DO WE NEED A NEW SERVICE RIFLE CARTRIDGE? - HKPro.com

DO WE NEED A NEW 

SERVICE RIFLE CARTRIDGE? 

END USER PERSPECTIVE AND LESSONS LEARNED // JIM SCHATZ 

Do we need a new service rifle 

cartridge? Another way of 

asking this question is “Is 

there a problem with the lethality 

of the 5.56mm NATO 

caliber?” These questions are two of the 

most controversial in the military/defense 

industry today. It pervades the trade 

shows and is constantly discussed by the 

end users as well as those on the sidelines. 

The current wars are giving a lot of feedback 

to the suppliers and designers, and 

perhaps the best way to address this is to 

look at the evidence we can see from recent 

developments and new programs and 

trends in the U.S., within the NATO alliance 

and in threat countries. 

There are various key caliber-related 

topics that we should consider before trying 

to gain an answer to this question, such as: 

5.56X45MM HISTORY 

The 5.56x45mm NATO cartridge 

was developed in 1959 from the commercial 

.222 Remington cartridge for 

hunting varmints (weighing up to 40 

pounds) out to 200-250 yards. The current 

U.S. 5.56x45mm NATO SS109-style 

M855 round loaded with a 62 grain “penetrator” 

projectile was developed not for 

improved terminal performance on soft 

tissue but for long range helmet penetration 

from machine guns (the FN Minimi), 

NOT specifically for rifles or carbines. Its 

effect on soft tissue and the human target 

is greatly dependent upon bullet fragmentation 

and/or yawing at striking velocities 

above 2,500 feet per second (fps) 

and was developed to be fired from 18-20 

inch barreled weapons like the M16 rifle 

and M249 SAW. The “lethality” (more accurately 

described as “terminal effectiveness” 

as there are no varying degrees of 

lethality. If an opponent is fatally shot, 

but manages to wipe out an entire squad 

of friendly personnel before succumbing 

to the wound, the projectile demonstrated 

100% lethality but was utterly ineffective 

at stopping the enemy from continuing 

the attack) of the M855 round is severely 

degraded beyond 150 meters when fired 

from a 14.5 inch barreled M4 Carbine or 

at any range (0 meters and out) from the 

10 inch barreled MK18 CQBR due to the 

insufficient striking velocities at these 

ranges. The unique physical stature (narrow 

torso) of many of the malnourished 

Middle Eastern combatants when struck 

by the M855 projectile often produces 

insignificant wounds similar to those 

produced by .22 Long Rifle ammunition. 

Unless the M855 projectile yaws in the 

target, through and through shots is the 

norm and yaw from weapon to weapon 

(fleet yaw) and round to round is unpredictable 

at best. This is fact based on 

numerous official U.S. wound ballistic 

studies conducted and user accounts collected, 

some of which are presented below 

as evidence to the point. 

WOUND BALLISTICS EXPERTS SUPPORT 

END USER ACCOUNTS 

The disturbing failure of the 

5.56x45mm caliber to consistently offer 

adequate incapacitation has been known 

for nearly 20 years. Dr. Martin Fackler’s 

seminal research at the Letterman Army 

Institute of Research Wound Ballistic 

Laboratory during the 1980s illuminated 

the yaw and fragmentation mechanism 

by which 5.56x45mm FMJ bullets create 

wounds in tissue. “If 5.56mm bullets 

fail to upset (yaw, fragment, or deform) 

within tissue, the results are relatively 

insignificant wounds, similar to those 

produced by .22 long rifle bullets – this 

is true for all 5.56x45mm bullets, including 

both military FMJ and OTM (open 

tip match) and civilian JHP/JSP designs 

used in law enforcement. As expected, 

with decreased wounding effects, rapid 

incapacitation is unlikely: enemy soldiers 

may continue to pose a threat to 

friendly forces and violent suspects can 

remain a danger to law enforcement 

personnel and the public. This failure of 

5.56x45mm bullets to yaw and fragment 

can be caused by reduced impact velocities 

as when fired from short-barreled 

weapons or when the range to the target 

increases. Failure to yaw and fragment 

can also occur when the bullets pass 

through only minimal tissue, such as a 

limb or the chest of a thin, small statured 

individual, as the bullet may exit 

the body before it has a chance to yaw 

and fragment. Two other yaw issues: 

Angle-of-Attack (AOA) variations between 

different projectiles, even within 

the same lot of ammo, as well as Fleet 

Yaw variations between different rifles, 

were elucidated in 2006 by the Joint Service 

Wound Ballistic Integrated Product 

Team (JSWB-IPT), which included experts 

from the military law enforcement 

user community, trauma surgeons, aero 

ballisticians, weapon and munitions engineers, 

and other scientific specialists. 

These yaw issues were most noticeable 

at close ranges and were more prevalent 

with certain calibers and bullet styles — 

the most susceptible being 5.56x45mm 

FMJ ammunition like M855 and M193.” 

