The Speeches of John Enoch Powell POLL 4/1/1 Speeches ...
The Speeches of John Enoch Powell POLL 4/1/1 Speeches ...
The Speeches of John Enoch Powell POLL 4/1/1 Speeches ...
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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Speeches</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>John</strong><br />
<strong>Enoch</strong> <strong>Powell</strong><br />
<strong>POLL</strong> 4/1/1<br />
<strong>Speeches</strong>, November 1957-September<br />
1965, 6 files<br />
<strong>POLL</strong> 4/1/1 File 2, January-May 1965<br />
Image <strong>The</strong> Literary Executors <strong>of</strong> the late Rt. lion. J. <strong>Enoch</strong> <strong>Powell</strong><br />
& content t, the copyright owner. 2011.
Index <strong>of</strong> speeches within archive.<br />
1st May 1965 Untitled Nuneaton Page 3<br />
2nd April 1965 Untitled Wolverhampton Page 16<br />
31st March 1965 Untitled Caxton Hall Page 18<br />
26th-29th March 1965 Toryism, past, present Swinton Conser Page 22<br />
and future<br />
College<br />
19th March 1965 Untitled Beaconsfield Page 35<br />
8th March 1965 Untitled Grosvenor House Page 46<br />
7th March 1965 Untitled Folkestone Page 49<br />
26th February 1965 Untitled Westbury-on-Trim Page 58<br />
25th February 1965 Untitled Aylesbury Page 66<br />
12th February 1965 Untitled Wolverhampton Page 73<br />
15th January 1965 Untitled Edinburgh Page 79
•<br />
'peech <strong>of</strong> the -.JP, to the Lidl3nd<br />
•1-reat <strong>of</strong> Junior Oh--J:.::bers u 1301-,:merce,<br />
Council Ohsr.bere, :rune-3ton,'‘3p.m.3-Itur5tv 1 1.J.--3y 1e65.<br />
Durin: the lnst -.leeks the foret-:rtund f -,-na3.116 Jimm<br />
mee.1 if not nonotolised 2-“te<br />
occupied ince:Lesn " or, to ;i\L,... the<br />
full,..nr title , "tolicy for 7.)21CCJS ":;.af, incomes". Our.:3e-.. den tl,/-<br />
little 3ttention to ;3-33=re for n-Jition-i economic<br />
pirsn Id is oain-2.29,.'in Up in t rc ent <strong>of</strong>Econo..-Lic<br />
A.rf airs,<br />
_<br />
I like ernoon to redre,s- to Lnco bi considerino,<br />
the theorj tlic u ili a <strong>of</strong> ;hie econoL-ic<br />
for the nncns or indunstr,•<br />
into it, -3nd zutner u2 tsr tnere 3iO recnonen.<br />
'<strong>The</strong> ject, et.lted s0 r...).vo.Jn in -.L-.2-ibm..nt l-;Jt ;ur-<br />
"to e7roduce -e-Jlen for fiie rm to Auo<br />
the neleloornen't t-.ie<br />
it :r.1137, jr e t...n <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Lt it 'Jr induced to tJke<br />
-71fferent decieions - on rod...lotion, met: -.ne, ent etc<br />
- f2on t use 10 t-nen oeser_fee.<br />
In Is resso tI o2C is riu<br />
ord ir lon: c is
•<br />
0<br />
o infLuence ctio. z2:J:tsc<br />
the intenti on LO imuu se the colupaision, H.11<br />
kinds <strong>of</strong> he r rifl1n6* eL)res sions, sac<br />
consent, co - or, era ti cunr2,dit3tron, re current. In ,<br />
en the a ssa:-.:p tions uridein the Dieir tion, theie is<br />
3 SCItO".:...S -..,1e.E3.K:1e3s bOU t" pic3n td.._ is not co:LitalsorilJ<br />
imosed. F2esan. 1 the restecti:ze, p'.3.rts <strong>of</strong> the ..7)1'3112e to be<br />
!Tic 11: re I t d o oneruer. If to, it is ess ti 3 1.<br />
e --. te d ; i e<br />
ic rt 2C)IL so.:te ;Jo- c 1,, e<br />
s t'n.e<br />
others dno re it .r,,oia ust, rrd ro-<br />
Liniti 3 ed st3 te<br />
tc it is intend e 7:1.3 ss.persecle.<br />
H07eier volunt-.:Ir -tLe<br />
for t ii dc Cre to -,:iter peo e Deb Yititur<br />
3 0 SLu confonct oith it. Let 3o<br />
ents 01 t e rL.i L2O._:n th • ic : e cluse<br />
si Cie IrLIeflo Lu co7..2)1y.<br />
Department ul C LurLic reoenuli<br />
strj- to s 72,i1;,- u iLf r:L-3 tL 11 e S<br />
un Ci1orLs r::“.„ 1970. „uestion:i.-)ires h: o Jeen<br />
i s t:a e tc-,6 e ILL.duITiuC,<br />
z:ent so -c L0 "ii ttle t...e se<br />
i 3 t nI e re nt , L. . 3 i<br />
so IIILIfiC
•<br />
ans-e-erin:;,7<br />
the euestionna ire ere to -eesdri:e u,e J;ross<br />
dornestic -roduct in 1970 ;Jill be ,2re:at.:. 02th -en in 1964<br />
otherriise tT1 1970 i1 be Lien-Lel or e re 'ear .<br />
<strong>The</strong>, -ere then re: :re o truiidie, fur ea.c.- ;ears •iiiE0<br />
1965 to 1967 and, in c,ese, for 1970., the foLrcein;ji; estimates:<br />
total troduction, e-Le,e,rts02n1 il.nc.) 2LS re'.:uiralents<br />
rriterials, fuel and labour( Iitalyse-e-, into c --teizories) , and<br />
in iest:7.-:ent, 1j tjpes nrni resio..es.<br />
<strong>The</strong> -.:0e0tionnaire stresses n tLe enediri<br />
little or no i:lue" if th_e; inforil.etion Ia so:, died, '3;<br />
least in tot.els, -PO2 the ;ear 1970.<br />
t:)0 uuufl 3L10 cue. letin,i1 the oestionnaire,<br />
71: ter 02 !u•—d Dein tne sec eni,<br />
<strong>of</strong> the :/.--r-lode reeilee -..it =....nother Itheste..._:tes<br />
fin-d de,--end .31-ed t no reirnt:e <strong>of</strong> 31 e3IC3<br />
-en dnutu ladjus tm t" . L C 0 for3e-]2 to -.1u Ge le2J t.<br />
obser ietion u f e 302 <strong>of</strong> ..--._;tclo2e1c<br />
timete;ble:"li,<br />
dee_ s th.,.::;e concerned Hith the consult-3tions<br />
end roiooi iiee in<br />
t". is en-;diry. there is ar,„±:ent need fur<br />
-.,hion .xu-lelenTient nsor0 cen .crk court.<br />
ai LJor 31"..an-=-....,;ere:, direct u23, 5 0<br />
02 nelised inddsries,<br />
11edlies' 2020 mu :u02•uu 022 0 t
-T<br />
'T 7 :T, (-v.) •<br />
g T-I0 D<br />
GT3.0 7;77<br />
: T<br />
P ,r,p,IT701! 0 T<br />
9qa 'TLI0Tsci=on 'TTou700<br />
6c6T TIT Tiel:LT<br />
e7.7:1 ITs'rnJoTprT UGO,JO<br />
,To, To 0ATJ.<br />
J0,7<br />
,7 ET<br />
cri7,7-,<br />
PU C1TssGTGLI0---i, @a. ITT Lueu.q „To<br />
T,ITJor 777 cc_.) o„rT0ECE FuT GT50<br />
1,77r4EnpUT ui T-T='Tj<br />
„ 9C. 0`-1 PT- 110 gOL6T joj<br />
G7CC T.:-.SGTOC<br />
"LTC; fr47.77=j „TO 901(.. ET ci:„9rTE.t. 0'; .10 "Eqr-L-TT<br />
To, norr ^-,7 n Tfl 'ET' : 0 ,GnTa.A ou a0 aTTT<br />
=7,0 ITT,", ILITT'L:ue 0/.46T. .10J)LT-rf"c„:-<br />
4 -:;a-rgo E'u77.1.131-C 7 4<br />
IT an 0730-4bF:<br />
C0T 0_7451-1.70•o1 ,70j OTC: r2,00CLEE.GT<br />
- FuT-J,0i,Tp.inegc. 940 o.ru-Te!'c: 7-9CB.]:01-4<br />
0011 0Pt.t 0"- 111 SIT— 7-T,T Tplae G.INE1,7,10 7,4ea 11-, 9
•<br />
by en" CI-..ancs, oo 2GO million tons, end if so<br />
I.<br />
But eri-raps it is un12 air to :Dion on<br />
ndustries, bee Tuse the," '-31.e L31f •:Dolitico1 re ther<br />
thsn com_nerciel entities, 1i331e -to be orders-1, b2o-na.e,aten<br />
oo1itici3ns into iceepin: :)rices 3.:y;:n or their -.Lebo or<br />
force up, or to be f therbedUeU Int 060 L.-5:o3tii -des or is-<br />
Crin1nor, sn ion oi their coin -)stitors. .TE O-- se,<br />
-.nnterd enoul;h, 3 =Eon/ -2in:ent a o.c7_ "vice<br />
Co2:le r i„;ht for el n]tione1ised industry. ,3o le:t<br />
at the- steel, incr:astri, for<br />
the ste,e1 firo , ererione •<br />
territl"nt. If -r)e Est tL.Los t'ne<br />
P13n 120 2 1970,'na-.2.-12L,"- s- o liu to be 2i:2:Lt.<br />
:--- , he,26 , -7,h-3 1 7.,<br />
the -form book. 1 oar s :aEo t'ne 12f_.<br />
iederation ireC o steel -:rodaction in 1953<br />
3 S 24.7 rni.Jlion ons. -. fortni Jl<br />
oeir estL:i 'ate n1 fore° inste rsccr 00. , 1i0 Lro,-,t-at<br />
lin(-_ely to be 26 or Jô million tons. umm en t3t or :•2e",<br />
"o so-onor ! Jn'e 2.- in :2:Li:it,<br />
21 ,:zniary<br />
3'-'17,53 rue—, is -1 3<br />
c:i f;._1; re j_<br />
:..31
— 6 —<br />
rid -.T.31-,Y ": 7. the Irn ni . jteel d na the Zef.ers—<br />
ion bre c 1 .e in 1964 s s'le indas try be<br />
lucky to be, schin; 30m. tons 7ir in 1970. Jusbici6n<br />
on both it'ne short—r3nEe steel roduction fo2ecests for 1963<br />
lung—rane forecests for 1970."<br />
"1::othi_n.," the cor.i:.e:its tor cnntinuPd, e<br />
t: e 6oard or 5 e inc73ustry bu t 7,11 e )erfcri.::nco,<br />
steel. <strong>The</strong> ides <strong>of</strong> -3 7r ductioL Leieo onlj 6c; djrn<br />
tons 3 I-E-32 oj 1970 bec,..3):..e.3333 erediole .•:ith each OLL.-3<br />
fes, indeed; .3n:d 7.onder fi ore u e indastri<br />
- :rote into its L.destionnsire for 1970. 1<br />
_1_4,,<br />
c ance, bc 30 naiilion tons 2here is, <strong>of</strong> Course, rct dif—<br />
ferece fluctuations in i e se f<br />
-nacity nd on3 terJ-o trens, es-oeciaili if<br />
cre.7ition <strong>of</strong> ne c s citj. :E'en .33L) i ertJnenti',/<br />
on se o<br />
eu3r_-.ence fi.ve y:rs hence<br />
If this is ;13icl-3 -::chss<br />
..J;t for ti<br />
feide:Hti s;.•<br />
t, -<br />
littleies nI z riu<br />
ill e.:33, c bil3t iun<br />
2,:-.,ferrin.h s bL321ci ic c,!ul
- 7 -<br />
ensin.serinz industries )ici C---mpri se<br />
0 ser.y.-3r9t e in no<br />
estirri:.] Ie 111 int ent1on-r-2.11,<br />
032 .1.3.3,Zh 1e3rtedly, en I <strong>of</strong> -3<br />
c,111e..i. !J.:2sn ,2 -<br />
o-,-,-:sointsin i7L ill not, , c3nnol, 10 so under 1,-;.:H.e:<br />
Coriditi<br />
.1..sL3J-s<br />
3 13 ;.71-r3Ti_<br />
• • i7 1.7t X - in<br />
fiU<br />
- I 7<br />
SUCh t 3 31: i33c,H3osf 0 313 in.',..uitri.es<br />
oe const-2-des-..:Jf.<br />
e t- 1 i c r.)ns<br />
de 7J:2i<br />
o<br />
e rtrrient <strong>of</strong>"<br />
3*2 - 7:3 30 22 -<br />
ssd.....i.ed to 7220-1201 C<br />
31-.01: it, c ;<br />
„Z 733<br />
3 53d 11313i 11 :;:;. • ,0 • 0 n<br />
e<br />
f<br />
ii-sion 31-3 H:3 i (3'1- 3<br />
.32e ...._.n<br />
I. 0 :2, _L. 2o2e Ltt , ie33 t::. .;n<br />
0 d ir313a 3 73 ,<br />
3
iot 33t 3 3 - 1 • a .3 2 -3 - -3 0 2 - -,_311<br />
'Jt 3 Th-51 :se n T2 C i JJ3C t,f<br />
S.n.:J.,_,,s-sry. Is<br />
-33 } seen<br />
J_ F., -2; else s 2 1 C.<br />
:_s<br />
i S ()I t=.;.3 '3323i t3.1-222i:-.2<br />
sI 2 ,<br />
i.s<br />
s S s<br />
t;t Illuch •7s.<br />
11 .<br />
--, c,e113 z s-Lri<br />
sell CC 0-2 1s.7 74.<br />
iss 2i<br />
i 3 3111, r ; L 17.; I•<br />
13 :22:1:3 i 0.;.: -30 1.) '3.3 -,- 73<br />
e<br />
... 3 :3<br />
J..J<br />
Ltli . 11.t3 '7.311 • :11.; 31, ,
- 9 -<br />
teris to indiiidul ninn, nent c-]nnot<br />
(-, nifl t C °ZS:. ere ] c 3 c 3<br />
j • fined LI_ e2.] s s 3 n./- 2.]]de is<br />
inc]:)ncei..n.-;<br />
_Le• 11; 1 .3 th].)tin re2 ie e n ic<br />
-3r2i e :dinner_ i 1i if]:=3cribe.d, Tre"lic.tions hc<br />
o-.)n 3e. s in.:,<br />
zi•-323 ";111 uns ce t.he<br />
co.urse<br />
not<br />
31.11C:3 t'-]e :J2 0 i<br />
cl-]n not be d ch ]:=;li e ]o- :Le re SOL:<br />
credulous Soul 3hOU15. 1303 ifl3u a3a.aus<br />
L3ible tells rie , he is )1,rin,_;o<br />
ef]:=....,rt; 33<br />
h , sHa c o] , cnia, 33.f fu e n iii<br />
:i i t Les if i "d_ .31<br />
3 e ' :2€:i t • ,<br />
e iiied encJ.2 t •o e u CH a<br />
i a , L cL,noe_eno.i.<br />
-5.6. 2..aott.r2....in.eed<br />
v e<br />
97-7 3-7Z-ff<br />
-irtas.ri-y -<br />
C: 2<br />
_7., .7,`, i un<br />
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err- 77 TT T.2. T -2'2 DUTc ITO 71<br />
r 7,-c: 777. .aT • ,r-'nT."—"rr,r—r rir<br />
71,7: Eor7oac:<br />
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'233<br />
,
CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONISI LOFFItu<br />
•<br />
RELEASE TIME<br />
9323 19.30hours/2nd Yoril, 1955.<br />
PL-72,-17] OT-17ca C31,7C7ULLY FOR ANY 217-it-.7-07c 1-7:7 7.77TT77v<br />
7Eztract from a speech by <strong>The</strong> Rt. Hon. J. <strong>Enoch</strong> 70-7=<br />
(Thlverhampton) at the Institute <strong>of</strong> Thlding<br />
Dinner, —ulfrun Hall, 7olverhampton, on Friday,<br />
2nd 4fil, 1965.<br />
'o seem to have a positive mania for interesting ourselves<br />
in areas and industries which are doing badly, and ignoring or<br />
even sneering at thos,- which a-oe successful, even while tho<br />
nation accepts the fruits <strong>of</strong> their success ° without gratitude''.<br />
This is not the attitude <strong>of</strong> mind best suited to a country<br />
engaged in a fierce international race. Helping lame dogs over<br />
stiles is a generous ard humane occupation; but those engaged<br />
in training greyhounds -will do it strictly in their spare time.<br />
therefore rejoice, as a Black Country man, representing<br />
what a stranp-er has recently called the woliest town in England,<br />
to pronounce a -oanegTric upon this place. <strong>The</strong> whole <strong>of</strong> this<br />
area is one great workshoP, a highly effirdont and a highly<br />
successful workshop. —e may not be easy to mistake for<br />
Athena, eithp-0 the -0-ni Y_thens or the Lthens<br />
-P<br />
-L 7orth;<br />
but it is be^ause <strong>of</strong> what we manufacture and sell that not only<br />
our own people but many <strong>of</strong> thoir fellow citizens elsewhere enjoy<br />
a standard <strong>of</strong> living which includes access to the beauties <strong>of</strong> art,<br />
the beauties <strong>of</strong> nature hero !trid abroad, and th.e L:70 ,0d things <strong>of</strong><br />
life, on a scale never known hefore.<br />
T cluestinn whothar it is wise that me here in - Olyerhampton<br />
should be laid under contribution, and the e::ranson <strong>of</strong> our<br />
Nlach Conntrv enterprises orm a ed, in ordel- to sharo, ulD other<br />
aroas and industries whom prowress snd change has passed by.<br />
Tt mould be better to say to them, if they have hnds and<br />
brains to spare: "come and join us here; here thane is no<br />
no in,7- n,<br />
/<strong>The</strong> it.eaia not<br />
Issued by the Press Department, Conservative Central Office, 32 SMITH SQUARE, 'A estminster. SA1.1. (Telephone:
1r<br />
•<br />
9:523 70"TELL - 2 -<br />
<strong>The</strong> idea is not a new one, somo strange new fansied riarado::.<br />
It is how the 7Ka.ck Country, and this town itself grew: to be one<br />
<strong>of</strong> thc, grflat Do-7er hous-s -^onomy. In years gone<br />
by<br />
:Deople came here from 7:11 over tho country - perhaps above<br />
all from 'ITales, as my own forefathers did - because there was<br />
o-oportunity, because-though<br />
they did rot know the jargon thenit<br />
was a ugrowth a ea-.<br />
It is a ''gro,T:th area:' still.<br />
say, let it gro-.
