to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the 

principles defined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela 

in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator for Latin 

America, writes, The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is of 

Chavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that 

would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future 

free of chavista and foreign interference. Demand free, fair and verifiable elections. 

Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez will be held 

next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a 

democracy. Indeed, Chavez long embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, 

consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political 

system and altered the outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and intimidation 

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Answers to: Pressure fails Maduro 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic sanctions work and force Maduro to reform 

Halabi , co-founder of Global Risk Insights , 2013 

(Sammy, “Reasons for Optimism in Venezuela”; May 3, 2013; 

http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/05/03/spring-is-coming-we-should-be-optimisticabout-venezuela/) 

Though Venezuela will continue to be able to export oil, slightly mitigating some of 

Chavez’s more disastrous economic policies, Maduro sits on a ticking time bomb. 

Inflation is sky high, moving past 30%. Murder rates are skyrocketing while foreign 

investment continues to plummet due to past expropriations. And with increased 

American energy independence the era of $100 oil may be coming to an end. 

Chavez had both the ideological conviction and public support necessary to withstand 

pressures to liberalize and integrate the Venezuelan economy in the face of such 

terrible indicators. Yet given his weakened mandate, and the fractured political 

climate under which he operates, Maduro will not be able to withstand such 

pressures for long. Already there have been signs that Venezuela is inching 

towards change, with Maduro going so far as to temporarily open a back-channel with 

the US State Department during Chavez’s cancer treatments. While it would be 

difficult to see an overnight reversal of US-Venezuelan relations, these subtle 

steps are more indicative of a pragmatist than an ideologue. This is cause for 

optimism, and may be the root of better ties with Venezuela’s biggest export market in 

the medium term. In the short term, expect Venezuela to pursue its liberalization on 

a more regional basis. Importantly, Brazil very quickly recognized Maduro’s 

government in spite of the electoral controversies. Additionally, Brazil and Peru have 

shown that there is a viable “third way” through which Venezuela can integrate into the 

international system. States like these have contributed to the general decline in 

anti-American sentiment, and give Venezuela a workable model for change. For 

all the fever and emotion associated with Latin America, the logic of Venezuela’s 

economic problems remains cold and calculating. Maduro is not the reincarnation of 

Chavez and attempts to analyze Venezuela’s future on its Chavismo past are superficial 

at best. In short, spring is coming. 

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Answers to: Pressure fails in the case of Venezuela 

[ ] 

[ ] Sanctions are justified and empirically work in Venezuela—forces them to 

promote US interests 

GPO, the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform and Foreign Affairs 

2011 ( 

(“VENEZUELA’S SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY”; June 24, 2011; 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71297/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71297.pdf) 

Venezuela continues to extend a lifeline to Colombian narcotrafficking 

organizations by providing significant support and safe haven along the border, and it 

remains one of the most preferred trafficking routes for the transit of cocaine out of 

South America. U.S. sanctions have successfully targeted and applied financial 

measures against narcotic traffickers and their organizations in Venezuela, 

helping to ensure regional security . Venezuela has proven that it cannot be trusted 

and the United States should take the necessary measures to stifle its powers and 

ensure regional security, but we must do so in a tactful manner, as not to further 

empower Chavez. The national security threats posed by Venezuela are complex. We 

must implement the appropriate measures to protect the people of Venezuela and 

promote U.S. interests 

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Answers to: Pressure fails in the case of Venezuela 

[ ] A pressure strategy will democratize Venezuela and provide stability for 

the transition. 

Walser and Zuckerman, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America and Research 

Associate at Heritage, 2013 

(Ray and Jessica—in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies; 

“Venezuela After Chavez: U.S. Should Rally to Democracy”; 

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/venezuela-after-death-of-chavez-usshould-rally-to-democracy) 

A principled U.S. policy toward Venezuela should be guided by continued 

commitments to broad-based—not just electoral—democracy enshrined in the 

2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter. Preservation of the constitutional order in 

Venezuela requires new elections that are not only free but fair. The interests of 

the U.S. will be best served with the return of fully functioning democracy 

(separation of powers, rule of law, protection of individual rights and liberties) in 

Venezuela. To achieve these objectives, the Obama Administration should: Deliver 

by public diplomacy channels a comprehensive report on the costs and consequences 

of the Chavez regime; Insist on maintaining the 30-day electoral timetable and 

press for real international electoral observation; Signal clearly that anything other 

than free and fair elections will open the door to possible diplomatic and 

economic sanctions; Continue to investigate narco-corruption and collect 

intelligence on criminal, terrorist, and Iranian activity in Venezuela; and Refrain 

from restoring relations at the ambassadorial level without a firm Venezuelan 

commitment to cooperate in fighting drug trafficking and international terrorism. 

Too Big to Ignore The weeks and months ahead are a period of opportunity and peril in 

Venezuela. The Obama Administration should not be content with leading from 

behind or claiming more pressing engagements. From defending democracy to 

preserving stability, a post-Chavez Venezuela is too big to ignore. 

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[ ] 

Answers to: Must Recognize Maduro 



[ ] Recognition of Maduro in any form will undermine democratic signals to 

the entire region 


(Alasdair, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” Christian 

Science Monitor, [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s- 

Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition][MG] 

The US’s reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the 

heavy crude is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US 

refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly 

following the recent slump in global oil prices. In fact, many believe the US’s 

reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other 

regional observers. “Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela,” says Mark 

Jones, professor of political science at Rice University in Texas. “The US’s refusal to 

recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduro’s win sends 

a signal to other Latin American countries that these elections didn’t meet 

minimum democratic standards.” 

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Answers to Maduro says No 

[ ] 

[ ] An economic sanction would spark Venezuela reaction 

Duddy ’12 (Patrick D. Duddy is a senior lecturer in international studies at Duke 

University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela; “Political Unrest in Venezuela”; 

September 2012; http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936) 

Economic Interests: A significant number of U.S. companies have operations in 

Venezuela; it remains an important market for U.S. goods and some services, 

especially oil services. Many of these companies could be at risk if violent internal 

conflict broke out. Venezuela is consistently among the five largest foreign suppliers of 

oil to the United States. The United States is Venezuela's largest market, buying up 

to nine hundred thousand barrels of oil daily, up to 45 percent of Venezuela's 

total oil exports. Around six hundred thousand barrels of Venezuelan crude per day 

are refined at CITGO facilities in the United States. Although a cut off of Venezuelan 

oil to the United States is theoretically possible, it is unlikely given Venezuela's 

dependence on the U.S. market. The United States is now less vulnerable to a cut off 

of supply from Venezuela as U.S. domestic production has risen and imports from 

elsewhere could relatively quickly replace Venezuelan oil. Venezuela's economy, on 

the other hand, has become more dependent on petroleum. Although production has 

stagnated since 2003, oil accounts for over 95 percent of Venezuela's export 

earnin, and export revenue pays for nearly 50 percent of the government's 

budget. Thus, although Venezuela is vulnerable to pressure via its dependence on 

its oil exports generally and the U.S. market and refineries specifically, global 

markets would likely react negatively to either an interruption of Venezuelan production 

or a crisis in U.S.-Venezuelan relations that threatens the bilateral trade in oil. 

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Answers to: Cooperation is key 

[ ] 

[ ] Pressuring Maduro solves relations and stability—now is key 

Pagano, contributing editor for Truman National Security Projec. 2013 

(James, t, “Moving Venezuela to the Center”; 3-18, http://trumanproject.org/doctrineblog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/) 

Venezuela’s next president will have to decide whether to reverse these trends, or 

continue the slide to outright authoritarianism. The United States can and should 

influence this decision. The United States must support the democratic process 

and engage the likely winner of April’s election, Chavez’s chosen successor, Nicolás 

Maduro. He will have a real opportunity to put Venezuela back on the path to a 

free-market democracy. The next president will face an extremely politicized Supreme 

Court and military and reforms are likely more palatable if made by Maduro. 

Changes to apportionment, food subsidies or tax rates coming from Enrique Capriles 

(the opposition candidate) could spark a legal challenge from the supreme court; or 

worse, opposition from the military. What should the U.S. role be It must work with 

its Latin American allies in the region, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to gently 

pressure Maduro into making the types of institutional and economic changes 

necessary for Venezuela to prosper. Failure to do so could lead to the reemergence 

of authoritarianism in Latin America, instability in world oil markets and serious 

regional security repercussions. Chavez was infamous for his anti-American tirades. 

George W. Bush’s poor global standing gave Chavez an easy target. With a more 

positive global image, the most important step President Obama can take is to 

normalize relations with Cuba. As Venezuela’s closest ally, Cuba has remained a 

persistent problem in U.S.-Latin American relations. By normalizing relations, Obama 

would take a huge step in reducing anti-Americanism in Venezuela. Simultaneously, 

Obama would ingratiate himself to the rest of the region by ending the dated embargo. 

Perhaps most importantly, eliminating this issue would give Venezuela’s next 

president the political cover necessary to mend relations with the United States. 

The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which seeks a greater 

role in international and regional politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has 

close ties to Venezuela, and touting the recent successes of his center-left government 

in Brazil could help persuade Maduro to moderate his government. Brazil has made 

huge societal gains without suffering the kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela. 

Friendly cajoling, along with the promise of closer economic ties could help lead Maduro 

onto a path of economic reform necessary to extend certain “Chavista” social 

programs. Colombia, Brazil and the U.S. also have a shared interest in improving 

Venezuelan security. Under Chavez, Venezuela became on the most violent countries 

in Latin America, as drug related crimes skyrocketed. Violence is the number one 

concern of Venezuelans, and significant reductions would be a major political victory for 

whoever is in power. Brazil and Colombia together should pressure Venezuela to 

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accept sorely needed D.E.A assistance with the tacit acceptance of modest political 

reforms, most importantly freer press. The death of Chavez is a critical juncture in 

U.S.-Latin American relations and it is important the United States not miss this 

opportunity. Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would allow the United States 

to continue to draw down operations in the ever-volatile Middle East, fight 

narcotrafficking and expand trade. 

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[ ] 

Answers to: Permutation “Do Both” 

[ ] Our threat is the only way to solve—there have to be repercussions 

without concessions—giving carrots to Venezuela links to the appeasement turn. 

Ros-Lehtinen, member House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2013 

(Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is; 3/14/13; “Venezuela after Chavez: What comes next”; 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/venezuela-after-chavez-whatcomes-next/)// 

The United States’ role in the post-Chavez era should be to support democratic 

order by continuing to promote the Venezuelan civil society and ensuring that 

their rights are respected. The freedom-hungry people of Venezuela fear that the 

United States is too weak to counter interim President Nicolas Maduro. Support for prodemocracy 

leaders cannot be accomplished if the Obama administration continues to 

cozy up to their oppressors and refuses to draw a line in the sand for Mr. Maduro, 

demanding an end to these undemocratic policies. Last year, it was reported that the 

Obama administration was seeking to exchange ambassadors in an attempt to 

normalize relations between the countries. The U.S. State Department’s approach was 

extremely premature, and it, unfortunately, legitimized Mr. Maduro without even 

questioning whether the Venezuelan Constitution was being upheld. The Obama 

administration continued to send mixed messages and to undermine the opposition by 

sending a delegation to attend Chavez’s funeral services last week, alonide enemies of 

the United States, such as Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Words matter, but 

actions matter more, and this decision not only sends mixed signals to the people of 

Venezuela, but reiterates the failed policy of attempting to re-establish diplomatic 

relations. It is in our best interest if political and economic reforms come to 

Venezuela, but all signs currently point to the contrary. As the leader of the Chavista 

movement, Mr. Maduro could potentially be worse for the Venezuelan people and 

for U.S. national security interests. Mr. Maduro still controls all branches of 

government, stifles free speech and was indoctrinated with socialist ideology. He 

has traveled to Tehran and has strong ties with Iran, supports the Assad regime in Syria 

and has become a lap dog for Cuba’s Castro brothers. In January, the Castros 

orchestrated the violation of the Venezuelan Constitution when Chavez did not take the 

oath of office. The U.S. State Department responded that it is up to the Venezuelan 

people to decide if there was a violation, and that it would not interpret the constitution. 

However, those sentiments were nowhere to be found in 2009 when the State 

Department led the charge against the people of Honduras, helped expel Honduras 

from the Organization of American States, and did not recognize Honduras’ 

constitutional authorities. Why the double standard Democratic rights under the Inter- 

American Democratic Charter cannot be selective; they must be uniform. The United 

States should be telling the leaders of Venezuela that they need to respect the 

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constitution, abide by the Inter-American Democratic Charter and uphold 

democratic principles. These democratic processes can only be enforced if the 

Venezuelan leadership thinks that there will be serious repercussions if they do 

not take responsible actions to fulfill their obligations. This is an opportunity for 

the United States and responsible nations to demonstrate a commitment to 

restoring true democracy to Venezuela, and I hope the opportunity isn’t missed. 

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The Counterplan solves Appeasement Turns 

[ ] 

[ ] Economic sanctions effectively promote democracy—comparative study 

Collins, Assistant Professor in Political Science and International Affairs at 

Kennesaw State University, 2009 

(“Democracy Sanctions: An Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of 

Democracy Promotion”; December, http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069- 

096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf) 

Democracy promotion is often dismissed as a futile American foreign policy 

endeavor. Economic sanctions conventionally are derided as ineffective and 

counterproductive. Consequently, one might predict that the use of economic sanctions 

to promote democracy would represent a hopelessly inept strategy. This study finds, 

conversely, that sanctions represent a relatively effective instrument of democracy 

promotion. The idea that sanctions were futile was minted in the bipolar era, when the 

structural attributes of the international system limited the effectiveness of superpower 

sanctions. After the marked shift in the polar configuration of power upon the 

disappearance of the Soviet Union, however, the structural attributes of the system 

presented a more benign environment for the sanctions efforts of the United 

States. A comparative analysis of the use of democracy sanctions in the bipolar 

era versus those implemented in the 1990s reveals that sanctions became 

significantly more effective. This essay examines the causal origins of the 

increase in the effectiveness of democracy sanctions, and considers whether the 

high success rate for the approach can be sustained into the near future in light 

of recent challenges to American hegemony. 

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The Counterplan solves Appeasement Turns 



[ ] Threatening economic pressure solves democratization—Guatemala 

proves 

Collins, Assistant Professor in Political Science and International Affairs at 

Kennesaw State University, 2009 

(“Democracy Sanctions: An Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of 

Democracy Promotion”; December, http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069- 

096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf) 

In a number of instances, democracy-promotion sanctions delivered deep and 

rapid results. In 1993, when Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano dissolved 

Congress and the judiciary, and attempted to establish an autocratic government, 

the United States led a coalition of states in terminating all nonhumanitarian aid, 

and threatening sharp trade sanctions if democracy was not immediately 

restored. The grave threat of comprehensive sanctions worked to drive a wide 

number of sectors in Guatemalan society-including business, the military, and civil 

society-to abandon Serrano. The disgraced Serrano was ousted by the military, 

Guatemala’s human rights ombudsman took over as president, and the country’s 

democratic institutions were restored. The coup was reversed within days.26 

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Answers to: Counterplan doesn’t solve oil industry 

[ ] 

[ ] Only counterplan can force the reforms necessary to jump start 

Venezuela’s oil infrastructure. Mismangement not international investment is the 

problem. 

Coronel, president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida, 2008 ( 

(Gustavo “The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela”; 

http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela)// 

High levels of mismanagement at the state-owned petroleum company, Petroleos 

de Venezuela. Corruption here takes many shapes. It includes the naming of six 

presidents and boards in seven years, in an effort to control the company 

politically. This finally was accomplished by naming the Minister of Energy and 

Petroleum president of the company, in violation of good management practice, 

since he now supervises himself. As a result, oil production has declined by some 

800,000 barrels per day during the last decade. In a recent public hearing, Luis 

Vierma, the firm’s Vice President for Exploration and Production, admitted giving 

an oil well drilling contract for some $20,000,000 to a company with only three 

employees and no ri. 

