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aluthgama report final

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Conclusions and Recommendations<br />

Conclusions<br />

There was evidence that the hate speech cultivating hate sentiment against Muslims had had<br />

an extremely deleterious effect on communities’ perceptions of one another. The fact that<br />

rumours circulating in the aftermath spoke of violent attacks by Muslims against monks and<br />

temples, and that the people believed such stories to the extent that they joined mobs that<br />

were perpetrating violence against Muslims is a sad comment on the state of law and order in<br />

society.<br />

At no point did the government acknowledge either the extent of the violence, the severe<br />

breakdown of relations in the affected areas, the seriousness of the fact that an event of this<br />

nature occurred in the period of transition from war to peace, or the manner in which<br />

southern Muslims’ sensibilities were affected. The government response attempted to downplay<br />

the seriousness of the incident and mitigates the damage to its reputation in the<br />

international arena. The government response suggests that its concern was with regard to<br />

dealing with perceptions that the government was unstable, or racist: to manage the narratives<br />

emerging out of the events in a way that did not damage their reputation. In doing so, the<br />

government lost the opportunity to do the necessary reconciliation work among the<br />

communities. The government also reinstituted the idea of Muslim marginality, Buddhist<br />

superiority and the fact that the BBS could act with impunity. It also exposed the limitations<br />

of the government’s capacity to understand the extent to which such incidents affect<br />

individuals and communities. Even the swift response of the government to rebuild homes<br />

and buildings suggests that the government’s strategy is to deal with only infrastructure<br />

problems. The larger, more complex and serious issues of community relations, minority<br />

insecurities, majority dominance were ignored or not even recognized.<br />

In addition to the attacks on Muslim houses in Dharga Town, six houses in Pathirajagoda and<br />

one house on Mihiripenna Road belonging to Sinhalese were also attacked. The attacks in<br />

Pathirajagoda occurred at the same time as the other attacks in Dharga Town. One Sinhala<br />

house in Adhikharigoda was attacked later in what may have been a retaliation. The attacks<br />

on the Pathirajagoda houses occurred at the same time as those on the Muslim houses in<br />

Dharga Town and we feel therefore that they could not have been in retaliation. While we<br />

acknowledge the victims’ testimonies that they recognized neighbors among Muslim persons<br />

who showed the mobs the way, evidence indicates that the mobs that attacked the Sinhala<br />

homes were organized and carried out the attacks in a manner similar to those who attacked<br />

Muslim houses. The similarities include minimal harm to persons, organized and systematic<br />

looting of jewelry and cash, using domestic materials including furniture, books and car tyres<br />

for the burning. These similarities speak not to a spontaneous attack either by Sinhala mobs<br />

or by Muslim neighbors but part of a larger organizing strategy. It is also curious that the<br />

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