TERMINAL PERFORMANCE, WOUND BAL- 

LISTICS AND BALLISTIC GELATIN TEST 

COMPARISON DATA 

We need to compare the various calibers 

using more than just exterior ballistics 

data such as muzzle velocity, muzzle 

energy, and time of flight. Any comparison 

or assessment of ammunition effectiveness 

is incomplete without a detailed 

measure of the projectile’s effect on target 

U.S. Marine Cpl. Ian. E. Peterson, with 1st Marine Logistics Group’s personal security detail (PSD), fires his M4 assault rifles to align their advanced combat 

optical gunsight for their battle sight zero at Joe Foss Range aboard Camp Al Taqaddum, Al Anbar, Iraq, Feb. 10, 2008. The PSD provides security for the 

commanding general of 1st MLG as well as other high priority personnel within the 1st MLG. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jason W. Fudge) 

118 SPRING 2011 SPRING 2011 119

5.56 NATO ROUNDTABLE JIM SCHATZ 

and through intermediate barriers common 

in modern shooting encounters. The 

effects of the projectile on the human target 

cannot be measured by exterior ballistics 

alone and any comparison or claims 

made without terminal performance data 

are both inconclusive and perplexing to 

the uninformed. 

TARGET SUPPRESSION 

There was a very thoughtful “Suppression 

Study” briefing conducted 

by the UK MoD at the 2009 European 

Small Arms and Cannons Symposium 

in Shrivenham, England, which clearly 

showed the vast differences in the effectiveness 

of personnel target suppression 

between 5.56x45mm, 7.62x51mm 

and .50 BMG. The U.S. experience has 

echoed this as well. Clearly larger is better 

in this case. The Taliban, it has been 

said, “Ignore 5.56mm, respect 7.62mm 

and fear .50 BMG.” Our enemies today 

practice the art of standoff shooting, staying 

just outside the effective range of our 

5.56x45mm weapon systems and in turn 

engage the friendlies with 7.62x54mm 

Russian caliber weapons like the SVD 

and PKM. This is why there is a resurgence 

of many more 7.62x51mm weapons 

within the maneuvering frontline units 

with those NATO countries still fighting 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our troops on 

the receiving end have learned this lesson 

well, and often at a tremendous cost. 

TRAINING 

Training is an undeniable factor in 

weapon and ammunition effectiveness in 

battle. That goes without saying. However 

even the very best and most realistic 

marksmanship training cannot make up 

for the many factors outside the control of 

the riflemen. Even the very best trained 

marksman cannot achieve well placed hits 

on fleeting or partially exposed targets, 

those at long range or protected by intermediate 

barriers, especially when firing 

under poorly supported field conditions 

and while taking incoming fire. Thus we 

must demand that the effectiveness of the 

rifle cartridge, more specifically the projectile, 

deliver the greatest possible terminal 

effects even when the small, hard to 

hit vital areas on the tough human target 

like the central nervous system (brain and 

brain stem) are not struck. Kinetic energy 

projectiles (bullets, fragments) kill in only 

two ways – through hits on the central 

nervous system resulting in near instantaneous 

death or through tissue destruction 

and the resulting loss of blood which can 

take a significant amount of time, up to 50 

seconds in fact, an absolute lifetime in the 

life and death millisecond world of armed 

combat. Hits to the head and brain stem 

are nearly impossible to obtain in anything 

but the very best circumstances and those 

conditions seldom exist on the battlefield. 

ANGLE SHOOTING 

Engaging targets at high or low angles 

A French military service member assigned to an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit fires an HK416 rifle during a three-day joint operation with U.S. Sailors 

assigned to the EOD Mobile Unit 11 and U.S. Marines with the EOD Detachment, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in Djibouti June 13, 2010. The operation included 

equipment familiarization, scenario-driven events, small arm live fire and a demolition range. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt. James Frank/Released) 

as is the case in a mountainous environment 

like Afghanistan, as any good sniper 

or marksman can tell you, is a great determining 

factor on accurate target engagement 

based on the effects of gravity and 

drag on rifle projectiles. 

THE END USER EXPERIENCE 

Then, we should carefully consider 

the actions of the end user community 

and the effects of their requests on their 

chain of supply. Perhaps the best indication 

of whether the current weapons and 

calibers are doing the job in the eyes of 

the people out front doing the fighting 

is the feedback from those people. Sort 

of looking for columns of smoke, to find 

where there is fire. We should consider 

what those nations and units who are 

carrying the heavy load and doing most 

of the hard fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq 

and other hot spots in the world are carrying, 

developing and fielding. The U.S. 

has clearly carried the ball for more than 

a decade having as of June 2010 in excess 

of 78,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan 

alone with ISAF, 66% of the total troop 

numbers there. America has also lost 

nearly 1,100 brave souls there to war and 

the numbers are rising. Other countries 

like the UK have real hands on experience 

outside the wire and as such deserve our 

respect and examination of their lessons 

learned and resulting new material developments. 

We must watch what they do 

and not be distracted by the claims and 

actions of those who are not making the 

same contributions and sacrifices in the 

ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT). 

One must look at what the major combatants 

are doing in terms of small arms and 

ammunition programs, especially within 

their special operations units as their experiences 

result in rather rapid changes in 

tactics and equipment. These choices are 

often emulated by larger, conventional 

military and other government organization 

(OGAs) but as in the case with SS109- 

style 5.56x45mm cartridge improvements 

or replacement, the larger the organization 

it seems the slower it embraces 

change, if things there ever change at all. 

