Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin - Federation of American ...

MIPB
Operations in OEF
April - June
2009
PB 34-O9-2
Afghanistan

FROM THE EDITOR
In this issue, three articles offer perspectives on operations in Afghanistan. Captain Nenchek discusses
the philosophy of the evolving insurgent “syndicates,” who are working together to resist the
changes and ideas the Coalition Forces bring to Afghanistan. Captain Beall relates his experiences in
employing Human Intelligence Collection Teams at the company level in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Lieutenant Colonel Lawson provides a look into the balancing act U.S. Army chaplains as non-combatants
in Afghanistan are involved in with regards to Information Operations.
Colonel Reyes discusses his experiences as the MNF-I C2 CIOC Chief, detailing the problems and
solutions to streamlining the intelligence effort. First Lieutenant Winwood relates her experiences in
integrating intelligence support into psychological operations.
From a doctrinal standpoint, Lieutenant Colonels McDonough and Conway review the evolution of
priority intelligence requirements from a combined operations/intelligence view. Mr. Jack Kem discusses
the constructs of assessment during operations–measures of effectiveness and measures of performance,
common discussion threads in several articles in this issue.
George Van Otten sheds light on a little known issue on our southern border, that of the illegal immigration
and smuggling activities which use the Tohono O’odham Reservation as a corridor and offers
some solutions for combined agency involvement and training to stem the flow.
Included in this issue is nomination information for the CSM Doug Russell Award as well as a biography
of the 2009 winner.
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Sterilla A. Smith
Editor

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
PB 34-09-2 Volume 35 Number 2
FEATURES
April - June 2009
Commanding General
Major General John M. Custer III
Deputy to the Commanding General
Mr. Jerry V. Proctor
Deputy Commanding General
(Reserve Component)
Brigadier General Joesph M. Wells
Deputy Commander for Training
Colonel Dennis A. Perkins
Director, Directorate of Doctrine
Colonel Michael J. Arinello
Chief, ISR Operations Analysis
Division
Mr. Chet Brown
MIPB Staff:
Editor
Sterilla A. Smith
Design Director
Patrick N. Franklin
Design and Layout
Patrick N. Franklin
Lawrence Boyd
Cover Design
Lawrence Boyd
Inside Back Cover
Lawrence Boyd
Issue Photographs
Courtesy of the U.S. Army
Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence
Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH)
publishes the Military Intelligence
Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly
under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB
presents information designed to keep intelligence
professionals informed of current
and emerging developments within
the field and provides an open forum
in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques,
and procedures; historical perspectives;
problems and solutions, etc.,
can be exchanged and discussed for purposes
of professional development.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are those
of the authors and not those of the
Department of Defense or its elements.
The contents do not necessarily reflect
official U.S. Army positions and do not
change or supersede information in any
other U.S. Army publications.
6 Observations as the MNF-I C2 CIOC Chief
by Colonel D.J. Reyes
10 War of Ideas: A New Way to View the Afghan Insurgency
by Captain Margaret J. Nencheck
13 Intelligence Support to Psychological Operations: The Ongoing Challenge
by First Lieutenant Katie Winwood
16 Understanding Priority Intelligence Requirements
by Lieutenant Colonel William G. McDonough and Lieutenant Colonel John A.
Conway
24 Doctrinal Tension: The Chaplain and Information Operations
by Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Kenneth Lawson
32 The HUMINT Heresies: The Disposition of Human Intelligence Collection
in Counterinsurgency
by Captain David Beall
38 Illegal Immigration and Smuggling on the Tohono O’odham Reservation
of Arizona: Opportunities for Applied Intelligence Training
by George A. Van Otten, PhD
46 BCST: The Army’s Premiere Battle Command Systems Collective Task
Trainer
by Major Michael Spears
48 Assessment: Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness
by Colonel Jack D. Kem, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired
2 Always Out Front
3 CSM Forum
51 Training the Corps
WIT—The Battlefield
Commander’s Force Multiplier
in the CIED Fight
by Major Chris Britt
Fort Huachuca Invests in the
Technological and Educational
Development of Civilians
by Mr. Richard K. Ward
Embedded Training: What MI
Needs in the Future
by Ramona McCaa`
59 20th Annual Bataan Memorial
Death March
Photos by Sergeant Austin
Thomas
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0919801
DEPARTMENTS
60 Buffalo Soldier Dedication
Story and photos by Garlan
Martens
61 The Military Intelligence
Corps 2009 Hall of Fame
Inductees
70 Professional Reader
72 Intelligence Philatelic
Vignettes by Mark Sommer
73 Contact and Article
Submission Information
74-75 CG’s Reading List
76 Nomination Information for
the 2010 CSM Doug Russell
Award
Inside Back Cover: Sergeant
Julian M. Jones, 2009 Doug
Russell Award Recipient
GEORGE W. CASEY JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

AlwAys Out FrOnt
Major General John M. Custer III
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
On June 14, 2009, the U.S. Army celebrated 234 years of answering the call to duty. Since its inception
in 1775 our Army has continued to evolve by becoming ever more flexible, innovative and better prepared
to tackle new challenges. These characteristics will become increasingly important for our Army and
our branch as we re-focus on Afghanistan as part of our expanding involvement in Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF).
Looking at our Army’s history, whether it originated within the Continental Army or the State Militias,
overcoming multifaceted adversity to achieve victory is our hallmark. The intelligence successes we
have achieved together in this current conflict have required intense dedication to our profession, innumerable
personal hardships, the unwavering support of our loved ones, and all too often, the ultimate
sacrifice of our brothers and sisters with whom we served. The lessons we have learned over
these many years in which we have been engaged in OEF have come at a great cost that we will continue
to bear. However, the sweat and blood which we have shed to pay for these lessons has also
made us more determined, more agile, more proficient, and more assured of victory.
The challenges and sacrifices we have all endured are not unique to our time. We share these hardships
with those who formed our Army at its inception. I recently read a book entitled Founding Father
about General George Washington’s experiences as the Commander of the Continental Army during
the Revolutionary War. An introspective man, a great leader, a great Soldier, before becoming a great
president, he feared his task might be too great for his talents. Yet under his leadership the Army
endured years of misery and setbacks. Think about the men who served under his command. Those
Continental Soldiers always seemed to be one misfortune away from defeat. They faced frequent shortages
of food, supplies, medicine, and ammunition. For five years, Washington and his men continually
faced defeat, death and internal setbacks. It took every ounce of courage, determination, faith, and a
belief in what they were fighting for was truly worth the sacrifices each Soldier bore. After six years
of fighting, on October 19, 1781, the Continental Army achieved victory with the surrender of British
General Cornwallis at Yorktown.
That’s persistence. That’s staying power. That’s what this Army was born with and born of, and that’s
what our Army possesses today. It is this spirit of courage and tenacity that lives within each of us within
Military Intelligence (MI) working every day to find and bring to justice the radical extremists who killed
more than 3,000 of our innocent men, women, and children on September 11, 2001 and continue to
threaten our nation.
Still, there’s another aspect of our Army that we should be equally proud and will be increasingly
important as the nature of this conflict evolves, and that is the degree of compassion and understanding
U.S. Soldiers bring to the fight. Our adversaries know that American Soldiers will protect, care,
and treat with dignity those whom we defeat or capture. Civilians with whom we come in contact do
not fear our presence, for they know we understand their plight, their sacrifices, and their desire to
live in peace.
You’ve had to serve not just as Soldiers, but as diplomats; not just as Warfighters, but as peacekeepers.
And with every new challenge, you have demonstrated the ability to rise to the occasion.
(Continued on page 4)
2 Military Intelligence

CsM FOruM
Command Sergeant Major Gerardus Wykoff
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
Earlier this month we celebrated the Army’s 234 th birthday. On June 14, 1775, our country’s founding
fathers established the Continental Army in preparation for revolution against the British. In that
regard, the Army has been around longer than the U.S. itself.
What began as a mostly untrained group of 15,000 farmers and craftsmen has grown to become one
of the largest, most elite and technologically advanced fighting forces in the world. The Army’s mission
today remains much the same as it was more than two centuries ago–to champion the cause of freedom
on our shores and abroad.
Throughout the history of the Army, the noncommissioned officer (NCO) has played a vital role in
the overall readiness of the force. Since 1775, the Army has set its NCOs apart from other enlisted
Soldiers by insignia of grade. With more than 200 years of service, the U.S. Army’s NCO Corps has
distinguished itself as the world’s most accomplished group of military professionals.
Through wars and military operations in every corner of the globe, America’s soldiers have served
our country with bravery and pride. Seventeen U.S. presidents and 2,403 Medal of Honor recipients
have served in the Army. Of those Medal of Honor recipients, almost half were NCOs. Thousands more
heroes have sacrificed their lives in the name of liberty and millions have dedicated their lives to the
service of their country.
Historical and daily accounts of life as an NCO are exemplified by acts of courage, dedication, and willingness
to do whatever it takes to complete the mission. In recognition of our commitment Secretary of the
Army, Pete Geren, announced last October during the annual Association of the U.S. Army Conference,
that 2009 will be the “Year of the NCO.” He stated that “the Army will accelerate the NCO development of
strategic initiatives, develop new initiatives that enhance training, education, capability, and utilization of
the NCO Corps, showcase the NCO story to the Army and the American people, honor the sacrifices and
celebrate the contributions of the NCO Corps, past and present.” In its 234 year history, this is only the
second time the Army has used this theme “Year of the NCO.”
In the winter of 1778, during Valley Forge, Inspector General Friedrich von Steuben wrote the Army’s
first manual, “The Blue Book” and described the importance of choosing the right soldiers as NCOs. “The
order and discipline of a regiment depends so much upon their behavior, that only those who show their
merit and good conduct are entitled to it.” NCOs have been celebrated for decorated service in military
events ranging from Valley Forge to Gettysburg, to charges on Omaha Beach and battles along the Ho
Chi Minh Trail, to current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. NCOs have led from the front by providing
purpose, direction, and motivation. The NCO Corps has and will always be the backbone supporting the
greatest fighting power in the world!
On May 20 th , Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr. stated, “Any officer out here will tell you
. . . that they are the officer that they are today, because there was an NCO behind them every step of the
way. To some extent, all of us stand on the shoulders of great NCOs.”
Today’s NCO is an innovative, competent, and professional enlisted leader grounded in heritage, values
and tradition. I encourage all NCOs to embody the Warrior Ethos and live the Army Values. We must lead
by example, train from experience, maintain and enforce standards, take care of Soldiers and adapt to a
(Continued on page 5)
April - June 2009 3

AlwAys Out FrOnt (Continued from page 2)
We’ll be victorious in this War on Terrorism. Of that I am absolutely certain and confident. It’s not
just because of our overwhelming firepower, professionalism, dedication, and the sweat and blood the
men and women of our armed forces bring to the fight. We have a secret weapon on our side–the unwavering
belief, shared with the Continental Army, that ours is the true cause of liberty, equality, and
human freedom. Through your efforts the forces of darkness will be defeated. The forces who would
turn the clock back on civilization will fail and the forces of light will be victorious. We will not fail in
this fight.
For over 200 years, the Army has been at the forefront of defending the freedom that makes our country
such a very special place; a place where men and women are judged not by race, religion, creed, or family
heritage, but on their individual merit. America has always been that flame burning bright where anyone
with a desire to serve can excel with drive and talent.
Every MI Soldier and the civilians serving alongside them are helping to write a new chapter in our Army’s
glorious history. I know you will make it a proud chapter. Heritage is a burden on occasion. At other times
it’s a great joy. Sometimes ‘Army Strong’ seems an understatement to me in describing what you do. Our
nation may never know each of the individual successes made by MI professionals serving around the
world, but they will never forget the sacrifices and commitment you brought to this fight. Because of you
the Army will proudly celebrate many birthdays in the future.
Always Out Front!
MG John Custer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca,
and Fort Huachuca’s youngest Soldier, PFC Garrett Bouldin cut the cake during the Army
Birthday celebration on 12 June at Brown Parade Field.
4 Military Intelligence

CsM FOruM
(Continued from page 3)
changing world. We are an important and essential part of the Army. The NCO Corps provides invaluable
service and sacrifice in the line of duty. We continually prove our dedication and our willingness to make
great sacrifices on behalf of our Nation. This goes not just for the Army, but for all services. NCOs of all
branches are accomplishing great feats everyday that deserves recognition by the American public.
I have witnessed first hand other nations, allies, and even our enemies seek out the expertise of our
highly skilled, expertly trained, and proficient NCOs. They are amazed with our organization, skill set, initiative,
and professionalism. Most importantly, they are impressed with the level of respect given to our
NCO Corps.
NCOs understand the mission at hand. They are mentors, leaders, true professionals. Above all, they
take care of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines and ensure their safety. Although our military
continues to challenge its service members with a heightened OPTEMPO, back to back deployments,
and often times missions which seem unattainable, I encourage you to strive to remain relevant! I want
to remind you of what Secretary of the Army, Pete Geren has said, “At the front of every Army mission
in the U.S. or overseas, you’ll find NCOs. They know their mission, they know their equipment, and
most importantly, they know their Soldiers.”
I would like to relate the story of two amazing NCOs who were part of an event that truly changed the
world. Before the USS Cole bombing, before 9/11, there was Somalia. On October 3, 1993 the world
saw pictures of a dead American Soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia.
Although Soldiers in every conflict and war have seen that level of hate, this was the first time the
American public and the world saw it.
Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randy Shugart were part of an operation that
many people don’t even know had a name. That name was Operation Gothic Serpent. At the second crash
site, the two Delta Snipers were inserted by helicopter (at their own request) to defend a crashed helicopter
from hundreds of advancing Somalis in the Battle of Mogadishu.
Ultimately both snipers were killed and the pilot, Michael Durant was taken hostage. But the fight
that these NCOs showed left the impression to the Somali Militia that whomever they were protecting
must be important, and perhaps that is why he wasn’t killed. SFC Shughart and MSG Gordon were
the first Soldiers to be awarded Medals of Honor posthumously since the Vietnam War.
Not every NCO will be put in a position to sacrifice his or her life. But every NCO will be expected to
lead; they will be expected to make decisions that impact lives and missions. They will be expected to
successfully complete missions, and they will be expected to live with the decisions that they make.
We are at a point today that even junior NCOs are expected to take the level of responsibility of a senior
NCO ten years ago. That may seem a tall order but the NCO Corps has been and always will be
the backbone supporting the greatest fighting power in the world.
NCOs Lead from the Front!
April - June 2009 5

Introduction
by Colonel D.J. Reyes
From June 2007 through June 2008, I deployed to
Iraq and served as the Multi-National Force-Iraq
(MNF-I) C2 Combined Intelligence and Operations
Center (CIOC) Chief. Like so many Military Intelligence
(MI) Soldiers returning again to Iraq, I had mixed
feelings regarding the actual threat environment,
how it changed or evolved, how I was going to
understand the complexities, and how I would leverage
the intelligence battlefield operating system
capabilities to help the warfighters in the
find, fix, finish, exploit, assess, and disseminate
targeting process.
This article is based on my own personal experience
and observations during my tour. It outlines
how I attempted to make sense of and develop processes
into the system, provides some challenges
faced, and offers some recommendations for consideration
to future CIOC chiefs as our military
continues to support this endeavor.
Organizational Analysis and Solutions
1. Know your environment, know the plan, know the
players, and know your capabilities. Realizing that
the environment was complex, fluid, and involved
aspects of PMESII (political, military, economic, social,
information, and infrastructure) covering the
tactical to strategic spectrum, I reviewed the MNF-I
Commanding General’s (CG’s) Joint Campaign Plan
(JCP) to understand the CG’s intent and vision. As I
integrated into the daily battle rhythm of intelligence
analysis, production and dissemination, I learned
to appreciate the MNF-I network of key players. The
diagram is only intended to illustrate the organizations
that I was personally involved with for information
flow and operational support.
What it does not adequately capture is the intricate
cross-flow of information among and between
all of these organizations and the CIOC. Although
the CIOC had a formal request for information/
intelligence (RFI) system, there were multiple
means of information sharing that resulted in ongoing
actions or RFIs that were difficult to track.
Thus, there was no single and comprehensive entry
point into the CIOC. Another point to note on
the diagram is the CIOC composition. We were
fortunate to have robust interagency cell support,
specifically the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and
the National Security Agency as well as the U.S.
State Department.
Although we had a good relationship with the
other governmental organizations, we did not have
embedded analytical support in the CIOC. This
would have been most helpful in synchronizing intelligence
and operations.
6 Military Intelligence
BFC
TF17
TF HYDRA
IFC
MND-N
MND-B
MND-C
MND-SE
CJSOTF-AP
TF TROY
COIC
TF16
OCF-I
TF714
EUCOM
MNC-I
C2
CIFC-A JAC
Molesworth
JASG MNSTC-I
CIOC Chief
A&P CM&D C2X CSG NGA
ITFC DOMEX JDEC
SCID CLE
“C2 CIOC Enterprise”
TF134
JDIC
MNF-I
• STRATOPS
• FSEC
• SPA
• STRATEFF
• SJA
• CIG
• IO
-------------------USEMB
• POL
DIA CENTCOM
“Reachback”
MNF-I C2 CIOC Chief
MNF-I C2 CIOC Chief Intelligence and Information Flow
Intelligence and Information Flow

Analytically, the CIOC provided a very capable,
in-theater, all source fusion capability. How we tailored
our efforts and support is covered later in
the article. One of our challenges was providing the
depth and fidelity of intelligence analysis that our
broad audience required including, but not limited
to, the CG, MNF-I and the various staffs, and the
Iraqi intelligence, law enforcement, and judicial
systems.
During this phase, we identified the CIOC’s major
essential tasks, how we were configured to accomplish
those tasks, who was accomplishing those
tasks, and how we mitigated loss of key personnel
due to rotation and transition/train up time. We
categorized the CIOC functions into analytical support,
administrative support and overhead; thereby
narrowing the field of available analysts. We further
broke down the analysts into three sub-categories of
expert, journeyman, and novice. The major criteria
that distinguished the expert from the journeyman
categories were the actual subject matter expertise
(SME) on the specific topic and amount of time
spent on the specific topic (“dwell time” whether in
theater or via reachback).
At the end of the study it became apparent
that we had three layers of analyst proficiency.
DIA (Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating
Terrorism and the Iraq cell (IZ)) mainly comprised
the experts, along with a handful of CENTCOM
analysts. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and
a handful of Worldwide Individual Augmentation
System (WIAS) analysts comprised the journeymen.
The majority of the WIAS analysts fell into
the novice category. In September 2007, we provided
this analysis to the senior MI leadership
(DIA, CENTCOM, U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command (INSCOM)) at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia. One of the issues we discussed was balancing
the need to support the CG, MNF-I with
robust forward based analytical expertise against
developing the required bench strength in sanctuary
(reachback) and sustaining the trained and
current pool of analysts.
2. CIOC Functional and Physical Re-alignment
Analysis. Based on the previously mentioned
study, we had to ensure that we maximized our
capabilities to provide the most responsive, accurate
and predictive intelligence to the warfighters.
We realized that we had to “flatten the organiza-
tion command and control (C2) wise and information
flow wise.” We intuitively understood that the
identified core of experts would carry the heavy analytical
load and briefings/products and that we
would place demands on the intelligence community
(IC) reachback infrastructure in the Beltway.
We knew that the journeymen and novices would
have to overcome a steep learning curve and still
provide value added in support of the rapidly moving
intelligence cycle.
Additionally, we looked at whether CIOC physical
realignment (identify sections that collaborated
on the most common issues, and physically
redesign the CIOC floor to better facilitate this
flow of information and intelligence sharing) was
feasible, made sense, and would outweigh any
costs to interrupting OPTEMPO and timely intelligence
support. Our methodology was to review
the CIOC battle rhythm, given a snapshot
in time. We captured a 45 day period, noted the
daily CG MNF-I battle update assessment (BUA)
notes, identified key comments and taskers to
the C2, and grouped these into major issues. We
then used Visio and Analyst Notebook programs
to graphically associate these issues with the respective
CIOC Analysis & Production (A&P) functional
area sections (i.e., Sunni, Shi’a, national
issues, etc.) On paper, we redesigned the CIOC
main floor to physically position those sections
that shared common issues.
We discovered that, in many instances, more
than one analytical section was in fact working on
the same CG issue. Additionally, with some exceptions,
the current physical layout of analysts on
the main floor did not lend well to “coffee breath
close” analyst interaction across the various sections.
However, the sheer logistical and information
technology efforts required to relocate entire
analytical sections would adversely impact continuous
intelligence support to operations. So, for
this phase, we ended up moving less than a handful
of analysts to help synergize analytical efforts
and information flow between the sections.
3. Additional re-look based on “Knowledge Centers”
concept. Not quite satisfied with the current structure,
we continued our organizational re-look. We
still had to flatten the organization for better responsiveness.
To maximize success, we realized
that we needed to align our efforts with the opera-
April - June 2009 7

tional structure found in the MNF-I STRATOPS.
Its structure revolved around operational planning
teams that directly supported the JCP lines
of operation (LOOs). Using CJCSM 3500.04D, 01
August 2005, Joint Mission Essential Task List as
our guide, and specifically Strategic-Theater (ST)
Objective 2 “Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance”, 2.1 through
2.26, we identified 38 CIOC tasks, in accordance
with Annex G (Intelligence) JCP OIF, v.1,
27 November 2007. We then cross walked these
tasks to the current analysts on hand, and formed
five major groups, or Knowledge Centers. These
included the following:
Ê Government of Iraq C2 (covered Ministries and
Governance.)
Ê Regional neighbors (Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait.)
Ê Countering Iranian influence.
Ê Countering maligned actors influence.
Ê Foreign terrorists/fighters.
This reorganization greatly assisted CIOC efforts
in identifying the daily OPTEMPO product requirements
in concert with STRATOPS, STRATEFF and
the Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC), establishing
the “core” of required SMEs, journeymen,
and novices to focus on the problem sets, and mitigating
the loss of fully trained analysts due to tour
rotations. This, in turn, helped CENTCOM and DIA
better support the mission via their reachback and
forward deployed assets.
During my tour, the CIOC was able to “build
the SME bench strength” up to 22 to 25 SMEs
from CENTCOM and DIA. What was also significant
was the in-theater senior analytical firepower
at the Senior Executive Service (SES) level. Rich
Baffa (A&P Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)), Tom
Greco (CIOC SIO), and Dan O’Brien (DIA Forward
Element, Iraq) provided the C2 with real time, forward
based, executive level analysis, as well as
critical reachback connectivity and support from
the national IC. This proved to be the added edge
we required to “think and analyze at the graduate
level.”
Lessons Learned
Ê
Flattening the organization for responsiveness is
a good thing. However, we occasionally experienced
the challenges of quality control and du-
plication of effort due to the fact that some “in
the chain” were unaware of ongoing actions or
its status. Analysts at all levels must ensure,
and leaders must demand, that information is
passed to those who need to know.
Products/deliverables tended to be living documents
with constant updating due to the fast
moving OPTEMPO and requirements. Although
we strive for the 100 percent solution, perfection
is often times the enemy of good enough given
the environment and demands.
Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO)/Translator review
was a huge issue and often times a staffing
impediment. Forward based elements required
robust FDO and translator capabilities that required
quick turn approval from the stateside
originating agencies. We encountered many situations
where the FDO approval process was
not responsive to the CG requirements directing
the CIOC to brief and provide “releasable IZ
and non-releasable IZ” level products on short
notice that would help shape the conditions for
furthering the CG’s JCP or other missions.
Ensure that the right analysts are deployed to
meet the requirements. We studied the TF 714
rotation model that trained, deployed forward,
then redeployed but maintained continued expertise
by dwelling on the target from sanctuary.
Both DIA and CENTCOM patterned their methodology
on this process. The challenge, as stated
earlier, was to ensure that the maximum time
and numbers of analytical expert presence forward
based occurred. Deployment times varied
from as little as three months to a year. Our experience
indicated that six months was the acceptable
duration for expert level deployments,
but we also realized the challenges associated
with sustaining the analytical base in sanctuary.
Finally, we were able to deliver at the four star
level because the C2 had the SES team to help
develop, shape and operationalize his vision.
The same rigor in screening requirements for DIA
and CENTCOM must be applied to contractor
and WIAS analyst requirements. Although the
requisite level of security clearance is a must,
analytically qualified and experienced analysts
are the standard.
Establish tactics, techniques, and procedures
on how to conduct business. This is another
8 Military Intelligence
Ê
Ê
Ê
Ê
Ê

Ê
Ê
Ê
Ê
Ê
time consuming task but it must be done to
offset the rapid personnel turnover and trainup
time, and continuous OPTEMPO. Simple 3x5
cards that outline, step by step, the required
tasks to run the morning C2 preparatory session,
CG roundtable briefings, develop daily
BUA themes, etc., will get the team into a predictable
battle rhythm, increase time efficiency,
and reduce the stress associated with discovery
learning.
“No one wakes up in the morning wanting to
fail.” Leaders at all levels must always positively
coach, teach, and mentor their respective teams
or sections. They must always believe, and make
their troops believe, that regardless of the incredible
tasks and impossible deadlines, they can
and will accomplish the mission to standard.
OPTEMPO required a formal C2 chief of staff to
assist the C2 in orchestrating the various moving
parts and missions in the Perfume Palace and
downtown. I noted that the other MNF-I staffs
had authorized chiefs of staff. To this end, I informally
initiated weekly (Sunday) deconfliction
meetings with the other O-6 staff heads to help
synchronize efforts, share information, and focus
intelligence support across the MNF-I staff.
Next to the C2, the most important position in
the C2 is the Deputy C2 (DC2). The DC2 needs
to be operationally experienced, proficient in directing
a staff, a leader, and a team builder and
synchronizer. Anything less and the C2 risks
fracture within his organization and mission
failure.
The MNF-I OPTEMPO often required coordination
with the stateside IC during off duty hours
or weekends. This often created a synchronization
challenge for our more senior analysts
charged with the daily C2 0600 BUA updates
and CG Sunday morning roundtable briefings.
CENTCOM C2 noted this challenge and refocused
his Tampa based IZ cell main effort and
“local time” to Baghdad time. Although this understandably
created a certain level of discomfort
in CONUS, the CIOC analysts greatly appreciated
the support to the main effort in Iraq.
As stated earlier, not only does the CIOC provide
timely, relevant and predictive strategic
level intelligence to the CG, MNF-I and warfighters,
but the intelligence helps shape the strate-
gic battlespace for the MNF-I staff to prosecute
the four LOOs (political, diplomatic, economic
and security) in support of the JCP. Thus, intelligence
must support the strategic information
operations efforts (STRATEFF), operations
(STRATOPS), engagements and reconciliation
efforts with maligned individuals and groups
(FSEC), and overall strategy, plans and policies
as we evolve as an organization supporting the
post Provincial Iraq Control (PIC) environment
(Strategy Plans and Analysis).
The physical separation from the MNF-I staff
often created challenges involving priority of
support/work, information sharing, and coordinating
efforts. However, we mitigated this shortfall
by embedding intelligence officers across the
MNF-I staff. The intent was to inject operationally
savvy, and intelligence attuned officers who
could leverage the CIOC’s capabilities, understand
the staffing requirements and prioritize
intelligence support, and ultimately help the operational
staffers shape the battlefield conditions
in order to successfully prosecute the JCP.
The C2 was often tasked with supporting the
detainee review board by providing compelling
intelligence on various detainees, high value individuals,
and maligned actors in order to justify
their conviction in an Iraqi Court of Law. This
proved to be difficult as intelligence analysis
was not always translated into hard, evidentiary
proof. As we continue along the post-PIC timeline
we can expect an increasing support role
of this nature as MNF-I transitions more functions
to the Government of Iraq. Continued collaborative
efforts and formal education/sharing
between the IC and the legal system will help
mitigate some of these challenges.
April - June 2009 9
Ê
Ê
Colonel Reyes is currently serving in HQ, INSCOM as the
G3, Director for Operations and Training, and will assume
command of the 116 th MI Group (NSA Gordon) this summer.
Prior to the CIOC deployment he commanded the Joint
Analysis Center , Molesworth, UK. He has commanded and
served in principal staff positions in MI, Infantry and Special
Forces units, and also served in the J3, Joint Staff. Colonel
Reyes previously deployed to OIF 1 as the G2, 101 st Airborne
Division (AASLT).