Extract from a<br />
3peech by the t on. J.<strong>Enoch</strong> PoeJ.l , 1,1*F. to the<br />
Annual •.:Teneral Leetin_: <strong>of</strong> the Cities <strong>of</strong> 'London -:estieinster<br />
Conserle tive Asuc13tion Liestminster :tssociation<br />
Caxton Hall, J. 7 p.m. Jednesday, , áls; 1,3Cch,1965.<br />
ikre ot,t 1.4.-crz4<br />
sessott. <strong>of</strong> the year r is t'ick<br />
the iuics <strong>of</strong> the e,xe ..rt and the i ex tisbn the Chencellor<br />
<strong>of</strong> the ceier ho much. dereand Lu "t.-',..e out <strong>of</strong> -..;he<br />
econo_ny" or "put into tile economy". ih e co armtor en-press<br />
their fa/earii hs•.,-Jers in Dere.s cef -precise fi<br />
i',100 million<br />
interilinably yhether 4:14)C5.9.32.- more 02 ZeCtmillion iore<br />
*-<br />
Or i100 million less is"right7 :hen -3..e Gb ncJor fil'arieu<br />
sceech ne spends leaden `)'31-332a7,1-is :Er '.';ur_;_in; throu,:;t<br />
11133.3 <strong>of</strong> sta tistics and predic tions to the cim Lere<br />
conb_udes that this or t'Lat fi ire .L.n his judinent is the<br />
"rirrht " one and that therefore he is m•etin7 th e follo'.dn6<br />
bud.rEet crotosals . I bet ;le shall ha ie it 01.3U<br />
Call,.,-han this yea'r.<br />
in ef Co.. chs ore euej.<br />
.<br />
. . . .<br />
ti,reugh lobeiestanst i<br />
t-:eoee h-..re seen ihiented<br />
or incresed, the ninis ire in soir ufeic es scribbline<br />
3y to eei. in :LUC 000 litle tt)<br />
"put ino or "teite oat <strong>of</strong> the ece:_umy .<br />
i j. 'are tey slnin ii on t eu ttem<br />
line <strong>of</strong> the 13 st a <strong>of</strong> the bu..1;et 3tete:_ent. I L. t1'.e<br />
surilus cr eficit or, jris e.ere recenti./ cee_e Do
•<br />
be called, the "net borro-,-dng reriairment". (As<br />
<strong>of</strong> fect, it is not -the true ne; borroin„ re- airme.ot <strong>of</strong><br />
Cr'overnment, beceuse ;here re o er iimbortent su::4'ices <strong>of</strong><br />
or dem.snas for casn .ich do nos -e oer in the eud:zet stetoment<br />
ot 1.1; for ixamale, te xchneE- Account,<br />
. _ .<br />
mus; halo tor nea ±3.s.-L_ ()_ sterdin..- to ;he , Exchequer<br />
this jeer, -bith ;!-,e bound so -ber-3k..) dlo the in-portunt<br />
f3ct -ioout this fiure, „:7ich ezerybel, eres esuot, 011<br />
ehich the Ch :nceli_or <strong>of</strong> the Exc ioguer bujis I.ie Ou:12,et<br />
reasoning, shich i eu LU be t_ho .i;heel for ..-o-vernent<br />
to "steer the econony ni th, is t';'.'.-at it is usuelly niliJ<br />
- the error is usuelly f =Jr .-re:3;er t the 1-itudes<br />
•cen.'its en the J 3110ellor he io boen ar oinp<br />
.2;re.te-,‘ than the diff•e-ence betvieen the extreme 'Toints <strong>of</strong> -ii•-oA<br />
in either ,:',irection-r,don::st tIde co...onteto .'1.rdd the funbics;<br />
t in i o- -t-e• boh-'•iir <strong>of</strong> t-1-- economy bo-LL's 11urele-t'i<br />
either to •-•,ha; coo Jo =:ncellor in-sende.1 to do to ne; oerro'.ing<br />
re- uirez.ent or t-,t) the riri b hi cone<br />
trget.<br />
'ear' bud]et deb,Jte - firs ; fch h;d1<br />
free to sp-E'.• Since l966 Nt. I cam7)-r,r-, e<br />
c /e2-31_1 surplus ur deficit .i ;1.! '<br />
h. economy to di :tcli-le c n , • tdins<br />
J.; 11 jitins o .ndle , undete_;re:]. b: 1 CI;
3<br />
the su, still rises even if 'Tis blo-.-Js out. I -ooinu<br />
0<br />
4.t that in the fin -:nC1T.'.1 year t en ,ust ended 1.,_riud1in had<br />
.d.ceted to -put million extr a into the econon7,-;nd tha t<br />
the e.-21.7•ert,,,' had oj their 11,-.:,,send seld not enouEh,<br />
,ihereas j fcu there had. been a loveli boom but the intended<br />
£260 million Li Miti on to t net borro--.-iin:7re .,..isaLT t I-rad not<br />
3li3ed3 O. In o-,-;:er ...s;o2ds,<br />
c andle , s it -,-.Jer h'ad been absent, „DLL:, conse-<br />
,.:.uence 7: beautiful sunrise) had dui' errived.<br />
to<br />
esiered t t1 tte444.1 be a 2 -ither bizarre ,<br />
or umi rate tactless, excuzsion on my -,art into lo :ic )nd<br />
corn- onsense. O let us see h-J.7)ened then.<br />
In that buda'et las: the :nctlior rroceooeu to ith<br />
dra7J fr,, the econu:,.:/' million <strong>of</strong> d2C<br />
bi increased atxe ti on, so t t the ne borroin re rent<br />
.3- .._,0:1<br />
un4'-/<br />
800 r;i1rion,I.i<br />
=.1-1 esin.-1:<br />
tel<br />
900 million if hn rn 'on. bes c<br />
E3 old , io th::.t ste the eco-<br />
3 7, lie definite check<br />
ot<br />
t<br />
)<br />
c on toLu or,<br />
,<br />
I 3<br />
e er-i; <strong>of</strong> the a , o onin, no
ak"/11,.4.-t,et<br />
ment had turned out to be not ci ICmillion ar ;::;900<br />
but just over Z400nhidion -au-y-)ose had 3nnuan-<br />
--<br />
ed thet he cs sud,2etin.s. for an overall<br />
2:6-31<br />
/million. All the corri:- en tat ors, folla:Jed b the,<br />
the rest, ie rent Le..1.1.. 1.Lurea<br />
dust on their he3ds 3nd scre-3ned blue :-:urder. iu<br />
th]t fin-=anci:9.l ye,r 1964-55 _.neo e<br />
aepression bat one e2 cont.i.:_uef& in<br />
terMs.<br />
All the -2,=.:aoc Of e ranne :.)f ink, dc :ere<br />
discu.--sin,g r 1-1 s ZO milli on 3 di<br />
t3x.Ition tOO .muc- or too little, -:nd etThr net<br />
r Tairement <strong>of</strong> 8..O milli - e'aff-lbt ontly<br />
or de--)ressi to the econo:::y, cr r_, ccci,<br />
to e 1o 21 ,1 as if t been e<br />
medicine L. c _ndle too too I ,te<br />
Bu•._; inej oil ill be _;",t it a n ti<br />
just to e , ,e; if r_LL thf_nf,<br />
144-, /c-o14d4A.<br />
A,fr aati 4-1"-t-4-/<br />
Giv,txpel<br />
h'erc<br />
I'
SWINTON CONSERVATIVE COLLEGE<br />
MPrch 26th-29th 1965 Course No. 12/65<br />
week-end<br />
COURSE MAINLY FOR BIRMINGHAM<br />
<strong>The</strong>me: Tor-rism ast present and future<br />
TIE THEE<br />
BALFOUR TO IlmILLAN<br />
-WHAT SORT OF SOCIETY<br />
WHff SORT OF ECCNONY<br />
<strong>The</strong> Principal<br />
. A. J. L. Barnes<br />
Mr. T. L. Higgins, M.P.<br />
Mr.illiam Clark, M.P.<br />
AUGUST 1961 TO OCTOBER1964 <strong>The</strong> Rt. Hon. J. <strong>Enoch</strong><strong>Powell</strong>,<br />
M.B.E., M.P.<br />
THE CONSEQUMICES OF rt-TE GENE,A.T.,<br />
ELECTTOIT<br />
TORY PARTY ORGYITISATION<br />
THE TORY PARTY'S ROLE DI TIE<br />
POLITICS OF arE FUTURE<br />
<strong>The</strong> Rt. Hon. J. <strong>Enoch</strong> <strong>Powell</strong>,<br />
M.B.E., M.P.<br />
Sir Michael Fraser, ••B.E.<br />
Mr. <strong>John</strong> W. 7T.Peyton, M.P.
THE =LE <strong>The</strong> Principal —<br />
A study <strong>of</strong> party history shows that from time to time we come to the crossroads;<br />
for instance after the fall <strong>of</strong> Peel when it took from 1E46-1874 to get another secure<br />
Tory government. On each occasion Toryism has been revived by a return to the source<br />
<strong>of</strong> our faith; and now that we are all thinking about future oolicy, we should also<br />
think about what our party stands for.<br />
<strong>The</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> ideas is now twaway and it is no longer a matter <strong>of</strong> policy being<br />
handed dawn from above. But we cannot produce policies out cf a vacuum; neither shoure<br />
we put forward pclicies simply to catch votes. We can best produce policies as the<br />
result <strong>of</strong> an interpretation <strong>of</strong> a basic philosophy in terms <strong>of</strong> the facts and circumstance<strong>of</strong><br />
a particular tisae. <strong>The</strong> main aim <strong>of</strong> policy is to propose what the nation needs.<br />
Principles are not dogas. or creeds; they are more a way <strong>of</strong> looking at things, and what<br />
the Conservative Party exists for is to defend the values which we have developed over<br />
the years. Such values existed leng before the Conservative Party, and this might<br />
prcvoke us to ask anew the question3 which Disraeli answered, what meaning do the<br />
principles developed in a rural society have for an industrial Britain<br />
Whilst policies change the principles behind them do not. Our society is an<br />
organic ane; in other words we act both with the past and the future in mind.<br />
Continuity has a very real meaning in Britain; similarly there has always been a Tory<br />
emphasis cn 'One Nation', as Disraeli put it. <strong>The</strong> Tory party is a national party or it<br />
is nothing. If the Conservative Party does stand for the middle class it does so only<br />
in the sense that it stands for it as part <strong>of</strong> the nation as a whole. Leadership muet<br />
be open to those <strong>of</strong> industry and ability, irrespective <strong>of</strong> their background. Equality<br />
<strong>of</strong> opportunity is the important thing, not equality, which is neither possible nor<br />
desirable. Tories have always seen the merits <strong>of</strong> diversity and variety instead <strong>of</strong><br />
uniformity, and have stood for a society in which weslth, power and responsibility are<br />
diffused; that is why we want to see an industrial democracy in which every family has<br />
its own house and owns shares. In such a society co-operation and responsibility are<br />
encouraged; self-reslisation comes through groups like the family, which has the same<br />
flexibility as our institutions. <strong>The</strong>se have always bent in the face <strong>of</strong> change; that is<br />
why we have had a society in which continuity has been preserved and in which evolution<br />
and not revolution has taken place.<br />
While Tories recognise the importance <strong>of</strong> authority they realise that if society is<br />
to be healthy there must be the maximum opportunity for individual freedom <strong>of</strong> choice.<br />
What matters is the individual; as Lord Eustace Percy said '<strong>The</strong> Conservative finds the<br />
motive force <strong>of</strong> human progress not in the power <strong>of</strong> the State but in the individual's<br />
conscience and sense <strong>of</strong> duty. It is the individual human heart and not the Government<br />
which is shaken by the wind <strong>of</strong> the Spirit'. '<strong>The</strong> laws go but a little way' as Burke<br />
put it; more recently Calitin Hogg has stressed that the Conservative does not believe<br />
in the unlimited power <strong>of</strong> government to put things right.<br />
At this point it may well be that we need someone to, interpret anew Conservative<br />
policies in terms <strong>of</strong> modern conditions. This will involve keeping certain things<br />
firmly in mind. <strong>The</strong>re is a cardinal need to avoid carrying arguments through to their<br />
logical conclusion. We have to remeMber that although we owe our higher standard <strong>of</strong><br />
living to what the scientist has developed, the business <strong>of</strong> change involves risk <strong>of</strong> loss<br />
as well. Disraeli saw that change was inevitable, and constant, but that it should be<br />
carried out not in deference to any abstract or arbitrary doctrines but in accordance<br />
with the manners, customs, laws and traditions <strong>of</strong> the people concerned. In other words<br />
we have to be careful to see that change ouses out <strong>of</strong> our nature as a people.<br />
Conservatives need to remember the value <strong>of</strong> balance. Bolingbroke summed up the<br />
meaning <strong>of</strong> the balance between freedom and order when he said " Because popular liberty<br />
without government will degenerate into licence as government without sufficient liberty<br />
will degenerate into tyranny they are mutually necessary to each other". In modern terms<br />
this explains why Conservatives should reject both Socialism and laissez-faire. As far<br />
as Socialism is concerned J. h . Keynes remarked that it was 100 years out af date, and<br />
he said that thirty years ago. It is inefficient as is anything run by theorists.<br />
<strong>The</strong> great clanger is that already 2q4 <strong>of</strong> our economy is socialised. Far from thinking <strong>of</strong><br />
undoing socialism, we are forced to realise that further socialisation will bring us to<br />
the point <strong>of</strong> no return, when socialisation has to be extended simply In order to keep<br />
the economy going. But Socialism has greater dangers than the purely material, since<br />
its centralisation threatens the ba7snce between material, moral and spiritual values;<br />
and because the two sets af values are interdependent on elbowing out <strong>of</strong> spiritual and<br />
moral values might well destroy the source <strong>of</strong> materialwell being.<br />
Conservatives must eeually reject laissez-faire. It Has no relevance to the Social<br />
Services, 1e all accept that there are certain things that are best left to the<br />
government or which only the government can carry cut; while at the same time seeking to<br />
keep these to the minimum. This is not to sugsest that we should cease to think how<br />
the Secial Serviees can be improved or insist that they shoud be exclusive as well as<br />
universal. For instance at the moment there is the need for more attention to pensions;<br />
while in the lon- run private scheees will probably eake the State T)ension less importu-
- 2 -<br />
to people, there is a need for more selective help. As for the economic spheres<br />
we have to recognise that it is possible for the State to intervene too little as well<br />
as too much. It is doUbtful nhether there has been adequate programming in the nublio<br />
sector or whether the public and private sections have been sufficiently in touch<br />
with one another. But State intervention should not be undertaken without good<br />
justification, and since no economy cae work effectively unless it is based on market<br />
considerations, the best kind <strong>of</strong> State intervention being that kind which will help to<br />
make the market work more effectively. A move towards the Common Market could help<br />
to make us ncre coepetitive; the same could be achieved by certain changes in Company<br />
Law and in taxation.<br />
We can be feather-bedded too much; and we have to look forward and outward;<br />
Socialists are not capable <strong>of</strong> looking outwards. One <strong>of</strong> the problems we have to think<br />
about is Sterling and its future. Once we have an international currency then we will<br />
find that existing groupings such as the Common :Jarket may be too small. But this<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> world will not cone <strong>of</strong> its aan accord.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re never was a time when Britain needed the Tory Party more than it does today,<br />
and there never was a time when the world needed Britian more than today. But first<br />
we as Tories have to go to the sources <strong>of</strong> our faith:<br />
'All our past proclaims our future;<br />
England yet shall sto.nd again'<br />
D.S.A.<br />
BA:FOUR TO LACI.all-LN<br />
hr. A. J. L, Barnes<br />
<strong>The</strong> Conservative Party at the beginning <strong>of</strong> the Balfour administration was still<br />
essentially the party <strong>of</strong> the landed interest. <strong>The</strong>re was also, <strong>of</strong> course, the movement<br />
<strong>of</strong> Radical Imperialism, advocating the use <strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>of</strong>its <strong>of</strong> Empire for social<br />
imorovement, which was the chief contribution <strong>of</strong> Josenh Chaeberlain and the Birmingham<br />
Unionists to Conservative thought.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Balfour Government was not without its achievements. Three <strong>of</strong> them are<br />
Particularly significant. <strong>The</strong> firstwas the 'entente', the beginning <strong>of</strong> our long<br />
love-hate relationship with France; this marked the end <strong>of</strong> "splendid isolation" and<br />
the first sign that interdependence was to be Britain's future role. <strong>The</strong> second were<br />
the great army reforms, the key step <strong>of</strong> which was the foundation <strong>of</strong> the Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Imperial Defence; from this was to derive the modern Cabinet structure. <strong>The</strong> third<br />
achievement was the realisation that education was going to be <strong>of</strong> enormous importance<br />
to this country, and the establishment <strong>of</strong> public education. <strong>The</strong> work that Balfour<br />
began, and took a personal interest in, was to be canpleted by R. A. Butler in the 1944<br />
Education Act.<br />
Another achievement <strong>of</strong> the Balfour Government was the Land Purchase Act for<br />
Ireland, which put an end at least to sone <strong>of</strong> the economic grievances <strong>of</strong> Ireland;<br />
onfortunately it was too late. One other measure which might be sipqled out is the<br />
first move towards Labour Exchanges and towards treating unemployment as an economic<br />
problem, the work <strong>of</strong> Balfour's brother at the Local Government Board.<br />
<strong>The</strong> significant point about the Balfour administration however, was its failure to<br />
concentrate on economic problems, and above all to conciliate the rising power <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Trade Unions and <strong>of</strong> labour as a political force. Disraeli had recruited the force <strong>of</strong><br />
labour into the Conservative Party; the Taff Vale decision <strong>of</strong> 1901 destroyed the whole<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> trade unionism, and paved the -way for many <strong>of</strong> the economic and social problems<br />
<strong>of</strong> the following years. It is not without significance that Stanley Baldwin grunted<br />
about forty years later that the Conservatives cannot talk about the class war: they<br />
started it. To the Taff Vale decision can be traced the real emergence <strong>of</strong> the Tabour<br />
Party, which up to then had been not very much more than a pressure groun.<br />
. In the inter-war years, during which unemployment ran at an average level <strong>of</strong> around<br />
lq,„ Conservative Governments were compelled to make a choice between three economic<br />
<strong>The</strong> first, isolationism, was rejected. <strong>The</strong> second, ameire Free Trade, was<br />
impossible because <strong>of</strong> the attitude <strong>of</strong> the Dominions; this became clear at Ottawa.<br />
Finally there was the policy followed by Churchill in 1924.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Conservative Government af 1924-25 has been very much underrated. <strong>The</strong> first<br />
contribution it made was a tremendous expansion <strong>of</strong> National Insurance. By the end <strong>of</strong><br />
the 1920's much <strong>of</strong> the basis cf the Welfare State was already laid; much <strong>of</strong> what the<br />
1945-50 Labour administration did was not so much pioneering as the consolidation <strong>of</strong><br />
what had already been done. Chamberlain consolidated public health legislation, he<br />
completely reformed the powers <strong>of</strong> Local Government, he swept away the old Poor Iaw, he<br />
consolidated the rating system, and set the pattern for all subsequent welfare reforms,<br />
In addition, this Gover=ent made very serious effor',,s tu grapple with the<br />
economic problems. One <strong>of</strong> the stories always told against Baldwin is that he stood up
- 3 -<br />
in one <strong>of</strong> the economic debates and said that the right way to tackle our economic<br />
difficulties was to reduce our exports; there was a loud cry from his benches <strong>of</strong><br />
"irlports!". He said, no, he meant exports. Everyone has told -Lhe story against him,<br />
But what he was referring to was the extreme dependency <strong>of</strong> the British economy on the<br />
old, basic industries, which was leading to maladjustment and to unemployment. 'Alat<br />
we had to do was to switchour production into new growth industries, and to this end<br />
came the first Tory nationalisation Leasure, the creation <strong>of</strong> the Central Electricity<br />
Generating Board.<br />
At the sarE time, Churchill at the Treasury - who has been underrated as an<br />
economist, and overrated as a nolitician - sought to cheapen our imports by bringing<br />
back the Gold Standard. This was by the need to revive world trade, upon which the<br />
British economy has always depended; the Gold Standard was seen as a way <strong>of</strong> providing<br />
a stable currency framework. A second reason was that a return to the Gold Standard<br />
would increase our invisible earnings. Churchill's policy was to get both British<br />
industry and world trade "on the move", and was linked with that <strong>of</strong> the Ministry <strong>of</strong><br />
Labour, which was to get labour out <strong>of</strong> the declining industries.<br />
It is thus unfair to say that the Conservatives did not have an economic policy in<br />
the inter-,war years. <strong>The</strong> great Depression - which was caused by a coMbination <strong>of</strong><br />
French selfishness and American incompetence - meant that the far-reaching long-term<br />
plans could never be implemented.<br />
<strong>The</strong> policy <strong>of</strong> Appeasement has also been misjudged. <strong>The</strong> motives behind it have<br />
always been thought <strong>of</strong> as being political, whereas in reality they were economic in<br />
origin. Very largely it was inspired by the desire to promote the economic reconstruction<br />
<strong>of</strong> Eurone and the expansion <strong>of</strong> world trade.<br />
As Britain was forced to turn away from Empire, the problems inEurope became more<br />
acute. <strong>The</strong>re was a sad division <strong>of</strong> policy between ourselves and France over the<br />
Versailles legacy, which contributed to the Ineffectiveness af the League <strong>of</strong> Nations.<br />
Appeasement began as an attempt to bring Germany back into thefamily <strong>of</strong> nations and to<br />
rectify sone <strong>of</strong> the injustices <strong>of</strong> Versailles towards the Germans. France prevented<br />
any effective economic co-operation between Austria and Germany, thus creating, by way<br />
<strong>of</strong> reaction, the pressure for "Anschluss".<br />
Churchill realised the danger <strong>of</strong> Hitler to European peace, but unfortunately<br />