EVIDENCE ALL AROUND US THROUGH 

LESSONS LEARNED 

The following are just a few recent 

and/or ongoing official examples of serious 

moves to improve or outright replace 

5.56x45mm as both assault rifle and light 

machine gun cartridge that are happening 

today. These initiatives and trends in 

most cases are a direct result of the urgent 

user requests coming back from the various 

combat theaters the U.S. and NATO as 

well as our non-NATO allies are engaged 

in when the repeated and documented 

failures of 5.56x45mm SS109-style ammunition 

results in lives lost and missions 

jeopardized. The fact is that many countries 

in NATO have found the 5.56x45mm 

round seriously lacking in modern combat, 

both at short range and long range. 

Thus is the reason why: 

1. The UK, the U.S., and now Germany 

and most recently the French military are 

urgently fielding thousands of 7.62x51mm 

NATO rifles for troop use Afghanistan. 

2. By choice and based on extensive 

combat experience and independent 

comparative testing, U.S. Special Mission 

Units for the most part do not use 

standard 5.56x45mm M855/SS109-type 

120 SPRING 2011 SPRING 2011 121


ammo and instead use the 70 grain Optimal 

“Brown Tip,” 77 grain MK262 MOD 

1, 62 grain MK255 MOD 1 R2LP, and 62 

grain MK318 MOD 0 SOST ammunition 

because of their vastly improved terminal 

performance against both unprotected 

and protected human targets and 

continue to develop and field compact 

7.62x51mm carbines (HK417, KAC SR- 

25K Carbine, LMT MRP/L129A1, LaRue 

OBR or FN SCAR Heavies). 

3. The U.S. Army has spent 15+ years and 

over $120M developing NLT three iterations 

of an improved 5.56x45mm M855A1 

round to address numerous terminal effectiveness 

complaints and combat failure 

reports (at all engagement ranges from 

CQB to over 500 meters) from at least 

as far back as U.S. combat operations in 

Somalia in the early 1990s and certainly 

post 9/11. The U.S. Army fired more than 

1M rounds during the development of the 

radically new M855A1 round as part of a 

concerted and focused major effort to replace 

the SS109-type M855 “penetrator” 

round deemed ineffective in modern combat. 

The projectile design of the M855A1 

is radically different that that of all other 

SS109-type ammunition used throughout 

NATO, and for very good reason. 

4. USSOCOM/NSWC Crane/ATK-Federal 

jointly developed the highly effective 

5.56x45mm MK318 MOD 0 SOST round 

to specifically replace the M855 round 

based on documented combat failures 

and its larger SOST cousin the 7.62x51mm 

MK319 MOD 0 round. These rounds have 

been fielded within USSOCOM and the 

USMC (5.56x45mm) with excellent results 

to date, and are highly sought after 

by other NATO SOF units and federal law 

enforcement agencies. 

5. BAE Systems is developing and the UK 

MoD is testing a new 5.56x45mm “High 

Performance” projectile/round to improve 

long range performance and lethality on 

unprotected and light skinned vehicle targets 

as a possible replacement to the current 

5.56x45mm L2A2 Ball round sometime 

after planned 2011 trials are completed. 

There is also an independent ongoing effort 

in the UK in 2010 to revisit and evaluate the 

medium-caliber .280 British round (and 

other medium-caliber options) as a possible 

replacement to the 5.56x45mm and 

possibly 7.62x51mm cartridge(s) in a modern 

assault rifle platform. 

6. At time of writing at least one NATO 

SOF unit is still developing a mediumcaliber 

cartridge/platform to increase the 

terminal performance of a compact M4- 

style platform based upon combat failures 

of 5.56x45mm SS109-style ammunition 

during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

7. The German Bundeswehr has written 

a classified report detailing the repeated 

combat failures of their SS109-style 

5.56x45mm NATO DM11 round and have 

as a result (like the UK) issued an Urgent 

Requirement for 7.62x51mm semiautomatic 

rifles for use by German troops in 

Afghanistan. They have also initiated 

the design of a new modular, non-caliber 

specific assault rifle and will soon field a 

lightweight 7.62x51mm general-purpose 

machine gun (GPMG) to replace the MG3 

GPMG and some 5.56x45mm MG4 light 

machine guns to deal with long range and 

protected targets that the 5.56x45mm 

round is not defeating. 

8. The very latest new assault rifle platforms 

(Beretta ARX-160, Czech Republic 

CZ 805 A, Taiwan T97 and SCAR Common 

Receiver) exist after the costs of millions 

in R&D and are caliber- convertible by the 

operator beyond just 5.56x45mm NATO. 

9. USSOCOM and FN are developing 

a single, “Common” or universal SCAR 

rifle receiver that can be converted into 

other calibers to include 7.62x51mm 

NATO, medium-calibers (6.8x43mm 

Rem. SPC and 7.62x39mm Russian) and 

5.56x45mm NATO. 

10. The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy continue 

to pull from Anniston Army Depot 

and the NSWC in Crane, Indiana and then 

modify and field additional mothballed 

7.62x51mm NATO M14 rifles to be fielded 

to front line units as Squad Designated 

Marksman’s Rifles (SDMRs) to better deal 

with long range and protected targets not 

defeated by current 5.56x45mm platforms. 

11. The Canadian military is open to and 

investigating the merits of a new caliber 

and/or projectile in their ongoing SARP 

(Small Arms Replacement Program) effort 

for the future Canadian DoD family of 

small arms to be fielded through 2022. 

