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Service Reviews – Outline Business Case - Somerset County Council

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(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

<strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong><br />

Paper A<br />

Cabinet Appendix 1<br />

Programme and Project Management Handbook 2011<br />

<strong>Service</strong> <strong>Reviews</strong> – <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong><br />

<strong>Service</strong> Review Title:<br />

Learning Disability Provider <strong>Service</strong><br />

Version: 3.0<br />

Status Final<br />

Document Name: LDPS – OBC 3.0<br />

Author: Mel Lock/Stephen Miles<br />

Owner:<br />

Last Review:<br />

Next Review Due:<br />

Name Signature Title Revision history Date Version<br />

A - 5


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

Executive Summary<br />

The Learning Disability (LD) In-House service provides Care Quality Commission (CQC)<br />

regulated Residential, Supported Living, Shared Lives and domiciliary services. It also<br />

provides day and work services. The customers supported by the service are among the<br />

most vulnerable people in receipt of social care funding, and include individuals with<br />

complex physical needs, autistic spectrum conditions and those whose behaviour<br />

challenges services. These services are jointly funded via a pooled budget arrangement<br />

with NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>. The aim for this service is to deliver good, quality and sustainable,<br />

outcomes for customers that are value for money.<br />

The Learning Disability Provider <strong>Service</strong> (LDPS) is a jointly funded and commissioned<br />

service with the NHS with SCC acting as the lead commissioner. The service was set up<br />

between <strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> (SCC) and the NHS in the early 1990’s. Any decision<br />

to change the service would therefore need to agreed by both the SCC Cabinet and the<br />

NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board. The outline business case will be considered by the new <strong>Somerset</strong><br />

Clinical Commissioning Group who will make recommendations to the NHS <strong>Somerset</strong><br />

Board.<br />

This service was subject to an options appraisal in 2010. The process previously<br />

undertaken was:<br />

• In March 2010 a Joint Commissioning Strategy was agreed by SCC Cabinet and<br />

NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board.<br />

• Between April and August 2010 a full options appraisal was developed which<br />

including soft market testing based on actual cases.<br />

• On the 20 th October 2010 the options appraisal was considered by SCC Cabinet<br />

and the NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board. The option selected was to remain in-house but<br />

redesign services to drive out inefficiencies. The savings target for this was £3.33m<br />

(including savings to be received by NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> as joint commissioner) by<br />

March 2014.<br />

• To date £730k of savings have been achieved and plans are in place to achieve<br />

the rest by a complete remodelling of the staffing structure, the Residential Short<br />

Break service and the Work Preparation <strong>Service</strong>.<br />

• We have also completed the review of 6 Supported Living services. The original<br />

expectation was that each review could lead to a small-scale outsourcing exercise.<br />

We have postponed this while we complete this <strong>Service</strong> Review.<br />

This outline business case considers whether:<br />

• The services delivered by the provider service are “need to do” want to do” or “nice<br />

to do”<br />

• The <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> has to commission these services<br />

• The <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> has to deliver the services directly<br />

• Alternative methods of delivery would be beneficial<br />

<strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> is legally required to continue providing funding to those<br />

customers that meet or exceed the Fair Access to Care <strong>Service</strong>s (FACS) eligibility<br />

threshold. As this customer group meet this threshold the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> will need to<br />

maintain funding. It does not, however, have to provide the services directly.<br />

A - 6


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

Personalising care is seen as a critical change to deliver greater customer satisfaction<br />

and improved outcomes by offering more choice and control. It is the foundation of<br />

current national policy for adult social care and will continue to feature in the new Adult<br />

Social Care White Paper, to be published later in 2012. Personal Budgets will, over time,<br />

lead to people making different choices about the social care services that they receive,<br />

and will provide additional incentives for service providers to personalise their response to<br />

each individual. It will require providers to operate in a way that embraces and responds<br />

quickly to customer need and market changes. The LDPS cannot respond fully to these<br />

challenges in its current form as remaining as part of the county council precludes<br />

providing services funded Direct Payments.<br />

The options considered in this outline business case are 1 :<br />

1. To keep the services in-house, but continue to remodel them through a <strong>Service</strong> Plan<br />

2. To externalise the LDPS to a Local Authority Controlled Company<br />

3. To outsource the entire LD LDPS through a competitive process<br />

Summary of Advantages<br />

Summary of Disadvantages<br />

Remain in the county council and continue to redesign and deliver efficiencies.<br />

