Service Reviews â Outline Business Case - Somerset County Council
Service Reviews â Outline Business Case - Somerset County Council
Service Reviews â Outline Business Case - Somerset County Council
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(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
<strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong><br />
Paper A<br />
Cabinet Appendix 1<br />
Programme and Project Management Handbook 2011<br />
<strong>Service</strong> <strong>Reviews</strong> – <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong><br />
<strong>Service</strong> Review Title:<br />
Learning Disability Provider <strong>Service</strong><br />
Version: 3.0<br />
Status Final<br />
Document Name: LDPS – OBC 3.0<br />
Author: Mel Lock/Stephen Miles<br />
Owner:<br />
Last Review:<br />
Next Review Due:<br />
Name Signature Title Revision history Date Version<br />
A - 5
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
Executive Summary<br />
The Learning Disability (LD) In-House service provides Care Quality Commission (CQC)<br />
regulated Residential, Supported Living, Shared Lives and domiciliary services. It also<br />
provides day and work services. The customers supported by the service are among the<br />
most vulnerable people in receipt of social care funding, and include individuals with<br />
complex physical needs, autistic spectrum conditions and those whose behaviour<br />
challenges services. These services are jointly funded via a pooled budget arrangement<br />
with NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>. The aim for this service is to deliver good, quality and sustainable,<br />
outcomes for customers that are value for money.<br />
The Learning Disability Provider <strong>Service</strong> (LDPS) is a jointly funded and commissioned<br />
service with the NHS with SCC acting as the lead commissioner. The service was set up<br />
between <strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> (SCC) and the NHS in the early 1990’s. Any decision<br />
to change the service would therefore need to agreed by both the SCC Cabinet and the<br />
NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board. The outline business case will be considered by the new <strong>Somerset</strong><br />
Clinical Commissioning Group who will make recommendations to the NHS <strong>Somerset</strong><br />
Board.<br />
This service was subject to an options appraisal in 2010. The process previously<br />
undertaken was:<br />
• In March 2010 a Joint Commissioning Strategy was agreed by SCC Cabinet and<br />
NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board.<br />
• Between April and August 2010 a full options appraisal was developed which<br />
including soft market testing based on actual cases.<br />
• On the 20 th October 2010 the options appraisal was considered by SCC Cabinet<br />
and the NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board. The option selected was to remain in-house but<br />
redesign services to drive out inefficiencies. The savings target for this was £3.33m<br />
(including savings to be received by NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> as joint commissioner) by<br />
March 2014.<br />
• To date £730k of savings have been achieved and plans are in place to achieve<br />
the rest by a complete remodelling of the staffing structure, the Residential Short<br />
Break service and the Work Preparation <strong>Service</strong>.<br />
• We have also completed the review of 6 Supported Living services. The original<br />
expectation was that each review could lead to a small-scale outsourcing exercise.<br />
We have postponed this while we complete this <strong>Service</strong> Review.<br />
This outline business case considers whether:<br />
• The services delivered by the provider service are “need to do” want to do” or “nice<br />
to do”<br />
• The <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> has to commission these services<br />
• The <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> has to deliver the services directly<br />
• Alternative methods of delivery would be beneficial<br />
<strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> is legally required to continue providing funding to those<br />
customers that meet or exceed the Fair Access to Care <strong>Service</strong>s (FACS) eligibility<br />
threshold. As this customer group meet this threshold the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> will need to<br />
maintain funding. It does not, however, have to provide the services directly.<br />
A - 6
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
Personalising care is seen as a critical change to deliver greater customer satisfaction<br />
and improved outcomes by offering more choice and control. It is the foundation of<br />
current national policy for adult social care and will continue to feature in the new Adult<br />
Social Care White Paper, to be published later in 2012. Personal Budgets will, over time,<br />
lead to people making different choices about the social care services that they receive,<br />
and will provide additional incentives for service providers to personalise their response to<br />
each individual. It will require providers to operate in a way that embraces and responds<br />
quickly to customer need and market changes. The LDPS cannot respond fully to these<br />
challenges in its current form as remaining as part of the county council precludes<br />
providing services funded Direct Payments.<br />
The options considered in this outline business case are 1 :<br />
1. To keep the services in-house, but continue to remodel them through a <strong>Service</strong> Plan<br />
2. To externalise the LDPS to a Local Authority Controlled Company<br />
3. To outsource the entire LD LDPS through a competitive process<br />
Summary of Advantages<br />
Summary of Disadvantages<br />
Remain in the county council and continue to redesign and deliver efficiencies.<br />
• Low or no short term impact on customers.<br />
• Retains skills, expertise, knowledge and<br />
existing service levels.<br />
• No additional or double funding of corporate<br />
overheads, including Southwest One<br />
• Retains direct provision within the public<br />
sector which many carers indicated a<br />
preference for as part of initial feedback<br />
events<br />
• Least likely to generate anxiety and change<br />
resistance.<br />
• Maintaining the in-house provision avoids<br />
the risk of market failure, with its consequent<br />
dangers for vulnerable people and SCC's<br />
ability to meet its statutory responsibilities,<br />
as well as cost and reputational implications.<br />
• Does not incur short term change costs<br />
Whole service externalisation<br />
• During the initial feedback meetings with<br />
family carers they expressed an<br />
overwhelming preference for a transfer to a<br />
“not for profit” organisation, should the<br />
service not be retained within SCC. This<br />
could be ensured through an externalisation<br />
process.<br />
• Unable to provide services funded by direct<br />
payments (DPs). As more customers take<br />
advantage of DPs there is significant risk to<br />
the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> of them choosing<br />
alternative providers, therefore increasing<br />
unit costs.<br />
• Retaining the LDPS in-house would require<br />
significant investment particularly relating to<br />
capital spend.<br />
• Inflexibilities in SCC corporate overhead<br />
costs means that the potential to maximise<br />
long term revenue savings will be more<br />
limited than either externalisation or open<br />
market tender.<br />
• Limited flexibility as some SCC decision<br />
making processes reduce responsiveness,<br />
particularly around HR, recruitment and<br />
arranging appropriate accommodation to<br />
meet customer needs<br />
• Limited opportunities for capital investment,<br />
sharing overheads with independent<br />
provision or offering services to people<br />
using direct payments during the initial<br />
contract period of 3 years while subject to<br />
the Teckal exemption. As more customers<br />
take advantage of DPs there is significant<br />
1 Further consideration needs to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />
development of a full business case for any option that is taken forward<br />
A - 7
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
• Could be implemented as part of a phased<br />
approach, allowing SCC to better manage<br />
risk through the transition phase.<br />
• Would allow the LDPS to build a strong<br />
brand identity and reputation ahead of any<br />
future open market tender exercise and<br />
could potentially enable current service to<br />
bid within any future tendering process.<br />
• Would allow the LDPS to develop a user<br />
centred and outcome focussed service<br />
delivery approach, in line with customer and<br />
commissioner expectations ahead of any<br />
open market tender exercise.<br />
• Would enable SCC to retain access to the<br />
capacity to tackle struggling providers for a<br />
given period and therefore discharge its<br />
statutory responsibilities with the new<br />
organisation acting as “provider of last<br />
resort” for adults with learning disabilities.<br />
• Would enable the service to become more<br />
responsive around issues such as staff<br />
recruitment and deployment.<br />
Whole service open market tender<br />
• At initial feedback meetings, a number of<br />
service users expressed a desire to direct<br />
their own care through a direct payment,<br />
which an outsourced organisation would be<br />
risk of them choosing alternative providers<br />
therefore increasing unit costs.<br />
• Carers could not see the benefit of a two<br />
step approach as legally we would probably<br />
need to tender the services within 3 years.<br />
• There would be extremely high levels of<br />
operational, financial and reputation risks to<br />
SCC should the new entity fail.<br />
• Initial financial and resource outlay will be<br />
high.<br />
• It is estimated that the implementation would<br />
take a minimum of 1 year due to the high<br />
level of complexity.<br />
• The level of risk could be high for an<br />
organisation of this (small) size until well<br />
established. This would be elevated risk<br />
during the first year unless skilled<br />
management with proven business acumen<br />
is embedded in advance of the<br />
externalisation.<br />
• Should the externalised organisation fail to<br />
win any tender at the end of the initial<br />
contract period SCC could be responsible<br />
for funding any resulting costs. It would also<br />
be responsible for funding any one-off costs<br />
