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development and establish procedures for post-incident investigations. Focusing on institution-building by leveraging international governmental bodies would simultaneously ameliorate pathologies that spread political disagreements and empower multilateral cooperation toward conflict management. The extent to which China undermines these organizations would highlight its disruptive behavior. While this is consistent with the current U.S. approach, a conflict management framework would clarify the intent and purpose of multilateral engagements, particularly for defense cooperation, beyond just reinforcing international norms. To develop these tools, a serious dialogue about conflict management requires experts from the fields of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, while incorporating and expanding the tools of preventative diplomacy. Unlike deterrence, this broader dialogue offers an opportunity to better address historical and cultural factors vis-à-vis the most intractable problems in the region. All of the above initiatives also require that the security dialogue be broadened domestically across the U.S. Government. Twenty-first-century security strategy must be built around the understanding that the domestic affects the international—an understanding which is acknowledged, but not fully implemented. The contemporary geopolitical landscape demands that diplomatic efforts blend with those of the military and vice versa. The crucial strategic move involves a reorientation, not a reallocation, of human and financial capital. Functioning interagency partnerships could be developed by instituting the type of cross-cultural pollination that already exists between the branches of the U.S. military, each of which has its own educational and training systems, while also ensuring that seats are given to officers of other Services. A feasible step to ensure a wide breadth of shared expertise and contacts throughout U.S. and allied public and private organizations is to design an educational system wherein this more eclectic crowd can work and learn together. Few things allow for enduring cooperation like time spent getting to know a comrade in the classroom, coffee shop, and pub. Such cultural changes needed for a strategic reorientation are not as difficult to execute as they may at first appear, and they could effectively be instituted by congressional legislation. In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which ensures officers gain experience in joint Service positions as a prerequisite for promotion to senior ranks. A similar action would cause a much broader inter-Service outlook by mandating not only joint military Service positions, but also experience working in other nonmilitary departments and organizations entirely. This interagency development would operationalize Joseph Nye’s concept of “smart power” and ensure that all elements of national power are brought to bear on the intractable disputes of the Asia-Pacific. It’s a Conflicted World after All Conflict is endemic and will continue to occur. It is fortunate that, in some ways, we live in a safer world than that of the Cold War. No longer are we routinely forced to duck and cover under our desks to practice protecting ourselves from a nuclear blast. What we are faced with today, however, is hardly a halcyon international environment. If big wars are rare, smaller crises are not. A security strategy focused almost entirely on the rare, at the expense of serious thought and action regarding the common, is not the most useful framework to live with. A coherent security strategy must be both agile and predictable enough to deal with dangerous incidents while also preventing war. Differentiating conflict management from deterrence would have a tangible impact on the U.S. approach to chronic conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. A focus on conflict management would improve military support of U.S. national interests by better reflecting the current diplomatic priorities and by refocusing military peacetime planning on new tools and objectives. It would modernize the current security dialogue from one focused on Cold War hard power approaches to one that better leverages civil-military power and the best practices of negotiation. Moving to such a strategic framework would also allow resources of time, money, and talent to be used more effectively to manage the unavoidable, while deterrence would be used to avoid the unthinkable. There is no reason why we should forget about deterrence, but it should not continue to monopolize our strategic thinking. The Cold War is long over, and it is time to implement what is already widely acknowledged but not acted on. Ultimately, by reducing tension and the risk of escalation in the near term, conflict management leaves open the possibility of a more permanent and secure solution in the future. JFQ Notes 1 Richard K. Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2013), 99. 2 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 2, available at . 3 Ibid., 5. 4 Betts, 88. 5 Ibid., 96. 6 Michael D. Swaine, passim, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Latest Analysis, available at . 7 Robert F. Willard, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” February 28, 2012, 8. 70 Features / Refocusing the U.S. Strategic Security Perspective JFQ <strong>76</strong>, 1 st Quarter 2015
Soldier aims XM-25 weapon system, Aberdeen Test Center, Maryland (U.S. Army) Nonlethal Weapons A Technological Gap or Misdefined Requirements? By Ofer Fridman The internal and international conflicts that have taken place in the last few decades have significantly raised the issue of interacting with with civilian populations, a problem that has been worsened by urbanization. In the last few decades of the 20 th century, a universal respect for human life became Ofer Fridman is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Reading, United Kingdom. a crucial variable within the international community in general and Western societies in particular. 1 In this new political reality, the military seeks new technologies that have “greater precision, shorter duration, less lethality, and reduced collateral damage . . . [as these technologies] may provide more effective power than their larger and more destructive, but also more inexact and crude, predecessors.” 2 Nonlethal weapons (NLW) would seem to be the perfect answer for this military quest; however, observers point out that, to date, “few non-lethal weapons incorporating new technologies have actually been deployed on a large scale” 3 and that “operational use of available non-lethal weapons by the military has been limited.” 4 Despite the reasonable demand for the employment of less lethal military technologies on the battlefield, then, it seems that such technologies are still far from becoming a reality. JFQ <strong>76</strong>, 1 st Quarter 2015 Fridman 71
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