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[ ] 

Answers to: Counterplan doesn’t solve the economy 



[ ] Corruption reform solves the economy—Maduro key 

Helios Global, 2013 

(Independent news agency covering Latin American affairs in conjunction with Fair 

Observer; “Change in Venezuela Yields Political and Economic Uncertainty”; 6/4 

http://www.fairobserver.com/article/change-venezuela-yields-political-and-economicuncertainty) 

Nicholas Maduro’s narrow electoral triumph over opposition leader Henrique Capriles 

Radonski in Venezuela’s April 14 elections — to serve out the remainder of the late 

president Hugo Chavez’s current presidential term — signifies a turning point in 

Venezuelan politics. Maduro’s victory has also reverberated beyond Venezuela’s 

borders. Due to its role as a major source of oil, the course of political events in 

Venezuela also has important implications for the world economy. The death of 

Chavez has also raised concerns about the prospects of social, political, and 

economic stability in Venezuela. The victory of Chavez’s heir apparent – Chavez and 

his supporters went to great lengths to ensure the survival of the Bolivarian Revolution 

launched by Chavez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (known by its Spanish 

acronym PSUV) – in a politically charged and polarized climate has already resulted in 

unrest and violence between Maduro’s supporters and his opponents. Venezuela’s 

increasingly dire economic predicament has further exacerbated tensions across 

the country. Despite a contentious bilateral relationship, Venezuela remains the 

fourth-largest supplier of imported oil to the United States. Given the peculiarities 

of its oil, namely, the category of relatively low quality heavy crude oil that represents 

the bulk of its oil capacity, Venezuela relies heavily on US refineries located in the 

Gulf of Mexico that were designed to refine oil from Venezuela (and Mexico). Roughly 

40 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports are delivered to the United States. Consequently, 

the United States is Venezuela’s top trade partner. This is the case even as US 

imports of Venezuelan oil have steadily declined in recent years. In 1997, the United 

States imported about 1.7 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Venezuela. In 

contrast, only about one million bpd of Venezuelan oil makes its way to the United 

States today. Venezuela also boasts major natural gas reserves, possibly the secondlargest 

natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, 

Venezuela’s oil production capacity continues to deteriorate due to 

mismanagement, corruption, and antiquated infrastructure. 

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Affirmative

Pressure Counterplan Affirmative 

Pressure Counterplan Affirmative -Table of Contents 



Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................... 2 

Solvency Answers: 

No Solvency: Pressure Fails—Maduro ......................................................................................................... 3 

No Solvency: Pressure Fails in the case of Venezuela .............................................................................. 4 

No Solvency: Maduro Says No ...................................................................................................................... 5 

No Solvency: Maduro Recognition ................................................................................................................ 6 

Solvency Turn: Only Cooperation Solves ..................................................................................................... 7 

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Glossary 

Chavistas- supporters of Hugo Chavez, former president of Venezuela 

Dissent- The expression or holding of opinions at variance with those previously, commonly, or 


Empirically- Verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment 


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No Solvency: Pressure Fails—Maduro 

[ ] Status quo rhetoric prevents the counterplan from solving—more pressure only 

emboldens Maduro’s Anti-American stance and wrecks relations 

Oppenheimer, foreign affairs columnist with The Miami Herald, 2013 

(Andres, “Andres Oppenheimer: Venezuela Vice President Maduro will raise anti-U.S. rhetoric — for 

now”; 3/6/13; http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/06/3270595/maduro-will-raise-anti-usrhetoric.html) 

On Tuesday, shortly before announcing Chávez’s cancer-related death, Maduro — the Venezuelan 

government’s candidate for elections expected within the next 30 days — suggested that the United 

States had “inoculated” Chávez’s with the cancer. At the same time, he expelled two U.S. 

diplomats from Venezuela. Maduro was in full campaign mode when he made those claims, U.S. 

officials say. The vice president, a former bus driver and union leader who was designated by Chávez 

as his political heir, needs to cast himself as a hard-line “anti-imperialist” leader both to keep 

the Chavista movement united, and to rally Venezuelans behind him against an imaginary U.S. 

threat, they say. The Obama administration has turned the other cheek on Maduro’s accusations. It 

has categorically denied having caused Chávez’s death, and called the charge “absurd.” 

Interestingly, Maduro and the U.S. State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, 

Roberta Jacobson, had discussed improving bilateral relations during a telephone conversation as 

recently as late last year. In a Nov. 21 telephone call initiated by Jacobson, Maduro had suggested 

restoring the two countries’ ambassadors. Jacobson, in turn, had proposed a step-by-step approach 

to upgrade relations, starting with counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism cooperation measures, the 

U.S. official said at the time. On Wednesday, I asked Jacobson why she thinks Maduro made his 

claim earlier this week that the U.S. government had “inoculated’’ Chávez with cancer. “We find it 

really unfortunate that at a time when we were, and are, seeking a more productive relationship with 

Venezuela, they use this kind of rhetoric publicly and expel two of our officials,” Jacobson said. “It’s 

disappointing. But we remain interested in having a productive relationship with Venezuela.” 

Jacobson didn’t want to speculate on Maduro’s motives, but other well-placed Venezuela watchers in 

Washington see it is as an obvious electoral ploy. Maduro, a former bus driver who is very close to 

Cuba’s military government, does not have Chávez’s charisma, and does not have a record to run on. 

And with Venezuela’s inflation and crime rates reaching record highs, his best hope to win the 

election is capitalizing on Chávez’s popularity, and showing that he is as tough on the Gringos as 

Chávez was, they say. “The harder days in U.S.-Venezuelan relations are not behind us, but 

ahead of us,” says Carl Meacham, Americas Director of the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies in Washington D.C., and until recently a senior analyst with the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee. “Maduro is shoring up political support within Chavismo,” Meacham added. “His 

charges against the United States and his expulsion of the two U.S. diplomats were his way of 

telling his followers, “I’m like Chávez.” We can expect his rhetoric to get worse in coming weeks.” 

My opinion: I agree that Maduro is likely to raise his “anti-imperialist’’ rhetoric during the campaign, 

but I wouldn’t be surprised if he resumes his amicable dialogue with the Obama administration 

afterward should he win the elections, as now seems likely. Right now, Maduro is following 

Chávez’s script of provoking confrontations and inventing domestic and foreign conspiracies, 

so as to present himself as the protector of the fatherland and cast his political rivals as alleged U.S. 

stooges. It’s a script that Chávez followed for the past 14 years, and that worked well for him. 

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No Solvency: Pressure Fails in the case of Venezuela 

[ ] Venezuela won’t bow to pressure—South American alliances and international law 

prove our argument. 

Daly, developing editor for NewsNetworkReport, 7-12-13 

(Marilyn, “South American countries unite against U.S. policies”; 

http://www.examiner.com/article/south-american-countries-unite-against-u-s-policies) 

Reuter reports that leaders from Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay and Bolivia 

will be meeting today to discuss many issues of mutual concern, including the alleged spying by 

the United States at the international level, possible asylum for Edward Snowden, and the detention 

of Bolivian President Evo Moralas last week in Europe, after he was denied access to travel airspace 

by several European countries. Morales was suspected of having Edward Snowden aboard his 

airplane, an allegation that ended up being false. Edward Snowden is wanted by the United States on 

suspicion of espionage and theft, and has been formally charged by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

The South American group meeting today is part of Mercosur, or the “Common Market of the 

South.” Mercosur is a South American Trade Bloc. It includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 

Uruguay, and Venezuela, with five associate members: Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, 

who do not have access to all the cooperative benefits, but do receive tariff reduction in return for the 

same from participating countries. Their mission is to promote free trade among the participating 

nations in goods and services. Mercosur came out of the 1991 "Treaty of Asuncion" between 

South American nations, with hopes of creating a union similar to the European Union, uniting all of 

the South America countries in a cooperative economic bloc. Ever since the allegations that the 

United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) targeted many Latin American countries with 

spying programs, the leaders of some of these nations want clarification and details of the 

extent of the spying from U.S. officials. Edward Snowden is still presently delayed at a Russian 

Airport evaluating his options for asylum, with many nations not wanting to cooperate due to U.S. 

pressure. Nonetheless, Reuter further reports that Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua 

announced: "We believe that the international community must demand the right of all citizens 

of the world to request asylum: diplomatic, political, humanitarian, whatever you want to call 

it," "Venezuela is going to exercise its right under international law regardless of threats, 

regardless of retaliation, regardless of consequences," 

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No Solvency: Maduro Says No 

[ ] Maduro won’t give in to pressure—has to gain legitimacy through Chavismo policies 

Grais-Targow, an associate in Eurasia Group's Latin America practice, 2013 

(Risa; “Maduro’s victory is the worst possible outcome for Venezuela’s economy”; April 15, 2013; 

http://qz.com/74567/maduros-victory-is-the-worst-possible-outcome-for-venezuelas-economy/) 

Further complicating matters, Maduro begins his presidency in a very difficult economic context. The 

economy is plagued by sluggish economic growth (0.9% in 2013 according to local consultancy 

Ecoanalitica), high inflation (25% year-over-year in March), dollar and goods scarcity, stagnant oil 

production, and fiscal accounts that are in disarray. In this context, Maduro will struggle to recover 

popularity. Consequently, economic policy and political stability will likely suffer. Maduro will 

be an inherently weak president, and will be under pressure to reverse social discontent, which 

means he is unlikely to make needed economic adjustments. This means that foreign exchange 

and price controls will likely remain in place, and demands on state-run oil company PDVSA for 

financing will remain high, limiting the firm’s investment capacity. Moreover, Maduro will be 

constrained in his ability to implement more pragmatic policies, as he will need to prove his 

revolutionary credentials in order to legitimize his role as heir to Chavez. In this context, 

Maduro will likely attempt to rally his support base by finding common enemies. This means he 

will probably have to take some tough actions, especially towards the private sector, such as 

further nationalizations or more stringent controls. In this context, political dynamics will likely 

deteriorate further, and rapidly, which will also worsen economic conditions, increasing the risk of 

political instability. 

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No Solvency: Maduro Recognition 

[ ] Failure to recognize Maduro guts solvency—seen as an act of belligerence 

Christian Science Monitor, 2013 

(Christian Science Monitor; “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition”; 

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on- 

Washington-s-recognition) 

More than a month after Venezuela’s contested presidential election, President Nicolás Maduro’s 

narrow victory has yet to be recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new 

premier while a partial recount of the vote is underway, the US position has led to further political 

tensions in a relationship historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo 

Chávez. A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the 

democratic standards of the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. 

Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of 

election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth 

intimidation. “Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to have serious questions 

about the viability of that government,” said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the 

US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduro’s victory in April. 

While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize 

Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how – if at 

all – it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez. “[The US isn’t] recognizing or failing to recognize,” says 

David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. “They’re just waiting. But here in 

Venezuela that’s seen as an act of belligerence.” 

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Solvency Turn: Only Cooperation Solves 

[ ] Any type of threat will harm relations—only cooperation solves 

Venezuelan Embassy, 2013 

(“Calixto Ortega Designated as Chief of Venezuelan Embassy in Washington”; 4/24/2013; 

http://venezuela-us.org/2013/04/24/calixto-ortega-designated-as-chief-of-venezuelan-embassy-inwashington/) 

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro announced Tuesday his decision to name Deputy Calixto 

Ortega as charge d’affaires for Venezuela in the United States. “For some time I have been 

evaluating naming a new charge d’affaires at our Embassy in Washington and I have decided to 

name Deputy Calixto Ortega as the new charge d’affaires so that he can increase dialogue 

with US society,” Maduro said at a meeting with governors at Miraflores Presidential Palace in 

Caracas. Dialogue in the US, he said, should include “universities, the academic world, the social 

world, unions, the African-American community, the Latino community, the Congress, senators, 

representatives, the economic world, economic and commercial sectors with which we have 

relationships.” “Calixto Ortega is a man with a lot of experience and knowledge of US society 

and we believe he can play an important role in bringing the truth about Venezuela [to the 

United States] to continue opening up understanding so that, sooner rather than later, there is 

respect for Latin America, the Caribbean, respect for the Bolivarian Revolution.” The head of 

state said that the Venezuelan government wants to have the best possible relations with all 

governments around the world, including the United States, but on the basis of respect. “There 

cannot be any type of threats,” he said. To the US government, Maduro said: “If you want to 

have relations based on respect, conversations, cooperation, that’s welcome.” 

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Development Kritik

Development Kritik 

Development Kritik – Table of Contents 



Summary .............................................................................................................................................. 2 

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 3 

1NC: 

Development K 1NC .......................................................................................................................... 4-6 

Links: 

Link – Cuba Embargo ........................................................................................................................... 7 

Link – Mexico (Generic) ........................................................................................................................ 8 

Link – Mexico (Trade/Exports) .............................................................................................................. 9 

Link – Mexico (Rural Assistance) ........................................................................................................ 10 

Link – Venezuela (Oil) ......................................................................................................................... 11 

Link – Economic Engagement ............................................................................................................ 12 

Link – Free Trade ................................................................................................................................ 13 

Link – Foreign Investment ................................................................................................................... 14 

Link – Foreign Aid ............................................................................................................................... 15 

Link – Government Assistance ........................................................................................................... 16 

Link – Humanitarianism ...................................................................................................................... 17 

Impacts: 

Impact – Laundry List .......................................................................................................................... 18 

Impact – Interventionism/War ............................................................................................................. 19 

Impact – Environment/Economy ......................................................................................................... 20 

Impact – Terrorism/Instability .............................................................................................................. 21 

Impact – No Value to Life .................................................................................................................... 22 

Impact - Authoritarianism .................................................................................................................... 23 

Alternative: 

Alternative Solvency Extension ........................................................................................................... 24 

Answers to Affirmative Arguments: 

ANSWERS TO: Perm .................................................................................................................... 25-26 

ANSWERS TO: Economic Engagement is Good................................................................................ 27 

ANSWERS TO: Neoliberalism Is Inevitable ........................................................................................ 28 

ANSWERS TO: Neoliberalism is Inevitable (Economic Logic) ............................................................ 29 

ANSWERS TO: Neoliberalism Is Making The World Better ................................................................ 30 

ANSWERS TO: Neoliberalism Solves Poverty ................................................................................... 31 

ANSWERS TO: Framework ........................................................................................................... 32-33 

ANSWERS TO: Cede the Political ...................................................................................................... 34 

ANSWERS TO: There is No Alternative ............................................................................................. 35 

ANSWERS TO: Cuban Government will Check Capitalism ................................................................ 36 

ANSWERS TO: Venezuela is Already Capitalist................................................................................. 37 

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Summary 



This argument claims that the fundamental goal of economic engagement is to re-integrate Latin 

America into an economic system that is designed to benefit the United States more than anyone 

else. This paradigm of economic engagement is called “development” – it is a process of taking 

countries that don’t embody our ideals of economic mobility or stability and getting them to fall in line 

with the system of international trade that the US controls. 

Because this system of economic development is designed to make trade benefit the United States, it 

often overlooks how bad our model of economic growth and our modes of production could be for the 

people & the environment in any of the 3 topic countries. On top of hurting the environment & 

increasing poverty rates, this mode of development objectifies people because it thinks of them as 

nothing more than profit opportunities or helpless victims that couldn’t survive without our leadership. 

The alternative to this model of engaging other countries is to let them take charge of their own future. 

This is not a rejection of economic growth or development, but a claim that the people in the topic 

countries should be the ones to determine how they trade, what they produce, etc. – not US 

corporations or US policymakers. We won’t have a just system of economic engagement until the 

people who produce the goods that are going to be traded have a bigger voice in the process. 

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Glossary 



Development – the deliberate efforts of leaders to promote the growth of economic activity and 

output in a particular area. 

Economic rationality/logic – a framework for understanding social and economic behavior, which is 

typically associated with the pursuit of profits. 

Export Processing Zones (EPZs) – an area, within which goods may be landed, handled, 

manufactured or reconfigured, and exported without the intervention of the customs authorities. 

Foreign Direct Investment (FI) – investing in United States businesses by foreign citizens (often 

involves stock ownership of the business). 

Globalization – the process of international integration of culture, products, knowledge, etc. 

Globalization involves the disintegration of boundaries between nations, and in the context of this 

kritik, refers mostly to the process of making capitalism a universal feature of all nations. 