Introduction
For over seven years, American and international
forces have been waging a bitter, forgotten war in
Afghanistan. Recently, the Afghan conflict has risen
in focus and prominence as the war in Iraq draws
down and the international community realizes that
the Taliban and global jihadists have not been defeated
as easily or swiftly as was once thought. In
order to defeat this resilient and adaptive foe, more
than a “new strategy” must be applied to this problem
set. The solution first requires a nuanced understanding
of the nature of the Afghan insurgency and
the myriad of factors influencing this situation.
Mao has aptly compared guerrillas to fish, and the
people to the water in which they swim. If the political
temperature is right, the fish, however few in
number, will thrive and proliferate. It is therefore the
principal concern of all guerrilla leaders to get the
water to the right temperature and to keep it there. 1
Mao’s analogy of fish and the maintenance of political
temperature is uniquely appropriate to the current
evolution of the Afghan situation. Many insurgent
groups and regional powerbrokers have a vested interest
in the maintenance of a weak central government.
Without the unifying presence in Kabul of a
strong central government, enabled by a viable economy
and represented regionally by effective Afghan
National Security Forces, conditions will continue
to be set for regional insurgents and transnational
terrorists to proliferate. Afghan insurgents capitalize
on the relative deprivation of the Afghan population.
Discontent with the distribution of opportunity is a
theme that insurgents have used to pull tribal youth
away from the cultural tribal elders and toward sympathetic
religious leaders. To understand the impact
the Afghan insurgency has on this situation, a better
understanding of the full-spectrum operational environment
must be achieved.
by Captain Margaret J. Nencheck
The Insurgent Syndicate
In his book, “Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The
Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Antonio
Giustozzi describes a crisis in Afghan rural society
that has led to a “revolution of rising expectations.”
He postulates that this situation cannot be resolved
by the current counterinsurgency or development
strategies for Afghanistan. In addition, the border
issues and policy problems with Pakistan have exacerbated
this problem. 2
These factors have influenced the current operational
environment in Afghanistan, which is dominated
by an evolving insurgent syndicate strategy.
It is a unique and adaptive force, comprised of competing
insurgent elements which interact and cooperate
in order to serve mutual tactical interests
and contribute to their overall strategic objectives
in Afghanistan and the greater area of interest. In
Afghanistan, we have seen the emergence of two
distinct insurgencies: a Kandahari-based Taliban in
the south and a more complex, adaptive insurgency
influenced, though not controlled, by Al Qaeda’s
global jihad in the east.
This insurgent syndicate operating within
Afghanistan, the destabilizing influence of the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the political
situation inside Pakistan, as well as the
level of support provided to various aspects of the
Afghan insurgency by Al Qaeda have ensured that
Mao’s “political temperature” within Afghanistan
remains optimal for continued insurgent efforts.
This situation has afforded the diverse enemy
groups within the East to develop the emerging
insurgent syndicate strategy. Based on necessity,
these groups with otherwise divergent goals operate
in harmony. Logistical disruption and setbacks
caused by Coalition operations, as well as
governance and development successes evident
10 Military Intelligence

throughout Afghanistan, have given the insurgency
reason to ally in order to retain local and
regional relevance and to maximize the potential
for tactical and operational results.
Revolution vs. Resistance
Small wars and counterinsurgency expert Bernard
Fall studied the American and French experiences
in Vietnam extensively. From his observations, he
concluded that conflicts, and indeed, the conflicts
of the “future,” would not be “sublimited warfare,”
“insurgency,” or “counterinsurgency,” but:
RW=G+P
Or “revolutionary warfare (RW) equals guerrilla
warfare (G) plus political action (P).” This formula
for revolutionary warfare is the result of the application
of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an
ideology or a political system. 3 This type of warfare
is evident in Afghanistan; however, the endstate is
not a revolution in the common understanding of the
concept. Instead, it is more of a resistance to change
and those ideas that run counter to their extremist
ideology. The change being resisted is embodied in
the Coalition’s efforts to bring democracy, freedom of
choice, and religious tolerance to Afghanistan. The
global jihad of Al Qaeda is viewed as preferable to the
more radical initiatives of the Coalition. All aspects of
the Afghan operational environment fall on the continuum
between revolution and resistance. Pakistan
falls along a similar continuum but is less impacted
by Western revolutionary influences. The following
graphic depicts this paradigm from the perspective
of the Afghan populace:
Scale of Revolutionary Warfare in Afghanistan
Key:
ISAF- International Security Assistance Force
GIRoA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HiG – Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
HiK – Hezb-E Islami Khalis
TNSM – Tehrik Nefaz-e Shariat Mohammadi
IMU – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
LeT – Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
TTiP – Tehrik Taliban-I Pakistan
On one end of the scale of revolutionary warfare is
“revolution.” This extreme is embodied by the U.S.
and ISAF, which promote the concepts of democracy
and universal rights–terms foreign and revolutionary
to Afghanistan. On the other extreme of the
continuum is Al Qaeda and its strategic goal to establish
a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world
by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to
overthrow regimes it deems “non-Islamic”; to expel
Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries
(particularly Saudi Arabia), and to attempt to carry
out future attacks against the U.S. and its worldwide
interests. Along this scale fall the different,
though often cooperative, insurgent groups with
varying degrees of separation between revolution
and resistance.
Lessons from Vietnam
In 1968, Army Chief of Staff General H.K. Johnson
briefed the new U.S.-Vietnamese strategy for
Vietnam. It was aimed at destroying the revolutionary
position using what was described as a “twopincers
strategy”: a violence program and a rural
construction program. 4 The violence program can
be compared to a conventional Security line of operation
focus; whereas the construction program is
likened to the Governance and Development lines of
operation. At the time, the strategy was nearly all focused
on the violence program, leaving only a small
percentage of the overall effort to the rural construction
program. It is evident that the American military
approach to this conflict relied too heavily on
an “umbrella theory,” which points to the allegedly
April - June 2009 11

decisive role of the enemy’s conventional military
forces and of pre-stocked bases. 5 Such an “umbrella
theory” might be contrasted to Mao’s fish theory,
according to which proper social conditions are decisive
and, once these are achieved, make the enemy’s
conventional military forces largely irrelevant. 6
The strategy to counter the Afghan insurgency is
falling into the same pattern as the umbrella theory,
which is incapable of answering the revolution
of rising expectations and allows the insurgency to
keep the political temperature right to allow this
conflict to survive.
Conclusion
While Afghan insurgents will always have a vested
interest in a weak central government, it is critical
to GIRoA and ISAF success to give the Afghan
people capable governance enabled with stable and
viable economic development. More than a renewed
commitment, but increased resources along with
a detailed and comprehensive plan for counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency operations, must be
levied in Afghanistan in order for Al Qaeda and the
complex Afghan insurgency to be defeated.
Endnotes
1. FMFRP 12-18, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare, 1989, 8.
2. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-
Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2008), 230, 232.
3. Bernard Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency,” Naval War College Review, Winter 1998, Vol. LI,
No. 1, Military Module, 47 at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ietcop/
documents/NWCR%20-%20The%20Theory%20&%20Practice%20
of%20Insurgency%20&%20COIN%20APR%2065.pdf.
4. Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a
Vietnamese Province (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1973),
224.
5. Ibid., 226.
6. Ibid., 227.
Captain Nencheck is currently assigned as the Fusion Officerin-Charge
in the CJ2 section for Combined Joint Task Force-
101. She has been deployed in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom IX for over 13 months. She has also served as Brigade
Collection Manager, Battalion S2, and Platoon leader and is
a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Captain Nencheck is a
2004 Distinguished Graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.
12 Military Intelligence

Perception management, influencing operations,
product dissemination, measures of effectiveness,
propaganda, persuasion
Introduction
These are buzzwords heard every day in the
9 th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion
(Airborne) headquarters as commanders and staff
plan and prepare to support tactical PSYOP missions
worldwide. I served in this unit for nearly nine
months as the Battalion S2 after graduating from
the Military Intelligence (MI) Basic Course. It was
not, however, until my move from Battalion S2 to
Company Intelligence Officer that the above phrases
came to mean anything to me.
Tactical PSYOP companies are attached to other
units; therefore, intelligence requirements are
typically met by the supported unit, similar to the
way administrative needs are met. Unfortunately
for an eager lieutenant fresh out of the basic
course, being a Battalion S2 in PSYOP meant
passports, clearances, and security management.
I served under leaders who recognized this issue
and within a few months the unit was willing
to forfeit a battalion staff officer to be the first
ever Tactical PSYOP Company Intelligence Officer.
During my time in this position, I served in the
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), among the military’s
finest. Serving among men and women of
this caliber in the Special Operations Forces (SOF)
community was not only intimidating, it was inspiring.
With this new found respect and title I
earnestly set out on a quest to crack the code on
intelligence support to PSYOP.
The Threat
The first step for any intelligence professional is
to gain atmospherics on the current threat and in
my case PSYOP preparation of the operational environment
(OE). This included understanding the
idealism that drove militias and high value individuals
(HVIs), but more specifically it meant seeing
the conflict from the Iraqi people’s perspective. To
understand their perspective the OE must be put
in context of culture, education, religious affilia-
by First Lieutenant Katie Winwood
tion, economic stature, history and every other anthropological
consideration. Ultimately I was trying
to understand how Coalition Forces could change
perceptions, and eventually behaviors. Since I was
mostly alone in my quest among my analyst peers, I
found a way to simultaneously support Psychological
Operations and bring a PSYOP perspective to SOF
intelligence.
The Challenge
The concept of perception management or influencing
with words is not always embraced in the
Armed Forces and certainly was not in an organization
as kinetic-based as CJSOTF-AP. However, after
five years of lethal operations military planners
at every level were forced to re-evaluate the need
for such force and ultimately place more emphasis
on non-kinetic effects. This transition was due in
part to the success of the surge, the Sunni awakening,
and the ceasefire agreement with Muqtada
Al-Sadr (leader of a major Shia militia). But mostly it
was the realization that changing perceptions may
just be the key to getting out of Iraq. Through these
turns of events PSYOP, and consequently intelligence
support to PSYOP, received a level of interest
at CJSOTF-AP that was unlikely given to PSYOP
planners during the earlier phases of the war.
PSYOP leaders took advantage of this momentum
by making perception management a consideration
on every mission and intimately integrating themselves
within the J3. Conspiracy theories run rampant
among a populace as ill informed as Iraq’s and
experience has taught us if we don’t tell the story
someone else will.
Often times a three man Tactical PSYOP Team
(TPT) is the only voice of an entire Army. Intelligence
support to these operations is critical and leaves little
room for error. There is a common saying in the
4 th PSYOP Group (A) that “no PSYOP is better than
bad PSYOP,” and the same is true for intelligence.
The majority of my work came before operations began
and after they completed. This included finding
April - June 2009 13

and confirming facts on HVIs used for posters and
handbills, compiling imagery for leaflet drops, and
analyzing enemy propaganda to see how our products
might be viewed in light of the competition.
TPT Operations
After operations concluded, I would sift through
endless reports from any source available in the
hopes of capturing some shred of evidence that
could be used to specifically identify the populace’s
response to the operation or measure of effectiveness
(MOE.) My efforts were sometimes in vain due
to the difficulty in connecting effects directly to nonkinetic
operations. In fact, attempting to tie behavioral
changes directly to PSYOP is the single greatest
challenge of MOE; it is impossible to know if behavior
changes are the result of PSYOP because it will
never be feasible to eliminate all external factors. To
further frustrate the matter the changes that can be
measured take months or even years to surface and
unfortunately there may not always be boots on the
ground to capture them.
The Information
When I wasn’t monitoring behavioral changes and
non-kinetic effects, I focused on meeting the immediate
intelligence needs of the Company through
requests for information (RFIs.) In this regard my
mission was not much different from other intelligence
professionals; however the nature and content
of these RFIs varied greatly and consequently I could
not always rely on conventional unit’s products or
my fellow SOF analysts. The PSYOP Soldiers on the
ground were more interested in perceptions than any
other factor so I often researched symbolism, animal
and color associations, clothing attire, susceptibilities
to products like medical aid vs. soccer balls,
local graffiti, regional verbiage, even tribal history.
On one occasion in particular, I reached back to 1st
Information Operations (IO) Command to better understand
the value put on horses in Arabic culture.
This inquiry eventually led to a well received product
used to mourn the loss of a loved tribal leader.
This type of research and eventual knowledge
gave me a chance to support PSYOP with relevant
timely intelligence and bring a PSYOP perspective to
CJSOTF-AP. This dual support ultimately meant job
security for me. As the first intelligence officer to deploy
with a tactical PSYOP company at CJSOTF-AP,
it was imperative that I distinguished that role from
traditional support and establish some level of credibility
for intelligence specific to PSYOP. I was enthusiastic
about this task because I came into the
deployment feeling very strongly about providing intelligence
tailored to the greatest information manipulator
in the OE. I came out of my deployment
equally enthusiastic about this task but more realistic
in my expectation of meeting it.
The Way Ahead
Veterans of MI and IO recognize the deficit that exists
with regard to intelligence support. The consensus
for a solution seems to be education. Providing
good intelligence analysis is simple–doctrine and
training reinforced with experience. A good analyst
should know intelligence software, data mining, basic
analyses, and stand ready to support any unit,
in any capacity. One of the toughest challenges facing
intelligence support to PSYOP is understanding
PSYOP information needs. This problem will only
be resolved with mutual efforts between PSYOP and
Intelligence to better understand each other. Most
PSYOP specialists will tell you the Army doesn’t un-
14 Military Intelligence

derstand what they do, and after an eight month
deployment with a Tactical PSYOP Company I can
tell you this is mostly true. Like any major military
change it takes time, especially for veteran Soldiers,
to relook the way they see the fight. This transformation
has made significant progress over the last
five years as reflected in current stability, counterinsurgency
and operational field manuals, but there
is still much work to be done. The PSYOP and intelligence
community must embark upon integration
training that focuses on change, with a mutual respect
for what each branch brings to the table. The
success of PSYOP depends in part on its ability to
integrate with the intelligence community and this
integration depends primarily on good leaders who
recognize the necessity and are diplomatic enough
to integrate and move forward.
Educating the Support
Intelligence analysts at the lowest level of PSYOP
units are a legitimate and necessary asset. PSYOP
specialists are effects-based and really no different
than maneuver in terms of their support needs.
They do not have the time to read every situation report,
track trends, gather imagery and conduct pattern
analysis. At the very least, intelligence analysts
free up PSYOP specialists to plan and operate. For
far too long PSYOP specialists have been forced to do
their own intelligence analyses in addition to the already
demanding target audience analyses. There is
much value added in cross training Soldiers but MI
professionals will not get better at analysis by conducting
operations and operators will not get better
at executing by doing analysis. Intelligence support
to PSYOP is unique but it is still by definition a support
element and for the sake of providing world
class PSYOP should be trained on all facets of IO.
The disconnect here is often in defining needs
and requirements from top down. For example,
when TPTs need special equipment they request it
through their headquarters element, which in turn
tasks supply. It is not up to the supply sergeant to
anticipate a special need any more than it is up to an
intelligence analyst to tell the commander what information
needs his operators will have. Doctrinally
speaking, intelligence drives maneuver and the commander
drives intelligence. This type of guidance is
traditionally generated through priority intelligence
requirements and information requirements but it
can be done in any capacity that defines and artic-
ulates the commander’s objectives. Analysts need
to be given areas of focus, especially when dealing
with a theater of operation as complex as Iraq or
Afghanistan. The real danger in not giving adequate
guidance regarding information needs is unnecessarily
risking lives of Soldiers in TPTs to disseminate
ineffective or even inaccurate products.
A Product Development Detachment packages products for a
leaflet drop.
The Code
Essentially intelligence support to PSYOP provides
the tools, in the form of information, necessary to understand
and eventually influence behavior. Cracking
the code on intelligence support to PSYOP cannot be
done in one rotation but that is not to discredit the
aggressive efforts that are underway to integrate, educate
and ultimately improve the support. A crucial
part of this solution is getting intelligence analysts integrated
with the PSYOP process and the evidence of
this is the 4 th PSYOP Group’s ability to provide trained
analysts with a broad, and when necessary, in-depth
understanding of IO in terms of function, capability
and application. The more each branch understands
the intricate details of the other, the more likely they
are to maintain successful longevity in meeting worldwide
missions. Long term success for both elements
is interdependent–support to PSYOP is not a success
until PSYOP leaders wouldn’t conceive of going to the
planning table without all resources available to them,
and this includes intelligence assets.
First Lieutenant Katie Winwood currently serves as the 9 th
PSYOP Battalion (A) S2. She deployed with D/9 th PSYOP
Battalion as the Company Intelligence Officer attached to
the 5 th Special Forces Group in support of CJSOTF-AP, OIF
IV. Lieutenant Winwood graduated from Liberty University
with a BA in Government and was commissioned out of the
University of Virginia in 2006.
April - June 2009 15

y Lieutenant Colonel William G. McDonough and Lieutenant Colonel John A. Conway
Introduction
The most fundamental change within Army intelligence
transformation is an effort to change the behavior
and expectations of intelligence producers
and consumers. The Army leadership views this as
an essential step toward changing organizational
and operational culture. Intelligence producers will
transition from a current requirements orientation to
an anticipatory approach while consumers shift their
mindset from one of fighting with knowledge to one
of fighting for knowledge. This new mindset views
every soldier as a collector and as an analyst. 1
The Military Intelligence (MI) Corps exists to provide
commanders at all levels intelligence analysis
to support decision making for planning and execution,
assist in understanding the adversary, and
define the operational environment. Since we will
never have sufficient intelligence collection assets or
analysts to produce all the intelligence a commander
may want, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs)
help focus collection and analytical production on
select intelligence requirements. However, many of
today’s U.S. Army operational commanders 2 and
key staff officers simply do not understand or are
not aware of doctrinal changes and the increased
extent of what PIRs are supposed to do for the commander.
There are three primary reasons for this
misunderstanding or lack of awareness.
First, and most importantly, this misunderstanding
is directly tied to our warfighting culture reflected
through our operation’s doctrine since the
mid-1970s. Doctrine, of course, provides a common
frame of reference as a guide to action and is not a
strict or inflexible set of rules. Army operations’ doctrine
has shaped how we fight, plan, and interpret
how all warfighting functions support operations.
For the past three decades, this context shaped the
culture, focus, and viewpoints that today’s senior
field grade and general officers use to make deci-
sions as well as establish processes to assist in their
decision making.
Second, Army Transformation has further complicated
the issue. Prior to transformation, division and
corps commanders could assist ground commanders
primarily in the form of increased logistics, deep
attack aviation or artillery, or more intelligence assets.
Today, brigade commanders have capabilities
once reserved for division commanders. Resultantly,
brigade commanders have increased responsibility
and capacity thus increasing the potential for decisions
they have to make. Corps and division commanders
have fewer or different decisions to make,
especially in decentralized counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations. Finally, while there are similarities in PIRs
for conventional (offensive and defensive) operations,
there are differences for unconventional type conflicts
(stability or civil support) such as COIN or Foreign
Internal Defense.
Operations and Intelligence–The
Inseparable Link
Before addressing PIRs, we must discuss the inseparable
link between operations and intelligence.
Specifically, we will highlight the evolution of Army
operations’ doctrine since this is the driver of all
other warfighting functions’ support. This doctrine
shaped today’s senior leaders, our training centers
and programs, and our planning and execution for
operations. Since the 1970s, operations’ doctrine
was predominantly tactically and offensively focused
against a Soviet threat. Competing with this
doctrine was the reality of world conditions, most
notably the threat and collapse of the Soviet Union,
and emerging military, information, and intelligence
capabilities and our ability to exploit them.
After the Vietnam War, the Army rebuilt itself and
largely forgot about its operations during Vietnam.
While it rebuilt itself, the traditional Soviet threat
in Europe regained its preeminence in our world
16 Military Intelligence

view. Directly related to this was the realization
during the 1973 Yom Kippur War that the conventional
battlefield had become more lethal. As a result,
the 1976 Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations
envisioned an active defense in Europe against numerically
superior Soviet military forces. This prescriptive
and tactical manual focused on firepower
more than maneuver and fixated on fighting and
winning the first battle. 3
In 1982, the Army released an updated version
focused on the offense. Known as Airland Battle,
the manual focused on conventional offensive operations
to fight outnumbered and win. The main
threat was still the Soviet Union in Europe. The
manual introduced the four tenets of Airland Battle:
initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization, as
well as the operational level of war and the linking
of the strategic to the tactical. 4 A legacy of the synchronization
of operations and all other warfighting
functions, while well intentioned and necessary,
was an emphasis to synchronize finite assets over
time and space for Airland Battle. This became increasingly
more restrictive and, arguably, counterproductive
in later years despite updated concepts
of Army operations.
The 1986 version of FM 100-5 moved beyond
Europe and recognized unconventional, low intensity
conflicts and light infantry divisions. It was also more
general and theoretical which allowed flexibility for
commanders. 5 However, it was still tied to the concept
of Airland Battle, especially conventional offensive
operations and the desire for synchronization.
In 1993, recognizing the world had changed after
the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Army published
a new FM 100-5. The manual was largely influenced
by operations in Panama and Kuwait as well
as emerging technologies. The manual emphasized
depth and simultaneous attack in order to bring
about a quick resolution. 6 Synchronization of the
multiple lines of operations or effort was a critical
component. The manual placed more emphasis on
unconventional, low intensity conflicts and conflict
termination; a conspicuous change from the 1976,
1982, and 1986 manuals. However, the new FM
lightly addressed these issues with the substance
of those types of operations covered in other doctrinal
publications. Conventional offensive operations
remained the Army’s doctrinal focus. The stunning
application of this doctrine during Operation Desert
Storm not only validated the Army’s conventional
offensive focus but solidified its primacy and focus
throughout the Army.
The 1998 version of FM 100-5 provided balance
between offensive and defensive operations, simultaneous
and sequential operations, and emphasized
joint operations. It also folded the concepts of
unconventional and conventional warfare into this
manual. Prior to this manual, a generation of Army
leaders grew up learning offensive operations in a
conventional warfare context. This type of warfare
lends itself to decisions and decision points on a
battlefield where battalion through corps level commanders
have to make decisions such as when to
commit a reserve, conduct a deep attack, shift the
main effort, etc. along a linear battlefield.
In 2001, the Army published FM 3-0 (previously
numbered as 100-5) Operations. It clearly defined
operations in a more holistic manner–offense, defense,
stability, and support operations. Despite
this more encompassing approach, like the previous
versions of FM 100-5, the Army focused on
defensive operations just long enough to generate
enough combat power to reinitiate offensive operations.
This permeated the construct of our National
Training Center (NTC) and mission readiness exercises
(MREs) in the 1980s and 1990s. It has
taken the reality of the past seven years to finally
acknowledge and provide equal weight to stability
and support operations; operations that were marginalized
as late as 2003 in our training centers
and MREs.
In February 2008, the Army produced the latest
FM 3-0. The manual clearly acknowledges a holistic
and complex operational environment; one that
is multidimensional and increasingly fought among
the population. This doctrine acknowledges an “operational
concept where commanders employ offensive,
defensive, and stability or civil support
operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent
joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities
to achieve decisive results.” 7
Army operations doctrine has changed from a singular
focus on conventional offensive operations to
a more holistic and inclusive recognition of offensive,
defensive, and stability operations. PIRs have
also changed in recognition of today’s more complex
environment.
April - June 2009 17

Evolution of PIR
Today’s senior Army leaders have spent the preponderance
of their military careers serving in an
army equipped, trained, led, and educated to defeat
a nation-state peer-competitor….The officer
professional development career path designed to
defeat this threat is a rigid path that has evolved
into a “best answer” process….The Army teaches
its leaders from day one that there are almost always
proven sequences of events that, if followed,
will lead to the desired outcome. Facing a templatable
enemy like our Cold War adversaries, adherence
to Army Doctrine became the glide path into
“how to think” and “what to do”….this approach
has resulted in the development of narrow, sometimes
inflexible leadership qualities and decision
making processes that are not necessarily suited
for today’s contemporary operating environment.
Army leaders have been quite successful…putting
conventional warfighting and leadership skills into
a “black or white” category. The challenge faced today
and in the future is reassessing and reorganizing
these skills to operate just as effectively and
efficiently in the ever-growing “gray” world. 8
For three decades, the Army focused on conventional,
offensive operations while ignoring or shortchanging
other operations. This is not a critique of
that focus given the strategic problems facing our
nation and the Army’s answer to meet that challenge.
It is simply to highlight the cultural environment
that today’s senior officers grew up in during
their formative years coming up through the ranks.
Before 1990, the Army had eleven mechanized,
one airborne, one air assault, one motorized, and
four light active duty divisions. After the drawdown
in the 1990s, the Army possessed six mechanized,
one airborne, one air assault, and two
light active duty divisions. Mechanized units are
ideal for fighting a peer competitor such as the
Soviet Union. The preponderance of today’s senior
officers were influenced in some fashion by conventional,
offense oriented training and doctrine.
The Army’s training centers and exercise events
reinforced our predilection to make decisions in
order to take action.
Since the opening of the NTC in 1981, most “of
America’s top Army generals carry with them the
almost-war stories of their trips to Fort Irwin.” 9
Until fairly recently, the NTC focused on conven-
tional force-on-force exercises with little attention
paid to other types of operations. Additionally, our
training centers and MREs are designed to force
battalion through corps level commanders and
staffs to plan and make decisions in a very compressed
time frame in order to meet multiple training
objectives. This in turn reinforces our cultural
tendency to want to “do something” or make a decision
as opposed to demonstrating patience and
realize that a decision or action may not have to
be made.
The training center exception is arguably the
Joint Readiness Training Center. It was designed
for light infantry, airborne, and special operations
forces as a light infantry equivalent of the NTC. A
typical pre-9/11 training scenario consisted of an insertion
and counterinsurgency operation; a defense
(in response to a fictitious enemy attack), and culminated
with an attack into a Military Operations in
Urban Terrain complex. However, units still planned
and made decisions in a very compressed time frame
in order to meet multiple training objectives.
On a final note, division and corps commanders
are typically infantry officers; they grew up in the
Army inculcated in our offensive, tactically focused
doctrine. A majority of division and corps level staff
officers typically have only served at the battalion
or brigade level in staff and/or command positions
prior to serving on a higher staff. Since we are all
victims of our past experiences, we are comfortable
using methods that have worked in the past in new
positions. This becomes important when related to
PIR development.
The 1994 FM 34-2 Collection Management and
Synchronization Planning collection management
doctrine is nested in the conventionally focused operations
doctrine of the past. FM 34-2 recommended
that intelligence officers and commanders should
refine PIRs to specific questions that are linked
to operational decisions. 10 Additionally, Collection
Managers usually developed specific information
requirements for both PIRs and intelligence requirements
(IRs) to “complete the collection strategy by
associating each requirement and its corresponding
decision points and timelines.” 11 This inference
linked PIRs, already linked to decisions, to arguably
more constricted decision points.
However, in 2004, the definition of PIRs became
less constrained. FM 2-0 Intelligence, expanded the
18 Military Intelligence