overestimated the extent <strong>of</strong> German re-armament. Hence Baldwin and Chamberlain, who<br />
had the figures, and who were in any case getting British re-armament under way,<br />
preferred to see whether a re-drawing <strong>of</strong> boundaries in Europe would not lessen tension<br />
there. <strong>The</strong>re was quite a good case against Czechoslovakia aver the Sudeten Germans.<br />
Also it must be remembered that the Commonwealth was not prepared to fight over that<br />
issue. Once, however, Hitler had taken in the Czechs, as well, the Commonwealth rallied<br />
to Britain's determination to resist, which can be seen in nany ways as a triumph <strong>of</strong><br />
ChaMberlain's policies.<br />
14emories <strong>of</strong> the Depression and <strong>of</strong> Appeasement have done the Conservative Party a<br />
great deal <strong>of</strong> harm. Consequently, after the war, we were defeated by Labour. Far<br />
from planning the economy, however, the Labour Governments rarely looked more than a year<br />
ahead. Instead, they maintained in being a complex and inefficient system <strong>of</strong> controls,<br />
which Butler was able to sweep away to advantage when the Conservatives were returned to<br />
power in 1951.<br />
It has been said that R. Le Butler only understood 24-'—/<strong>of</strong> what was going on in<br />
the economy; but that later Chancellors only understood 2V, Certainly Butler<br />
understood the political implications <strong>of</strong> policy, and resisted restrictionist pressure.<br />
Later Chancellors did not sufficiently realise that our recurring economic crises were<br />
not caused so much by pressure <strong>of</strong> demand as by the structural weaknesses <strong>of</strong> the economy.<br />
<strong>The</strong> 1957/8 crisis was misread by Thorneycr<strong>of</strong>t as one <strong>of</strong> internal inflation, whereas it<br />
was in fact a crisis <strong>of</strong> external confidence. <strong>The</strong>re were two years <strong>of</strong> expansion under<br />
Heathcote-Anery, but in 1960 Selwyn-Lloyd went to the Treasury and was eventually<br />
persuaded to adopt restrictionist policies once again.<br />
Very few Chancellors appear to ha-m realised that the fluctuations <strong>of</strong> the British<br />
economy cannot be controlled in the way which was attempted. <strong>The</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> both<br />
"brake" and "accelerator" tend to come only after a considerable time-lag. ',7e also<br />
allowed the Trade Unions too much rope, and tended to fall back continually into a wageprice<br />
spiral. Mereover, although the result was a cost Inflation, we tried to solve it<br />
by cutting back an demand. This tended to penalise the growth industries, with the<br />
result that we found ourselves lagging behind our competitors by 1960. It was then that<br />
Macmillan decided that a "wind <strong>of</strong> change" should blow through British industry and<br />
applied to join the European Co=en 'Market. <strong>The</strong>re were also political reasons for<br />
this application: the fact that the "three circles" concept <strong>of</strong> the British position in<br />
the wbrld was no longer tenable.<br />
After the collapse <strong>of</strong> the Common Market negotiations, the Conservative Party was<br />
without a sense af direction, 7re did, hewei,er, make considerable efforts to define the
- 4 -<br />
problems that faced us. This was the great period <strong>of</strong> Reports. In addition,<br />
however, quite a lot <strong>of</strong> modernisation did take place. It was, after all, a great<br />
achievement to have made ourselves aware <strong>of</strong> our position, in particular <strong>of</strong> our<br />
international interdependence.<br />
GoB.R.<br />
THAT SORT OF SOCIETY<br />
a‘. T. L. Hi Tins H.P0<br />
<strong>The</strong> recent Socialist tactics over the Bill to give a pension to the very old<br />
provides a starting point for considering the political side <strong>of</strong> the society we wish<br />
to see. <strong>The</strong> Government blocked the Bill althouFh showing no sign <strong>of</strong> arranging the<br />
Income Guarantee promised in the election. This episode should be eUblicised since<br />
it underlines the urgent need to get rid <strong>of</strong> the Government; this kind <strong>of</strong> action<br />
threatens to bring Parliament into disrepute and emphasises that what we have to be<br />
careful above all else to preserve in the future is a democratic society. But then<br />
whereas the Conservative Party is a centre party shadinginto the right, the Socialist<br />
Party ranges to the extreme left. We do need to remember the continuing danger from<br />
Communism; it is similarly that we tend tu forget what happened in the thirties.<br />
None af this means that we want a middle <strong>of</strong> the road alliance;<br />
we woo3d<br />
either have to continue indefinitely with such an alliance or sooner or la•. r have to<br />
have an extreme party developing on one flank or the other. We should demolish the<br />
idea that the Liberals can in any sense provide such a middle <strong>of</strong> the road alternative.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y have exploited local issues without regard to consistency owr the country and<br />
they make it necessary to affirm the great tradition <strong>of</strong> Burke that M.P.'s are not<br />
delegates but representatives, voting for the good <strong>of</strong> the country as a whole and not<br />
any particular group.<br />
<strong>The</strong> current series <strong>of</strong> C.R.C. pamphlets, New Conservative Tasks, illustrates Some<br />
<strong>of</strong> the thinking being done on our policies. As far as the eccnomy is concerned we<br />
have to do something to forecast what the basic economic trends are likely to be;<br />
though reaembering that economic forecasting has its awn dangers. This brings us to<br />
the changes in our economic structure; in place <strong>of</strong> mass unenployment we have a<br />
constant knife edge situation. It is now emerging that this is basically a regional<br />
problem; when demand is increased to mpp up unempleyment in the North East it brings<br />
inflation in Birmingham and London. We have to balance up the regions so that we can<br />
run the economy on a steadier platform and at a higher level <strong>of</strong> utilisation. Wage<br />
agreements and pricing policies on a national rather than regional basis both tend to<br />
discourage investment in those areas which need it and we should also think more about<br />
regional investment allowances. To complement the econcmic measuren, urban decay need;<br />
to be tackled; otherwise there is little hope <strong>of</strong> attracting people to these areas.<br />
Abetter regional pattern means social and cultural as well as industrial balance.<br />
We must aim towards a commetitive economy. Transferring the decision to<br />
investigate mergers to a separate Registrar as we weuld have done would not have<br />
threatened to prevent desirable mergers as the Socialist Bill cn Monopolies does.<br />
This introduces clauses against big business as such instead <strong>of</strong> tackling the dominating<br />
firmswhich are in a position to raise prices to the detriment <strong>of</strong> the consumer. <strong>The</strong>re<br />
is a great danger <strong>of</strong> the Socialists falling back on a 'Little Englander' policy,<br />
blocking our imports rather than helping to make us competiti*e enough to meetthena<br />
Being competitive also involves reforming action on the structure <strong>of</strong> the trade unions<br />
and ensuring that voting, bcth for the election <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers and on strike action,<br />
should be by secret ballot and subject to some qualifications about minimum nuMbers.<br />
Yet the actians <strong>of</strong> the Socialist Government only postpones action.<br />
Turning to sociological changes, the increase in the standard <strong>of</strong> living, for whic<br />
the Conservative Party stands far more than the Socialist, has accellerated the change<br />
in the structure <strong>of</strong> incomes; the pyramid shape has given way to the diamond, and after<br />
tax, the onion. Another consequenee is the need to substitute machinery for the<br />
labour that is becoming increasingly expensive; hence it must be made easier for<br />
people to change jobs. People are no longer worried where the next meal is coming<br />
from; however they are worried about mortgages and hire purehase and we ought to give<br />
them incentives through tax changes to work and to earn more. To complement this<br />
there is the need for a society which is mere discriminating and better informed about<br />
choice and opportunities.<br />
Turning to the wider question <strong>of</strong> 1.41rope, we have to rethink our attitude very<br />
carefully and consider what the move towards Europe will involve. Az far as<br />
agriculture is concerned we must ask whether we want to renain an agricultural country<br />
to the same extent that we have been in the past. If productivity on the land<br />
contInues to rise we are going to need fewer people in agriculture. <strong>The</strong> main<br />
difficulty has been that the European systen <strong>of</strong> support is Quite different. It seems<br />
that the British farmers are now realising that because they are more ccmpetitive they<br />
in fact stand to gain; the disadvantage <strong>of</strong> the European system is that it involes<br />
controlling supply, restrt7pting imports nnd raising the price to the consumer, whereas<br />
we know exactly hew much our systen costs tne taxpayer. As far as industry is
- 5 -<br />
concerned, we should welcome the competition cf a bigger earket. We should anyway try<br />
and work towards a lower level <strong>of</strong> tariffs to ensure a greater choice for the consumer.<br />
<strong>The</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> life that we have is likely to depend very largely on how suocessfu<br />
we are in managing the economy; Conservative policies are much more likely to raise<br />
the standard <strong>of</strong> living and enable people to have better opportunities than the<br />
dogmatic Labour Party. But as far as what peonle do with their lives we in the<br />
Conservative Party have faith in the individual and, given the framework, the ability<br />
<strong>of</strong> people to choose for themselves.<br />
";Te want above all else a democratic society, because this means that the true<br />
wishes <strong>of</strong> society can be reflected in the structure <strong>of</strong> the country. We want a<br />
regionally balanced society, for cogent social and economic reasons. We want a more<br />
competitiee society and we should not be afraid <strong>of</strong> greater affluence; this in turn<br />
may mean appraising our political links with Europe. We are very much on the crossroads<br />
here in the Conservative arty; we have to consider what our relationship with<br />
Europe is going to be politically because if we do decide to join the Common Market we<br />
shall find a move towards political integration and this may have very radical implications<br />
for the Parliament af this country. If the Common Market =es towards political<br />
integration the Council <strong>of</strong> Hinisters will have to be replaced by the European Parliament<br />
which presumably will have delegated to it certain decisions which would normally be<br />
taken in the countries concerned.<br />
D.3.-.<br />
WHAT SORT OF ECOHC= Hr. William Clark, m,p,<br />
<strong>The</strong> first answer to the Question; what kind <strong>of</strong> economy do we want, is <strong>of</strong> course<br />
an easy one, heall want it to be prosperous. Unfortunately it is also too <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
true that we wart someone else to pay for it.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Socialists are getting away too easily with the charge that the Conservative<br />
Government left the econcey in a eess last year. To begin with we must point to the<br />
record over the whole previous 13 years. During that time taxation feal; under the<br />
previous Socialist Government it rose, and now we are seeing it begin to rise once more.<br />
Prices rose very much more slowly than under Socialism; now we are beginning to see<br />
them rise more rapidly once again, host important to remember, the balance <strong>of</strong> payments<br />
over the whole period was in surplus.<br />
At the beginning af last year Mr, Maudling pointed out that there was likely to be<br />
a balance <strong>of</strong> payment deficit for that year because <strong>of</strong> stock-building and an exceptional<br />
outflow <strong>of</strong> investment abroad. He also pointed out that we had adecuate resources to<br />
cover the deficit. Clearly, when the Socialists took <strong>of</strong>fice there was no crisis. <strong>The</strong><br />
Pound was stable until after the General Election.<br />
After the Labour Government was in power, however, a Sterling crisis very rapidly<br />
developed. This was alecst entirely their aan fault. In order to justify the manner<br />
in which the 153 surchargehad been introduced, they painted as black a picture <strong>of</strong> the<br />
economy abroad as they could, with the result that overseas holders <strong>of</strong> Sterling began to<br />
fear that a devaluation was on the way. In aq.dation, Mr. Callaghan introduced a Budget<br />
which put 6d. on petrol (and hence en costs),/ich envisaged taking money from people<br />
who might have saved and disbursing it to people who would almost certainly consume.<br />
He thought it was a deflationary Budget; chroad it was seen as an inflationary one.<br />
Another criticism <strong>of</strong> us is that we left the reserves at a lower level than in 1951.<br />
But we did not borrow from the United States, as did the previous Socialist Government.<br />
George Brown has been on television and has said that the 15 surchanije provided<br />
no excuse for putting up prices. This merely shows how little he understood its<br />
purpose. <strong>The</strong> object <strong>of</strong> the 15/6 was to put up the prices <strong>of</strong> imports so that people would<br />
be deterred from buying them;<br />
If inflation is to be avoided it will be necessary for Kr. Callaghan in the Budget<br />
to increase taxation by about &C200 million. He should do this by using the regulator<br />
to the extent <strong>of</strong> about 5, and taxing other consumption. Thds would be a quick way <strong>of</strong><br />
reducing the pressure <strong>of</strong> consumer demand. <strong>The</strong> Archilles heel <strong>of</strong> the Government, however,<br />
is the Labour Left wing. This has already become militant over Pensions and Over -Viet<br />
TnTam. In the Bnriget Callaghan will have to do something against "Capitalism" in order<br />
to pacify them.<br />
Already we have two axamples <strong>of</strong> siich measures in view. <strong>The</strong> first is the Corporation<br />
Tax. If this were fixed at about 35 , it is said, the same revenue would be produced<br />
as under the present system <strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>its Tax and Income Tax. Unfortunately, it is by no<br />
eeans certain whether 35/6 will be the eventual rate. <strong>The</strong> tax has one anomaly above all<br />
others, which is that it is likely to eenalise companies which remit divddends from<br />
abroad. This could have a serious effect upon our invisible exports. Corporation Tax<br />
also has the effect <strong>of</strong> anceuraa.ing the retentien rather than the distributien <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its,<br />
which uan only lead to Increasing inflexibility in the capitni market, and consequently<br />
investment.
- o -<br />
<strong>The</strong> shareholders in companies which retain rather than distribute pr<strong>of</strong>its: <strong>of</strong><br />
course, receive their dividends in the form <strong>of</strong> increased share prices. For this<br />
reason there is also to be a Capital Gains Tax, probably- at a fairly stringent rate.<br />
<strong>The</strong> complexities and anomalies involved in this, however, are vast. It is not clear,<br />
for example, whether there is to be tax on the gains made by institutional investors<br />
like pension funds, unit trusts, etc. Conservatives should probably accept the idea<br />
<strong>of</strong> some form <strong>of</strong> Capital Gains Tax, but make a pledge to reverse Labour's measures where<br />
these are clearly unjust.<br />
Our long-term objective must be to increase the efficiency <strong>of</strong> Capitalism In<br />
this country. Perhaps we did not visibly do enough in the years before election to<br />
increase share-ownernhip, and competition. 1::e must set out to persuade the electorate<br />
that the anlyway the British economy can be made internationally competitive, and<br />
hence the only wtly in which ccmfidence in the Pound can be assured,is the return <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Conservative Government.<br />
G.B.P.<br />
AUGUST 1961 TO OCTOD1R 1964 <strong>The</strong> Rt. Han. J. <strong>Enoch</strong> <strong>Powell</strong>, e.B.E.,<br />
In July 1961 occurred one <strong>of</strong> our periodic Sterling crises• It was the<br />
revaluation <strong>of</strong> the German Mark rather than anything directly attributable to Sterling<br />
which precipitated the outflow <strong>of</strong> gold and reserves from this country. However, as<br />
on previous occasions, this vas widely believed, not only by the Gevernment, to be a<br />
symptom only possible because <strong>of</strong> a genuine doubt about the long-term internal value <strong>of</strong><br />
our currency. <strong>The</strong> strong measures which followed the preceding similar crisis <strong>of</strong><br />
1557 had been succeeded in 1958 and 1959 by a period <strong>of</strong> heavy Government spending, whice<br />
had contributed to the boom <strong>of</strong> those years, and to the overheating <strong>of</strong> 1960. Hence the<br />
1961 crisis was diagnosed both here and abroad as the sign <strong>of</strong> a much deeper malaise.<br />
<strong>The</strong> continuing phenomenon <strong>of</strong> inflation had <strong>of</strong> course been reflected in the fact<br />
that total money incoees rose considerably faster than the output af goods and services,<br />
than real income. In addition, in recent years the rise in our real income had been<br />
compared unfavourably with the rise in real income in continental economies. Thus<br />
the problems which presented theaselves to the Government in July 1961 were first <strong>of</strong><br />
all those relating to the behaviour <strong>of</strong> money incoaes, and secondly those relating to<br />
the behaviour <strong>of</strong> real incomes.<br />
Yr. Selwyn Lloyd accordingly put forward the propositions that: first, unless<br />
inflation was to continue, money incomes as a whole ought not to rise faster than real<br />
incomes as a whole; secondly, that, unless this was tobe risked, public expenditure<br />
ought to bear no more than a constant relationship to total national income; and<br />
thirdly, that it would be a good thing if the national income itself were to increase<br />
at a somewhat faster rate than had previously been the case. He went on to say that in<br />
recent experience the national income had been rising at a rate <strong>of</strong> 2 to 2i- per cent a<br />
year. Accordingly, ve should find ourselves in diffieulties if total money incomes,<br />
and Government expenditure also, rose by acre than 2.7-% a year, until that underlying<br />
rate <strong>of</strong> growth became higher.<br />
Unfortunately no-one knew how to arrange individual moveeents <strong>of</strong> incomes in such a<br />
way that total income moved at any particular rate. Everyane knaw that increases <strong>of</strong><br />
the total above 2:±70 would have inflationary consenuences; no-one knew how you could teD<br />
whether any particular increase was inflationary er not. hr. SelwTn Lloyd accordingly<br />
announced that he intended to seek machinery for solving this conundrum; and until<br />
the conundrumwas solved it woull be better if money incomes did not rise at all.<br />
This was the Pay Pause, initiated in Au,cmst 1961.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re was <strong>of</strong> course no machinery for ensuring tne -7-)ray Pause either. <strong>The</strong><br />
Governeent, in so far as it was paymaster, could refuse to pay its own employees any<br />
more; though there existed in many cases arbitration procedures which had been regarded<br />
as binding. <strong>The</strong>refore the Government announced that it dia not intend to sUbalt to<br />
arbitration the date <strong>of</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> any nay incroases awarded. So far as the<br />
rest <strong>of</strong> tho economy was concerned the Pay Pause depended upon asking employers 'not to'.<br />
Parliament rose therefore with the Government comaitted to discovering some means<br />
<strong>of</strong> regulating money incomes, and, in addition, to finding ways <strong>of</strong> obtaining a faster<br />
growth rate than 27%. This WEIS the classic aistahe <strong>of</strong> announcing an intention without<br />
having discovered whether it could in fact be carried out. But one has to pay, in the<br />
end, for issuing this kind <strong>of</strong> promissory note. ';:hen the new session began in November<br />
1961, no-one was any nearer to discovering what an incoaes Policy could possibly mean;<br />
and with the continuing rise in prices there wae groeing impatience aaong those whose<br />
incomes had been 'paused'. <strong>The</strong> Goverme-ent was increasingly emlarrassed by the task <strong>of</strong><br />
moving from a Pay f7ause, in which no-one 7:as supposed to be paid any more at all, to the<br />
theoretical situation in which individual chanees would be harmoniously regulated so that<br />
they all added up together to a 2-2 increase a year. .Joreover,when people had been<br />
acsustcaed to getting increases like 2e, looked very small indeed.