Imperialist – the policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over foreign 

countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies. 

Multinational Corporations (MNCs) – A corporation that has its facilities and other assets in at least 

one country other than its home country. 

Neoliberalism – the name given to an economic ideology that promotes the reduction of the public 

sector and the expansion of private sector. This system seeks to reduce regulation and government 

manipulation of businesses and trade. 

Transnational capital – provides capital formation, financial structuring, and merger and acquisitions 

advisory services to emerging growth companies. 

Washington Consensus – a term used to describe a set of core policy prescriptions that US leaders 

would frequently implement when dealing with developing countries. 

Worker-Engineer-Public-Control (WEPC) model – an alternative model of economic development 

that envisions growth led by the people who work, as opposed to foreign investors and policymakers. 

3 | P a g e


Development K 1NC (1/3) 



Economic engagement is a tool utilized to facilitate economic integration in Latin America – it 

is a policy based on a paternalistic conception of development that culminates in the mass 

privatization of public goods and social inequality. 

Jacobs, assistant professor of political science at West Virginia U, 2004 

(Jamie, "Neoliberalism and Neopanamericanism: The View from Latin America," Latin American 

Politics & Society 46:4, Project MUSE) 

While Oliva and Prevost and the other authors featured in this volume point to the changes that have 

altered global relations since the end of the Cold War—among them an altered balance of power, 

shifting U.S. strategy, and evolving interamerican relations—they all view the U.S. foreign policy of 

neoliberalism and economic integration essentially as old wine in new bottles. As such, old 

enemies (communism) are replaced by new (drugs and terrorism), but the fear of Northern 

domination of and intervention in Latin America remains. Specifically, Oliva and Prevost identify 

the process through which "economics had taken center stage in interamerican affairs." They [End 

Page 149] suggest that the Washington Consensus—diminishing the state's role in the 

economy, privatizing to reduce public deficits, and shifting more fully to external markets— 

was instead a recipe for weakened governments susceptible to hemispheric domination by 

the United States (xi). The book is divided into two main sections that emphasize hemispheric and 

regional issues, respectively. The first section links more effectively to the overall theme of the 

volume in its chapters on interamerican relations, culture, governance, trade, and security. In the first 

of these chapters, Oliva traces the evolution of U.S. influence in Latin America and concludes that, 

like the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny in the past, the prospect of hemispheric economic 

integration will be marked by a dominant view privileging U.S. security, conceptualized in 

transnational, hemispheric terms, that is both asymmetrical and not truly integrated among all 

members. In this context, Oliva identifies the free trade area of the Americas (FTAA) as "an economic 

project suited to a hemispheric context that is politically favorable to the United States" (20). The 

chapters in this section are strongest when they focus on the political aspects of neoliberalism and 

the possible unintended negative consequences that could arise from the neoliberal program. Carlos 

Alzugaray Treto draws on the history of political philosophy, traced to Polanyi, identifying ways that 

social inequality has the potential to undermine the stable governance that is so crucial a part 

of the neoliberal plan. He goes on to point out how this potential for instability could also 

generate a new period of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. 

4 | P a g e





This imposed model of economic interaction causes poverty, military interventions, and 

environmental degradation – culminates in extinction. 

Szentesa, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest, 2008 

(Tamás, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society”, 4/22 

http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/-Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf) 

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without 

peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous 

local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most 

developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarization have not ended with the collapse 

of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction 

and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are 

suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, 

unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, 

exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, 

disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, 

women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of 

human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological 

balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is 

still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and 

“invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasocietal inequities and distorted 

development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus 

paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely 

the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not 

only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination 

of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of 

large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a 

process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of 

societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign 

participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic 

democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world 

society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict 

management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the 

contemporary conditions of accelerating globalization and deepening global 

interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if 

reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world 

when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, 

demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable 

development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as 

an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological 

balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources 

and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep 

international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. 

5 | P a g e





The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s imperialist model of development. 

Global social movements are underway – these worker-organized struggles are essential to 

reclaim economic development in the people’s interest. 

Wise, Director of Doctoral Program in Migration Studies & Prof of Development Studies; 

Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico, 2009 

(Raúl Delgado, Forced Migration and US Imperialism: The Dialectic of Migration and Development, 

Crit Sociol, 35: 767, ProQuest) 

The promotion of development as social transformation could curtail forced migration. 

Globalization depicts migration as inevitable; we must endorse, both in theory and practice, 

the viability of alternative processes of development and do so on different levels. We 

must first redefine the asymmetrical terms that developed countries, aided by principles 

that have by now turned into fetishes (e.g. democracy, liberty, and free trade), used for 

imperialist domination. This involves an exposé of imperialist practices, which have 

created oceans of inequality and condemned vast regions of the world to marginalization, 

poverty, social exclusion, and unfettered migration. Foreign investment (FI) has been a 

fundamental driving force in this regard. A genuine process of social transformation involving 

the migrant and non-migrant sectors of society would not only seek to contain the 

overwhelming flow of forced migration but also revert the ongoing processes of social 

degradation that characterize underdevelopment and even pose a threat to human existence 

(Bello, 2006; Harvey, 2007). As an alternative to the current phase of imperialist domination, 

Petras argues in favor of what he defines as a Worker-Engineer Public Control model (WEPC) 

based on six main principles: tax revenues versus tax evasions; profit remittances and privileged 

salaries versus social investment; high reinvestment ratios versus capital flight; long term investment 

in research and development versus speculative investment; social welfare versus capitalist 

privileges; and fixed capital/mobile labor versus mobile capital/fixed labor (Petras, 2007: 234–5). 

This model provides an alternative approach that maximizes national and working- class 

interests: ‘it has potential drawbacks and internal contradictions, which require constant 

reflection, deliberation, debate and reforms’ (2007: 237). Nonetheless, ‘the model provides the 

surest and most direct road to development with democracy, social justice and national 

independence. 

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Link – Cuba Embargo 



Lifting the embargo paves the way for capitalism to bulldoze over Cuba’s people and 

environment – it is the only obstacle to ecological destruction and cultural independence. 




Many Cuba well-wishers fear if President Obama lifts the trade embargo, the invasion of raw 

capitalism could destroy Cuba’s relatively pristine environment. Although the Cuban 

government points to its environmental laws and the government agency which was established to 

develop a sustainable environmental policy, these measures have done little up to now to affect 

substantial change. In several distinct sectors, Cuba seems to remain unprepared for the lifting of 

the embargo and the island inevitably could face a flood of investors from the United States 

and elsewhere, eager to exploit the beautiful landscapes of the island, at great cost and risk. 

After years of relying on government subsidies and protectionism, this rapid growth could 

generate irreparable shock waves through the economy. Oliver Houck, a professor at Tulane 

University who aided the Cuban government in writing its environmental protection provisions, said 

“an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it (Cuba) like a 

bulldozer,” when the embargo ends. The wider Caribbean region has experienced water 

contamination, mangrove destruction and sewage problems due to large quantities of tourists 

and inadequate plumbing. Therefore, U.S. tourism regulations need to be in place in order to 

protect the precious ecosystem of the island and prohibit over development. Collaboration between 

the U.S. and Cuba would be mutually beneficial, as the U.S. could use Cuba as a laboratory of 

sustainable development and U.S. tourism would stimulate Cuba’s stagnant economy, if its negative 

impact could be controlled. Both countries must agree upon a mutual plan for development. The 

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has conducted research in Cuba since 2000, working with Cuban 

partners on scientific investigations and strategies for protecting coastal and marine resources. 

Operating under a special license from the United States government, EDF experts are collaborating 

with Cuban scientists on research projects aimed at ensuring that if Cuba taps offshore oil and gas 

reserves, it will be done in an environmentally concious way. The US should establish more 

partnerships like these as President Obama has the legal authority to institute far-reaching 

cooperation with Cuba on joint marine environmental projects. These partnerships should be 

implemented as the first step in creating an elaborate alliance for environmental protection between 

the two countries. If the embargo is lifted, symbols of meretricious American capitalism are 

likely to invade the once relatively isolated island. Opinion columnist Cynthia Tucker has 

commented on such matters: “Mickey Mouse is sure to arrive, bringing with him the aptly 

predicted full frontal assault of American culture and consumer goods,” suggesting that if 

Obama lifts the embargo, a functioning system of environmental protection supported by both the 

U.S. and the Cuban public must be present for the island to be protected. 

7 | P a g e


Link – Mexico (Generic) 



Mexico-US economic engagement is the lynchpin and proving ground of neoliberalism – the 

affirmative aides the global success of neoliberal exploitation. 

Mexico Solidarity Network, 2012 

(“Mexico - A neoliberal experiment,” Online: 

http://www.mexicosolidarity.org/programs/alternativeeconomy/neoliberalism) 

0 

The United States and Mexico have been central to the development of the neoliberal 

model. We share a 2,000 mile border, the only place in the world where the Global North meets 

the South. The US-Mexico border is unique, and the relationship between the two nations is 

equally unique. In many ways, this geographic marriage represents the most important 

relationship in the world - a laboratory that is defining the neoliberal model. Three historical 

markers stand out as central to the development of neoliberalism: the establishment of free trade 

zones and maquiladoras in 1965, Structural Adjustment Programs initiated by the International 

Monetary Fund in 1982, and the signing of the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1994. 

The US-Mexico relationship has been the proving ground for the practical realities of the 

Washington consensus: production-for-export replacing production for internal consumption, 

the use of debt as a lever to force structural adjustment programs, loose investment rules that 

allow hot money to cross borders in seconds, and a trade agreement (read NAFTA) that is 

the model for a new legal framework that expands the rights of corporations at the expense of 

civil society. Experiments that "work," from the perspective of transnational capital (and all 

of the above-mentioned experiments "worked") are exported to other countries. This implies a 

complete restructuring of the economies, politics and cultures around the world, to make 

them consistent with the neoliberal vision. Nearly everything is on the table for reform: 

economic policy, public subsidies, social programs, industrial policy, government procurement, 

intellectual property rights, patents, banking and financial services, agricultural policy, foreign 

direct investment, energy policy, labor regulations, environmental protection, public 

education and health care - and the list goes on. Twenty-first century neoliberalism is a 

project for world domination, and the US and Mexico are at the center of the vortex. 

8 | P a g e


Link – Mexico (Trade/Exports) 



Export-based engagement with Mexico is a cover for poverty and the neoliberal exploitation of 

women. 

Kelly, writer at Citizen’s Press, 2008 

(Lara, “Neoliberalism in Latin America,” Oct 29, http://citizenspress.org/editorials/neoliberalism-inlatin-america) 

Another aspect of neoliberal restructuring policies is the encouragement and creation of 

export processing zones (EPZs). Export processing zones are parcels of territory where special 

laws exist regarding production. These zones are meant to attract foreign investments. The 

incentives offered to corporations include the ability to import without tax, minimal corporate 

income tax, freedom from labour unions, lessened regulations on the environment and labour, 

and state subsidized infrastructure (Teeple, 89). Transnational corporations have the ability to 

invest in whichever country they please, and EPZs offer an extreme advantage in that the 

production costs to corporations are minimal in these zones. Wages are low, infrastructure 

costs are born by the state, and employee protections are nil (Teeple 90-91). Hojman argues 

that in Mexico EPZs helped to create a new middle class of transnational executives, public 

servants, politicians, professionals, tradespeople and media personnel (202). He does not specify 

if these people are those who have improved their standard of living due to employment 

opportunities within EPZs. I assume he is referring to people attracted to the export-processing 

zones in order to profit from the increased production activities. It is unclear why he makes this 

argument, because chances are, these upper-class people have always been upper-class, and 

the fact that they have moved to an EPZ does not mean anything for the regular worker in these 

zones. Contrary to Hojman, Sadasivam has shown that EPZs profit from women’s cheap 

labour, and offer jobs which are repetitive in nature and dead-end. These women are 

targeted for these jobs because of their ‘vulnerability, docility and dispensability’ and the 

jobs do not include any security or safety requirements from the employer. She uses the 

example of EPZs in the Dominican Republic where the women must endure “strict discipline, 

sexual harassment, low pay, occupational health hazards, excessive and forced overtime, 

and arbitrary suspension and dismissal for protesting or organizing” (642-643). 

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Link – Mexico (Rural Assistance) 



Rural assistance divides Mexico’s urban and rural poor, pitting them against each other for 

resources – it’s a strategy to fracture anti-development groups. 

Holzner, assistant director of Latin American Studies at the University of Utah, 2007 

(Claudio, “The Poverty of Democracy: Neoliberal Reforms and Political Participation of the Poor in 

Mexico Latin American” Politics & Society, 49:2, Summer, Project MUSE) 

On the other hand, successive administrations have dismantled Mexico’s elaborate welfare 

system, leading many low-income Mexicans to the conclusion that politicians have turned 

their backs on Mexico’s poor (Gutmann 2002). This has had harmful consequences for lower-class 

political efficacy and engagement. Macroeconomic reforms shape political behavior by restructuring 

the relationship between citizens and the state in ways that create powerful incentives or 

disincentives for becoming involved in politics. In Mexico, repeated austerity programs since the 

1980s, which gutted federal spending programs and eliminated subsidies for basic foodstuffs; a 

decline in the spending and scope of rural development programs; and a general shrinking of state 

budgets made the state less relevant for the poor.10 Other free market reforms, such as the 

privatization of state- owned enterprises, the deregulation of the market for coffee and other 

cash crops without agricultural extension services, and attempts to pri- vatize ejidos (a form 

of collective property in rural areas), have reinforced the perception among popular groups 

that the state cannot or will not provide for them. Central to this change in incentives was the 

government’s shift away from comprehensive welfare, poverty alleviation, and rural development 

programs to more limited programs that carefully target people on the basis of individual need. 

Grindle (1986) has argued that rural development projects were core elements of the state’s 

strategy to extend its presence as deeply as possible into the Mexican countryside. In reality, it was 

precisely because of state-building efforts during the 1950s and 1960s and because of 

comprehensive development programs like PIDER-COMPLAMAR, SAM, and CONASUPO in the 

1970s and 1980s that peasants had more and more incentives to target the state when seeking 

solutions to their material needs (see also Fox 1993). Similarly, Craig and Cornelius argue that 

Recent reforms have dismantled this welfare system, eliminating many of the incentives the poor had 

for engaging in political activity. The poverty alleviation initiatives of Ernesto Zedillo’s administration 

(1994–2000) particularly signaled a retreat of the state from the lives of the poor. A central 

characteristic of the new era of government-sponsored poverty alleviation programs, such as 

PROGRESA; its successor, Oportunidades; and agricultural subsidy programs like PROCAMPO is 

that they target individuals on a strict need basis, using formulas for calculating the level of support 

that individuals and households receive. This rationalization of public spending may be good 

economic policy because it insulates policymakers from political pressures; but by eliminating much 

of the discretionary power that parties, corporatist organizations, and politicians had in allocating 

benefits to their most loyal clients, it makes political participation irrelevant, if not irrational. Perhaps 

even more damaging, the selective allocation of social assistance often divides communities 

between those receiving assistance and those left out of programs. This fragmentation of 

interests atomizes the rural and urban poor, places them in competition with each other, and 

weakens their capacity for collective action. The net effect of these changes has been to 

increase the cost of targeting the state while making it less likely that political action will be 

successful. 

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Link – Venezuela (Oil) 



A shift away from export to the US is providing resources to fight neoliberal hegemony now – 

reverting to an alliance with the US will allow colonialist domination over Venezuela. 