definition of PIRs by stating that answers “to the
PIRs help produce intelligence essential to the commander’s
situational understanding and decisionmaking
[emphasis added].” 12
The new February 2008 FM 3-0 further loosened
the confines of PIRs solely being tied to offensive
focused decisions and decision points and related
them to the more inclusive definition of operations
(offense, defense, and stability). PIRs, along with
friendly force information requirements (FFIR),
are part of what are known as commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIRs). CCIRs are
information requirements identified as critical to
facilitate timely decisionmaking. CCIRs directly influence
decisionmaking and facilitate the successful
execution of military operations; they may support
one or more decisions. 13 FM 3-0 states that a PIR
“is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority
for intelligence support, that the commander and
staff need to understand the adversary or the operational
environment….PIRs identify the information
about the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil
considerations that the commander considers most
important.” 14
Finally, the just released 2008 FMI 2-01
(the replacement for the 1994 FM 34-2), ISR
Synchronization, states that a PIR is “an intelligence
requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence
support, which the commander and staff
need to understand the adversary or the operational
environment.” 15
Transformation
As described above, a generation of Army operations’
doctrine created a culture and leadership
mindset that emphasized conventional offensive operations,
decisions to conduct an offensive fight, and
synchronization of all available warfighting capability
towards that focus. Additionally, until the Army’s
ongoing transformation efforts, the Army has been
a division centric organization since World War I.
Pre-transformation divisions were the largest tactical
units considered to be a combined arms team,
self sustaining, and capable of independent operations.
Transformation has changed this paradigm
with brigades now the emphasis. This has exacerbated
the friction between senior leaders working or
commanding at the division or corps level, educated
in the culture of the past 25 years with less or different
ability to influence the battle space, and trans-
formed brigades who enjoy significant autonomy,
more combat power, increased situational awareness,
and larger battle space.
Transformation restructuring resulted in an Army
that is now brigade combat team (BCT) centric.
Simplistically, capabilities once assigned to a division
are now organic in a BCT, providing them with
means to accomplish more tasks. For example, the
division formerly had a military intelligence (MI)
battalion with division level assets. Under transformation,
this MI battalion no longer exists; many of
its assets are now organic to a BCT while the rest
are obsolete and no longer in the Army inventory. 16
This reduced a division’s traditional ability to shape
the battle space for a brigade commander with additional
intelligence collection.
Additionally, transformation has expanded the
battle space for BCTs and increased the length
of the lines of communications laterally between
units and vertically between command and support
echelons. 17 The end result are BCTs that are
the Army’s primary tactical formations and more
autonomous than before; a significant friction
point between BCTs and higher level organizations
commanded by leaders whose formative years were
shaped by the Army’s division centric and conventional
offensive operations culture. BCT commanders
are largely no longer dependent on the division
to provide resources. Technology has expanded a
BCT commander’s ability to see the battle space
and affect it with organic assets. Today, intelligence
is distributed and managed in nearly a flattened
network where all echelons receive the dissemination
of intelligence at nearly the same time and
share the same databases of information. There is
no real stove-pipe or special highly classified intelligence
that is not shared with all echelons. BCTs
are no longer dependent on a division for “seeing
over the next ridge” and for early warning of enemy
intentions and actions. This creates some cognitive
dissonance for senior officers at the division
and corps level since this new dynamic is not what
they grew up with in the 1980s and 1990s. The
type, scope, and timeliness of decisions that both
BCT and higher level commanders have to make
have changed.
Priority Intelligence Requirements
In 2003, to meet the needs of Army Transformation,
the Army G2 created TF Actionable Intelligence
April - June 2009 19

to change the way that MI would operate in the
future. 18 One of the four Task Force Actionable
Intelligence concepts was to change the culture
and mindset of intelligence producers and consumers.
19 To achieve this goal, the task force
envisioned organizational, procedural, and technological
changes to affect our culture in order
to facilitate intelligence, information, and insights
from all echelons. 20
Part of this procedural change is to recognize that
PIRs have changed as well as the types and timeliness
of decisions that commanders have to make.
PIRs help to provide commanders with an understanding
of the operational environment which assists
in planning and making decisions.
PIR development involves not just anticipating
what decisions a commander may have to make
but also the relationships between friendly units;
information systems; collection, processing, and
dissemination systems; and the political, military,
economic, social, infrastructure, information,
physical environment, and time operational
variables. Answers to PIRs (and FFIRs) help the
commander visualize the operational environment.
Crafting PIRs is important because every
PIR costs time, resource allocation, and analytical
effort.
Intelligence officers validate and recommend
PIRs. 21 Commanders approve IRs essential to mission
accomplishment as PIRs, which form the basis
for planning and executing operations. 22 Typically,
PIRs are developed during MDMP and are reviewed
and adjusted as conditions change, operations progress,
or the PIR(s) are answered. Each set of PIRs
is unique to the circumstances and context of the
time. FM 5-0 and FMI 2-01 describe how PIRs are
developed during MDMP. 23
The following highlight the PIR guidelines [emphasis
added] from 1994 to present.
FM 34-2 (1994) 24 FM 34-8-2 (1998) 25
They ask only one question. They ask only one question.
They focus on a specific fact, event, or
activity.
They provide intelligence required to support
a single decision.
They focus on a specific fact, event, or
activity.
They provide intelligence required to support
a single decision.
PIR should be focused, specific, and directly They are tied to key decisions that the
related to friendly decision expected to occur commander has to make.
during COA execution.
They give a latest time information is of
value (LTIOV).
ST 2-50.4 (2001) 26 FMI 2-01 (2008) 27
Do not give multiple questions in a single PIR Ask only one question.
or you will not focus on your real requirement
and may not satisfy your requirement.
Base most of your PIR on a specific fact, They focus on a specific fact, event, or
event, or activity that threat has or is known activity.
to do (or specific to environment) but
remember to consider how threat could
suprise you (an atypical threat) - potentially
one of their greatest advantages.
PIR are listed and ranked in order from most They provide intelligence required to support
to least important.
a single planning task, decision, or action.
Do not ask questions that have been
They can be satisfied using available assets or
answered.
capabilities.
The guidelines have changed little between 1994
and the new FMI 2-01. However, there has been a
subtle and nuanced expansion of PIRs supporting
a single decision to supporting a single planning
task, decision, or action. Another guideline is that
FMI 2-01 states that PIR should be satisfied using
available assets or capabilities. While this seems
obvious, it usually inferred technical intelligence
capabilities in the pre-Transformation Army. This
is especially important for a division that no longer
possesses any organic intelligence collection assets.
A unit’s collection assets or capabilities are
all its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) and non-ISR resources. All units and
Soldiers are potential sources of relevant information
to support the commander’s PIRs.
PIRs today need to support those key IRs that
a commander needs to achieve better overall situational
understanding of his operational environment
that he deems a priority for mission
success. These priorities do not necessarily need
to be linked directly to a commander’s decision;
one PIR in fact may be linked to multiple decisions,
actions, or future planning efforts. Also,
PIRs must not be so restrictive that they force
rigid and singular enemy/threat based collection
requirements. Additionally, despite these guidelines,
it is sometimes acceptable to ask more than
one question. For example, if you want to know
where an enemy force might attack, it is almost
automatic to ask when they might attack. So, instead
of writing two PIRs where the answers are
interrelated, it should be acceptable to create a
PIR such as “Where and when will Threat Group
X attack U.S. forces in our operational environment?”
Finally, PIRs can be solely about nonlethal
aspects of the full spectrum of operations such
as focusing on understanding the capacity of a
community’s essential services it provides or the
effectiveness of its local security forces and local
governance.
20 Military Intelligence

ISR assets include: infantry and armor scout platoons;
cavalry units; battlefield surveillance brigades;
all human intelligence; geospatial intelligence;
signals intelligence; measurement and signature intelligence;
counterintelligence assets; unmanned aerial
system units; fires target acquisition sections;
long-range surveillance units; chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear squads; reconnaissance
squadrons; and attack and/or reconnaissance aircraft.
ISR capable units are units that do not have
surveillance and/or reconnaissance as their primary
mission but can be directed to perform ISR
functions. The units include combat engineer battalions;
engineer reconnaissance sections; infantry
battalions; military police; and brigade combat
teams. Other units that can collect and disseminate
PIR information include unit leaders that meet with
local leaders; civil affairs teams; and transportation
or sustainment units.
Since a unit’s collection assets or capabilities are
all its ISR and non-ISR assets, the operations officer
synchronizes intelligence collection throughout
the organization. “The operations officer (in coordination
with the intelligence officer and other staff
members) tasks available ISR assets to best satisfy
each requirement.” 28 PIRs are answered by multiple
echelons of units and staff sections across a unit.
The collection manager synchronizes intelligence
collection assets and ensures, in conjunction with
the operations officer, that other non intelligence
collectors are worked into an overall synchronization
plan.
Irregular Warfare (COIN)
The 2008 FM 3-0 states that a PIR is a requirement
that the commander and staff need to understand
the adversary or the operational environment and
can identify information about the enemy, terrain
and weather, and civil considerations. 29 All major operations
combine offensive, defensive, and stability
elements. PIRs that support COIN operations are often
different than conventional operations’ PIR. This
is not to suggest that creating PIR for conventional
offensive and defensive operations is not difficult
or complex. PIRs for these types of operations are
simply understood better by our senior officers and
are more often tied to decisions or situations they
have been trained to make by the Army’s training
and education centers before 9/11. Stability operations,
particularly ones with an irregular war-
fare (e.g., COIN) operational theme, differ distinctly
from offensive and defensive operations. 30
Successful COIN operations rely heavily on good
intelligence and a thorough understanding of the
enemy. “Counterinsurgents have to understand that
[every situation is different] in as nuanced a manner
as possible, and then with that kind of understanding
try to craft a comprehensive approach to
the problems.” 31 Insurgencies are struggles for control
over contested political space, between a state
(or group of states or occupying powers), and one
or more popularly based, non-state challengers. 32
Insurgencies are fought in a complex environment
consisting of government; physical terrain; information,
propaganda, and the 24 hour news cycle; insurgent
ideology; refugees, displaced persons, and
mass migration; ethnic, tribal, clan or community
groups; nongovernmental and private volunteer
organizations; armed private contractors; porous
borders; external funding; social classes; local and
foreign armed groups; urban and rural populations;
economic and political institutions; unemployment;
crime; bandits; narcotics traffickers; smugglers;
couriers; black marketers; and religious parties. 33
Many independent and interlinked individuals and
groups contribute to the complexity.
Because COIN operations are dispersed, a counterinsurgent’s
own actions are a key generator of intelligence.
Operations produce intelligence that drives
subsequent operations. 34 “Reporting by units, members
of the country team, and associated civilian
agencies is often of greater importance than reporting
by specialized intelligence assets. These factors,
along with the need to generate a favorable tempo
(rate of military operations), drive the requirement to
produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest
practical level.” 35 Collection with ISR and non-ISR
assets occurs at all echelons. 36 Additionally, effective
COIN operations are decentralized; local commanders
have the best grasp of their situations. 37
As previously discussed, it is important to observe
the linkage between PIRs and collection management
since PIRs should drive all future collection
and analytical priorities. In today’s current COIN
environments, divisions and corps are not maneuvering
combat formations as in conventional “high
intensity” offensive or defensive operations. There
are few, if any, decision points and immediate decisions
a division or corps commander need to make.
April - June 2009 21

Combat operations are executed in a decentralized
manner by “empowered” BCTs who are responsible
as the battle space owner for a defined area of operation.
BCTs drive daily collection requirements
based upon broadly defined guidance to include PIR
and SIR and Commander’s Intent which is usually
summarized in a written or verbal division fragmentary
order to subordinate units. BCTs must translate
this broad collection guidance and division ISR
objectives and priorities into operational plans with
clearly defined collection tasks and purposes.
To ensure that intelligence collection is synchronized,
the overall intelligence synchronization plan
ensures that PIRs are nested at all echelons; they
can be tailored to local or regional circumstances
but tactical and operational collection efforts should
support one another. Additionally, a headquarters
monitors requests for information from lower echelons
and taskings from higher which assists to validate
the synchronization effort. Also, operational
and some tactical ISR synchronization assists host
nation, inter-agency, inter-service, and multinational
efforts. These in turn can provide valuable information
that assists in answering a unit’s PIR. 38
Finally, because every Soldier is a potential collector,
the intelligence synchronization plan addresses
day to day tactical operations; every patrol or mission
should be given intelligence collection requirements
as well as operations requirements. 39
Because COIN operations by their very nature are
decentralized and lower level commanders have a
better understanding of the operational environment,
higher level commanders have different and,
in many cases, less decisions to make. Directly related,
transformation has removed the traditional
tools of influence, particularly for division level commanders,
altering or removing decisions that a pre-
Transformation division commander may have had
to make. Thus, the synchronization plan should be
less restrictive and constraining the higher a headquarters
given the fewer decisions required and/or
the larger degree of time to decide. This facilitates
the flexibility, nimbleness, and decentralization required
during COIN operations.
Conclusion
PIRs are an important part of understanding the
threat we face, the operational environment as a
whole, and what decisions a commander may have
to make. PIRs help commanders to both visual-
ize the operational environment and facilitate both
planning and decisionmaking. PIRs have changed
and are no longer rigid and inflexible with the intent
of providing answers to a checklist of questions.
Operations and intelligence doctrine have
evolved to fully appreciate the complexity of today’s
battlefield. Today’s senior leaders and military intelligence
professionals must be educated on these
changes.
Today’s complex operational environment requires
less prescriptive processes and thinking
and more commanders’ coup d’oeil or intuition 40
based on information, intelligence, and experience.
As our doctrine has evolved along with our
strategic requirements, our processes for asking
the right questions have changed. Senior field
grade and general officers today must have the
mental agility to acknowledge that the processes
and doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s do not meet
all challenges we face today. Simply put, all operations
are contextually and operationally dependent;
PIRs based on conventional offensive or
defensive operations differ from COIN. Also, transformation
has changed the methods and scope of
influencing the battle space. BCTs today have as
much combat power, technology, and situational
awareness as divisions of the past. Brigade and
lower and division and higher commander’s roles
have changed and with it, the type of intelligence
required and the type and timeliness of decisions
these commanders have to make. Today’s commanders
must put away their antiquated understanding
of PIRs they grew up with during their
formative years and recognize that PIRs will vary
for offensive, defensive, and stability operations
and are not solely tied to immediate decisions or
decision points.
Endnotes
1. Major Frank A. Smith, “Intelligence Transformation: Using Threat
Characteristics to Define Division Capabilities” (Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 25 May 2006), 56, at
http:// www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA450630&Location
=U2&doc= GetTRDoc.pdf.
2. For the purposes of this article, operational commanders refer
to tactical BCT, division, and corps Commanders, and the G3,
Chief of Staff, and Assistant Commanders in divisions and corps
organizations; officers primarily from the Infantry but also from the
Armor, Artillery, and Aviation branches. These are the key leaders
leading transformed BCTs and today’s tactical and operational
organizations or running the staffs of these organizations.
22 Military Intelligence

3. David Jablonsky, “US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in
Military Affairs”, Parameters, Autumn 1994, 21-22 at http://www.
carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/1994/jablonsk.htm.
4. FM 100-5, Operations, 20 August 1982, 8-4.
5. FM 100-5, Operations, 5 May 1986, i.
6. John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold
War (Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC Historical Monograph
Services, 1996), 132 at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/
GetTRDoc?AD=ADA317654&Location= U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
7. FM 3-0, Operations, 27 February 2008, Forward, at http://www.
dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf.
8. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. DeAntona, “Transforming the
Operational Career Field Officer Path: Preparing Leaders for Today’s
Contemporary Operating Environment and to Lead the Army into
the 21st Century” (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War
College, 18 March 2005), 2 at http://www.strategicstudies institute.
army.mil/pdffiles/ksil29.pdf.
9. Julian E. Barnes, “Hard-Learned Lessons”, U.S. News & World
Report, 19 March 2006 at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/
articles/060327/27military.htm.
10. FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning,
8 March 1994), 3-6 at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/
fm34-2/toc.htm.
11. Ibid., 3-14.
12. FM 2-0, Intelligence, 17 May 2004, 1-11 at www.fas.org/irp/
doddir/army/fm2-0.pdf.
13. FM 3-0, 27 February 2008, 5-8.
14. Ibid., 5-9.
15. FMI 2-01, ISR Synchronisation, 1 November 2008, 1-6.
16. Smith, 60.
17. John J. Magrath, “An Army at War: Change in the Midst of
Conflict: The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2005
Military History Symposium” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2-4 August 2005), 356 at http://www-cgsc.
army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#army.
18. Joe Burlas “Actionable Intelligence Relies on Every Soldier”,
Army News Service, April 13, 2004 at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/
read.php?story_id_key=5847.
19. Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army 2004
Transformation Roadmap (Washington, D.C.: Army Transformation
Office, July 2004), 5-15 at http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/
strategic/army_trans_roadmap.pdf.
20. Ibid.
21. FM 34-2, D-1; FMI 2-01, 1-12; FM 3-0, 27 February 2008, 5-9.
22. FM 34-2, 3-7; FMI 2-01, 2-4.
23. FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January
2005, Chapter 3, and FMI 2-01, Chapter 1.
24. FM 34-2, D1 to D2.
25. FM 34-8-2, Intelligence Officer’s Handbook, 1 May 1998, D-2 at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-8-2.pdf.
26. ST 2-50.4 (FM 34-8), Combat Commanders Handbook on
Intelligence (Fort Huachuca, AZ: United States Army Intelligence
Center and Fort Huachuca, AZ, 6 September 2001), B-2. https://
rdl.train.army. mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/8684-1/
st/2-50.4/st2-50.4.htm
27. FMI 2-01, 2-5.
28. Ibid., 4-2.
29. FM 3-0, 27 February 2008, 5-9.
30. Ibid., 2-3 to 2-4.
31. Carlotta Gall, “Insurgents in Afghanistan Are Gaining,
Petraeus Says”, The New York Times, 30 September 2008 at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/asia/01petraeus.
html?partner=rssnyt&emc =rss.
32. Dr. David J. Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency:
Remarks Delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency
Conference”, Washington D.C., 28 September 2006 at www.au.af.
mil/au/awc/awcgate/ uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf.
33. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, 3-3 to 3-4,
3-13 at https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/
public/23285-1/FM/3-24/FM3_24.PDF.
34. Ibid,, 3-1.
35. Ibid., 1-23.
36. Ibid., 3-24.
37. Ibid., 1-26.
38. Ibid., 3-25.
39. FM 3-24, 3-27.
40. Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Edited and translated by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 112.
Lieutenant Colonel William G. McDonough, U.S. Army, has
served for the past 25 years in a variety of assignments
from the platoon to corps level as an Infantry and MI
Soldier to include deployments in support of Operations
Hurricane Andrew, Restore Hope, Uphold Democracy,
Joint Endeavor, and Enduring Freedom IV and VII. He is
currently the G2 Analysis and Control Element Chief for
the 10 th Mountain Division (LI) supporting Operation Iraqi
Freedom VI. He holds a BA and MA in History from the
California State University, Sacramento; an MS in Military
Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and
Staff College; and a MS in Airpower Arts and Science from
the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.
Lieutenant Colonel John A. (Jake) Conway, U.S. Army, has
served for the past 20 years in a variety of artillery and
military intelligence positions to include Infantry Battalion S2
in support of Operation Uphold/Maintain Democracy and BCT
S2 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. He is currently
the G2 for the 10 th Mountain Division (LI) supporting Operation
Iraqi Freedom VI. He holds a BA in Pre Law from Penn State
University, an MA in Management from Webster University,
St. Louis, Missouri, and is a graduate of the Post-Graduate
Intelligence Program, Washington D.C.
April - June 2009 23

y Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Kenneth Lawson
Introduction
Army chaplains and chaplain assistants serving in Afghanistan have numerous opportunities to interact
with local Muslim clergy. The mullah, or religious leader, of a village is a vital element of village political,
religious, and cultural life. Many chaplains reach out to mullahs as points of contact for humanitarian
activities (donating school supplies; rebuilding orphanages; distributing gifts and candy to Afghan children
in hospital) conducted by U.S. Soldiers. With the permission of unit commanders, chaplains frequently
engage in these humanitarian missions.
A potential controversy exists when a chaplain is asked for specific information from commanders or intelligence
officers related to his interaction with local mullahs. Chaplains, as doctrinal non-combatants,
could be placed in the awkward position of providing targeting information to commanders, a combatant
task. In order to examine the doctrinal tension between chaplains and Information Operations (IO), we will
first review the roles and responsibilities of Army chaplains. Next we will examine the components and
capabilities of IO. Finally, a discussion of chaplains’ experiences in Afghanistan related to mullah engagements
(religious leader liaison) and IO will illustrate the tensions in this fragile relationship with suggestions
for success for the overall mission of the commander.
Doctrinal Guidelines
The two guiding Army documents that articulate the roles and responsibilities of chaplains are Field
Manual (FM) 1-05, Religious Support, and Army Regulation (AR) 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United
States Army. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, reinforced by Title 10 of the U.S. Code, guarantees
every American the right to the free exercise of religion. Americans in the military enjoy this right as
well as civilians. Commanders are responsible for insuring the religious freedoms of their troops through
the chaplain as a staff officer. FM 1-05 states:
The mission of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) is to provide and perform religious support to soldiers, families, and
authorized civilians as directed by the commander. Chaplains serve as personal staff officers to commanders at
all levels of the command providing essential information on troop and unit morale, quality of life matters, free
exercise of religion issues, ethical decision making, and the impact of religion on the operation. 1
The religious support activities of chaplains are widely known. They consist of religious services, counseling,
religious education, advisor to the commander and staff, and other activities, including coordinating
“religious/humanitarian support.” The FM states that such support includes humanitarian support
programs on issues of religion, morale, morals, and ethics.” 2 The chaplain, by doctrine, then is to assist
24 Military Intelligence

the commander with religious/humanitarian support. Chaplains are also, by regulation, to “provide liaison
to indigenous religious leaders in close coordination with the G5.” 3 Additionally, chaplains coordinate
with elements of the G9 (Civil Affairs) in religious liaison/mullah engagements. 4
Information Operations
Based primarily on advanced technology, IO is an element of combat power. It encompasses attacking
adversary command and control (C2) systems while protecting friendly C2 from adversary disruption.
Thus IO has both offensive and defensive capabilities. The goal of IO is to produce information
superiority over the enemy at decisive points. Commanders conduct IO to apply combat power to
achieve information superiority on the battlefield. Enemy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
(ISR), and targeting are all part of IO. Offensive IO seeks to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive,
and exploit enemy forces. A high value target of IO is enemy center of gravity, typically communication
and headquarters locations, to target enemy decision makers and information systems.
IO maximizes the use of technology to shape the combat power of friendly forces. In FM 3-13, Information
Operations, the following summary of IO is provided:
“Commanders conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) IO to apply the information element of combat
power. Combined with information management and ISR operations; effective IO results in gaining and
maintaining information superiority. Information superiority creates conditions that allow commanders to
shape the operational environment and enhance the effects of all elements of combat power. IO has two
categories, offensive IO and defensive IO. Commanders conduct IO by synchronizing IO elements and related
activities, each of which may be used either offensively or defensively.”
“IO brings together several previously separate functions as IO elements and related activities. To provide unity
of effort, IO is placed under a special staff officer, the assistant chief of staff G7. The G7 has coordinating
staff responsibility for IO. He does this by means of the G7 section and IO cell. Placing responsibility for
synchronizing the activities of the IO elements and related activities on one special staff officer helps
commanders mass their effects to gain and maintain information superiority.” 5
The Army chaplain is a noncombatant. As a religious leader and a staff officer, AR 165-1 states,
“Chaplains are noncombatants and will not bear arms.” 6 This regulation is clear enough. The confusion
relates to the idea of information as a weapon, and that a chaplain may receive information that IO personnel
in the G2, G3, or G7 would like to use in offensive action against enemy forces. There is no approved
doctrinal standard for the role of the chaplain in IO. However, AR 165-1 does suggest possible
roles of the chaplain. For example, it states that, “Commanders will detail or assign chaplains only to
duties related to their profession. Chaplains may perform unrelated duties in a temporary military emergency.”
It also states that a commander will not detail a chaplain as an “information” officer. AR 165-1
further states, “Commanders will not…require a chaplain to serve in a capacity in which he or she may
later be called upon to reveal privileged or sensitive information incident to such service.” 7
The Army chaplain will have some role in advising the commander on religious and cultural issues in
the area of operations (AO). FM 1-05 states that the chaplain will provide “support to the commander
on matters of religion, morals, and morale, as affected by religion and the impact of indigenous religions
on the military mission.” 8 It further states that the chaplain will “provide liaison to indigenous religious
leaders in close coordination with the G5/S5.” 9 The question remains: “At what point does a chaplain as
a religious advisor to the commander cross the line and partake of combatant activities in IO?”
Army chaplains concerned about their involvement with IO are on safe ground when they concentrate
their efforts primarily on providing religious support to soldiers. Religious support includes religious services,
rites, sacraments, ordinances, pastoral care and counseling, religious education, and humanitarian
support. As a staff officer, the chaplain supports the commander and staff, administrates, and acts
as an advisor to the command on indigenous religions. 10 As one chaplain stated, “It is conceivable to witness
commanders demanding that chaplains provide information advantageous to U.S. forces that may
April - June 2009 25