12. Many experienced law enforcement 

snipers/counter snipers no longer employ 

5.56x45mm/.223 Remington caliber 

sniper rifles even though they can employ 

superior non-Hague compliant expanding 

hollow-point, polytip-style projectiles 

because this cartridge is simply not 

considered an effective “one-shot manstopper”. 

(The author personally knows 

of one such failure that resulted in the 

tragic death of an Arlington County Virginia 

SWAT officer killed when the assailant 

killed him with a shotgun after being 

drilled dead center mass in the torso with 

a 55 grain M193 FMJ 5.56x45mm round 

at less than 100 yards.) 

13. A June 2009 report compiled for elements 

of the Canadian DoD concluded that 

to enhance their ammunition effectiveness 

it must “abandon the C77 FMJ (SS109- 

style) cartridge and replace it with a round 

loaded with a SOST/TOTM projectile,” or 

field a 6.8x43mm Rem. SPC round or a 

7.62x51mm platform as a third option. 

14. U.S. troops in Afghanistan are calling 

for additional 7.62x51mm MK48 light machine 

guns to augment and/or outright replace 

5.56x45mm M249 SAW to effectively 

deal with longer range, protected targets 

and suppression deficiencies encountered 

with 5.56x45mm platforms. 

15. The U.S. Army has left caliber or projectile 

style open in the requirements for 

the pending new “Individual Carbine” full 

and open competition and is investigating/ 

modeling other projectiles and calibers in 

support of this and other new Army small 

arms initiatives. 

16. The 2006 U.S. Joint Service Wound 

Ballistics Integrated Product Team 

(JSWB-IPT) report recommended, and 

data developed from more than 10,000 

test shots from 3–300 meters, to include 

those taken with M855, MK262 MOD 1, 

6.8x43mm Rem. SPC, 7.62x39mm and 

7.62x51mm NATO, supported the conclusion 

that in terms of terminal performance 

the optimum caliber for assault rifle 

use was not 5.56x45mm NATO nor the 

M855/SS109-style projectile. In fact, the 

331 page draft (interim) report dated 12 

April 2006 stated, “The best performing 

systems emphasizing tissue damage, on 

the average, in this study were of larger 

caliber than 5.56mm” and, “The 6.8mm 

performance observed in this test suggests 

that an intermediate caliber is the 

An M16 rifle sets in a V- 

notch stake with a target 

in the background, as a 

reminder of the annual 

weapons qualifications 

the Army Reserve 

units are required to go 

through, at Fort Pickett, 

Va., Nov. 21, 2009. (U.S. 

Army photo by Spc. Jeff 

Daniel/Released) 

122 SPRING 2011 SPRING 2011 123


answer to the trade-off balance issue.” 

The report goes on to state that, “The 6.8 

mm projectile had a near optimum balance 

of MASS, VELOCITY, and CONFIG- 

URATION to maintain its effectiveness, 

even at lower impact velocity.” “The 

clear and unequivocal best performing 

cartridge in the JSWB-IPT was 6.8mm” 

which was also validated by the 11 August 

2006 USMC Test Evaluation Report for 

the Alternate, Phase I. Ironically, these 

statements and recommendations from 

the expert panel were omitted from the 

final U.S. Army report. 

17. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) 

with concurrence from U.S. Army 

Special Forces Command (Airborne) leadership 

developed the 6.8x43mm Remington 

Special Purpose Cartridge and MURG 

(Modular Upper Receiver Group) concept 

to enhance the terminal effectiveness of 

5.56x45mm carbine platforms (MK12 

SPR, M4A1 Carbine, MK18 CQBR) to deal 

with combat failures of short-barreled 

5.56x45mm weapons in common use today. 

Documented accounts of enemy personnel 

being hit as many as 15 times with 

M855 drove the 5th SFG (A) to take action 

to address these ammunition failures. One 

well known and documented example of 

these M855 failures is provided by MSG 

Anthony Pryor – 5th SFG (ABN) – Silver 

Star recipient - Afghanistan mountains 

– 23 January 2002. “…Pryor snapped 

his gun around and shot the terrorist at 

point blank range with two rounds of 

5.56. “The man crumpled. So I went left 

to right, indexed down and shot those 

(two more) guys.” “What he thought were 

their corpses sagged lifelessly to the floor. 

“I realized that I was halfway through 

my magazine, so I started to change 

magazines. Then I felt something behind 

me, and thought it was one of my teammates…” 

The blow came suddenly. With 

stunning power.” He heard a noise, looked 

over and saw the ghostly apparition of the 

two men he had shot clamber back to their 

feet, fumbling for their weapons. 

Or the account of U.S. Army SFC Bill 

Bennett, briefed to the U.S. Congress in 

November of 2007, a Special Forces medic 

who was killed by an insurgent in Iraq after 

that individual was shot 7-9 times in 

Member of the Polish Army CIMIC (Civilian- 

Military Co-Operation) team emerging from an 

armored Hummvee with his wz.96 Beryl assault 

rifle undergoing intensive ‘in-theater’ tuning. 

the torso. The same bad guy then gets up 

and comes over a wall and reengages the 

other team members, gets shot another 

6-8 times from about 20-30 yards and is 

finally killed by SFC Bennett’s fellow team 

member SSG Springer who shoots and finally 

kills him with a M1911 .45 ACP. 

