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2010] Derailing Penn Central 885<br />

III.<br />

An Exploration of Post-Lingle Takings Jurisprudence<br />

With the potential death of Penn Central’s character prong and<br />

the Supreme Court’s previous wavering between per se rules and balancing<br />

tests, one can only hypothesize how the Court will approach<br />

future claims of regulatory takings. This Part begins by assessing the<br />

Court’s most likely approach, which is the continued and unaltered<br />

application of the Penn Central balancing test as though Lingle never<br />

occurred. After concluding that this approach is deficient, this Note<br />

examines an alternative approach. <strong>The</strong> merits of this second approach,<br />

which is an abandonment of Penn Central and a resort to the<br />

per se rules of Lucas and Loretto, are also examined, and this Note<br />

ultimately concludes that this approach is also inadequate.<br />

A. Option Number One: Stubbornness<br />

If history is any indication of which approach the Court will take,<br />

it will likely continue to apply Penn Central’s ad hoc balancing test.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Court has been reluctant to abandon Penn Central, despite past<br />

indications that this approach would be superseded. As mentioned<br />

previously, the per se tests of Lucas and Loretto were once believed<br />

by some to represent an effort to replace Penn Central as the sole<br />

methods of analysis. 89 Nevertheless, the Court returned to its “polestar”<br />

in subsequent regulatory takings inquiries. 90<br />

<strong>The</strong>refore, it would come as little surprise if the Court continued<br />

to apply the Penn Central balancing test as though Lingle had not undermined<br />

it, just as it continued to apply Penn Central following Lucas<br />

and Loretto. 91 Advocates of this approach argue that Lingle left the<br />

character prong unscathed. 92 <strong>The</strong>se advocates interpret Lingle narrowly<br />

and view the Court as holding only that a regulation’s failure<br />

under a substantive due process analysis does not require the government<br />

to give just compensation. 93<br />

89 See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.<br />

90 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336<br />

(2002).<br />

91 Another less likely option is that the Court will apply an altered version of the Penn<br />

Central balancing test. This would mean that the Court would acknowledge that Lingle foreclosed<br />

application of the character prong, but would nonetheless apply a simpler version of the<br />

Penn Central balancing test that focuses solely on economic impact and distinct investmentbacked<br />

expectations. See Whitman, supra note 70, at 590 (arguing that the elimination of the<br />

character element of the Penn Central test “simplifies and rationalizes Penn Central in a desirable<br />

way”).<br />

92 See, e.g., Romero, supra note 82, at 365.<br />

93 See id. at 360 (advocating for the position that “[t]he Court’s rejection of the substantial

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