A mullah engagement in October 2003 sponsored by the CJTF-
180. This religious liaison was hosted by CH (LTC) Ken Sampson,
back row, far left. Photo by MSG Bruce Snowdeal.
be gleaned from a liaison and contact with local religious
leaders. One would be naïve to think that the
chaplaincy would be exempt from the pressure of a
well-meaning but ill-advised commander.” 11 The focus
of chaplain ministries must first be on religious
support to the soldiers within the unit and not on
humanitarian missions to indigenous peoples.
The expanding role of religion in contemporary
operations will increase the requests for religious
advice on local populations. The senior chaplain
should be a subject matter expert in this area, a key
point of contact in advising the commander. When
the opportunity arises to perform a religious liaison
with local clergy, such as the mullah engagements
in Afghanistan, chaplains should follow the following
guidelines:
Ê A religious liaison mission must be endorsed by the commander.
Ê The chaplain must staff his intentions with the G2, G3, G5 and G9 sections.
Ê Only chaplains of field grade (Major) or higher should participate.
Ê Emphasis should be on common humanitarian and religious concerns and not on political/military
matters.
Ê After the mission, chaplains are not to provide information related to targeting or offensive operations
to the command. Some non-lethal targeting information may be appropriately shared with the command,
such as the location of schools, religious sites, and orphanages.
In stability and support operations, chaplains will have an increasing role in engaging indigenous
religious leaders to help facilitate the peace keeping and nation building missions of U.S. troops. This
liaison role of Army chaplains with local clergy must be practiced with caution, as more and more
demand on chaplain religious expertise will be requested by IO personnel. As one chaplain warned,
“Caution must be applied to avoid the slippery slope of grasping for a deeper and inappropriate role.
With an increasing command emphasis on IO, the [Chaplain] Corps must guard against justifying its
value in its role in IO.” 12 The role of a chaplain is justified as a provider of religious support to all soldiers,
not as a tool of IO to coerce intelligence from indigenous clergy.
The Role of Religion in IO
In Operation Enduring Freedom, religious issues weighed heavily in the commander’s decision making
process. Religion served as a source of information and as a type of information. As foreigners in a
Muslim land, the sensitivity to religious issues for U.S. troops in Afghanistan was paramount. The customs
and rituals of Islam are unknown to most Americans, making it increasingly important for chaplains
to advise commanders and soldiers on the religious/spiritual aspects of indigenous Afghans. 13
Chaplains are expected to provide the commander information related to the religious customs and
practices of indigenous peoples. In Afghanistan, the typical U.S. soldier has no idea of the differences
between Sunni or Shiite, and between a mullah and an imam. First, the chaplain must determine what
types of religious information are essential for the commander to understand. Next, the chaplain analyzes
the local population to see how it understands these categories. Finally, the chaplain briefs the
commander and staff and soldiers as appropriate. This type of religious advice to a commander is standard
practice in the Army chaplaincy, a typical responsibility understood by all chaplains.
Army chaplains are not in the intelligence gathering business. Chaplains, as religious advisors, must not
allow themselves to drift too far into the realm of IO. It is one thing to interact with local religious leaders
26 Military Intelligence

to facilitate dialogue and understanding to better advise the commander on the impact of local religions
on the military mission. It is another thing altogether for a chaplain to gather information in a religious
liaison capacity that unethically could be used for targeting or other offensive operations. 14 Afghan religious
leaders place a high value on clergy. The U.S. Army chaplain can engage in a respectful dialogue and
exchange of ideas and cultural sensitivities in discussions with indigenous clergy. But the sacredness of
such dialogue must not be compromised by IO personnel eager to glean any information from the chaplain
that may help their mission. A military chaplain who compromises the sacred bond between clergy will be
instantly discredited by Afghan clerics, promoting distrust and disdain of all U.S. personnel.
There are some legitimate ways a chaplain can serve as a staff officer in general support of IO. Chaplains
working as liaisons with indigenous clergy can have a positive influence on the way American intentions
and operations are perceived. These chaplain “liaison officers” are a part of IO and require a thorough
understanding of the key religious leaders, religious worldview of the population, and social structure.
The G2, G3, G5, and IO personnel often overlook or under emphasize this understanding. The staff chaplain,
as a liaison with indigenous clergy, can be a crucial person in the analysis of religion and culture in
IO, preventing U.S. and allied troops from committing cultural or religious blunders. For example, Joint
Publication (JP) 1-05 allows the chaplain to advise commanders through their liaison roles with host nation
religious leaders. Army Field Manual 1-05 states the same thing, instructing chaplains to support the
Commander through relationships with indigenous clergy. 15
The optimal time to integrate the analysis of religion and culture is during the mission analysis phase
of the military decision making process (MDMP). This responsibility generally falls upon the G2/J2 Plans
section. Here the chaplain can provide input as to the role of religion on military operations. Since IO sections
can be small and limited in time and religious resources, ad hoc members are necessary to develop
the cultural analysis requirement. It is here that a staff chaplain can contribute significantly. During the
mission analysis, the IO section develops the IO Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). Essential
elements of IO IPB include: an in-depth analysis of religion; an awareness of important religious and cultural
dates and observances; an understanding of religious and social structure, and recognition of key
religious leaders and their probable influence.
FM 3-13 defines IO as “…the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network
operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified
supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence
decision making.” 16 The FM specifically excludes the chaplain from the list of coordinating, special,
and personal staff who have IO planning and support responsibilities. UMT personnel, both chaplains and
chaplain assistants, should not be involved in the planning or execution of IO with the sole exceptions of
security for themselves and friendly forces and the location of sacred or humanitarian sites.
All the core and supporting IO capabilities and functions, with the exception of operational and physical
security, are either combatant tasks which chaplains, as noncombatants, are not legally authorized to directly
engage in or highly technical tasks which are outside the realm of chaplain’s professional responsibilities.
Chaplain assistants, though combatants, should not be involved in the planning or execution of IO
with the same exceptions, because their close association with the chaplain could create the appearance
or contribute to the perception of the chaplain’s involvement in IO. 17
Chaplains as Liaisons with Indigenous Clergy and IO
Afghanistan is a religious country. Almost 100 percent of Afghans practice some type of Islam. Religion is
a major cultural factor throughout all levels of the society. The role of religion and clergy in peacekeeping
and nation building here must not be devalued. Most senior U.S. Army chaplains, as clergy and as officers,
are well suited to advise commanders on religious issues and to act as intermediaries between military and
indigenous religious leaders. Chaplains are positioned to communicate with local religious leaders to promote
trust, coordination, problem solving, and to reduce local violence. 18 They can serve their commanders
by acting as mediators with local mullahs or imams to build a relationship for civil military operations
April - June 2009 27

(CMO). Any role for a chaplain as a liaison with indigenous clergy must be balanced by security concerns,
by the commander’s intent, and by the skills and willingness of the chaplain. Some chaplains, for theological
reasons, opt not to serve as religious liaisons to local clergy.
The primary role of Army chaplains is to minister to the troops, the commander, and his staff. But chaplains
as staff officers do have a role in networking with indigenous clergy. Chaplains can help to win the
hearts and minds of local populations in support of U.S. policies to rebuild a peaceful Afghanistan which
lawfully elects its own leaders and maintains a civil and humane society. The role of Army chaplains as
liaisons with local clergy is mentioned in FM 1-05, which states: “Chaplains will support the commander
through advisement in the following areas that may influence CMO: Relations with indigenous religious
leaders when directed by the commander.” 19 When Army chaplains serve in a Joint Task Force or similar
assignment with Navy, Air Force, or Marine personnel, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 provides guidance on
chaplains as religious liaisons. Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint
Operations, states:
The JFCH [Joint Force Chaplain], after careful consideration and only with the Joint Force Commander’s
approval, may serve as a point of contact to host nation (HN) civilian and military religious leaders,
institutions, and organizations, including established and emerging military chaplaincies, through the
Civil-Military Operations Center. 20
As clergy and non-combatants, Army chaplains are respected in the Muslim world. By this status
they are in a position to build bridges and networks with indigenous clergy. Unquestionably, the
chaplain’s primary role is to provide religious support to Soldiers and their families, yet the role of a
chaplain as a liaison to local clergy is clearly mentioned in various military publications. The doctrinal
guidance is broad, giving commanders and chaplains flexibility in determining how best to fulfill this
responsibility. Due to the ongoing nature of the War on Terror in Afghanistan, the U.S. will maintain
peacekeeping, nation building, and stability operations for the foreseeable future. Since military personnel
will have to engage the local population more and more in these operations, chaplains must be
prepared to dialogue and interact with indigenous religious and community leaders.
This is not an unusual or unrealistic expectation. In Afghanistan, military Judge Advocate General
officers routinely work with the Afghan legal system; military surgeons work closely with Afghan community
medical services; military engineers are active throughout Afghanistan working with local
contractors on a wide array of construction projects; military Civil Affairs soldiers are active in rebuilding
schools and donating school supplies to Afghani children; and military chaplains throughout
Afghanistan are interacting with local mullahs and imams.
Army chaplains routinely coordinate or assist with humanitarian and religious liaison missions.
Because of these relationships with indigenous clergy, knowledge is gained through informal conversations
that may contain information related to the U.S. military mission. Unsolicited information that
affects the security of U.S. and allied forces should be reported. Relaying information about threats
against U.S. interests does not violate the non-combatant status of a chaplain. But the chaplain who
uses his religious status to gain intelligence from indigenous clergy with the intent of feeding that information
to the G2, G3, or the IO staff has crossed the line and has assumed combative targeting
tasks in violation of the non-combatant status of chaplains.
Chaplains must instruct their commanders and the command staff as to the roles and responsibilities of
a chaplain related to IO. It can not be assumed that a commander or a command staff will know the details
of what a chaplain can or cannot do related to the chaplain’s non-combative status. Commanders must
take care not to utilize chaplains against military regulations. FM 1-05 states, “Under Title X of the U.S.
Code, Chaplains should not perform the following: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection and/or target
acquisition.” 21 Commanders must not utilize chaplains as intelligence officers. Chaplains are responsible
for advising the commander when such expectations are prevalent. No military regulation states precisely
28 Military Intelligence

what information a chaplain should or should not relay to the IO staff. The guiding principles are military
regulations, maintaining the chaplain’s credibility with indigenous religious leaders, guidance from the
commander, input from supervisory chaplains, and the conscience of the individual chaplain. These flexible
guidelines must be assessed in light of the chaplain’s clear understanding of his non-combatant role.
Army chaplains in Afghanistan were frequently involved with humanitarian missions. These missions,
typically coordinated by chaplains with local mullahs, helped to renovate schools, supply orphanages,
and rebuild mosques. Falling under the general identification of CMO, chaplains on humanitarian
missions often worked with Civil Affairs officers and Public Affairs. In such relationships the chaplain
must protect his non-combatant status, in that both Civil Affairs and Public Affairs soldiers routinely
contribute intelligence to IO. In a Muslim culture, a U.S. Army chaplain is considered a clergyman, a
person of esteem at the level of a mullah. The chaplain must ensure that his credibility is not compromised
by working on CMO projects with other soldiers who are combatants. As one chaplain stated,
“UMTs should…avoid the appearance of involvement in the execution of IO related activities to avoid
undermining their credibility in support of CMO. Part of the reason that UMTs can be effective in conducting
the CMO related function of liaison with indigenous religious groups is because of the perception
that as religious leaders they will act as “honest brokers.” 22
Contributions of Chaplains to IO: What Can the Chaplain Do?
There are numerous examples of chaplains excelling in their role as a liaison or bridge-builder with
local mullahs in Afghanistan. Chaplains were able to successfully perform these liaison and humanitarian
missions without compromising their integrity as non-combatants. An example of interacting
with indigenous clergy while rejecting the opportunity to feed intelligence to IO personnel was CH (CPT)
Eric Eliason, who deployed to Afghanistan during 2004. As chaplain to the 1 st Battalion, 19 th Special
Forces Group, CH Eliason refused to provide HUMINT or targeting information while he worked with
local mullahs to coordinate the rebuilding of village mosques. 23
An example of a senior Army chaplain who properly balanced his roles as a religious leader and a
staff chaplain was CH (LTC) Larry Adams-Thompson, the CJTF 76 Chaplain in Afghanistan from March
2004 through March 2005. Continuing the work of his predecessor CH (LTC) Ken Sampson, CH Adams-
Thompson organized monthly meetings with local mullahs. The intent of these meetings was to discuss
religious issues, moral concerns, and to build clergy-to-clergy relationships. Chaplains obtained funds
to assist mullahs in the renovation of village mosques and orphanages. In one encounter, he learned
that U.S. funds were readily building Afghan public schools but not the traditional religious schools, the
madrassas. This created the perception that the U.S. was secular and not concerned about the religious
needs of Afghanistan. CH Adams-Thompson knew that if he could get the construction of some madrassas
authorized, a clear message would be sent to the Afghan people that the U.S. cared about the local
religion and culture. In reflecting on the relationship between CH Adams-Thompson and local mullahs:
Note that the feedback from the mullah was not related to combat operations. Rather, it provided an
awareness of wider issues in the area of responsibility (AOR). CH Adams-Thompson encouraged chaplains
to take similar issues from their meetings with mullahs back to their commanders. This example
demonstrates how chaplains can advise commanding officers on the ways religion impacts the AOR. Local
religious leaders, who usually are quite influential in their communities, can provide unique viewpoints on
issues and concerns among the populace. Such insight is crucial for commanders, and chaplains are often
in a unique position to provide it. This information is not tactical; rather, it is situational awareness that
can be utilized to build bridges with the general population. As a result of CH Adams-Thompson bringing
the education mullah’s assessment back to the command, approval was given to fund the construction of
a madrassas in Kapisa Province, the first U.S. effort of its kind in Afghanistan. 24
Staff communication between the chaplain and the commander and his staff is essential to maintaining
the unique status of chaplains as non-combatants. As chaplains communicated plainly what they
were and were not able to do related to intelligence collection, their commands almost always respected
April - June 2009 29

those boundaries. For example, shortly after arriving in Afghanistan, CH Adams-Thompson met with
the G2 and told them what he could and could not do related to IO. He indicated that during his 12
months in Afghanistan the command never asked him to utilize his connections with indigenous clergy
in an improper manner. It is the responsibility of the chaplain as a staff officer to inform the command
of his non-combatant boundaries. 25 Chaplains must be careful not to allow their networking with local
religious leaders to be used inappropriately as targeting or human intelligence collection opportunities.
If chaplains allowed themselves to be debriefed by G2, G3, or IO personnel in order to gain information
related to combat operations, they would place their unique role as clergy non-combatants in jeopardy.
What the chaplain can or cannot do related to interaction with indigenous clergy is guided by the
commander. No commander wants his chaplain kidnapped, killed, or injured. Security for mullah
engagements is a vital consideration. The concern is not only for the Army chaplains but for the local
clergy with whom they meet. There were instances in Afghanistan in which intimidation, violence,
or murder was committed against religious leaders who dialogued with U.S. chaplains. For example,
CH (CPT) Guy McBride of the 173 rd Combat Support Battalion, who was in Afghanistan from March
2005 through March 2006, recalled, “The mullah engagements in my area were not successful. I remember
two of these engagements, after which both times the mullahs were assassinated.” 26 Careful
consideration must be given as to how much danger local leaders face in relating with U.S. chaplains.
Obviously the opportunity for chaplains to interact with indigenous clergy will be restricted or eliminated
when the danger is too great. Chaplains must balance their roles as advisors to the commander
on local religious issues against operational and force protection concerns.
A religious liaison mullah engagement planned by CH (LTC) Ken
Sampson and hosted by MG Lloyd Austin, Commander, CJTF 180,
Bagram, Afghanistan. MG Austin is in the center of the photo.
Photo by MSG Bruce Snowdeal.
While Army chaplains typically enjoyed their interaction
with indigenous clergy, there were moments
of apprehension. Occasionally a chaplain
understood that he was very close to becoming an
intelligence officer gathering targeting information
on the enemy. For example, CH (CPT) Isaac Opara
of the 25 th Infantry Division conducted four mullah
engagements during his June 2004 to April
2005 tour in Afghanistan. He lamented that he
did not have set IO guidelines as to what he could
and could not report to his commander and staff.
While helping with the rebuilding of schools and
orphanages, he learned many things about the
Afghan people. He stated that he walked “a thin
line between hosting mullah engagements and becoming
an Intel officer.” He stated, “I did not cross
the line but I was an ear to the local people to hear complaints…I never reported info to anyone except
my brigade chaplain.” 27
Conclusion
To fully develop the role of the military chaplain as a religious liaison for the commander, more training
is needed. It is inaccurate to assume that chaplains with the rank of major or above are competent
in religious liaison activities. Military chaplains must be trained at the major level and above to
dialogue as religious leaders with indigenous clergy; to be sensitive to the religious culture of allied
personnel and the HN; to understand mission and situational awareness related to religious issues; to
engage in liaison activities with a clear understanding of the Commander’s intent and end state; and
to not be used in any way as an intelligence gathering or targeting tool for IO.
Chaplains of the rank of major or above are a valuable but underutilized resource in developing the
analysis of an adversary’s religion and culture for the MDMP. Many IO missions begin before combat
30 Military Intelligence

operations, and failure to understand the complexities of religion and culture can negatively impact
those operations. Commanders and operations staff officers should understand that experienced chaplains
can be a valuable multiplier in the total planning process by assisting in developing a religious
impact assessment for the commander and staff. Chaplains should insist on the opportunity to participate
in the process, although such participation is always bound by their status as non-combatants.
Their products are critical for background support to IO, which requires an in-depth understanding of
culture for operations involving combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and civil affairs.
Endnotes
1. FM 1-05, Religious Support, 2003, 1-5.
2. Ibid., p. 1-6.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 4-40.
5. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 2003, 1-1, 1-2.
6. AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, 2004, 6.
7. Ibid.
8. FM 1-05, A-1.
9. Ibid., 1-5, 1-6.
10. Ibid., 1-1.
11. Randy Edwards, “Information Operations and the Army Chaplaincy,” Command and General Staff College, unpublished paper, 2003,
3.
12. Ibid., p. 5.
13. The term “religious/spiritual” refers to the system of beliefs and practices that give meaning and purpose to people’s lives, FM 1-05,
F-1.
14. Greg W. Hill and Rob Meyer, “The Role of the Chaplain in Information Operations,” The Army Chaplaincy, Summer/Fall 2002, 54-57.
15. JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations, June 2004, II-3a5. See also FM 1-05, 2003, appendix A, A-1 and A-2.
16. FM 3-13, 1-53.
17. Jonathan Gibbs, “Unit Ministry Teams and Information Operations,” Unpublished Paper, U.S. Army Chaplain Center & School, 10
March 2007.
18. George Adams, “Lessons Learned for Iraq and Afghanistan: Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders,” Peaceworks, (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 1.
19. FM 1-05, A-1.
20. JP 1-05, II-3.
21. FM 1-05, A-2.
22. Gibbs, 2.
23. Adams, 16.
24. Ibid., 17.
25. Ibid., 18.
26. Questionnaire from CH (CPT) Guy McBride, 07 February 2007.
27. Correspondence from CH (CPT) Isaac Opara to CH (LTC) Ken Lawson, 14 February 2007.
Chaplain (LTC) Ken Lawson is currently the Installation Chaplain, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. He joined the Army as a
private in 1979, and entered the Army Chaplain Corps in 1989. He holds a PhD in U.S. History and is a 2007 graduate of
the U.S. Air Force Air War College.
April - June 2009 31

Intelligence Collection in Counterinsurgency
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and
Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Introduction
“Because intelligence and operations are so closely
related, it is important for collectors to be linked to
the operators and analysts they support…collectors
should not passively wait for operators to submit requirements;
rather they should closely monitor the
operational environment and recommend requirements
based on their understanding of operators’
needs.” –FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 3-129
Many have now written on the necessity for the maneuver
company commander to have an analytical
capability within his formation. The Company
Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) or Company
Intelligence Cell has already been much discussed,
even within this very publication, and few now disagree
with the concept’s value. However, we must
now begin to take the next step: Empowering the
maneuver company commander not only with increased
analytical capability, but intelligence collection
capability as well.
In a counterinsurgency (COIN), maneuver is the
most important column on the intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) collection matrix.
The maneuver company and its platoons are in constant
contact with the local populace everyday, from
planned engagements to traffic control points, even to
local nationals coming to the patrol base. The pulse
of the insurgency lies with its ability to influence the
population and that pulse can only be felt with the everyday
contact made at the company level and below.
Thus, the maneuver company commander is forced
to devote an immense amount of his time to the collection
and analysis of information. 1 Sir Frank Kitson
adds that, “…the system involves a commander in
collecting all the background information he can get
from a variety of sources including the intelligence
organization, and analyzing it very carefully in order
to narrow down the possible whereabouts of the enemy,
the purpose being to make deductions which
will enable him to employ his men with some hope of
success as opposed to using them at random in the
hope of making a contact.” 2
by Captain David Beall
Besides his own soldiers and perhaps a Raven
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), the maneuver company
commander has no organic intelligence collection
capability. He is forced to compete with his peers
for assets to assist in his gathering of background information.
The first place he looks is naturally to the
battalion, where in practice there are more maneuver
forces, in the form of different platoons, and the Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Team (HCT).
The HCT is usually made up of three to four
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35M HUMINT
Collectors with one serving as the Team Leader.
“The guiding principle to the use of HUMINT in
support of offensive operations is to minimize the
time between when friendly forces encounter potential
sources (detainees, refugees, and local civilians)
and when a HUMINT collector screens them.” 3
As the name implies, the HCT is taught to operate
as a team, all or most attending every source
meeting, thereby guaranteeing security and source
familiarity with the collectors in case something
should happen to one of the collectors (e.g., injury
or Environmental Leave). This proves very frustrating
to the Infantryman; the only time he interacts
with the HCT is when he is tasked to escort them to
source meetings, the information from which may
not even concern his area of operations (AO). To
make matters worse, in terrain where weather and
distance hamper timely transportation between
outposts, such as Afghanistan, or heavily IED’d
lines of communication restrict regular movement,
such as certain parts of Iraq, an HCT’s circulation
to all company AOs is often severely hobbled.
The Art of Locality
“Insurgencies are local…The mosaic nature of insurgencies,
coupled with the fact that all Soldiers
and Marines are potential collectors, means that
all echelons both consume and produce intelligence.
This situation results in a bottom-up flow of
intelligence. This pattern also means that tactical
units at brigade and below require a lot of support
32 Military Intelligence

for both collection and analysis, as their organic intelligence
structure is often inadequate.” –FM 3-24
Counterinsurgency, 3-5
To most effectively gather and analyze intelligence,
the collector and analyst must become intimately
familiar with the area in which they operate.
Outside intelligence organizations provide products
and analysis that are very useful, particularly for the
objectivism that certain types of collection can give.
But the primary source of what happens on a dayto-day
basis has to come from those who live in the
area and interact with the populace. 4 The analyst
from afar can never fully appreciate the situation
on the ground, and subsequently his products most
often lack a focus that the supported unit is driving
at. The same is true of the collector from afar and
the collector who comes to visit only occasionally.
This “visiting collector” is the HCT. As previously
mentioned it comes to support when it has source
meetings in companies’ AOs. The HCT will of course
do its best to respond to any priority intelligence
requirements (PIRs) of the company, but this is difficult
since most company commanders have not
been taught to create their own PIRs. Thus, commanders
are constantly pinging the battalion S2
shop for HUMINT support until they are fed up with
the irregularity.
If the HUMINTers are not local, then they never
learn the mētis they require to be fully successful.
That is, they never completely gain the local
knowledge that is comprised of “a wide array
of practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding
to a constantly changing natural and human
environment.” 5 If the HUMINTer lives with the
company and constantly goes on patrols to spot and
assess when not in source meetings, then his local
knowledge is that of the company, and there is
no loss between the collector and the customer due
to misunderstanding. Furthermore, by developing
mētis, the HUMINTer is a better collector; he understands
the rationality behind the actions of those he
aims to influence by living in their context and is also
less susceptible to be taken in by false reporting.
That is not to say HUMINTers do not go out on patrols
with companies when they are placed at the
battalion level. From time to time the HCT visits to
go on missions with the company to see the AO and
spot and assess. The argument however, is that in
the most common configuration (the HCT as a bat-
talion level collection asset), the access that the HCT
has to every company’s AO is limited and generally
is restricted to either whichever AO has more reporting,
or whichever company commander is easier to
work with. For the most part, the HCT is just another
enabler that the commander is trying to juggle
and coordinate for, just another visitor to his AO.
As a visitor, the HUMINTer is only left with his
techne, his understanding of his craft as a science,
and lacks contextual insight. An HCT armed with
its craft is powerful, but it is not COIN. COIN is local,
and therefore intelligence collection must be as
well.
The HUMINTers are Part of the CoIST
“HUMINT collectors may have to be placed in DS of
lower echelon combat maneuver forces (battalion
and lower) to support operations. HUMINT and combat
reporting by units in direct contact with threat
forces and local inhabitants becomes the means of
collection.” –FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector
Operations, 3-16
HUMINTers need to be at the company level.
Clearly, for MOS-specific training, this is impractical,
but for operations it is necessary. The CoIST is,
in effect, the S2 shop for the company; it empowers
the company commander with a staff for information
management and intelligence analysis. The CoIST
pre-briefs and de-briefs patrols; analyzes combat information
to create a company level enemy situation
template; develops threat courses of action; targets,
both lethally and non-lethally, at the company
level; serves as a company link to the battalion S2;
and recommends ISR requests and develops recommended
PIR for the company commander.
The HUMINTer is a natural extension of this concept,
as he is capable of providing much more benefit
than just Military Source Operations (MSO). The
35M works in concert with the company commander
and the CoIST team leader to better focus his collection.
He reviews every patrol de-brief to expand his
knowledge of the AO and to identify future sources
of collection. He helps plan the company’s missions,
sometimes planned around the HUMINTers’ source
meetings. He also runs the company commander’s
informant network; every company commander has
informants, and these are often mishandled when
the commander tries to illegally task them as if they
were sources. The HUMINTer keeps the commander
‘legal’ by managing who is worthy of being a source
April - June 2009 33

and handling them appropriately. Within the CoIST,
he can have a dedicated analyst, which provides
sharper focus to HUMINT operations. 6 But perhaps
most importantly, the HUMINTer goes on the majority
of patrols, every planned operation, and attends
every possible local leader engagement, The
HUMINTer is now providing intelligence collection in
support of all the lines of effort at the company level,
and not solely focusing on security. He develops the
mētis necessary to become a part of that company
fight and AO through practice and experience. 7
Despite the HUMINTer becoming part of the CoIST,
the 35M reporting channels are unchanged. The
individual HUMINTer still sends his reports to the
HCT team leader, who in turn forwards the reports
to the Operational Management Team. The HCT is
not disbanded, just dispersed. The team leader still
has responsibilities despite the team not operating
as one unit. In addition to reviewing and editing his
team’s reports, he is also responsible for weighting
heavy collection areas or planned operations with
additional HUMINT support. The team leader must
still hold meetings, virtually or telephonically if need
be, with all of his HUMINTers to provide mentorship
and ensure information sharing across the battalion’s
AO. He also has to manage, with oversight
from the MI company (MICO), which HUMINTer is
with which company. Certain HUMINTers may not
fit into some companies’ command climates, so the
team must remain flexible to adjust.
The HUMINTer’s interactions with the company
commander, platoon leaders, and other members
of the CoIST are as important as his interactions
with the local populace. This fusion of the collector,
the analyst, and the consumer at the company and
platoon levels, enables counterinsurgents to execute
operations more effectively, sooner. 8
Iraq
“All actions designed to retain and regain the allegiance
of the population are relevant to the process
of collecting background information….” –Sir
Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion,
Insurgency, and Peacekeeping
As the S2 for 3-509th Infantry Battalion (Airborne),
I had a very interesting deployment to Iraq. Before
the deployment began, I set up CoISTs in each of
our companies. We began the deployment with our
Transfer of Authority (TOA) in Iskandariyah, at the
end of November of 2006. In December we were de-
tached from our brigade and sent to the Marines in
Al Anbar. We returned to Iskandariyah at the end
of June 2007, where we served in a Brigade Strike
Force for three months. We then owned battlespace
in Iskandariyah again for the final two months. In
each of those moves, the methods available for collecting
intelligence varied greatly. Often the sources
of intelligence were extremely undeveloped or not
available at all at the start of each new phase of
the deployment. This fomented the establishment of
creative methods to maximize collection and generate
substance for the targeting process. Our time in
Garmah, Iraq, a small city and region northeast of
Fallujah, was a notable example.
We arrived in Garmah in late December 2006, and
took control from an Iraqi Army Brigade(-), who relocated
to Baghdad in support of the Surge. There was
no Relief in Place/TOA and no intelligence hand-off.
The Shi’a Iraqi Army had largely alienated the local
Sunni population and had become prisoners in
their own patrol bases due to Al Qaida’s dominance.
The Iraqi Army had burned every HUMINT source
they had. We started from zero.
At first, my HUMINT Team Leader intended to run
operations like he had in Iskandariyah, largely waiting
for walk-ins to come to the forward operating
base (FOB) and requesting to go on missions with
companies when he felt the team had time. However,
one of the biggest changes from Iskandariyah to
Garmah was that the companies were now living in
six separate combat outposts, and not on the large
FOB where the Battalion Headquarters was located.
There was no HUMINT reporting.
The continued absence of HUMINT reporting was decisive
in persuading the HUMINTers that they needed
to live with the companies or they would never acquire
any sources, nor have any idea what the environment
was like. Once they left, they never came back. The
HCT was divided in order to have at least one collector
per company. Staff Sergeant Ken Del Valle maintained
all of his team leader responsibilities, and still provided
constant feedback to the battalion S2 shop.
At first company commanders did not know
how to use 35Ms, but through coaching from the
HUMINTers themselves and the S2 shop, eventually
all of the commanders began integrating them into
mission planning. Captain Matt Gregory and his
Able Company, 3-509th IN (ABN), took the greatest
advantage of having a HUMINTer at the company
34 Military Intelligence