• Low or no short term impact on customers.<br />

• Retains skills, expertise, knowledge and<br />

existing service levels.<br />

• No additional or double funding of corporate<br />

overheads, including Southwest One<br />

• Retains direct provision within the public<br />

sector which many carers indicated a<br />

preference for as part of initial feedback<br />

events<br />

• Least likely to generate anxiety and change<br />

resistance.<br />

• Maintaining the in-house provision avoids<br />

the risk of market failure, with its consequent<br />

dangers for vulnerable people and SCC's<br />

ability to meet its statutory responsibilities,<br />

as well as cost and reputational implications.<br />

• Does not incur short term change costs<br />

Whole service externalisation<br />

• During the initial feedback meetings with<br />

family carers they expressed an<br />

overwhelming preference for a transfer to a<br />

“not for profit” organisation, should the<br />

service not be retained within SCC. This<br />

could be ensured through an externalisation<br />

process.<br />

• Unable to provide services funded by direct<br />

payments (DPs). As more customers take<br />

advantage of DPs there is significant risk to<br />

the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> of them choosing<br />

alternative providers, therefore increasing<br />

unit costs.<br />

• Retaining the LDPS in-house would require<br />

significant investment particularly relating to<br />

capital spend.<br />

• Inflexibilities in SCC corporate overhead<br />

costs means that the potential to maximise<br />

long term revenue savings will be more<br />

limited than either externalisation or open<br />

market tender.<br />

• Limited flexibility as some SCC decision<br />

making processes reduce responsiveness,<br />

particularly around HR, recruitment and<br />

arranging appropriate accommodation to<br />

meet customer needs<br />

• Limited opportunities for capital investment,<br />

sharing overheads with independent<br />

provision or offering services to people<br />

using direct payments during the initial<br />

contract period of 3 years while subject to<br />

the Teckal exemption. As more customers<br />

take advantage of DPs there is significant<br />

1 Further consideration needs to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />

development of a full business case for any option that is taken forward<br />

A - 7


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

• Could be implemented as part of a phased<br />

approach, allowing SCC to better manage<br />

risk through the transition phase.<br />

• Would allow the LDPS to build a strong<br />

brand identity and reputation ahead of any<br />

future open market tender exercise and<br />

could potentially enable current service to<br />

bid within any future tendering process.<br />

• Would allow the LDPS to develop a user<br />

centred and outcome focussed service<br />

delivery approach, in line with customer and<br />

commissioner expectations ahead of any<br />

open market tender exercise.<br />

• Would enable SCC to retain access to the<br />

capacity to tackle struggling providers for a<br />

given period and therefore discharge its<br />

statutory responsibilities with the new<br />

organisation acting as “provider of last<br />

resort” for adults with learning disabilities.<br />

• Would enable the service to become more<br />

responsive around issues such as staff<br />

recruitment and deployment.<br />

Whole service open market tender<br />

• At initial feedback meetings, a number of<br />

service users expressed a desire to direct<br />

their own care through a direct payment,<br />

which an outsourced organisation would be<br />

risk of them choosing alternative providers<br />

therefore increasing unit costs.<br />

• Carers could not see the benefit of a two<br />

step approach as legally we would probably<br />

need to tender the services within 3 years.<br />

• There would be extremely high levels of<br />

operational, financial and reputation risks to<br />

SCC should the new entity fail.<br />

• Initial financial and resource outlay will be<br />

high.<br />

• It is estimated that the implementation would<br />

take a minimum of 1 year due to the high<br />

level of complexity.<br />

• The level of risk could be high for an<br />

organisation of this (small) size until well<br />

established. This would be elevated risk<br />

during the first year unless skilled<br />

management with proven business acumen<br />

is embedded in advance of the<br />

externalisation.<br />

• Should the externalised organisation fail to<br />

win any tender at the end of the initial<br />

contract period SCC could be responsible<br />

for funding any resulting costs. It would also<br />

be responsible for funding any one-off costs<br />

as a result of service reconfiguration.<br />

• Contracting with a single provider for these<br />

services, which currently account for over<br />

half of the expenditure, may limit choice and<br />

service quality unless robust contract<br />

management processes are put in place and<br />

adequately resourced.<br />

• Costs are likely to remain higher than an<br />

outsourcing arrangement due to the need to<br />

the need to continue to procure back-office<br />

services from SCC and/or Southwest One or<br />

set them up from scratch.<br />

• A full reassessment of all residential care<br />

and supported living care packages will<br />

need to be undertaken in advance of any<br />

transfer in order to mitigate some, but not<br />

all, risks related to cost escalation. This will<br />

incur additional costs.<br />

• Two big changes in 3 years could generate<br />

unnecessary anxiety amongst vulnerable<br />

users.<br />

• Initial financial and resource outlay will be<br />

very high and this option would be likely to<br />

require a dedicated team to implement<br />

• Due to the size of the service, and the need<br />

A - 8


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

free to provide.<br />

• The entire service can be evaluated against<br />

current market rates, potentially resulting in<br />

the service being outsourced at a lower cost<br />

than the current LDPS budget.<br />

• There is a reduced risk of service failure<br />

subject to adopting a robust and wellmanaged<br />

tender process, eliminating any<br />

“weak” bidders at the outset.<br />

• Would be a single-step approach.<br />

• A lead provider could sub contact. This<br />

would facilitate the participation of small<br />

providers that might otherwise be “crowded<br />

out” by Option C, externalisation.<br />

• Would allow the service to rapidly adopt<br />

best practice from the successful bidder<br />

• Outsourcing the LDPS as a whole would<br />

provide opportunities to reduce operational<br />

overheads as bidders would be likely to<br />

already have resources that could be<br />

extended, allowing the overheads to be<br />

shared across a broader range of services,<br />

rather than newly established.<br />

• We would expect to favour bids that include<br />

opportunities for external capital investment.<br />

• While the tender process for a large<br />

outsourcing exercise is complex and time<br />

consuming SCC would avoid potential ongoing<br />

complications relating to the Teckal<br />

exemption.<br />

• A competitive tendering process should<br />

encourage cost efficient bids that drive out<br />

savings. The tender and evaluation process<br />

would ensure that these were sustainable.<br />

to carefully involve people who use the<br />

service and carers at all stages of the tender<br />

and evaluation process, it is estimated that<br />

the implementation would take a minimum<br />

of 1 year<br />

• There are significant and complex property<br />

issues, and options to address the<br />

associated cost and risk factors need to be<br />

developed as part of the full business case.<br />

• Robust monitoring arrangements will need<br />

to be to be in place to protect vulnerable<br />

customers and provide reassurance to<br />

carers, many of whom expressed concern<br />

about the potential involvement of a “private<br />

for profit” provider in the provision of care<br />

and support for their loved ones during initial<br />

feedback meetings.<br />

• There is a potential risk of a service provider<br />

offering vacancies in supported living<br />

accommodation to people currently living<br />

outside of the <strong>County</strong>, ultimately leading to<br />

funding becoming SCC’s responsibility<br />

under ordinary residency rules. There could<br />

also be additional costs falling on NHS<br />

<strong>Somerset</strong>. There may be opportunities to<br />

mitigate these risks through SCC’s interest<br />

in the property assets utilised by the LDPS<br />

which need consideration within the<br />

development of the full business case.<br />

• Contracting with a single provider for these<br />

services, which currently account for over<br />

half of the expenditure, may limit choice and<br />

service quality unless robust contract<br />

management processes are put in place and<br />

adequately resourced.<br />

• A full reassessment of all residential care<br />

and supported living care packages will<br />

need to be undertaken in advance of any<br />

transfer in order to mitigate some, but not<br />

all, risks related to cost escalation. This will<br />

incur additional costs.<br />

• In the short-term at least there would be<br />

double funding of overheads, including<br />

some of those associated with Southwest<br />

One where they relate to activity that is not<br />

releasable.<br />

Stakeholder engagement activities have been held to inform the development of this<br />

<strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong>. The preferred option was:-<br />

• From service users: - There was no clear preferred option, however, the most<br />

important issue was that the staff that support them stay the same.<br />

A - 9


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

• From Carers: - To remain in the county council and continue to redesign. Carers<br />

were clear that they did not want to pursue the whole service externalisation<br />

option as they could not see the benefit of a two stage approach.<br />

• From Staff: - Remain in the county council and continue to redesign or whole<br />

service externalisation.<br />

Parents/carers and staff did however highlight a preference for a not for<br />

profit/charitable/social enterprise type organisation if we consider whole service open<br />

market tender. We will explore further how the new public services Act March 2012 could<br />

support this.<br />

The recommendation is to develop the whole service open tender option into a full<br />

business case, comparing this against remaining in the county council and continuing to<br />

redesign and deliver efficiencies. The full business case will need to be considered by<br />

<strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> and NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>.<br />

In summary, the main benefits of this recommended option are<br />

• A greater opportunity for customers to exercise choice and control through Direct<br />

Payments.<br />

• Opening up opportunities for capital investment to improve and/or replace<br />

accommodation that supports quality care delivery.<br />

• To secure high quality provision with the potential for longer term efficiencies.<br />

.<br />

A - 10


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

1 Scope and context<br />

1.1 Background<br />

<strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>’s (SCC’s) <strong>County</strong> Plan is to become a smaller, more<br />

enabling organisation focused on its customers, with a target operating model that<br />

ensures services are “right sourced”; i.e. that the most efficient and effective<br />

commissioning solution is applied to community needs. The expectation is largely<br />

that in future the <strong>Council</strong> will shape and influence service provision, rather than<br />

provide services directly.<br />

Unlike most other areas of adult social care provision across the country, <strong>Somerset</strong><br />

<strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> still has a large in-house provider service (the “LDPS”) that<br />

supports adults with learning disabilities who have a range of needs that meet Fair<br />

Access to Care <strong>Service</strong>s (FACS) eligibility criteria. The customers supported by the<br />

service are among the most vulnerable people funded by SCC, and include<br />

individuals with complex physical needs, autistic spectrum conditions and those<br />

whose behaviour challenges. The LDPS accounts for 55% of the total spend<br />

against this customer group and supports approximately 900 of the 1600 adults<br />

with a learning disability across the county supported by SCC. The remaining 700<br />

customers are supported through spot or block contracts with external providers or<br />

via Direct Payments. These customers and suppliers are out of scope for this<br />

service review.<br />

It is anticipated that the growing use of Personal Budgets will, over time, lead to<br />

people making different choices about the social care services that they receive,<br />

and will provide additional incentives for service providers to personalise their<br />

response to each individual. It will require providers to operate in a way that<br />

embraces and responds quickly to customer need and market changes. The LDPS<br />

cannot respond fully to these challenges in its current form.<br />

The main issues that the LDPS currently experiences, through being an in-house<br />

service are:<br />

• It is unable to deliver services that are paid for using direct payments. 2<br />

• Its ability to invest in existing properties and source new accommodation in<br />

a timely fashion is restricted.<br />

• It is unable to attract new business other than from the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>.<br />

• There is inflexibility in staff terms and conditions.<br />

2 Department of Health, A Guide to Receiving Direct Payments From Your Local <strong>Council</strong>: A Route to<br />

Independent Living, 2009, p16: Question: “Can I purchase services from my local council “<br />

Answer: “You cannot buy services from your local council as it is not allowed to sell its services in this way.”<br />

A - 11


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

1.2 Key <strong>Service</strong> Information<br />

The key information used in the development of this <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> is<br />

shown in Table 1, below:<br />

Funding arrangements<br />

Commissioning arrangements<br />

Pooled budget with NHS. Funding ratio is 75% SCC and<br />

25% NHS.<br />

Commissioned in-house through SLA<br />

2012/13 Gross Budget/net Gross £32,219,090<br />

Net £28,480,100<br />

2012/13 Direct delivery costs £26,438,080<br />

2012/13 Operational<br />

overheads<br />

£2,042,020<br />

Customers Approximately 908 adults with learning disabilities and 800<br />

carers<br />

Summary of customer views<br />

Number of staff delivering<br />

service<br />

Potential pensions<br />

crystallisation costs<br />

Key partners<br />

Statutory basis of services<br />

Demographic context<br />

Policy context<br />

Constraints<br />

<strong>Outline</strong>d within paper<br />

1,218 staff (965.95 FTE) employed by <strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong><br />

<strong>Council</strong><br />

Awaiting figure following analysis of current staff<br />

NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>/Clinical Commissioning Group, <strong>Somerset</strong><br />