- 7 -<br />
By the beginning <strong>of</strong> 1962 it was clear that something had to give way; and so in<br />
February was published a ';Thdte Paper entitled 'Incomes, the Next Step'. This said that<br />
we had had the Pay Pause (which was Quite true!) and thnt it would be all right now if<br />
incomes started to rise over-all at 2. Individually, <strong>of</strong> course, there would be<br />
exceptions: for example, where firms needed to attract more labouz, or in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
those groups with whom a lot <strong>of</strong> voters had a lot <strong>of</strong> syerpathy. But ndbody yet had any<br />
idea what this was the next step to - what exactly one was to do when faced with particulae<br />
cases, each claiming to be "an exception". In the Budget that April a tax on Capital<br />
Gains was introduced in order to facilitate the acceptance by the trade unions af an<br />
Incomes Policy. ByMET, so many pay claims had been satisfied at a rate far in advance<br />
af 2%, that it became clear the Government had ended up in a 'cul de sac'•<br />
Accordingly, it was decided to set up a body which could carry on the search for an<br />
Incomes Policy inderendent <strong>of</strong> the Government. At the saee time, as a diversionary<br />
exercise, attention was turned towards such pclicies as planned revival <strong>of</strong> the North-East,<br />
contracts <strong>of</strong> employment, wage-related benefits and severance payments. On the 13th July<br />
1962.seven cabinet ministers were dismissed so that the diversion in policy should be<br />
marked by a change <strong>of</strong> personnel.<br />
By the winter <strong>of</strong> 1962/63 the National Economic Development Council was 'examining the<br />
implications <strong>of</strong> a growth-rate <strong>of</strong> 4; per annum, and the National Incomes Commission was<br />
set up. Before the 1963 Budget the N•E.D•C• had produced a model <strong>of</strong> the British economy<br />
growing at 4. Inevitably 4 became the "target rate cf growth", and the Chancellor was<br />
asked to announce that 3:22-'; rather than 2 would he a reasonable "guiding light" for<br />
increases in money incomes. But no-one could explain what relationshdp existed between<br />
the model set up by the N,E.D,C, and the reality.<br />
Meanwhile a nuMber <strong>of</strong> major political events had taken place: the Nassau agreemont<br />
the rebuff which ended this country's hopes <strong>of</strong> joining the Common Larket and, in June/JulytheTr<strong>of</strong>uno<br />
Affair". <strong>The</strong>n came the events <strong>of</strong> October, 1963, and the consequences <strong>of</strong><br />
"the usual processes <strong>of</strong> consultation". In Noveeber the Government published its<br />
projections for public expenditure over the following five years. In 1961 it had been<br />
determined that this shoeld not increase by more than 2i% a year until it was certain<br />
that national income would be rising faster. But by Noveeber 1963 we had accepted a<br />
commitment to a 4 growth rate, which provided the besis for the estimates <strong>of</strong> Government<br />
expenditure - tnough it was quite uncertain whether this rate would in fact be achieved.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re was no escape from the consequences af having set up the N.E.D.C.; there was no<br />
means <strong>of</strong> stepping <strong>of</strong>f the travelling band - at least not voluntarily!<br />
And so, by 1964, the Conservative Party found itself committed to the following<br />
major items <strong>of</strong> policy; first, an incomes policy, whieh everyone was conmitted to finding<br />
but no one knew how to discover; the planning <strong>of</strong> the North-East, and indeed <strong>of</strong> every<br />
region as a consequence; the planning <strong>of</strong> the economy as a whole in order to produce, as<br />
a minimum, a specific rate <strong>of</strong> growth @AA; and finally, increases in public expenditure<br />
<strong>of</strong> over 4% per annum for at least five years ahead. It was with these comeitments that<br />
we entered the General Election.<br />
G.B.P.<br />
TEE CONSETCES OF THE GETER!LL ELECTION <strong>The</strong> Rt. Hon. J. <strong>Enoch</strong> <strong>Powell</strong>, '.B.E L.P.<br />
<strong>The</strong> most obvious, and yet a very pr<strong>of</strong>ound conseeuence <strong>of</strong> the 1964 Ceneral Election<br />
was that the continuing chain <strong>of</strong> responsibility which haa stretched through without a<br />
break franNovember 1951 to October 1964 was broken. It is a consequence, and a necessary<br />
consequence <strong>of</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> collective Cabinet responsibility that as long as one<br />
Government cf the same party succeeds another, nothing which has been done or said during<br />
the whole cf the lengthening period can ever explicitly be disavowed or even criticised.<br />
Since in a period <strong>of</strong> thirteen years, there are immense changes in the very nature <strong>of</strong> the<br />
problems which the country is facing, this continued piling-up <strong>of</strong> an ever larger roll <strong>of</strong><br />
baggage - the acts and the words <strong>of</strong> previous years - becomes more and more oenressive.<br />
<strong>The</strong> process wns imeensely accelerated in the last three years before the election.<br />
<strong>The</strong> continuity has now been broken. Of course this does nct mean that it is easy or<br />
even possible to draw the sponge across the board and start afresh. One starts with the<br />
responsibility still, though now dirdnished and f:Lirmore modifiable, for one's own past<br />
stataments and positions. For those who were continuously in <strong>of</strong>fice it is not possible<br />
overnight to unravel the trains <strong>of</strong> thought, to retrace the stees ito whichever cross-roads<br />
one thinks eight have <strong>of</strong>fered a different course <strong>of</strong> action. Only time, added to the loss<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice, can graduelly make it possible for the Party to find a new position.<br />
<strong>The</strong> nation has an unforeulated, perhaps an unconscious need, which the Conservative<br />
Party is celled upon to eeet if it can.<br />
This kind <strong>of</strong> thing is terribly difficult to identify, still mere to define. It is<br />
also terribly easy to exaegerate the ieeortance <strong>of</strong> the point <strong>of</strong> tine at which one haerens<br />
to find oneself - one never goes into an election without pretesting that there never was<br />
an election in the history <strong>of</strong> the country more fraught with the pr<strong>of</strong>oundest consequences!<br />
It is also terribly easy to strike attitudes in eelitics. But in the weeks after the
- 8 -<br />
election, when the sterling crisis was upcn us, somebody said to me: "_Are we never going<br />
to escape from this It seems that we climb up the greasy pole, and always slip back<br />
to where ve were. Whyhas there been this procession <strong>of</strong> crises over the years, sterling<br />
crises, crises <strong>of</strong> the balance <strong>of</strong> payments, crises <strong>of</strong> the reserves; 1955, 1957, 1961,<br />
1964"<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is a pr<strong>of</strong>ound longing in our people for achievement. It is perfectly true,<br />
and we were right in claiming, that whatever the international comparisons - and many <strong>of</strong><br />
them are pretty bogus - we have enjoyed in these last thirteen years a steady growth in<br />
prosperity, widely diffused, at a faster rate than has characterised any previous recorded<br />
sinilnr period <strong>of</strong> our economic history. This is all true; but it does not alter the<br />
aching feeling that other nations know where they are going, and that somehow ve do not.<br />
It is true that when we are called the Sick 1.1nn <strong>of</strong> Europe, you can disprove it by chapter<br />
and verse. But we ask ourselves: how did anybody get around to calling us <strong>The</strong> Sick Han<br />
<strong>of</strong> Europe When with all our pride and all our refusal to take so many things too<br />
seriously, we look at the fantastic surge forward <strong>of</strong> Europe, Japan, and at the way in whicn<br />
the U]Bited States, for all its faults, has achieved a combination <strong>of</strong> stabilitr <strong>of</strong> currenc;<br />
with/rate <strong>of</strong> growth which no other country can rival, we do all feel that something has<br />
escaped U.S.<br />
This country has passed through a period <strong>of</strong> immense transition, nearly all <strong>of</strong> its<br />
practically realised in the last thirteen years. If anyone in 1951 had said that in 1964<br />
there would be scarcely any dependent British territories anywhere on the face <strong>of</strong> the<br />
earth, we should have wondered what sort <strong>of</strong> Communist he was. But so it has been. As<br />
a historical fact much cf what wo believe about the glories <strong>of</strong> the British Emoire is a<br />
subseeuent construction,existing more in the imaginativa than in the reality. <strong>The</strong> British.<br />
Empire, in more senses than one, was 'Brummagem'. <strong>The</strong> historical reality was different<br />
from the construction with which we grew up. But we did grow up with it. We were all<br />
born into a world where we had been taught to believe that Britain had an Empire on which<br />
the sun never set. Today the visible, undeniable reqlity is utterly different.<br />
One can never truly resolve in the span <strong>of</strong> a human lifetime that kind <strong>of</strong> a revolution<br />
without the marks being left af the struggles.<br />
Something which we believed to be our coin-Jon achievement, something which filled the<br />
need <strong>of</strong> people to believe that they had a life and significance extending beyond their own<br />
immediate place and time, has gone. In the period which now succeeds October 1964, the<br />
Conservative Party has to discover whether it can furnish to this country the structure <strong>of</strong><br />
thought, the structure <strong>of</strong> policy,.which can fill that void.<br />
If we are to do that we have to set out from an unsparing analysis <strong>of</strong> our own<br />
position. We have to be ruthlessly straight with ourselves. Oppositions do not have a<br />
great deal <strong>of</strong> impact on what the Government does from day to doy. But a Party in<br />
Opposition does decisively influence what it can do if and when that Party next forms a<br />
Government.<br />
What sort <strong>of</strong> achievement in the modern world is there.for Britain It must consist<br />
<strong>of</strong> the exploration and exploitation <strong>of</strong> what we have here in these islands, and wthat we can<br />
make the rest <strong>of</strong> the world want from us in terms <strong>of</strong> goods, services and ideas. <strong>The</strong> rest<br />
<strong>of</strong> that world is engaged on the same business. <strong>The</strong>re is a constant comparison and<br />
competition going on between the nations. This is one <strong>of</strong> the great forces in the world;<br />
the economists call it the international division <strong>of</strong> labour.<br />
On what principles are we to set about discovering what it is that wo particularly<br />
can <strong>of</strong>fer this world Again it must be those same principles <strong>of</strong> comparison and<br />
conuetition, the constant discarding <strong>of</strong> whatever fails to meet the etest <strong>of</strong> comparison,<br />
the reinforcement <strong>of</strong> excellence, the removal <strong>of</strong> the inferior. We have to decide whether<br />
we do this better if it is the State which directs this effort, or if, to use a metaphor,<br />
we "do it ourselves" (or, to get nearer to that French Oxpression, if we let people do<br />
it themselves: whether we let people invest where they thiEk there will be the biggest<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>it, work where they think they will be given the highest remuneration, spend on what<br />
they_think will give them the most satisfaction, and allow this to work itself through<br />
in the belief - and it is only a belief, only a theory, in the same way that Socialism is<br />
only a theory - that for us this is the way most likely to achieve success.<br />
If this be so, then we have to ensure that the actions and policies <strong>of</strong> Government are<br />
consistent with that belief; that they aim at giving people as a framework for this<br />
process, for the taking <strong>of</strong> these decisions, stable terms <strong>of</strong> reference. We have to decide<br />
whether the function <strong>of</strong> the State is to be restricted te areas <strong>of</strong> the national life where<br />
the process <strong>of</strong> co[soarison and competition cannot operate, or whether it is to extend<br />
potentially or actually over the whole.<br />
Until we have settled those questimns for marselves, we cannot make a policy. Until<br />
we have a policy, we have nothing to say to our countryment - we hove no bread to give then,<br />
You can't do this suddenly. You need the healing and oblitorating effects <strong>of</strong> tire<br />
and the rising object-lesson provided by the worlmings <strong>of</strong> the other system. Thus if we<br />
fight an election this year, it is quite clear on what basis we fight. We say: 'we told
— 9 -<br />
you what the consequences would be, and there they are'. We don't need a policy to do<br />
that. But this is triviality comared to what we rust provide wnen we have the time.<br />
By the end <strong>of</strong> 1964 we were saving and doing things which were inconsistent with any<br />
intelligible view, Socialist or non-Socialist, <strong>of</strong> the future destiny <strong>of</strong> this country.<br />
Our first task, therefore, is to recognise this among ourselves.<br />
If a nation is to have faith in what it is doing it must sense that this can be<br />
argued cut and stand up to the most rigorous analysis. A nation must have a good<br />
conscience to its policies, Surely if the use <strong>of</strong> price, <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it, <strong>of</strong> market forces and<br />
competition are the processes by which a free nation discovers what it alone can give<br />
the world, we cannot use these processes effectively if we do so with half our minds<br />
looking the other way, in fear that someone will point the finger <strong>of</strong> scorn at us•<br />
Difficult things will have to be dcne if the habits <strong>of</strong> this nation - in so far as<br />
legislation can chanEe habits - are to become truly and fearlessly competitive. You<br />
cannot do these difficult things unless you bring to them a conviction, not only that they<br />
do not have to be apologised for, but that you can commend them and all their implications<br />
confidently to your countrymen.<br />
G.B.P.<br />
TORY NRTY ORG,NISL.TION Sir Michael Fraser, C. .nn,.<br />
Our Party has had an almost continuous existence for some three hundred years, and<br />
this explains the major difference in origins and development between it and the Labour<br />
Party. <strong>The</strong> Conservative Party existed as a Party in Parliament long before the extension<br />
<strong>of</strong> the suffrage made it necessary to have any organisation in the country; on the.other<br />
hand the Labour Party, being <strong>of</strong> much more recent origin, developed as an organisation in<br />
the country which later achieved Parliamentary representation. Consequently, whereas our<br />
organisation is biassed in the direction <strong>of</strong> assuring that we are going to be in <strong>of</strong>fice,.the<br />
Labour Party tends to be organised on the basis that it is more likely to be in opposition.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Reform Act <strong>of</strong> 1832 first made organisation outside Parliament necessary, since it<br />
required the registration <strong>of</strong> electors on an electoral roll by a certain date annually, and<br />
this gave scope for ingenuity in ensuring that supporters were inscribed and opponents<br />
excluded. <strong>The</strong> Conservative Registration societies which Sir Robert Peel encouraged were<br />
the first Conservative constituency associations <strong>of</strong>ten employing solicitors as agents;<br />
there was the beginnings <strong>of</strong> a central organisation around the Chief alio and Peel's<br />
organiser, F. R. Bonham, while the Carlton Club, founded in 1831, provided an informal<br />
headquarters. This concerted organisation broke down the huge Whig majority <strong>of</strong> 1832 in<br />
three successive elections and put the Tories into power in 18a1 until the split over the<br />
Corn Laws in 1846, which shattered the organisation as it then existed.<br />
184.6was the first <strong>of</strong> the big defeats in =dein party history. Restoring the unity<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Parliamentary party was naturally the first priority, but after the fall if the<br />
Derby-Disraeli government in 1852 attention was again turned to organisation outside<br />
Parliament. Disraeli's lawyer Philip Rose was Principal Agent, followed by Markno2o<br />
Sp<strong>of</strong>forth (1859-70) who rebuilt the system <strong>of</strong> local agents. However, the election cf 1868<br />
was not won even though Disraeli had enfranchised the townworking-man, and there was a need<br />
for a more pr<strong>of</strong>essional organisation. Anew system was therefore started in 1870 under<br />
J. E. Gorst, who was-told by Disraeli that every constituency should have a candidate and<br />
an association to support him in advance <strong>of</strong> the next General Election. 7reviously<br />
candidates had been supplied to constituencies; these now began to choose their own, with<br />
the help cf what was now recognisable as Central Office. Working ren's associations were<br />
encouraged, local associations strengthened and bribery abandoned. <strong>The</strong> snap election <strong>of</strong><br />
1874 found the Party perfectly prepared. After this brilliant victory the ora,anisation lost<br />
its edge, until the defeat <strong>of</strong> 1880 brought further reorganisation, which took a not<br />
uncomplicated form. Lord Randolph Churchill, in pursuit <strong>of</strong> Tory Democracy, tried to convert<br />
the National Union,which had been formed In 1867, into an instrument for controllinc! the<br />
Party. His success would have meant a weaker position for the leader and policy determined<br />
by the conference, but he was reconciled with Salisbury in 1885. A golden age <strong>of</strong> Party<br />
organisation followed under Captain Middleton and much started then which continues today.<br />
Hn nas Principal Agent from,1885-1903, and secretary <strong>of</strong> the National Union, and tied<br />
together the Parliamentary Party, the mass organisation and Central Office.<br />
Organisations are liable to deteriorate and the defeat <strong>of</strong> 1906 - the second great<br />
defeat - showed up various weaknesses and was followed by reorganisation. Tao results were<br />
enlargement <strong>of</strong> the Central Council and the foundation <strong>of</strong> the Junior Imperial League. <strong>The</strong><br />
tao defeats <strong>of</strong> 1910 resulted in the decision to have a nhairman <strong>of</strong> the -Party organisation,<br />
and that <strong>of</strong> 1929 in the foundation ae the Research Denartment.<br />
<strong>The</strong> third great defeat in 1945 was mainly caused by a feeling that we were as a Party<br />
out <strong>of</strong> touch with the mood <strong>of</strong> the nation and intent on a return to pre-war conditions.<br />
What had to be done in the years <strong>of</strong> opposition was to get back into the rain stream <strong>of</strong> the<br />
nation's political thi.ndng and not only to get up-to-date but to be seen to be up-to-date.<br />
In the process <strong>of</strong> modernisation many important cnanges were made, many resulting from the<br />
report <strong>of</strong> the :,axwell-Fife Comnittee published in 1548, and in particular:
- 10 -<br />
<strong>The</strong> foundation <strong>of</strong> the Young Conservative Lbvement.<br />
<strong>The</strong> decision to liElt the contributions that a candidate could be asked<br />
to make to his constituency organisation.<br />
<strong>The</strong> setting up <strong>of</strong> a separate advisory cosmittee on policy representative <strong>of</strong> both<br />
Houses and the National Union with ir Butler as chairman.<br />
.<br />
<strong>The</strong> setting up <strong>of</strong> the C.P.C., the two way movement <strong>of</strong> ideas, and <strong>of</strong> Swinton.<br />
<strong>The</strong> institution <strong>of</strong> the constituency oucta system <strong>of</strong> finance•<br />
<strong>The</strong> building <strong>of</strong> an effective trade union organisation.<br />
<strong>The</strong> closer integration <strong>of</strong> the women's organisation.<br />
<strong>The</strong> amalgamation in 1948 <strong>of</strong> the Research Department, the Parliamentary Secretariak<br />
set up in 1945 and the Information Department <strong>of</strong> Central Office.<br />
<strong>The</strong> organisation which exists today consists <strong>of</strong> those elements. First there is<br />
the ParUamentary Party which consists <strong>of</strong> all those -1-10 take the whip and has a weekly<br />
meeting in the '1922' committee where all matters <strong>of</strong> general business are transacted.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are 'tactical' committees which meet weekly or fortnightly in the upstairs committee<br />
rooms. <strong>The</strong> important thing is that their membership has always been flexible; while ti-le<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers form a regular nucleus all reMbers have the right to attend any session <strong>of</strong> any<br />
committee so that they can go where the interest lies.<br />
In Opposition, the front bench spokesmen, members <strong>of</strong> the Leaders' Consultative<br />
Committee, are the chairmen. In Government the committees are entirely run by backbenchers<br />
and ministers only attend by invitation.<br />
<strong>The</strong> basic unit cf the Party in the country, the constituency, has complete control<br />
over the management <strong>of</strong> its own affairs which are run by a representative executive council<br />
and it employs a pr<strong>of</strong>essional organiser. Constituencies are voluntarily federated into<br />
the provincial areas <strong>of</strong> which there are 11 fcr England and VTales, and which are useful in<br />
conveying views to the centre, in matters <strong>of</strong> finance and mutual aid. Each constituency<br />
organisation is affiliated to the National Union and is represented on the central council<br />
and at the Annual Conference. <strong>The</strong> National Union is administered by an Executive<br />
Committee, composed <strong>of</strong> representatives cf all area councils and <strong>of</strong> the leaders and Chief<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials; a smaller General purposes committee transacts day-to-day business on behalf<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Executive. A series <strong>of</strong> advisory committees renort to the Executive.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Central Office, founded in 1867, was originally under the control <strong>of</strong> the Chief<br />
Whip, but since 1911 has been run by the Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Party Organisation appointed by<br />
the Leader <strong>of</strong> the Party. <strong>The</strong> job <strong>of</strong> Central Office,together with its <strong>of</strong>fices in the<br />
areas, is to guide, co-ordinate and encourage the work <strong>of</strong> the Party, to advise and<br />
assist constituencies and area councils and provide such services as can best be organised<br />
centrally. In addition to its specific departments there is the Conservative Political<br />
Centre in charge <strong>of</strong> political education, the Overseas Bureau, a voluntary body - the<br />
Conservative Commonwealth Council, and the physically separate Research Department• This<br />
had its own chairman, responsible directly to the Leader <strong>of</strong> the Party, from its foundation<br />
by Neville Chamberlain until the last election. Its functions are to do long-term<br />
research and help in the formulation <strong>of</strong> policy, to provide <strong>of</strong>ficial secretaries for the<br />
Party's Committees in the House, as well as briefs for debates, to provide political<br />
information to the Party as a whole, and to assist departments <strong>of</strong> Central Office with<br />
factual information. It is divided into five sections, dealing with economic affairs,<br />
home affairs, foreign affairs, the Commnnwealth and defence.<br />
In turning to consider action now and in the future it is necessary to realise that<br />
we did not suffer a great defeat in October. Though our Party organisation is good in<br />
relation to organisations in other countries, there is always bound to be room for<br />
improvement in organisations <strong>of</strong> this kind• <strong>The</strong> Labour Party organisation has been<br />
getting better since their defeat <strong>of</strong> 1955, so that we must imnrove in order to keep ahead.<br />
But while we do not need another Woolton or Butler as after 1945, because we have lived in<br />
an electioneering atmosphere over the last years we have not until now been able to<br />
tackle various long-term problems. W'erk started on these immediately after the<br />
election; the list <strong>of</strong> candidates is being revised; thought is being given to Laking<br />
Party finance more broad based, reducing the gar between the 2i-3 million subscribers<br />
and the 11 million voters and getting at other unexploited sources. <strong>The</strong> Party ought to<br />
think about getting a capital fund, doubling its income and making the sources <strong>of</strong> this<br />
income less 7.ulnerable; electioneering is going to become increasingly exnensive. A<br />
committee is looking at the status, recruitment, remuneration and training <strong>of</strong> agents and<br />
this is particularly important in view <strong>of</strong> the difference a good agent can make in a<br />
marginal situation. <strong>The</strong>re is a need for the pr<strong>of</strong>essionals in politics to be much more<br />
fully aware politically now that with television etc. political ideas, albeit muddled,<br />
penetrate much further. Attention is being paid to publicatims, to ensure they are<br />
what is wanted and get where they aro needed. <strong>The</strong> C.P.C. is basing its efforts for<br />
political education on being an independent publishing house, making impact at the level<br />
<strong>of</strong> national thought and as the channel within the Party for the tgo-way movement <strong>of</strong> ideas,
<strong>The</strong> Youn Conservatives are working to build ur their meMbership and broaden their appeal<br />
across the classes and at both ends <strong>of</strong> the age group; though the movement has been a<br />
great success it is still too exclusive. .As far as policy is concerned there are to be<br />
20 groups; the type <strong>of</strong> group is not new but the scale <strong>of</strong> the anterprise is and whereas<br />
in their past there has been a maximum <strong>of</strong> six there are 14. operatingalready. <strong>The</strong>re are<br />
8-12 members on each, generally half from the Parliamentary Party; a new feature is that<br />
their work is being backed up by research 'being done by outside bodies and this is<br />
Particularly important for international comparisons. With the prospect <strong>of</strong> a snap<br />
election there is emphasis on immediate problems and there is a new manifesto etc. in<br />
readiness.<br />
A final word about aims. "<strong>The</strong>re is much to regret in the modern world; what is<br />
not dangerously old appears to be dangerously new", and we have to understand both these<br />
feelings without pandering to either. Whatever our personal leanings we have to deal<br />
with realities, and at this time it is important for Britain to continue the work begun<br />
in the last decade <strong>of</strong> carving out a new role in the world. We have to understand the<br />
nature <strong>of</strong> the evolutionary changes going on; yet the Labout Party have all the wrong<br />
attitudes. While some are revolutionaries,the majority wish only to preserve the• status<br />
quo. In a period <strong>of</strong> rapid change a medern and progressive Conservative Government is<br />
wanted; it alone can make use <strong>of</strong> the opportunities while still having regard for the<br />
individual, and it alone will preserve the best <strong>of</strong> the old in the scraMble for the new•<br />
To get the present Government out we need to be ready, with improved organisation and<br />
relevant policies, and this can be achieved only through the co-operation <strong>of</strong> the centre<br />
and the Party throughout the country.<br />
THE TORY RIRTY'S ROLE L THE POLITICS OF THE FUTURE Mr. <strong>John</strong> W. W. Pe ton M.P.<br />
History, continuity and growth are at the basis <strong>of</strong> the Tory Party. <strong>John</strong> Stuart<br />
n11 described it as the stupid party, and there is a certain measure <strong>of</strong> safety in not<br />
being too clever; the present Government is much too clever.<br />
'Go, teach eternal wiadom how to rule<br />
<strong>The</strong>n drop into thyself and be a foolt<br />
<strong>The</strong> Tory Party must continue to avoid the dogmatic approach shown by Socialists. One <strong>of</strong><br />
the characteristics <strong>of</strong> the Conservative Party is a willingness to accept facts coupled<br />
with a lazy but resolute process <strong>of</strong> hoping for the best, and the ability to digest a<br />
Disraeli or a Churchill. In a changing world, the less we are the intellectual masters<br />
the greater will be the need for a coMbination <strong>of</strong> pragmatism and history. We have no<br />
political dogma; attitudes have always been more important than policies, which can<br />
become a considerable embarrassment as they becoee out <strong>of</strong> date.<br />
Looking back over the years <strong>of</strong> Conservative Cevernment it would seem that we were too<br />
timid in our approach, to Socialist controls, to nationalisation and to rent control.<br />
We were surprised by our successes, even though their root was deep in Conservative<br />
thinking, and were not encouraged to go on and tackle restriction elsewhere• If the<br />
Conservative Party has a role to play in the future it will not be as a pale sMdow <strong>of</strong><br />
the Socialists.<br />
How far can we expect these characteristics to be important in the future<br />
Attitudes remain more important than policies. We have to make things work; this does<br />
not mean that we have to worship the idol <strong>of</strong> Planning which the Socialists have set up.<br />
We do not have to have loa,confidence in Noddy and its outpourings simply because it was<br />
set up to be a Conservative Government. Many industrialists are unimpressed by it, by<br />
what it asks and the premises behind its questions. <strong>The</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> arranging our<br />
affairs properly brings us on to the machinery <strong>of</strong> government, which is still recognisably<br />
<strong>of</strong> the last century. For a start we have a Cabinet which is much too large; commonsense<br />
should not allow any comnittee, such as a Cabinet, which has to take decisions, to be<br />
larger than a dozen. Not only has Wilson kept his Cabinet the same size as the last<br />
administration,he has increased the nuMber <strong>of</strong> departments, and this only increases the<br />
difficulty <strong>of</strong> any gcvernment in keeping in touch with what its various parts are doing.<br />
Not unly is there a Ministry <strong>of</strong> Technology but a Ministry <strong>of</strong> Land and Natural Resouroes,<br />
with powers to do nothing. Turning to Parliament, this is not a remote body, it is<br />
an almost uncanny reflection <strong>of</strong> the Britiah people. Very little has been done about<br />
Parliar:entary procedures for a long time. 'Much is entrenched in that procedure for very<br />
good reasons, and particularly to protect the right <strong>of</strong> the minority to make its voicie<br />
heard. But Parliament today is far mere formidable when it has gone through some<br />
Processes <strong>of</strong> informing itself; the reports <strong>of</strong> the Select Committees are taken notice <strong>of</strong><br />
in the way that a good deal <strong>of</strong> its discussions are not. ';:e should remenber that it is not<br />
designed to act as a Board <strong>of</strong> Directors, it is a sounding board <strong>of</strong> opinion and an<br />
alternative to civil war. Decisions are ierertant, and hard to get, and we should<br />
welcome those whe are prepared to make them rather than always playing safe. We must<br />
always be ready to distinguish between useful institutions and sacred cows; there are<br />
few <strong>of</strong> our institutions which have not been under fire since the war, and yet very iliac<br />
has been done to reinforce theraand it is too easy te take them for grantJd.