level. He quickly recognized the concept’s utility:
“The 35Ms assigned to my company were the biggest
combat multipliers by far.” 9
Able Company accelerated past her sister companies
in the battalion task force due largely to superior
intelligence collection efforts. They focused on gathering
background information on the local area and
populace that either had never been gathered before,
or had been lost. Additionally, CPT Gregory incorporated
SSG Del Valle and the CoIST into his mission
planning process. Able Company began focused patrols
and planned missions where the HUMINTer was
the main effort; “We conducted patrols specifically in
order for SSG Del Valle to engage the local population
in specific areas, and this had a tremendous effect
over time.” 10 By integrating into Able Company,
he began to not only spot and assess on every patrol,
but also gained the local knowledge that he could
not have by simply visiting from Camp Fallujah. CPT
Gregory soon recognized that the HUMINTer could
assist in more than just producing reports, and began
to utilize him in planning his political engagements
and information operations messages.
Another innovator was CPT Stew Lindsay, commander
of Charlie Company, 3-509 th IN (ABN) in
North Babil Province, Iraq. Early in CPT Lindsay’s
command, there was no HUMINT support, and he
was forced to run an extensive informant network
in order to gather any intelligence on the ground.
“Local nationals would come and tell me information
all of the time, but because I was not a HUMINTer,
I could not put the intelligence into a format that
would allow me to detain someone.” 11 The Iraqis living
in Charlie Company’s AO were frustrated since
they were providing information on Al Qaida, but the
Coalition Forces were unable to arrest the enemy.
Visits from HUMINTers alleviated some of the reporting
legitimacy problems, but did not adequately
resolve the issue.
After receiving a dedicated 35M, CPT Lindsay
was able to reorganize his operations to focus on
building the intelligence framework necessary to
support one of the most successful company targeting
efforts in the brigade. “I took my HUMINTer
with me everywhere; I took him to Sheik engagements,
Iraqi Security Force meetings, infrastructure
events, raids, you name it…” 12 Additionally, Charlie
Company’s HUMINTer, Sergeant Micah Boor, assumed
CPT Lindsay’s informant network, was able
to apply his craft, and turned most of them into
legitimate sources. SGT Boor played an integral
part in the company’s targeting process as Lindsay
adds, “I was focusing on so many different things
as a company commander; having SGT Boor and
the CoIST there to keep all of the background information
straight and make realistic lethal, nonlethal,
and ISR targeting recommendations was
tremendous.” 13 Through targeting with SGT Boor,
and later 35M Specialist Wayne Border, Lindsay’s
weekly detainment rate rose 800 percent over a
three month period. 14 Finally, CPT Lindsay established
a Company SOP for operations on the objective
that featured the HUMINTer screening potential
detainees with focused tactical questioning (TQ),
while his CoIST performed tactical site exploitation
(TSE) and started detainment paperwork.
Unfortunately, some company commanders were
less open minded with tactical planning or distrustful
of intelligence in general. There was some misuse
at first, until the battalion field grade officers could
be convinced to correct it. The other companies’ success
with their assigned HUMINTers was more gradual,
but it was nevertheless there. It took more time
for them to learn CPT Gregory’s lesson: “If you put
him [the 35M] at the back of the patrol and forget
about him you will get nothing in return, but if you
put him up front and put his talent to work, then
you will get more than you could ever ask for.” 15
Afghanistan
“Yet a man who uses an imaginary map, thinking
that it is a true one, is likely to be worse off than
someone with no map at all; for he will fail to inquire
whenever he can, to observe every detail on his
way, and to search continuously with all his senses
and all his intelligence for indications of where he
should go.” –E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful
Following the Iraq deployment of 4th Brigade
(Airborne), 25th Infantry Division (Light), I moved
from battalion S2 to MICO Commander, and naturally
sought to incorporate the intelligence lessons
learned into training and operations for the current
deployment to Afghanistan. It is difficult to effect
change in a large organization without the support of
the chain of command. But this turned out not to be
an issue as the new brigade commander also believed
strongly in both the importance of the CoIST, and
also the company level placement of HUMINTers. He
had drawn the same conclusions from his previous
April - June 2009 35

service in Afghanistan as I had in Iraq. Accordingly,
the CoIST concept was soon implemented in every
maneuver company in the brigade.
The 4/25th ABCT CoIST is comprised of six people,
and is uniform throughout the brigade’s maneuver
companies. The only MOS-specific positions
are one MOS 35F Intelligence Analyst and one MOS
35M HUMINT Collector. The other positions are
the CoIST Team Leader, the Raven Operator, the
Analyst Assistant, and the HUMINT Assistant, and
are MOS immaterial. Careful training and control
has been placed on the HUMINT Assistant to ensure
that no laws are broken. They cannot conduct MSO,
but rather serve as a dedicated analyst for the 35M
and perform some tasks HUMINTers receive more
in-depth training in, such as TSE/TQ, etc.
There are, of course, challenges with the both the
CoIST concept and having HUMINTers at the companies.
The first, as I mentioned in my Iraq experience,
is that most Infantryman do not know what a
HUMINTer can do, and they are subsequently misused.
My First Sergeant and I have played a direct
liaison role with all of the maneuver companies; we
sought early in the life cycle to establish positive
working relationships so that we could help them
understand the role of intelligence at the company
level and prevent collectors and analysts from being
relegated to radio watch and the like.
Another valid argument is that just as in any unit,
the HUMINT platoon members have a varying level
of experience and maturity. One maneuver company
will get a noncommissioned officer with combat
experience and additional HUMINT schools,
and another will get a HUMINTer straight out of initial
entry training. Therefore, the junior 35Ms can
scarcely get the mentorship needed in their craft.
The junior soldiers are also likely to be less confident
in their HUMINT skills and may have difficulty
making solid recommendations to Infantry captains.
We identified these issues in advance and did
our best to match personalities of command teams
to HUMINTers, but were confident that these hurdles
were worth it. Leader training was the priority
in pre-deployment, and I stressed that it included
every HUMINTer. There have been some conflicts,
and we have adjusted to the best of our ability to
ensure adequate support for all the units.
A third problem was the availability of Category-II
Interpreters in order to maintain legality for
HUMINTers conducting MSO. Obtaining all of the
interpreters was easier than we anticipated. We
provided detailed justifications for our increased
interpreter requirement to the contracting companies
and, in less than a month, they all arrived.
When we arrived in Afghanistan, we relieved the
previous unit’s “HUMINT map.” 16 Three-fourths
of its organic HUMINT collection had been placed
in one battalion’s AO. They were placed there because
that was where the unit believed the majority
of collection was to be found. In addition, a few attached
HUMINTers provided coverage in two other
areas. Another reason they never tried to expand
their HUMINT coverage geographically was that they
thought other organizations were already collecting
where their brigade had gaps, so there was no point
to alter the order of things. However, the most important
reason why the majority of the maneuver companies
rarely saw the HUMINTers was because there
were only four HCTs, and they remained intact.
By focusing on their imaginary HUMINT map, no
one could confirm or deny whether there were more
sources to be had in many of the remote areas. Instead
of replacing HUMINT one-for-one, we drove on with
our more dispersed CoIST-focused HUMINT lay down.
Our HUMINTers are spread out over fifteen different
locations. They were able to take on the former unit’s
source pool and quickly expand it. In the areas where
there wasn’t supposed to be any reporting, we have acquired
sources. The previous unit failed to confront the
fact that even if there were other organizations running
sources in some areas, those organizations would be
collecting on a different set of criteria and responding
to a different chain of command’s priorities. The area
that our sources report on has approximately doubled
the previous unit’s network in less than ninety days.
The area covered by our source network also has a
greater correlation to occurrence of significant activity
than the previous HUMINT map. However, these are
measures of performance, and not effectiveness. The
measures of effectiveness will not become evident until
more reflection has been achieved. But, as of right now,
it would be fair to say that several of the earlier internal
critics have been greatly persuaded, if not won over.
Conclusion
“They said…that he was so devoted to Pure Science
… that he would rather have people die by the
right therapy than be cured by the wrong.” –Sinclair
Lewis, Arrowsmith
36 Military Intelligence

Afghanistan is not Iraq, anyone who has deployed
to either knows this and is frequently reminded.
However, whether addressing an urban insurgency
or a rural insurgency, “…the HUMINT collectors
must be able to maintain daily contact with the local
population.” 17 The closer a HUMINTer can get
to the population the better. In a bottom-up intelligence
structure, the place of the collector is at the
bottom, not mid-way.
There has been much resistance to the changes
that constitute this concept. The majority of this resistance
comes not from the collector himself, but
from those with great HUMINT experience in the
pre-9/11 Army. Team centricity is well established
in the HUMINT schoolhouse and amongst its subject
matter experts. But it has been my experience that
when this concept is tried, the hands-on experience
turns some doubters into believers. Just like my
Team Leader in Garmah, who fought against separating
the HCT and living with the companies, once
they go, most don’t look back. Still others remain
entirely obstinate, because it is not taught that way
and involves letting go of control. In the end, however,
this concept is really just another manifestation
of the HUMINT collector being able to, “operate
with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational
environments in support of offensive, defensive,
stability and reconstruction operations, or civil
support operations. Based on solid planning and
preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely
information if deployed forward in support of maneuver
elements.” 18
“There are never enough HUMINT collectors to
meet all requirements.” 19 But this is a maxim true of
all intelligence, whether collection or analysis, and
doubly so in COIN. The increased intelligence burden
that COIN creates easily exposes the inadequacy
of the BCT intelligence modified table of equipment.
Low-Level Voice Intercept Teams in every CoIST
would allow Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection
and tactical intelligence fusion at the company, but
the MICO’s SIGINT manning simply doesn’t support
it. The UAS platoon is designed to only have one aircraft
flying an ISR mission at a time. But, with more
operators and maintainers, it would not be difficult
to sustain aircraft conducting persistent surveillance
on multiple objectives.
There aren’t enough collection assets in the BCT’s
MICO to satisfy the requirements of the maneuver
company. This problem is exacerbated even further
by the employment of field artillery and brigade special
troops battalions as maneuver formations, as is
common practice in Afghanistan and Iraq today. As
demonstrated earlier in the article, intelligence collection
in a COIN is not “plug and play,” you cannot
train effective intelligence collection systems
while divorced from maneuver. The modular design
of the BCT necessitates an intelligence collection system
that is integrated with maneuver during training
and in combat. All of these factors place the tactical
company grade MI officer in the pillory for the lack of
organic intelligence capability within the BCT. It becomes
his job to “create” more. Training non-MI MOS
soldiers in the crafts of some INTs involves plotting an
absurd course between the desires of maneuver and
the requirements of statutes, both military and nonmilitary.
But that, clearly, is another article.
Endnotes
1. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency,
and Peacekeeping (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 1971), 98-9.
2. Kitson, 97.
3. FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, September
2006, 3-2.
4. Kitson, 96.
5. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998), 313.
6. FM 2-22.3, 2-12.
7. Scott, 317.
8. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 5-39.
9. Interview with Major Matthew Gregory, USA, FOB Salerno,
Afghanistan, 2 May 2009.
10. Ibid.
11. Interview. Major Stewart Lindsay, USA, FOB Salerno,
Afghanistan, 12 May 2009.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Interview, Gregory.
16. This is not intended as criticism of the out-going unit. Their
approach was not unreasonable and, in fact, might be considered
normal and customary. Instead, the intent is to document the gains
achieved over the traditional methods of HUMINT operations.
17. FM 2-22.3, 3-9.
18. FM 2-22.3, 1-31.
19. FM 2-22.3, 1-32.
Captain David Beall is currently serving as the MICO
Commander for the 4/25 th Airborne BCT in Operation Enduring
Freedom. He also served as the S2 for TF 3-509 th IN (ABN) and
an Armor Platoon Leader in TF 1-16 IN (MECH) during his two
deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is a graduate of
the University of Montana and an Anna Sobel Levy Fellow.
April - June 2009 37

y George A. Van Otten, PhD
Introduction
The border that separates the U.S. and Mexico runs
for approximately two thousand miles through some
of the most challenging and inhospitable terrain in
North America. It is also a place plagued by persistent
violence and crime. Currently, smugglers move
thousands of undocumented immigrants and massive
quantities of illegal drugs across the border into
the U.S. Moreover, until recently, illegal activities
along the border have steadily increased over the
last several decades.
During the same period of time, violence along the
border has become almost endemic thereby forcing
the Mexican government to directly confront the extremely
well financed, well armed, and dangerous
Mexican drug-trafficking organizations of northern
Mexico. Smugglers who operate along the border
spread terror by killing police, reporters, officials,
and members of rival organized crime units. 1 In border
cities such as Agua Prieta and Naco, Sonora,
increasingly violent acts against police and other
officials now make it difficult for Mexico to recruit
people to serve in law enforcement. Since December
of 2006, more than 5,000 Mexican citizens (including
many public officials) have been killed in drugrelated
violence. 2
In addition to the tumult that organized crime
brings to the region, gang members and smugglers
also effectively bribe and intimidate people on both
sides of the border. They know how to recruit people
driven by need, as well as those driven by greed.
Mexican drug cartels and criminal gangs have
greatly expanded their operations since the Medellin
and Cali drug cartels in Colombia were curtailed
by the cooperative efforts of the governments of
Colombia and the U.S. In addition to illegal drugs,
these cartels and gangs are also engaged in human
smuggling. 3
Whereas most Americans worry about the onerous
implications of the current situation, people who live
near the border in California, Arizona, New Mexico
and Texas regularly experience first hand the impacts
of illegal immigration and drug trafficking.
For many communities in these states, smuggling
strains the capabilities of their law enforcement and
emergency response agencies. Furthermore, the recruitment
of young men and women by drug cartels
weakens the social fabric of American towns, cities
and rural counties in the region. Although human
and drug smuggling along the entire reach of
the border between Mexico and the U.S. is an immense
problem that is, in one way or another, felt
by all Americans, no community has suffered more
than the residents of the Tohono O’odham Nation of
Southern Arizona.
Arizona
The Tohono O’odham Reservation
38 Military Intelligence
Colorado River
Gila River
Mexico
Gila Bend
Tohono O’odham
Phoenix Salt River
Tohono
O’odham
Reservation
Gila River Reservation
Gila River
Santa Cruz
River
Tucson
San Pedro River
San Xavier
Reservation
N

The southern boundary of the Tohono O’odham
(formerly called Papago) Reservation runs for approximately
78 miles along the U.S. border with Mexico.
When the current boundary was established in the
mid-nineteenth century by the Gadsden Treaty between
Mexico and the U.S., no one seemed to notice
that the new border cut through the traditional
homeland of the Tohono O’odham (Desert People).
The Desert People generally disregarded the border
and travelled back and forth between Mexico and
the U.S. with few restrictions. Over the last several
decades however, tightened security has made
cross-border travel for the Tohono O’odham increasingly
difficult. For all practical purposes, the
Tohono O’odham who have always wanted to be left
to live in keeping with their traditional ways and
values (Him-dag), are now caught in the middle of
the ongoing international crisis on the border.
The Tohono O’odham
The Tohono O’odham have occupied the desert region
of southern Arizona and northern Sonora for
centuries. Their traditional semi-nomadic, agricultural
lifestyle was intrinsically intertwined with the
summer monsoon rains of the desert that brought
their crops to fruition.
Prior to the official demarcation of the Reservation,
the Tohono O’odham system of governance focused
on the family, clan, and village. Traditionally, villages
were led by headmen who settled disputes and
provided guidance. Headmen also protected the sacred
artifacts of the village and made certain that
ceremonies followed proper traditions. 4 Throughout
their history, the Tohono O’odham were, and have
remained, a peaceful people dedicated to the preservation
of their language, culture and traditions.
Spanish Influence
When the Spanish first arrived in the Santa Cruz
River Valley in the 1680s, they were surprised to
find irrigated fields spreading out for several miles
on both sides of the river near the village of Bac
(near the site of modern-day Tucson). Soon after,
the Spanish priest, Eusebio Kino arrived in the region
and almost immediately initiated the construction
of missions in order to convert the indigenous
people to Catholicism. He also sought to establish
European style ranches and mines. Although
he was primarily interested in saving souls, Father
Kino also had a passion for farming and ranching.
He introduced European crops to indigenous farmers
and encouraged them to move into permanent
settlements near the missions.
In the 1700s, the Apache began to raid O’odham
villages. 5 Despite European influences and Apache
raids however, the Tohono O’odham continued to
cling to their traditions. They were nonetheless
changed by these encroachments in that many adopted
the Catholic faith, learned to raise cattle and
European crops, and were forced to develop effective
defenses against those who attacked them. 6
The Tohono O’odham and Mexico
Mexico became independent from Spain in 1821.
By 1828, the Mexican government began closing
Spanish missions throughout the Tohono O’odham
homeland and for the most part, left the Desert
People alone. Even so, many Mexican citizens continued
to establish farms, ranches and mines in areas
traditionally occupied by the Tohono O’odham.
By 1840, such encroachments were becoming serious
enough to cause conflicts between Mexican immigrants
and the Desert People. At one point, the
Tohono O’odham battled with these immigrants
near the Mexican border-town of Cobota. 7
The Americans and the New Border
In 1846, the U.S. and Mexico fought over the location
of the international border between the two
nations. In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
ended the war, but the exact location of the border
was not formalized until 1853 when both nations
signed the Gadsden Treaty. Despite the fact
that the new border cut through the heart of the
Tohono O’odham homeland, the U.S. and Mexico
did not include representatives of the Desert People
in the negotiations. Moreover, the U.S. did not grant
citizenship to the Tohono O’odham who lived on
the north side of the new border. 8 Without citizenship,
and without the protection of a formally established
reservation, the O’odham homeland north
of the border became part of the public domain of
the U.S., thereby opening these lands to American
settlers. As non-Indians began to settle on their
land, the Desert People moved further into more
isolated parts of their territory. 9 Additionally, the
Desert People and non-Indians disagreed over the
use of land and water. To put an end to this tension,
President U.S. Grant created the 71,000 acre San
Xavier Reservation near the city of Tucson, Arizona
April - June 2009 39

in 1874. In 1882 the federal government set aside
another 10,000 acres near Gila Bend, Arizona.
Because many of the Desert People did not move
to the reservations, they continued to clash with
non-Indians in the area. In 1916, the federal government
responded by setting aside more than two
million acres for the use of the Desert People. 10 Over
the next thirty years, it added additional pieces of
land to the Reservation. It is now the second largest
Native American reservation (after the Navajo) in
the U.S. 11
In 1934, in keeping with the Indian Reorganization
Act, the Tohono O’odham established the “Papago
Tribe of Arizona.” 12 The creation of a centralized
tribal government was a dramatic departure from
the traditionally decentralized, village-based, consensus-oriented
O’odham culture and many tribal
members continued to go to their villages to discuss
problems and ask for decisions. 13
Over the years following the implementation of
the Indian Reorganization Act, the tribal government
located at Sells, Arizona has increased its
authority over the affairs of the Desert People.
Moreover, the Tribal Legislative Council is empowered
by its fiduciary role for federal and tribal
dollars and by the tendency of all non-O’odham
to go to the Council to transact business on the
Reservation. Therefore, though many continue to
practice traditional ways, and the O’odham language
is spoken throughout the Reservation, regular
interaction with the dominant society makes
the preservation of the traditional culture an increasingly
challenging goal.
The Tohono O’odham Reservation
This is a vast, rugged region of exceptional beauty
that encompasses approximately three million acres
immediately north of the U.S. border with Mexico.
Despite some urban development near Sells (the
Nation’s capital) and the cultivation of thousands
of acres by the tribal farm, the lion’s share of the
Reservation continues to be characterized by large
tracts of natural desert and open range dotted with
small villages and family compounds.
The desert of Southern Arizona is characterized
by hot summers with temperatures often exceeding
100 degrees. Although winters are generally
mild, night time temperatures sometimes drop be-
low freezing. Normally, rainfall is scant, but from
time to time, summer thunder storms result in torrents
of water that flood washes and restrict travel.
Natural vegetation on the Reservation is surprisingly
lush and includes a wide variety of desert
flora. Reservation wildlife, typical of the desert climate,
remains diverse and abundant despite years
of cattle ranching. 14
Despite its great beauty, the desert presents major
challenges to those who are unaccustomed to its
extremes. Summer heat, winter cold, long distances
between sources of water, poisonous wildlife, wild
animals, rough terrain, and vast areas of isolated
country pose serious risks to those who try to travel
over the Reservation on foot.
Crisis on the Border
Until recently, the Desert People were free to
travel back and forth between Mexico and the
Reservation to visit family members and to take part
in ceremonies and celebrations. Recently however,
robust enforcement makes cross-border travel difficult.
Whereas, stronger border security inconveniences
tribal members who travel back and forth
between Mexico and the U.S. legally, thousands
of immigrants from Mexico use the isolation of the
Reservation to avoid detection to cross illegally into
the U.S. According to the Tohono O’odham Police,
as many as 1,500 people from Mexico pass through
the Reservation every day. 15 Furthermore, since
2000, the U.S. Border Patrol has investigated 1,156
deaths of illegal migrants that have occurred on the
Reservation as a result of the harsh remoteness of
the environment. 16 These deaths have placed immense
psychological, social, and financial burdens
on the Desert People.
Over the last decade, there have been several incursions
into the Reservation by people dressed
in Mexican uniforms. In March 1999, Homeland
Security personnel were fired on by personnel wearing
Mexican military uniforms who were smuggling
illegal drugs into the U.S. In April 2000, a cattle
truck drove into the village of Menager’s Dam on
the O’odham Reservation carrying men wearing
Mexican military uniforms and armed with machine
guns. In January 2002, two men, dressed as
Mexican soldiers, crashed into a car and killed two
innocent people while smuggling drugs through the
Reservation. Later in May 2002, a Tohono O’odham
40 Military Intelligence

Nation Ranger was pursued by men wearing Mexican
military uniforms and driving a military vehicle. 17
Impacts of Illegal Immigration on the
Reservation
Through no fault of their own, the Desert People
are now caught in the middle of an immense crisis
created by decisions made long ago and exacerbated
by perceptions of wealth and opportunity
in the U.S. relative to the poverty and deprivation
that is often synonymous with life in Mexico.
Furthermore, illegal immigration and drug smuggling
on the Reservation directly threaten the best
efforts of the Tohono O’odham to preserve their traditional
culture and way-of-life.
Many illegal immigrants who come from Mexico
to the Reservation arrive in need of water, food, and
medical attention. The humanitarian needs of these
people cannot be ignored by the Tohono O’odham
who must, by tradition, help others in need. On the
other hand, tribal members do not want to be arrested
for aiding illegal immigrants. Because of these
and other similar problems, Tribal Chairman, Ned
Norris, stresses the need for better communications
and consultation between O’odham leaders
and federal officials. Though cooperation between
the tribal and federal government is evident, and
despite efforts by the U.S. Border Patrol to improve
relations with the O’odham nation, many tribal
members believe the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) should show greater concern for the
sovereignty of the Tohono O’odham Nation. 18
Large numbers of illegal immigrants have resulted
in increased levels of crime on the Reservation.
During March 2008 alone, an estimated 15,500 illegal
immigrants entered the Reservation. 19 The
Desert People now find it necessary to secure their
homes because immigrants have stolen food, clothing
and other possessions. Sometimes, people
find undocumented immigrants sleeping on their
porches or in outbuildings near their homes. Until
recently, people who lived on the Reservation were
able to walk through the desert without fear. Now
they have found it increasingly necessary to take
personal security measures in order to protect their
families and their possessions.
Although these problems are immense, one of
the most damaging ramifications of human and
drug smuggling on the Reservation is the instant
wealth that smugglers offer to people who have
lived in poverty and deprivation for generations.
The lure of tax free dollars in exchange for transportation,
food, water, and shelter has led some
tribal members (especially the young) to participate
in smuggling. Additionally, for humanitarian
reasons, some people have established water
stations along well-travelled routes through the
Reservation. Whereas these stations save lives,
they also draw illegal migrants and smugglers.
Water stations are a contentious issue on the
Reservation, and families are sometimes torn
apart by differences of opinion over interaction
with illegal migrants and smugglers.
The Tohono O’odham value privacy and do not
welcome intrusions by outsiders. The smuggling
of large numbers of people and drugs now brings
hundreds of law enforcement personnel to the
Reservation. As Border Patrol agents and employees
of other agencies attempt to apprehend undocumented
migrants and drug smugglers, they often
find it necessary to intrude on the private lives of
the Desert People. Additionally, most of the authorities
who are assigned to work on the Reservation
have not studied the nature of O’odham culture,
values, attitudes and beliefs. Sometimes, this lack
of knowledge leads to misunderstandings and tense
encounters.
Costs of Illegal Immigration
Illegal immigrants leave more than 2,000 tons of
cast-off bottles, clothing, back packs, and human
waste on the Reservation each year. This trash is
more than merely an eyesore; it is hazardous to
wildlife, domestic animals, and local residents. The
Tohono O’odham Nation now finds it necessary to
spend thousands of dollars each year to remove this
garbage. Furthermore, those who live in the small
villages and ranches scattered over the Reservation
are also forced to haul away truck loads of garbage
and waste left near their homes. 20
In 2003, the Tohono O’odham Nation spent more
than three million dollars to combat illegal immigration
and smuggling and these costs have continued
to escalate. This, however, is not the only potentially
disastrous ramification of illegal immigration and
smuggling. The involvement of some tribal members
in these activities seriously complicates the
Nation’s long term commitment to the preservation
of the Tohono O’odham culture. Smugglers are will-
April - June 2009 41

ing to pay local people as much as $1,500 per person
to drive illegal immigrants from the Reservation
to the Phoenix metropolitan area. They also pay for
storage, food, water, shelter, and the transportation
of illegal narcotics. A person who has access
to a six passenger vehicle could receive more than
$7,000.00 (tax free) for making an eight hour round
trip. For many people who live on the Reservation,
that is a lot of money. While no one knows the exact
amount of personal income that comes to some
tribal members as a result of providing these services,
one study found that the annual total may
exceed $13,795,000. 21
The Desert People live in close-knit communities.
For them, the participation of tribal members
in smuggling and other such activities presents
an immense challenge because the Tribal Police
are sometimes called upon to arrest people who
they know very well. Even so, they work closely
with federal, state, and county authorities to enforce
the law and stem the flow of illegal migrants
and smuggling on the Reservation. 22
During fiscal year 2002, the Tohono O’odham
Nation was forced to spend nearly $7,000,000 to
deal with the manifestations of illegal migration.
During this period, 85 illegal immigrants died on
the Reservation causing $266,050 to be spent on
autopsies and other related costs. At the same
time, Tribal Police dealt with 140 drug smuggling
cases at a cost of $642,880; twelve immigrant related
homicides costing $260,000 to investigate;
towed nearly 4,000 abandoned immigrant vehicles
at a cost of $180,000, and provided medical
emergency treatment to immigrants at a cost of
more than $500,000. 23
Although the Tohono O’odham Nation receives
some assistance from the federal government,
the massive numbers of illegal entrants to the
Reservation have made it necessary for the Desert
People to divert scarce resources from other pressing
needs including support to schools, economic
development, and infrastructure improvements.
Law Enforcement Issues
While most tribal members want to put an end to
crime on the Reservation, many are uncomfortable
with the presence of large numbers of non-O’odham
law enforcement personnel in their communities.
Tribal members tell their leaders that some-
times they are inconvenienced, or even harassed
by these personnel. They also point out that many
federal law enforcement officers and agents seem to
know little about the traditional ways of the Desert
People. They call upon the Federal Government and
other governments to respect the sovereignty of the
Tohono O’odham Nation. 24
Tribal Chairman, Ned Norris, Jr., in written testimony
to a Joint Subcommittee of the U.S. House
of Representatives in April 2008, noted that the
Tohono O’odham Nation has worked closely with
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to find alternatives
to walls along the border. He argues that
viable alternatives include vehicle barriers, towers,
check-points, and camera-radar systems. He believes
that these methods can effectively improve
security without causing the environmental damage
and personal inconveniences associated with
the construction of a wall. The Tohono O’odham are
particularly concerned about the impacts of a border
wall on migratory wildlife such as the Mexican
jaguar. Chairman Norris now calls upon the federal
government to repeal the authority given to the
Secretary of Homeland Security to wave the limitations
of the Environmental Protection Act in the interests
of security. 25
In recent years, the Border Patrol has sought to expose
agents who patrol on the Reservation to Tohono
O’odham culture. It also employs a community relations
officer who works closely with tribal members
to insure effective communications. 26 Nevertheless,
the training that most Border Patrol personnel receive
about the culture of the Desert People remains
fairly light. Given the complex nature of the current
situation, it is clear that law enforcement personnel
assigned to work on the Reservation would benefit
from training designed to immerse them in the traditions,
values, attitudes, and beliefs of the Desert
People.
Initiatives to Deal with Illegal
Immigration and Smuggling
Tribal police, as well as federal and state law enforcement
agencies, are making strides in finding
effective ways to stop the flow of illegal migrants and
drugs through the Reservation. Among the more
important of these initiatives are the employment
of Native American ‘Shadow Wolf’ trackers, and the
training of law enforcement personnel in the gathering,
analysis and use of actionable intelligence by
42 Military Intelligence