These are just a few of the documented 

accounts on this subject. One need not 

go too far to find other examples, though 

there are those who seemingly would prefer 

not to explore the known short comings 

of the 5.56x45mm cartridge for political or 

competing commercial or economic reasons, 

maybe as a result of entrenched institutional 

resistance to change or maybe 

they are operating under the flawed concept 

of “good enough.” Combat equipment 

should never be just good enough. 

Failures of 5.56x45mm round in combat 

are not new nor are they a unique occurrence 

in the current long range war in Afghanistan. 

They have been occurring for 

years at even CQB ranges throughout the 

theater of operations we are engaged in at 

the cost of brave U.S. and foreign friendly 

war fighters. 

18. The USMC and the U.S. Army are putting 

retractable butt stocks on 20 inch barreled 

M16’s to retain range, penetration 

and accuracy in shorter, more portable 

5.56x45mm weapons to provide terminal 

effects not available from carbine length 

14.5 inch barreled platforms. 

19. The U.S. Army PM-MAS (Product 

Manager – Maneuver Ammunition Systems) 

and ARL (Army Research Laboratory) 

developed the M855A1 EPR 

(Enhanced Performance Round) with a 

non-SS109-style projectile to increase the 

terminal performance and penetration of 

the standard issue 5.56x45mm cartridge 

from short-barreled M4 carbines based on 

failure reports from U.S. troops in combat 

and confirmed in a 2006 Lethality Study 

conducted by the U.S. Army. 

20. In the December 2006, CNA “Soldier 

Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat” 

survey commissioned by the U.S. 

Army (PM Soldier Weapons) of 2600 

OIF/OEF combat troops stated on Page 

29: “Twenty-six percent of M9 users requested 

higher caliber ammunition and 

increased stopping power. M4 and M16 

users echoed this recommendation. When 

speaking to experts and soldiers on site, 

many commented on the limited ability to 

effectively stop targets, saying that those 

personnel targets who were shot multiple 

times were still able to continue pursuit. 

M249 users also expressed a desire for 

increased ammunition caliber, but to a 

much lesser degree than other weapon users. 

Twenty percent of M9 users called for 

a replacement. 20% of M4 users Recommend 

larger caliber bullet and increase 

stoppage - lethality” 

21. The South Korean Army is fielding 

this year the K11 - a 20mm shoulder-fired 

multi-shot air-bursting grenade launcher 

with a maximum effective range of 500 

meters (the maximum range for a point 

target for even accomplished Marine Corps 

riflemen armed with the 20 inch barrel 

5.56x45mm M16A2/A4). How long will it 

be before this unique technology is in the 

hands of unfriendly states? (South Korea 

is actively offering the K11 for export sale 

now and has reportedly already delivered 

some K11s to a “friendly” Middle Eastern 

nation). The stand-off range of their new 

K11 individual weapon matches that of our 

issue M16 rifle (500 meters) and exceeds 

that of the Army’s pure-fleeted 14.5 inch 

barreled M4 carbine (460 meters). As 

an air-bursting grenade launcher it does 

not rely solely on well-placed single rifle 

or machine gun rounds from a trained 

marksman while under combat stress to 

induce casualties on the enemy. 

22. During the 2010 NDIA Joint Armaments 

Conference in Dallas then MARCO- 

SYSCOM Commanding General BG Brogan 

spoke about the need to conduct a “Trade 

Study to compare new projectile technology 

in other than 5.56mm and 7.62mm” 

rounds for the next USMC service rifle. 

23. Last year USMC 4-star General James 

N. Mattis, nominated for CENTCOM Commander 

at the time of writing, emailed his 

3 and 2-star command CGs about his serious 

concerns over the failures of USMCissue 

5.56x45mm rounds in combat with 

USMC troops (after a visit to Walter Reed 

Hospital and hearing accounts of multiple 

5.56x45mm failures that resulted 

in friendly casualties with USMC Lt. 

David Borden who, “lost a leg to a suicide 

bomber when he and other Marines 

emptied a magazine (5.56x45mm) into 

the man charging them, at close range.”. 

GEN Mattis wrote in his email about his/ 

the “USMC interest in shifting to a higher 

caliber assault rifle,” and “Physics say that 

the best advances in bullet technology will 

not give us the increased stopping power/ 

energy in the 5.56, since any improved 

5.56mm ammunition could only be more 

effective if adopted in a 6.8mm or other 

heavier round.” 

24. The USMC earlier this decade conducted 

an extensive joint USMC/FBI Test 

Evaluation Report for the Alternate Ammunition 

Study, Phase 1 dated 11 August 

2006 that clearly showed that various medium-caliber 

cartridges/projectiles tested 

(6.8x43mm Rem. SPC, 6.5mm Grendel) 

were superior in terminal performance 

when evaluated against comparable cartridges 

in caliber 5.56x45mm NATO 

(M855, M995, MK262 MOD 1 and then 

FBI-issue Federal LE223T3 with 62 grain 

Bonded projectile). The Conclusions and 

Recommendations from that evaluation 

test report were: 

1.2 Conclusions: 

1. At this time, identification of a projectile 

that is less susceptible to intervening barriers 

appears to be of substantially greater 

importance than the identification of 

an optimal cartridge size. 