-12-<br />
"It is hard for those who live near a bank to fear for the security <strong>of</strong> their money<br />
Equally we should be wary <strong>of</strong> the expert and <strong>of</strong> the pressure group, since we have suffered<br />
at the hands <strong>of</strong> both.<br />
We should try to make sense <strong>of</strong> progress. How many people believe that their work<br />
is <strong>of</strong> any consequence <strong>The</strong> chill plans <strong>of</strong> buxeaucratic socialism will not do anything<br />
to help. What is needed is greater thought about the aims behind education and an<br />
awareness that 'human history is a race between education and population' (H. G. Wells)<br />
Education should'aim to raise the tastes and aMbitions <strong>of</strong> everyone and for a start people<br />
need to realise that politics are the concern <strong>of</strong> all. <strong>The</strong>y must be made to see that they<br />
cannot contract out <strong>of</strong> politics; it is extraordinary that many people who have a large<br />
stake in the country can take so little interest.<br />
We must stand ngainst excessive concentrations <strong>of</strong> power. <strong>The</strong>re is first <strong>of</strong> all the<br />
danger <strong>of</strong> inefficiency; secondly, in the case <strong>of</strong> the Governmant, the fact that it always<br />
aims for the best makes concentration <strong>of</strong> power in its hands the more dangerous. We have<br />
not given sufficient attention to monopolies and trade unions, and the recent reversal<br />
<strong>of</strong> Rookes v. Barnard has tilted the balance <strong>of</strong> power back against the individual.<br />
Instead we should stand for the encouragement and reward <strong>of</strong> enterprise, and we should<br />
remember in this context that excessive taxation is no cure for greed. We must seek to<br />
preserve as much individual liberty as possible, against whoever threatens it. We must<br />
realise what Aldous Huxley pointed out, that 'organisation men and some scientists are<br />
anxious to reduce the maddening diversity <strong>of</strong> men to some kind <strong>of</strong> manageable uniformity'.<br />
If we are not careful we will find that we have lost freedom almost without noticing it.<br />
We have, therefore, to be ready to say unfashionable things and risk unpopularity and<br />
recognise that electoral bidding is not the best basis for politics.
3peech by the 2t Hon.J.<strong>Enoch</strong> one1 , LP<br />
at the 2,.=unl (.3-eneol Leetin-.! <strong>of</strong> the Beaccsf4,:o:id 3ranch<br />
<strong>of</strong> the .3ockin:fhamshire Gonseria five :,ssn.<br />
Council CarrIbers, 3eacopsfield, 8,3L p.m.14-7-idey 19 -...qrch,<br />
1955.<br />
!<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is oree1ent suberstjtion that te:e ritioh eccnomy<br />
is plasued by .---,trikes. T.17is su:erstitLon is<br />
3ritain it nowilhere near u.le uop <strong>of</strong> the internutionel<br />
table <strong>of</strong> dvs lost by strikes in broportibn to size <strong>of</strong> 1=E-,bour<br />
fnrce. Arlonz, ths '.rery top nations in t is ieeoue table ho,ie<br />
been, quite steadily for a nunber <strong>of</strong> ,le,91.'s -oast, frle United<br />
3tates and ,T.:3pan; , the rignest neti,Jn on earth,<br />
unrivalled record for combined. crsi. uh arid stability ,<br />
andithe fastet ronin industrial nati..")n in te on v:hose<br />
dsz:l±n oci-j evements in -oroduction dro,1 ministers e.lTd indutrialists<br />
to Cokyo like moths to oone die , to try to find nut<br />
it is done.<br />
In the fsce <strong>of</strong> facts like t'ese one is Un net te:::7-tbd 'uo<br />
)pel.<br />
enquire ether, ->erh_ab 3, our troule -445,T thot h,o,:e too<br />
str'kes in ritain rather t'yen -Jpo many. I 7rnmis;<br />
the peradoT too far; but it I r o o im exa:rlin7;tion.<br />
2he econom4c co nseouences <strong>of</strong>e strike te does<br />
;much fro ,rce serious t ri t .ose <strong>of</strong> e doss.<br />
"T‘a-3-_.her the one; nor the oter con ce :accarasly fr±,,.sured.<br />
the k-ne "cse indeed .e count the number <strong>of</strong> I3<br />
tae. other (...Hse t°er is netbir suscaptible to otetiST3i.e31<br />
t _ at cll. Bat strik.e c:Of o oo_lnen<br />
bet',,oeri
employers and unil)ns at the eLbense <strong>of</strong> the public may - I<br />
do not say necessarily or aL.:ays does, tut may - cause<br />
ore misuse <strong>of</strong> economic resources than a strikei#fought out<br />
over -.Teeks.<br />
.<br />
One may susbect, t)Ugh it can!,rrree be pro red,<br />
that re W/J)uld have lost, no t rai ue , if Mamm-finlipowitam!, t.here<br />
1-lod been no steel sttik.e in ....3routh les la.:37- year.<br />
1"rlose no dc7lore the T._1770Sed are ía larice <strong>of</strong> strikes in<br />
Brtain <strong>of</strong>ten also - especially I think, the,/ are Con.:,=rv-s<br />
2ivac - Tproceed to do olore -_-ilDryv. .E2 are cal led "un-<br />
„- • • •<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial strikes”. For 7ood<br />
scribed as "7;ildcat strikes". I -;onder c invented thi,,t adjectile<br />
for them': it m.i71-1; hyle been a journalist; for iJd—<br />
,---<br />
ca$t"is a 7ood flamboyant v:ord. I r--thar line ho,.'ever to<br />
think it f140.4.iy ha v e be en a trade union •.fficial, for '',Nildcat"<br />
is also a splendid smear norJ. Jat decent, re'a:sonao le person<br />
co'ild possioly hale the least sympa ith anythinj c.a<br />
.<br />
e..Ty.3.ilitst it str-.3i7hta:,,ey. int as ri.uuly a<br />
stri..e supcorted by national trade uninn is to hale<br />
r,,lorse economic consenuences tari stri'Ke rot Jo ..,..pported, if<br />
only because te firah is bac'K ed by. a ireater po...er <strong>of</strong> coi,-.3ination<br />
tiTan the second.<br />
Th a ord "<strong>of</strong>fic ial" is itself crejujic<br />
It cerries te plica tic f cur t1in cdblicly 91<br />
he a nin:: te arr,i <strong>of</strong> n9 ti nal a pp ro . d(::. no t<br />
e ,Dn'tents <strong>of</strong> en velo Pe c. ich cn out t
3<br />
the !.00d citizen feels himself duti-bound to heed them.<br />
But the difference bet,!Jeen an "<strong>of</strong>ficial" strile,:e and an<br />
un<strong>of</strong>ficial"strike is essentially rrivate diffarE ce, s=ethin<br />
relates to the internal 9-f'''9ir" <strong>of</strong><br />
on. 'feu can see this 7,1en 9 strike is , a s thei ,<br />
<strong>of</strong>f4 ci al". <strong>The</strong> econo: ic conseose'net.ts fes. me and eieryone<br />
,..1se are not thereby altered, certainly not for the better.<br />
..17he -.,;orst sriue f all t'ne <strong>of</strong>ficiel st:rike<br />
not r 1 e.<br />
.'Cfficial" is fic;" re rr,ane the onl:i -;-ord used in the field<br />
•<br />
<strong>of</strong> industrial relPtions in 9 ",2:9.,;- cr,:atea Prejudice end<br />
fostrif misund :"-i.no:ther <strong>of</strong> these is "eeace". .;hen<br />
38",/ over to ;o:ursalf ase 1ke 'industrial it<br />
ricatez does it r.cf-_<br />
'71r! ran he called "pe'<br />
ha a st,r-t teat t a -,^e et <strong>of</strong> riry he<br />
1-7a That <strong>The</strong>ac-,'",- ttere is"co-operqtion'.<br />
c.n-o-herative sort <strong>of</strong> cha7,, 3nd indeed it i3<br />
7E7 hfl, felfao-n,:,<br />
t1-7,3 n2.1,3 builet4ns e-o7aounce -_ -.<br />
•- ,'<br />
or -te;<br />
:Pour or tat 'Ishe.3 ef 7,-ace" are tie in;17<br />
-T<br />
fan d„. ,:.,7)11t."..,.lie tr. alLu r<br />
';hen,ead"no <strong>of</strong> .Loinyers
4<br />
37-7reeinz to "co-operate"f.n raisilirr rrodactjvit orat rot<br />
we tn to ourselves,"dhat excellent people these Irluqt ba<br />
9<br />
Butco-opera.tion 9re ,,,Jordscconceal<br />
very !..Inthisiraole things indeed. Peace in era aerniarhets is<br />
not 3 sloan aLich no iii a t;tract toe ho:,seife; on t`-.e con 1.2321<br />
she bs.efers to hear <strong>of</strong> 7-. nrrioe 7:;ar•', which nften mean:: •.,aha t<br />
scnone'o little racket h,as bro",7on do= ,7-3t last arLd e are LLoinz<br />
to get frle benefit <strong>of</strong> ccmpetiti ie prices. 14'en ere -::orried<br />
because ttere is no "co-e.)eration" beteen the seops<br />
Jtreet ,dnd their custo_ ers for t.:-e urnasa <strong>of</strong> fzlirtfing<br />
retail trading. On the contrary, ne :3r miL;hty anxious that<br />
our alternative sc=ces <strong>of</strong> not be "co-c-')eratin<br />
and -in:e su li be alarmed if ne he 9 rd the t a naouo <strong>of</strong> theo: acre<br />
in chouts nith a 07re:.;.p <strong>of</strong> their a,z.c-Jliers.<br />
Coytination to fix the price <strong>of</strong> ai tide or a ber7 ce<br />
- cr, , for thiit nisoter, 1074er - than te price fL.t:.nan<br />
co:: and in o7en c,,Lapetition is sons ich a are .3-7,reed to<br />
:o try and ')relent as far u z)ossiale, aco ara e .are<br />
conrinced t:.-2at the re:2'J, lts cf unc a coo tina tlon are to -;e Lee<br />
all-oce-se <strong>of</strong>f than co 'aid :otheri.se be.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is no thin:,7 :special 0: beris :Liar ha Lhis :eseec nbout<br />
the price <strong>of</strong> Ia anon - a 2,:.;ter lhfuha,aae. ter ., t, a.,<br />
be .177.,H27td btand for bkill<br />
or pro,:orti on th:-nt. aru an. rite ef fect
•<br />
5<br />
ndtion to fix tte nrice <strong>of</strong> 1 et,..-,L1r i: e7-3rtics.lar<br />
mcntcrestrini...rf, tnogercHci oe<br />
P°more<br />
c r sccept le - j CeC tive<br />
=•<br />
if it ns nyti - is the seme tl-e effect <strong>of</strong> L„ny<br />
other restrictive :prctice: it ri- s e;er:eody "Jorse <strong>of</strong>f Ln<br />
elent,o911y t'oce o beneit in the 3 L,<br />
run. muet be fe7; :c-b o eon to Do e:Lf.<strong>of</strong><br />
en economy is L.de =re efficitnt<br />
nrice <strong>of</strong> the fe.c tnrs ctedectlon '.ijT en 0: 113-,'er<br />
ht"; cm.--)Ation. ho r zty<br />
thanselree, tne C otE.;<br />
repodi9e!. snellei: ent, c...ric.:Ltly, in it: PPnlicat.ion<br />
17,:: 14 lstoor. the contrsr;, ehe bre.=..the thr---3teninze<br />
nDi siee
•<br />
:ihatsoever. fut ira=testwee- collsoti/e 0e;r:.;ainini2: does succeed<br />
in tistorting cos ts , it rrAst rniarrp.:,n,,=,' the o`osto cis s<br />
oarimoro<br />
rement in thP stsndard <strong>of</strong> ion<br />
„<br />
<strong>of</strong> tl-o • 3ritLsh .<br />
"<br />
,<br />
ker; 'and the :I-lore e:fecti-le it is,<br />
e 2he iritish<br />
industrial h;<strong>of</strong>rer -:;o.'"'-.31oner --wiurs for l es s real<br />
h!olEas thesi his coanter,mart in ',lest , and t',Iat •Yj..11 soon<br />
true , if it is not e.lready, , <strong>of</strong> 'his counter-nrts in a nurnber<br />
<strong>of</strong>' otber<br />
-.L--;uro,Deen countries. 2'lis is not Ceceu,3e e 3ritish<br />
trade unions iire not stro nL1.h, 'my more thin is is because<br />
the munocolies -and restrictive cractices -:rr:on;o7 buyers<br />
SEC<br />
sell<br />
,<br />
<strong>of</strong> other goods an:a ser ric es are not ti,Eht erioa... It is beceus<br />
industrial effort is tein.s. more effici ently used else,:here thiAn<br />
'nere . 7:'nt gives the i<br />
rlhole uest on <strong>of</strong> e tr,E.de un' ors.<br />
urenc si tie<br />
co untry<br />
can ot ford to allon t'hesrlsei_ves the lax,urj <strong>of</strong> orecticss snd<br />
he:oits, hisiejer encrusted -hi.fr sentiment an'l Oen,,,00 lent s ser—<br />
sti tian , 7:hicl: -,lace obit cl,-3:3 in the <strong>of</strong> nore <strong>of</strong>fi_cint use<br />
<strong>of</strong> oar<br />
11.) pric finind is inere,nt in the toit<br />
is n l'eso.Jnei e i2f,' nt,entfL:ri:., 0 -2<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> t to eneocieed.<br />
;; idea <strong>of</strong> "res 117,!;-:Lt io<br />
,pf thrse<br />
.n tr*le on 'Dn le i(i.ers.<br />
t'7,1,n <strong>of</strong><br />
e
•<br />
7<br />
splendid chaps, :actin", oo fio..,bt in, the int.er,ots <strong>of</strong> th..ar<br />
mern'.),-ars, .!:ho afte- cii e:rnioy them, oct -;' t;:-. 7e9ther<br />
c,;)Je nnen th the natisn.-il interest , the $ont <strong>of</strong> poso,:,le r'to)<br />
fiodel husbnds and fathers; r:hen o:e find the:n haired<br />
<strong>of</strong>f -;:ith "reshonsible" e.hojers, then ccrei , the 1.1.:;91.1caltiz)n<br />
the cso) <strong>of</strong> rjr ctisfcoticn ts be fufl ts run[1 n:7<br />
'; •<br />
n.f raid I eannot t'alte this !ie cil. i<br />
tJe " rssoonsible ifn2 hat,<br />
9naf, to I do not . res-Donei Ole fn:r<br />
or lo t-.±: an the ele .rnt crooli ud tteamid<br />
Ler:.nine th err .<br />
0-2 I rtt.73'<br />
ls eH indicate::: tio tr: em fne •:::riricipl,=;s Li -,c<strong>of</strong>ord-<br />
-. .:ftnt t-i: ti dim 'trio a a: ro--- •<br />
For ice:el f, I no t re-:tire -tns st tone , e:e-r t<br />
tH- contr-ihr,r, ccr ere tff<br />
00, is .-,onJr0o nce ,<br />
h<br />
; tr.<br />
for<br />
Trij:; t -iifi:oe -<br />
c 11. he cels, 6:i. •n , H-H<br />
1 : ts th t effett, :itnn
:iri'-.c C tYt.t:•.-,c-_ts it-, la tc<br />
----1<br />
'H:<br />
--— r• "<br />
-.1.7<br />
3.1-' a 11''.: _ ''<br />
', --<br />
t;<br />
f:-..71';':<br />
S:-L-•.c)2,.rts<br />
f.' k , er e:-.. a<br />
tc<br />
a...._,.,_ T -- -7, 2-' v ,±Z...-.., ,:-<br />
st •nci, ! iv; Ls*...____, .• s...-<br />
trsie-orro- En'7.1 -1<br />
;•es ts on<br />
-~-_-••:•: , isn ii<br />
anion<br />
1-.••<br />
Le-nos:aro •ttn ereSt, On S're to<br />
tra<br />
Ss<br />
c.s7.„ c.2.f cfteiftiarsbe-7,s<br />
marnbe-23<br />
7..o,11-_1<br />
';i2C):1-,Tdirect', cn r,<br />
erisrer-c;-:<br />
utiC 3,-incsi0n to collccsiiec<br />
itself, .<br />
,<br />
oisSI<br />
e<br />
etetitI:-.,<br />
_<br />
;;.' arsere:oc<br />
also.-i/o<br />
•<br />
r_-<br />
-0+9-<br />
tiC91 scjecticn,s. If anion: tc contre_cs 73 d'E:,siTe2 Ti<br />
sti-;•.11-3sef.<br />
laCco,t-r<br />
oti c0e d 'trice , she t•;-e; ELO<br />
Ci r -rs- their 1Cenb10231Ciot 0.7-72.e.r C s eca -<br />
c ss<br />
saSj best des shs •::-ener So <strong>of</strong> 222i r•2<br />
code. Svc de an-11.,n ce ts.e so t•••-Jt• Ee-:Lse Tc,j:Jr17,0:2,.;<br />
on.4 -1 47,.insa Se rs, and sh,'E,<br />
cific tre anion, coI in-)occtice e<br />
to<br />
f2 tiot,n e ro9Si ft) ac i , sc."-<br />
ecGnc.T - nd <strong>of</strong> s ordiviaal<br />
'1 r stns2 0Cs nion s I:-<br />
•
•<br />
9<br />
tne private combinations <strong>of</strong> e=.loyers 4--crployeeo oith<br />
czte.A.-P<br />
tne -c.,4A-4.14..t.4... <strong>of</strong> orsans <strong>of</strong> ,+-;--e :tate.<br />
Considerable experience hoc Peen zaine'j in the _last ton<br />
or fifte.,n ye rs in t nis Poontrjr. in dealins oco<strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> collective price fixins. coo surensi ly the methods to 'se<br />
adopted dePer, d on the form -;inion te co _Leo tive actior takes.<br />
ceses it is Practicable .ind necessary to outl,i.:v tne restrictive<br />
arement itse:_f; in otners it is only necessery to<br />
dorive t'Pe parties to it <strong>of</strong> t're co-,er to enforce IL by bozrcion.<br />
ITo enforceas7e lot cen prelent persons from coriouloino to Q:ether<br />
.D.OLI'L; the ter.ocs n blot they :re prepored to <strong>of</strong>fer 02 contract<br />
to seil their goods or th et: labour. But t'oe ir. c :-.;-Tek_ to<br />
tre lent oh err, done,-, from proceerlin-J_! to overe:)e ,-e<br />
or iictimise t use o s arr-i le at a different conclusion..2'.o.e<br />
<strong>of</strong> the coiled isreerrent lint lot t'7-e csercive nfo cement<br />
because it is _qnlikely Lh ut It out coerci sn se=s dtffnorri'cly<br />
from_ t. use -ss ob;<br />
conditions<br />
cc _C_LP for I on:; he m..-i:_tUned.<br />
I belie onoS direct."-1-, in<br />
seek to mi -/.3 nee. 2he free.1,,:'3sction,<br />
on tett elf <strong>of</strong> cD llective price fixir, 0: tro 1- 'onions, moon.<br />
not unless the: a is 'in e nol ri'!-..t <strong>of</strong> nc,ii-eo,$ociJatio" is<br />
controry r•._.11, <strong>of</strong> lot that <strong>of</strong>:L-<br />
:ens e-Lerbi se, le' sne Se
•<br />
10<br />
tse<br />
the ostiie poer to e.xe-7cise , coercion over nti7Trn<br />
do not c ose to 'eel L;n,7 to it, 00<br />
7,o'r;er <strong>of</strong> coercion derives orirril foot the le. - 21<br />
privileges 7.,ihich tbde onions, 3nd trcde unions anicl'uel.j,<br />
h'37e enjcyed for the ze5rs, priiileges<br />
en3o1P them to in for 2,n, ; oth ,c, r<br />
7400.LdCo.unlefu1 :n1 -:f2,'..;_ 1(.1 rosit lema gee for t-hos<br />
suffered injur.,- _3t.; their 2L3ni.e. I 3r'L not o;oinz, to enter ton$t.ht<br />
into th str • lge on1 cumplic3ted stor: <strong>of</strong> na.; thf.7:se<br />
privile7es come to be conferred in first :7;i.-3.ce.<br />
I ocen the cuestion, 7o.hich is noo: onl: sf C demic ,<br />
..,;hethe r ot sor.:.:e paso erio(.,, <strong>of</strong> time cc erc-on ono.<br />
tr3de unions e on t-tL-]nce Ceneficil to their mem S 0-2<br />
the cormianity - thou.,;h t'hc-o Is a ste'3c-ij-irii resc:-...ilDle bo(77.,/<br />
<strong>of</strong> o72inion fro:t tiTes ef.fct th•-3t<br />
rf,r,0.<br />
dc, -3rt t t no ono h7is ou.cceeded in<br />
t ose corc :o po:ers e er<br />
vs; re t or<strong>of</strong>ob<br />
t 17± c2, Com-<br />
mission, r -<br />
r. Ocnser,-;tive c....=!n r C<br />
t,t f tho--::<br />
rebt 71.2<br />
rrr 1^ tr,<br />
n i=<br />
c. mem not e r in t+,.!.•!!!!!!