Barra, International Development Consultant and Public Policy Analyst; Former Public Policy 

Advisor at UNICEF, 2010 

(Ximena de la, Sacrificing Neoliberalism to Save Capitalism: Latin America Resists and Offers 

Answers to Crises, 2010 36: 635, Crit Sociol) 

Decline in demand now exacerbates this self-inflicted crisis. In contrast with this mismanagement 

in Latin America, and as a way of recovering national sovereignty especially in Bolivia, Ecuador 

and Venezuela, action is gradually being undertaken to recover public control over natural 

resources. Tired of seeing their resources such as oil, gas and metals depleted to make 

transnational corporations richer, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have renegotiated their 

contracts, increased royalties and established joint companies with their individual states 

as main shareholders and as the only owners of the resources. Unlike the American 

companies, most European companies accepted the new conditions seeing that profits 

would still be plentiful. At the same time, these countries have increased their growth indicators – 

until the crisis – which has allowed for unprecedented increases in their public budgets. Larger 

shares of resources, so badly needed to fend off the ravages of the crises, are therefore 

now being kept in the region. In the case of Venezuelan oil this has allowed it to firmly 

position itself on the international scene, including a leadership role within OPEC. Ecuador, for its 

part, has legislated dominion over extraordinary crude oil revenue (unexpected except in times of 

bonanza), increasing control from 50 percent to 99 percent of that extra revenue. Nationalizing 

Latin American natural resources to benefit legitimate owners and to help support other 

countries in need has enormous emancipatory effects. One of the greatest of these 

emancipatory effects is that of providing resources to fund badly needed social 

transformations. In addition to making sense financially, this is also a fundamental matter of 

national and regional sovereignty and dignity. Conclusion Multiple crises have resulted from 

conscious political decisions made by global leaders holding economic and military power. These 

crises have been imposed on the rest of humankind. The countries better positioned to withstand 

these crises are those with regulated economies and fewer links to the US economy. Should the 

USA lose its hegemony as a consequence of the crises, others would soon emerge to take its 

place. There are countries ready to undertake a sub-imperial role in Latin America (Brazil) and in 

Asia (China) that have the capabilities to inflict considerable damage on weaker economies 

should they so wish. There is growing awareness that poverty and exclusion levels in Latin 

America prove that the prolonged hegemonic alliance with the USA has not been favorable; 

and that recovering sovereignty and the role of the state has become vital. And for that purpose, 

a development model that is totally different from neoliberal capitalism is needed. Latin 

America has been in the forefront of resistance to neoliberalism but the crises now pose 

new challenges such as the need to confront capitalism and imperialism. 

11 | P a g e


Link – Economic Engagement 



Economic engagement serves as a smokescreen to put Latin America under multinational 

corporate control. 

Palley, Schwartz Economic Growth Fellow, 2009 

(Dr. Thomas, “America's exhausted paradigm: Macroeconomic causes of the financial crisis and great 

recession,” Online: www.newamerica.net/files/Thomas_Palley_America's_Exhausted_Paradigm.pdf, 

p. 26-27) 

The flawed model of global economic engagement broke with the old model of 

international trade in two ways. First, instead of having roughly balanced trade, the United 

States has run persistent large trade deficits. Second, instead of aiming to create a global 

marketplace in which U.S. companies could sell their products, its purpose was to create a 

global production zone in which U.S. companies could either produce or obtain inputs 

from. In other words, the main purpose of international economic engagement was not to 

increase U.S. exports, but rather to substitute cheaper imported inputs for US domestic 

production and to facilitate American owned production platforms in developing countries 

that could export to the United States. As a result, at the bidding of corporate interests, the 

United States joined itself at the hip to the global economy, opening its borders to an 

inflow of goods and exposing its manufacturing base. This was done without safeguards to 

address the problems of exchange rate misalignment and systemic trade deficits, or the 

mercantilist policies of trading partners. NAFTA The creation of the new system took off in 1989 

with the implementation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement that established an integrated 

production zone between the two countries. 18 The 1994 implementation of NAFTA was the 

decisive next step. First, it fused Canada, the United States, and Mexico into a unified North 

American production zone. Second, and more importantly, it joined developed and developing 

economies, thereby establishing the template U.S. corporations wanted. 

12 | P a g e


Link – Free Trade 



Free trade forcibly integrates populations into the global system of exchange without regard 

for the social and political implications – the impact is the perpetuation of massive wealth 

inequalities between the North and South. 

De Angelis, lecturer in Political Economy at University of East London, 2000 

(Massimo, “Trade, the global factory and the struggles for new commons,” Paper presented at the 

CSE conference "Global Capital and Global Struggles: Strategies, Alliances, and Alternatives,” July, 

Online: http://libcom.org/files/NewComm.pdf) 

Let us be clear from the outset. There is no such as thing as "faire" trade liberalization. To the 

billion of people in the global economy, trade liberalization is part of the project to impose 

upon them the discipline of the global factory. This discipline is the competing game itself. 

Whether is Pakistan’s textiles that replaces Italian’ textile workers or a British telecommunication firm 

that make Thailand's telecom workers redundant, it is the game itself that sucks. Whatever gains 

some group of workers obtain due to their competitive advantage, some other group of 

workers loses out, until they themselves are forced to take notice of a new competitive force 

which came to displace them. And if we patently follow the economists’ advice to wait for the 

long-term positive effect of trade, we are left to wonder: isn’t it now the long term of 200 

hundreds yeas ago, of 100 years ago, of 50, 40 years ago, of twenty years ago The people 

who died as result of the new enclosures accompanying trade liberalisation in all these years, the 

people who suffered war as result of the disintegration of the social fabric brought about by 

structural adjustment and associated export promotion, the people of any country of the North has 

to run in the competing rat race no less, but even more than in the past, just to acquire what is on 

average necessary to live with dignity, the average people struggling to overcome an imposed 

condition of scarcity when in fact we live in plenty, can we say these people have benefited of 

the long term advantage of trade Nonsense, nobody can make these sorts of judgements. 

Without a proper assessment of human, social and environmental costs of modern trade, one 

cannot even to start talking about long term or short term advantages of trade. Without taking 

into consideration the voice of those without voice the rhetoric of trade benefits is a bias 

rhetoric. If there is no way anybody can argue whether trade has brought advantages or 

disadvantages, the only thing we can say with certainty is that because of current patterns of trade 

the context in which our lives and struggles of today are located is different than the context of our 

lives and struggles of yesterday and, if trade liberalisation continues, of tomorrow. However, the 

recomposing factors of various movement in Seattle last November, can be summarised by the 

slogan “no new round, WTO turnaround.” With this slogan the movement sets against the 

boundlessness of capital’s accumulation, but there is more. “No new round”, all movements agree. 

"WTO turnaround”, here is the problem, because people start to ask and debate “where to” The 

problem for us is to identify, in the context of the large movement emerged in Seattle and that has set 

a temporary limit to trade liberalisation, whether it is possible to start to promote a debate towards an 

independent position of planetary civil society, one that does not bow to the easy traps of the free 

trade ideology. To do so, we must open a debate on the contradictory nature of trade in this 

phase of capitalist accumulation, its meaning and implications for a diverse organisation of 

human and natural resources of the planet. 

13 | P a g e


Link – Foreign Investment 



Foreign investment in Latin America leads to massive neoliberal exploitation of workers. 





Although Petras does not use the notion of the indirect exportation of labor he has been aware of 

the implications of this aspect of the process of industrial restructuring. When discussing the 

implications of foreign direct investment (FI), he notes that ‘since the 1990s, FI has increasingly 

looked toward outsourcing skilled jobs to low-wage/salary regions’. This, he notes, 

‘requires state promotion of an educated low-paid work force and financing of local 

business elites to act as recruiters and point men for the FI’. Overseas relocation (both the 

reality and the threat of it) is a common policy for lowering wages, pensions, health benefits and 

job security in the imperial countries. Foreign investors, he notes, benefit from both ends: 

‘exploiting skilled and unskilled labor in assembly plants and manufacturing industries in 

Latin America while reducing labor costs within the US’. Thus, the MNCs play one against 

the other and secure labor-related incentives in both. ‘ The net effect is to increase 

profitability by squeezing out greater productivity per worker at lower costs, expanding market 

shares and creating lucrative export platforms to sell back into the home market’ (Petras, 2007: 

216). 

14 | P a g e


Link – Foreign Aid 



US aid programs are continually hijacked by a neoliberal agenda – the plan will only help 

elites and corporations. 

Dixon, Department of Development Sociology, 2011 

(Marion, BRIEFING An Arab spring Cornell University, New York, USA Review of African Political 

Economy Vol. 38, No. 128, June 2011, 309–316, Online: 

http://cornell.academia.edu/MarionDixon/Papers/824718/An_Arab_Spring) 

The role of US aid in promoting a professional class of international development ‘experts’ and a 

vast military complex overseas, and in sidelining human rights and advocacy groups (in the 

case of Egypt), illustrates that the United States’ relationship with democracy promotion in the 

region is weak and contradictory, at best. What such critiques fail to show is how the system of 

Western-led expertise, with contractors and ‘meet and greets’/workshops, reinforces the 

bifurcated ‘West knows best’ and the ‘underdeveloped Rest’. And of course there is nothing 

democratic about that modelled relationship. Further, a close examination of US aid 

programming in the region reveals the pervasive character of the neoliberal agenda. Among 

USAID’s programmes – from economic growth to health to education to governance – there is a 

thinly veiled thread of growth-based ‘development’ and Western corporate-sector 

profiteering. The health programmes deploy expert-led capacity-building workshops, rather than 

essential life-saving supplies. The education programmes focus on primary education and 

vocational training to create a pool of semi-skilled workers in the region for the ‘global market’. 

Economic growth equates with an export-oriented economy, with countries like Egypt exporting 

water- intensive and non-essential commodities (like strawberries and green beans), while 

importing staples (like wheat). These are the so-called prescriptions for countries in the region to 

become competitive globally. There is nothing democratic about these mechanisms 

prescribed for and adopted in the Global South supposedly to become a global player. 

Populations in authoritarian and democratic countries alike have not voted and do not vote for 

neoliberal ‘reforms’, which have been imposed (albeit welcomed and wil- fully implemented by the 

elite, benefiting classes) on governments by international banks as the only way to restructure 

debts and build creditworthiness. One may argue that the claim of US-led war and occupation 

unleashing the Arab Spring is the flipside of the argument that promotion of the undemocratic 

economic order is essential to the region’s democratic transition. One side involves 

visible coercion, the other subtle – or perhaps more fitting in Gramsci’s terms – the twin 

mutually reinforcing hegemony of coercion and of consent. 

15 | P a g e


Link – Government Assistance 



Trying to promote “equality” by assistance governance reinforces the state as the arbiter of 

all social relations and promotes a mechanical method of improving democratic processes 

that authorizes violent action to naturalize political forces it cannot integrate. 

Zanotti, Fellow European University Institute, 2005 

(Laura, “Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime: The UN Debate on 

Democratization and Good Governance,” Alternatives, 30, JSTOR) 

States became the subject of international scrutiny and reformation efforts aimed at making 

them to function as "governments" instead of as uncontrolled "sovereigns" (in the Foucaultian 

understanding) and at making them the visible and predictable actors of a normalized 

international arena. Governmentality emerges as a multifaceted and universally valid technique of 

rule, a knowledge/power formation that opens multiple spaces of visibility at the national and 

international level. In times of proliferating threats, where total control of variables becomes 

impossible, international security is sought through techniques aimed at reducing risk and increasing 

predictability through the normalization of potentially dangerous actors. Governance doctrines 

promote the construction of modern states and endeavor to protect citizens from states' incapacity by 

extending international regulatory and monitoring functions. In this sense, governmentalization may 

contribute to fostering the health, wealth, and security of populations. Furthermore, governance 

translates the abstract and controversial notion of democracy into a plurality of technical problems 

and issue-specific programs of institutional reform. This is an operational virtue that makes this 

framework appealing for international organizations, concerned about the political neutrality and 

soundness of their programs. Governance is presented as an apolitical, technically sound, and 

universally valid endeavor, and democracy can be delinked from the political debate and 

associated with good management procedures. Good governance is a capacious concept that 

creates consensus around matters that would otherwise remain politically controversial.'^'* It provided 

the United Nations with a framework and a neutral technical language for addressing a wide range of 

issues and operationalizing diverse interventions. However, notwithstanding its apparent anodyne 

technical neutrality, governance discourse extensively uses value-loaded metaphors and dichotomies 

and reinforces oppositional identities. It aims at creating visibility out of obscurity, transparency 

out of opacity, accountability out of corruption, efficiency out of redundancy, effectiveness 

out of aimlessness, rights out of abuses, rule of law out of unpredictability. The international 

arena is thus divided between the orderly space of the civilized and the unpredictable and obscure 

borderlands of the uncivilized. Indeed, some of the current themes of democratization and good 

governance show many similarities with elaborations of the "civilizing mission" that, according 

to Michael Adas, was embedded in the European colonial enterprise.'^s This enterprise was 

expected to bring peace and order, overthrow despotism and corruption, bring about fair 

taxation, improve populations' income, and foster productivity. 

16 | P a g e


Link – Humanitarianism 



The affirmative’s call to provide its small acts of aid for Latin America papers over the causes 

of poverty and American colonialism. 

Lawston and Murillo, Assistant Professor of Women’s Studies at California State University 

San Marcos; Prof @ University of San Diego, 2009 

(Jodie Michelle Lawston and Ruben R. Murillo, The discursive figuration of U.S. supremacy in 

narratives sympathetic to undocumented immigrants, Social Justice, 36.2 (Summer 2009): p38(16)) 

Such stories engender sympathetic feelings for immigrants, especially for children, in the reader. 

Faced with the shocking violence these children endure, the reader wants to "rescue them" 

or allow them to remain in the country. The focus on the travails and tribulations of undocumented 

children compels the reader to believe that conditions in the country of origin must be so bad that 

immigrants are willing to risk their lives and endure tortuous journeys to establish a "better life." In 

this way, the narrative naturalizes the United States as inherently superior to the 

immigrants' home countries without historicizing the direct involvement of the United 

States in creating oppressive social and economic conditions in Central America. Mexico 

serves as a melodramatic villain in Enrique's Journey, just as it does in 30 Days and Under the 

Same Moon. Readers learn how hostile and discriminatory some Mexicans are toward 

immigrants from Central America. This tends to placate the guilt and anxiety that many 

liberals feel over U.S. immigration policy and enforcement. The imperative to engage in 

charitable acts for the "less fortunate" is also an important part of the story. One of the 

book's most compelling chapters describes how residents in a small town in Vera Cruz throw 

bundles of food, clothing, and supplies to migrants riding the freight trains. Nazario's description 

of those generous people contrasts sharply with the hostile discrimination seen in Chiapas. She 

writes: Enrique expects the worst. Riding trains through the state of Chiapas has taught him that 

any upraised hand might hurl a stone. But here in the states of Oaxaca and Vera Cruz, he 

discovers that people are friendly. They wave hello and shout to signal if hostile police are lying in 

wait for them in an upcoming town (2006: 103). The altruism in Oaxaca and Vera Cruz breathes 

hope into a formerly bleak situation. Residents here tell Nazario (2006: 105), "If I have one tortilla, 

I give half away," "I know God will bring me more," "I don't like to feel that I have eaten and they 

haven't," and "It feels good to give something that they need so badly." These passages resonate 

poignantly with the sense of charity in the U.S. national imagination and they perhaps account for 

why Nazario's narrative won the Pulitzer Prize and became a bestseller. Charitable acts by these 

poor Mexicans move the typical American reader to offer a "helping hand" to undocumented 

immigrants and to "rescue" some of these children. But acts of charity do not make up for a 

legacy of conquest, neocolonialism, and U.S. interventionism; instead, like a shell game 

they distract groups and individuals from the causes of poverty. 

17 | P a g e


Impact – Laundry List 



Neoliberal development practices make social inequality and extinction inevitable. 

Wise et al., Director of Doctoral Program in Migration Studies & Prof of Development Studies; 


(Raúl Delgado Wise, Humberto Márquez Covarrubias, Rubén Puentes, Reframing the debate on 

migration, development and human rights: fundamental elements, October, 2010, 

www.migracionydesarrollo.org) 

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, a general crisis centered in the United States 

affected the global capitalist system on several levels (Márquez, 2009 and 2010). The 

consequences have been varied: Financial. The overflowing of financial capital leads to 

speculative bubbles that affect the socioeconomic framework and result in global economic 

depressions. Speculative bubbles involve the bidding up of market prices of such 

commodities as real estate or electronic innovations far beyond their real value, leading 

inevitable to a subsequent slump (Foster and Magdof, 2009; Bello, 2006). Overproduction. 