2. The capability of the current issue 

M995, Mk262 Mod1 and M855 could be 

improved upon by substituting a “purpose-built 

projectile” — a projectile whose 

terminal ballistics are less affected by intervening 

barriers than current service 

rifle ammunition, thus providing a more 

consistent capability for our Marines. 

3. Improved performance could be realized 

through the development of a cartridge 

with a caliber other than 5.56mm. 

4. If an alternate cartridge is identified, 

the “purpose-built projectile” technology 

could be developed in the caliber of that 

cartridge, thus merging these two efforts 

and realizing an optimal ammunition. 

1.3 Recommendations: 

1. Commencement of phase II is recommended. 

The objectives of phase II would 

be: 

a. Expeditious pursuit of an improved 

purpose-built projectile for the 5.56mm 

NATO cartridge that is “blind to barriers”, 

i.e. a projectile whose terminal ballistics 

are not affected by intervening barriers. 

b. Continued study to determine the optimal 

cartridge size that satisfies current 

requirements and to aid in the development 

of future requirements.” 

25. At the 2010 NDIA Joint Armaments 

124 SPRING 2011 SPRING 2011 125


Conference in Dallas U.S. Army PM-Soldier 

Weapons Majors Shawn Murray and 

Elliot Caggins briefed the results of a survey 

conducted during 2 weeks in Afghanistan 

in 2010 wherein combat troops stated, 

“One of 8 key focus areas the troops 

stated needed urgent effort on was 5 - increased 

firepower (caliber) at extended 

ranges,” and wanted more 7.62x51mm 

MK48 LMG’s to replace 5.56x45mm 

M249 SAWs to deal with both protected 

and long range targets. 

26. At this same May 2010 NDIA conference 

the U.S. Army ARDEC (Armaments 

Research, Development and Engineering 

Center headquartered at Picatinny Arsenal, 

NJ) Program Manager for the LSAT 

(Lightweight Small Arms Technologies) 

program once again briefed that the current 

LSAT ammunition, LMG and new 

LSAT Carbine system architecture was 

a “scalable design” and open to and had 

been modeled for a “larger caliber” alternative 

to the current 5.56x45mm prototypes 

(6.5mm had been discussed in public 

the forum previously). 

27. A confidential unreleased study and 

test report prepared by the U.S. Army AR- 

DEC on an optimum assault rifle cartridge 

identified not 5.56x45mm as the optimum 

assault rifle cartridge but one within the 

6.5mm-6.8mm range. 

28. The majority of states in America do 

not allow cartridges under .25 caliber to 

be used for deer hunting, to include .223 

Remington and 5.56x45mm rounds even 

with enhanced non-Hague compliant 

hunting-style (deforming) projectiles. 

29. The Communist Chinese developed 

and have since fielded an entire family of 

5.8mm ammunition (specifically to outperform 

the 5.56x45mm NATO round) and 

weapons versus the traditional Chinese 

Communist practice of fielding the service 

rifle cartridge of Russia, e.g. the inferior 

5.45x39mm round. The Chinese consider 

the 5.8mm caliber family of weapons to 

be so effective and superior to the weapons 

chambered in the 5.56x45mm NATO 

round that they do not export this technology 

to other customer states. 

30. One of the prime conclusions of the 

December 2009 NSWC Crane-compiled 

test report entitled Comparison of Terminal 

Ballistic Performance of M855, 

MK318, 115 gr. 6.8 SPC and MK319 concluded 

that the M855 in its current NATO 

SS109-style loading was inferior in many 

important regards to include accuracy, 

short range (CQC) and 100 yard terminal 

effects, a tendency for through and 

through over penetration and inferior 

barrier penetration. It is worth noting 

that the medium-caliber 6.8x43mm Rem. 

SPC round included in this test report was 

tested not with the BTB (Blind to Barrier) 

SOST projectiles used in the MK318 and 

MK319 SOST rounds tested but with a 

conventional OTM (Open Tip Match) bullet 

and thus would likely have performed 

far better with the SOST projectile when 

compared to the 5.56x45mm SOST and 

M855 rounds tested. 

31. The factual contents of the excellent 

monograph written by U.S. Army Major 

Thomas P. Ehrhart entitled Increasing 

Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan; 

Taking back the Infantry Half-Kilometer 

discusses the unsuitability of the SS109- 

style 5.56x45mm cartridge in modern 

warfare, in particular in the long-range 

war in Afghanistan. Key observations 

and conclusions in this excellent study 

include, “Small caliber high velocity 

rounds are especially dependent on this 

instability (yawing) for their lethality. 

For the M855 cartridge, maximum stability 

is from 150 meters out to 350 meters 

and it is therefore potentially less 

lethal between these two ranges.” Major 

Ehrhart goes on to state, “With the recent 

halt in production of the M855A1 cartridge 

(2nd iteration M855A1 ‘Lead Free 

Slug’ {LFS} variant), which designers 

promised would deliver this effectiveness 

(enhanced terminal effectiveness), 

it appears all options within this caliber 

have been exhausted.” On the subject 

of training as it relates to hit probability 

of the rifleman, Major Ehrhart states 

that, “The limited capability of the current 

M855 cartridge combined with the 

extended distances of engagements in 

Afghanistan requires that shot placement 

on target is more critical than ever 

before.” And on page 28 of this document 

Major Ehrhart recounts the factual 

report about when, “Lieutenant Colonel 

David H. Petraeus (then current 4-star 

Commander of the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces 

in Afghanistan) was shot in the chest by 

an M855 round from an M249 squad automatic 

weapon. He walked out of the 

hospital several days after the accident.” 