Partnership NHS Foundation Trust<br />

The main acts are listed below, please see Appendix B for<br />

further details:<br />

• The National Assistance Act 1948<br />

• The Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970<br />

• The NHS and Community Care Act 1990<br />

• The Mental Capacity Act 2005<br />

• The Carers and Disabled Children Act 2000<br />

• The Carers (Equal Opportunities) Act 2004<br />

• Health and Social Care Act 2008<br />

The number of adults with learning disabilities is projected<br />

to increase by 4.15% by 2014 and by 15.74% in those<br />

aged 65 and over. The improved survival rates of people<br />

with severe disabilities will have an impact and it will be<br />

important to develop an appropriate response to improving<br />

services for people with autism<br />

Valuing People (2001) 3 and Valuing People Now (2009) 4<br />

New white paper for Adult Social Care and revised<br />

legislation later in 2012<br />

Restrictions to the use of Direct Payments linked to the<br />

3 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4009153<br />

4 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_093377<br />

A - 12


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

personalisation agenda<br />

Under the Health and Social Care Act 2008 the following<br />

types of service that are provided by the LDPS are<br />

regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC):<br />

• The provision of personal care for people who are<br />

unable to provide it for themselves, because of old age,<br />

illness or disability, in the place where they are living,<br />

for example, by a domiciliary care agency 5 . This<br />

includes domiciliary care provided as part of the<br />

“Supported Living” model of provision<br />

• Adult placement schemes 6 .<br />

• Accommodation for people who require nursing or<br />

personal care 7 . This includes residential care and<br />

residential short breaks<br />

2012/13 LD Employers<br />

Superannuation contribution<br />

Fees and charges<br />

This means that all services, other than day and work<br />

preparation, are subject to statutory regulation<br />

£4,656,600<br />

Adult Social Care fees and charges may apply to services<br />

provided by the LDPS depending on individual<br />

circumstances. As part of the Medium Term Financial<br />

Plan (MTFP), fees and charges are updated annually and<br />

adjusted to take account of cost of living and annual<br />

benefit increases, market factors, legislation, national<br />

guidance, demand and local policy requirements. Adult<br />

Social Care fees and charges for 2012/13 were set by<br />

SCC’s Cabinet on 1 st February 2012 8 .<br />

In terms of SCC statutory duties the following applies in terms of funding services<br />

to meet FACS eligible needs, irrespective of the type of provider:<br />

• Must do: Funding of Adult Social Care services to meet eligible needs under<br />

Fair Access to Care <strong>Service</strong>s. The types of service that meet these needs<br />

include residential care, nursing care, supported living, shared lives (adult<br />

“fostering”), respite services (including daytime respite) emergency assessment<br />

service for people experiencing a crisis and support to carers. There is currently<br />

no single modern statute which outlines the statutory framework for Adult Social<br />

Care services 9 ; however it is clear that the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>’s responsibility for<br />

funding these and similar types of service are underpinned by legislation. See<br />

Appendix B for an overview of the legislative framework.<br />

5 Care Quality Commission, The scope of registration, Care Quality Commission, December 2011, p17<br />

6 Care Quality Commission, The scope of registration, Care Quality Commission, December 2011, p18<br />

7 Care Quality Commission, The scope of registration, Care Quality Commission, December 2011, p20<br />

8 Item 9, Community Directorate Fees and Charges 2012-13, Appendix A<br />

9 The Law Commission , Adult Social Care, 10 May 2011, LAW COM No 326<br />

A - 13


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

• Want to do: These would be services meeting needs that are not FACS<br />

eligible, but would be beneficial to provide for other reasons such as preventing<br />

future need. In LD services this tends to be employment support services. For<br />

the majority of customers these employment support services provide a cost<br />

effective alternative to Day /Respite services which would need to be provided<br />

to meet FACS eligible needs, and provides vital support for many carers.<br />

1.3 Comparison of current service costs with the market<br />

Soft market testing undertaken as part of the options appraisal conducted in<br />

2010 10 indicated that the LDPS offered good value for money for care and support<br />

for people with the most complex needs, but was potentially not as good value for<br />

people with less complex (but still FACS eligible) needs.<br />

We are undertaking a more detailed analysis of Supported Living and Residential<br />

services to compare both quality and value for money against the market. A full<br />

analysis of this data will inform the Full <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong>. We have begun this<br />

process and have looked at four individual supported living services, operated by<br />

the LDPS. Early indications suggest that:<br />

• The current hourly rate for care and support is higher for the LDPS than that<br />

currently charged by existing external providers of similar services. The<br />

difference in rates, including an overhead rate of 15% 11 added to the LDPS<br />

(SCC) rate to enable comparison, is summarised in the following table.<br />

SCC 12 SCC 13 2012 2012 2012 2012<br />

2012 2014 Provider 1 Provider 2 Provider 3 Provider 4<br />

£17.18 £16.85 £14.85 £16.10 £15.82 £15.93<br />

Table 1<br />

• The future hourly rate that could be achieved once all planned service redesign<br />

is completed indicates that SCC may reduce their rate to £16.85 (£16.50<br />

removing the SCC pension’s shortfall liability).<br />

• We are currently discussing the likely timeframe to achieve this rate with the<br />

provider service but it is likely to take until 2014 as a result of changes being<br />

made through staff turnover.<br />

• The Supported Living service represents 47% of the LDPS spend.<br />

10 SCC Cabinet meeting held on 20/10/2010. Paper C, Appendix E “Soft Market Testing Analysis”<br />

11 External partner rates include all overheads, where as the in-house rate does not include SCC corporate<br />

overheads. Although a 15% rate was used to enable a comparison the actual SCC overheads rate applied<br />

to the LD <strong>Service</strong> is likely to be higher.<br />

12 Note: removing the SCC pension fund shortfall liability (enabled through externalisation) reduces the SCC<br />

rate in 2012 to £16.76.<br />

13 Projected hourly rate based on structural changes already in progress. Note: removing the pension’s<br />

shortfall liability reduces the projected SCC rate in 2014 to £16.50.<br />

A - 14


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

2 Options for Change<br />

The options that have been considered are 14 :<br />

A. Redesign services in line with the Localism Bill. The majority of expenditure<br />

(75% of the budget) is used to provide residential care, supported living and<br />

domiciliary care services. These would be difficult to deliver at a local level whilst<br />

maintaining a cost effective and equitable service. Mencap have been vocal in their<br />

concern about devolving this type of service to the community as, although they<br />

believe in greater devolution of power, they continue to highlight the risks that with<br />

increased local decision-making comes less cost effective services that will be<br />

subject to a ‘postcode lottery’. However some services, primarily respite day<br />

services and work preparation services may, in part, be better delivered at a local<br />

level. This option has been rejected for the whole service; however we could<br />

consider alternative models of delivery for day/work services as part of the full<br />

business case.<br />

B. Remain in the county council and continue to redesign and deliver<br />

efficiencies. Under this option we would continue with the existing programme of<br />

change, and develop a <strong>Service</strong> Plan to restructure and to meet the challenges of<br />

the Medium Term Financial Plan (MTFP), demographic trends and increased use<br />

of Direct Payments (DP).<br />

This option does not fit well with the high level design principles of the Target<br />

Operating Model and exposes SCC to escalated levels of financial risk as more<br />

people choose to personalise their services. Retaining the direct provision of these<br />

services was part of the options appraisal considered by SCC’s Cabinet in October<br />

2010. As a result of the Cabinet decision, the in-house service has been reshaping<br />

to ensure that it is outcome driven, streamlined and more cost effective, with £730k<br />

(including QIPP 15 ) of savings having already delivered and a further £2.6m in the<br />

pipeline. This has enabled the LDPS to begin to provide services that are more<br />

aligned with market costs and which are more flexible and responsive to customer<br />

need. This option is considered further in section 3.<br />

C. Whole service externalisation. Under this option the service would be moved<br />

out of the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> without a competitive process. There are a number of<br />

different legal vehicles that need to be explored further in the full business case if a<br />

decision is taken to pursue this option, however in order to comply with European<br />

Union procurement regulations it is likely to take the form of a Local Authority<br />

Controlled Company. This option is considered further in section 3.<br />

D. Whole service open market tender. Under this option the whole service would<br />

be subject to an open market tender compliant with SCC contract standing orders<br />

14 Further consideration needs to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />

development of a full business case for any option that is taken forward<br />

15 QIPP (Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention) is a large scale transformational programme for<br />

the NHS, involving all NHS staff, clinicians, patients and the voluntary sector and will improve the quality of<br />

care the NHS delivers whilst making up to £20billion of efficiency savings by 2014-15, which will be<br />

reinvested in frontline care. http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Healthcare/Qualityandproductivity/QIPP/index.htm<br />