Overproduction crises emerge when the surplus capital in the global economy is not channeled into 

production processes due to a fall in profit margins and a slump in effective demand, the latter mainly 

a consequence of wage containment across all sectors of the population (Bello, 2006). 

Environmental. Environmental degradation, climate change and a predatory approach to 

natural resources contribute to the destruction of the latter, along with a fundamental 

undermining of the material bases for production and human reproduction (Fola- dori and Pierri, 

2005; Hinkelammert and Mora, 2008). Social. Growing social inequalities, the dismantling of the 

welfare state and dwindling means of subsistence accentuate problems such as poverty, 

unemployment, violence, insecurity and labor precariousness, increasing the pressure to emigrate 

(Harvey, 2007; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006). The crisis raises questions about the 

prevailing model of globalization and, in a deeper sense, the systemic global order, which 

currently undermines our main sources of wealth—labor and nature—and overexploits them to 

the extent that civilization itself is at risk. The responses to the crisis by the governments of 

developed countries and international agencies promoting globalization have been short-sighted and 

exclusivist. Instead of addressing the root causes of the crisis, they have implemented limited 

strategies that seek to rescue financial and manufacturing corporations facing bankruptcy. In 

addition, government policies of labor flexibilization and fiscal adjustment have affected the living and 

working conditions of most of the population. These measures are desperate attempts to prolong 

the privileges of ruling elites at the risk of imminent and increasingly severe crises. In these 

conditions, migrants have been made into scapegoats, leading to repressive anti- immigrant 

legislation and policies (Massey and Sánchez, 2006). A significant number of jobs have been lost 

while the conditions of remaining jobs deteriorate and deportations increase. Migrants’ living 

standards have drastically deteriorated but, contrary to expectations, there have been neither 

massive return flows nor a collapse in remittances, though there is evidence that migrant worker flows 

have indeed diminished. 

18 | P a g e


Impact – Interventionism/War 



The affirmative’s ideological commitment to economic integration becomes a drum beat that 

demands co-operation – when the inevitable backlash to neoliberal reforms boils over again, 

military intervention will become a necessity. 

Roberts, Secor and Sparke, professors of Geography at the University of Kentucky, 2003 

(Susan, Anna and Matthew, “Neoliberal Geopolitics,” Online) 

Other, still more narrowly national circuits of American capitalism benefited from the war—including, 

for example, Kellogg Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Vice President Dick Cheney’s Halliburton that, 

having helped the Pentagon orchestrate the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, is now receiving 

generous contracts to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure using proceeds from Iraq’s “liberated” oil sales. But 

these classically imperial aspects of the hostilities are not our main focus here. Instead, our central 

concern is with how a neoliberal world vision has served to obscure these more traditional 

geopolitics beneath Panglossian talk of global integration and (what are thereby constructed as) 

its delinquent others. In the neoliberal approach, the geopolitics of interimperial rivalry, the 

Monroe doctrine, and the ideas about hemispheric control that defined Butler’s era are eclipsed 

by a new global vision of almost infinite openness and interdependency. In contrast also to the 

Cold War era, danger is no longer imagined as something that should be contained at a 

disconnected distance. Now, by way of a complete counterpoint, danger is itself being defined as 

disconnection from the global system. In turn, the neoliberal geopolitical response, it seems, is 

to insist on enforcing reconnection—or, as Friedman (2003:ANSWERS TO7) put it in an upbeat 

postwar column, “aggressive engagement.” It would be wrong, of course, to suggest that even this 

vision is brand new. Much like the broken neoliberal record of “globalization is inexorable,” the 

vision can be interpreted as yet another cover for the century-old package of liberal 

development nostrums that critics (eg Smith 2003) and apologists (eg Bacevich 2002) alike argue 

lie at the defining heart of “American Empire.” But what distinguishes this moment of 

neoliberal geopolitics is that the notion of enforced reconnection is today mediated through a 

whole repertoire of neoliberal ideas and practices, ranging from commitments to marketbased 

solutions and public-private partnerships to concerns with networking and flexibility to 

mental maps of the planet predicated on a one-world vision of interdependency. Thomas 

Barnett merely represents one particularly audacious and influential embodiment of this trend. 

19 | P a g e


Impact – Environment/Economy 



This neoliberal spread makes environmental and economic collapse inevitable. 






The internationalization of capital. The expansion strategy of the global economy involves a 

profound economic restructuring based on the establishment of subcontracting chains 

dominated by large multinational corporations, which have a global reach. This form of 

expansion seeks to economically reinsert peripheral countries that are rich in natural resources and 

ensure an abundant and cheap workforce. The new export platforms, in fact, operate as enclaves, 

that is production, commercial and services zones dominated by multinational corporations and often 

exempted from national taxation and regulation of working and environmental conditions. These types 

of plants currently employ between 55 million (Robinson, 2008) and 66 million Southern workers 

(Singa Boyenge, 2006) and the strategy is widely implemented by large manufacturing, financial, 

agricultural, commercial, and service-sector multinationals (Robinson, 2008). Financialization. 

Financial capital generates speculative strategies that foster the chan- neling of investment 

funds, sovereign funds, pension funds and social savings toward new financial instruments 

that offer short-term high profit margins but can entail re- current crises and massive fraud. 

These speculative strategies obstruct and affect the functioning of the so-called real economy 

(Foster and Magdof, 2009; Bello, 2006). Environmental degradation. Biodiversity, natural 

resources, and communal and national wealth are privatized for the benefit of large 

corporations that favor profits while ignoring social and environmental costs. This leads to 

increased environmental degradation, pollution, famine, and disease, as well as climate 

changes (global warming and increasingly frequent extreme climatic events) that threaten the 

symbiotic relationship between humans and the environment (Foladori and Pierri, 2005). The 

restructuring of innovation systems. Advances in IT, telecommunications, biotech- nology, new 

materials and nanotechnology cater to the needs of large corporations looking for increased profits. 

Scientific and technological research have been restructured under mechanisms such as outsourcing 

and offshore-outsourcing, which allow corporations to employ southern scientists, transfer risk and 

responsibility, and capitalize on resultant benefits by amassing patents. This has lead to 

unprecedented mer- cantilism in scientific research, short-term perspectives and a lack of 

social concern (Freeman, 2005b, Lester and Piore, 2004). 

20 | P a g e


Impact – Terrorism/Instability 



This model of development closes off avenues of self-determination, forcing suppressed 

antagonisms to use radical tactics to negate the universalization of American norms – this is 

the root cause of terrorism and threats to global stability 

Baudrillard, 2004 

(Jean, “This is the Fourth World War,” An Interview with Der Spiegel, IJBS 1:1, Online: 

http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/spiegel.htm) 

In general all the positive historical utopias are extremely murderous, as fascism and 

communism have shown. Spiegel: Surely you cannot compare globalization with the bloodiest 

systems of the 20th century. Baudrillard: It is based, as colonialism was earlier, on immense 

violence. It creates more victims than beneficiaries, even when the majority of the Western 

world profits from it. Naturally the United States, in principle, could liberate every country just as it 

has liberated Afghanistan. But what kind of peculiar liberation would that be Those so fortunate 

would know how to defend themselves even with terror if necessary. Spiegel: Do you hold 

globalization to be a form of colonialism, disguised as the widening of Western civilization 

Baudrillard: It is pitched as the endpoint of the Enlightenment, the solution to all contradictions. In 

reality, it transforms everything into a negotiable, quantifiable exchange value. This process is 

extremely violent, for it cashes out in the idea of unity as the ideal state, in which everything 

that is unique, every singularity, including other cultures and finally every non-monetary value 

would be incorporated. See, on this point, I am the humanist and moralist. Spiegel: But don’t 

universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights also establish themselves through 

globalization Baudrillard: One must differentiate radically between the global and the universal. The 

universal values, as the Enlightenment defined them, constitute a transcendental ideal. They confront 

the subject with its own freedom, which is a permanent task and responsibility, not simply a right. This 

is completely absent in the global, which is an operational system of total trade and exchange. 

Spiegel: Rather than liberating humanity, globalization only in turns reifies it Baudrillard: It pretends 

to liberate people, only to deregulate them. The elimination of all rules, more precisely, the reduction 

of all rules to laws of the market is the opposite of freedom-namely, its illusion. Such out-dated and 

aristocratic values such as dignity, honesty, challenge and sacrifice no longer count for anything. 

Spiegel: Doesn’t the unrestricted recognition of human rights build a decisive bulwark against this 

alienating process Baudrillard: I think that human rights have already been integrated into the 

process of globalization and therefore function as an alibi. They belong to a juridical and moral 

superstructure; in short, they are advertising. Spiegel: Therefore mystification Baudrillard: Is it not a 

paradox that the West uses as a weapon against dissenters the following motto: Either you share our 

values or… A democracy asserted with threats and blackmail only sabotages itself. It no 

longer represents the autonomous decision for freedom, but rather becomes a global 

imperative. This is, in effect, a perversion of Kant’s categorical imperative, which implies freely 

chosen consent to its command. Spiegel: So the end of history, the absolute sway of democracy, 

would be a new form of world dictatorship Baudrillard: Yes, and it is completely inconceivable 

that there would be no violent counter-reaction against it. Terrorism emerges when no other 

form of resistance seems possible. The system takes as objectively terrorist whatever is set 

against it. The values of the West are ambivalent, at a definite point in time they could have a 

positive effect and accelerate progress, at another, however, they drive themselves to such 

extremes that they falsify themselves and ultimately turn against their own purpose. 

21 | P a g e


Impact – No Value to Life 



The imposed value system of development paradigms reduces all life to commodity for 

exchange – the facilitates mass violence and exclusion. 

Shiva, 2003 

(Vandana, physicist, ecologist, activist, editor, and author of many books, ZNet Daily Commentaries, 

Globalisation and Its Fallout, April 2, Online: http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2003- 

04/02shiva.cfm) 

The first is the market fundamentalism of globalization itself. This fundamentalism redefines life 

as commodity, society as economy, and the market as the means and end of the human 

enterprise. The market is being made the organizing principle for the provisioning of food, 

water, health, education and other basic needs, it is being made the organizing principle for 

governance, it is being made the measure of our humanity. Our being human is no longer 

predicated on the fundamental human rights enshrined in all constitutions and in the U.N. declaration 

of human rights. It is now conditional on our ability to "buy" our needs on the global 

marketplace in which the conditions of life -- food, water, health, knowledge have become the 

ultimate commodities controlled by a handful of corporations. In the market fundamentalism of 

globalization, everything is a commodity, everything is for sale. Nothing is sacred, there are no 

fundamental rights of citizens and no fundamental duties of governments. The market 

fundamentalism of globalization and the economic exclusion inherent to it is giving rise to, 

and being reinforced and supported by politics of exclusion emerging in the form of political 

parties based on "religious fundamentalism"/xenophobia/ethnic cleansing and reinforcement 

of patriarchies and castism. The culture of commodification has increased violence against 

women, whether it is in the form of rising domestic violence, increasing cases of rape, an 

epidemic of female foeticide, and increased trafficking in women. 

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Impact - Authoritarianism 



Neoliberalism will destroy human rights and democracy in Latin America and cannot be 

morally allowed. 


(Lara, Neoliberalism in Latin America, Oct 29, http://citizenspress.org/editorials/neoliberalism-in-latinamerica) 

Liberal democracy is being hijacked by neoliberalism in Latin America. This new neoliberal 

order is a form of authoritarianism to which it is increasingly difficult to mount opposition. The 

interference of international lending institutions in a sovereign nation’s budgetary policy-making 

nullifies an essential process inherent in healthy liberal democracies. Innocent workers, 

peasants, women, men, and children all pay for the actions of international lending institutions 

who often loaned money to undemocratic regimes. The re-configuration of Latin American 

society in order to repay already rich nations is a global injustice. Human rights to 

sustenance, culture, political process, labour standards, and self-determination must 

come before the property rights of greedy corporations. 

23 | P a g e


Alternative Solvency Extension 



Latin America is developing alternatives to neoliberalism now – failure of that struggles risks 

extinction. 

Barra, International Development Consultant and Public Policy Analyst; Former Public Policy 

Advisor at UNICEF, 2010 

(Ximena de la, Sacrificing Neoliberalism to Save Capitalism: Latin America Resists and Offers 

Answers to Crises, 2010 36: 635, Crit Sociol) 

In this sense, crises are an opportunity to increase popular awareness that a better world is possible 

and that it is worth fighting for. A genuine hemispheric alliance will allow the development of a 

post-neoliberal and post-capitalist future in which an expanded universal citizenship will flourish. 

The opposite is also valid. A genuine hemispheric alliance and the survival of the human 

species depend upon the development of that post-capitalist future. Walden Bello warns that 

the world seems to be debating whether to refloat capitalism by way of a globalized social democracy 

or to opt for fundamentalist, nationalist, protectionist populism. The fact that discredited neoliberalism 

gets rapidly abandoned in order to embrace formerly vilified Keynesianism (though now in a 

globalized, deformed and meaner version) means that the real crisis feared by the powerful is the 

crisis of capitalism, not of neoliberalism, and that they will find new ways to rescue the system (Bello 

2009). The struggle for emancipation therefore demands actions against capitalism in any of its forms 

as well as against imperialism. The struggle requires a socialist perspective going way beyond 

the mere regulation of the current system. As Wallerstein reminds us, what is important is that we 

be prepared for when we start emerging from the crises. The key issue, he says, is to understand that 

reconstruction can lead us into a better world, but it can also take us into a worse one (Wallerstein 

2009). Only a socialist perspective will enable the organization of an economy at the service of 

common needs. It should be a democratic and participative socialism developed from the base, totally 

different from the failed experiences of bureaucratic state-socialism during the 20th century. It should 

be a type of socialism that will place collective selfmanagement at the center of efforts to build an 

egalitarian society for people in their emancipation process. Marx warned that capitalism will not fall 

by itself. Socialism will also not fall from the sky (Lebowitz 2006). Social struggle and the search 

for viable alternatives are what are vitally needed, precisely what Latin America is offering 

now. Current weaknesses at global centers of power, and structural contradictions embedded 

in capitalism especially regarding the environment and peoples’ development, are 

increasingly fostering alliances among social movements, peoples and nations to fight for an 

alternative post-capitalist, multicultural system in harmony with nature. In Latin America the 

struggle for a better future has already started and the alternative is gathering steam. We call it 

‘socialism for the 21st century’ and we are inventing it and will perfect it as we progress in order to 

‘live well’. We also offer our experience to global movements seeking ‘another world’ so that we can 

converge together and fight our political battles better equipped. We find ourselves, as Marta 

Harnecker expresses it, in the process of changing the correlation of forces in order to make possible 

in the future what now seems impossible (Harnecker 1999). 

24 | P a g e


[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Perm 



[ ] Perm’s inclusion guarantee’s that inequalities are whitewashed and Western interests 

always win out. 

Martell, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, 2009 

(Luke, Global Inequality, Human Rights and Power: A Critique of Ulrich Beck’s Cosmopolitanism, 

Critical Sociology 35(2) 253–272, SAGE) 

Where Beck does try to put into action his cosmopolitan postcolonialism it runs into trouble (e.g. 

Beck and Sznaider, 2006). He advocates a ‘both/and’ perspective taking over from an ‘either/or’ 

perspective. This is good for bringing in previously excluded inputs to views that have stressed 

Westernization without understanding a mixture of influences including from non-Western 

sources (e.g. Abu-Lughod, 1989). However a ‘both/and’ view runs the risk of replacing 

Westernization perspectives with one in which power and inequality is glossed over by an 

attempt to resurrect understandings of the inputs of non- Western societies. When 

different global societies meet there are often some that have greater economic, political 

and ideological power. To highlight this fact is not to endorse it. And it is not to say there are 

not real sources of opposition and alternatives to Westernization both academically and 

politically (in the latter case from Iran to Venezuela for example). But positing a ‘both/and’ mix 

appears to give an equality to a mix of perspectives when there are great inequalities and 

power differences in that mix. In trying to give more of a role to inputs from beyond the West it 

runs the risk of playing down the Western power that such inputs are subjected to. Beck’s own 

use of a ‘both/and’ hybridizing postcolonialism (2000b: 89) underesti- mates these power 

relations and inequalities. In a discussion of deregulation and flexibilization which promote an 

informal economy, diluted trade union representation and weak states Beck suggests these are 

non-Western standards being adopted by Western societies. But the direction of power is the 

other way around. These are structures and effects of neoliberalism being exported by Westerndominated 

governments and institutions to other Western and non-Western societies with the 

deleterious effects that Beck rightly suggests. Western power is underestimated here when 

neoliberalism is seen as an effect of the importation of poor regulation from the non-West 

to West rather than an expression of the corporate and state power of Western interests. 