as a result of service reconfiguration.<br />
• Contracting with a single provider for these<br />
services, which currently account for over<br />
half of the expenditure, may limit choice and<br />
service quality unless robust contract<br />
management processes are put in place and<br />
adequately resourced.<br />
• Costs are likely to remain higher than an<br />
outsourcing arrangement due to the need to<br />
the need to continue to procure back-office<br />
services from SCC and/or Southwest One or<br />
set them up from scratch.<br />
• A full reassessment of all residential care<br />
and supported living care packages will<br />
need to be undertaken in advance of any<br />
transfer in order to mitigate some, but not<br />
all, risks related to cost escalation. This will<br />
incur additional costs.<br />
• Two big changes in 3 years could generate<br />
unnecessary anxiety amongst vulnerable<br />
users.<br />
• Initial financial and resource outlay will be<br />
very high and this option would be likely to<br />
require a dedicated team to implement<br />
• Due to the size of the service, and the need<br />
A - 8
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
free to provide.<br />
• The entire service can be evaluated against<br />
current market rates, potentially resulting in<br />
the service being outsourced at a lower cost<br />
than the current LDPS budget.<br />
• There is a reduced risk of service failure<br />
subject to adopting a robust and wellmanaged<br />
tender process, eliminating any<br />
“weak” bidders at the outset.<br />
• Would be a single-step approach.<br />
• A lead provider could sub contact. This<br />
would facilitate the participation of small<br />
providers that might otherwise be “crowded<br />
out” by Option C, externalisation.<br />
• Would allow the service to rapidly adopt<br />
best practice from the successful bidder<br />
• Outsourcing the LDPS as a whole would<br />
provide opportunities to reduce operational<br />
overheads as bidders would be likely to<br />
already have resources that could be<br />
extended, allowing the overheads to be<br />
shared across a broader range of services,<br />
rather than newly established.<br />
• We would expect to favour bids that include<br />
opportunities for external capital investment.<br />
• While the tender process for a large<br />
outsourcing exercise is complex and time<br />
consuming SCC would avoid potential ongoing<br />
complications relating to the Teckal<br />
exemption.<br />
• A competitive tendering process should<br />
encourage cost efficient bids that drive out<br />
savings. The tender and evaluation process<br />
would ensure that these were sustainable.<br />
to carefully involve people who use the<br />
service and carers at all stages of the tender<br />
and evaluation process, it is estimated that<br />
the implementation would take a minimum<br />
of 1 year<br />
• There are significant and complex property<br />
issues, and options to address the<br />
associated cost and risk factors need to be<br />
developed as part of the full business case.<br />
• Robust monitoring arrangements will need<br />
to be to be in place to protect vulnerable<br />
customers and provide reassurance to<br />
carers, many of whom expressed concern<br />
about the potential involvement of a “private<br />
for profit” provider in the provision of care<br />
and support for their loved ones during initial<br />
feedback meetings.<br />
• There is a potential risk of a service provider<br />
offering vacancies in supported living<br />
accommodation to people currently living<br />
outside of the <strong>County</strong>, ultimately leading to<br />
funding becoming SCC’s responsibility<br />
under ordinary residency rules. There could<br />
also be additional costs falling on NHS<br />
<strong>Somerset</strong>. There may be opportunities to<br />
mitigate these risks through SCC’s interest<br />
in the property assets utilised by the LDPS<br />
which need consideration within the<br />
development of the full business case.<br />
• Contracting with a single provider for these<br />
services, which currently account for over<br />
half of the expenditure, may limit choice and<br />
service quality unless robust contract<br />
management processes are put in place and<br />
adequately resourced.<br />
• A full reassessment of all residential care<br />
and supported living care packages will<br />
need to be undertaken in advance of any<br />
transfer in order to mitigate some, but not<br />
all, risks related to cost escalation. This will<br />
incur additional costs.<br />
• In the short-term at least there would be<br />
double funding of overheads, including<br />
some of those associated with Southwest<br />
One where they relate to activity that is not<br />
releasable.<br />
Stakeholder engagement activities have been held to inform the development of this<br />
<strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong>. The preferred option was:-<br />
• From service users: - There was no clear preferred option, however, the most<br />
important issue was that the staff that support them stay the same.<br />
A - 9
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
• From Carers: - To remain in the county council and continue to redesign. Carers<br />
were clear that they did not want to pursue the whole service externalisation<br />
option as they could not see the benefit of a two stage approach.<br />
• From Staff: - Remain in the county council and continue to redesign or whole<br />
service externalisation.<br />
Parents/carers and staff did however highlight a preference for a not for<br />
profit/charitable/social enterprise type organisation if we consider whole service open<br />
market tender. We will explore further how the new public services Act March 2012 could<br />
support this.<br />
The recommendation is to develop the whole service open tender option into a full<br />
business case, comparing this against remaining in the county council and continuing to<br />
redesign and deliver efficiencies. The full business case will need to be considered by<br />
<strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> and NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>.<br />
In summary, the main benefits of this recommended option are<br />
• A greater opportunity for customers to exercise choice and control through Direct<br />
Payments.<br />
• Opening up opportunities for capital investment to improve and/or replace<br />
accommodation that supports quality care delivery.<br />
• To secure high quality provision with the potential for longer term efficiencies.<br />
.<br />
A - 10
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
1 Scope and context<br />
1.1 Background<br />
<strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>’s (SCC’s) <strong>County</strong> Plan is to become a smaller, more<br />
enabling organisation focused on its customers, with a target operating model that<br />
ensures services are “right sourced”; i.e. that the most efficient and effective<br />
commissioning solution is applied to community needs. The expectation is largely<br />
that in future the <strong>Council</strong> will shape and influence service provision, rather than<br />
provide services directly.<br />
Unlike most other areas of adult social care provision across the country, <strong>Somerset</strong><br />
<strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> still has a large in-house provider service (the “LDPS”) that<br />
supports adults with learning disabilities who have a range of needs that meet Fair<br />
Access to Care <strong>Service</strong>s (FACS) eligibility criteria. The customers supported by the<br />
service are among the most vulnerable people funded by SCC, and include<br />
individuals with complex physical needs, autistic spectrum conditions and those<br />
whose behaviour challenges. The LDPS accounts for 55% of the total spend<br />
against this customer group and supports approximately 900 of the 1600 adults<br />
with a learning disability across the county supported by SCC. The remaining 700<br />
customers are supported through spot or block contracts with external providers or<br />
via Direct Payments. These customers and suppliers are out of scope for this<br />
service review.<br />
It is anticipated that the growing use of Personal Budgets will, over time, lead to<br />
people making different choices about the social care services that they receive,<br />
and will provide additional incentives for service providers to personalise their<br />
response to each individual. It will require providers to operate in a way that<br />
embraces and responds quickly to customer need and market changes. The LDPS<br />
cannot respond fully to these challenges in its current form.<br />
The main issues that the LDPS currently experiences, through being an in-house<br />
service are:<br />
• It is unable to deliver services that are paid for using direct payments. 2<br />
• Its ability to invest in existing properties and source new accommodation in<br />
a timely fashion is restricted.<br />
• It is unable to attract new business other than from the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>.<br />
• There is inflexibility in staff terms and conditions.<br />
2 Department of Health, A Guide to Receiving Direct Payments From Your Local <strong>Council</strong>: A Route to<br />
Independent Living, 2009, p16: Question: “Can I purchase services from my local council “<br />
Answer: “You cannot buy services from your local council as it is not allowed to sell its services in this way.”<br />
A - 11
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
1.2 Key <strong>Service</strong> Information<br />
The key information used in the development of this <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> is<br />
shown in Table 1, below:<br />
Funding arrangements<br />
Commissioning arrangements<br />
Pooled budget with NHS. Funding ratio is 75% SCC and<br />
25% NHS.<br />
Commissioned in-house through SLA<br />
2012/13 Gross Budget/net Gross £32,219,090<br />
Net £28,480,100<br />
2012/13 Direct delivery costs £26,438,080<br />
2012/13 Operational<br />
overheads<br />
£2,042,020<br />
Customers Approximately 908 adults with learning disabilities and 800<br />
carers<br />
Summary of customer views<br />
Number of staff delivering<br />
service<br />
Potential pensions<br />
crystallisation costs<br />
Key partners<br />
Statutory basis of services<br />
Demographic context<br />
Policy context<br />
Constraints<br />
<strong>Outline</strong>d within paper<br />
1,218 staff (965.95 FTE) employed by <strong>Somerset</strong> <strong>County</strong><br />
<strong>Council</strong><br />
Awaiting figure following analysis of current staff<br />
NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>/Clinical Commissioning Group, <strong>Somerset</strong><br />
Partnership NHS Foundation Trust<br />
The main acts are listed below, please see Appendix B for<br />
further details:<br />
• The National Assistance Act 1948<br />
• The Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970<br />
• The NHS and Community Care Act 1990<br />
• The Mental Capacity Act 2005<br />
• The Carers and Disabled Children Act 2000<br />
• The Carers (Equal Opportunities) Act 2004<br />
• Health and Social Care Act 2008<br />
The number of adults with learning disabilities is projected<br />
to increase by 4.15% by 2014 and by 15.74% in those<br />
aged 65 and over. The improved survival rates of people<br />
with severe disabilities will have an impact and it will be<br />
important to develop an appropriate response to improving<br />
services for people with autism<br />
Valuing People (2001) 3 and Valuing People Now (2009) 4<br />
New white paper for Adult Social Care and revised<br />
legislation later in 2012<br />
Restrictions to the use of Direct Payments linked to the<br />
3 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4009153<br />
4 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_093377<br />
A - 12
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
personalisation agenda<br />
Under the Health and Social Care Act 2008 the following<br />
types of service that are provided by the LDPS are<br />
regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC):<br />
• The provision of personal care for people who are<br />
unable to provide it for themselves, because of old age,<br />
illness or disability, in the place where they are living,<br />
for example, by a domiciliary care agency 5 . This<br />
includes domiciliary care provided as part of the<br />
“Supported Living” model of provision<br />
• Adult placement schemes 6 .<br />
• Accommodation for people who require nursing or<br />
personal care 7 . This includes residential care and<br />
residential short breaks<br />
2012/13 LD Employers<br />
Superannuation contribution<br />
Fees and charges<br />
This means that all services, other than day and work<br />
preparation, are subject to statutory regulation<br />
£4,656,600<br />
Adult Social Care fees and charges may apply to services<br />
provided by the LDPS depending on individual<br />
circumstances. As part of the Medium Term Financial<br />
Plan (MTFP), fees and charges are updated annually and<br />
adjusted to take account of cost of living and annual<br />
benefit increases, market factors, legislation, national<br />
guidance, demand and local policy requirements. Adult<br />
Social Care fees and charges for 2012/13 were set by<br />
SCC’s Cabinet on 1 st February 2012 8 .<br />
In terms of SCC statutory duties the following applies in terms of funding services<br />
to meet FACS eligible needs, irrespective of the type of provider:<br />
• Must do: Funding of Adult Social Care services to meet eligible needs under<br />
Fair Access to Care <strong>Service</strong>s. The types of service that meet these needs<br />
include residential care, nursing care, supported living, shared lives (adult<br />
“fostering”), respite services (including daytime respite) emergency assessment<br />
service for people experiencing a crisis and support to carers. There is currently<br />
no single modern statute which outlines the statutory framework for Adult Social<br />
Care services 9 ; however it is clear that the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>’s responsibility for<br />
funding these and similar types of service are underpinned by legislation. See<br />
Appendix B for an overview of the legislative framework.<br />
5 Care Quality Commission, The scope of registration, Care Quality Commission, December 2011, p17<br />
6 Care Quality Commission, The scope of registration, Care Quality Commission, December 2011, p18<br />
7 Care Quality Commission, The scope of registration, Care Quality Commission, December 2011, p20<br />
8 Item 9, Community Directorate Fees and Charges 2012-13, Appendix A<br />
9 The Law Commission , Adult Social Care, 10 May 2011, LAW COM No 326<br />
A - 13
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
• Want to do: These would be services meeting needs that are not FACS<br />
eligible, but would be beneficial to provide for other reasons such as preventing<br />
future need. In LD services this tends to be employment support services. For<br />
the majority of customers these employment support services provide a cost<br />
effective alternative to Day /Respite services which would need to be provided<br />
to meet FACS eligible needs, and provides vital support for many carers.<br />
1.3 Comparison of current service costs with the market<br />
Soft market testing undertaken as part of the options appraisal conducted in<br />
2010 10 indicated that the LDPS offered good value for money for care and support<br />
for people with the most complex needs, but was potentially not as good value for<br />
people with less complex (but still FACS eligible) needs.<br />
We are undertaking a more detailed analysis of Supported Living and Residential<br />
services to compare both quality and value for money against the market. A full<br />
analysis of this data will inform the Full <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong>. We have begun this<br />
process and have looked at four individual supported living services, operated by<br />
the LDPS. Early indications suggest that:<br />
• The current hourly rate for care and support is higher for the LDPS than that<br />
currently charged by existing external providers of similar services. The<br />
difference in rates, including an overhead rate of 15% 11 added to the LDPS<br />
(SCC) rate to enable comparison, is summarised in the following table.<br />
SCC 12 SCC 13 2012 2012 2012 2012<br />
2012 2014 Provider 1 Provider 2 Provider 3 Provider 4<br />
£17.18 £16.85 £14.85 £16.10 £15.82 £15.93<br />
Table 1<br />
• The future hourly rate that could be achieved once all planned service redesign<br />
is completed indicates that SCC may reduce their rate to £16.85 (£16.50<br />
removing the SCC pension’s shortfall liability).<br />
• We are currently discussing the likely timeframe to achieve this rate with the<br />
provider service but it is likely to take until 2014 as a result of changes being<br />
made through staff turnover.<br />
• The Supported Living service represents 47% of the LDPS spend.<br />
10 SCC Cabinet meeting held on 20/10/2010. Paper C, Appendix E “Soft Market Testing Analysis”<br />
11 External partner rates include all overheads, where as the in-house rate does not include SCC corporate<br />
overheads. Although a 15% rate was used to enable a comparison the actual SCC overheads rate applied<br />
to the LD <strong>Service</strong> is likely to be higher.<br />
12 Note: removing the SCC pension fund shortfall liability (enabled through externalisation) reduces the SCC<br />
rate in 2012 to £16.76.<br />
13 Projected hourly rate based on structural changes already in progress. Note: removing the pension’s<br />
shortfall liability reduces the projected SCC rate in 2014 to £16.50.<br />
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(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
2 Options for Change<br />
The options that have been considered are 14 :<br />
A. Redesign services in line with the Localism Bill. The majority of expenditure<br />
(75% of the budget) is used to provide residential care, supported living and<br />
domiciliary care services. These would be difficult to deliver at a local level whilst<br />
maintaining a cost effective and equitable service. Mencap have been vocal in their<br />
concern about devolving this type of service to the community as, although they<br />
believe in greater devolution of power, they continue to highlight the risks that with<br />
increased local decision-making comes less cost effective services that will be<br />
subject to a ‘postcode lottery’. However some services, primarily respite day<br />
services and work preparation services may, in part, be better delivered at a local<br />
level. This option has been rejected for the whole service; however we could<br />
consider alternative models of delivery for day/work services as part of the full<br />
business case.<br />
B. Remain in the county council and continue to redesign and deliver<br />
efficiencies. Under this option we would continue with the existing programme of<br />
change, and develop a <strong>Service</strong> Plan to restructure and to meet the challenges of<br />
the Medium Term Financial Plan (MTFP), demographic trends and increased use<br />
of Direct Payments (DP).<br />
This option does not fit well with the high level design principles of the Target<br />
Operating Model and exposes SCC to escalated levels of financial risk as more<br />
people choose to personalise their services. Retaining the direct provision of these<br />
services was part of the options appraisal considered by SCC’s Cabinet in October<br />
2010. As a result of the Cabinet decision, the in-house service has been reshaping<br />
to ensure that it is outcome driven, streamlined and more cost effective, with £730k<br />
(including QIPP 15 ) of savings having already delivered and a further £2.6m in the<br />
pipeline. This has enabled the LDPS to begin to provide services that are more<br />
aligned with market costs and which are more flexible and responsive to customer<br />
need. This option is considered further in section 3.<br />
C. Whole service externalisation. Under this option the service would be moved<br />
out of the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> without a competitive process. There are a number of<br />
different legal vehicles that need to be explored further in the full business case if a<br />
decision is taken to pursue this option, however in order to comply with European<br />
Union procurement regulations it is likely to take the form of a Local Authority<br />
Controlled Company. This option is considered further in section 3.<br />
D. Whole service open market tender. Under this option the whole service would<br />
be subject to an open market tender compliant with SCC contract standing orders<br />
14 Further consideration needs to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />
development of a full business case for any option that is taken forward<br />
15 QIPP (Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention) is a large scale transformational programme for<br />
the NHS, involving all NHS staff, clinicians, patients and the voluntary sector and will improve the quality of<br />
care the NHS delivers whilst making up to £20billion of efficiency savings by 2014-15, which will be<br />