A - 15


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

and European Union procurement regulations (Part B). This option is considered<br />

further in section 3.<br />

3 Options Appraisal<br />

3.1 Option B: Remain in the county council and continue to redesign and deliver<br />

efficiencies 16<br />

3.1.1 Overview<br />

Under this option we would continue with the existing programme of change, and<br />

develop a <strong>Service</strong> Plan to restructure and to meet the dual challenges of the<br />

Medium Term Financial Plan (MTFP) and increased use of direct payments. The<br />

vision for adult social care 17 clearly indicates that the preferred method for<br />

delivering choice and control to service users is through a direct payment which<br />

would create significant risks for in-house delivered services.<br />

As an in-house service the LDPS would not enjoy the benefits or legal freedom to<br />

trade commercially with the wider population, or in a manner which would allow<br />

more radical service redesign and response to personalisation and customer<br />

expectations. Remaining in-house would result in services becoming increasingly<br />

economically unviable and uncompetitive as, over time, elements of the LDPS are<br />

either “parcelled” off, closed or become outdated. This is likely to lead to increased<br />

costs to the <strong>Council</strong> as the consequences of running down services would result in<br />

higher unit costs, as overheads and fixed costs would be spread across reducing<br />

activity levels.<br />

<strong>Reviews</strong> of four services undertaken as part of the existing programme of change<br />

have indicated that, as current work to drive out efficiencies reaches fruition, the<br />

LDPS is likely to become increasingly competitive when compared to both<br />

independent and not-for-profit sectors (as summarised on p14) . However, as<br />

increasing numbers of people choose to direct their own care, the LDPS will be<br />

unable to respond where the mechanism used is a direct payment. As part of the<br />

full business case we will need to profile the likely demand for direct payments in<br />

the LDPS and the impact on this option. If the demand for direct payments is<br />

greater than 5-10% of the overall cost then this is likely to lead to a long term trend<br />

of reducing activity and increasing unit costs. This would mean that the overheads<br />

and fixed costs are spread over a shrinking volume of care delivery and the risk of<br />

16 Further consideration would need to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />

development of a full business case should this option be taken forward<br />

17 Department of Heath, “A vision for adult social care: Capable communities and active citizens”,<br />

16/10/2010, p15. Available from:<br />

http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_121508<br />

A - 16


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

securing quality care may increase, In addition retention of the service does not fit<br />

with the <strong>Council</strong>’s aspirations to be a commissioning led organisation and a smaller<br />

more enabling authority.<br />

3.1.2 Benefits<br />

• Low or no short term impact on customers.<br />

• Retains skills, expertise, knowledge and existing service levels.<br />

• No additional or double funding of corporate overheads, including Southwest<br />

One<br />

• Retains direct provision within the public sector which many carers indicated a<br />

preference for as part of initial feedback events, citing recent criticism of<br />

independent sector services following the BBC Panorama investigation into<br />

Winterbourne View, and the failure of Southern Cross. However it should be<br />

noted that this preference was less prominent in feedback from people who use<br />

services.<br />

• Least likely to generate anxiety and resistance.<br />

• Maintaining the in-house provision avoids the risk of market failure, with its<br />

consequent dangers for vulnerable people and SCC's ability to meet its<br />

statutory responsibilities, as well as cost and reputational implications.<br />

• Allows SCC to retain the skills and experience necessary to tackle struggling<br />

providers in-house to ensure it meets its statutory obligations and gives it more<br />

control to respond to emergency situations<br />

3.1.3 Disbenefits and any potential mitigations<br />

• Unable to provide services funded by direct payments (which a number of<br />

people who used services expressed a preference for at initial feedback<br />

events). As more customers take advantage of DP’s there is significant risk to<br />

the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> of them choosing alternative providers, therefore increasing<br />

unit costs. Even if this barrier was removed it is likely that the in-house service<br />

would find it difficult to develop new revenue streams as, once SCC corporate<br />

overheads are incorporated, hourly rates are unlikely to be competitive when<br />

compared to independent and not-for-profit providers<br />

• Retaining the LDPS in-house would require significant investment particularly<br />

relating to capital spend. Although projected future rates will bring the service<br />

more in-line with independent and not-for-profit providers this is expected to<br />

take 2 years, while a transfer to a different organisational model has the<br />

potential to release costs more quickly under the right conditions.<br />

• Inflexibilities in SCC corporate overheads costs means that the potential to<br />

maximise long term revenue savings will be more limited than options C and D.<br />

• There could be an “opportunity lost” with regard to introducing a step change<br />

through major service reconfiguration.<br />

• There would continue to be significant limitations in capital investment into the<br />

property portfolio due to on-going pubic sector austerity measures. Some<br />

properties are no longer “fit for purpose”, in terms of living (but not the care<br />

quality) environments. This increases the risk that customers who are directing<br />

their own care may choose independent sector providers over the in-house<br />

service, resulting in increased vacancies and therefore higher unit costs.<br />

A - 17


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

• Limited flexibility in comparison to all other options as some SCC decision<br />

making processes reduce responsiveness, particularly around HR and<br />

recruitment and arranging appropriate accommodation to meet customer needs<br />

• May lack business acumen / skills to compete with independent sector.<br />

• Some service costs are likely to remain higher than the independent sector for<br />

the foreseeable future, particularly in relation to SCC pension costs and terms<br />

and conditions in comparison to independent and non-for profit competitors.<br />

• Potentially limited opportunities for capital investment, although the Cabinet<br />

decision made on 20 th October 2010 and subsequent Section 28a agreement<br />

with NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> requires that any receipts from the sale of property to be<br />

reinvested in services for people with LD.<br />

3.1.4 Risks associated with this option 18<br />

Option Description of Risk<br />

Likelihood Mitigation<br />

B<br />

B<br />

The service fails to meet the<br />

requirements of the <strong>Service</strong> Plan<br />

resulting in another option having to<br />

be considered and the benefits<br />

resulting from it being realised at a<br />

later date than had the option been<br />

pursued in the first instance<br />

Staff terms and conditions, including<br />

shift patterns to meet customer<br />

needs, are unable to be varied<br />

sufficiently resulting in the service<br />

failing to meet the <strong>Service</strong> Plan<br />

and/or with unexpected<br />

consequences to the operational<br />

delivery of services<br />

3 Develop a robust and realistic<br />

<strong>Service</strong> Pan as part of a full<br />

business case if this option is<br />

taken forward<br />

3 Some aspects will need to be<br />

taken forward as part of wider<br />

work on staff terms and<br />

conditions across SCC<br />

3.1.5 Conclusion<br />

While this option may initially appear to be the lowest risk, as the number of people<br />

choosing to direct their own care through direct payments increases, the costs to<br />

SCC of providing services to people who do not choose this route, are also likely to<br />

increase. While carers have expressed concern about for-profit providers of<br />

services following the Winterbourne View scandal, poor care and abuse is not<br />

limited to the independent sector, and it is not recommended that the default<br />

position should be to retain the service in-house on this basis alone. While the<br />

LDPS is considered to be providing good quality services by many of the<br />

customers and carers from which initial feedback has been sought, it will become<br />

increasingly challenging to sustain this in the medium-long term within the current<br />

environment. A move away for direct provision of theses services has the potential<br />

to allow the LDPS to directly compete with other providers in the areas in which it<br />

A - 18


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

excels rather than be subject to a possible future of long term decline which would<br />

neither benefit its customers, its staff or the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>.<br />

3.1.6 Recommendation<br />

As this option has a number of disadvantages, it is recommended that other<br />

options are actively considered and compared against it in the detailed business<br />

case, unless the problems around flexing corporate overheads cannot be resolved.<br />

3.2 Common Themes for Options C and D (Whole service externalisation/open<br />

market tender)<br />

Options C and D have some commonality. Both models of service naturally drive<br />

efficiency and transparency, both in terms of process and overall costs.<br />

Continuing efficiencies could be delivered at the start of the contract as the level of<br />

assessed need is mapped to hours delivered. The current market has a number of<br />

private and not-for-independent suppliers offering good quality care and support.<br />

However, whole service externalisation or outsourcing could result in a single<br />

supplier receiving over half of all funding for services for adults with learning<br />

disabilities in <strong>Somerset</strong>. Contracting with a single provider for such a large<br />

proportion of the current expenditure could stifle competition, may reduce choice<br />

and could affect service quality unless robust contract management processes are<br />

put in place. However, this is not an uncommon supplier model and indeed the<br />

elderly care market in <strong>Somerset</strong> has been well served using a fairly similar model.<br />