So the novelty and uniqueness of Beck’s cosmopolitanism for establishing a postcolonial 

perspective is justified by an understatement of the extent to which postcolonialism is already in 

existence and an overstatement of the role of cosmopolitanism in having a new role in 

establishing this itself. At the same time, his more hybrid postcolonial view, rather than restoring a 

greater emphasis on poorer countries’ contribution to globalization, may underestimate the 

power they are subjected to. Beck’s postcolonialism fits into a more general pattern in his 

work, of underestimating previous cosmopolitanism in social science, overestimating the novelty 

of his cosmopolitan vision, and leading down a road which rather than overcoming power 

and inequality seems as much to play down how significant it is. 

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[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Perm 



[ ] The perm brings the South perspective in as a partner in implementing their policy, not 

a genuine partner in development which guts the alt. 

Castles and Wise, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas; International Migration Institute @ 

Oxford, 2007 

(Raúl Delgado, Stephen, Principles and measures to obtain more coherent and collaborative policy 

making on migration and development, International Network of Migration and Development, 

http://meme.phpwebhosting.com/~migr-acion/rimd/e-lista_documentos_miembros.php) 

Attempts to achieve coherent approaches and coordination on migration and development 

will not succeed if the terms of debate are imposed in advance and without discussion 

by all concerned. So far the debate on migration and development has been one-sided: it has 

been overwhelmingly driven by northern governments and by international agencies. Southern 

states and civil society organizations have been brought in, but usually as partners for 

implementation, rather than as equals in setting principles and priorities. Northern 

governments, supranational bodies and international agencies have varying interests and 

perspectives on migration and development, and they hold frequent meetings on migration 

control and management. Southern states also have varying approaches, but have had little 

communication between themselves. They have had marginal roles in global fora, while migrant 

associations have usually had none at all. Without wanting to reproduce the debate on the 

migration and development nexus dealt with in Session 6, this paper will aim to suggest principles 

and measures to obtain more coherent and collaborative policy making by starting out from a 

comprehensive approach on the migration and development nexus, whereby the perspectives of 

the South are fully integrated. It is essential to achieve a comprehensive approach, based on 

participation of migrants and their associations, as well as governments, social partners and 

communities of sending, transit and receiving countries. A comprehensive approach means 

recognising differences in needs, values and interests, and finding ways of cooperating to 

achieve workable compromises. It is crucial to reorient the terms of the debate. A deeper and 

broader understanding of the migration-development nexus is required in which 

perspectives from the South are fully incorporated. This implies, among other things: • 

Understanding the ideological character of the discourse of globalization and the 

contradictions of global economic integration, especially the growing asymmetries among 

countries, increasing social inequalities, and precarious employment conditions of workers in 

labour markets now re-constituted at the transnational level. • Focusing on emergent actors 

and agents from civil society, which operates at different levels: local, national, and 

transnational. • Constructing new information systems which transcend the dominant focus 

on migrant-receiving country concerns (especially security and social cohesion); and which 

reflect the complexity and multidimensional character of the migration-development nexus. 

26 | P a g e


[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Economic Engagement is Good 



[ ] The alternative doesn’t preclude development or engagement – it just reclaims that 

process in the interests of Latin Americans. 






Rejecting super-exploitation of labor and the increasing human rights infringements that affect the 

majority of the global population, we must construct an essentially humane type of 

development that favors the common good and social sustainability over a minority’s lust 

for profit. This requires a fundamental emphasis on the upholding of human rights as a key 

element in the process of social transformation. Equitable development. Development and 

underdevelopment are not separate processes, but rather two sides of a single 

phenomenon that has gained considerable momentum under neoliberal globalization: unequal 

development. Given the increase in intranational, international and regional asymmetries and the 

expansion and deepening of social inequalities, processes of social transformation capable of 

counteracting these trends are much needed. One of the great challenges of our times is to 

achieve equality or, as stated by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 

Caribbean, it is “Time for Equality: closing gaps, opening trails” (ECLAC, 2010). This requires, 

among other things, creative ways of countering the unequal exchange and surplus 

transfer- ence mechanisms that characterize contemporary capitalism. Limits and effective 

regulations must be imposed on both the overt and covert monopolization of production, 

consumption and service provision. The gaps fostered by the structural heterogeneity that 

characterizes peripheral economies must be closed and the building of endogenous 

development foundations across national economies, encapsulating innovation, 

production and consumption, must be encouraged. Finally, we must reject current patterns of 

unequal wealth distribution and promote modes of social redistribution that revitalize the 

weakened—and, in some cases, vanquished—welfare state. Sustainable development. Far from 

degrading the environment, development must be based on a balanced symbiotic 

interaction between society and nature, one that guarantees the fulfillment of social needs and 

the progressive improvement in the quality of life of current and future generations. To achieve 

this, development must be sustainable across all spheres (economic, environmental, 

social, cultural and scientific). 

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[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Neoliberalism Is Inevitable 



[ ] Neoliberalism is not inevitable. 





A Critical Approach to Neoliberal Globalization Contrary to the discourse regarding its 

inevitability (on this see Petras and Veltmeyer, 2000), we posit that the current phase of 

imperialist domination is historical and can and should be transformed. In this regard, it is 

fundamental to notice that ‘[t]he principal factor generating international migration is not globalization 

but imperialism, which pillages nations and creates conditions for the exploitation of labor in the 

imperial center’ (Petras, 2007: 51–2). A Critical Reconstitution of the Field of Development Studies 

The favoring of a singular mode of analysis based on the belief that free markets work as powerful 

regulatory mechanisms, efficiently assigning resources and providing patterns of economic 

convergence among countries and their populations, has clearly resulted in failure. New theoretical 

and practical alternatives are needed, and we propose a reevalua- tion of development as a 

process of social transformation through a multi-dimensional, multi-spatial, and properly 

contextualized approach, ‘using the concept of imperialism as an alternative explanatory 

framework of international capitalist expansion and the growing inequalities’ (Petras and 

Veltmeyer, 2000). This integral approach requires the consideration of the strategic and structural 

aspects of the dynamic of uneven contemporary capitalism development, which should be examined 

at the global, regional, national, and local levels. For this purpose it is crucial to understand, inter alia, 

a) the central role played by foreign investment in the process of neoliberal restructuring of peripheral 

economies, and b) the new modalities of surplus transfer characterizing contemporary capitalism. 

The Construction of an Agent of Change The globalization project led by the USA has ceased to 

be consensual: it has only benefited capitalist elites and excluded and damaged an overwhelming 

number of people throughout the world. Economic, political, social, cultural and environmental 

changes are all needed but a transformation of this magnitude is not viable unless diverse 

movements, classes, and agents can establish common goals. The construction of an agent 

of change requires not only an alternative theory of development but also collective action 

and horizontal collaboration: the sharing of experiences, the conciliation of interests and visions, 

and the construction of alliances inside the framework of South-South and South-North 

relations. 

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[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Neoliberalism is Inevitable (Economic Logic) 



[ ] Reject the affirmative’s conceptualization of free trade – by placing limits on what can 

be commodified, intellectuals can found a new form of trade based on need and equity rather 

than competitiveness and exploitation. 

De Angelis, lecturer in Political Economy at University of East London, 2000 

(Massimo, “Trade, the global factory and the struggles for new commons,” Paper presented at the 

CSE conference "Global Capital and Global Struggles: Strategies, Alliances, and Alternatives,” July, 

Online: http://libcom.org/files/NewComm.pdf) 

But the conceptual horizons we gain in envisaging alternatives when we abandon the given 

accepted wisdom of the market are immense. Thinking in terms of new commons makes the 

slogan that everybody shared in Seattle ("No new round, WTO turnaround!") to acquire new 

meaning. In the first place, by setting a limit to what can be turned into a commodity, and 

indeed to push back the sphere of what can be a commodity, new commons set limits to the 

market and capitalist accumulation. But the latter is inherently boundless, it must relies on 

continuous expansion, and on the colonisation of a wider range of aspects of life. The only limits it 

recognises are what the agents and institutions of capital are made to recognise by our struggles. 

To be able to set a limit to capital is like to announce its death. 

29 | P a g e


ANSWERS TO: Neoliberalism Is Making The World Better 

Poverty is massively increasing – neoliberal growth is unsustainable. 



Li, Prof of political economy at the Department of Political Science of York University, 2004 

(Minqi,After Neoliberalism: Empire, Social Democracy, or Socialism, 

http://monthlyreview.org/2004/01/01/after-neoliberalism-empire-social-democracy-or-socialism) 

According to United Nations’ Human Development Report, the world’s richest 1 percent receive as 

much income as the poorest 57 percent. The income gap between the richest 20 percent and the 

poorest 20 percent in the world rose from 30:1 in 1960, to 60:1 in 1990, and to 74:1 in 1999, and is 

projected to reach 100:1 in 2015. In 1999–2000, 2.8 billion people lived on less than $2 a day, 

840 million were undernourished, 2.4 billion did not have access to any form of improved sanitation 

services, and one in every six children in the world of primary school age were not in school. About 

50 percent of the global nonagricultural labor force is estimated to be either unemployed or 

underemployed.1 In many countries, working people have suffered an absolute decline in living 

standards. In the United States, the real weekly earnings of production and nonsupervisory 

workers (in 1992 dollars) fell from $315 in 1973 to $264 in 1989. After a decade of economic 

expansion, it reached $271 in 1999, which remained lower than the average real wage in 1962. In 

Latin America, a continent that has suffered from neoliberal restructuring since the 1970s, about 200 

million people, or 46 percent of the population, live in poverty. Between 1980 and the early 1990s 

(1991–1994), real wages fell by 14 percent in Argentina, 21 percent in Uruguay, 53 percent in 

Venezuela, 68 percent in Ecuador, and 73 percent in Bolivia.2 The advocates of neoliberalism 

promised that the neoliberal “reforms” or “structural adjustments” would usher in an era of 

unprecedented economic growth, technological progress, rising living standards, and material 

prosperity. In fact, the world economy has slowed towards stagnation in the neoliberal era. The 

average annual growth rate of world GDP declined from 4.9 percent between 1950 and 1973, to 3.0 

percent between 1973 and 1992, and to 2.7 percent between 1990 and 2001. Between 1980 and 

1998, half of all the “developing countries” (including the so-called “transition economies”) 

suffered from falling real per capita GDP.3 The global economy has been kept afloat by the 

debt-financed U.S. economy. Between 1995 and 2002, the U.S. economy accounted for 96 percent 

of the cumulative growth in world GDP.4 The U.S. expansion has been financed by reducing 

domestic savings, raising the private sector debts to historically unprecedented levels, and running 

large and ever-rising current account deficits. The process is unsustainable. The enormous 

imbalances have to be corrected one way or the other. If the United States cannot continue to 

generate ever-rising current account deficits and none of the other large economies are capable of 

functioning effectively as the autonomous driving force, the neoliberal global economy will be 

under powerful downward pressures and exposed to the threat of increasingly frequent and 

violent financial crises. 

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[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Neoliberalism Solves Poverty 



[ ] Neoliberalism causes massive poverty and inequality in Latin America. 


(Lara, Neoliberalism in Latin America, Oct 29, http://citizenspress.org/editorials/neoliberalism-in-latinamerica) 

The consequences of neoliberalist policies are far reaching for any nation, but particularly 

hurtful for the majority of Latin American residents. Income inequality has increased in most 

nations that have implemented the reforms (Bray, 68). Job losses and subsequent higher 

unemployment rates resulted due to the sale of state run enterprises and the scaling back 

of the public service (Kurtz, 269). Because of the removal of subsidies on necessary items such 

as fuel, food, and social services their prices have increased (Crisp & Kelly, 542). When 

Fujimori, the former president of Peru came to power in 1990, he immediately undertook 

neoliberal reforms. Immediately following there was an increase in the price of gasoline by 

3000%, telephone and water prices increased by 1300%, and electricity prices increased by 

5300% (Hays-Mitchell, 72). 

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ANSWERS TO: Framework 



[ ] 

[ ] The alt has to come first – the Northern agenda for policy debate guarantees failure. 

Wise, Director of Doctoral Program in Migration Studies Professor of Development Studies 


(Raúl Delgado, GLOBAL FORUM ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT CIVIL SOCIETY DAY, 

Migration and Development Setting the Scene, http://meme.phpwebhosting.com/~migracion/rimd/elista_documentos_miembros.php) 

Moreover, South-South dialogue is as important as the North-North dialogue that has been 

taking place for years – it is a precondition for a genuine global dialogue. The debate on 

migration and development has been dominated by the vision of the North, which tends to 

reduce the key issues to security, control of migratory flows, integration into the receiving 

society, and remittances (understood as the main driver of development). The vision of the 

South has been largely absent in this debate. This has led to a distortion of the very idea of 

development. It has also led to fragmented views and interpretations, which hinder 

understanding of the real significance and challenges of contemporary human mobility as a force 

for change. Northern-dominated research and policy debates on migration provide an 

inadequate basis for understanding the real scope and potential of the major changes 

taking place, and for designing and implementing new policy approaches. 

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[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Framework 



[ ] Rejecting the Aff’s research model makes alternative to neoliberal development 

possible. 






The promotion of alternative development as social transformation can prevent forced migration. 

Ideologically speaking, neoliberal globalization posits itself as inevitable. It is therefore 

crucial that we theoretically and practically endorse the feasibility of alternative 

development strategies. Rejecting the assymetrical power relationships between sending 

and receiving countries is of paramount importance. This will allow us to identify and 

counter practices that have plunged vast regions of the world into quagmires of inequality, 

marginalization, poverty, social exclusion and forced migration. A project of genuine social 

transformation must focus on the root causes of forced migration and fight them by 

creating decent, secure, and well-paid employment opportunities. This will make migration 

an option rather than a necessity. 

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[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Cede the Political 



[ ] The political sphere is dominated by corporate imperialist interests – the only effective 

strategy is to break away from policy reformism and retake the public sphere through 

intellectual rejection of imperialism. 

Boggs, professor of social sciences at National University, 2009 

(Carl, “A Way Forward,” August 21, Online: http://www.zcommunications.org/a-way-forward-by-carlboggs) 

Having made this point, I still believe any serious movement for social transformation in this 

society ought to address most if not all of the following: 1. An anti-imperialist politics. This 

means coming to grips with the barbarism of U.S. foreign and military policy, the permanent 

war economy, and the national security state - all factors in destroying the world and subverting 

democracy here. For me this perspective ought to be central. 2. An ecological model of 

development - and politics. This means a comprehensive rethinking of corporate-based growth with 

its predatory view of nature, its sickening use of resources, its fetishism of growth, its fast-food 

economy including MacDonaldization of the workforce, its horrific reliance on animal-based 

agriculture (responsible for more than 35 percent of global warming and the most egregious use of 

natural resources, including water). A strong dose of animal-rights consciousness would not hurt 

either. 3. A mode of change organically tied to diverse social movements: feminist, ecological, antiwar, 

gay/lesbian, animal rights, etc. There should be an ecumenical openness to the large variety of 

grassroots struggles. 4. Embrace of a process of democratization that enters into all spheres of public 

life, beyond government, beyond the economy. 5. Social priorities involving a large-scale shift of 

resources from the military, intelligence, and prison/law enforcement complexes, toward the obvious 

range of public needs, goods, services, and programs. This used to be called a "conversion" process. 