Major Ehrhart also provides more than 

100 references and documents, official 

and otherwise to support of the conclusions 

and statements on this subject as 

contained in this monograph. 

32. From December 2006 through May 

2007 the U.S. DoD Technical Support 

Working Group (TSWG) conducted an 

interagency/international assessment of 

various medium-caliber MURG upper 

receivers to improve the terminal effects 

of 5.56x45mm M4-style platforms. These 

extensive user tests documented that such 

a drop-on medium-caliber conversion 

was feasible and effective in nearly doubling 

the terminal effects of the short-barrel 

10-14.5 inch barreled carbine. It was 

also discovered that operators were able 

to engage targets with equal or better accuracy 

when compared with 5.56x45mm 

platforms. The additional recoil impulse 

of the more powerful 6.8x43mm Rem. 

SPC cartridge when compared to identical 

platforms in 5.56x45mm did not degrade 

the ability of the test personnel to rapidly 

engage multiple targets – in practice 

both calibers were identical contrary to 

common myth. From a compact carbine 

a medium-caliber COTS MURG option 

delivers 56-77% heavier and 24% larger 

frontal surface area projectiles and two 

times the projectile mass to the target, 

as well as a 33% increase in muzzle energy 

when compared to even the very best 

5.56x45mm cartridges, and at no degradation 

of hit probability even in rapid fire. 

To no ones surprise ballistic gelatin testing 

performed by the FBI, the USMC, and 

other agencies within the U.S. DoD with 

both calibers employing similar projectile 

designs reveal far greater permanent and 

temporary wound cavities for the larger, 

heavier projectiles. 

33. Recommendations to the troops from 

the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School 

at Fort Benning (recently combined with 

Colombian marines armed with 5.56 mm Galil assault rifles raid a building while participating in amphibious beach assault training during Southern Exchange 

and Partnership of the Americas 2010 in Ancon, Peru, July 24, 2010. The exercise is designed to enhance cooperative partnerships with maritime forces 

from Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia and the United States. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Brian J. Slaght/Released) 

126 SPRING 2011 SPRING 2011 127


the Armor Center from Fort Knox as the 

“Maneuver Center of Excellence”), as taken 

from the September/ October 2006 article 

in Infantry magazine, addresses the 

reports and causes of combat failures of 

5.56x45mm NATO ammunition and the 

results of the 2006 JSWB-IPT study into 

the issue, and offers this advice below to 

the troops fighting with 5.56x45mm NATO 

caliber weapons. 

4. “There are doctrinal and training 

techniques that can increase Soldier effectiveness. 

The analysis tools used in 

this study were used to evaluate some 

alternative engagement techniques. The 

technique of engaging CQB targets with 

controlled pairs — two aimed, rapid shots 

as described in Chapter 7 of FM 3-22.9 — 

was shown to be significantly better than 

single aimed shots. While that should 

certainly not be surprising to those who 

have been using this technique for some 

time, we now know why. Not only are 

two hits better than one, but controlled 

pairs help to average out striking yaw; 

on average, the Soldier is more likely to 

see a hit where the bullet’s yaw behavior 

works in his favor.” 

Is this not a direct admission by the 

U.S. Army organization responsible for developing 

new infantry and close quarters 

combat material requirements and training 

methods our soldiers in close combat 

and marksmanship that the terminal effectiveness 

of a single 5.56x45mm NATO 

round and the ability of even our well 

trained rifleman to accurate engage the 

target is questionable under realistic combat 

scenarios? Then certainly the 3rd such 

Finding in this same report is very telling 

and acknowledges the shortcomings of the 

U.S. M855 5.56x45mm NATO round. 

3. “Field reports are accurate and can 

be explained by the phenomenon of bullet 

yaw. Shot placement aside, why is it 

that some Soldiers report “through-andthrough” 

hits while others report no such 

problems, despite using the same weapons 

and ammunition?” 

34. The 2005 USSOCOM Joint Operational 

Requirements Document (JORD) 

for the SCAR family of modular weapons 

included a family of “Enhanced Ammunition” 

required directly as a result of various 

“post 9/11 failures of the M4A1 and 

M855 round.” Millions have been spent 

on this program to both improve the performance 

of the weapon system and the 

ammunition fired from it. It is indeed 

interesting to note that recently USSO- 

COM announced that the command no 

longer planned to purchase 5.56x45mm 

NATO caliber SCAR Light (MK16 MOD 

0) rifles due to lackluster reports from 

the SOF operators, even when employing 

the vastly improved 5.56x45mm MK318 

MOD 0 Barrier (SOST) round. However, 

USSOCOM still plans to procure and field 

multiple variants of the 7.62x51mm NATO 

SCAR Heavy (MK17 MOD 0) rifle based on 

positive field reports of its superior performance 

against both short range and long 

range unprotected and protected threat 

targets to include one account of two insurgents 

killed with a single 7.62x51mm 

SOST round fired from a MK17 MOD 0 

rifle after penetrating both the exterior 

and seat of a passenger vehicle. 