*<br />
in<br />
11<br />
1/k<br />
;.::..i.i...14-/R econc;inic ecnseencee .,;hen :-:;u:r, ir a t -:.,.,n<br />
the price or I;.b oar enjc:s ,-,.:c privile.Ees ,.: icl- e re denied to<br />
con-lbintiono, fo-t- tht; ',Dwrnose <strong>of</strong> fixin:-: otf-er prioPs, t:.:n<br />
the r i;.:ht <strong>of</strong> free a s prociati on ';11 be 73 7.'e.ilf. t,/ '3nd n-Dt<br />
one <strong>of</strong> -t-:-1 e :-. cet ser_o .:',3 C be: t ,2,1e.3 0ill h :lie<br />
t,------' en L--ITio's;:2,..11 '.',:.-'en irr:.pectre ,ao 77.7-3 -:ent th...,--: 03 <strong>of</strong> ti[<br />
2,3eo.Jrcee for t'7-:e Denefit <strong>of</strong> -311 '..- e:::' :-.,...-_-;::--,le,
•<br />
•<br />
3peec. by the _it to the<br />
Ar—nuel .1.)inner <strong>of</strong> the sspoi ti on<br />
(1...etronoliten j.outh—Eastern 3r-mtth)<br />
-„<br />
u;!f-J svenor -3.m.u.ondy,<br />
But for s'-_e 22....nsport, .;c t, 19:72, th:. ,.re —d 0 e,<br />
no iud Hralte ssothition, tee s:,;;SE; t are -;old be no :-)2 i—<br />
v t e enterprise road haul ths 3 1 zs!..e.rson<br />
or firm rni,ht ecto'.":1 317 CI.:ed to carri 3nn-rer r7:erson' .3<br />
gocis for ,a1d by no-; he le seemed t' J•r‘.H .71317<br />
S the ide. thst 'body excect<br />
to di co 31 or ins tel a tele -.)1-..one. In ft ot moot re ople<br />
hsze"7,.s.":_.;:_tmed t;---.7ft is so ir:poordble for an:one ta t the st-3 te<br />
to ,do it. Fortunately —St UL rStb , for tan3tel; in<br />
otinion <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> as —tt:is •'qiU not bs neon nre3alt,<br />
firo'r, 9nd indivi Iasi:: are sole to m:Le pr<strong>of</strong>its _:trld s-:rn<br />
li;ing by prov'idinr ser-rice ibh , no r.,he orice, t eir<br />
customers find :2refere3leclni alternt..tIve<br />
3ut t',e 1932 1,ct ,,n1; fre e-:7ression <strong>of</strong>. 3 b edioi,<br />
be lief in t'-e iirtae <strong>of</strong> corotetit com-:Detiti on bet-.%eer ros<br />
form. <strong>of</strong> tr3n 3-9or. t<br />
sn 0 eti-A. on bet .:oer_ 3 z:,.<br />
t-e =3.21e forff. <strong>of</strong> trt.r. s t . is tn.;<br />
'Lion th.S isE3C, ci -,n i<strong>The</strong><br />
iittsotr it reipresen'., ,-_-es its existence.<br />
;NA r<br />
°el-lei-Lis n o reoo -E;rou.<br />
• '<br />
tnd an -or,. les .<br />
,<br />
07<br />
nere:ecc,.on
, ; I<br />
trick teoph into 3 STIIT:117 th3ttil.e.:Q.aio,wria.' - imner._ .e e t ,)<br />
.:%,,t"..il,-,A a' Ga lt /<br />
fc-tition ,is 7,,orse thell no connetition C.,hich 1-„; not true) .<br />
Th3y 9ttach ousive joiJes to corneetit i on , rJ cii it<br />
"cut-thro.9.t" corrpetit' on, or "--.•:93:te-ful" curt-oetitiun, or<br />
"unfeir" ouneoiLi<strong>of</strong>l. uiou, b t; , nut L'-a, ;el,/<br />
sor sarT"-t t'ecnle su :ot1n tt the c iion b e e en<br />
ros i tr'ans7nrt 3nd tr-msport is net "I.Thir"<br />
those o use the ro.p,rde snor E._:71.0L12",h f<br />
2hqraii; :to eelieve in c<strong>of</strong>f-2-.)etiti on need tt,<br />
2hel r s tchu, or. d cnH te<br />
he 7, the hi est <strong>of</strong> 31 .0 osit' bori : 'Du<br />
u• tre .f. 1.t,/ 2"--e one a, c<br />
.;11 h`) 1116<br />
isto in,,,,Lst that ----Co:<br />
C.;<br />
freeilon -"nd tur tunl •^:3<br />
thc.--nu,sives. 21,1c e er<br />
others' 21:-..ht,ci.--Tete , e thou ::;1-isere<br />
te3TeU , e o E 1oic<br />
03i- ti<br />
,<br />
'<br />
e<br />
041, ••• • ••HA,:,,<br />
/0-<br />
-er •Y..") t<br />
nee-, not teinr° !,et<br />
„
•<br />
esserico -t1 71. 03<br />
t c> e ‘,!-] r_t tcr Le<br />
eff: "313', --Ell 33 t"he,-<br />
i =.7 0 23 ft-, 2 C Off - 3 t<br />
tkc co - 7"=`,-) e•=31-, t '7! ace:3<br />
-T.rd e e<br />
t1:.^0J ;ii , Cri<br />
ie .1 I. if. -.- 1 :,.. -2 ij iht,c=<br />
If Jou '.'") C ff. JZ-1"-- '77' 1 I 3' ' •"-=<br />
f o - •' tc r y<br />
t cte.-1<br />
I<br />
•, '<br />
P%--'4 f, -<br />
A p
cru-i:<br />
• 73--r: or _C2 3G<br />
_<br />
c U r g • • ,2 • ;<br />
;<br />
j0C,77,<br />
r<br />
7i.TAI=4"7 '<br />
7,..TJE41 Tr T.:T. p ..,TC.0,24C,<br />
„J-<br />
A."<br />
rr e:ECT
t e i<br />
(11er" c'r ,<br />
t<br />
7.;.;;; -<br />
-<br />
-"-It 1,7 701' r":7: :2-17, .<br />
ha T '‘L'2<br />
_<br />
- T..<br />
11 2<br />
'1 .11:...„;" _123. •••3
etinz,<br />
tointhe triz,ht ' iort sreo; :au<br />
tea<br />
:zat sort<br />
.-..rac re or 1..-o >is --D-af6-.0<br />
meke u it"--e tct13 7.,he <strong>of</strong> 017.7 '.'e2T'o et hcl.re<br />
ho -"minis't.ea. E..a-f_obrtez erc t-,003<br />
Procei 4 11 5.:toorto nbr<br />
t.l."eSe<br />
co.st. Of C,-)J.2-30, ideqs; bo,t<br />
7).7e1<br />
re ido-a13 7.°3 lien"' 93 -oobsible<br />
the 'ri.;:hti i=orto .:n t<br />
t<br />
,<br />
r4- 7:f3,7.7 -1I 7;1- time,<br />
-111 neler be 0'o , ioti on<br />
2eriocis toFseth,ear. t e<br />
-end heoit3, th:te 3 , o <strong>of</strong>'<br />
oiroir ch.;an::::e in en"- rt . or: .-1<br />
or if.1.a7ht e <strong>of</strong><br />
eo.,.p,-.)-L-st..-3. :I; • I t<br />
the c b:a.bo on; it tha one , er,,-<br />
illu3trtion, J:abboo,e v-; -art<br />
eners; -at preeen . int:or:ea" :-..;E:trcleaza<br />
ee-) en fit .1re <strong>of</strong> eff<br />
:doh r t s s fr: n T.'. fa-a r<br />
a I<br />
to<br />
'er --<br />
, '<br />
-:
_<br />
'ihis is ij the sroporti on <strong>of</strong> t•e niti one effort<br />
to ssyin-2.. fur IlApsr Ls not only is ries =:t ,,different ti:feo<br />
for -r)-,s. ssme country , Dot frOM one country to 9notner.<br />
Honsna/otes o=. third <strong>of</strong> her effort tois ouroose,<br />
7;e d.eJotefienderics imentistlt.2hqt, eles,<br />
does not mefour times 33 oroepe2003<br />
n i1<br />
1<br />
•<br />
niJ o:on better Afqn<br />
me 9ns th tY circ=tces n eech country<br />
en: s.nrticuier ,-.;ne fix ts tilt een imiqor ts Ind<br />
home proauction t differen t toint . TT'<br />
7:me imp or tserf-2 'ext.) or to <strong>of</strong> C 9c1- 2 oEi on Dr ....;2e<br />
:on uoi f irft ex 9 ctij the s<br />
eedie ss to se:, it is nut e esti ,qn <strong>of</strong> •-'ret c on ,<br />
c-inrot , se medte or 2ro iidedYi home. At s price eno tinch,<br />
slmost thIon imtorted cen be mede ot ',o)me 9<br />
replsced b, 9 ho-:,s-ms7e ,su.bstitate. itise<br />
tbe r the 're lue f ore:27one nroducihl the e cle<br />
substitute tl'.ome is ',ter Dr less ten the<br />
erticie. ere h-s been 2reet<br />
OrtatiCli LC, t:r1is country <strong>of</strong> v2iinery menuf<br />
.-35t e f9ct thst Lo-icrts st nib nr;rtico,ler<br />
fi zar e , iS undJ e r<br />
sY.1.bsosin,..; ot 1J q not riht . n:Hc - h<strong>of</strong>6his<br />
Too is no ur,:<strong>of</strong> - such ere e fer sm oro portion<br />
bf our netiono,1 sroduct ter. uf -It <strong>of</strong> en,, e Cdom,:-on
1rke t countries: in :;estern CTermany. the •Drupor tion<br />
ss large ein , in lrnce it is over tice s la_rEe.<br />
7.2here are t-!:o , enc only t.,-;o , <strong>of</strong> tryin::. to ec 9 S<br />
near as possible to the ioort iflLi eoorts t<br />
,rorn =mt. One mathod is to sc eore Bro'rm .3nd s ci<br />
servants (permanent or ta-nporary ) , his bi3 n-11 little T.:Teddies)<br />
his c orrnit tees anP'. councils and the rest, to -fin-, out , and<br />
havincr, done so , to 009x, bribe , threaten, --:bb.se, -and try to<br />
compel de to :4 ct accordin.21y. ..2his netod resenolet noth in7 so<br />
much cc i iponot3nus try to catch fleas. :T.ot hI sin:: the 07,:0<br />
eeentiJ paeliictiDfls for t7-ie job, 7,-.;hich. re (uicicness and<br />
!art<br />
)<br />
],,Lno7.) hereti-oe fless :rej ,tn:1 fie<br />
not cstch thern if aid . : 27et.pre 37rion rid Cc. d3 not<br />
311 eh cliFlnes ire - here s. throl,unut<br />
-If -<br />
could not catch un them if they (tlid. :Zhe only r.t)pe <strong>of</strong><br />
.7ettin:27 any-here s.r tT-ie tu nf,fe er rbody on the :ot<br />
.7:11 the time, comparia,7: t Jis. e one coarse onen<br />
to<br />
-- 1.th every other course dipen p9sin<br />
firmly on ,..-hat oe or2e consumer ntu. -nder this 'stem it<br />
till nay people to b r ona orci: end t sell ciroli c•-3 r '3, 3<br />
oosiblt tho.3a '..),..inrUes <strong>of</strong> uos nd 3erlices hca re<br />
imports, '::nd ths rijt ex oort,4 to for Jou 'V2)n<br />
to ru.sr..,. peuple h ,Tao eyLL,Dr-ing ,<br />
ben:edallin7 t!PerL ci E::t on )i.th t is<br />
intc-::rest<br />
.
-6—<br />
don't ha..'e to threaten, 9.bat,,,e or denirete the citi',en<br />
r buiinz .anci selii nd;:_;•oin.,-.7 business in the<br />
a'ay tInet makes best sense to him.<br />
this eoint somebody is sure; to say: "V ry ell , but if you<br />
jast leaJe imnorts 'and exports to be fixee by these marl,:et forces<br />
s!nat 1-97)7,,ens to oar balance, <strong>of</strong> nayments%; It ....Heald to oabt or<br />
rizht -!ith the nre-l914 Eola standara, s,17ichi reduced ,:lexiond<br />
if imeorts rose eboie the trignt'leiel, and increased it if they<br />
fell belo). t d ls0 ork if the .)era free to fr..:(xie up<br />
in ;nT3 <strong>of</strong> other currencies so as to maintain<br />
betsen the sunply end deman(f'., for pounds to 'nay oar ennerts 3,na<br />
for other currencies to bay oar imports. ,,ut<br />
;€ out<br />
tod3." is a currency neFsed externally at AO.co, or<br />
cents, and a currenc io intern9lly te ..,;-0ernment is ree<br />
to increase, sr rermit ee increase, ara lib. .rm thenY'<br />
Of course, tee t=itements "7,.-;2t'i true<br />
. the<br />
fact tleat s;e cannot bac"K 1'j14 is no re ,3 s ..t.:or triin J...)<br />
beck to 17th century france Cr mediieval -Lurone, I en rtonriirchs<br />
or roilL3 decided °.,:r-Ht -their outjents and c-itj-oens s'nesHd<br />
allreo. to T.cie o, ṯo '-;J"c sell. .hmcir else<br />
o tered, t e eifficalty economic C`7"" d<br />
r e Itin r3 e.r," t 1 complex ec trni se as ()ear<br />
th an: 'r as not din in i t atlt<br />
7r7,!r'Ket o 7-)=-5rfor.:n its reolace.7.ble b<br />
sibie anJ:er t'Ite ne.o conUitions.
-7-<br />
2he i.-Jloe <strong>of</strong>currencyoe ,neLled at a ie Tel<br />
- hich does not corresnond tin: one ",-ar oioh another,<br />
444 rahP sunnly and dern.--,nd for it in relati on to .-;ne sub-31]<br />
-and lemand for the other currencies in terms <strong>of</strong> -:;htch it is<br />
ber.p:ed. I do not proro=e to enter irto the r:uestion -<strong>of</strong> -;hether<br />
ytk<br />
a need currency is, or is not, desirable at ell thoult<br />
doubt if this nuestion, -.,,fhich hes been battened ao7An under<br />
hatches for t-„Nenty Jeers, can be kept there mach lonEer.<br />
simply ooserve that, as this country' 3 talance <strong>of</strong> nayments on<br />
current account has until recently been oeil"in t'-,e black",<br />
takin one y,=-ar -41 th nother, there is no re.ason 3t r)res.ent to<br />
--spnose that the existin:: tyrrity ot the round sterlin. is out <strong>of</strong><br />
line ith fundamental economic realitiies.<br />
:e mill assume then that the iscr.a.intained at its bresent<br />
parity. •L'het beinP: so, if dArn.:n d a t home outstrips pro bc ti on<br />
41T so much that prices ri,=,-e faste,7. here thr_n in ouuOsriEs<br />
th hiob e trade, the reS'j7 t ill te tht it<br />
m more'.adv.-:ntaeous to import, less ..adcrint-,....eous to -tomrrt,<br />
than it real _Ly is. • :market deprifed <strong>of</strong> it-- bo.-.er to<br />
fr-f<br />
determine the tri.ht imnorts., the. ts to T)ay<br />
them; toadthis in trn manifests itself in "3 balance<br />
deficit and - hen foreiraers stop sendint os ut ts it CO 10 -<br />
d
:;`-• r-- 2, 777T<br />
7.; c:ruT77-pTscs<br />
9Tdo7E,<br />
c,-,9u7srcE,G, TrTo'a;.j 97T 7T_7:7<br />
sT as -1..T3Tc3 r7 ,To<br />
oi su O 30333 I-•JOOT<br />
'aEl;TTo(7:r 1-17:ToGdstT ,,00,<br />
—,112TdE0E9 Jo<br />
TJOJ 7-107JP UT 3:-Thja 3 1 ()= 3101 ST s7T74.7<br />
.7,./7uTap 3TC. O1 OC<br />
c a,;..Tr.,Jodur 17,7 :J= 3In01JJ-1T. 2 :TTC4 27-1 TO'P-TTC-1<br />
0 0 TTī r•L n p rOT 3 0>3 rz±<br />
„<br />
arooj, — c3n7 JOJ ETTp:p<br />
77'17.7;;47r, -7 77.:T 3t-97..1 JO 3-517; 311<br />
uoToT,TTasrC 103 aT sT<br />
313C oa :=uT:TJ aou 33J uoT;E:oTJTaErc ou oT<br />
ao,T,T'af7,77.3J1 1--csosT,Tp sa0um0a701 a=„-,;a •<br />
.:ToATT,TuT ITau-LasuT YToor<br />
333 Yq.Eric"p`c, ETUC. 010J1 aoj<br />
7177-291 T0 'IDGauGruT u;sq q., 9/7 5124 pol4a97 ,0<br />
-ITT<br />
'IEG sT nç<br />
75 09t9 1100,0 .7.57rTJqvunte<br />
,T) 03T9 00 0". - ITrpun Garaanlj r.4.0u 170(rp squa71;1d<br />
Jo 90u6Tc, 2uTTJ9aE Jo J12C. 43 4C1xaual2TE- 7.uoo<br />
30 , ITT- T.9PGT<br />
a os op oa o.<br />
10,r17, bb-t rc sflxiTTOT<br />
uT pG;rdsTc<br />
1.011 ST sTLiag Nlou.i. I53 OE oz. :,9-11o4 12 u3T0OP J,".) TGAGT<br />
GouGTITJurT 03 00303 2742. I<br />
J9AGGI.1 ( qt_l@zuaataf_. e412,7
- 3-<br />
en incolies ..7,nd prices policy: e foredcoaned ettept to tr<br />
to set eleryone el a to beh7,-;e in s,ich y the-, the<br />
ai-o.lernment cen shirk it 0 respcnsibilit;, hith<br />
If the totl lelel <strong>of</strong> 1.3:r] ,J cor:esponds -LiLn neutrel<br />
balence <strong>of</strong> bojments ott'n-a present<br />
parity <strong>of</strong> tterlins, then<br />
Ind the '-i=zht' imlaorts, end<br />
people their c-n efforts ill —<br />
the eprorts to Pei fur the", eaahorted<br />
ble,Led, re,Jerded Dr pdraished, :and the: Jo 30 -2,1thoat onyone<br />
hevin: to 4/e thi.nstrLIctions. LI' the Thierrient<br />
in coshin s.the level <strong>of</strong> demend hishea: thin<br />
koeciraL;<br />
it<br />
hi:3-17. aer then thet, tLe';' nothin,-: else th3t they or anyone ben 'do<br />
s-31e the bal.ance <strong>of</strong> 'o.-7;yTient and It'ie
.3t3ect by the iit Hon. J. Lnoch , tc th<br />
T4ri3to1 17:orth :03t Consoriti ',.3.soci tne<br />
H11, ;esttu2y-on-'22i^b, t .45<br />
28t1' .0'eb2u3ry ,<br />
-<br />
30 no',.; kno':: S'-overnmen t ci itt expendi tor e to<br />
intenr-ie tc ri 39 in the next fin-3nbi a] je a7" b 3 'Der cent - 02<br />
5 nP7' bont if one iEnores, the inbebse in orit-is sihce :e<br />
2heolernor <strong>of</strong> the 3ork <strong>of</strong> nnd tho ejer:<br />
le3 <strong>of</strong> :To/err-tent en7o<br />
tare , let -1.iono the, 7brotose1<br />
:el,<br />
is aod tin tt oc sll 3h'a/C :nli0iii lor*, 3<br />
(-:22‘; on like tin3. ":Tot Choncellor<br />
he -iuer: 'if the nati onsl incbfne ,A7) T:z fist 1_ intent'.<br />
to r:foe i'xIL:-crnment 37) ent' inc„ e;erj, thin<br />
i<br />
before. On thp other han d, if t<br />
nFltionod. incur,:e Uues<br />
-,..Z7) '3 foot then so muc'r-. the 2.....-3e fu2 else. I intend<br />
to see th--3 the' ,17t11 or-Jend<br />
.H:30<br />
-nend' tire -<br />
jern:Tlent ez7'eri-Jit„Ard - is<br />
cons trac ,i/e exr)enditu re , eu:ionUi tht, is nor e<br />
than I ould c.26 to s.b, boot yoozrs. 2:TeferC.2e 1113C,<br />
necessbry , rt,b'ke ro<strong>of</strong>:: for<br />
;e3_2_ th'3,..t' ol'An<br />
e nioD ^cce. 5'3ck bre benti,- to-see --h.b t<br />
, 1O 2rime iflit 2 3 3: riclIsensc<br />
Ltr'd Cromec h been talin eJ_:-.)endtts ;fit's<br />
the ,.Iifforence bet-:een 7ttie.<br />
71d<br />
it 3 loolic <strong>of</strong><br />
t' 32 te deciJe 0',3_e on -11 ech.