A well designed contract that allows volumes to taper as people choose to direct<br />

their own care would help mitigate these risks and it would be possible to go to the<br />

market e.g. for work preparation services separately from regulated care services.<br />

In the interest of avoiding repetition the following areas, though varying in the<br />

magnitude of their impact, need to be carefully considered across both options C<br />

and D:<br />

• Pensions deficit crystallisation. The benefits and disbenefits of these<br />

options are outlined in Appendix A and would require further exploration as part<br />

of the development of a full business case should either of the externalisation<br />

or outsourcing option be taken forward. However, in summary unless there is a<br />

change to CLG Pensions Direction Order 2007 the effect in all cases would be<br />

to add an additional cost burden to the Authority.<br />

Advice received indicates that to plan and implement the changes to pension<br />

arrangements required by options C and D arrangement takes approximately<br />

six months to complete. Therefore, the points raised in Appendix A and the<br />

additional costs need to be considered and planned as part of the development<br />

of a full business case.<br />

A - 19


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

• SCC corporate overheads. The LDPS for 12/13 has £3.80m of corporate<br />

overheads apportioned.<br />

These can be broken down as follows:<br />

Capital Charges<br />

£1.56m<br />

Carbon Reduction £0.02m<br />

SCC Support <strong>Service</strong>s £0.35m<br />

Accommodation<br />

£0.06m<br />

SWOne Fixed Charges £0.93m<br />

SCC & SWOne Charges £0.70m 19<br />

Pension Deficit<br />

£0.18m<br />

Total<br />

£3.80m<br />

If externalising services, it should be done on the basis of new overheads being<br />

funded. The Authority will bear the cost of any existing arrangements as it<br />

endeavours to manage down (SWOne) costs. MTFP pressures would need to<br />

take this cost into account and will impact in the short to medium term on<br />

savings delivery.<br />

• Assets. The LDPS currently utilises a number of assets. These range from<br />

day centres to residential homes where people with learning disabilities live.<br />

Care and support services which are provided though the “supported living” 20<br />

model separate housing and care and support through the customer holding a<br />

tenancy with a Registered Social Landlord (RSL) as a result of arrangements<br />

put in place in the 1990s. The asset position is complex and often involves<br />

properties that are people’s homes. Future arrangements will need to be<br />

considered as part of the full business case.<br />

Many of the properties utilised, including 44 of those managed by RSLs, were<br />

originally purchased through funding made available by the NHS when longstay<br />

hospitals closed. The total value of these assets is £17.13m 21 including a<br />

Section 28a investment of £10.3m, and the NHS will continue to maintain a<br />

legal charge on the properties. NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> is in the process of transferring<br />

these properties to SCC on the condition that the asset or the capital value, if<br />

disposed of, continue to be utilised for the benefit of individuals with a learning<br />

disability. Any transfer of the LDPS out of SCC therefore needs to ensure that<br />

the assets are configured in a way that is financially sustainable and provides a<br />

sound base for capital reinvestment. It also needs to maintain a clear<br />

separation between the housing and care and support provider for supported<br />

19 Includes advisory and other services that will be retained by SCC<br />

20 The supported living model, as defined by the care Quality Commission, requires that care and support<br />

services are provided separately to housing/landlord functions. These are a number of mechanisms for<br />

achieving his including the introduction of a 3 rd party to perform the function of landlord or by devolving this<br />

responsibility to a separate legal entity within a larger organisation that also provides care and support<br />

21 As at 22/02/2012. The difference in value between the original Section 28a investment and current<br />

valuation includes where the there is part ownership by RSLs.<br />

A - 20


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

living services. Some of the current assets are not fit for purpose for the<br />

delivery model that will meet the future needs of the customers and both<br />

options C and D will require a clear asset plan to future proof the service.<br />

• Critical systems/ Information governance:<br />

Any new organisation will be required to register with the Information<br />

Commissioner and be set up its own data controller. This process involves<br />

one off fees as well as annual subscription fees.<br />

Information sharing protocols need to be agreed and put into operation with<br />

SCC<br />

Some of the services are currently provided by Southwest One (i.e.<br />

Specialist applications i.e. SAP / data secure storage etc). It is possible to<br />

procure similar services from an alternative provider although SCC is<br />

unlikely to recover Southwest One contract costs.<br />

Locally held confidential data will require the agreeing and setting up of<br />

security and access authorisation protocols – therefore incurring further<br />

costs.<br />

• TUPE. The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations<br />

2006 apply to what are known as ‘relevant transfers’, the definition of which<br />

would include both the outsourcing and transfer of the LDPS. The TUPE<br />

regulations are intended to safeguard employee rights and terms and<br />

conditions when the business in which they are employed transfers. The TUPE<br />

process would need to be appropriately planned with adequate time for<br />

determining which posts are/are not included for transfer. Consultation with<br />

staff is required for a minimum formal period of 90 days given the number of<br />

staff affected, which would include staff in a range of corporate functions i.e.<br />

finance, HR, some of whom may be seconded to South West One Ltd.<br />

• Value Added Tax (VAT). For an explanation of potential impacts, against a<br />

variety of service delivery mechanisms, please see Appendix A<br />

• <strong>Business</strong> continuity. There is a business continuity plan in place for the<br />

LDPS that was reviewed in 2011. Should the service be externalised (Option<br />

C) this would need to be updated by the new organisation to take account of<br />

the impact of the change. If the LDPS were to be outsourced (Option D) then a<br />

review of business continuity plans would need to take place as part of the<br />

tender evaluation process.<br />

• Management of personal finances. SCC has a legal obligation to undertake<br />

the administration of personal finances for people who are either under a<br />

‘Deputyship’ order or for those service users for whom SCC are the ‘Appointee’.<br />

This includes 196 adults with learning disabilities supported by the LDPS.<br />

These arrangements are administered by the Client Finances Team which<br />

currently consists of 4.52 WTE staff. Currently, because LDPS staff are SCC<br />

employees, much of the day-to-day administration is able to be undertaken at a<br />

local level within individual supported living and residential locations. However,<br />

should the LDPS be outsourced or externalised then the role that could be<br />

undertaken at a local level would be much more limited. This means that large<br />

A - 21


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

proportions of this work would instead need to be undertaken by the Client<br />

Finances Team in the same way as it does for any other external provider.<br />

This would have a significant impact on the team during both the transition and<br />

over the long term. A small number of staff support may need to be redeployed<br />

from the LDPS to the Client Finances Team.<br />

3.3 Option C: Externalisation 22<br />

3.3.1 Overview<br />

Under this option, the in-house service would be externalised to a new<br />

organisation, specifically created for the purpose and awarded a contract to<br />

provide services for an initial period (typically 3 years). The key difference<br />

between “outsourcing” and “externalisation” is that an externalised organisation<br />

would be awarded a contract without a competitive procurement process. This<br />

process would need to be undertaken in a way that mitigates the risk of legal<br />

challenge. A full market tender would then need to take place at the end of the<br />

initial contract and therefore this model could therefore only be an interim, time<br />

limited arrangement.<br />

Potential legal vehicles include:<br />

• Company Limited by Guarantee<br />

• Company Limited by Shares<br />

• Community Interest Company<br />

• Industrial and Provident Society<br />

• Charitable Status<br />

• Mutual<br />

• Local Authority Trading Company (LATC)<br />

Further exploration of the “best fit” legal vehicles would need to take place as part<br />

of the development of a full business case, should this option be taken forward.<br />

Early indications however are that it would need to take the form of a Local<br />

Authority controlled company in order to best comply with European Procurement<br />

law.<br />

Legal advice received in 2010 indicated that the externalised organisation could be<br />

set up in partnership with one or more other public sector organisation(s) (including<br />

other <strong>Council</strong>s, but not NHS organisations 23 or the independent sector) under the<br />

Teckal exemption to European Union procurement law. The Teckal exemption<br />

applies where a contracting authority (in this case the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>) contracts<br />

with a legally distinct entity for administrative purposes without undertaking a<br />

competitive procurement exercise. Usually this will be a company that the<br />

contracting authority has set up, either on its own or in partnership with others to<br />

provide services. The conditions for the Teckal exemption to apply are that:<br />