reinvested in frontline care. http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Healthcare/Qualityandproductivity/QIPP/index.htm<br />
A - 15
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
and European Union procurement regulations (Part B). This option is considered<br />
further in section 3.<br />
3 Options Appraisal<br />
3.1 Option B: Remain in the county council and continue to redesign and deliver<br />
efficiencies 16<br />
3.1.1 Overview<br />
Under this option we would continue with the existing programme of change, and<br />
develop a <strong>Service</strong> Plan to restructure and to meet the dual challenges of the<br />
Medium Term Financial Plan (MTFP) and increased use of direct payments. The<br />
vision for adult social care 17 clearly indicates that the preferred method for<br />
delivering choice and control to service users is through a direct payment which<br />
would create significant risks for in-house delivered services.<br />
As an in-house service the LDPS would not enjoy the benefits or legal freedom to<br />
trade commercially with the wider population, or in a manner which would allow<br />
more radical service redesign and response to personalisation and customer<br />
expectations. Remaining in-house would result in services becoming increasingly<br />
economically unviable and uncompetitive as, over time, elements of the LDPS are<br />
either “parcelled” off, closed or become outdated. This is likely to lead to increased<br />
costs to the <strong>Council</strong> as the consequences of running down services would result in<br />
higher unit costs, as overheads and fixed costs would be spread across reducing<br />
activity levels.<br />
<strong>Reviews</strong> of four services undertaken as part of the existing programme of change<br />
have indicated that, as current work to drive out efficiencies reaches fruition, the<br />
LDPS is likely to become increasingly competitive when compared to both<br />
independent and not-for-profit sectors (as summarised on p14) . However, as<br />
increasing numbers of people choose to direct their own care, the LDPS will be<br />
unable to respond where the mechanism used is a direct payment. As part of the<br />
full business case we will need to profile the likely demand for direct payments in<br />
the LDPS and the impact on this option. If the demand for direct payments is<br />
greater than 5-10% of the overall cost then this is likely to lead to a long term trend<br />
of reducing activity and increasing unit costs. This would mean that the overheads<br />
and fixed costs are spread over a shrinking volume of care delivery and the risk of<br />
16 Further consideration would need to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />
development of a full business case should this option be taken forward<br />
17 Department of Heath, “A vision for adult social care: Capable communities and active citizens”,<br />
16/10/2010, p15. Available from:<br />
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_121508<br />
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(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
securing quality care may increase, In addition retention of the service does not fit<br />
with the <strong>Council</strong>’s aspirations to be a commissioning led organisation and a smaller<br />
more enabling authority.<br />
3.1.2 Benefits<br />
• Low or no short term impact on customers.<br />
• Retains skills, expertise, knowledge and existing service levels.<br />
• No additional or double funding of corporate overheads, including Southwest<br />
One<br />
• Retains direct provision within the public sector which many carers indicated a<br />
preference for as part of initial feedback events, citing recent criticism of<br />
independent sector services following the BBC Panorama investigation into<br />
Winterbourne View, and the failure of Southern Cross. However it should be<br />
noted that this preference was less prominent in feedback from people who use<br />
services.<br />
• Least likely to generate anxiety and resistance.<br />
• Maintaining the in-house provision avoids the risk of market failure, with its<br />
consequent dangers for vulnerable people and SCC's ability to meet its<br />
statutory responsibilities, as well as cost and reputational implications.<br />
• Allows SCC to retain the skills and experience necessary to tackle struggling<br />
providers in-house to ensure it meets its statutory obligations and gives it more<br />
control to respond to emergency situations<br />
3.1.3 Disbenefits and any potential mitigations<br />
• Unable to provide services funded by direct payments (which a number of<br />
people who used services expressed a preference for at initial feedback<br />
events). As more customers take advantage of DP’s there is significant risk to<br />
the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> of them choosing alternative providers, therefore increasing<br />
unit costs. Even if this barrier was removed it is likely that the in-house service<br />
would find it difficult to develop new revenue streams as, once SCC corporate<br />
overheads are incorporated, hourly rates are unlikely to be competitive when<br />
compared to independent and not-for-profit providers<br />
• Retaining the LDPS in-house would require significant investment particularly<br />
relating to capital spend. Although projected future rates will bring the service<br />
more in-line with independent and not-for-profit providers this is expected to<br />
take 2 years, while a transfer to a different organisational model has the<br />
potential to release costs more quickly under the right conditions.<br />
• Inflexibilities in SCC corporate overheads costs means that the potential to<br />
maximise long term revenue savings will be more limited than options C and D.<br />
• There could be an “opportunity lost” with regard to introducing a step change<br />
through major service reconfiguration.<br />
• There would continue to be significant limitations in capital investment into the<br />
property portfolio due to on-going pubic sector austerity measures. Some<br />
properties are no longer “fit for purpose”, in terms of living (but not the care<br />
quality) environments. This increases the risk that customers who are directing<br />
their own care may choose independent sector providers over the in-house<br />
service, resulting in increased vacancies and therefore higher unit costs.<br />
A - 17
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
• Limited flexibility in comparison to all other options as some SCC decision<br />
making processes reduce responsiveness, particularly around HR and<br />
recruitment and arranging appropriate accommodation to meet customer needs<br />
• May lack business acumen / skills to compete with independent sector.<br />
• Some service costs are likely to remain higher than the independent sector for<br />
the foreseeable future, particularly in relation to SCC pension costs and terms<br />
and conditions in comparison to independent and non-for profit competitors.<br />
• Potentially limited opportunities for capital investment, although the Cabinet<br />
decision made on 20 th October 2010 and subsequent Section 28a agreement<br />
with NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> requires that any receipts from the sale of property to be<br />
reinvested in services for people with LD.<br />
3.1.4 Risks associated with this option 18<br />
Option Description of Risk<br />
Likelihood Mitigation<br />
B<br />
B<br />
The service fails to meet the<br />
requirements of the <strong>Service</strong> Plan<br />
resulting in another option having to<br />
be considered and the benefits<br />
resulting from it being realised at a<br />
later date than had the option been<br />
pursued in the first instance<br />
Staff terms and conditions, including<br />
shift patterns to meet customer<br />
needs, are unable to be varied<br />
sufficiently resulting in the service<br />
failing to meet the <strong>Service</strong> Plan<br />
and/or with unexpected<br />
consequences to the operational<br />
delivery of services<br />
3 Develop a robust and realistic<br />
<strong>Service</strong> Pan as part of a full<br />
business case if this option is<br />
taken forward<br />
3 Some aspects will need to be<br />
taken forward as part of wider<br />
work on staff terms and<br />
conditions across SCC<br />
3.1.5 Conclusion<br />
While this option may initially appear to be the lowest risk, as the number of people<br />
choosing to direct their own care through direct payments increases, the costs to<br />
SCC of providing services to people who do not choose this route, are also likely to<br />
increase. While carers have expressed concern about for-profit providers of<br />
services following the Winterbourne View scandal, poor care and abuse is not<br />
limited to the independent sector, and it is not recommended that the default<br />
position should be to retain the service in-house on this basis alone. While the<br />
LDPS is considered to be providing good quality services by many of the<br />
customers and carers from which initial feedback has been sought, it will become<br />
increasingly challenging to sustain this in the medium-long term within the current<br />
environment. A move away for direct provision of theses services has the potential<br />
to allow the LDPS to directly compete with other providers in the areas in which it<br />
A - 18
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
excels rather than be subject to a possible future of long term decline which would<br />
neither benefit its customers, its staff or the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>.<br />
3.1.6 Recommendation<br />
As this option has a number of disadvantages, it is recommended that other<br />
options are actively considered and compared against it in the detailed business<br />
case, unless the problems around flexing corporate overheads cannot be resolved.<br />
3.2 Common Themes for Options C and D (Whole service externalisation/open<br />
market tender)<br />
Options C and D have some commonality. Both models of service naturally drive<br />
efficiency and transparency, both in terms of process and overall costs.<br />
Continuing efficiencies could be delivered at the start of the contract as the level of<br />
assessed need is mapped to hours delivered. The current market has a number of<br />
private and not-for-independent suppliers offering good quality care and support.<br />
However, whole service externalisation or outsourcing could result in a single<br />
supplier receiving over half of all funding for services for adults with learning<br />
disabilities in <strong>Somerset</strong>. Contracting with a single provider for such a large<br />