Let Lord Cromer confille cbser/-tions, if he must make<br />
them st '311, to the totol.'<br />
-.L-q the Primel,inister is -o2ons<br />
nd ord Cromer is<br />
ri -ht Public =and private exPeniture ure not the same Ln their<br />
tent<br />
financidl and ecunomic effects. fhere is s ver,<br />
difference Peta,Jeen your expenditure and mine dri, the -zovernment's<br />
expenditure.<br />
If you -'!nd I intend tp spend -cut firZi e e nut<br />
enou6h money, hsie no choire bat to .-,hliank 'patter uf i.e. 1,Tot so<br />
the /_iovernment: if they dre short, they can either make ;Du -and me<br />
pdy more in t,ax.ation, or else they cdn actudlly cred,te additionel<br />
.money - C facility 7:hic nn7: those <strong>of</strong> as enjoy sh<br />
iery<br />
skilful dnd unscrubuleus enP.ravers. _7-,nd note: th-t jolernment3<br />
have nut or'y the po-!Jer but t:e incentile to hach on redess.<br />
en you -.bn I ;rii our budets, e don't ha:e to tell -any.y<br />
else or apoluire for it in Pdrliament or ifoe Thniatatio.ns fro<br />
outraed loters anC. Jested intoreste. A volerment does.<br />
Politicians to increase 1-) Jio eKpenaiture is e'lei<br />
to<br />
refrain from increasini-T it, lt alon to reduce it, is hend and,.<br />
ancomfo rts ole . 2flus it is th t Jo etnTen t Lhtenti<br />
' _17etcsrried throuh, irrespectile <strong>of</strong> -<br />
,1.str oh be e3j.1<br />
bein„: ore-,ted f3=3ter r;-.7-!n 000ie ull senT ces<br />
- irreo ecti:e in<br />
other ",)ords, <strong>of</strong> -rte infltIon<br />
riCjne-17<br />
ne2fectl0<br />
1'77rei 2 _colic<br />
nditure cd,Jses
-<br />
It me.y be soi'f, th tt I h.ave o verlooked one other<br />
bossibility: theovernment could meet some <strong>of</strong> its<br />
expenditure by torroinE from you Tm37.1me - ch min the<br />
money out <strong>of</strong> our pockets, instesid <strong>of</strong> for cin,,2 it from us <strong>of</strong><br />
.3 •<br />
fhis is the re3son the bud,r3..et deficiP - the<br />
excenditure not ProPosed to be met by toxation - is no,':.3ds<br />
described bi Chs,ncellors <strong>of</strong> the Exci-eciuer Gs their 'Tnet bp rrorAxiE<br />
reiuirement I im so rry to*rs3 le to di so.V)01.11,-., you over this ,<br />
but I an Croiu I must. Eo7; mach do you think. the EL Jeri-a-Lent<br />
succee;'Jed in borro-:inE from the 7u-lic hy- the ssle <strong>of</strong> securitie s<br />
the,, t')hole <strong>of</strong> the iid 0tOJ th e Cons cr1501<br />
/T/J:t • • ;!., • 1:t<br />
cffice he onsoer fHd:drscticolij j 3t-,<br />
million or so. Even more rem s rks Ole - dnd inbtracti ie - is th.e<br />
thiP h oene-d. .hrin the fir st hs' f <strong>of</strong> oh t period the<br />
Eorernmentsuccee— in OorroinE substsicti;]l toms on t<br />
re-:if from 1;31- to inciusi •Te<br />
th e<br />
seconf. I-Hif <strong>of</strong> the period , 136.!.-34.1 ell thi e so<br />
revers -3nd t±e, 3o,/ernmorit :331 to :)se...co me 3 nst purc-f3ser <strong>of</strong> its<br />
o-,/Jn securities on s .:r. 3nd sc -31e , u to so t'ce<br />
so rro7;in.,3- o tie orecetimie ee /en -3. Dot ii sl SEen<br />
-pattern nt 00000 lieS :,nd sus: oG sent<br />
- t'olerc.:'!.; no ounoomoj in '.,!Ito in/ehti,3n<br />
L.1.71.7 --072ds - co-L.re;sn'on. It -nor<br />
:clic e/m3er_ditu0e ie<br />
:,ropisrt's -on oe 0:0 St :rE It
0<br />
take s1e <strong>of</strong> '3 3.":.'3110 - not thio o tpe, e ier<br />
• -<br />
for rictory. . rom to 13b-'7-'3' the -,Dropor ef<br />
expenditure to natio091 o:ne f e.17 contin.i.ccus'• e,r fr. ter<br />
ros:.a. •_c;,rain, antil by the end <strong>of</strong> 0c0 13 J-,7:32s in <strong>of</strong>fice it<br />
obout 33hih F-3 it 1"-<br />
beto• pen t0 mo:rerrent:3 ic nut, cc foier3t31; itI a one <strong>of</strong> e<br />
effect. .2hile oobic expendituro in a-e1_ te.0)n.0<br />
oeieLiJeiJf31.1in•1, t 0 3 Te0)O0t<br />
and 133 therety in less •dal-.E.er uf<br />
to :'.e,et it'nett<br />
-4 3<br />
f :fluff 0O3uol<br />
borroinur. 7-2'-:u1r'ements" 'pi ot itself , .z-re,:•-•..n.TE, in<br />
ic<br />
t'ee<br />
,pointin_;<br />
Inc resed its c:1-3iLIS t._ e<br />
borro-:; 13.7 e d-ane7er <strong>of</strong> infl'ation<br />
2Pre lit netirt,neci01 3cryd-1-3 eoen;.iro<br />
oe<br />
,<br />
jr, :<br />
to<br />
th zoo. end rye<br />
2he op!. ec t4 o'F'<br />
"ihint ti ri - hih on '.--: er„, :•-•.u.<br />
Di the l'Ioe<br />
Toliciele then<br />
•<br />
e2 "<br />
oreda.5t:00<br />
n t .ee 0.<br />
n-5,ot' •fecu r••<br />
t<br />
•<br />
:C)t<br />
;t<br />
f -ec,c e e <strong>of</strong>: .• e.n
•<br />
,<br />
- •<br />
r o--,-e-f2 the next d r f cc) '1 .3oz.E.,-131-1<br />
uddeni‘i ch-anes, onc' the no.ti3n,e1 i'JCOILO<br />
o end <strong>of</strong> th,- dece(1e -et e coi:-.7-ound te<br />
s ,c3st -]-.• I n 9.3 15:'•f:: e to2Lberiend el, then<br />
e:-K2b enidita re -.;:.1.1‘.1 ine-r-eeerit in22e-:1,-P in OJnden . t<br />
no r.3cct eniscx c-r=ito hixeifto fu t i to re on. the<br />
Jr:suoborted essuolotion theJt his,inclooLe<br />
2:3ster then it s zer done before; non esen„,‘ rud ont on.<br />
2ho ,bnlysxe cc urte end 3e e inco:rb nit<br />
olon our ;2nlic exnenditore in fne i ,fht <strong>of</strong> reolibe,',,<br />
7_0n n:ish-fuanril:r:erit nropheoie,.<br />
2he snenct4 on fnn tin other-:ibe ix bri,rete<br />
'eon; on'. the ot-rIcruritoj court. 2h nirco it cDon ;ion<br />
on,:" ()rider hon h,eo r eefil .„!<br />
s-.9nction ohis is J-et n.e do nne r -o inn. c icumo-our.d intereo<br />
ie hoen dise,„ibsi.„_ no tes terz u <strong>of</strong> 3C, 21c.CIT<br />
'ter •;nnur:--:. Let us loo--ri t ixfcin innt,•<br />
rrentionea, this „io'r:Ir's LTins i1for - inonn .2nrico3<br />
fr; -7; e <strong>of</strong> ne ni: inn o brit . int<br />
-<br />
contolnued t this re Toe icon tris<br />
f if to;in inc 01^ pok tin„z:; n b the r , one. -fluex in<br />
1-1-----lveT1 to; ur Jet -3,no leco finn<br />
7.'1.4<br />
no int er:,,3'.o in th eir o u n<br />
40-<br />
<strong>of</strong> tocil otroct-:J,re eiaio ith t in.tne effect <strong>of</strong> ihfition<br />
on en;tnin:: tcele, in fonl,inuf,u :Jr<br />
j
-6-<br />
But !Je; are 310 entitled to con-siOer 7.hat effect 3<br />
, otiracuclly ris1n broportion <strong>of</strong> ablic e:ispenditure is<br />
r unon the efficienny <strong>of</strong> tho econom;. It is<br />
be;rgin:-.: the 7uestion to describe public<br />
expeniita-,, es tcretile'<br />
or 'const,'uctive'. Obriousi: there •hole sectors <strong>of</strong><br />
exreniture, such es clefenne, ich hoe:er ne3ess33 could not<br />
co02t1v9b1y be described in<br />
reistributiie expenditures <strong>of</strong> the -y, ieifcre<br />
shon thdt the net benefit <strong>of</strong> the sociaL<br />
those terms. 2hen tLare ere the<br />
state. It has been<br />
serlices<br />
fsniij, hen <strong>of</strong>fset e.„7,ainst p_coIes3D1J9 t<br />
eurprisin,71y loT leiel <strong>of</strong> income - onl; aeeL in t-e c-se <strong>of</strong><br />
3 11..rriedcouble. .;urel; -_aentitatirely thero_e, list<br />
-amount o_ this refs,ribu.-Lre en.<br />
the 3erise thst it 'Joss no7, re=ult in increasin te net<br />
nurchosimz<br />
bc,::er <strong>of</strong> t.r.se -;hu are supoted<br />
to ce 163 L-: enefici-<br />
On th otlher hana, lie ;ed .-u31i7etlie1y, it im.--)Jses<br />
bundle <strong>of</strong> cl-.oices anon ell or ne-_:cly nll, -:;31,- e3 the et,te<br />
far-reechin; influence on the ,dttern<br />
enterprises<br />
2hen a --in, t'here ,:re the exoer.,:aitos dodu odolic<br />
c.,f<br />
ir<br />
t_oese . dre intended to<br />
cc prodactire; tut j 3t oecaue:e te interest anon<br />
it u-,e.-.7.uernteed bj the stdte,O uod in hr.D<br />
eff-lcienti," resourtes 2C oein.. 7 used 2Cfl te ';;S:there<br />
short, nu eft -F.,ctile copetitien,<br />
eite-2 for c..popi,„d er<br />
/be iJ ,eoL,--:;r7_,d on
-7-<br />
priiate account,-:(-Jald hs:e been 13id out to produce ;:reate'.<br />
satisfaction.<br />
T.hose <strong>of</strong> us '::ho belive<br />
the anser is in the<br />
'affirmative, oecoase the salin<br />
hale been applied to<br />
Produce a pr<strong>of</strong>it and the consumption oulf, .fe. corresponded<br />
the pattern <strong>of</strong> pa:alio -i.shes, ere reinforced b;!- notic1n2 that<br />
throui:hout the countries east <strong>of</strong> the Iron Curtain these qr,--rj teots<br />
3re<br />
hCflEi introduced and deieloPed ir order to improie<br />
4<br />
r.).n)(:“.1c4- e efficiency. it 13 one cr the supre!-bs 1ronies <strong>of</strong> our<br />
time that the communist economies, after nadind throuj-_ oceans <strong>of</strong><br />
blood and ii iin for decades under brutl uocressiun, are findin:7.<br />
thcir a)•a.y for-:ard t. the methods <strong>of</strong>• cacit-ilism at t:e precise<br />
moment 7Jher 3ritain hesitates on the brink_ bf stanionin them.<br />
Even on the moot indalent<br />
licd <strong>of</strong> the n-He-ap <strong>of</strong> drit31:'3<br />
present and brojected pdatic ennenditare, it is impossible op<br />
er:.7.ue t'nat i- its :ro-.,)t17 in tota<br />
3he rete<br />
at 'nich /,:ce national income<br />
hit):ferto been ri:=ing, she ,‘esult<br />
be to reduce the productiie el:ficiency <strong>of</strong> this coanl...ry.<br />
-o one can Clain tht tn cr three ncr cent <strong>of</strong>f Thi s I enS -1<br />
oald mean any iLnit-ation <strong>of</strong> 0=.1r<br />
'.;11'to sell odr ei.purt<br />
inlest in the forms <strong>of</strong> production<br />
HenS brosbects fur T.:e<br />
future, or to incre-se tee efficiency ani acCesS <strong>of</strong> the<br />
022.<br />
,uite the contr:.ry. jo let us O4e<br />
this car resolie: •<br />
te or fsi tened, so culei into tarnir_•.. aode fene -)U2<br />
claim Let,. and common-sense la,acesit<br />
to con.-oril and<br />
and
-5-<br />
:zuide our -oublic ex7penditure tYiti no loner<br />
ur_lon this countri the recurrent menlce fp:' inflationary<br />
crises or the fr,ore insidious 'out in te lono run r-Lore<br />
d2nerous otror)hy <strong>of</strong> 3n incre9sin:E1y stte-r)Irlited economy.<br />
'<br />
°
( 3<br />
speech bsy. the :It Hon.(T.<strong>Enoch</strong> ceii,ILZ",<br />
to the Aylesbury 3onservativa :;omen 6 Ottee<br />
at the 3xcoub Asseoly Hall, Aylesbury,<br />
10.30 a.m.Tbursdsys25th rZeb. 1965.<br />
Last October ere diiided fram victory by narracJ<br />
line. Only t he thinnest <strong>of</strong> m3 rins decreed that the r)eriod<br />
<strong>of</strong> 13 years contonuous Conse-rvative ad!Linistrtion under<br />
four Prime Yinisters 7.:as not to be extended for oerhecs<br />
AMTeral years more. Th,-; narro-.'ines t1-. at margin can be<br />
deceptive and even dsnerJus to you and me Ai 0 are daily<br />
ensa2;ed in the -:ork <strong>of</strong> orzanisation, <strong>of</strong> canvassin, <strong>of</strong> -Preparation<br />
<strong>of</strong> .;11 kinds, u7on Leh a future victor; -3t the<br />
r)olls must be based. It coJ.l,±.'. tembt us to in ter-ns<br />
line<br />
<strong>of</strong> recrossin: tt narro; fin the reverse direction<br />
art takin:: from ;rnere left <strong>of</strong>f ':ifter a rief,<br />
but not historic:lly sinnificant , interruption. '21.7e IDIIrsa<br />
"p...ettny back in to ha:3er", rhic 7;c 1i h-;:bitully use,<br />
could easily rrisad- us in this .-•_:ntext into belierinz t'rat<br />
,:-±ctually is a c,uestion <strong>of</strong> bJ,k.<br />
.:A.sh ale cou..d V.:a -1 7 :ha e 3nd t inasa a<br />
--- ITeitber id(IFilE! nor -laticras<br />
cn a:Jar zzo back. fe ol(.11 ,bil aatant r <strong>of</strong> h,ao,s tss't to<br />
.re.21indna he,rere Jt rLD<br />
7:1 ri in t t;:e 7.:ne<br />
ri er ce' t e ri ver as o n If' • .7..tilre ,<br />
cf 9ii aba71-7-
co.T.e to 7o,....Jer ot t,77e te•-7,innin-E <strong>of</strong> thi<br />
perio,.9. <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice. 2'ne'eafter, t rj,7<br />
se, !.2..ent ch on:2e s ond c 91-Ices, orzt":7-ten int by_lt<br />
umbili cal al.. ord continued to fircily•<br />
01 to thIct oc <strong>of</strong> co 1 le o te fCio<br />
indtcd ri infoicten-3:abLe on•o•<br />
it tieii ccoll'.:1 be. rip ‘f_e_n-.Hocrotic -2et.t:onci t-si •<br />
jT<br />
-.1be •Tetis t thttt- :iiuco.o•-1<br />
one- r) t ri„: o'• n<br />
don.. ,c,ler be<br />
fic ti on c cc e<br />
rte 22foot o re0ort 2 .:.sh e the<br />
7. aria °,-rot'otort.i _o-,t.t• t-.7<br />
.•<br />
n<br />
•<br />
'<br />
,tt<br />
Lt;
e r e t i ree. •;<br />
o rs for lo e3 n e d<br />
be in ea rb Lae , th g9E their necks<br />
ill r Eeist the te.:..tetio-_-). tr. on: Ti pro-<br />
1 17 .7} ":;E: er<br />
ea to t c or. n tt 1<br />
tic the eape oo2.ino fth.e the (..;:pec 17, -<br />
t i ono <strong>of</strong> el eci one <strong>of</strong> ,de .„ --ore ref a te e.2 E reality<br />
1213 t ".r;e :Par ty 2:n t oc 7-1d. o do to- d'i.7./<br />
sho:ildb<br />
sa :3 fresh in obiri t 72.e 1,9<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1965 io dirent fron t1 e. orld <strong>of</strong> 1951. Unieee it io<br />
to see' nee'J inife J t do ne-r4 er<br />
and 07).--)ozturait-J, t the 11 riot<br />
rth fleTin. u oo:ct be tied to et.,.-,!t emento , i-<br />
tudee, to noldbtes 3erc,er .=.0.1-'',=.2n.m..etA mieili:=:3.Er<br />
1-.171 en to he." 2."od E' e'.°,7. -L.- bz J. et 02.20 tho:<br />
t.!ere Conser.L.:3til3 OVO2. 2 =-!.1-1,7d t<br />
c1..T.itted 1 ••• bet.-<br />
1984, s1i bu:Telple.-3:3 to do DJ t'e<br />
<strong>The</strong> t rd tt<br />
the r ti 1 r notice. :7,e, , flI<br />
, is tt..stified t.ecedoe ere oommitted<br />
Ice:..st. <strong>The</strong> onl: '.tion for ele.,-:ent<br />
ri;r:o.Jrode ezelmin.Htien Ifl. debr3tea ieliele it<br />
co:reeponds toehe preeent c out 32-i7:lin J3 e<br />
em in 1935 -r.' 3 a fu t.oure e c dn
.11 111•11<br />
•<br />
otand<br />
0\<br />
Z<br />
Toint <strong>of</strong> thot Tyr es Prl t .<br />
142 t oresent poses a stern but zirr_ole -..oesti on :o -r.; -<br />
peop.ee <strong>of</strong> these isl'ands. Have -:.:e the 000ra2.e to ' ccept<br />
thh.:•-t it is out <strong>of</strong> our o':_ n '3 silizi es 'in'f, resources hsre , such<br />
a s t hey are , tha t our future must be fashioned '',:ind if so,<br />
have 7e th,1 courJJe to -,-D:17, 1-, . ete b i li es end resources co<br />
the only truthful, the only acid test - th.,:t <strong>of</strong> competition,<br />
be te; e en Insn and man , comT; any and c<strong>of</strong>.:nany , industry and indu<br />
s try , co untr,-,,. and country <br />
<strong>The</strong> Conserva tive Forty, , if it 'r.2 es,..imE , ....i 1 r tha n-:rle <strong>of</strong> t he<br />
ni tion to '3!-Is'i've-.2 Yes to the se -_ue sti ors mus t ;_-7ubmit e ;ery debar<br />
trleT t <strong>of</strong> Ito ilejt and <strong>of</strong> the n3 t Lon-_Il life to 'i]. un To a<br />
1<br />
rin6<br />
analysis in the iz,1- t <strong>of</strong> th at .,n s'er before i t dare cl'lic: th e<br />
op',)orta -_ity to ,...,bv ern. Nothing ':ihich ,',,e ha ze UJne o r per-<br />
:flitted to be done in the bast, nothin; -,'-' -Leh hie pc.-..e like<br />
to -;;rite into uur --)lans for the fu tore, can be alio -,e,,d te<br />
stand unLass it -:ill -abide this test. For my o',.:Ja 7: ',Tr, i I<br />
ha ze tentu rerJ to -:ay tht I ',io not see h c—, , re,: ireT.eht<br />
can be oonsistenl, 7.Ji.t7 the beloterirac so bsidi sir. uncompetitite<br />
industries and tnouLpetitive rei4ons ; or .-'„Hith<br />
nrevent..in.7 ,s.cods ari.d ser iic es , includiniz .13nd and - omes,<br />
ff'om findi ;--- fl-air Trice in the open fri'" i I ' .c!, 5; 01' ,iith a couiescence<br />
in the ste te o;iner ship ''= l':!2 . 2 .: ":. J ,"., U 2 ')ur infcs tl',.;<br />
C Lit <strong>of</strong> combetiti .,, for cseit a'n,.1 cost:IL; or ,-,i ;h the ps:na-
5<br />
isin.,7 or denigrtion <strong>of</strong> ,health and nr<strong>of</strong>its, inclufltng<br />
spital .s .ains; or ,Ath the pretesion <strong>of</strong> governments or<br />
commissions to clan the economic future and adjudicate<br />
uthe ritt relative v:.7ilues <strong>of</strong> men and t'-ins;<br />
or mith 1as Ahich 'bertetuate the privileges <strong>of</strong> restrictionism<br />
it labour, brins and skill.<br />
i<br />
Inyone ':Lho peeps under these headings can :c17iimpse<br />
To move a sinle ste-p in ony<br />
<strong>of</strong> tY.o:-,c directions<br />
to disturb rested interests, to court t 1ne loss <strong>of</strong> votes,<br />
rut,'<br />
to a:front old prejudices, to be ac2used <strong>of</strong> innumnity, even<br />
tc eat t1-:at most diusting <strong>of</strong> meals - one s -,o-Ln<br />
But if the dif:iculties are at, SO is tYe prize tlso.<br />
It is not for tIte sake <strong>of</strong> adry-as-dust theory, or bec:_luse<br />
<strong>of</strong> the ecedemic bos,,tj and or,7,-. cision <strong>of</strong> a market economy,<br />
or from noterialistic clealatin <strong>of</strong> a point per cent. less<br />
or more to be rained ere or there, tha e are calle'l -upon<br />
to co=erfl tne test <strong>of</strong> comnetition to the 1- it.ion,<br />
9nd to<br />
submit our can oolicies and 'ctinns to tHat test fjrt. 21-le<br />
.9e.mnd coes pasionate art direct fro& te heart <strong>of</strong> nat'nn1<br />
pride itself. to-dai needs .des')ertely fOr its u7'n<br />
sake, for bhe sake <strong>of</strong> its self-respect, to regain 1- ,e confi.<br />
dence ma the contiction that it C9r:1Yold up its :1r, Comcetition<br />
7,ith ai c<strong>of</strong>ter,,, ia t a orid. it can geTer have<br />
that ooniiction oni':ss it ie f,rst eilitn to face t s :e te.:t<br />
<strong>of</strong> rombetition<br />
atYom3.