the Directorate of Intelligence Support to Homeland
Security (DISHLS), U.S. Army Intelligence Center
(USAIC), at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
The Shadow Wolves
Although high-tech intelligence and tracking
techniques are employed in order to capture illegal
immigrants and smugglers on the Reservation, the
Shadow Wolves effectively employ low-tech procedures
and techniques. These federal agents are a
Native American group of interdiction specialists,
who work under U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), within the DHS, using their
highly honed tracking skills to find and apprehend
drug smugglers operating on the Reservation.
During the first six months of 2007, the Shadow
Wolves seized almost 50,000 pounds of marijuana
on the Reservation. In addition to putting their
tracking skills to work, they also train other U.S law
enforcement agents as well as border guards from
other nations including Lithuania, Latvia, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Macedonia. 27
Cultural Awareness and Intelligence
Training
The ongoing war against terrorism in the Middle
East has brought about increasingly sophisticated
intelligence capabilities, more effective training
strategies and techniques, and an expanding emphasis
on cultural awareness training and education
within the U.S. military. Although the Tohono
O’odham are loyal U.S. citizens, they are strongly
committed to the preservation of their culture and
language, and they think of the Reservation as a
sacred homeland. Non-O’odham law enforcement
personnel assigned to work on the Reservation
should receive cultural awareness training that is
at least as robust as the training given to members
of the U.S. Armed Forces who are stationed in Iraq
and Afghanistan. USAIC has been at the forefront
in the development and delivery of cultural awareness
training for the military.
For six years USAIC, through DISHLS, has provided
basic and advanced intelligence training and
education for personnel from a variety of agencies
associated with the DHS mission. DISHLS has provided
specialized training via mobile training teams
(MTTs) including courses on terrorism and counterterrorism,
the reporting of intelligence data, intelligence
preparation of the operational environment,
combating terrorism, interviewing techniques, interrogation,
and effective report writing.
DISHLS has made courses available to U.S. Border
Patrol and other law enforcement agencies in a variety
of locations throughout the U.S. and provided
training to personnel attached to the Tucson Sector
of the U.S. Border Patrol, charged with protecting
the border from the Eastern Yuma County to the
Arizona/New Mexico boundary.
Tucson Sector
In addition to providing intelligence training
through MTTs, DISHLS is currently striving to supplement
traditional intelligence training with appropriately
designed distributed learning (DL) courses
offered through USAIC’s University of Military
Intelligence (UMI). The Directorate is also working
with Cochise College and other institutions of higher
learning (including the Tohono O’odham Nation’s
Community College) to gain college credits for many
of these courses. Available supplemental courses
include writing and critical thinking. Additionally,
UMI is currently developing DL courses on the importance
of culture and intelligence.
It is increasingly evident that securing the nation’s
borders is dependent on the robust collection
of information, effective analysis and the insightful
application of the resultant intelligence. In order
to do this, all law enforcement personnel who
work along the border (as well as local residents)
should be trained to concisely report observations
that could provide a tactical advantage to tribal
and other officials charged with bringing smuggling
and illegal immigration on the Reservation
April - June 2009 43

under control. In keeping with this concept, the
DISHLS and UMI are working to provide access to
such training and education to appropriate tribal,
community, county, and federal personnel. This
initiative is designed to increase the cost effectiveness
and timeliness of homeland security training
and education, and rests upon the current federal
mandate to all branches of government to share
information and resources wherever and whenever
possible.
Securing the Reservation Border
Although there is, as yet, insufficient data available
to definitively state that illegal immigration from
Mexico into the U.S. is in a long term decline, Leslie
Fulbright (San Francisco Chronicle), reported in
October 2008 that the numbers of illegal immigrants
have decreased in response to a slowing U.S. economy
and more effective border security measures. 28
Ronald J. Hansen (The Arizona Republic) stated that
illegal immigration in the U.S. has dropped by about
eleven percent over the last year. He attributes this
to the slowing American economy and the stepped
up efforts of the Border Patrol. 29
Despite these reports however, there has yet to
be a noticeable decline in the social and economic
costs of smuggling and illegal immigration on the
Reservation. Tribal, state, and federal personnel
continue to find enforcement of the 78 mile Tohono
O’odham border with Mexico a daunting challenge
and continue to seek effective and efficient intelligence
training opportunities through which they
can enhance their abilities to collect, process, and
apply intelligence to their vital homeland security
mission.
Conclusion
The creation of the border between Mexico and the
U.S. caused many serious, although not immediately
apparent, problems for the Desert People. In
1853, none who signed the Gadsden Treaty could
have foreseen the wave of violence and crime that
now characterizes life on the border. Because they
had nothing to do with creating the border in the
first place, the Tohono O’odham have historically
regarded it with ambivalence. In recent decades
however, drug and human smuggling have made it
necessary for federal officials, including the Border
Patrol, to critically scrutinize roads and communities
throughout the Reservation.
Although the majority of the Desert People support
efforts to stop smuggling and illegal immigration
from Mexico into the U.S. through their vast
Reservation, many are often disconcerted by constant
interaction with non-O’odham law enforcement
personnel. Differences in values, attitudes,
and beliefs sometimes lead to misunderstandings
that are not conducive to effective cooperation between
local tribal members who may have information
that could help build the intelligence base
needed to secure the border.
Gaining the cooperation of the Desert People could
be more easily accomplished if they were convinced
that non-O’odham law enforcement personnel understood,
and showed deference to, O’odham ways
and culture. The successful completion of a comprehensive
course on the language, history, traditions,
values, and culture of the Desert People by all
non-O’odham tasked with securing the Reservation
border with Mexico would be compelling evidence of
the desire of local, state, and federal governments
to work in respectful partnership with the Tohono
O’odham Nation. Such a course could be developed
and offered (some parts of it via DL) through a cooperative
venture between USAIC (DISHLS and UMI)
and the Tohono O’odham Community College.
Many tribal members now view with alarm the
numbers of O’odham youth who have been recruited
to work for the drug cartels and smugglers. They
know that unless the current invasion is halted,
the Reservation cannot become a prosperous, safe
hearth of traditional O’odham culture. An effective,
well planned long term effort to stop illegal immigration
and drug smuggling on the Reservation is
possible if federal, state, and other authorities fully
cooperate and consult with the Tohono O’odham
Nation.
Though the federal government has a moral obligation
to protect the rights of all indigenous groups
in the Nation, shielding the Tohono O’odham from
the disastrous consequences of smuggling and illegal
immigration is especially important because the
security of the Reservation is increasingly linked
to the security of the entire U.S. Actionable intelligence
coupled with high quality applied training
and education can do much to assist the tribal police,
Border Patrol and other law enforcement agencies
as they cooperatively endeavor to secure the
border.
44 Military Intelligence

Endnotes
1. Michael F. Logan, The Lessening Stream: An Environmental
History of the Santa Cruz River (Tucson, Arizona: The University of
Arizona Press, 2000), 15-181.
2. Chris Hawley, Drug Monitor, “Violence Rises on the US/Mexico
Border,” 14 September 2008, at http://mexicomonitor.blogspot.
com/2008/09/drug-monitor-on-violence-on-usmexico.html.
3. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Investigations, Michael T. McCaul, Chairman, “A Line in the Sand:
Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border,” 2007 at http://
www.house.gov/sites/members/tx10_mccaul/pdf/Investigaions-
Border-Report.pdf. and Lee Morgan, The Reaper’s Line: Life
and Death on the Mexican Border (Tucson, Arizona: Rio Nuevo
Publishers, 2006), 54-245.
4. Ruth Underhill, The Papago and Pima Indians of Arizona (Palmer
Lake, Colorado: The Filter Press, 1979), 1-57.
5. Logan.
6. J.D. Hendricks, Resistance and Collaboration: O’odham Responses
to U.S. Invasion (Long Beach, California: Tiamat Publications, 2004)
at http://www.tiamatpublications.com/docs/Collaboration_and_
Resistance.pdf.
7. Bernard Fontana, Of Earth and Little Rain (Tucson, Arizona: The
University of Arizona Press, 1989), 1-40.
8. In general, American Indians were not granted American
citizenship until the Indian Citizenship Act was enacted in 1924.
9. Hendricks.
10. Hendricks.
11. George Van Otten, “A Development Feasibility Study for San Lucy
District,” Department of Geography and Public Planning, Northern
Arizona University, 1-18.
12. The Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act) of 1934
called for Indian Nations to establish home rule or tribal governments.
See http://www.maquah.net/Kafkaesque/statutes/IRA-330.html.
13. Peter Blaine, Sr. with Michael S. Adams, Papagos and Politics
(Tucson, Arizona: The Arizona Historical Society Press, 1981),
67-90.
14. William G. McGinnies, “An Overview of the Sonoran Desert, An
Essay,” Developed from a Paper, Second Annual Conference of the
Consortium of Arid Lands Institutions, 4 February 1976, Tucson,
Arizona at http://alic.aric.arizona.edu/sonoran/documents/
mcginnies/McGinnies_overview.html.
15. John Dougherty, High Country News, “One Nation, Under Fire,”
19 February 2007 at http://www.hcn.org/issues/340/16834.
16. Brady McCombs and Eric Volante, Arizona Daily Star, 9
December 2007, “Deadliest Migrant Trail in U.S. is Right on Tucson’s
Doorstep,” A1-A2.
17. National Congress of American Indians, The Tohono O’odham
Nation and Homeland Security Report, 2003 at http://www.
ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/Tohono%20O’Odham%20
Nation%20Law%20Enforcement%20Materials.pdf
18. McCombs and Volante.
19. Ned Norris, Written Testimony to the Subcommittee on
Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans and Subcommittee on National
Parks, Forests and Public Lands of the House Committee on Natural
Resources: Joint Oversight Hearing, Walls and Waivers: Expedited
Construction of the Southern Border Wall and Collateral Impacts to
Communities and the Environment, 28 April 2008 at http://www.
tiamatpublications.com/docs/testimony_norris.pdf.
20. Gary Gross, Union Tribune, “Triple Fence along Border Would
Split Indian Nation,” 22 October 2006 at http://www.signonsandiego.
com/news/nation/20061022-9999-1n22tohono.html.
21. Kenneth D. Madsen, “A Nation Across Nations: The Tohono
O’odham and the U.S. Mexico Border,” unpublished doctoral
dissertation, (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State University, 2005), 139-
176.
22. Ibid.
23. National Congress of American Indians and the Tohono O’odham
Nation.
24. Madsen.
25. Norris.
26. Jose A. Gonzalez and Cristina Metheney, U.S. Border Patrol
Agents, Personal telephone interview, 9 December 2007.
27. Sylvia Moreno, The Washington Post, “‘Shadow Wolves’ Prowl the
U.S.–Mexico Border,” 6 May 2007 at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/05/AR2007050500771_
pf.html.
28. Leslie Fulbright, The San Francisco Chronicle, “Illegal Immigration
Slows as Economy Weakens,” 3 October 2008 at http://www.sfgate.
com/c/a/2008/10/02/BAGU139QIL.DTL.
29. Ronald J. Hansen, Arizonal Republic, “Number of Illegal Migrants
in Arizona, U.S. Plummets,” 31 July 2008 at http://www.azcentral.
com/news/articles/2008/07/31/20080731immigration0731.html.
George A. Van Otten, PhD is a retired Lieutenant Colonel,
USAR, and graduate of the MI Advanced Course and the
Command and General Staff College. He is a professor
emeritus at Northern Arizona University and retired Dean
of Training for USAIC. Dr. Van Otten holds a BS and MS
in Education from Western Oregon University and PhD in
Geography from Oregon State University. Currently, he is a
Strategic Planner for CACI, working with USAIC’s UMI and
DISHLS.
April - June 2009 45

BCST: The Army’s Premiere Battle Command Systems Collective Task Trainer
by Major Michael Spears
Day three of the MRX in the 1st BCT TOC: The Battle Captain remains focused on the CPOF in front of him
as battalion events continue to populate his “BCT Events” effort from simulated, subordinate battalions. The
Fire Support Cell shouts out, “Acquisition! AO Mustangs!” based on the AFATDS display, which immediately
causes the brigade staff to execute its Indirect Fire Battle Drill. In the White Cell room, a “puckster” continues
to provide event injects (events and reports) from his BCST computer into the brigade ABCS network . . .
Introduction
The introduction of various complex digital Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) across the Army over
the past several years has been accompanied by the creation of complicated, and often costly, simulations
programs and specialized applications to stimulate the ABCS boxes. Units required a training capability
to exercise and sustain ABCS skills to ensure user proficiency and employment of the entire ABCS
network. Current simulation programs, such as the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) and the Joint Combat
and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) serve very useful purposes for major training exercises, but require high
overhead for small unit training purposes. Some of this overhead includes external support and extensive
lead time for coordination.
History
As a result of unit requests for ABCS stimulation assistance, the National Simulation Center (NSC) initially
developed a low-overhead software application, which we know today as the Battle Command Staff
Trainer (BCST). Since its creation, the NSC worked with numerous agencies and program managers to
transition BCST and ensure mutual capability refinement. The Product Director, Common Services, under
direction of Program Manager Battle Command, now has responsibility to continue development of the
BCST. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager-Battle Command
(TCM-BC) is responsible for requirements generation and oversight.
Uses
BCST enables units to conduct battle staff training on ABCS command and control systems via internal
resources with minimal setup time and effort and facilitates collective and individual staff training (sustainment
and refresher) for specific sections or entire staffs, from battalion through U.S. Army Service
46 Military Intelligence

Component Command levels. Significant training opportunities afforded by BCST include: maintain and
improve highly perishable ABCS skills, train new battle staff personnel, apply staff coordination drills, battle
rhythm development and train-up for exercises/events. This software also provides an ability to stimulate
the battle staff reactions to friendly and enemy events, as well as planned Master Scenario Events
List (MSEL) injects to initiate staff reactions. BCST should only be used on training networks, never
on real-world operational network. The risk of mixed BCST simulated and real-world operational
events is too great!
What BCST is and is Not
BCST is a training program that operates on standard personal computer systems with Microsoft
Windows XP and is applicable to both Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) units, as well as Battle
Command Training Centers (BCTCs). However, this software application is not: hardware or computer,
a substitute for ABCS, or a replacement for CBS, JCATS, or other constructive training simulations.
These systems, like BCST, were born of necessity and serve a very useful purpose for larger-scale training
exercises.
How Units Receive BCST
Currently, BCST is provided to Army units through unit set fielding (USF) beginning in December
2008 or via the BCST AKO download site. Based on the approved USF schedule for AC/RC/National
Guard units, the software fielding and new equipment training (NET) dates are synchronized with
the unit’s input. The computer discs issued during NET include the actual BCST program, as well
as a reference disc that includes training support packages (TSPs) with specific scenarios. Units that
have recently completed USF and ABCS NET may download the BCST program and TSPs from AKO at
https://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/10244567.*
BCST NET
Prior to BCST NET, units should receive all ABCS equipment and complete NET for those systems.
During BCST NET, select personnel from the S/G-3 and S/G-6 will receive instruction on how to connect
the BCST into the ABCS network, BCST operator training, and exercise scenario skills. Additionally
BCTCs and Centers of Excellence will receive the BCST program and NET based on delivery coordination.
A tiered support apparatus will provide support to units for assistance with the BCST program to resolve
identified issues.
Summary
BCST has tremendous training potential for any Army battle staff, especially at brigade and battalion
levels. BCST provides: a flexible training medium to maintain operators’ proficiency on their respective
systems; flexible training employment, and great resources for quality collective training at
no cost to the unit. Additionally, this capability enhances and complements BCTC supported events
and exercises. The application and references provide a low-overhead training capability package that
commanders, staff sections, or institutions, can use to train on ABCS system-of-systems with organic
resources when they choose.
Questions and comments may be directed to: TCM-BC, ATTN: C2 Branch (BCST), 806 Harrison Drive,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2326 or POCs Major Michael Spears at michael.r.spears@us.army.mil,
(913)684-4505 or Mr. Gregory Eddy, at gregory.j.eddy@conus.army.mil, (913) 684-4597 of TCM-BC.
Once units have received the software, familiarized their units with it, and used it, send suggested improvements
and recommendations for new features to MAJ Spears and/or Mr. Eddy.
Meanwhile, back in the White Cell room, the BCST operator checks his MSEL, and initiates an event
that stimulates the DCGS-A box, as the brigade staff continues to execute their staff coordination and
battle drills . . .
*AKO users will request access to this site from the BCST POCs.
April - June 2009 47

Introduction
One of the most important functions during operations
is assessment–determining if the operations
are achieving the tasks and purposes that are intended.
The use of three different constructs assist
in assessment: indicators, measures of performance,
and measures of effectiveness. Understanding these
constructs and their use is critical to determine if
operations are focused on the desired end state.
The purpose for this article is to describe in detail
two of these concepts: measures of performance
and measures of effectiveness. Indicators are an important
construct, but most intelligence professionals
are familiar with indicators–items of information
that are measurable, collectable, and relevant to
give insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure
of performance. 1
MOP and MOE Joint Doctrine
Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations and
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning provide an explanation
of the terms measure of performance and
measure of effectiveness. The following are the definitions
from JP 5-0:
Measure of Performance (MOP): A criterion used
to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring
task accomplishment.
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE): A criterion used
to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or
operational environment that is tied to measuring
the attainment of an end state, achievement of an
objective, or creation of an effect. 2
JP 5-0 also provides an explanatory chart that
provides some clarity to the concepts of MOP and
MOE and how they interrelate. 3
by Colonel Jack D. Kem, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Level
National
Strategic
Theater
Strategic
Operational
ASSESSMENT LEVELS AND MEASURES
End State and
Objectives
-End State & Mission
-Objectives
-E�ects
-Tasks
-Mission
-Objectives
-E�ects
-Tasks
-Mission
-Objectives
-Tasks
It is important to note that MOPs relate to the
tasks being performed with the question “Are we
doing things right?” MOEs relate to the effects and
objectives with the question “Are we doing the right
things?” JP 5-0 states that “MOPs are closely associated
with task accomplishment” whereas MOEs
“measure the attainment of an end state, achievement
of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do
not measure task performance.” 4
MOP and MOE–Army Doctrine
Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, provides a similar
explanation of the terms MOP and MOE. FM 3-0
states that “measures of performance answer the
question, “Was the task or action performed as the
commander intended?” A measure of performance
confirms or denies that a task has been properly
performed.” For MOEs, FM 3-0 states “measures of
effectiveness focus on the results or consequences
of actions taken. They answer the question, ‘Is the
force doing the right things, or are additional or
alternative actions required?’ A measure of effectiveness
provides a benchmark against which the
48 Military Intelligence
Tactical
Guidance
Assessed using measures of
e�ectiveness -- MOEs
(Are we doing the right things?)
Assessed using measures of
performance -- MOPs
(Are we doing the right things?)
Battle Damage
Assessment
Reattack or
Future Targeting
Combat tasks
(particularly �res)
use Combat Assessment
Munitions E�ectiveness
Assessment

commander assesses progress toward accomplishing
the mission.” 5
FM 3-07, Stability Operations, provides a more explicit
definition of the concepts of MOP and MOE:
MOP: A measure of performance is a criterion
used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring
task accomplishment (JP 3-0). At the most
basic level, every Soldier assigned a task maintains
a formal or informal checklist to track task completion.
The items on that checklist are measures
of performance. At battalion level and above, command
posts monitor measures of performance for
assigned tasks. Examples of measures of performance
include the construction of a training facility
for host-nation security forces or an increased border
presence by friendly forces. 6
MOE: A measure of effectiveness is a criterion
used to assess changes in system behavior, capability,
or operational environment that is tied to measuring
the attainment of an end state, achievement
of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). They
focus on the results or consequences of task execution
and provide information that guides decisions
to take additional or alternate actions. Examples of
measures of effectiveness include reduced insurgent
activity, reduced inflation rates, and improvements
in agricultural production. 7
FM 3-07 also provides an excellent description
and example of how indicators are used to assess
MOPs and MOEs.
Indicator: An indicator is an item of information
that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness
or measure of performance. Indicators use available
information to inform a specific measure of performance
or measure of effectiveness. A single indicator
can inform multiple measures of performance
and measures of effectiveness. Valid indicators are
measurable, collectable, and relevant to a specific
time. Examples of indicators include bushels of apples
sold in a specific market in the past month,
number of escalation of force incidents along a given
route in the past 90 days, and number of bridges repaired
in a province.
MOP and MOE–Relating the Concepts
One useful way to think of MOPs and MOEs is to
think of them in terms of task and purpose. MOPs
relate to accomplishment of the task and MOEs relate
to the accomplishment of the purpose. For ex-
ample, a unit may be given the task and purpose of
occupying a hill in order to provide early warning.
The task of occupying the hill expertly executed; the
accomplishment of this task provides a MOP. If the
occupation of the hill does not provide early warning,
or doesn’t achieve the intended purpose for the
occupation, this is reflected as in a MOE.
Another example is that a unit may be tasked to
conduct at least ten patrols a day in a neighborhood
in order to gain the confidence of the local populace.
Even though the unit might conduct the requisite
number of patrols to standard, it still may not result
in confidence. From a MOP standpoint, the unit is
successful; from an MOE standpoint, it may not be.
As a result, MOP could easily be considered more
of a quantitative measure, while MOE tends to be a
qualitative measure.
The focus for MOP is primarily internal, answering
the question “Are we doing what we are told to
do?” MOE may have an external focus, answering
the question “Do our actions have the effect on others
that we are expecting?
The chart below illustrates a comparison of the
concepts of MOP and MOE and how they relate to
task and purpose, quantitative vs. qualitative measures,
internal vs. external focus, and the primary
questions to ask for each measure.
Relationship to Task
& Purpose
Quantitative vs.
Qualitative Measures
Internal vs. External
Focus
Primary Question
April - June 2009 49
MOP
Relates directly to Task
Primarily Quantitative
Internal Focus (Task at
hand)
Are we doing things
right? (Are we
accomplishing the task
to standard?)
MOE
Relates directly to Purpose
Primarily Qualitative
External Focus (Impact of
Actions)
Are we doing the right
things? (Are the things we
are doing getting us to the
end state we want?)
MOP and MOE–Examples from Operations
Using MOP and MOE for assessment does not just
apply to combat operations. The concepts also easily
apply to stability operations and to support to
civil authorities. In stability operations, there may
be a number of objectives that easily translate into
MOP and MOE measures. For example, if a line of
effort in a stability operation is the establishment

of the rule of law, there will be a number of tasks
that are given to units to support the legal system
in a region. The task and purpose for a unit could
be stated in such a way: Establish/fund judicial
training institutes in order to establish civilian trust
in the legitimacy of the judiciary system and to further
the establishment of the rule of law that fosters
the confidence of the people in the legal and judicial
systems.
In this case, the MOP and MOE could be:
MOPs: Numbers of judicial training institutes
established.
Amount of funding contributed for
institutes.
Establishment of accreditation agency for
law schools.
MOEs: Increase in public trust in the judiciary
system.
Increase in confidence in the legal and
judicial systems.
Another example from a support to civil authorities
mission could be in support of a line of effort
for public health and medical services. The task
and purpose for a unit could be stated in such a
way: Re-establish public health and medical services
in order to remove disease threat to save lives,
mitigate human suffering and restore critical services
and to enable the transfer of DOD relief operations
to civil authorities.
In this case, the MOP and MOE could be:
MOPs: Number of patients treated.
Number of hospitals operational.
Number of vaccines administered.
MOEs: Decrease in disease threat.
Restoration of critical services in the
community.
Increased ability of civil authorities to
respond.
In both of these cases, the MOPs relate to the
task, are primarily quantitative measures, and are
focused on the internal actions of the unit. MOEs,
on the other hand, relate to the purpose, are primarily
qualitative measures, and are focused on the
external effects that result from the unit’s actions.
Conclusion
Understanding how to apply MOPs and MOEs
for assessments is a critical task in both planning
and during operations. JP 3-0 provides the following
summary: Assessment is a process that measures
progress of the joint force toward mission
accomplishment. The assessment process begins
during mission analysis when the commander and
staff consider what to measure and how to measure
it to determine progress toward accomplishing
a task, creating an effect, or achieving an
objective. The assessment process uses measures
of performance to evaluate task performance at
all levels of war and measures of effectiveness to
measure effects and determine the progress of operations
toward achieving objectives. 8
Selecting appropriate MOPs and MOEs–and relating
them to task and purpose–can ensure that
actions are focused on the desired end state.
Endnotes
1. FM 3-07, Stability Operations, 6 October 2008, 4-69.
2. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, III-61.
3. Ibid., III-60.
4. Ibid., III-60 – 61.
5. FM 3-0, Operations, 13 February 2008, 5-86 through 5-87.
6. FM 3-07, 4-67.
7. Ibid., 4-68.
8. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, xxi.
Colonel (Retired) Jack D. Kem is a Supervisory Professor
in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational
Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as a
Battalion S2, G2 Plans Officer, DTOC Support Element Chief,
and Battalion XO in the 82d Airborne Division; as a Brigade
S2 in the 3d Infantry Division; as a Company Commander and
Battalion S3 in the 3d Armored Division, and as the Battalion
Commander of the 319th MI Battalion, XVIII Airborne Corps.
Colonel Kem graduated from MI Officers’ Advanced Course, the
Army Command and General Staff College, the Air Command
and Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College, and the
Army War College. He holds a BA from Western Kentucky
University, an MPA from Auburn University at Montgomery,
and a PhD from North Carolina State University. Readers may
contact the author via E-mail at jackie.kem@us.army.mil.
50 Military Intelligence