proportion of the current expenditure could stifle competition, may reduce choice<br />
and could affect service quality unless robust contract management processes are<br />
put in place. However, this is not an uncommon supplier model and indeed the<br />
elderly care market in <strong>Somerset</strong> has been well served using a fairly similar model.<br />
A well designed contract that allows volumes to taper as people choose to direct<br />
their own care would help mitigate these risks and it would be possible to go to the<br />
market e.g. for work preparation services separately from regulated care services.<br />
In the interest of avoiding repetition the following areas, though varying in the<br />
magnitude of their impact, need to be carefully considered across both options C<br />
and D:<br />
• Pensions deficit crystallisation. The benefits and disbenefits of these<br />
options are outlined in Appendix A and would require further exploration as part<br />
of the development of a full business case should either of the externalisation<br />
or outsourcing option be taken forward. However, in summary unless there is a<br />
change to CLG Pensions Direction Order 2007 the effect in all cases would be<br />
to add an additional cost burden to the Authority.<br />
Advice received indicates that to plan and implement the changes to pension<br />
arrangements required by options C and D arrangement takes approximately<br />
six months to complete. Therefore, the points raised in Appendix A and the<br />
additional costs need to be considered and planned as part of the development<br />
of a full business case.<br />
A - 19
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
• SCC corporate overheads. The LDPS for 12/13 has £3.80m of corporate<br />
overheads apportioned.<br />
These can be broken down as follows:<br />
Capital Charges<br />
£1.56m<br />
Carbon Reduction £0.02m<br />
SCC Support <strong>Service</strong>s £0.35m<br />
Accommodation<br />
£0.06m<br />
SWOne Fixed Charges £0.93m<br />
SCC & SWOne Charges £0.70m 19<br />
Pension Deficit<br />
£0.18m<br />
Total<br />
£3.80m<br />
If externalising services, it should be done on the basis of new overheads being<br />
funded. The Authority will bear the cost of any existing arrangements as it<br />
endeavours to manage down (SWOne) costs. MTFP pressures would need to<br />
take this cost into account and will impact in the short to medium term on<br />
savings delivery.<br />
• Assets. The LDPS currently utilises a number of assets. These range from<br />
day centres to residential homes where people with learning disabilities live.<br />
Care and support services which are provided though the “supported living” 20<br />
model separate housing and care and support through the customer holding a<br />
tenancy with a Registered Social Landlord (RSL) as a result of arrangements<br />
put in place in the 1990s. The asset position is complex and often involves<br />
properties that are people’s homes. Future arrangements will need to be<br />
considered as part of the full business case.<br />
Many of the properties utilised, including 44 of those managed by RSLs, were<br />
originally purchased through funding made available by the NHS when longstay<br />
hospitals closed. The total value of these assets is £17.13m 21 including a<br />
Section 28a investment of £10.3m, and the NHS will continue to maintain a<br />
legal charge on the properties. NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> is in the process of transferring<br />
these properties to SCC on the condition that the asset or the capital value, if<br />
disposed of, continue to be utilised for the benefit of individuals with a learning<br />
disability. Any transfer of the LDPS out of SCC therefore needs to ensure that<br />
the assets are configured in a way that is financially sustainable and provides a<br />
sound base for capital reinvestment. It also needs to maintain a clear<br />
separation between the housing and care and support provider for supported<br />
19 Includes advisory and other services that will be retained by SCC<br />
20 The supported living model, as defined by the care Quality Commission, requires that care and support<br />
services are provided separately to housing/landlord functions. These are a number of mechanisms for<br />
achieving his including the introduction of a 3 rd party to perform the function of landlord or by devolving this<br />
responsibility to a separate legal entity within a larger organisation that also provides care and support<br />
21 As at 22/02/2012. The difference in value between the original Section 28a investment and current<br />
valuation includes where the there is part ownership by RSLs.<br />
A - 20
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
living services. Some of the current assets are not fit for purpose for the<br />
delivery model that will meet the future needs of the customers and both<br />
options C and D will require a clear asset plan to future proof the service.<br />
• Critical systems/ Information governance:<br />
Any new organisation will be required to register with the Information<br />
Commissioner and be set up its own data controller. This process involves<br />
one off fees as well as annual subscription fees.<br />
Information sharing protocols need to be agreed and put into operation with<br />
SCC<br />
Some of the services are currently provided by Southwest One (i.e.<br />
Specialist applications i.e. SAP / data secure storage etc). It is possible to<br />
procure similar services from an alternative provider although SCC is<br />
unlikely to recover Southwest One contract costs.<br />
Locally held confidential data will require the agreeing and setting up of<br />
security and access authorisation protocols – therefore incurring further<br />
costs.<br />
• TUPE. The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations<br />
2006 apply to what are known as ‘relevant transfers’, the definition of which<br />
would include both the outsourcing and transfer of the LDPS. The TUPE<br />
regulations are intended to safeguard employee rights and terms and<br />
conditions when the business in which they are employed transfers. The TUPE<br />
process would need to be appropriately planned with adequate time for<br />
determining which posts are/are not included for transfer. Consultation with<br />
staff is required for a minimum formal period of 90 days given the number of<br />
staff affected, which would include staff in a range of corporate functions i.e.<br />
finance, HR, some of whom may be seconded to South West One Ltd.<br />
• Value Added Tax (VAT). For an explanation of potential impacts, against a<br />
variety of service delivery mechanisms, please see Appendix A<br />
• <strong>Business</strong> continuity. There is a business continuity plan in place for the<br />
LDPS that was reviewed in 2011. Should the service be externalised (Option<br />
C) this would need to be updated by the new organisation to take account of<br />
the impact of the change. If the LDPS were to be outsourced (Option D) then a<br />
review of business continuity plans would need to take place as part of the<br />
tender evaluation process.<br />
• Management of personal finances. SCC has a legal obligation to undertake<br />
the administration of personal finances for people who are either under a<br />
‘Deputyship’ order or for those service users for whom SCC are the ‘Appointee’.<br />
This includes 196 adults with learning disabilities supported by the LDPS.<br />
These arrangements are administered by the Client Finances Team which<br />
currently consists of 4.52 WTE staff. Currently, because LDPS staff are SCC<br />
employees, much of the day-to-day administration is able to be undertaken at a<br />
local level within individual supported living and residential locations. However,<br />
should the LDPS be outsourced or externalised then the role that could be<br />
undertaken at a local level would be much more limited. This means that large<br />
A - 21
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
proportions of this work would instead need to be undertaken by the Client<br />
Finances Team in the same way as it does for any other external provider.<br />
This would have a significant impact on the team during both the transition and<br />
over the long term. A small number of staff support may need to be redeployed<br />
from the LDPS to the Client Finances Team.<br />
3.3 Option C: Externalisation 22<br />
3.3.1 Overview<br />
Under this option, the in-house service would be externalised to a new<br />
organisation, specifically created for the purpose and awarded a contract to<br />
provide services for an initial period (typically 3 years). The key difference<br />
between “outsourcing” and “externalisation” is that an externalised organisation<br />
would be awarded a contract without a competitive procurement process. This<br />
process would need to be undertaken in a way that mitigates the risk of legal<br />
challenge. A full market tender would then need to take place at the end of the<br />
initial contract and therefore this model could therefore only be an interim, time<br />
limited arrangement.<br />
Potential legal vehicles include:<br />
• Company Limited by Guarantee<br />
• Company Limited by Shares<br />
• Community Interest Company<br />
• Industrial and Provident Society<br />
• Charitable Status<br />
• Mutual<br />
• Local Authority Trading Company (LATC)<br />
Further exploration of the “best fit” legal vehicles would need to take place as part<br />
of the development of a full business case, should this option be taken forward.<br />
Early indications however are that it would need to take the form of a Local<br />
Authority controlled company in order to best comply with European Procurement<br />
law.<br />
Legal advice received in 2010 indicated that the externalised organisation could be<br />
set up in partnership with one or more other public sector organisation(s) (including<br />
other <strong>Council</strong>s, but not NHS organisations 23 or the independent sector) under the<br />
Teckal exemption to European Union procurement law. The Teckal exemption<br />
applies where a contracting authority (in this case the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong>) contracts<br />
with a legally distinct entity for administrative purposes without undertaking a<br />
competitive procurement exercise. Usually this will be a company that the<br />
contracting authority has set up, either on its own or in partnership with others to<br />
provide services. The conditions for the Teckal exemption to apply are that:<br />
22 Further consideration would need to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />
development of a full business case should this option be taken forward<br />
23 The legal opinion received was that, while related, health and social care services are sufficiently different<br />
to be at risk of challenge<br />
A - 22
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
• The service provider carries out the “essential” part of its activities with the<br />
contracting authority. Legal advice received is that this would represent<br />
approximately 95%.<br />
• The authority exercises the same kind of control over the service provider as it<br />
does over its own departments. This means that control would need to extend<br />
beyond the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> simply maintaining a shareholding, and would<br />
preclude the external organisation subcontracting without careful consideration<br />
of the legal implications of doing so on both a case-by-case and cumulative<br />
basis.<br />
• There is neither private sector ownership of the service provider, nor any<br />
intention that there should be any.<br />
Legal advice obtained in 2010 and updated in 2012 (see Appendix D) indicates<br />
that any services purchased by the customer through a direct payment would not<br />
be considered to have been purchased by the contracting authority due to the<br />
introduction of a third party (the customer). This would mean that any significant<br />
expansion of direct payments in <strong>Somerset</strong> would impact on the viability of the<br />
provider and/or trigger a competitive procurement, as it could not undertake more<br />
than 5% of its business in this way, without risking legal change and potential<br />
compensation.<br />
Although the establishment of the organisation itself would have relatively limited<br />
costs associated with it, the process of awarding the contract would be likely to<br />
attract significant legal costs in order to ensure that SCC did not leave itself open<br />
to legal challenge and potential damages. The cost for a similarly sized <strong>County</strong><br />
<strong>Council</strong> to create a similarly sized organisation providing social care services was<br />
approximately £600,000. However we have no information regarding the make up<br />
of this figure.<br />
3.3.2 Benefits<br />
• During the initial meetings with carers they expressed an overwhelming<br />
preference for a transfer to a “not for profit” organisation, should the service not<br />
be retained within SCC. This option would therefore be potentially less likely<br />
(than an outsourcing approach) to encounter resistance from carers, and other<br />
stakeholders.<br />
• This can be implemented as part of a phased approach, allowing SCC to better<br />
manage risk through the transition phase. The first phase would involve setting<br />
up a local authority controlled company. During this phase, the new<br />
organisation would develop internal infrastructure and consolidate its financial<br />
and legal position. Following the expiry of the initial contract period an open<br />
market tender exercise would need to take place for the service to move<br />
outside of the limitations imposed by complying with the Teckal exemption.<br />
• This would allow the LDPS the potential to build a strong brand identity and<br />
reputation ahead of any open market tender exercise.<br />
• This would allow the LDPS to further develop a user centred and outcome<br />
focussed service delivery approach, in line with customer and commissioner<br />
expectations ahead of any open market tender exercise.<br />
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(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
• This would enable SCC to retain access to the capacity to tackle struggling<br />
providers for a given period and therefore discharge its statutory responsibilities<br />
with the new organisation acting as “provider of last resort” for adults with<br />
learning disabilities.<br />
3.3.3 Disbenefits and any potential mitigations<br />
• During the initial feedback meetings a number of people who used services<br />
expressed a preference for directing their own care using a Direct Payment.<br />
Legal advice received is that there would be a risk of legal challenge if the<br />
LDPS were to undertake more than 5% of its business in the form of services to<br />
individuals in receipt of a direct payment, while subject to any contract awarded<br />
under the Teckal exemption.<br />
• There is potential for legal challenge if an organisation awarded a contract<br />
under the Teckal exemption was invited to participate in the market testing of<br />
new business from SCC and was awarded this business in a way that could be<br />
viewed as being anti-competitive or favouring the organisation<br />
• Initial financial and resource outlay will be high. While the formation of the legal<br />
entity itself is relatively simple, significant work will be required in relation to the<br />
transfer of business and staff, and to ensure the awarding of the contract is not<br />
open to challenge. Potential costs include pension related work, legal work,<br />
registration, consultation, infrastructure and the procurement of external<br />
business expertise.<br />
• The level of risk could be high for an organisation of this (small) size until well<br />
established.<br />
• There is an elevated risk of organisational failure in the first year unless skilled<br />
management with proven business acumen is embedded in advance of the<br />
externalisation. There would be extremely high levels of operational, financial<br />
and reputation risks to SCC should the new entity fail. This is due to the<br />
specialist nature of the services provided and the limited capacity within the<br />
market for other providers to “step in” in a timely manner.<br />
• It is estimated that the process of setting up the entity would take a minimum of<br />
12 months, based on the operational status of the in-house service at this point<br />
in time.<br />
• There would be very limited opportunities for external capital investment during<br />
the initial contract period as any independent sector investment is likely to be in<br />
breach of the Teckal exemption. This could potentially be mitigated by the<br />
separation of the assets into a separate legally distinct entity to that providing<br />
care and support, but this would need further exploration as part of the<br />
development of the full business case, should this option be taken forward.<br />
• Should the externalised organisation fail to win any tender at the end of the<br />
initial contract period SCC could be responsible for funding any resultant<br />
redundancy costs. It would also be responsible for funding any one-off costs as<br />
a result of service reconfiguration as part of the transfer process.<br />
• Costs are likely to remain higher than an outsourcing arrangement due to the<br />
need to the need to continue to procure back-office services from SCC and/or<br />
Southwest One or set them up from scratch. There would also only be very<br />
limited opportunities to share fixed and management overheads with privately<br />
funded provision while complying with the Teckal exemption.<br />
A - 24
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
3.3.4 Risks associated with this option 24<br />
Option Description of Risk<br />
Likelihood Mitigation<br />
C<br />
C<br />
C<br />
C<br />
C<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
It becomes apparent that service<br />
cannot provide services funded by<br />
Direct Payments and remain within<br />
the protection of the Teckal<br />
exemption leading to this option<br />
becoming unviable<br />
Failure to follow due process could<br />
lead to a legal challenge to the<br />
externalisation of the service by an<br />
existing provider in the market which<br />
delays the process of externalisation<br />
and/or results in it being abandoned<br />
and/or results in substantial costs<br />
The organisation is externalised but<br />
fails and services need to be<br />
brought back in-house and/or<br />
outsourced with significant costs and<br />
reputation damage to SCC<br />
The service is externalised as a<br />
LATC but fails to win a tender at the<br />
end of the initial period resulting in<br />
significant wind-up costs to SCC<br />
The externalised organisation does<br />
not fully understand its cost base or<br />
is unable to procure appropriate<br />
business/commercial expertise<br />
resulting in benefits being unrealised<br />
or with unexpected consequences to<br />
the operational delivery of services<br />
There is significant opposition from<br />
customers, staff and unions to the<br />
externalisation/outsourcing which<br />
effects resource requirements, and<br />
timescales.<br />
There is double funding of<br />
overheads/back office services due<br />
to the externalised /outsourced<br />
organisation deciding to make its<br />
own arrangements for services while<br />
costs to SCC remain<br />
4 Currently seeking updated legal<br />
advice. If confirmed this could<br />
result in this option being<br />
recommended for rejection<br />
2 Examine in detail at an early<br />
stage as part of full business<br />
case development if this option is<br />
taken forward<br />
3 Examine the potential of<br />
embedding proven business<br />
acumen ahead of externalisation<br />
as part of full business case<br />
development if this option is<br />
taken forward<br />
3 Examine risk and potential<br />
consequences in detail at an<br />
early stage as part of full<br />
business case development if this<br />
option is taken forward<br />
3 Examine the potential of<br />
embedding proven business<br />
acumen ahead of externalisation<br />
as part of full business case<br />
development if this option is<br />
taken forward<br />
4 If a decision is taken not to<br />
pursue an externalisation option<br />
then the rationale will need to be<br />
clearly communicated through a<br />
set of key messages to ensure<br />
consistency<br />
4 Advice received corporately is<br />
that some double funding may be<br />
necessary in the short term<br />
24 This is an initial list of the main potential risks and full risk profiling exercise would need to be undertaken<br />
as part of the development of a full business case to identify the full scope of the risks associated with any<br />
one particular option<br />
A - 25
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
The effect of funding the pensions<br />
deficit results in the<br />
externalisation/outsourcing being<br />
unaffordable<br />
The VAT implications of<br />
externalisation/ outsourcing makes<br />
one or both of these options<br />
unviable<br />
Insufficient attention and investment<br />