22 Further consideration would need to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />

development of a full business case should this option be taken forward<br />

23 The legal opinion received was that, while related, health and social care services are sufficiently different<br />

to be at risk of challenge<br />

A - 22


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

• The service provider carries out the “essential” part of its activities with the<br />

contracting authority. Legal advice received is that this would represent<br />

approximately 95%.<br />

• The authority exercises the same kind of control over the service provider as it<br />

does over its own departments. This means that control would need to extend<br />

beyond the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> simply maintaining a shareholding, and would<br />

preclude the external organisation subcontracting without careful consideration<br />

of the legal implications of doing so on both a case-by-case and cumulative<br />

basis.<br />

• There is neither private sector ownership of the service provider, nor any<br />

intention that there should be any.<br />

Legal advice obtained in 2010 and updated in 2012 (see Appendix D) indicates<br />

that any services purchased by the customer through a direct payment would not<br />

be considered to have been purchased by the contracting authority due to the<br />

introduction of a third party (the customer). This would mean that any significant<br />

expansion of direct payments in <strong>Somerset</strong> would impact on the viability of the<br />

provider and/or trigger a competitive procurement, as it could not undertake more<br />

than 5% of its business in this way, without risking legal change and potential<br />

compensation.<br />

Although the establishment of the organisation itself would have relatively limited<br />

costs associated with it, the process of awarding the contract would be likely to<br />

attract significant legal costs in order to ensure that SCC did not leave itself open<br />

to legal challenge and potential damages. The cost for a similarly sized <strong>County</strong><br />

<strong>Council</strong> to create a similarly sized organisation providing social care services was<br />

approximately £600,000. However we have no information regarding the make up<br />

of this figure.<br />

3.3.2 Benefits<br />

• During the initial meetings with carers they expressed an overwhelming<br />

preference for a transfer to a “not for profit” organisation, should the service not<br />

be retained within SCC. This option would therefore be potentially less likely<br />

(than an outsourcing approach) to encounter resistance from carers, and other<br />

stakeholders.<br />

• This can be implemented as part of a phased approach, allowing SCC to better<br />

manage risk through the transition phase. The first phase would involve setting<br />

up a local authority controlled company. During this phase, the new<br />

organisation would develop internal infrastructure and consolidate its financial<br />

and legal position. Following the expiry of the initial contract period an open<br />

market tender exercise would need to take place for the service to move<br />

outside of the limitations imposed by complying with the Teckal exemption.<br />

• This would allow the LDPS the potential to build a strong brand identity and<br />

reputation ahead of any open market tender exercise.<br />

• This would allow the LDPS to further develop a user centred and outcome<br />

focussed service delivery approach, in line with customer and commissioner<br />

expectations ahead of any open market tender exercise.<br />

A - 23


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

• This would enable SCC to retain access to the capacity to tackle struggling<br />

providers for a given period and therefore discharge its statutory responsibilities<br />

with the new organisation acting as “provider of last resort” for adults with<br />

learning disabilities.<br />

3.3.3 Disbenefits and any potential mitigations<br />

• During the initial feedback meetings a number of people who used services<br />

expressed a preference for directing their own care using a Direct Payment.<br />

Legal advice received is that there would be a risk of legal challenge if the<br />

LDPS were to undertake more than 5% of its business in the form of services to<br />

individuals in receipt of a direct payment, while subject to any contract awarded<br />

under the Teckal exemption.<br />

• There is potential for legal challenge if an organisation awarded a contract<br />

under the Teckal exemption was invited to participate in the market testing of<br />

new business from SCC and was awarded this business in a way that could be<br />

viewed as being anti-competitive or favouring the organisation<br />

• Initial financial and resource outlay will be high. While the formation of the legal<br />

entity itself is relatively simple, significant work will be required in relation to the<br />

transfer of business and staff, and to ensure the awarding of the contract is not<br />

open to challenge. Potential costs include pension related work, legal work,<br />

registration, consultation, infrastructure and the procurement of external<br />

business expertise.<br />

• The level of risk could be high for an organisation of this (small) size until well<br />

established.<br />

• There is an elevated risk of organisational failure in the first year unless skilled<br />

management with proven business acumen is embedded in advance of the<br />

externalisation. There would be extremely high levels of operational, financial<br />

and reputation risks to SCC should the new entity fail. This is due to the<br />

specialist nature of the services provided and the limited capacity within the<br />

market for other providers to “step in” in a timely manner.<br />

• It is estimated that the process of setting up the entity would take a minimum of<br />

12 months, based on the operational status of the in-house service at this point<br />

in time.<br />

• There would be very limited opportunities for external capital investment during<br />

the initial contract period as any independent sector investment is likely to be in<br />

breach of the Teckal exemption. This could potentially be mitigated by the<br />

separation of the assets into a separate legally distinct entity to that providing<br />

care and support, but this would need further exploration as part of the<br />

development of the full business case, should this option be taken forward.<br />

• Should the externalised organisation fail to win any tender at the end of the<br />

initial contract period SCC could be responsible for funding any resultant<br />

redundancy costs. It would also be responsible for funding any one-off costs as<br />

a result of service reconfiguration as part of the transfer process.<br />

• Costs are likely to remain higher than an outsourcing arrangement due to the<br />

need to the need to continue to procure back-office services from SCC and/or<br />

Southwest One or set them up from scratch. There would also only be very<br />

limited opportunities to share fixed and management overheads with privately<br />

funded provision while complying with the Teckal exemption.<br />

A - 24


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

3.3.4 Risks associated with this option 24<br />

Option Description of Risk<br />

Likelihood Mitigation<br />

C<br />

C<br />

C<br />

C<br />

C<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

It becomes apparent that service<br />

cannot provide services funded by<br />

Direct Payments and remain within<br />

the protection of the Teckal<br />

exemption leading to this option<br />

becoming unviable<br />

Failure to follow due process could<br />

lead to a legal challenge to the<br />

externalisation of the service by an<br />

existing provider in the market which<br />

delays the process of externalisation<br />

and/or results in it being abandoned<br />

and/or results in substantial costs<br />

The organisation is externalised but<br />

fails and services need to be<br />

brought back in-house and/or<br />

outsourced with significant costs and<br />

reputation damage to SCC<br />

The service is externalised as a<br />

LATC but fails to win a tender at the<br />

end of the initial period resulting in<br />

significant wind-up costs to SCC<br />

The externalised organisation does<br />

not fully understand its cost base or<br />

is unable to procure appropriate<br />

business/commercial expertise<br />

resulting in benefits being unrealised<br />

or with unexpected consequences to<br />

the operational delivery of services<br />

There is significant opposition from<br />

customers, staff and unions to the<br />

externalisation/outsourcing which<br />

effects resource requirements, and<br />

timescales.<br />

There is double funding of<br />

overheads/back office services due<br />

to the externalised /outsourced<br />

organisation deciding to make its<br />

own arrangements for services while<br />

costs to SCC remain<br />

4 Currently seeking updated legal<br />

advice. If confirmed this could<br />

result in this option being<br />

recommended for rejection<br />

2 Examine in detail at an early<br />

stage as part of full business<br />

case development if this option is<br />

taken forward<br />

3 Examine the potential of<br />

embedding proven business<br />

acumen ahead of externalisation<br />

as part of full business case<br />

development if this option is<br />

taken forward<br />

3 Examine risk and potential<br />

consequences in detail at an<br />

early stage as part of full<br />

business case development if this<br />

option is taken forward<br />

3 Examine the potential of<br />

embedding proven business<br />

acumen ahead of externalisation<br />

as part of full business case<br />

development if this option is<br />

taken forward<br />

4 If a decision is taken not to<br />

pursue an externalisation option<br />

then the rationale will need to be<br />

clearly communicated through a<br />

set of key messages to ensure<br />

consistency<br />

4 Advice received corporately is<br />

that some double funding may be<br />

necessary in the short term<br />

24 This is an initial list of the main potential risks and full risk profiling exercise would need to be undertaken<br />

as part of the development of a full business case to identify the full scope of the risks associated with any<br />

one particular option<br />

A - 25


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

The effect of funding the pensions<br />

deficit results in the<br />

externalisation/outsourcing being<br />

unaffordable<br />

The VAT implications of<br />

externalisation/ outsourcing makes<br />

one or both of these options<br />

unviable<br />

Insufficient attention and investment<br />

in the client function results in quality<br />

failure for customers.<br />

The externalised (at the end of the<br />

initial period) or outsourced<br />

organisation uses excess capacity in<br />

the service to accept placements<br />

from outside of <strong>Somerset</strong> which<br />

become SCC’s responsibility under<br />

Ordinary Residency rules. This can<br />

also increase primary care and<br />

specialised NHS costs<br />

Funding available for programme is<br />

insufficient to meet the cost of<br />

procurement/ transfer<br />

2 Examine in detail at an early<br />

stage of full business case<br />

development if these options are<br />

taken forward<br />

2 Examine in detail at an early<br />

stage of full business case<br />

development if these options are<br />

taken forward<br />

2 Examine contract monitoring<br />

capacity requirements in detail at<br />

as part of full business case<br />

development if this option is<br />

taken forward<br />

3 Examine in detail as part of full<br />

business case development if<br />

these option are taken forward.<br />

Risk already exists within current<br />

market place but will increase<br />

under both scenarios, although<br />

will be mitigated while an external<br />

organisation is operating within<br />

Teckal and there may be<br />

opportunities to mitigate across<br />

both options through SCC’s<br />

interest in property assets. This<br />

will need further consideration as<br />

part of the development of the full<br />

business case should this option<br />

be taken forward.<br />

2 Examine in likely costs in detail<br />

as part of full business case<br />

development if these options are<br />

taken forward<br />

3.3.5 Conclusion<br />

This can only be viewed as a medium term option, requiring a competitive<br />

procurement to be undertaken at the end of the initial contract. Updated legal<br />

advice also calls into question its viability should there be any significant expansion<br />

of the number of people directing their own care. Whilst it would provide a<br />