6<br />
Let Us not make the mistake <strong>of</strong> overestimitinj , any more<br />
ham that o undar-estimetin, the difficalties Our riJ91S<br />
in the ',;orld are not -,:ithout their ,eaknesses end their hanr3ice,t's.<br />
'::hole sections <strong>of</strong> the "irnerican economy ay riO.dled<br />
v:ith restriction and subsidy, ti e pork-barrel and Con;,,ession<br />
log-roller jostle uneesily viith the brsh aaterorise <strong>of</strong> the<br />
frontiersminand the Tresentillmilborlatist alministration pier<br />
there 3h(Lns si,(77ns <strong>of</strong> espbusin su= <strong>of</strong> the sillier eacesses<br />
crove=ent<br />
<strong>of</strong> .&ft44.i(4,4by exhortation. Hgeie7-, A.merica, ith its<br />
endless natural resources and rcltiTely tiny need for i=ort<br />
- 3 mLere tentiett <strong>of</strong> the 1-itional broduct can berhans<br />
,3_ford the luxtry <strong>of</strong> lsting H zD -rt <strong>of</strong> its prodiall substance.<br />
<strong>The</strong>n look nearer home at lesbbrn Tx-In:any, SO dazalin2ly<br />
successful in the envious eyes <strong>of</strong> its ersthile lictors. fhe<br />
/<br />
retention <strong>of</strong> labour in inefficient peasnt farmir:for pclitical<br />
reasons is suffident to make t.;e 3h tish farer' mattress<br />
look ty Comparison more like the f'Pkir's bd <strong>of</strong> niis<br />
than tho proverbial fetherbed. If 3ritish<br />
tens <strong>of</strong> million.s <strong>of</strong> pounds a year on onital :no cu.-feat Aocount37resources<br />
aab io shoald be nut to be Star isa tan, in<br />
pro;iding services -LrE , onn.itP(i nr under-usPl uhen<br />
ta'r:e zlence at s a 7xeriTian I7odcrsi<br />
,RnA still mon7:nt 1033'3a ar tha ,price a e jars an Toliibin<br />
e pr pared to oay rater t,'ra "do<br />
Am.
7<br />
„gr mey think it pretty ghastly that o,-.2d ',job ens and fred<br />
Lee"accept the c ase for tryinp to motntain the Position <strong>of</strong><br />
oal ,3t eround its present le vel" and that t3x<br />
nd is retkined on indu stryt s fuel oil in order to protect<br />
a less efficient nd more costly source <strong>of</strong> lioter. B c33t<br />
your eyes across the 1:orth 3e3, and you find not only Zrnce<br />
end G.ermany but even Holland itself, unb:lieietly blest ith<br />
n'tural s under its o-:Jri surface, ta:ing st ers to sloc don<br />
proszress for the uske <strong>of</strong> the miners' votes end to create a<br />
protected and Tirtificial envmronment for the coal indus trie s<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Europ Zconor c Community. .<br />
competitive 3ritn need fear n orternal oonament. <strong>The</strong><br />
only deneru us or '•2 o t is :iithin: our -o-An fears nd doubts<br />
end ne sits t ions cod inhibitions. 2he dory 2 :2 ty is called<br />
upon to e vole the nation' s sill to overcome th,a-t inser obby<br />
ponent, 44+1*.4 sho,)ing tr:ret tJ)se very Chen fes end cnn,lleng.es<br />
Ahic re fear e full: competitive economy -Jo J,Id bring, toLL;h t<br />
to be a source <strong>of</strong> natio: el stren:t.1-'. end c onfidence.<br />
"'here, is no, effol't tht i- rot -or th .mvking to reg-,in<br />
if, , rhen regeined, it is to be de vot,ad to Tir c':ucz e.
1_ Z<br />
J .<br />
:,ten.,;oath-.;est<br />
Coneerztive ;:eeien's<br />
2:e:nold12<br />
:01,rernston, et<br />
11 12th 2etrori 195.<br />
..inister <strong>of</strong> e're.nsport de , 14'3 :iinnoarcPnent<br />
reek thst te-d to's:en on Lord Hinton<br />
e teft.:eor<br />
ser79nt to study the co-ordintion <strong>of</strong> tr3nsport,<br />
used<br />
siznificent sAerds. He se.id, ''71-think t5v3 ifust peos)le in the<br />
countr; necicy3 tnpre 03-stefZ c<strong>of</strong>f_eetitian in e'e:<br />
7.:to-I131on <strong>of</strong> oar trnscort 3er/Ines'. 2nerfore,<br />
:<br />
is 9 very :e_rept nPed to Cchieve -:restPr<br />
prick ape my esrs Tnlen S eer 0002S13iC1-!-2, like<br />
'Pestefl oprn^otition" or'cat-trpst, coler,etition'. people<br />
asP tkerms like these, it is<br />
adre sin feet th.e." hete<br />
cmpetition<br />
jtsolf'Thd 7771rit tu --Pt rid <strong>of</strong> it ol00:17.<br />
fore thev Pcply tjeese 000r0020oa3 e2thets to .<br />
.941<br />
helinthe osbd nsrLe, to lll be -.J1,med to strerH.Ie<br />
Cert.7!in10 there is coinetition in 3._7.r trensport<br />
becsa3e .oasseners end - sa-orq <strong>of</strong> poods t-<br />
ii<br />
choose beteen rosd rd roil ,<br />
privete end. eablic<br />
oJrfsce transort.<br />
Certeinl,i0 ere i3<br />
-!,aste in Od-2 trenseort serlices.<br />
onertin deficit <strong>of</strong> on epitish in<br />
72hich<br />
7rolided<br />
to be !let by the t,3x17;e:sr becm,3e Se2li303 -;ere<br />
hic 73e07,1 'lid not 'T,nt et li'Pe price tn,H,<br />
<strong>of</strong>fere ia evidence <strong>of</strong> colossel -ste - Lisepelied effort ,71-1<br />
ec7 ceitel on vest ceoie.:7-fl 30, ..rp-re been Je_iity
<strong>of</strong> un7lerstatement,ceccase t-.t deficit is before c rin<br />
one penny <strong>of</strong> interest, not 'to 7-,cntion 7,201- it, upon c]p -ti.<br />
But it does not follo that oec'adse t,el'e is Cotlcom_petition<br />
and -Jests, therefore tl-e competition causes /-;le,<br />
- Jaste or that it is '.:;asteful conetition'. 6n t-e contrary,<br />
the -,:aste continues becauo.e there is not enou7h<br />
because operations ore carrie on -:hich are not cortcetitive.<br />
Burin4 the la-t decade or fficre this country :a.as been<br />
rroidins itself 7ith a modern sistem, ander a road<br />
prorcmme hic aongst other ttin:S ill i,re us c thouE3nd<br />
miles <strong>of</strong> motor-Jay by the early 1,7o's. 1 havc not ho3rd<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the public, certainl I hale not he•ard malT:cr <strong>of</strong><br />
the Ca,overnment, either before or since the last election, aruirl<br />
thot this proramme is too b.L. ,;ather peociee tended to<br />
suest that it is too smli. If have decided to<br />
provide ourselves '.TAth this road system, v!e thri nave te<br />
other forms <strong>of</strong> transport it is -,forth our yihile to orolii.e<br />
„4.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is only one to find this out. It i3 to ensure<br />
competition,both in the use ot' t e fo9ds theselves its<br />
rocd trananort n oter forlTls c' trnscort.<br />
akcad trensoort 3t the 7720=t time it 3!.lbject to licensin-z:<br />
end other restrictions 7:;hic dte from 'a -oriod<br />
:iistnt, a time -.;.hen conditions +,e,-re ier," different f-r'<strong>of</strong>f., t•op<br />
to—cl,ay 'end -;hen it 79:3 c,coepted not<br />
otil3lij 93 desirbie to reetrict '.nd limit copetition. des
estrictions are hard to justify in the l060's, and it may<br />
o<br />
,.., ,,..<br />
ell prove that the report the Committee to examine them<br />
o<br />
o<br />
z<br />
Ernest Earples set uo under the chairmanship <strong>of</strong> Lord<br />
\\--./I<br />
,reddes-rill before long open the -Aay for a clean seep <strong>of</strong> out<strong>of</strong>-date<br />
thinking and legislation in this field. It is to ce<br />
hoped that when the Linister <strong>of</strong> 2ransport cryptically said in<br />
an intervie<br />
this week that "Lord Hinton e)ill eork closely edth<br />
the Geddes Committee" it,does n97,;-- mean that pressure is gain,: t<br />
s<br />
be b ourtt to bear upon thevito modify their conclusions.<br />
3ut the fact that there are still these limitations upon<br />
competition on the roads is no justification for ncrnetuatinj 3<br />
moment lo.ner than necessary a sttucture <strong>of</strong> the railays eJnich<br />
is uneconomic and uncompetitive.<br />
fie-orous action taken under<br />
Conservetive -,;,overnment has knocked ell.ost 4U millions during<br />
the lest to years ..lorie <strong>of</strong>f the onerating losses c1(the rail-<br />
-)ayslhich the taxpayer has to make rood.<br />
2his represents the<br />
result so far <strong>of</strong> the first phase <strong>of</strong> jr. beechirrE's plan for the<br />
-,<br />
reshaping <strong>of</strong> dritish haile:ays - ,i,44--kme-1-1 (let Us add in ell<br />
,i<br />
feirnessl the comirr=_: to fruition <strong>of</strong> scEhemes and iniestment<br />
underteen eerlier. T.he next phase, for ehich Jr. 3eeching's<br />
proposals, I understand, are elreaeey e;itl.. the L::irister, should<br />
meke it possible over the next four or fife 'ears to eliminate<br />
altoether the oertin.g del'icit <strong>of</strong> ..:67 riillions a Jeer e:hich<br />
still reains,end so at last teke the deddeight <strong>of</strong> the raile<br />
<strong>of</strong>f the taxpeyer's beck ehd enoble them to break evei . on their
-4-<br />
workin7 resultS. '2he capital lnitested in them would still<br />
not be yielding a commercial return, and the ma tion ould<br />
till have said good-bye to the e.1200 million which has had<br />
o be written <strong>of</strong>f. All the same, we could at least claim to be<br />
v;e11 on our ,tJay to recovery from the disastrous experiment in<br />
national ownership which 'JR3 inflicted on our transport system<br />
and thus on the whole economy almost twenty years o. Jo high<br />
is the p.Lice <strong>of</strong> error, and so hard and stony t e 7'oad back froz,<br />
it.<br />
This beins so, I ,Jas horrified to heir the nee I:linister <strong>of</strong><br />
Transport, within a month or taking <strong>of</strong>fice, declare in the<br />
<strong>of</strong> Commons that "one cannot in tao foreseeable future ma e thP<br />
- o• -<br />
railways ,oay" and that in th e 49€rt Tran-nort -cti•raLliaenp<br />
toe foolishly invited to ,Irite-in ti,ose provisions about<br />
ensuring that the t il'Ays "Board should mo:ke t:_e railways pay".<br />
Pe had folvotten that the Jocialist act <strong>of</strong> 1947 itself imposed<br />
on the 3ritish Transport Comiliission the self-same recuirement to<br />
break even, taking one year -rith another. Jut what is ropily<br />
fnishtening is the attitude <strong>of</strong> mind thich thee k'nd <strong>of</strong> 1,3nu.:Le<br />
reveals. It su7ests that the Government have no inter ion <strong>of</strong><br />
csrrinl the reshnapir1l <strong>of</strong> British ail-!Jays throuh, aOt naait<br />
in tead to p t an extinuisher upon Dr. Beechin Is<br />
lk about -ordina tion" only arned<br />
people that it did, the objeci, <strong>of</strong> maint:inin n-tionalised
-5-<br />
industry as a Permanent pensioner <strong>of</strong> the public., nut<br />
re:luired to justify itself in open competition for capital<br />
and traffic, but feec'in-g like a narasite on 6hose parts <strong>of</strong><br />
2:„te ef-ei /r<br />
he economy -:;hich are competiti re. - in one<br />
or poth <strong>of</strong> tv;o '.,;ays. Either the plolic iil 1ie to Se<br />
nre/ented from choosin the-i4orn",-,- <strong>of</strong> transport h1ci± the.,” erefer,<br />
or else the public 'Jill nie to se l3id under contriputi on tc<br />
meet the reoil'Aaydeficits in persetuity. L con ::,;uess is t'Ict<br />
both methods )re intended to Pe u.sed.<br />
2he terms <strong>of</strong> -eference <strong>of</strong> Lord Finton' s stud,/ refer to<br />
"the co-ordination <strong>of</strong> investment -olicies for p<br />
reilays" and "the ri,zht balance beteen t'2.o u;:ye <strong>of</strong> -201<br />
rail".<br />
am 'afr,-;id His Lordship has joined the ez -rO o iny ranITs<br />
<strong>of</strong> those om thi s 7.i-overnment anplcviss on t task <strong>of</strong> fillin<br />
sieves; for all ';his talk about "co-ordination" TInd "ri!,ht<br />
balnce" i3 the merest hocus-pocus.<br />
Unless our roads are t3ll to be converted into toll roads,<br />
there is no means <strong>of</strong> f.isPoverin ho mac. eKbenditure on them<br />
is ju-tified by a2hat the Jeers are prepared to p3f . L.)n<br />
rair:Jays, on. the oth er hand , it is ou ssib le toe iscov er just<br />
th: t can have , and me nu ::.;ht to e , each a r<br />
st em as i$ justifi :te pl-<strong>of</strong>it out 0-1..° te<br />
trdr.L'ichich uses it in ureferenc e to the a zai ebi Jo rne ti<br />
outtin<br />
it M3: be the jrrert con ten1.17)1 te/ rud
SAA- 0 -,-.1,--L.<br />
It may be they intend to impose 444404W.Qa taxation upon<br />
road users. If so, they may hold back the de1,3101:ment <strong>of</strong><br />
roal tr9nsport and force onto the ri_i_ays, or keep on the<br />
railays, traffic vihich other-oise 'oL,C use the roads. ;:tet<br />
they cannot cleiri is that bg doir,s2' 30 thPy --e achievin<br />
"co-ordination' or strikind a "riht balance'. 2hey -::ill only<br />
be perpetuatins a I7.ue :iJaste <strong>of</strong> nationi resources in obedience<br />
to prejudice, spite,or obsolete -1-1dn). ,31.e(9 . thinkin.
3peech by the at Hon.J.Enodh <strong>Powell</strong>,YP<br />
to the Edinburgh University L;onser;ative Club,<br />
University Union, Edinburgh, 1 p.m.Friday 15th January<br />
1965.<br />
"Mind your own business" is the one and only correct reply<br />
to the (luestion about prices and the reasns for increasing<br />
them mhic':: irr.leorge 31,ivin is in course <strong>of</strong> addressing to the<br />
representatives <strong>of</strong> various branches <strong>of</strong> commerce. No doubt<br />
the reply could and should be phrased with more courtesy and<br />
circumlocatiant but that is the gist <strong>of</strong> it.<br />
I an not averse to the citizen dupplying the government,<br />
on request, if he finds it convenien14 and not too laborious,<br />
mith statistical information and even vvith gratuitous edvice,<br />
mithout being under a statutory obligation to do 60. Liut that<br />
is something entirely dif2erent from the operation on which 'LI.<br />
Bromn and the .4,abo-r government are engaged. ;hat in effect<br />
they are doing is to out the private Citizen into the dock,<br />
to anser guestions bublicly '.--ibout the conduct <strong>of</strong> his orivate<br />
affairs, in order that authority, if It thinks fit, may hold<br />
him uc to obloquy and create brejudice a.F7.ainst him.<br />
TI-Jis<br />
government by smear. It is cleen contrary to the<br />
Rule <strong>of</strong> LarJ. <strong>The</strong> citizen is entitled under the :Y.ule <strong>of</strong> 4..3,w to<br />
know what it is that by law he is entitled to do or not to do.<br />
If there dre particular ways in r.hicche ought nc. to act in<br />
r;,7 rd to brices, then t ose must be efined by 21:7C:j, la.iLede<br />
by yariient in tne pro er interbred end qIied by
2<br />
the Courts in the proper :Nay. Unless dnd until the low is<br />
thus changed., the citizen is entitled to conduct his <strong>of</strong>-<br />
'id_thout critici-'s'e-i or houndg, io accordonce it<br />
the lb-vv os it exis,,,s-. He is not required to hove regard to<br />
vlhot Er Brown chooses to say on television Or Lr Cou3ins ot<br />
by-election. Those men are in fact tr,ing to supersede the<br />
holing<br />
machinery <strong>of</strong> legislation and justice by the citizen<br />
before the uncontrolled and. irresponsible trTbunal <strong>of</strong> their<br />
p7;inprejudices ond dictums,_<br />
,<br />
This behaviour <strong>of</strong> the ;,3overnment '!'ouls1 be intol eroule eJen<br />
if ';;hot these genA.emen bre sr3yinz obout prices oere econo:iic<br />
sense.'As it is they ore tclking economic nonsense.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is only one price 7Thich o firm or a person is ,ustifled<br />
in tryin: to get for his goods or hi-4 ser.rices: that is<br />
the prica htch he believes vdll bzlng im tjle best re7.;u.rn.<br />
Of course I fio not mer h. that a hu-•=7,e tro fi t oiie month f ti<br />
by t1Te coliaase <strong>of</strong>he ruiret t e<br />
return over such eriod T2s e de em ,7 it rnt-., to tri loo<br />
shod. Th ot -.;en-1-).t to 2.,et t'is ric,- is every so s<br />
t is no t only is dst; to inriif, is • )<br />
, .<br />
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Jo f a frOM ocirig a E iris 4 inconoi hai e otitudo<br />
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•
•<br />
4<br />
By hoc much does he consider it to be in the general<br />
interest to reduce his pr<strong>of</strong>it beITN the mSximum obtainableby<br />
20, by 40, by C5C‘i He doesn't kno; he can't knu;J;<br />
yet tl-e nresumption that he does knoii oust underlie his arrogant<br />
claim to act on our behalf. Agin, should the price <strong>of</strong> all<br />
goods end services be uniformly roduced 7hat can be obtained<br />
for them, or some more, some loss end some not at all,<br />
axie<br />
end in ';Jhich cateory #Ea- HP doesilS kno; he can't 1.c.no;<br />
yet he must be assuming that Heaven has somehop) told him. Are<br />
ne to Play ttis game viith our exports, and to <strong>of</strong>fer to sell i,hem<br />
for less than ,Aiould maximise our gain';' If the re .9ly be,"Ot no,<br />
those are for foreigners; no holds barred there; i.re ought<br />
go out for the last penny", then. I sAall ask hiyv. anybody f=no's<br />
,AhLLch goods and services are ultimately exported and v:hich consumed<br />
at home.<br />
I have been talKing about goods and services and pr<strong>of</strong>its; but<br />
the same applies to brains and labour a)ild ages. rian has the<br />
duty to sell his brains ,,nd his bra,! In in the best 1. mrKet<br />
he can<br />
find for them; that is, in the market -;*ere their use yields<br />
him -hat he calculates to be t!ie greatest satisfaction. If he<br />
deliberately does otherise, then he dinies his fello-citizens<br />
the best he has to <strong>of</strong>fer, by r)roventing them from indicating<br />
7;hat serv:ices they most desire fr.m hiL and hat relative value<br />
they place upon them. True, he does t'7"-e'Snlif ,a ,,:rong if he enter<br />
into a c<strong>of</strong>l:Apination 7,!ith others in order, o prefenting comPe-
•<br />
5<br />
tition to obtain a er orice for his work than he<br />
could get in an open marke , just like the tradesman<br />
•ho in combination Tlith others tries to secure an artificially<br />
hih price for his „.goods by restricting or preventing<br />
competition. But who is defedinb that': It is as wrong to<br />
try to get more than the market price as to try to get less.<br />
the public<br />
But peeotae still say - and this is the reason why Messrs<br />
Brown and Cousins get a hearing 3t this m.ay be very<br />
people try to put their prices<br />
true, bat if 1,t4eee-Ifee-Re4e up, surely that means inflation":"<br />
<strong>The</strong> anser is:"No, not at all, unless the governzient<br />
deliberately<br />
finances inflation; otherwise one set <strong>of</strong> prices can only go up<br />
if another set goes down". This is why it is not a rude retort<br />
but a sound and sober piece <strong>of</strong> advice to r Brawn and his<br />
colleagues to "mind their own bisiness"; for the business <strong>of</strong><br />
government, which government alone can mind, is to reulate the<br />
total level <strong>of</strong> money demand. <strong>The</strong> 1,abour Chancellor <strong>of</strong> the Exchecuer<br />
himself has admitted that he can do this dnd even that<br />
he is trying to do it. If government minds its own business<br />
doing this job and doing it properly, then the citizen can<br />
mind his osn business, secure in the knoledge that his effert<br />
to make the very best <strong>of</strong> his capital or brains, His laocur or<br />
enterprise is contributing to the giA)d <strong>of</strong> his country. If<br />
:zovernment will not do its job, or fsils in it, we mu3t not let<br />
them divert attention from the true mischief by finding scapegoat
•<br />
0<br />
and bogeys. That is tyranny and 1aw1essnes, <strong>of</strong> a kind<br />
we have seen too <strong>of</strong>ten in too many countries in our own<br />
generatione