in the client function results in quality<br />
failure for customers.<br />
The externalised (at the end of the<br />
initial period) or outsourced<br />
organisation uses excess capacity in<br />
the service to accept placements<br />
from outside of <strong>Somerset</strong> which<br />
become SCC’s responsibility under<br />
Ordinary Residency rules. This can<br />
also increase primary care and<br />
specialised NHS costs<br />
Funding available for programme is<br />
insufficient to meet the cost of<br />
procurement/ transfer<br />
2 Examine in detail at an early<br />
stage of full business case<br />
development if these options are<br />
taken forward<br />
2 Examine in detail at an early<br />
stage of full business case<br />
development if these options are<br />
taken forward<br />
2 Examine contract monitoring<br />
capacity requirements in detail at<br />
as part of full business case<br />
development if this option is<br />
taken forward<br />
3 Examine in detail as part of full<br />
business case development if<br />
these option are taken forward.<br />
Risk already exists within current<br />
market place but will increase<br />
under both scenarios, although<br />
will be mitigated while an external<br />
organisation is operating within<br />
Teckal and there may be<br />
opportunities to mitigate across<br />
both options through SCC’s<br />
interest in property assets. This<br />
will need further consideration as<br />
part of the development of the full<br />
business case should this option<br />
be taken forward.<br />
2 Examine in likely costs in detail<br />
as part of full business case<br />
development if these options are<br />
taken forward<br />
3.3.5 Conclusion<br />
This can only be viewed as a medium term option, requiring a competitive<br />
procurement to be undertaken at the end of the initial contract. Updated legal<br />
advice also calls into question its viability should there be any significant expansion<br />
of the number of people directing their own care. Whilst it would provide a<br />
“stepping stone” between the existing arrangements and a fully outsourced<br />
solution, thereby potentially reducing opposition, it potentially carries a higher risk<br />
for SCC than undertaking a competitive procurement process.<br />
While the basic set-up costs are relatively small, the process of awarding the<br />
contract and transferring the business is likely to incur significant costs while the<br />
risk of legal challenge cannot be completely discounted. In addition skilled<br />
management with proven business acumen would need to be embedded in<br />
advance of any externalisation, to mitigate the high levels of operational, financial<br />
and risks to SCC.<br />
A - 26
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
3.3.6 Recommendation<br />
To reject this option at the <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> stage and develop a full<br />
business case to outsource the LDPS.<br />
3.4 Option D: Outsourcing 25<br />
3.4.1 Overview<br />
Outsourcing refers to initiating a tender process leading to a transfer of the whole<br />
of the LDPS to independent provision. This could include bids from the<br />
independent sector, a social enterprise, existing third sector providers, consortia,<br />
or the current LDPS management team.<br />
3.4.2 Benefits<br />
• At initial feedback meetings, a number of service users expressed a desire to<br />
direct their own care thorough a direct payment, which an outsourced<br />
organisation would be free to provide.<br />
• Consortium bids could be encouraged that would facilitate the participation of<br />
small providers that might otherwise be “crowded out” by Option C,<br />
externalisation. In addition, multiple service providers in a consortium could<br />
reduce the risks associated with a single provider failure.<br />
• We would expect to favour bids that include opportunities for external capital<br />
investment.<br />
• Outsourcing the LDPS as a whole would provide opportunities to reduce/share<br />
operational overheads as bidders would be likely to already have resources<br />
that could be extended, allowing the overheads to be shared across a broader<br />
range of services, rather than newly established.<br />
• The entire service can be evaluated against current market rates, potentially<br />
resulting in the service being outsourced at a lower cost than the current LDPS<br />
budget. While the LDPS is in the process of reducing costs, this is expected to<br />
take two years without incurring potentially significant one-off costs, while a<br />
transfer to a different organisational model has the potential to release them<br />
more quickly, under the right conditions. However, it should be noted that<br />
some of the costs associated with being part of SCC will not be releasable.<br />
• There is a reduced risk of service failure subject to adopting a robust and wellmanaged<br />
tender process, eliminating any “weak” providers at the outset.<br />
• The full outsourcing option would be achieved through a single-step approach.<br />
• This would allow the service to rapidly adopt best practice from the successful<br />
bidder<br />
• While the tender process for a large outsourcing exercise is complex and time<br />
consuming SCC would avoid potential on-going complications relating to the<br />
Teckal exemption.<br />
• A competitive tendering process should encourage cost efficient bids that drive<br />
out savings. The tender and evaluation process would ensure that these were<br />
sustainable.<br />
25 Further consideration would need to be given to the model for employment support services as part of the<br />
development of a full business case should this option be taken forward<br />
A - 27
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
3.4.3 Disbenefits and any potential mitigations<br />
• Initial resource requirements will be high. Due to the complexity of the service<br />
and the high levels of operational risk involved in service provision there would<br />
be significant costs involved in a competitive tender process, although the<br />
tender would be subject to a Part B procurement process. Estimates received<br />
from the Strategic Procurement <strong>Service</strong> are that the costs would be in the<br />
region of £1.5m (+/- 500k) and that the process would require a dedicated team<br />
of 6 staff.<br />
• Due to the size of the service and the need to carefully involve service users<br />
and carers at all stages of the tender and evaluation process is estimated that it<br />
would take in excess of six months.<br />
• There are significant and complex property issue (see page 12 for background),<br />
and options to address the associated cost and risk factors need to be<br />
developed as part of the full business case.<br />
• Robust monitoring arrangements will need to be to be in place to protect<br />
vulnerable customers and provide reassurance to carers, many of whom<br />
expressed concern about the potential involvement of a “private for profit”<br />
provider in the provision of care and support for their loved ones during initial<br />
feedback meetings. Many carers indicated that the concept of “not for profit”<br />
provision was more acceptable.<br />
• There is a potential risk of a service provider offering vacancies in supported<br />
living accommodation to people currently living outside of the <strong>County</strong>, ultimately<br />
leading to funding becoming SCC’s responsibility under ordinary residency<br />
rules. There could also be additional costs falling on NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>. There<br />
may be opportunities to mitigate these risks through SCC’s interest in the<br />
property assets utilised by the LDPS, including those originally purchased using<br />
Section 28a funding. These opportunities will need to be considered further in<br />
the development of the full business case.<br />
• Contracting with a single provider for these services, which currently account<br />
for over half of the expenditure, may reduce choice and service quality unless<br />
robust contract management processes are put in place and adequately<br />
resourced.<br />
• The service, as it stands, is in the process of significant reconfiguration that is<br />
scheduled to be completed by March 2014, and potential bidders are likely to<br />
price the risks associated with completing this into any bid. In the medium to<br />
long-term, this would be expected to exceed the short-term costs of<br />
accelerating the process so it is completed before any transfer takes place.<br />
• A full reassessment of all residential care and supported living care packages is<br />
undertaken in advance of any transfer in order to mitigate some, but not all,<br />
risks related to cost escalation. This will need to be undertaken in addition to<br />
normal care management activity and will therefore incur additional costs.<br />
• In the short-term at least there would be double funding of overheads, including<br />
some of those associate with Southwest One where they relate to activity that<br />
is not releasable.<br />
• The risk of the new service provider(s) failing within the contract duration<br />
cannot be completely ignored. There would be extremely high levels of risks to<br />
vulnerable people as well as operational, financial and reputation risks to SCC<br />
should the new provider fail due to the specialist nature of the services provided<br />
A - 28
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
and the limited capacity in the market by other providers to “step in” in a timely<br />
manner.<br />
• Potential cost of warranties and indemnities provided by the council to the<br />
provider in relation to staff, assets and other resources.<br />
3.4.4 Risks associated with this option 26<br />
Option Description of Risk<br />
Likelihood Mitigation<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
There is double funding of<br />
overheads/back office services due<br />
to the externalised /outsourced<br />
organisation deciding to make its<br />
own arrangements for services<br />
currently while costs to SCC remain<br />
The effect of the pensions deficit<br />
results in the<br />
externalisation/outsourcing makes<br />
one or both of these options<br />
unviable<br />
The VAT implications of<br />
externalisation/ outsourcing makes<br />
one or both of these options<br />
unviable<br />
Robust contract monitoring capacity<br />
is not put in place resulting in<br />
issues not being addressed at an<br />
early stage, and escalating to the<br />
point where there is financial or<br />
reputation damage to SCC<br />
The use of a single provider for 55%<br />
of SCC’s business in this area<br />
