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officer’s testimony—reversed by appellate court. State v.
Long, No. 03-11-00725-CR (Tex.App.—Austin May 31,
2012).
“[B]y focusing on what it characterized as a ‘lack of intoxication
indicators’ in the video recording, the trial court
seems to have overlooked or minimized the significance of
evidence of intoxication that [officer] personally observed. . .
. Even though these facts and circumstances were not apparent
in the video recording (except for [D’s] admission that he
had been drinking, which can be heard in the recording), they
were nevertheless personally observed by the arresting officer
whose testimony the trial court expressly found to be credible,
and therefore should have been considered by the trial court
in its determination of whether [officer] had probable cause
to arrest [D].”
Caller was not “anonymous” for purposes of PC determination,
even though officer was unaware of caller’s
identity, because police dispatcher’s knowledge of caller’s
identity is deemed imputed to officer. Arguellez
v. State, Nos. 13-11-00266-CR, 13-11-00267-CR (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi May 31, 2012, pet. granted).
D’s attempt to use his vehicle to push victim’s van into
an intersection and into the path of oncoming traffic
deemed sufficient to establish use of the vehicle as a
deadly weapon, even though D did not successfully
push victim’s van into the intersection. Mills v. State,
No. 10-11-00144-CR (Tex.App.—Waco June 6, 2012).
“[D] could not push the van at the time because [victim]
had his foot on the brake. [Victim] believed that had he not
been pushing down on the brake, [D] would have pushed
[victim’s] van into oncoming traffic. . . . [T]he act of pushing,
regardless of the result, was the threat which constituted the
assault. [I]t is either the use or intended use of an object which
can make it a deadly weapon.”
Frisk for weapons justified, despite officer’s admission
that he never feared for his safety. Fields v. State, No.
12-11-00221-CR (Tex.App.—Tyler June 13, 2012).
“There is no requirement that a police officer feel personally
threatened. . . . [Officer’s] testimony that he did not subjectively
fear [D] is not dispositive of whether the officer could
legally frisk. . . . The ultimate test is an objective one.”
Community caretaking exception established, despite
officer’s verbal directive to D to approach officer, use of
emergency lights, and positioning of police car in front
of D’s car. Solano v. State, 371 S.W.3d 593 (Tex.App.—
Amarillo).
“After passing her, [Deputy] noticed [D] exit from the [car]
and raise the hood of the engine compartment. This caused
[Dep uty] to ‘want to make sure that everything was fine, everything
was running,’ and that ‘they’re going to get to their destination.’
So, he turned his patrol unit around, drove back to
where [driver] had stopped, stopped in front of [driver’s] car,
unlatched the hood of his engine compartment, and engaged
his emergency lights. . . . At about that time, the officer exited his
patrol car and directed [D] to come to him. [D] complied, and
that apparently constituted the ‘initial interaction’ or detention
now condemned by him.”
Point tickets issued by game room’s machines, which
had a non-immediate right of replay at a machine of the
ticket holder’s choice, were novelties under the “fuzzy
animal” exclusion to the definition of a gambling device.
$1760.00 in U.S. Currency, 37 “8” Liner Machines
v. State, 372 S.W.3d 277 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth June 21,
2012).
“This is an issue of first impression. . . . At Magic Games
Game Room, no cash is used to credit points to another machine;
an attendant electronically transfers points from a central
location[.]”
State’s failure to produce search warrant affidavit at
suppression hearing does not necessarily mandate suppression
of the evidence. Williams v. State, Nos. 01-11-
00017-CR, 01-11-00018-CR (Tex.App.—Houston [1st
Dist] June 21, 2012).
“Generally, when the State seeks to justify an arrest on
the basis of a warrant, it is incumbent on the State to produce
the warrant and its supporting affidavit for inspection by the
trial court. . . . Here, the State introduced the search warrant
into evidence without objection from [D], but the supporting
probable-cause affidavit was not attached. However, the warrant
itself indicated that the affidavit existed. . . . Furthermore,
[the affiant] testified extensively regarding the contents of the
affidavit and was subject to cross-examination by [D].”
Prolonged detention during traffic stop reasonable,
despite officer’s testimony that “when speaking about
consent, once it was denied, that extended things a
lot farther and further led us to believe that there was
something in there.” Stafford v. State, No. 10-11-00224-
CR (Tex.App.—Waco June 27, 2012).
“[Trooper] asked D where he lived, and [D] first responded
‘Fort Worth’ but later changed his answer. . . . ‘[Trooper] observed
[D] act nervously.’ . . . [D] refused to make eye contact.
. . . In addition, the troopers learned that the three passengers
had been partying all night. . . . [W]hen checking for warrants,
the troopers discovered that the two other passengers both had
prior drug-related arrests. These circumstances constituted articulable
facts from which a reasonable officer could reasonably
infer that [D] or one of the other passengers may have been
transporting contraband[.]”