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876 <strong>The</strong> <strong>George</strong> <strong>Washington</strong> <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Review</strong> [Vol. 78:870<br />

ernmental action. 26 Despite the fact that the Court in Penn Central<br />

merely identified “factors that have particular significance,” 27 the<br />

Court cited these exact factors a year later in Kaiser Aetna v. United<br />

States. 28 <strong>The</strong>se factors have come to be known as the Penn Central<br />

three-factor test. 29<br />

<strong>The</strong>reafter, however, the Court recognized a pair of per se rules<br />

that, in the author’s view, created doubt about the appropriate analysis<br />

for regulatory takings claims. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan<br />

CATV Corp., 30 the Court held that a taking occurs if the regulation<br />

causes a permanent physical occupation. 31 Subsequently, the Court<br />

established a second per se rule for regulatory takings in Lucas v.<br />

South Carolina Coastal Council, 32 holding that a taking occurs if the<br />

regulation denies the owner all economically viable use of the land. 33<br />

It was arguable that the per se rules were meant to replace Penn<br />

Central as the sole source of regulatory takings analysis. 34 A significant<br />

amount of evidence indicated that the Court had indeed abandoned<br />

ad hoc balancing in favor of bright-line rules. First, the<br />

language in Penn Central stating that diminution in property value<br />

alone cannot establish a taking 35 cannot be reconciled with the holding<br />

of Lucas, 36 which states that a complete economic wipeout constitutes<br />

a per se taking. 37 Second, Justice Scalia, the Court’s chief proponent<br />

of bright-line rules, authored the majority opinion in Lucas, and to<br />

26 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.<br />

27 Id.<br />

28 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979).<br />

29 See Peterson, supra note 2, at 1317.<br />

30 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).<br />

31 See id. at 426 (holding that the mandatory installation of cable facilities on a property<br />

constituted a regulatory taking because the government intrusion was a permanent physical<br />

occupation).<br />

32 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).<br />

33 See id. (holding that a per se taking occurs “where regulation denies all economically<br />

beneficial or productive use of the land”).<br />

34 See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y<br />

171, 172–73 (2005) (noting that “the Court appeared poised to jettison the Penn Central analysis<br />

altogether. During the 1980’s and 1990’s, as an antidote to the chronic vagueness of the Penn<br />

Central framework, the Court attempted to develop a set of alternative, bright line tests”).<br />

35 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (recognizing that<br />

past decisions “uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing<br />

alone, can establish a ‘taking’”).<br />

36 See Echeverria, supra note 25, at 5 (questioning how Penn Central’s insistence that no<br />

diminution in property value is sufficient to establish a taking can be reconciled with Lucas’s<br />

bright-line rule that a taking occurs “where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive<br />

use of land”).<br />

37 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.

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