wfp, food aid and local survival in guinea-bissau, 1998-99 - Nina ...

Hjalte Tin : Food Aid in Guinea-Bissau 1998-99. June 2001 ; page 27
was that all over the world, WFP had never seen that a national committee made
decisions about how to distribute. But we told them: you are not in here, since you have
left Bissau some other people have to take care of people. They never agreed with the
committee. They wanted to rule themselves, but they are not here, when the war started
they just left.”
In Bafata the situation was more difficult because WFP was present and the agencies
had to distribute according to WFP criteria. On November 7, for example, the regional
Comité Nacional coordinator requested permission to distribute food to the whole
population in Gabu town numbering 32.000 people. WFP declined this, saying, ”Since
this does not tally with WFP’s objectives of targeting only the most vulnerable
population, WFP has refused the operation.” (WFP sit. rep. 17/98 3-9/11/98) The unwise
lack of flexibility displayed by WFP caused violent local protests. Tony Pires
remembered, ”Even the WFP representative in Bafata knew the problem. Red Cross
went to distribute to people and they had some problems because people picked up
stones and said they must leave the place because they cannot distribute only to the
refugees [IDPs].”
The main international response to the emergency in Guinea-Bissau came from WFP,
but with remarkable insensitivity to existing social structures. WFP actively undermined
the two most important local coping mechanisms: the grass-roots solidarity of extended
families and the national aid-coordination committe. In the Donor Report for Guinea-
Bissau WFP made it clear that they regarded the local state institutions including the
committee as ”dysfunctional”: the Comité Nacional ”did not function in practice” and
”WFP is implementing the operation without Government inputs of any kind or
support”.