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WIT—The Battlefield Commander’s Force
Multiplier in the CIED Fight
Introduction
Weapons Intelligence Teams (WITs)
have been a critical asset in the
War on Terrorism and the
counter improvised explosive
device (CIED) fight
since 2004. WITs are consistently
proving their
worth as the battlefield
commander’s resident
technical intelligence expert
and force multiplier.
These teams are filling a
critical gap and providing
timely and actionable intelligence
to the Warfighter.
Their unique skill sets, training,
experience, and equipment
provide commander’s with the capability
to reach out and influence insurgent
networks before they strike against U.S. and
Coalition forces.
We are training these young men and women to
go into harm’s way, to willfully and purposefully expose
themselves to the most dangerous weapon of
all–an enemy with no regard for human life, an undying
desire to kill us, and the technical means to
succeed at his mission. WITs are helping battlefield
commander’s get at their enemies with unprecedented
success rates. Prosecutions in tribunals and
criminal courts are enjoying much higher conviction
rates thanks in part to evidence and material collected
and exploited by these teams. We are training
and equipping these teams with the singular purpose
of defeating this enemy and his weapons “left
of the boom,” before he can inflict casualties on us
or our Coalition partners.
In this article I will discuss the history, training,
mission, composition, and future of Weapons
Intelligence and the teams that conduct it.
by Major Chris Britt
WIT History. A brief look at the history
of these teams provides the background
necessary to understand
how they work and why they
are such a critical component
in waging a successful
counterinsurgency (COIN)
campaign. As operations
in Iraq transitioned to
Phase IV, the tactics employed
against Coalition
Forces changed dramatically.
The IED became the
weapon of choice against
us and as such “IED” became
a common expression.
Commanders at every level realized
that the IED networks had
to be eliminated. The problem was
that, at that time, there wasn’t an organization
particularly well suited to combat this threat.
As a result, a decision was made that a CIED capability
must be created and fielded as quickly as
possible.
Army leadership at the highest levels took the
lead in the fight against the IED by creating the
Army IED Task Force (TF) in October 2003. It
proved its worth over the following months by reducing
the success rates of insurgent IED attacks
despite an overall increase in the total number of
attacks. In 2004, under the direction of Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, the decision
was made to transform the entity into a Joint
IED TF (JIEDD-TF). In early 2004 JIEDD-TF (now
the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)), the
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM), and the Department of the Army (DA)
G2 began the process of identifying gaps in intelligence
support needed to combat the growing number
of insurgent IED networks. The next step was
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trAInInG tHE COrPs
to assign responsibilities for the execution of training,
equipping, and fielding the resulting teams.
INSCOM tasked the National Ground Intelligence
Center (NGIC) with developing a workable Concept
of Operations to implement a CIED program. NGIC’s
mission analysis led to the recommendation of establishing
a Counter IED Targeting Program (CITP).
The CITP would consist of three basic cooperating,
but separate, sections: WITs; a forward fusion cell,
and a CONUS based fusion center. The current CITP
mission is to increase the collection of technical intelligence
(TECHINT) using WITs and to provide
forward and rear fusion cells producing actionable
intelligence to support the targeting of bomb-makers
and their networks.
The first WITs received sixteen days of training at
Fort Gordon, Georgia in 2004 and immediately deployed
to Iraq. These initial teams enjoyed limited
success, but more importantly, succeeded in validating
the concept of the WIT. Additionally, the teams
were instrumental in getting the word out to battlefield
commanders that they now had a valuable asset
in the CIED fight. The second WIT rotation (Phase
II) was assigned to the 203 rd MI Battalion (TECHINT)
which deployed to Iraq to assume responsibility for
the WIT mission in 2005. Since 2006, WITs have
been made up of a combination of personnel from
the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy.
In June 2006, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center
(USAIC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona was designated
as the proponent for the WIT training mission and
assumed responsibility for the training, development,
and integration of weapons technical intelligence
(WTI) in the CIED fight. The first formal Weapons
Intelligence course was taught at Fort Huachuca in
September 2008.
WIT Training. WIT training, conducted at the
USAIC, consists of fifty-one days of instruction divided
between classroom academics, performancebased
practical and laboratory exercises, and a
comprehensive field training exercise. The course
is currently taught three times a year to support
deployment requirements. There are two separate
tracks within the course. The primary track trains
students who will deploy as team members. The secondary
track trains students assigned to the analyst
cell of the Weapons Intelligence Company (WIC).
All WIT members are trained to the same standard
and every prospective team member must demonstrate
proficiency in each task before graduating
from the course. Individuals are assigned to a team
upon arrival at the course and in most cases will
train and deploy with that team for the duration of
their assignment. Team member training content
consists of the following broad categories:
Ê Battlefield Forensics: Material collection and preservation;
fingerprint fundamentals and techniques,
and forensic photography.
Ê Media Exploitation/TECHINT Kit: Exploitation of
captured media and instruction on the use of team
equipment.
Ê Weapons Intelligence: Scene exploitation; IED
fundamentals; electronics theory; investigation
and questioning, and report writing.
Ê Operational Support Functions: Land navigation;
explosive systems recognition; combat tracker operations;
cultural awareness, and foreign weapons
identification.
52 Military Intelligence

Training for the analysis cell consists of various
intelligence software applications; IED fundamentals;
report writing; targeting, and WTI analysis
techniques.
The Weapons Intelligence Mission
WITs are small tactical teams that provide WTI
support to Army brigade combat teams (BCTs)
and U.S. Marine Corps regimental combat teams
or other similar elements as required. They are
an intelligence asset that provides both a collection
and an analysis capability at the BCT level.
WITs provide battlefield commanders with a dedicated,
IED related, tactical intelligence collection
and exploitation capability in support of targeting
efforts. Commanders may employ WITs at attack
sites (post-blast IED, sniper incidents, etc.) or at
locations where weapons are discovered (pre-blast
IED detected and rendered safe, cache sites, bomb
making facilities, etc.) WITs may also be employed
in other operations such as supporting a raid or
cordon and search by providing in-depth tactical
site exploitation on the objective. As the WIT
concept matures, it becomes more valuable to the
commander. The Weapons Intelligence program
was initially focused primarily on the IED threat
but has evolved over the years and is no longer limited
solely to the CIED fight.
Essential tasks and functions include:
ÊÊMove
tactically.
ÊÊConduct
technical collection and exploitation
missions.
ÊÊConduct
media exploitation (including printed
and electronic media.)
ÊÊConduct
WTI analysis.
trAInInG tHE COrPs
ÊÊProduce
intelligence reports and products.
ÊÊCommunicate/disseminate
intelligence to supported
units and higher headquarters.
In addition, WIT provides the following support to
division and higher CIED intelligence efforts:
ÊÊProvide
and inject expert tactical-level reporting
on incident sites into the Theater and
National TECHINT enterprise.
ÊÊPackaging
and delivery of evidence/materials
collected at incident sites for more detailed,
higher-level technical exploitation. All material
is collected, tagged, cataloged, transported,
and forwarded according to strict
guidelines that preserve the intelligence and
evidentiary value of the materials.
WIT Composition. The Weapons Intelligence
Company (WIC) deploys in support of a Corps or
joint task force (JTF) level headquarters, The current
WIC Headquarters is placed within TF Troy,
supporting the Multi-national Corps-Iraq. It provides
planning and coordination support for the
Corps or JTF staff and exercises technical control
(TECHCON) of WTI capabilities (the WI Detachment
and all WITs) supporting the Corps or JTF. The WIC
commander advises the Corps/JTF commander on
task organization, distribution, and employment of
WTI capabilities, supporting him in the area of operations
(AO). The WIC also links the Corps/JTF
commander and staff to the Theater and National
TECHINT enterprise. The company consists of up
to fifteen personnel: the WIC commander (0-4); WIC
Executive Officer (0-3); WIC NCOIC (E-9); administrative
specialist (E-6/7); supply specialist (E-6/7);
and eight to ten intelligence analysts (any rank up
to E-7). The analysts receive WIT reports and collected
materials from the teams. They process the
reports, conduct further analysis, and forward intelligence
products to higher headquarters for dissemination
and targeting as required.
The Weapons Intelligence Detachment (WID)
deploys to support a division-level headquarters
and normally works directly with the Intelligence
staff. The WID advises the commander and staff on
task organization, distribution, and employment of
WTI capability in the division’s AO. It also provides
TECHCON of WITs assigned to the division. A critically
important function of the WID is to provide
a link for the division’s Intelligence staff into the
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trAInInG tHE COrPs
Theater and National level TECHINT enterprise. The
WID consists of the Detachment Commander (0-3)
and the Detachment NCOIC (E-7).
WITs normally consist of five enlisted personnel.
Specific military occupational specialties (MOSs)
may vary between teams but in general have consisted
of a combination of the following:
Ê The Team Leader is historically a qualified explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) technician. In
addition to being the Team Leader, he or she
functions as the liaison between the BCT commander
and staff and the WITs higher headquarters.
The Team Leader will also coordinate
with EOD units that provide support in their local
AO.
Ê The senior and junior analysts are Military
Intelligence personnel from the U.S. Army, Air
Force, or Navy. Typically the senior analyst is an
E-5 or E-6 and the junior analyst any rank below
that of the senior analyst. There is no specific
Intelligence discipline required in order to
be assigned to a team. However, analysts with
strong briefing skills and multi-discipline experience
are preferred and traditionally do better
within the teams.
Ê A combat cameraman or photographer’s mate
brings an in-depth knowledge of shot composition,
mid-level photography expertise, and some
limited public affairs experience to the team.
Ê An Army Military Police Investigator, Air Force
Office of Special Investigations Agent, or a Navy
Master at Arms serves as the team’s law enforcement
expert. They understand crime scene investigation,
evidence preservation, evidentiary
rules and procedures to a greater degree, and
can coordinate with other investigative agencies
when necessary or beneficial to accomplishing
the mission.
Ê The final team member is the combat arms representative.
He contributes to the team by providing
expert tactical analysis of incident sites.
The combat arms advisor determines how the
incident was set up and or how the attack was
executed from a tactical point of view, records
any changes to enemy tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs), and makes recommendations
on how to counteract any new enemy TTPs.
In order for the team to accomplish its mission,
every member is cross trained in each individual
position. Because every team member has a basic
knowledge and proficiency in each skill, the Team
Leader is able to divide the team up when necessary.
Team members are expected to train each other on
their unique skill set throughout their tour of duty.
Much of this training occurs in the forward operating
base between missions. Over the last two years,
many of the teams in theater have been required to
conduct split operations in order to support units
within their BCT that are not co-located. Having an
individual team member who can conduct each portion
of a successful WIT operation is a definite advantage
to the supported unit.
The Future of Weapons Intelligence
In the summer of 2008, the Department of Defense
announced that Weapons Intelligence would become
an enduring capability, with DA as the Service
proponent. While it’s clear that having teams with
this unique skill set is critical to winning any COIN
fight, there are several issues that still have to be
worked out.
First, WITs don’t technically exist on any unit’s organizational
authorization documents. As a result,
scheduling Soldiers for training, and tracking utilization
of the Soldiers trained and equipped to perform
as a WIT is challenging, to say the least. Plans
are underway to create a WIT force structure requirement
at the BCT level which would authorize units
to train Soldiers to fill those positions. Once this requirement
is established, USAIC will be prepared to
conduct periodic classes throughout the year to meet
the requirement for WIT trained Soldiers.
Over the last two years, requests from deploying
units to train their Soldiers have been tremendous.
54 Military Intelligence

The value of an organic WIT capability within the BCT
has finally caught on. At present, there are typically
a few seats in each class that aren’t filled by those
deploying to support one of the CIED TFs downrange.
Those seats are offered to deploying units,
the only cost to units is the TDY for their Soldiers. In
the past two years, we have trained teams from the
82 nd Airborne Division, 10 th Mountain Division, 25 th
Infantry Division, 4 th Infantry Division, 1 st Cavalry
Division, and many others.
Secondly, equipment issued to the teams is not
currently in the Army supply system. USAIC is
diligently working to identify equipment requirements
and establish a TECHINT Kit as a program
of record so that units can order it as a major enditem
through the standard Army supply system.
Additionally, each component of the kit will have its
own national stock number so that it can be easily
replaced. Over the last year we’ve been working
with experts in the fields of forensics, law enforcement,
intelligence, and site exploitation (as well as
the associated industries) to assemble a better tool
kit for the teams. The intent was to make the kits
as light and easily transportable as possible while
still equipping the teams with the necessary tools
for the job. Currently, the price of each kit has
dropped by almost fifty percent. Keeping cost low
was a huge consideration while designing a kit so
that units could afford it without having to sacrifice
other needed equipment.
Lastly, the WIT does not have assigned MOSs, and
likely will never be assigned them. It does, however,
fit the model for an additional skill identifier (ASI).
USAIC has begun the process for the creation and
trAInInG tHE COrPs
award of an ASI to Soldiers trained as WIT members.
Having a WIT ASI will allow the Army to recognize
Soldiers who have graduated from this unique
training, and also allow the Army to assign Soldiers
against WIT coded positions in the future based on
this ASI. With the ASI approved and WIT authorizations
determined for the BCT, it should be a simple
process to assign the right Soldier to the right job.
Conclusion
We are excited about the future of the Weapons
Intelligence program. Recently completed construction
of two specially designed weapons ranges allow
us to conduct live explosives demonstrations
for training purposes. These ranges add realism
to the training and expose students to the realities
of IEDs on a practical level. Additionally, we
will teach the next course in a newly renovated
Weapons Intelligence Compound separated from
other USAIC instructional facilities. This new compound
will allow us to train all WIT students to a
higher standard in a consolidated and secure atmosphere.
We’ve spent the last eighteen months
updating the training curriculum to ensure it remains
relevant to the CIED fight and WTI needs
of the Warfighter. The course is ready to train and
equip the best WITs in the world. Our staff of instructors
are dedicated to this mission and united
in providing the most professional, realistic, and
relevant training possible.
Major Chris Britt is the Course Manager for the Joint Weapons
Intelligence Course. He has served as a Platoon Leader,
Company Executive Officer, Company Commander, Brigade
S6, and ISR Operations Officer.
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1111101001000100010010000001001001001000100000000000000101001000100100010001000100101000100010101010010010010100100100101001001010010101010101010
01001001001010010010111001010010010100100100101001001001010101010010010010101010100100100101010101001001001010101010010010010101010100100100101010
01010101001001001010010101010010010010100101010100100100101001010101001001001010010101010010010010100101010100100100101001010101001001001010010101
01001001001010010010111001010010010100100100101001001001010101010010010010101010100100100101010101001001001010101010010010010101010100100100101010
01010101001001001010010101010010010010100101010100100100101001010101001001001010010101010010010010100101010100100100101001010101001001001010010101
0001001001001010010000000000000000000111010100101000000000010101110101010010010001001000001000010101010101010000100100101001010001001010001010010
1111101001000100010010000001001001001000100000000000000101001000100100010001000100101000100010101010010010010100100100101001001010010101010101010
01001001001010010010111001010010010100100100101001001001010101010010010010101010100100100101010101001001001010101010010010010101010100100100101010
01010101001001001010010101010010010010100101010100100100101001010101001001001010010101010010010010100101010100100100101001010101001001001010010101
0001001001001010010000000000000000000111010100101000000000010101110101010010010001001000001000010101010101010000100100101001010001001010001010010
The University of Arizona
1111101001000100010010000001001001001000100000000000000101001000100100010001000100101000100010101010010010010100100100101001001010010101010101010
Background
How does an organization acquire the skills needed
to develop and conduct training in the high technology
environment of today and tomorrow? For some,
the answer may be in contracting or hiring from the
“millennial” generation. While both approaches have
been used successfully at Fort Huachuca, a lesser
known program has been providing Department of
the Army (DA) civilians these necessary technological
and educational skills for the past ten years.
That program is the “Educational Technology”
plan of study offered by the U.S. Army Intelligence
Center (USAIC) in cooperation with the University of
Arizona South.
The concept for the program grew from discussions
during 1997-1998 between Dr. Gregory M.
Kreiger, then Dean of Continuous Learning, and
Dr. Glenn L. Kjos, Chief of the Staff and Faculty
Development Office at the time. Their concern was
that the Intelligence Center needed to keep up with
the wave of educational technology and, at the same
time, retain the vast experience level of the current
work force. The solution they arrived at was to “grow
our own.” They decided, with command support, to
invest in the technological training and education of
those experienced instructors and training developers
already in the schoolhouse.
Working with Dr. Phil Callahan of the University
of Arizona South, they came up with a three-year
program of study known then as the “Master of Arts
in Educational Psychology, Educational Technologies
Emphasis” (today it is simply the “Educational
Technology” program). The curriculum was focused
primarily on the needs of the Intelligence Center’s
training community, although the program was also
open to members of the community.
The Center’s sponsorship of the program got
underway in the fall of 1998 when 12 DA civil-
by Mr. Richard K. Ward
ians began classes during the evening hours at
the University’s southern campus in Sierra Vista,
Arizona. Sponsorship means that the Intelligence
Center pays the students’ tuition fees. Students pay
for their books, transportation costs, and incidental
expenses. Sponsored students in the program
usually take two courses per semester for six semesters,
and can, if they stay with it, complete the
program in three years. Courses are conducted in
the evenings and do not conflict with the normal
duty day.
Among the courses taken by the initial students
in the program were: Computer Applications in
Education; Multimedia Applications in Education;
Design of Instructional Technologies; Advanced
Design of Instructional Technologies; Introduction
to Educational Research; Statistical Methods in
Education; Educational Tests and Measurements;
Learning Theory in Education; Educational
Evaluation, and Theories of Human Development.
Program Focus–A Practitioner’s
Approach
The program focused, and still does, on a practitioner’s
approach to the design, development, and
evaluation of instructional technology for education
and industry. The program addresses issues related
to learning, instructional design, visual design, multimedia
development, evaluation and research.
What is interesting is the fact that of those 12
civilians who started the program in 1998, 10
are still working for the government, and eight of
those are still at the Intelligence Center. The other
two have retired. The government is still getting a
return on its initial investment in the professional
development of these instructors and training developers
as they apply the technical skills and ed-
56 Military Intelligence

ucational foundations developed in the program
to their daily work requirements.
At this time, a total of 22 DA civilians have taken
advantage of this opportunity to enhance their technological
skills and earned a master’s degree in educational
technology as a result. Nineteen are still
government employees. Currently, there are eight
civilians scheduled to continue and/or start the
program in January.
When you ask graduates of the program what impact
this opportunity has had on them personally or
in their job performance, their answers reinforce the
original intent of the program.
Mr. Leon Leszczynski, an Education Specialist with
the 111 th MI Brigade here at Fort Huachuca, notes
that the program “provided me an opportunity
to ‘retool’ my skills, knowledge, and abilities
to those required by the Intelligence Center.”
Further, “this program gave me a solid grasp of
learning theory and how it relates to instructional
system design and, consequently, I am better able
to advise and assist brigade training developers
and instructors design, develop and implement
the training and training products for which they
are responsible.”
“I highly recommend this program to anyone who
wishes to remain competitive and upwardly mobile
at the Intelligence Center. The time and effort
invested in the program pale in comparison with
the dividends enjoyed as a result of completing
it,” he adds.
Similar comments come from Mr. Pete Shaver,
Director, MI Foreign Language Training Center, also
a graduate of the program. He feels the program
provided him “the capability to design, develop and
evaluate language education programs” and the
“ability to assess their effectiveness.”
Addressing both the personal and professional
benefits of the program, Mr. Shaver adds, “thanks to
the program, I feel my contribution to the language
community and Fort Huachuca linguists has been
more effective and beneficial.”
Evolving Curriculum
As is the nature of educational technology, the
curriculum is constantly evolving to better meet
the technological and educational needs of the
Intelligence Center and its DA civilians, and remain
relevant. Unlike those first 12 students in the pro-
trAInInG tHE COrPs
gram who received their training in the University’s
traditional classrooms and computer labs, the students
now in the program receive almost all of their
training online.
The change to an all online program is reflective
of the direction training is taking, and is a major
effort of Dr. Betul C. Ozkan, who currently heads
up the Educational Technology Department at the
University of Arizona South. Experienced in technology
integration, teacher education, distance learning
environments, educational technology research,
and emerging technologies, she is moving ahead to
make the program relevant to the “millennial” generation
of students.
And so, while the core courses in instructional
design and computer applications in education
and training remain, today’s DA civilians in the
program are heavily involved in such courses as
Application of Technology in Education; Multimedia
Applications in Education; Introduction to Interface
Design; Designing Online Learning Environments;
Educational Change Through Technology, and
Emerging Technologies in Education. They are engaged
in web based development, authoring tools,
basic programming, scripting, streaming audio and
video, dynamic content determined by server database
values, and many other areas of study.
The program is project based with each course requiring
a major development effort by the student.
Students are also expected to complete a comprehensive
best-works portfolio demonstrating competency
within the discipline as a requisite component
for program completion.
Conclusion
The curriculum evolves to meet the ever changing
wave of educational technology, but the commitment
remains the same. After 10 years, the Intelligence
Center is still “growing” their own–investing in the
technological and educational development of it’s
civilian training developers and instructors.
Richard K. Ward is an Instructional Systems Specialist in
the Training, Development and Support (TD&S) Directorate,
USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He serves as the Chief of
the Staff & Faculty Development Division (SFDD). Mr. Ward
holds an MA in Education Psychology and Technologies
from the University of Arizona. He can be contacted at
rick.ward1@us.army.mil
April - June 2009 57

trAInInG tHE COrPs
Embedded Training: What MI Needs in the Future
Embedded training (ET) is defined as a function
hosted in hardware and/or software, integrated into
the overall equipment/system/capability configuration.
With ET the soldier receives information from
the display on the equipment/system and takes action
by making menu selectiond, pushing buttons,
etc. These actions can change the common operating
picture (COP) and the information is transmitted
to other platforms updating the COP in all
the other platforms in a training exercise. As part of
the normal fielding of a new system/equipment New
Equipment Training (NET) is provided to the system
operators and other key personnel.
However NET is usually entry-level training on
“knobology”, the type of skills traditionally documented
in user manuals, not “battle-focused” training
that achieves and sustains proficiency on all
possible Soldier, leader, and collective tasks. The
ET that is required for the future will support commanders
and tactical operations staffs, units, and
soldiers to practice and hone critical warfighting
skills through direct interactions with their warfighting
systems. These systems will incorporate a
full spectrum of training support modes as integral
components of the system design.
For the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWF)
a system-of-systems intelligence training capability
with priority to the operational training domain
(home station, combat training centers, and deployed);
secondarily to the institutional training domain,
and lastly to the self-development training
domain is needed. This ET stimulation training capability
needs to be fielded to the Army to support
tactical Military Intelligence (MI) units in brigade
combat teams (BCTs) and above. This will enable
realistic battle command training through the high
fidelity simulation, stimulation, and presentation of
Joint and Army intelligence capabilities. It must be
designed to stimulate the MI collection systems with
scenarios which replicate battlefield situations utilizing
an overarching constructive simulation as the
driver. This will put the MI Soldier in the training
loop using the operational/warfighting equipment
and provide the required reports and data to the
combat commander and his staff.
by Ramona McCaa
This capability, encompassing the latest doctrine
and best practices from the operational force, will
ensure digital training for intelligence systems and
replicate as closely as possible the current and future
Intelligence operational environment. The intent
is to concentrate on each applicable individual,
section and/or team’s role and requirement in the
collection, synchronization, integration, production
and dissemination of intelligence to support
the commander and drive operations. This capability
relies on actual processors of intelligence
to train cross-queuing of multi-discipline intelligence
interactions, forcing the production of intelligence
products to achieve the needed training for
Commander’s, battle staff and Intelligence system
drivers as a cohesive team.
The BCT/Brigade Special Troop Battalion
Commanders, MI company commanders and S2s
will use this ET stimulation/capability to ensure
their organizations and MI soldiers are trained to
support Full Spectrum Operations, and sustain
the low-density MI MOSs training of perishable
skills which support the IWF, as an integral part
of operations. This sustainment training capability
provides the BCT Commander an accurate evaluation
of the IWF capabilities, and accesses the BCT’s
IWF training needs; thereby increasing confidence
in the ability to execute the warfighting mission.
This capability allows the BCT Commander to train
IWF as an essential element of Battle Command As
a Weapon System on intelligence collection through
production, integration, and reporting using the very
systems the Soldiers employ. This allows the IWF to
train as it would operate and to develop effective
Intelligence Soldiers as appropriate combat multipliers.
This training capability is not exclusive to the
BCT; it also supports training and evaluation of the
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and IEW/ISR system
training at all echelons in a similar manner.
Ramona McCaa served as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S.
Army with primary experience in the U.S. Army Acquisition
Corps. She is currently a contractor with the New Systems
and Training Integration Office at Fort Huachuca, Arizona
where she serves as the Deputy Operations Group Chief. She
may be contacted at (520) 533-2590.
58 Military Intelligence

March 29, 2009, White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
Photos by Sergeant Austin Thomas
More than 5,300 participants from 50 states and eight countries,
including the Philippines, Germany, Canada and the
United Kingdom came together for the 20th Annual Bataan
Memorial Death March.
Paul Kerchum of Benson, Arizona, a Bataan survivor, who
served with B Co, 31 st Infantry Battalion, had this to say,
“10,000 men died on that hot, dusty road. They were shot,
bayoneted, beheaded, or beaten to death for no reason
whatsoever, . . . I think of that limerick composed by an
anonymous member of the 31 st Infantry on Bataan:
We are the battling bastards of Bataan,
No mama, no poppa, no Uncle Sam.
No aunts, no uncles, no nephews or nieces,
No guns, no ammunition, no artillery pieces,
And nobody gives a damn!”
Team Hell Hounds, HHC, USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Arizona
from left to right: SPC Zachary Taylor, SSG Charles Dybo,
SFC David Schreiner, SGT Austin Thomas, and SSG RJ
Niesen.
Everyone who participated had their individual reasons for
being there, but all came to honor the Soldiers, Marines,
Airmen, and Sailors who sacrificed their lives. Military and
civilian, young and old marched, ran and rucked side by side
across the rough terrain.
April - June 2009 59

Buffalo
Soldier dedication
Story and photo by Garlan Martens
(From left) Joan Way, president of the Southwest Association of Buffalo
This article originally appeared in the Fort Soldiers, the Honorable Ronald James, assistant secretary of the Army
Huachuca Scout, 30 April 2009, and is reprinted (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and MG John Custer unveil the plaque at the
with permission.
dedication ceremony of the Buffalo Soldier Legacy Plaza, Friday.
For more than 50 years, black men from around the United States called Fort Huachuca home and became
known as Buffalo Soldiers. On April 23, their contributions to the Army and the Southwest were recognized
at the dedication ceremony of the Buffalo Soldier Legacy Plaza.
The plaza, located across from the traffic circle in what is known as Old Post, is also the new location
for the Buffalo Soldier statue that stood by the main gate for many years. The statue, first dedicated over
30 years ago to mark Fort Huachuca’s 100th anniversary, was moved when Major General Barbara Fast,
a former post commander, formalized the idea for the plaza and Legacy Trail. The walking trail begins at
the plaza and takes visitors through Old Post stopping at many historical sites such as the Fort Huachuca
Museum.
The legacy of the Buffalo Soldier is one dating back to 1866 when Congress passed legislation approving
the formation of six Army regiments which included the 9th and 10th Cavalry. The 24th and 25th Infantry
were formed separately several years later, and conducted missions around the West. Beginning in 1892,
all four of the units were permanently located at the remote Army post in Southeast Arizona and remained
there for years to come. Major General John Custer reminded all in attendance that, although many other
Army installations claim they are the home of the Buffalo Soldiers, Fort Huachuca is the true home of the
black soldiers.
“We should all hold that very dear,” he added. The guest speaker for the dedication was the Honorable
Ronald James, the assistant secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). James, also a retired
Army Officer, spoke of the long history black Soldiers have made in the military, not only the Buffalo
Soldiers, but others dating back to the Civil War. His remarks centered on people such as his great grandfather,
Alexander Hogan, who was born into slavery and entered the military later in life. He added that
many such as his great grandfather made the ultimate sacrifice for a divided nation not fully appreciative
of their service and dedication. James also spoke about how the plaza would be a lasting tribute to all
black Soldiers and the steps they made to make a difference in the Armed services.
The dedication concluded with James, Custer, Colonel Melissa Sturgeon (Fort Huachuca garrison commander),
Joan Way, representing the Southwest Buffalo Soldier Association ,and Ron Eppich of the Old
Guard Riders, unveiling the plaque in front of the Buffalo Soldier statue and then raising the red and white
Buffalo Soldier Cavalry Guidon.
60 Military Intelligence