“stepping stone” between the existing arrangements and a fully outsourced<br />

solution, thereby potentially reducing opposition, it potentially carries a higher risk<br />

for SCC than undertaking a competitive procurement process.<br />

While the basic set-up costs are relatively small, the process of awarding the<br />

contract and transferring the business is likely to incur significant costs while the<br />

risk of legal challenge cannot be completely discounted. In addition skilled<br />

management with proven business acumen would need to be embedded in<br />

advance of any externalisation, to mitigate the high levels of operational, financial<br />

and risks to SCC.<br />

A - 26


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

3.3.6 Recommendation<br />

To reject this option at the <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> stage and develop a full<br />

business case to outsource the LDPS.<br />

3.4 Option D: Outsourcing 25<br />

3.4.1 Overview<br />

Outsourcing refers to initiating a tender process leading to a transfer of the whole<br />

of the LDPS to independent provision. This could include bids from the<br />

independent sector, a social enterprise, existing third sector providers, consortia,<br />

or the current LDPS management team.<br />

3.4.2 Benefits<br />

• At initial feedback meetings, a number of service users expressed a desire to<br />

direct their own care thorough a direct payment, which an outsourced<br />

organisation would be free to provide.<br />

• Consortium bids could be encouraged that would facilitate the participation of<br />

small providers that might otherwise be “crowded out” by Option C,<br />

externalisation. In addition, multiple service providers in a consortium could<br />

reduce the risks associated with a single provider failure.<br />

• We would expect to favour bids that include opportunities for external capital<br />

investment.<br />

• Outsourcing the LDPS as a whole would provide opportunities to reduce/share<br />

operational overheads as bidders would be likely to already have resources<br />

that could be extended, allowing the overheads to be shared across a broader<br />

range of services, rather than newly established.<br />

• The entire service can be evaluated against current market rates, potentially<br />

resulting in the service being outsourced at a lower cost than the current LDPS<br />

budget. While the LDPS is in the process of reducing costs, this is expected to<br />

take two years without incurring potentially significant one-off costs, while a<br />

transfer to a different organisational model has the potential to release them<br />

more quickly, under the right conditions. However, it should be noted that<br />

some of the costs associated with being part of SCC will not be releasable.<br />

• There is a reduced risk of service failure subject to adopting a robust and wellmanaged<br />

tender process, eliminating any “weak” providers at the outset.<br />

• The full outsourcing option would be achieved through a single-step approach.<br />

• This would allow the service to rapidly adopt best practice from the successful<br />

bidder<br />

• While the tender process for a large outsourcing exercise is complex and time<br />

consuming SCC would avoid potential on-going complications relating to the<br />

Teckal exemption.<br />

• A competitive tendering process should encourage cost efficient bids that drive<br />

out savings. The tender and evaluation process would ensure that these were<br />

sustainable.<br />

25 Further consideration would need to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />

development of a full business case should this option be taken forward<br />

A - 27


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

3.4.3 Disbenefits and any potential mitigations<br />

• Initial resource requirements will be high. Due to the complexity of the service<br />

and the high levels of operational risk involved in service provision there would<br />

be significant costs involved in a competitive tender process, although the<br />

tender would be subject to a Part B procurement process. Estimates received<br />

from the Strategic Procurement <strong>Service</strong> are that the costs would be in the<br />

region of £1.5m (+/- 500k) and that the process would require a dedicated team<br />

of 6 staff.<br />

• Due to the size of the service and the need to carefully involve service users<br />

and carers at all stages of the tender and evaluation process is estimated that it<br />

would take in excess of six months.<br />

• There are significant and complex property issue (see page 12 for background),<br />

and options to address the associated cost and risk factors need to be<br />

developed as part of the full business case.<br />

• Robust monitoring arrangements will need to be to be in place to protect<br />

vulnerable customers and provide reassurance to carers, many of whom<br />

expressed concern about the potential involvement of a “private for profit”<br />

provider in the provision of care and support for their loved ones during initial<br />

feedback meetings. Many carers indicated that the concept of “not for profit”<br />

provision was more acceptable.<br />

• There is a potential risk of a service provider offering vacancies in supported<br />

living accommodation to people currently living outside of the <strong>County</strong>, ultimately<br />

leading to funding becoming SCC’s responsibility under ordinary residency<br />

rules. There could also be additional costs falling on NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>. There<br />

may be opportunities to mitigate these risks through SCC’s interest in the<br />

property assets utilised by the LDPS, including those originally purchased using<br />

Section 28a funding. These opportunities will need to be considered further in<br />

the development of the full business case.<br />

• Contracting with a single provider for these services, which currently account<br />

for over half of the expenditure, may reduce choice and service quality unless<br />

robust contract management processes are put in place and adequately<br />

resourced.<br />

• The service, as it stands, is in the process of significant reconfiguration that is<br />

scheduled to be completed by March 2014, and potential bidders are likely to<br />

price the risks associated with completing this into any bid. In the medium to<br />

long-term, this would be expected to exceed the short-term costs of<br />

accelerating the process so it is completed before any transfer takes place.<br />

• A full reassessment of all residential care and supported living care packages is<br />

undertaken in advance of any transfer in order to mitigate some, but not all,<br />

risks related to cost escalation. This will need to be undertaken in addition to<br />

normal care management activity and will therefore incur additional costs.<br />

• In the short-term at least there would be double funding of overheads, including<br />

some of those associate with Southwest One where they relate to activity that<br />

is not releasable.<br />

• The risk of the new service provider(s) failing within the contract duration<br />

cannot be completely ignored. There would be extremely high levels of risks to<br />

vulnerable people as well as operational, financial and reputation risks to SCC<br />

should the new provider fail due to the specialist nature of the services provided<br />

A - 28


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

and the limited capacity in the market by other providers to “step in” in a timely<br />

manner.<br />

• Potential cost of warranties and indemnities provided by the council to the<br />

provider in relation to staff, assets and other resources.<br />

3.4.4 Risks associated with this option 26<br />

Option Description of Risk<br />

Likelihood Mitigation<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

There is double funding of<br />

overheads/back office services due<br />

to the externalised /outsourced<br />

organisation deciding to make its<br />

own arrangements for services<br />

currently while costs to SCC remain<br />

The effect of the pensions deficit<br />

results in the<br />

externalisation/outsourcing makes<br />

one or both of these options<br />

unviable<br />

The VAT implications of<br />

externalisation/ outsourcing makes<br />

one or both of these options<br />

unviable<br />

Robust contract monitoring capacity<br />

is not put in place resulting in<br />

issues not being addressed at an<br />

early stage, and escalating to the<br />

point where there is financial or<br />

reputation damage to SCC<br />

The use of a single provider for 55%<br />

of SCC’s business in this area<br />

adversely impacts on competition in<br />

the local market for these services<br />

leading to escalating costs in the<br />

medium to long term<br />

The externalised (at the end of the<br />

initial period) or outsourced<br />

organisation uses excess capacity<br />

in the service to accept placements<br />

from outside of <strong>Somerset</strong> which<br />

become SCC’s responsibility under<br />

Ordinary Residency rules and also<br />

4 Advice received corporately is<br />

that some double funding may be<br />

necessary in the short term<br />

2 Examine in detail at an early<br />

stage of full business case<br />

development if these options are<br />

taken forward<br />

2 Examine in detail at an early<br />

stage of full business case<br />

development if these options are<br />

taken forward<br />

2 Examine contract monitoring<br />

capacity requirements in detail at<br />

as part of full business case<br />

development if this option is taken<br />

forward<br />

3 Examine in detail as part of full<br />

business case development if<br />

these option are taken forward.<br />

In the case of Option D the risk<br />

could be partially mitigated by<br />

undertaken market shaping to try<br />

encourage existing<br />

national/regional providers in the<br />

market not currently operating in<br />

<strong>Somerset</strong> to participate in the<br />

tender<br />

3 Examine in detail as part of full<br />

business case development if<br />

these option are taken forward.<br />

Risk already exists within current<br />

market place but will increase<br />

under both scenarios, although<br />

will be mitigated while an external<br />

organisation is operating within<br />

26 This is an initial list of the main potential risks and full risk profiling exercise would need to be undertaken<br />