6. An agenda revolving around the dismantling of corporate power, a violent, destructive, 

predatory, corrupt form of domination that currently seems to colonize just about every realm 

of government, the economy, and society. Further: other dimensions of change will depend 

upon how far we can go in an anti-corporate direction. The failure of even the most modest 

efforts to "reform" health care indicate, once again, just how difficult this task will be. 7. Fundamental 

change requires a center of gravity outside the party duopoly: both Republican and 

Democratic parties are so basically corrupt and worthless as tools of change that we should 

be finished with discussions about how best to push the Democrats "leftward", once and for 

all. These "debates", in my opinion, are a total waste of time. 8. From the above it might be 

concluded that my view of the best political "strategy" would be something along the lines of 

what emerged with the European Greens in the 1980s, only more radicalized. 

34 | P a g e


[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: There is No Alternative 



[ ] Latin America is at the center of the dismantling neo-liberal system- alternative is key. 

Escobar, Professor of Anthropology at UNC, 2010 

(Arturo, Alternative modernizations, post-liberalism, or post-development, Cultural Studies 

Vol. 24, Issue. 1) 

Latin America is the only region in the world where some counter-hegemonic processes of 

importance might be taking place at the level of the State at present. Some argue that these 

processes might lead to a re-invention of socialism; for others, what is at stake is the 

dismantling of the neo-liberal policies of the past three decades – the end the ‘the long neoliberal 

night,’ as the period is known in progressive circles in the region – or the formation of a 

South American (and anti-American) bloc. Others point at the potential for un nuevo comienzo (a 

new beginning) which might bring about a reinvention of democracy and development or, 

more radically still, the end of the predominance of liberal society of the past 200 years 

founded on private property and representative democracy. Socialismo del siglo XXI, plurinationality, 

interculturality, direct and substantive democracy, revolucion ciudadana, endogenous 

development centered on the buen vivir of the people, territorial and cultural autonomy, and 

decolonial projects towards post-liberal societies are some of the concepts that seek to name the 

ongoing transformations. The Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano perhaps put it best: ‘It is a time 

of luchas (struggles) and of options. Latin America was the original space of the 

emergence of modern/colonial capitalism; it marked its founding moment. Today it is, at last, 

the very center of world resistance against this pattern of power and of the production of 

alternatives to it’ (2008, p. 3). 

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[ ] 

ANSWERS TO: Cuban Government will Check Capitalism 



[ ] The Cuban government can only protect its people if it continues to be economically 

isolated. 

Reyes, staff writer, 2000 

(Hector, Cuba: The Crisis of State Capitalism, International Socialist Review Issue 11, Spring 2000, 

http://www.isreview.org/issues/11/cuba_crisis.shtml) 

But defending Cuba against American domination is not the same as identifying with 

Castro’s regime. Cuba’s crisis is not separate from the severe economic recession that currently 

affects nearly 40 percent of the world. In country after country, the political parties traditionally 

associated with reforms—social democrats and liberals—have proven unwilling and incapable of 

effecting significant reforms. On the contrary, they have presided over extensive attacks on their 

working classes. Cuba’s population is facing a situation similar, but much sharper, to that of 

workers in Britain, Germany and the U.S., who are suffering from drastic cuts in the welfare state. 

The strategy of the guerrillas-turned-bureaucrats has always been playing the international 

market—a dead end for the Cuban working class. For in order for the Cuban economy to 

compete favorably in that market, continuous increases in productivity are demanded 

from its workers—in the form of longer working hours, speedups and lower wages. Even in their 

own terms, the bureaucracy’s goals of national development and of overcoming the dependence 

on sugar have failed wretchedly. There is a different road. It involves not playing the market, 

but fighting to end the international capitalist system that relies on that market. Cuba’s 

working class needs to fight its struggle on two fronts simultaneously. One is to defend its living 

standards against the impositions of its ruling class organized in the CCP. The other is against 

U.S. imperialism. Cuba’s fate has showed that there cannot be an island of “socialism” in a 

capitalist world. Even at its best, the conception of international revolution espoused by some 

revolutionaries in Cuba—such as Che Guevara—amounted to no more than a collection of 

nationalist revolutions that could come together to resist the policies of the advanced 

countries.59 That was in the 1960s. Such rhetoric has been abandoned by the Cuban leadership 

for many years. The liberation of the Cuban working class will come by means of a different 

strategy—through its own self-activity, defending its own interests and joining the workers 

of the world in a common fight to end the international system of capitalism, which causes 

misery in Cuba and imperialist siege and wars and destruction everywhere. 

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ANSWERS TO: Venezuela is Already Capitalist 



Chavez’s death has put Venezuela at a crossroads – it can either fully break with capitalism, or 

fall back in line as the affirmative desires. 

Socialism Today, the official magazine of England and Wales’ Socialist party, April 2013 

(“Venezuela after the death of Hugo Chavez, Online: http://www.socialismtoday.org/167/chavez.html) 

Following the elections in 2012, divisions were beginning to open up within the Bolivarian 

movement as increasing layers of workers were coming into conflict with the regime. National 

security laws made strikes in the public sector almost illegal. The day before Chávez died, 

protests over housing conditions were met by police repression. His death has checked 

these developments, temporarily, as the masses have unified again to defeat the right-wing in 

presidential elections due on 14 April. The elections are likely to result in a victory for Nicolás 

Maduro, Chávez’s named successor. At this stage, the various groupings in the 

PSUV/Bolivarian movement have rallied together to ensure they win. Maduro, a former bus driver 

coming from the trade union bureaucracy, is clearly sensitive to the pressure and demands from 

the working class. Maduro and the Bolivarian leaders are fighting the election with an almost 

religious fervour, bestowing near sainthood on Chávez whose line they will continue. Maduro has 

even described himself as an "apsotle of Chávez", recognising the demands of the workers but 

appealing to them and all groups to be calm for "the sake of the fatherland". On the other side, 

the class prejudice of the capitalists is demonstrated in their hysterical outbursts of horror at the 

idea of a former bus driver becoming president. Yet Maduro is also trying to appease the ruling 

class. His declarations have been aimed at trying to moderate the working class, speaking about 

the "patriotic revolution continuing". Even before Chávez died, meetings had been arranged 

with representatives of US imperialism. The attempts at arriving at a consensus with 

capitalism are certain to come into conflict with the aspirations of the working class and 

masses after the elections. The worsening economic scenario globally and in Venezuela is 

certain to result in new conflicts and struggles. Moreover, Maduro does not have the same 

authority or loyalty in the eyes of the masses as Chávez did. It is not excluded that, under 

mass pressure, Maduro could also be compelled to adopt more radical policies which 

encroach on capitalist interests, but this is not certain. Divisions within the Bolivarian 

movement will re-emerge with even greater intensity reflecting different class interests. A 

new chapter in Venezuela will open following the election. Now more than ever it is urgent 

to build independent workers’ organizations to take the revolution forward with a 

democratic socialist programme to transform society. 

37 | P a g e

Development Kritik Answers

Development Kritik Aff Answers 

Development Kritik Answers – Table of Contents 



Glossary............................................................................................................................................... 2 

Affirmative Answers: 

Permutation: 

Perm Solvency – 2AC ......................................................................................................................... 3 

Perm Solvency – Economic Engagement Good .............................................................................. 4 

Answers to Links 

Neoliberalism Solves Poverty ............................................................................................................ 5 

Cede the Political Turn – 2AC ............................................................................................................ 6 

Cede the Political Turn – 1AR ............................................................................................................ 7 

Answers to Impact 

Cuban Government Will Check Capitalism ....................................................................................... 8 

Venezuela is Already Capitalist ......................................................................................................... 9 

Answer to Alternatives 

There Is No Alternative ..................................................................................................................... 10 

There Is No Alternative – Capitalism ............................................................................................... 11 

Neoliberalism Is Inevitable ............................................................................................................... 12 

Neoliberalism Is Inevitable – Economic Logic ............................................................................... 13 

1 | Page


Glossary 



Development – the deliberate efforts of leaders to promote the growth of economic activity and 

output in a particular area. 

Economic rationality/logic – a framework for understanding social and economic behavior, which is 

typically associated with the pursuit of profits. 

Export Processing Zones (EPZs) – an area, within which goods may be landed, handled, 

manufactured or reconfigured, and exported without the intervention of the customs authorities. 

Foreign Direct Investment (FI) – investing in United States businesses by foreign citizens (often 

involves stock ownership of the business). 

Globalization – the process of international integration of culture, products, knowledge, etc. 

Globalization involves the disintegration of boundaries between nations, and in the context of this 

kritik, refers mostly to the process of making capitalism a universal feature of all nations. 

Imperialist – the policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over foreign 

countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies. 

Multinational Corporations (MNCs) – A corporation that has its facilities and other assets in at least 

one country other than its home country. 

Neoliberalism – the name given to an economic ideology that promotes the reduction of the public 

sector and the expansion of private sector. This system seeks to reduce regulation and government 

manipulation of businesses and trade. 

Transnational capital – provides capital formation, financial structuring, and merger and acquisitions 

advisory services to emerging growth companies. 

Washington Consensus – a term used to describe a set of core policy prescriptions that US leaders 

would frequently implement when dealing with developing countries. 

Worker-Engineer-Public-Control (WEPC) model – an alternative model of economic development 

that envisions growth led by the people who work, as opposed to foreign investors and policymakers. 

2 | Page


Perm Solvency – 2AC 



[ ] Combining the criticism with traditional economics is effective --- the alt cedes 

economics and makes it destructive. 

Thompson, Jr, Vice Dean and Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, 

Stanford Law School, 2003 

(Barton H., SYMPOSIUM: SYNERGY OR CONFLICT: THE ROLES OR ETHICS, ECONOMICS, 

AND SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DECISIONS: PANEL: What Good Is Economics, 

U.C. Davis Law Review November, 2003 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 175) 

Far from being inherently inconsistent with environmental ethics, economics may actually be 

essential to accomplishing ethical ends. Economics can be used in at least four partially 

overlapping ways. First, it can be used as a normative tool to determine the appropriate type and 

level of environmental protection. This is the realm of cost-benefit analysis, where the 

economic benefits of various environmental proposals in the form of avoided health injuries, 

increased recreational opportunities, species value, and the like are balanced against the 

economic costs of lost jobs, new equipment, and reduced consumer choices. Much of the 

criticism of economic analysis in the environmental context has focused on this normative 

use of economics. To the environmental moralist, cost-benefit analysis errs at the outset by 

focusing on the Heaven-rejected "lore of nicely-calculated less or more" n2 rather than the ethical 

importance of a healthy and sustainable environment. Beyond the question of whether costbenefit 

analysis uses the correct criteria, critics also object to how the government makes 

cost-benefit comparisons. Critics, for example, have challenged the methods used to measure 

the benefits of environmental programs, the decision to measure benefits based on 

individuals' current preferences, the comparison of benefits and costs that environmental 

moralists find economically "incommensurable," and the decision to discount future benefits 

(such as lives saved many decades from now due to current environmental protection 

measures). n3 Economics, however, can be used for purposes other than normative 

evaluations of potential environmental measures. A second use to which economics is 

frequently put, for example, is as a diagnostic tool to determine why society is not achieving 

the desired type and level of environmental protection (regardless of how the desired types and 

levels of protection are determined). Garrett Hardin's famous discussion of the [*178] "tragedy of 

the commons" is a good example of this diagnostic use of economics: when a common 

resource is free, users enjoy all of the benefits of use but share the losses and thus tend to 

overutilize the resource. n4 Used as a diagnostic tool, economics can help point to the reasons 

for, and thus the most effective solutions to, a wide variety of environmental problems. Third, 

environmental advocates can use economics as a strategic political tool to help overcome 

opposition to environmental measures and increase the chances of successful adoption. 

3 | Page


Perm Solvency – Economic Engagement Good 



[ ] Economic engagement that develops local resources and capacities is a necessary 

pre-requisite to combatting capitalist exploitation. 

DeMartino, Professor of international economics at the University of Denver, No date 

(George DeMartino is a Professor of international economics at the Josef Korbel School of 

International Studies of the University of Denver and holds a PhD in economics from the University of 

Massachusetts. Accessed 5/19/13, “Ethical Economic Engagement in a World Beyond Control,” 

Under Review Rethinking Marxism, p.6-7) 

Notably, the book (and other Gibson-Graham work of the past decade) turned a careful eye to the 

question of how to cultivate an economic subject that could open up to the possibilities associated 

with economic difference. Gibson-Graham explored abstractly in their theoretical work and 

concretely in their community work the stubborn resistance to imaging and welcoming 

opportunities to live differently. Even those harboring anger and resentment toward a 

capitalist system that exploited and then discarded them—for instance, workers rendered 

unemployed by capital flight—often refused to engage the idea of creating alternative 

enterprises under worker control (Gibson-Graham 2003). Instead, they aspired to return to 

employment in the capitalist sector that, they felt, had abused them. What is it about the human 

psyche, Gibson-Graham asked, that so often prevents actors from recognizing, imagining and 

welcoming opportunities to live differently What bodily processes interrupt the capacity to grab 

hold of the chance to break free from practices that are recognized as oppressive And how in 

practice do we overcome the fear, resignation, anger and resentment that block the exploration of 

alternative economic identities In A Postcapitalist Politics, “An Ethics of the Local” (2003) and 

other work Gibson-Graham explore the power of language and theory, but also interpersonal 

encounter and collaboration, in confronting and overcoming these obstacles. What they would 

later come to call “hybrid research collectives” came to serve as the chief practical vehicle for 

pursuing projects of economic emancipation. The collective joins university and community-based 

researchers with other community members in joint projects to inventory already existing 

alternative economic practices and indigenous resources and capacities, and to imagine and 

pursue economic practices and build economic institutions that defy traditional conceptions of just 

what economic forms are and are not achievable and sustainable. A central goal is to 

proliferate economic forms—to generate a vibrant economic ecosystem populated by all 

sorts of economic species—rather than to pursue a pre-defined set of models of economic 

engagement. Implicit in the project is the need to inquire into economic alternatives 

without judgment; to silence the reflexive skepticism that haunts the academic mind so as to 

allow for the “frothy spawn” (Gibson-Graham 1996) of new and as-of-yet unimagined progeny. Of 

equal importance is the task of promoting safe spaces within which economic agents who 

are marginalized and emptied of aspiration regenerate themselves as vibrant economic 

subjects who recognize the potency of their agency in making the world anew. 

4 | Page


Neoliberalism Is Inevitable 



[ ] Neoliberalism is inevitable and movements are getting smothered out of existence—no 

alternative economic system. 

Jones, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People 

on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", 2011 

(Owen, The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, 

www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-changenothing-2373612.html) 

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation 

movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten 

today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged 

neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. 

Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank 

summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled. Today, as protesters 

in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street 

protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalization movement. Its activists 

did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neoliberal 

project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the 

jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa. Don't get me wrong: the 

Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the 

West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs 

to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public 

spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the 

banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire 

Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's 

making war, and we're winning." The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US 

Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti- 

American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on 

the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a coherent alternative to the 

tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. Neo-liberalism crashes 

around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow. There's always a presumption that 

a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much 

of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and 

right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its 

opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the 

right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from 

being virtually smothered out of existence. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the 

New Right; neo-liberal globalization; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union 

movement. But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. 

As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. 

Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements 

across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left 

wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an 

age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose. 

5 | Page


Neoliberalism Is Inevitable – Economic Logic 



[ ] Rules of the market are inevitable --- incorporating them into political calculations is 

key to successful reforms. 

Assheuer, Jacques Derrida Professor of Humanities, UC Irvine, Founder and President, 

International College of Philosophy and Director of Studies, School of Advanced Study in the 

Social Sciences, 2000 

(Thomas, Paris 2000 “Intellectual Courage: An Interview” Culture Machine, Vol 2) 

Q: In your book The Other Heading you conceive Europe as a political project. Can one 

continue to do so after the long and tough discussions about the European currency, the Euro Or 

should one not say that Europe is on the way to becoming an enterprise which is defined by 

monetary criteria, a kind of enterprise that co-ordinates the trade of merchandise JD: This is an 

effect to whose risks I have alluded (economism, monetarism, 'performative' adaptation so as 

to be competitive in a global market, often after brief and supposedly scientific analyses). It 

seems to me that one must indeed oppose to it a resolutely political project. That is the stake 

of many of the tensions between the different European governments, and within each of 

them, but also among the social forces that dominate Europe. I should add some qualifications, 

since you wish to talk about 'intellectuals': the necessary resistance to economism or 

monetarism need not take the form of demonising incantations, of magical protestations 

based on incompetence, against an entity called the 'Euro' or evil, manipulative bankers. 