A soldier with the Indian army 

shows U.S. Army Sgt. Luke 

Hoffman, with 2nd Squadron, 

14th Cavalry Regiment, 

2nd Stryker Brigade Combat 

Team, 25th Infantry Division, 

the 5.56 Insas sniper rifle 

during the static display portion 

of the opening ceremony 

for exercise Yudh Abhyas 

2009 at Camp Bundela, 

India, Oct. 12, 2009. Yudh 

Abhyas is a bilateral exercise 

involving the armies of India 

and the United States. (U.S. 

Army photo by Staff Sgt. 

Crista Yazzie/Released) 

35. In a May 2010 briefing on development 

and fielding status of the U.S. 

M855A1 EPR round the U.S. Army reports 

that in “Baselining surveys initiated 

(current Soldier/Public perception 

of the M855A1) 2/3 of 2,200 Soldiers do 

not think the Army is providing the best 

5.56mm ammunition.” 

Some of America’s very best trained 

and most combat hardened SOF warriors 

elect to carry the additional weight of a 

7.62x51mm rifle and ammunition in the 

brutal mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. 

Could it be they know something we 

don’t? Maybe we should listen to them. 

Having considered 

the above 

situations and accounts, 

and all the 

money and effort 

that has been expended 

in recent 

years to improve 

or outright replace 

the 5.56x45mm 

NATO round 

throughout the 

U.S. and NATO, 

this author is led to 

conclude that without 

a doubt, “Yes, 

there is a problem 

with the current 

rifle caliber and 

cartridge in service 

today.” 

DON’T ALLOW THE “LOGISTICAL TAIL TO 

WAG THE DOG” 

It’s not just from the above situations 

and reports that we should consider the 

need for a new system and caliber. There 

are many factors to be weighed into these 

decisions. It’s expensive and time consuming 

to change out a caliber and related 

weapon systems with all of the incumbent 

training issues, logistical concerns, etc. 

Frequently we hear social issue solutions of 

great financial magnitude being touted because, 

“If it saves one child’s life, it’s worth 

it.” In the case of weapon systems, we 

should not be looking at only the expense, 

we should be looking at whether it will consistently 

save the lives of our soldiers and 

enhance their ability to incapacitate and 

kill our enemies. Many of the symptoms we 

can see in the above list indicate that lives 

are being lost, enemies not being effectively 

countered in the current theatres of operation 

due to the rifle caliber currently in use. 

The symptoms are not only the requests for 

a new or enhanced cartridge but the massive 

removal of other legacy systems like 

the M14 from mothballs in order to address 

the current environment. 

A SIMPLE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH IS NEEDED 

There is a relatively small cost to develop 

or procure various cartridges and 

platforms and conduct a detailed assessment 

of the trade-offs on medium-caliber, 

intermediate calibers or non-traditional 

small caliber projectiles. The success of 

rounds such as the USSOCOM SOST ammunition 

are excellent examples of how 

this can be done cheaply for the overall 

good of our war fighters. We can only 

know where we stand as far as the true 

effectiveness of our current issue rifle ammunition 

if we are wiling to openly and 

fairly assess it against more modern alternatives. 

Then once developed, tested 

and safety certified we should field small 

batches in combat and let the troops report 

back on their effectiveness. Let the troops 

decide for a change what works best – they 

are the ones fighting and in some cases 

sadly dying with what the supply system 

issues them. Keep the enemy off guard 

by fielding incremental improvements in 

small arms and ammunition more often. 

Spend some money, do the assessment, 

don’t limit the choices and give the troops 

an equal seat at the decision making table. 

The fact that these boots-on-theground 

warriors are choosing (or would 

choose if given an option) other than the 

current issue 5.56x45mm NATO caliber 

weapons for their current combat needs 

is not an indictment of how that family 

of weapons has served in other conflicts, 

other environments, but it does clearly 

show that the people who have their lives 

at risk and a job to do would choose something 

different if the option is open. 

The U.S. should lead this effort if 

NATO will not. If the U.S. Army will not 

then call in the Marines to do it – they’ll 

get it done. If they will not then we can 

rely on our special operators as they have 

already addressed this capability gap with 

new weapons and more effective ammunition. 

What are we afraid of? That we 

might put the fear of the American rifleman 

back in our adversaries? 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Jim Schatz is a life long student of 

military and modern small arms and 

ammunition and their use. A former 

U.S. Army Airborne infantryman with 

the famed 82nd Airborne Division and 

advanced marksmanship instructor/ 

shooter with the U.S. Army Marksmanship 

Unit, Jim has spent more than 3 

decades performing in the field of small 

arms use and training, development, 

testing and user support. Presently he 

is an independent consultant in the field 

of modern small arms and ammunition 

and has been a strong proponent for the 

rapid fielding of incrementally superior 

enhanced small arms and ammunition to 

better serve our dedicated frontline war 

fighters through the regular assessment 

of proven new and off-the-shelf technologies 

and materials. 

128 SPRING 2011 SPRING 2011 129

DO WE NEED A NEW SERVICE RIFLE CARTRIDGE? - HKPro.com

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