adversely impacts on competition in<br />
the local market for these services<br />
leading to escalating costs in the<br />
medium to long term<br />
The externalised (at the end of the<br />
initial period) or outsourced<br />
organisation uses excess capacity<br />
in the service to accept placements<br />
from outside of <strong>Somerset</strong> which<br />
become SCC’s responsibility under<br />
Ordinary Residency rules and also<br />
4 Advice received corporately is<br />
that some double funding may be<br />
necessary in the short term<br />
2 Examine in detail at an early<br />
stage of full business case<br />
development if these options are<br />
taken forward<br />
2 Examine in detail at an early<br />
stage of full business case<br />
development if these options are<br />
taken forward<br />
2 Examine contract monitoring<br />
capacity requirements in detail at<br />
as part of full business case<br />
development if this option is taken<br />
forward<br />
3 Examine in detail as part of full<br />
business case development if<br />
these option are taken forward.<br />
In the case of Option D the risk<br />
could be partially mitigated by<br />
undertaken market shaping to try<br />
encourage existing<br />
national/regional providers in the<br />
market not currently operating in<br />
<strong>Somerset</strong> to participate in the<br />
tender<br />
3 Examine in detail as part of full<br />
business case development if<br />
these option are taken forward.<br />
Risk already exists within current<br />
market place but will increase<br />
under both scenarios, although<br />
will be mitigated while an external<br />
organisation is operating within<br />
26 This is an initial list of the main potential risks and full risk profiling exercise would need to be undertaken<br />
as part of the development of a full business case to identify the full scope of the risks associated with any<br />
one particular option<br />
A - 29
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
C and<br />
D<br />
D<br />
increase NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> COSTS<br />
Funding available for programme is<br />
insufficient to meet the cost of<br />
procurement/ transfer<br />
Cost of reconfiguring the service is<br />
priced into bids resulting in a higher<br />
costs to SCC over the lifetime of the<br />
contract than if the reconfiguration<br />
was undertaken in-house<br />
Teckal and there may be<br />
opportunities to mitigate across<br />
both options through SCC’s<br />
interest in property assets. This<br />
will need further consideration as<br />
part of the development of the full<br />
business case should this option<br />
be taken forward.<br />
2 Examine in likely costs in detail<br />
as part of full business case<br />
development if these options are<br />
taken forward<br />
2 Undertake as much<br />
reconfiguration as<br />
possible/viable/economic inhouse<br />
so that the service is<br />
outsourced with costs already<br />
reduced<br />
3.4.5 Conclusion<br />
The main benefit of this option is that it can provide opportunities for customers to<br />
personalise their services through the use of Direct Payments which offer choice<br />
and control. Some of the properties are not fit for purpose and this option gives us<br />
an ability to favour bids that include capital investment to develop accommodation<br />
that supports quality care delivery. It would also allow the service to be transferred<br />
out of the <strong>County</strong> <strong>Council</strong> without the need to comply with Teckal and the<br />
restrictions that this imposes on providing services to a third party. While there is<br />
potential to realise some efficiencies and savings this is not considered to be<br />
significant as a result of on-going work to reconfigure services. Depending on the<br />
successful bidder there could be opportunities to share overheads across a wider<br />
range of services, including private provision. While the risk of an external provider<br />
failing cannot be completely discounted, this can be effectively mitigated through a<br />
robust procurement process that takes into account service quality as well as cost<br />
and supplier robustness. In addition, consortium bids could be encouraged that<br />
would facilitate the participation of small providers that might be “crowded out” by<br />
other options,<br />
There are two key risks that require further exploration as part of the full business<br />
case. The first relates to potential cost escalations following the transfer, which<br />
could be mitigated in part by undertaking full reassessments of all care packages.<br />
The second relates to any external partner offering spare capacity to people who<br />
live outside of <strong>Somerset</strong> who go on to become “ordinary residents” requiring SCC<br />
to fund their places as well as extra costs for NHS <strong>Somerset</strong>. This is a risk that<br />
could be mitigated though SCC’s interest in property assets along with robust and<br />
adequately resourced contract management.<br />
3.4.6 Recommendation<br />
To develop this option into a full business case<br />
A - 30
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
4 Impacts of Options<br />
See Appendix C<br />
5 Interdependencies<br />
The LDPS is a jointly commissioned service with the NHS, with SCC acting as the<br />
lead commissioner. Any decision to externalise or outsource would therefore need<br />
to agreed by both the SCC Cabinet and the <strong>Somerset</strong> CCG/ NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board.<br />
The outline business case will be considered by the clinical commissioning group<br />
who will make recommendations to the NHS Board.<br />
6 Next Steps<br />
To develop full business case ahead of final decision, this will require:<br />
• Development of full business case incorporating:<br />
blueprint for each option taken forward<br />
the results of a full 12 week public consultation plus a minimum of 2 weeks<br />
either side to set up and analyse responses (depending on the volume of<br />
responses and the point in the processes when they are achieved,<br />
dedicated resources could be needed to achieve this turnaround)<br />
Consultation with partner agencies and the Clinical Commissioning Group<br />
Consultation with staff and unions<br />
Parallel work to identify best-fit legal vehicle for externalised service if this<br />
option is taken forward<br />
Parallel market testing and shaping to identify viability of whole service<br />
outsourcing, if this option is taken forward<br />
Parallel work to develop requirements for a <strong>Service</strong> Plan should the option<br />
for the service to remain in-house be taken forward<br />
Parallel detailed costing exercise<br />
Parallel work on VAT and pensions implications<br />
Parallel work to update impact assessment<br />
• During this period it is recommended that reviews of residential and supported<br />
living accommodation should continue to identify any “quick wins” in these<br />
areas which make up 75% of the service cost and to ensure that the services<br />
provided meet service needs<br />
We anticipate that a full business case could be competed by September should a<br />
decision be taken on the <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> by both SCC and the NHS by the<br />
beginning of the week commencing 7 th May, and the required resources being<br />
available to undertake the work outlined above. This would then need to be followed<br />
by consideration by the Clinical commissioning Group and NHS <strong>Somerset</strong> Board and<br />
constitutional consultation processes with elected members on the completed<br />
document and before a final decision is taken.<br />
A - 31
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
The resources required to undertake this work would be significant and while the<br />
process could be managed by the existing team, additional support would be needed<br />
to undertake specific elements.<br />
Stakeholder engagement<br />
Stakeholder engagement already taken place:<br />
22 nd Feb Carers meeting – East<br />
23 rd Feb <strong>Service</strong> user meeting – East<br />
27 th Feb Carers meeting – West<br />
29 th Feb <strong>Service</strong> user meeting – West<br />
29 th Feb Area Staff Forum – West<br />
5 th March Joint Consultative Committee<br />
5 th March Area Staff Forum – East<br />
7 th March Consultative Conference – Directorate Update<br />
Timescale for <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong>:<br />
w/c 12 th<br />
March<br />
w/c 12 th<br />
March<br />
<strong>Somerset</strong> Partnership (contact Diana Rowe)<br />
Summary of feedback sent to stakeholder<br />
groups<br />
Mel Lock<br />
Fiona Kivett<br />
(David Dick and<br />
Mel Lock to<br />
sign off)<br />
12 th March <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> to Design Authority Mel Lock<br />
14 th March Design Authority Mel Lock and<br />
Martin Young<br />
15 th March<br />
(am)<br />
15 th March<br />
(pm)<br />
Briefing with Cllr Jimmy Zouche<br />
Mel Lock<br />
Members Workshop<br />
Miriam<br />
Maddison and<br />
Mel Lock<br />
21 st March Papers to Clinical Commissioning Group Stephen Miles<br />
March<br />
Telephone briefing to:<br />
David Rooke - CCG<br />
GP Lead for LD<br />
Mel Lock and<br />
Wayne Lewis<br />
27 th March Clinical Commissioning Group Trevor Gillham<br />
and Mel Lock<br />
End March Briefing with Cllr Christine Lawrence Trevor Gillham<br />
and Mel Lock<br />
2 nd April Cabinet Steering Group / Change<br />
Mel Lock<br />
Programme Board<br />
Early April Staff Briefing Sheet Fiona Kivett<br />
(David Dick and<br />
Mel Lock to<br />
sign off)<br />
Early April Briefing to Leader Cllr Christine<br />
A - 32
(Cabinet – 2 May 2012)<br />
Lawrence and<br />
Trevor Gillham<br />
Early April Draft letter to key partners for sign-off Fiona Kivett<br />
(Mel Lock to<br />
sign off)<br />
11 th April Scrutiny Chair pre-meet<br />
(12.30pm – Hobhouse Room.<br />
Contact Jamie Jackson ext. 5032)<br />
11 th April <strong>Outline</strong> <strong>Business</strong> <strong>Case</strong> published for PCT<br />
Board/Scrutiny Committee<br />
Trevor Gillham<br />
and Mel Lock<br />
Fiona Kivett to<br />
link with Jamie<br />
Jackson<br />
11 th April Letter & report to key partners Fiona Kivett<br />
11 th April Briefing sheet & paper to Trade Unions Mel Lock and<br />
Stephen Miles<br />
13 th April Email & link to paper to staff Fiona Kivett<br />
(David Dick to<br />
sign off)<br />
18 th April PCT Board Wayne Lewis<br />
and Mel Lock<br />
24 th April Scrutiny Committee Trevor Gillham<br />
and Mel Lock<br />
2 nd May Cabinet Trevor Gillham<br />
and Mel Lock<br />
A - 33