Even if one need not believe just anyone or anything about this topic, one should not ignore the 

constraints of the laws of the market; they exist, they are complex, they require analyses 

which even the institutional 'experts' themselves have not completed. Perhaps one must 

oppose another political logic, but also another socio-economic logic (informed, 

demonstrative), to the current dogmas of 'liberalism'. Perhaps the Euro is not in itself an evil. 

There could be another social and economic framework for the 'transition to the Euro'. Each 

nation state of Europe has its own calculations and its own historical responsibilities in this 

respect. Those of Germany and France are particularly grave, as you know. Finally, even if my 

sympathies, as you well know, go towards a political resistance (of a certain political Europe) to a 

Europe which would be a mere administrator of its economy, the concept of the political which 

saturates that discourse does not satisfy me completely yet. It transfers upon Europe, and the 

boundaries of Europe, a tradition of the political, of the nation state, that begs many questions, and 

I have reserves about it. There again, one would require a long discussion; I refer to my 

publications. 

6 | Page


Neoliberalism Solves Poverty 



[ ] Neoliberalism has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. 

Pipe, staff writer at The South Australia Globalist, 2011 

(Nicholas, The South Australia Globalist, "The Global Financial Crisis", 2011, 

www.perspectivist.com/business/the-global-financial-crisis) 

When assisted by the other neo-liberal views of globalisation and foreign investment, this 

economic growth leads to other social benefits; it “trickles down” to marginalised 

populations, while open borders ensure the most efficient distributions of goods worldwide. As a 

result, closing the gap between affluent and marginalised populations is encouraged. Ergas 

summarises the effects of this phenomenon as: “(liberalism) works, while the interventionist 

prescription doesn’t. Ask the hundreds of millions of Chinese, Indians and Vietnamese 

whom liberalisation has lifted out of poverty.” The benefits of neo-liberalism are clear, and 

it is fallacious to overlook them when judging the system itself in the wake of the GFC. Yet 

there is something else that any critic of neo-liberalism must consider – the fact that, like it or 

not, neo-liberalism is here to stay. As Chris Brown notes, the system has become 

hegemonic and so deeply entrenched in society that its ideals are now part of how things 

really are. You only have to look at the US Government’s need to bail out and protect several 

corporations at the height of the GFC to see how deep rooted the neo-liberalism system is, 

and how its influence lives on. 

7 | Page


Cede the Political Turn – 2AC 



[ ] The Perm is key economics is inevitable --- it’s only a question of using it for 

progressive ends --- they let economics get coopted to crush the alt. 

Thompson,Jr, Vice Dean and Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, 





Even environmental moralists who reject any economic tempering of ethical obligations 

may find normative economic arguments useful for supplementing their ethical entreaties. 

Although environmental moralists might believe that non-economic criteria should be 

used in judging the merits of environmental goals, many politicians, voters, bureaucrats, and 

courts are far more attuned to wealth-maximization arguments. Indeed, Professor 

Christopher Stone's contribution to this symposium suggests that arguments based on noneconomic 

precepts of environmental ethics have played only a marginal role in legislative 

debates and judicial decisions over the past several decades. n9 If this is correct, 

environmentalists have a strong strategic reason to look for arguments that resonate more 

robustly with key decisionmakers. Even if environmental ethics currently play a stronger role 

than Stone suggests, environmentalists might wish to broaden their base of support by [*181] 

making economic arguments in favor of their goals. In some cases, economic arguments are 

clearly supplemental to and thus separable from arguments based on environmental ethics. The 

famous battle between the Tennessee Valley Authority and proponents of the endangered snail 

darter over completion of the Tellico Dam is an example. Environmentalists opposed the dam 

because it risked causing the extinction of the snail darter, threatened to eradicate the last freeflowing 

stretch of the Little Tennessee River, and required the flooding of a beautiful valley. But 

environmentalists were not hesitant to argue that the dam also made no economic sense, costing 

more in federal funds than it was ever likely to produce in benefits. Indeed, while the 

environmental arguments led to a Supreme Court decision enjoining further construction of the 

dam under the Endangered Species Act, n10 the economic arguments almost won the day 

politically when Congress balked at stopping construction on the almost-completed dam 

to save the economically "worthless" snail darter. The cabinet-level Endangered Species 

Committee, which Congress created to decide the fate of the dam, voted unanimously not 

to exempt the dam from the Endangered Species Act because it concluded that the dam 

was economically not worth completing. n11 Unfortunately, neither the environmental nor 

the economic arguments were capable of overcoming political support for the dam, which 

Congress ultimately exempted from the Act. n12 Environmental opposition to the federal 

reclamation program, which constructed hundreds of dams in the western United States 

during the 20th century in an effort to expand irrigation, provides another example of the 

effective use of normative economic arguments. 

8 | Page


Cede the Political Turn – 1AR 



[ ] Economics inevitable --- using it for progressive means is key. 

Thompson, Jr, Vice Dean and Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, 





Environmental moralists are naturally skeptical of economics. Economics appears to speak 

of human wants, individual preferences, and self-interested behavior, while most variants of 

environmental ethics emphasize the importance of the entire biotic community, the 

relevance of societal values, and the need to look beyond one's immediate interests. Used as a 

normative tool, economics can clash with environmental ethics. Used in other contexts, 

economic analysis accepts a world that the environmental moralist rejects. Environmental 

moralists may wish for a different world. Yet economics remains an undeniable and 

powerful force. The environmental moralist who wishes to accomplish immediate change 

must confront economic truths and learn to utilize economic analysis in support of the 

environment. As discussed, economics can supply supplemental arguments for protecting 

and improving the environment, provide insight into why even environmentally enlightened 

individuals often harm the environment, help defuse opposition to valuable environmental 

measures, and furnish new and more effective tools for accomplishing environmental 

goals. In many of these contexts, environmental moralists can make use of economics 

without undermining ethical precepts or education. Recent studies raise the additional and 

intriguing possibility that environmental moralists might be able to use economic tools to 

help develop new environmental mores, encourage environmental altruism, or both. Social 

scientists still know little about how governmental policies affect societal norms and the 

willingness of individuals to behave altruistically. At least some economic incentive systems, 

however, may encourage environmental altruism. If so, environmental moralists might find 

economics not only a tool for immediate environmental change but for longer-term shifts in 

the way in which society regards and treats the environment. 

9 | Page


There Is No Alternative 



[ ] No alt --- it’s utopian nonsense that causes ecological and social catastrophe. 

Barnhizer, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, 2006 

(David, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n) 

Grand utopian visions, and even smaller utopias based on an ideal of pastoral communities 

harmoniously husbanding local resources, simply are not reflective of the reality faced by the 

vast majority of people. E.F. Schumacher's argument that "small is beautiful" may appear to 

be an elegant solution for how we can all live comfortable and rewarding lives within enriching 

community bonds, but it is not going to happen. n56 "Small is beautiful" has become an 

impossible dream for all but a few communities. The process of impossibility is driven by 

population growth, the breakdown of local communities through migration, the infusion of 

multicultural diversity, and a materialistic ethos that has altered our sense of what 

constitutes [*619] quality of life. The most obvious driving forces include increasing urban 

densities and coastal development requiring massive infrastructures and supportive supply 

systems, overall population levels, and the distortions of population distribution and age 

demographics. To these can be added quality of life demands caused by people in 

economically impoverished countries who can see how material life is led in richer 

countries and the spread of interdependent economic systems that allow global 

production and distribution systems to penetrate what had been largely closed economic and 

cultural systems. These conditions are not reversible. My concern here is related to the 

speed at which societies are approaching various kinds of large-scale dislocations, 

injustices, strife, and even disaster. I do not want to resort to doomsday prophecies or set a 

clear date on which critical resources will be irreversibly depleted, such as was done in the Club 

of Rome's Limits to Growth report in 1972. n57 In addition to being destructive and careless, 

humans are also adaptive and resilient. Placing hard and fast deadlines on when chaos 

occurs and the worst effects are generated is unwise and chancy at best. n58 But if it is 

unwise or at least extremely difficult to make accurate and detailed predictions involving 

"doom and gloom" scenarios, it is equally unwise and foolhardy to ignore that the equivalent 

of ecological and social tectonic plates with massive disruptive potential are shifting 

underneath the surface of our national and global systems. Failing to prepare for the most 

likely consequences reaches the level of gross irresponsibility. We face a combination of 

ecological, social, and economic crises. These crises involve the ability to fund potentially 

conflicting obligations for the provision of social benefits, health care, education, 

pensions, and poverty alleviation. They also include the need for massive expenditures to "fix" 

what we have already broken. n59 Part of the challenge is that in the United States and Europe 

we have made fiscal promises that we cannot keep. We also have vast economic needs for 

[*620] continuing wealth generation as a precondition for achieving social equity on 

national and global levels. Figuring out how to reduce some of those obligations, eliminate 

others, and rebuild the core and vitality of our system must become a part of any honest social 

discourse. Even Pollyanna would be overwhelmed by the choices we face. There will be 

significant pain and sacrifice in any action we take. But failing to take prompt and effective 

action will produce even more catastrophic consequences. 

10 | Page


There Is No Alternative – Capitalism 



[ ] No alternative to capitalism --- even socialists agree. 

Wright ,Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, 2007 

(Erik Olin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, 

www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf) 

To be a radical critic of existing institutions and social structures is to identify harms that are 

generated by existing arrangements, to formulate alternatives which mitigate those harms, and to 

propose transformative strategies for realizing those alternatives. There was a time when many 

intellectuals on the Left were quite confident in their understanding of each of these: theories of 

class and political economy provided a framework for identifying what was wrong with capitalism; 

various contending conceptions of socialism provided models for alternatives; and theories of class 

struggle and socialist politics (whether reformist or revolutionary) provided the basis for a 

transformative strategy. Today there is much less certainty among people who still identify 

strongly with Left values of radical egalitarianism and deep democracy. While Left 

intellectuals remain critical of capitalism, many acknowledge – if reluctantly – the necessity 

of markets and the continuing technological dynamism of capitalism. Socialism remains a 

marker for an alternative to capitalism, but its close association with statist projects of 

economic planning no longer has much credibility, and no fully convincing alternative 

comprehensive model has become broadly accepted. And while class struggles certainly 

remain a central source of conflict in the world today, there is no longer confidence in their 

potential to provide the anchoring agency for transforming and transcending capitalism. 

11 | Page


Cuban Government Will Check Capitalism 



[ ] Cuban globalization is inevitable and can occur without altering its economic system. 

Shreve, J.D candidate at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2012 

(Heather Shreve is the Executive Articles Editor for the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, and a 

J.D candidate at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Accessed 5/16/2013, “Harmonization, 

But Not Homogenization: The Case for Cuban Autonomy in Globalizing Economic Reforms,” p. 386- 

387. [JZ]) 

Ultimately, all of the forces found in these theories make it difficult for a state like Cuba to resist 

change, as predicted by Larry Catá Backer. Moreover, globalization itself accounts for all of these 

changes—it is both the transformative trigger and the answer to Cuba’s motivation to reform. 

From a case study of Cuba, a historically resistant country, the overwhelmingly unavoidable 

nature of globalization becomes obvious; in the words of Fidel Castro, globalization is an 

“inevitable phenomenon.” However, the mere fact that globalization is inescapable for 

Cuba does not mean that Cuba must change its ideological basis or goals in order to 

globalize; Castro conditioned his declaration by saying that globalization was not 

inevitable if it was an imposition of neoliberal globalization. Today, under the leadership of 

Raúl Castro, it is clear that, contrary to Backer’s 2004 prediction, a fundamental change of 

ideology is not a requisite for Cuban reform. Instead, Cuba changes its economy within 

the context and the understanding of its own Marxist-Leninist goals, rather than mirroring 

the Chinese or the neoliberal forms of globalization. The very fact that Cuba is reluctant to 

globalize or is not globalizing for altruistic, market-based reasons does not negate the 

significance of its reforms. Indeed, the importance of the reforms is that Cuba, as a state, decides 

to implement changes, albeit in a new model, to remain in power and to engage the global 

economy. Moreover, in the context of globalization, the fact that these changes are not 

accompanied with fundamental changes to the Cuban Marxist-Leninist framework is an 

even stronger argument that global harmonization does not require ideological 

homogenization, linear changes, or a simplistic one world model. Globalization is infinitely 

flexible, complex, and diverse. Globalization in today’s world no longer requires 

homogenization; Cuba does not need to either adopt a neoliberal or Maoist version of 

economics to globalize. Instead, it can remain Marxist-Leninist while entering into the 

global economy. Just as neoliberal policies are not the only concept of globalization, as seen in 

China, so too Chinese Maoism is not the only alternative form of globalization. The fundamental 

differences between China and Cuba are vast—for example, the focus of the Cuban reform 

differs from that of the Chinese, the decision by Cuban officials to shun Chinese “market 

socialism” in favor of limited Communist reforms, and the histories and cultures of the two 

countries differ. 

12 | Page


Venezuela is Already Capitalist 



[ ] The critique’s demand for total rebellion is stuck in the past – Venezuela’s socialism is 

so successful because it engages with capitalism. 

Harris, Professor at DeVry University, 2007 

(Jerry Harris is a professor at the DeVry University of Chicago and holds a Masters of Education in 

History, Globalization, and Political Economy. “Bolivia and Venezuela: the democratic dialectic in new 

revolutionary movements,” in Race & Class, 49:1 July 2007, p. 18-19) 

The temporary coup, followed by a hard-fought two-month strike in the oil industry, radicalised 

Chavez and his movement. This process was similar to the radicalising of Cuban leader 

Fidel Castro as a result of the US-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion. Revolutionary paths are 

always defined in part by the opposition, the two opposing sides linked in a process of 

action and reaction. It was only after this failed invasion that Castro declared a socialist direction 

for Cuba, as Chavez did after three attempts to oust him from office. His intent was made clear at 

the World Social Forum in Brazil, where Chavez stated: ‘We must reclaim socialism as a thesis, a 

project and a path, but a new type of socialism, a humanist one that puts humans, not machines 

or the state, ahead of everything.’ But the process in Venezuela is significantly different from 

the Cuban experience. Most capitalists have not fled the country but continue to operate 

their corporations and make profits, and Venezuela is firmly linked to the transnational 

economy rather than niched into some socialist bloc. In fact, Chavez signed a new 

contract with Chevron-Texaco in the middle of the oil strike provoked by his pro-US 

opposition. There have been no nationalisations; nor is socialism mentioned in the new 

Constitution. As Latin American scholar Steve Ellner explains, the approach envisions an 

extended process of revolutionary change which is without precedent in history and which 

some claim may take several decades to complete. The end result will be a complete 

replacement of old structures created by the Chavista government and movement . . . 

replacing the current capitalist system with a mixed economy or association of mediumsized 

cooperatives. Clearly this strategy is Gramscian and does not follow the 

insurrectionary approaches advocated by Lenin and Che Guevara. Ellner adds that the 

Chavistas are committed to a ‘peaceful democratic revolution [and] have ruled out the 

suppression of the existing institutions controlled by their adversaries in economic, 

political and state spheres and instead opted for parallelism’. However, a war of position is 

a far from static process. In fact, the opposition has plunged the country into repeated 

crises, initiating confrontations that it continues to lose. In response, participation and 

mobilisation have been key to the continuing battle for change, with an expansion of 

programmes and goals after every major confrontation. This is the dialectic in Gramsci’s 

concept of position and manoeuvre, one state of affairs leading to another in a process of 

advance. In consolidating the transformational process, radical forces in state positions 

have united with social movements to help build counter-hegemonic space throughout 

civil society. This is where the PT and ANC failed, causing severe political contradictions 

to develop between the state and organised social sectors. But in Venezuela, the link 

between the state and social movements has, for now, a revolutionary character and 

expanded potential that is lacking in countries where autonomist power remains isolated 

from the government. 

13 | Page

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