as part of the development of a full business case to identify the full scope of the risks associated with any<br />

one particular option<br />

A - 29


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

C and<br />

D<br />

D<br />

increase NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> COSTS<br />

Funding available for programme is<br />

insufficient to meet the cost of<br />

procurement/ transfer<br />

Cost of reconfiguring the service is<br />

priced into bids resulting in a higher<br />

costs to SCC over the lifetime of the<br />

contract than if the reconfiguration<br />

was undertaken in-house<br />

Teckal and there may be<br />

opportunities to mitigate across<br />

both options through SCC’s<br />

interest in property assets. This<br />

will need further consideration as<br />

part of the development of the full<br />

business case should this option<br />

be taken forward.<br />

2 Examine in likely costs in detail<br />

as part of full business case<br />

development if these options are<br />

taken forward<br />

2 Undertake as much<br />

reconfiguration as<br />

possible/viable/economic inhouse<br />

so that the service is<br />

outsourced with costs already<br />

reduced<br />

3.4.5 Conclusion<br />

The main benefit of this option is that it can provide opportunities for customers to<br />

personalise their services through the use of Direct Payments which offer choice<br />

and control. Some of the properties are not fit for purpose and this option gives us<br />

an ability to favour bids that include capital investment to develop accommodation<br />

that supports quality care delivery. It would also allow the service to be transferred<br />

out of the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> without the need to comply with Teckal and the<br />

restrictions that this imposes on providing services to a third party. While there is<br />

potential to realise some efficiencies and savings this is not considered to be<br />

significant as a result of on-going work to reconfigure services. Depending on the<br />

successful bidder there could be opportunities to share overheads across a wider<br />

range of services, including private provision. While the risk of an external provider<br />

failing cannot be completely discounted, this can be effectively mitigated through a<br />

robust procurement process that takes into account service quality as well as cost<br />

and supplier robustness. In addition, consortium bids could be encouraged that<br />

would facilitate the participation of small providers that might be “crowded out” by<br />

other options,<br />

There are two key risks that require further exploration as part of the full business<br />

case. The first relates to potential cost escalations following the transfer, which<br />

could be mitigated in part by undertaking full reassessments of all care packages.<br />

The second relates to any external partner offering spare capacity to people who<br />

live outside of <strong>Somerset</strong> who go on to become “ordinary residents” requiring SCC<br />

to fund their places as well as extra costs for NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>. This is a risk that<br />

could be mitigated though SCC’s interest in property assets along with robust and<br />

adequately resourced contract management.<br />

3.4.6 Recommendation<br />

To develop this option into a full business case<br />

A - 30


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

4 Impacts of Options<br />

See Appendix C<br />

5 Interdependencies<br />

The LDPS is a jointly commissioned service with the NHS, with SCC acting as the<br />

lead commissioner. Any decision to externalise or outsource would therefore need<br />

to agreed by both the SCC Cabinet and the <strong>Somerset</strong> CCG/ NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board.<br />

The outline business case will be considered by the clinical commissioning group<br />

who will make recommendations to the NHS Board.<br />

6 Next Steps<br />

To develop full business case ahead of final decision, this will require:<br />

• Development of full business case incorporating:<br />

blueprint for each option taken forward<br />

the results of a full 12 week public consultation plus a minimum of 2 weeks<br />

either side to set up and analyse responses (depending on the volume of<br />

responses and the point in the processes when they are achieved,<br />

dedicated resources could be needed to achieve this turnaround)<br />

Consultation with partner agencies and the Clinical Commissioning Group<br />

Consultation with staff and unions<br />

Parallel work to identify best-fit legal vehicle for externalised service if this<br />

option is taken forward<br />

Parallel market testing and shaping to identify viability of whole service<br />

outsourcing, if this option is taken forward<br />

Parallel work to develop requirements for a <strong>Service</strong> Plan should the option<br />

for the service to remain in-house be taken forward<br />

Parallel detailed costing exercise<br />

Parallel work on VAT and pensions implications<br />

Parallel work to update impact assessment<br />

• During this period it is recommended that reviews of residential and supported<br />

living accommodation should continue to identify any “quick wins” in these<br />

areas which make up 75% of the service cost and to ensure that the services<br />

provided meet service needs<br />

We anticipate that a full business case could be competed by September should a<br />

decision be taken on the <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> by both SCC and the NHS by the<br />

beginning of the week commencing 7 th May, and the required resources being<br />

available to undertake the work outlined above. This would then need to be followed<br />

by consideration by the Clinical commissioning Group and NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board and<br />

constitutional consultation processes with elected members on the completed<br />

document and before a final decision is taken.<br />

A - 31


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

The resources required to undertake this work would be significant and while the<br />

process could be managed by the existing team, additional support would be needed<br />

to undertake specific elements.<br />

Stakeholder engagement<br />

Stakeholder engagement already taken place:<br />

22 nd Feb Carers meeting – East<br />

23 rd Feb <strong>Service</strong> user meeting – East<br />

27 th Feb Carers meeting – West<br />

29 th Feb <strong>Service</strong> user meeting – West<br />

29 th Feb Area Staff Forum – West<br />

5 th March Joint Consultative Committee<br />

5 th March Area Staff Forum – East<br />

7 th March Consultative Conference – Directorate Update<br />

Timescale for <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong>:<br />

w/c 12 th<br />

March<br />

w/c 12 th<br />

March<br />

<strong>Somerset</strong> Partnership (contact Diana Rowe)<br />

Summary of feedback sent to stakeholder<br />

groups<br />

Mel Lock<br />

Fiona Kivett<br />

(David Dick and<br />

Mel Lock to<br />

sign off)<br />

12 th March <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> to Design Authority Mel Lock<br />

14 th March Design Authority Mel Lock and<br />

Martin Young<br />

15 th March<br />

(am)<br />

15 th March<br />

(pm)<br />

Briefing with Cllr Jimmy Zouche<br />

Mel Lock<br />

Members Workshop<br />

Miriam<br />

Maddison and<br />

Mel Lock<br />

21 st March Papers to Clinical Commissioning Group Stephen Miles<br />

March<br />

Telephone briefing to:<br />

David Rooke - CCG<br />

GP Lead for LD<br />

Mel Lock and<br />

Wayne Lewis<br />

27 th March Clinical Commissioning Group Trevor Gillham<br />

and Mel Lock<br />

End March Briefing with Cllr Christine Lawrence Trevor Gillham<br />

and Mel Lock<br />

2 nd April Cabinet Steering Group / Change<br />

Mel Lock<br />

Programme Board<br />

Early April Staff Briefing Sheet Fiona Kivett<br />

(David Dick and<br />

Mel Lock to<br />

sign off)<br />

Early April Briefing to Leader Cllr Christine<br />

A - 32


(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />

Lawrence and<br />

Trevor Gillham<br />

Early April Draft letter to key partners for sign-off Fiona Kivett<br />

(Mel Lock to<br />

sign off)<br />

11 th April Scrutiny Chair pre-meet<br />

(12.30pm – Hobhouse Room.<br />

Contact Jamie Jackson ext. 5032)<br />

11 th April <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> published for PCT<br />

Board/Scrutiny Committee<br />

Trevor Gillham<br />

and Mel Lock<br />

Fiona Kivett to<br />

link with Jamie<br />

Jackson<br />

11 th April Letter & report to key partners Fiona Kivett<br />

11 th April Briefing sheet & paper to Trade Unions Mel Lock and<br />

Stephen Miles<br />

13 th April Email & link to paper to staff Fiona Kivett<br />

(David Dick to<br />

sign off)<br />

18 th April PCT Board Wayne Lewis<br />

and Mel Lock<br />

24 th April Scrutiny Committee Trevor Gillham<br />

and Mel Lock<br />

2 nd May Cabinet Trevor Gillham<br />

and Mel Lock<br />

A - 33

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