The 22 nd Annual Military Intelligence (MI) Corps Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony was held at Fort
Huachuca on 26 June 2008. Including this year’s seven inductees, only 217 MI professionals have been
selected for membership into the Hall of Fame. The selection process is deliberate and thorough. Each
nomination is judged by a board of active and retired senior officers, noncommissioned officers, and professional
MI civilians.
The 2009 inductees are: Major General Robert A. Harding (U.S. Army, Retired); Major General William
E. Harmon (U.S. Army, Retired); Brigadier General Roy M. Strom (U.S. Army, Retired); Chief Warrant
Officer Five Wallace S. Price (U.S. Army, Retired); Chief Warrant Officer Three Doris I. Allen (U.S. Army,
Retired); Command Sergeant Major Odell Williams (U.S. Army, Retired, Deceased); and Command
Sergeant Major Ronald D. Wright (U.S. Army, Retired)
Major General Robert A. Harding, (U.S. Army, Retired)
Major General Robert A. Harding is a native of New York City (NYC). He was commissioned as
a second lieutenant from the Officer Candidate School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in April 1969. From
September 1969 to April 1971, then Second Lieutenant Harding conducted Counterintelligence (CI) investigations
and operations with the 108 th MI Group in NYC. He left New York to command the Inchon
and Uijongbu Field Offices in Korea. He concluded
his initial assignment for the 501 st MI Group in
May 1972. Captain Harding then assumed command
of Headquarters Company, 1 st MI Battalion
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
In early 1975, CPT Harding was assigned to the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the Pentagon
as the strategic analyst for Korea, where he served
until October 1978. Following this assignment,
he served first as the S2 of the 1 st Battalion, 59 th
Air Defense Artillery, 8 th Mechanized Infantry
Division, and then as the S2 for the 1 st Brigade, 8 th
Mechanized Infantry Division. While serving as the
Brigade Intelligence Officer, CPT Harding was promoted
to the rank of Major. Returning stateside,
he was assigned as the Professional Development
Officer, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center,
Alexandria, Virginia. Approximately two years later,
he would report as a student to the Armed Forces
Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Upon his graduation
in June 1983, MAJ Harding assumed the duties
as the Executive Officer, Army CI Directorate
in the Pentagon. In October 1985, he moved to the
April - June 2009 61

position of Assistant to the Director of the Army Staff, where he served for almost three years, and during
which he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
LTC Harding then assumed command of the 524 th MI Battalion, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea. Returning
from Korea in July 1990, he attended the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. From July
1991 to June 1992, he served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and was promoted to the rank of
Colonel. Following his promotion, COL Harding commanded of the 902 nd MI Group (CI) at Fort Meade,
Maryland, for two years. After leaving this post, he was assigned to the Pentagon as the Executive Officer
to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army.
In September 1995, he reported to Quarry Heights, Panama, to serve as the Director of Intelligence (J2)
for the U.S. Southern Command, where he was responsible for directing and managing daily collection and
reporting activities. He planned and executed intelligence support to military operations, including contingency
planning and crisis actions. During his tenure as the J2, COL Harding was promoted to the rank
of Brigadier General in July 1996. Upon completing his duties in Panama, BG Harding returned to DIA to
serve as the Director of Operations from December 1996 to March 2000. While serving as the Director of
Operations, he was promoted to Major General in October 1999. MG Harding’s final assignment in uniform
was as Deputy G2, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. He concluded his distinguished Army intelligence
career of 33 years when he retired in August 2001.
Major General Harding’s awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the
Army Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (3 OLCs), the
Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Army Meritorious Service Medal (2 OLCs), and the Army Staff
Identification Badge.
Major General William E. Harmon, (U.S. Army, Retired)
Major General William E. Harmon was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry in the summer
of 1960 and reported for the Infantry Officer Basic Course at Fort Benning, Georgia in August 1960.
His first assignment was as an Infantry Platoon Leader with D Company, 2 nd Airborne Battle Group, 187 th
Infantry at Fort Campbell, Kentucky where he served nearly two years as a Platoon Leader and Company
Executive Officer. In 1962 Lieutenant Harmon was
detailed from Infantry to Army Intelligence, before
MI became an active duty branch. He received training
at the Intelligence Research Officer Course, U.S.
Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland.
While there, he transferred to the newly formed active
duty Army Intelligence and Security Branch,
and remained in MI until his retirement thirty two
later.
His first MI field assignment was in 1963 as a
CI Officer, 201 st MI Detachment, I Corps Group
Headquarters, Uijongbu, Korea. In February 1964,
he served as the G2 Security and Automation
Officer, while assigned to the 11 th MI Detachment,
11 th Air Assault Division at Fort Benning, during the
Army field testing of the air assault concept. Moving
to Fort Bragg in December 1964, CPT Harmon assumed
the duties as Chief, Current Intelligence
Branch, G2, U.S. Army Kennedy Center for Special
Warfare. In September 1965, he reported as a Plans
Officer, S3, 519 th MI Battalion to help plan and ex-
62 Military Intelligence

ecute the movement of the 525 th MI Group to Vietnam. Once in Vietnam he was attached to the 5 th Special
Forces Group (VN) as the CI Officer for Detachment C-5 (Project Horse). CPT Harmon then returned to Fort
Holabird to attend the MI Officer Advanced Course. Following the course he was assigned to the Office of
the G2, U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii with duty on the Korea Desk for a brief period; then was
reassigned to the Vietnam Desk following the Tet Offensive.
Major Harmon would return to Vietnam and serve on the III Corps Desk, J2, U.S. Military Assistance
Command Vietnam (MACV). In August 1969 he attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College before reporting to London, England to become a Desk Officer studying the Soviet Army on the
British Intelligence Staff. After three years in England, MAJ Harmon assumed command of the 203 rd
MI Detachment, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. Following command, in March 1976 he became the G2,
2 nd Armored Division. In May of 1977, Lieutenant Colonel Harmon assumed command of the 522 nd MI
Battalion (CEWI), 2 nd Armored Division at Fort Hood. Following battalion command, he attended the U.S.
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
Upon graduating from the War College, Colonel Harmon assumed the duties as the Director, Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) Division, Intelligence Systems Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, U.S. Army. For one year he would serve in the Pentagon before returning in July 1980 to Fort
Bragg to become the XVIII Airborne Corps Deputy G2. In January 1981, COL Harmon assumed command
of the 525 th MI Group (CEWI), XVIII Airborne Corps. He would command the Group for two and half years.
In June of 1983, he became the Director, Intelligence Systems Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army.
In November of 1984 until 1990, Brigadier General Harmon was the Program Manager, Joint Tactical
Fusion Program Management Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S.
Army, Washington, D.C. His final assignment was as the Program Executive Officer for Command and
Control Systems, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. He retired in 1992 after a distinguished career spanning
32 years.
Major General Harmon’s awards and badges include
the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of
Merit, Bronze Star Medal (2 OLCs), Meritorious
Service Medal (1 OLC), Joint Service Commendation
Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Master
Parachutist Badge, Ranger Tab and the Army Staff
Identification Medal.
Brigadier General Roy M. Strom, (U.S.
Army, Retired)
Brigadier General Roy M. Strom was commissioned
as a second lieutenant in Artillery in 1954
and reported to Artillery Officer Basic Course at Fort
Bliss, Texas. His first assignment would be as a second
lieutenant serving as a Platoon Leader, 764 th
Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 90/120 mm Gun Battalion at
Fort Clayton, Panama, Canal Zone. He also commanded
the Caribbean Command Honor Guard
Company to honor dignitaries during their visits
to the Canal Zone. Returning to the U.S., he attended
Gunnery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, then
the Airborne School at Fort Benning. In November
of 1959, Captain Strom reported to Columbus, Ohio
where he would assume the duties as an Intelligence
April - June 2009 63

Officer, Columbus Field Office, 109 th CI Corps Group. Serving for approximately two and one half years,
he departed Ohio in January 1962 and transferred to Korea where he served as the Officer-in-Charge of
the Inchon Field Office, 502d MI Battalion from May 1963 to May 1964. His next assignment was at Fort
Holabird where CPT Strom would serve the next 19 months as the Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding
General, Intelligence School, Fort Holabird.
In July 1967, Major Strom was assigned as the Intelligence Officer to the Army’s Alternate Command
Post, Operations Group, Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. After two years in Pennsylvania, MAJ
Strom took command of the 519 th MI Battalion, 525 th MI Group serving in combat operations in Vietnam.
In January 1970, he took command of the 4 th MI Battalion, 525 th MI Group also conducting operations in
the Delta region of Vietnam. After concluding his second command, Lieutenant Colonel Strom reported to
Munich, Germany, where he took command of his third battalion, the 18 th MI Battalion, 66 th MI Group.
He left command in March 1972 and complete 16 months as the Adjutant of the 66 th MI Group in Munich
before returning to Washington, D.C. where he would become a CI Officer and Executive Officer in the
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. LTC Strom served a little
over two years in the Pentagon and then became the Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Special Security
Group in Washington. Moving over to DIA approximately one year later, he became the Staff Chief, Special
Intelligence Operations from June 1977 to June 1978.
In July of that year, Colonel Strom took command of the 500 th MI Brigade, INSCOM at Camp Zama,
Japan. Two years later, in July 1980, he assumed the duties as the Deputy Commandant and served as
the Commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Early in 1982,
BG Strom returned to Washington, D.C. to become the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army.
His final assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM),
Fort McPherson, Georgia. It was during this tour that he and his staff developed a workable language
maintenance program fitting the reserve components, as well as active forces, to keep pace with the requirements
of an army facing the need for language
facility. In March 1985, he retired from active duty
in the U.S. Army after having served honorably for
31 years.
Brigadier Strom’s awards and badges include
the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit,
Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (3 OLCs),
National Defense Medal (1 OLC), Vietnamese Service
Medal, Department of Army Staff Badge, U.S. and
Vietnamese Parachutist Wings.
Chief Warrant Officer Five Wallace S.
Price, (U.S. Army, Retired)
A native of Oregon, Chief Warrant Officer Wally
Price began his Army career in 1966 with the
Army Security Agency (ASA). He attended Defense
Language Institute (DLI) for Czech language training,
and following advanced training at Goodfellow,
AFB, Texas was assigned to Detachment J, 16 th
ASA Field Station, Schneeberg, Federal Republic of
Germany. From 1967 until 1970, he provided intelligence
support for U.S. Army Europe and NATO
commands during the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
64 Military Intelligence

Upon completion of his tour of duty in 1970,
he returned to civilian life to attend school, graduating
in 1974 from the University of Texas at
Austin with a BA in Slavic languages. In 1975 he
returned to active duty in the ASA. His initial assignment
was as a Technical Language Advisor at
DLI, where he worked with native instructors to
provide unclassified training in military occupational
specialty (MOS) related military and technical
terminology. In 1976 he was appointed as a
Warrant Officer and returned to Germany, where
he served as a watch supervisor overseeing operations
at the U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg.
While there, he achieved certification by the
National Security Agency (NSA) as a Language
Analyst and Voice Language Analyst. He became
proficient in three languages–Czech, Russian and
German, and maintained his proficiency for the
remainder of his military career.
CWO Price returned to the DLI Foreign Language
Center in December 1980 for advanced language
training in Czech, graduating with honors. He remained
for a year as a Training Officer in the Slavic
Language Group until September 1981. Heading to
Fort Devens, Massachusetts from DLI, CWO Price
became the Chief Instructor and Officer in Charge of
the MOS 98G (Voice Intercept Operator) Task Force.
He returned to Germany for a third tour in 1983,
serving in several different positions at Field Station
Augsburg. While there, he served on the task force
responsible for transitioning of the field stations
into the 701 st MI Brigade. He would serve at Field
Station Augsburg until March 1986.
Fort Meade became CWO Price’s home again
from April 1986 until December 1991. While there
he first was assigned to Operations Group A at
NSA, where he served in sensitive technical and
leadership positions. Although his title would
be Senior Technician and Deputy Branch Chief,
NSA, he would serve in a variety of roles. During
Operations Desert Shield and Storm, he volunteered
to augment the Cryptologic Support Group
at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward
Headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he
served as a team leader directing CSG operations
on watch. In 1992, he became the Deputy Chief,
Exploitation and Production, Bravo Company,
743 rd MI Battalion, Menwith Hill Station, United
Kingdom. While serving in England, CW5 Price
helped lead the Support Military Operations efforts
for Operations Provide Comfort, Northern
and Southern Watch in Southwest Asia and for
NATO operations in the Balkans.
Chief Warrant Officer Five Price returned to Fort
Meade in November 1993, as the Team Chief and
the NSA representative to the National Military
Command Center, where he assisted in establishing
the Cryptologic Support Team, and ultimately the
Cryptologic Support Group at the National Military
Joint Intelligence Center. Nearly two years later in
the spring of 1995, CW5 Price was transferred to
the 344 th MI Battalion, Goodfellow AFB, where he
served as the Officer-in-Charge of the MOS 98G
training where he oversaw the design, planning and
execution of all Army SIGINT/Electronic Warfare
(EW) linguist training.
In 1997 he was assigned as Senior Technical
Advisor in the Army Technical Control and
Analysis Element to the 704th MI Brigade. While
there, and following the 9/11 attacks and onset
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), CW5
Price initiated an international collaborative effort
with Commonwealth Allies, helping to create
the first U.S./Canadian SIGINT-EW Operations
Coordination Center in Afghanistan using the
NATO model. Later he worked on the creation of the
first NSA Cryptologic Support Teams deployed to
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In July of 2003, he
served as the Special Assistant for Military Affairs
to the SIGINT Director, NSA. CW5 Price retired
from the Army after 35 years of distinguished service.
After retirement, he began work at INSCOM
in the Army Cryptologic Operations office at Fort
Meade. He became a driving force in developing
the concept for SIGINT Foundry support. He continues
today serving as a DA civilian assigned in
support of INSCOM as an Intelligence Staff Officer
in the Army Cryptologic Office. Currently, he is
engaged in planning and coordinating pre-deployment
orientation visits to NSA for division, brigade
and battalion commanders preparing for
OIF and OEF rotations as part of a FORSCOM G2
program.
Chief Warrant Officer Five Price’s awards and
decorations include the Defense Superior Service
Medal (1 OLC), the Legion of Merit, the Bronze
Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Medal, the
Meritorious Service Medal (1 OLC), the Joint Services
April - June 2009 65

Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal (1 OLC), the Army Achievement Medal, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.
Chief Warrant Officer Three Doris I. Allen, (U.S. Army, Retired)
Chief Warrant Officer Three Doris I. “Lucki” Allen,
a native of El Paso, Texas, enlisted into the Women’s
Army Corp through Jackson, Mississippi in late
1950. She completed basic, then advanced training,
as an Entertainment Specialist at the Adjutant
General School in 1951 at Fort Lee, Virginia. She
spent a few months at the Presidio of San Francisco,
California and Fort Lewis, Washington before going
overseas. Private First Class Allen served for a year
and half as an Entertainment Specialist organizing
Soldier shows and as the Editor of the Military
Newspaper for the Army Occupation Forces in support
of the Korean War in Camp Sendai, Japan.
Upon returning Corporal Allen was assigned as
a radio broadcast specialist at Camp Stoneman in
California. After the closing of Camp Stoneman,
Specialist Five Allen was assigned to Oakland Army
Base, California and then attended the Armed
Forces Information School at Fort Slocum, New
York for the Information Specialist course. In 1956,
SP5 Allen returned to Japan and served as a Public
Information Officer and Newspaper Editor. After
two years in Japan, she returned to the U.S. and
served as an Information Specialist. From 1958, she served for five years as an Information Specialist
for the Headquarters at Fort Monmouth. After completing French language training at DLI in 1963, SP5
Allen became the first military female trained in a Prisoner of War Interrogation course at the U.S. Army
Intelligence School, Fort Holabird.
Upon the completion, she was assigned as an interrogator to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army
Command Intelligence Center, Fort Bragg. For the next two years she would serve as the sole strategic
intelligence analyst covering Latin America affairs until 1965. While at Fort Bragg, and as one of only 22
persons in the entire Armed Forces to hold that rank, Specialist Seven Allen completed interrogation and
intelligence analyst courses where she was the honor graduate in three consecutive courses conducted by
the Third U.S. Army Area Intelligence School in 1967.
SP7 Allen would then report to Vietnam and serve as the Senior Intelligence Analyst, Army Operations
Center, Headquarters, U.S. Army (USARV) at Long Binh, Vietnam. While in Vietnam she started her second
tour and held the position of Supervisor, Security Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Security, Plans, and Operations, Headquarters, 1 st Logistical Command, Vietnam. In the Spring of 1970
she would be appointed as a Warrant Officer. She was then one of only nine female warrant officers in MI
and one of only 23 in the entire Army at the time.
WO Allen began her third consecutive tour in Vietnam in March 1970 as the Officer in Charge of the
Translation Branch, Combined Document Exploitation Center–MACV, Saigon, Vietnam. Despite not
being able to speak Vietnamese, WO Allen supervised approximately 40 South Vietnamese nationals
employed in the translation of the large amount of captured enemy documents brought to the center
on a daily basis. Her loyalty, diligence, and devotion in all of her assignments in Vietnam earned her
the Bronze Star with 2 Oak Leaf clusters.
66 Military Intelligence

Returning to the U.S. from Vietnam in September 1970, she would serve as an Instructor for Prisoner of
War Interrogations, Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Holabird and moved with the school in 1971
to Fort Huachuca. After completing the CI Transition Course in 1971, WO Allen returned to DLI where she
completed the German course.
After a stint with the intelligence unit at the Presidio of San Francisco, Chief Warrant Officer Two Allen
was sent overseas. Her follow on assignment was as a Special Agent with the 527th MI Brigade, Federal
Republic of Germany. In 1977, CW2 Allen reported to the INSCOM’s CI and Signal Security Battalion,
Presidio of San Francisco, where she worked as the Senior CI Agent and Security Manager. While at the
Presidio, CW2 Allen would be promoted to Chief Warrant Officer Three in 1978. CW3 Allen retired after a
distinguished 30 year career in 1980.
Chief Warrant Officer Three Allen’s awards and decorations include the Bronze Star (2 OLCs), Meritorious
Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Good Conduct Medal (6th award), Army of the Occupation
Medal (Japan), National Defense Service Medal (1 OLC), Vietnam Service Medal (10 Campaigns), United
Nations Service Medal, the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal, the Korean Service Medal, Presidential
Unit Citation, Meritorious Unit Commendation, and the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm.
Command Sergeant Major Odell Williams, (U.S. Army, Retired, Deceased)
Command Sergeant Major Odell Williams entered
the U.S. military on July 26, 1955 and was
first trained as an Aircraft Mechanic, and then
later trained and served as a Firefighter in the
U.S. Navy Reserves until May 1960. In September
1960, he entered the U.S. Army and attended the
Manual Morse Collector’s Course at Fort Devens,
graduating in April 1961. That same month, then
Specialist Four Williams would report to his first assignment
as a Morse Interceptor at Vint Hill Farms
Station, Virginia where he served until October
1961. In November 1961 he reported to the 5 th
Radio Research Unit, Bangkok, Thailand serving as
a Morse Interceptor for a year and a half. Specialist
Five Williams returned to the U.S. in April 1963
where he would complete two more assignments as
a Morse Interceptor. The first assignment was to the
303rd ASA Battalion at Fort Carson, Colorado from
May 1963 to May 1964, and then at Fort Lewis from
June 1964 to June 1965.
In summer of 1965, Staff Sergeant Williams served
as Senior Morse Interceptor with Detachment 2, 3rd Radio Research Unit, U.S. Army Pacific and the 11th Radio Research Unit during combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam. The following year, September
1966, he became Senior Morse Instructor at the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, ASA Training
Center, Fort Devens, where he served in the position for three years.
In the fall of 1969 Sergeant First Class Williams would transition from duties as instructor to those
of leader and supervisor. In September, he reported for duty with A Company, ASA Field Station, Sobe,
Okinawa, where he supervised all Morse Intercept operations. Because of his outstanding performance
as supervisor, he was selected to become the A Company First Sergeant in April 1971, a position he held
with distinction for nearly two years until he was reassigned in 1973. His reassignment brought SFC
Williams back to the U.S. for additional training; first at the Cryptology Supervisor Course from April to
May 1973, and then to Senior NCO training with C Company, ASA Support Battalion (SB), Fort Devens,
April - June 2009 67

from May to July 1973. Following his training, SFC Williams would serve as a Senior Instructor with the
Operations Company, SB, Fort Devens until May 1974. That same month he reported to 2 nd Battalion,
ASA SB, Fort Devens and for a second time would serve as the First Sergeant of a company (F Company,
2 nd Battalion).
Two years later, from April 1976 to March 1977, he was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters
Company, ASA Field Station Korea where he served as Mission Management Supervisor and Operations
Sergeant. In 1977, Master Sergeant Williams served as First Sergeant for the Operations Company, ASA
Field Station Korea. In June 1977, MSG Williams returned to the U.S. where he would serve as First
Sergeant for the fourth time with F Company, 2 nd Battalion, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens.
Having served for two years MSG Williams was selected attended the Army Sergeant Major’s Academy at
Fort Bliss. In February 1980, he transferred to Germany to serve as the Operations Sergeant for Field
Station Berlin. In June 1981, Command Sergeant Major Williams served as the S3 Sergeant Major, Field
Station Berlin. CSM Williams was then assigned to Kunia, Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii in July 1982
where he served for three years as the Command Sergeant Major for the Army component. His leadership
and vision ensured that the field station at Kunia would become the premier listening post in the Pacific.
Late in 1985, he became the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the National Security Agency/Central Security
Service (NSA/CSS), U.S. Army Element NSA at Fort Meade. He served as the Command Sergeant Major
for NSA/CSS for three years.
CSM Williams was the first ever Command Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Director to the NSA where
he led in a multi-service environment. His leadership and intelligence support contributed to the successful
diplomacy and the executions of operations in incidences such as the TWA hijacking in Lebanon
in June 1985, the rescue of the Achille Lauro in October 1985, and the bombing raid in Libya in April
1986. CSM Williams retired in 1988 after honorably serving 33 years with a distinguished career in Army
Intelligence.
Command Sergeant Major Williams’ awards and badges include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion
of Merit, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (6 OLCs), National Defense Medal (1 OLC), Vietnamese
Service Medal, Department of Army Staff Badge, U.S. Parachutist Wings, and the Vietnamese Parachutist
Wings. In 2001 he was awarded the National Military Intelligence Association’s Major General John E.
Morrison Award for outstanding professionals.
Command Sergeant Major Ronald D.
Wright, (U.S. Army, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Ronald D. Wright is a
native of Fort Smith, Arkansas. He enlisted in the
U.S. Air Force and served from 1971 to 1975 as a
parachute rigger. In 1979, after a four year break
in military service, he entered the U.S. Army as an
Intelligence Analyst. Specialist Wright served as the
Senior Intelligence Analyst and as the Assistant
NCOIC of the Battle Information Coordination
Center, 3 rd Brigade, 101 st Airborne Division, Fort
Campbell. During his assignment at Fort Campbell,
SPC Wright was promoted to Sergeant. He would then
be assigned to the Headquarters and Headquarters
Company, 2 nd Armored Division (Forward) in the
Federal Republic of Germany. While in Germany,
he exhibited initiative, resourcefulness, and professional
competence. Because of these qualities, he
was selected by his leadership to compete for NCO
68 Military Intelligence

of the Year for U.S. Army, Europe. In 1983, Sergeant
Wright’s exemplary past performance and future
potential was recognized when he was selected. He
was also promoted to Staff Sergeant and inducted
into the U.S. Army Europe Sergeant Morales Club.
That same year, SSG Wright returned to the U.S.
and served as an instructor for the Intelligence
Analyst Course, USAIC and School, Fort Huachuca.
He would then move to the NCO Academy as a Senior
Instructor from 1984 to 1986, teaching Intelligence
Analysis. In 1987, he returned to Germany and
served as the First Sergeant for Headquarters and
Headquarters Battery, 56 th Field Artillery Command
(Pershing Missile). In the fall of 1990, Master
Sergeant Wright reported in to the 111 th MI Brigade,
Fort Huachuca where he became the Operations
Sergeant Major responsible for preparing plans,
operations, and providing soldier training for the
6,000 officers and enlisted personnel at the Army’s
intelligence schoolhouse. After eight months as the
Brigade Operations Sergeant Major, MSG Wright
became the First Sergeant of C Company, 304 th MI
Battalion, 111 th MI Brigade. C Company was the
only deployable Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) company in the Army. His efforts contributed
to the selection of the Hunter as the Army’s
next generation UAV. First Sergeant Wright was
instrumental in the development of the MOS 96U
UAV Operator. He served as a subject matter expert
and briefed senior Army leaders worldwide on
the UAV program. He also helped draft the ground
rules for UAV airspace management, ensuring the
safety of other military and commercial air traffic.
1SG Wright was soon thereafter selected and promoted
to Command Sergeant Major and attended
the Command Sergeant Major’s course.
In 1994 he reported to Fort Hood as the Command
Sergeant Major of the 522 nd MI Battalion, 2 nd Armored
Division. A year later, the unit was reflagged as the
104 th MI Battalion, 4 th Infantry Division. Two years
later, CSM Wright returned to Germany in 1996, and
became the Command Sergeant Major of the 302 nd
MI Battalion, 205 th MI Brigade. He was then selected
to become the 205 th MI Brigade Command Sergeant
Major. Following his successful tour in the Brigade,
he was selected to serve as the INSCOM Command
Sergeant Major at Fort Belvoir. As the senior enlisted
advisor, his leadership was instrumental in positive
changes to the command’s architecture, force struc-
ture, training and combat development. He brought
a unique perspective to the budgetary issues and
provided input to the disposition of the command’s
budget that totaled over 500 million dollars a year.
CSM Wright oversaw the development and execution
of the Command’s Strategic Business Plan. At
the time INSCOM was responsible for over 12,500
Soldiers and civilians located in 21 countries around
the world. As INSCOM CSM, he also represented the
Sergeant Major of the Army at various functions and
meetings. CSM Ronald Wright retired in 2001 after
serving his country honorably for 26 years.
Command Sergeant Major Wright’s awards and
decorations include the Distinguished Service
Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (4 OLCs), the
Army Commendation Medal (3 OLCs), the Army
Achievement Medal (1 OLC), the Army Good Conduct
Medal (6 th award), the Air Force Good Conduct Medal,
the National Defense Service (2 nd award), the Vietnam
Service Medal, the NCO Professional Development
Ribbon (4 th award), the Overseas Service Ribbon (4 th
award), the NATO Medal, the Republic of Vietnam
Campaign Medal, the Army Superior Unit Award,
the Air Force Parachute Riggers Badge, Air Assault
Badge, Master Instructor Badge, and the German
Marksmanship Badge. He received the Field Artillery’s
Order of Saint Barbara and the MI Knowlton Award.
CSM Wright is also an Honorary Member of the
Sergeant Audie Murphy Club.
2010 MI Corps Hall of Fame
Nominations
All commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted
Soldiers, and civilian intelligence professionals who
have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an
intelligence position elsewhere within the U.S. Army
are eligible for nomination. Full nomination procedures
can be obtained by contacting the Office of the
Chief, Military Intelligence, Deputy Director, U.S.
Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN:
ATZS-MI (23), 110 Rhea Street, Second Floor, Fort
Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7080, (520) 533-1190, or
timothy.quinn@us.army.mil. The Nomination Board
convenes annually at the direction of the Chief of
the MI Corps (the Commanding General, U.S. Army
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca), usually during
September/October. Although nominations are
accepted year round, to be considered by the current
year Nomination Board, nomination packets must be
received not later than 15 September.
April - June 2009 69

Professional Reader
Afghanistan and the Troubled
Future of Unconventional Warfare
by Hy S. Rothstein
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press, 2006), 218 Pages,
$17,75, ISBN 1-59114-745-X
Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional
Warfare is an examination of why the U.S. Military
has difficulty conducting Unconventional Warfare
(UW) despite the increased funding and attention
given to special operations and intelligence used
in conducting UW operations. The author, Hy
Rothstein, is a former career Special Forces officer
who currently teaches at the Naval Postgraduate
School. He argues that the types of operations that
include UW and stability operations are not necessarily
best conducted by conventional means
although, in Afghanistan for example, a conventional
approach is what has been taken. In order
to support the author’s perspective, the first
one-third of the work is organized into chapters
that focus on the historical context of UW. These
early chapters describe how special operations
have evolved to meet the challenges of these types
of missions. This background is both informative
and contextually relevant for those professionals
who deal with the complexity of UW to include
Conventional Troops and Special Operations.
The author focuses on Special Forces although
Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs are also
discussed at length.
Of the many bureaucratic obstacles facing Special
Operations are organizational constraints and a failure
to develop processes of innovation in the army.
Rothstein thus utilizes the remaining two-thirds of
his work in a progression that moves from theoretical
to practical considerations. First, he focuses
on Organizational Theory and how the concept of
Contingency Theory could be a more successful
model for the organizational structure of the high-
est levels of military decision making. For example,
Rothstein argues that the Department of Defense
(DOD) is not organizationally structured to allow
for options that fall outside of conventional warfare
paradigms. Contingency Theory, however, could potentially
guide DOD decision making in a more appropriate
direction for the types of future conflicts
that will invariably be unconventional by definition
and difficult to predict in nature. As the author
notes, “Organizational scholars have concluded that
Weberian-type bureaucracy found in many large,
modern organizations is ineffective in coping with
the demands of a dynamic and uncertain environment.
Additionally, standardized procedures, a fundamental
tenet of bureaucracy, inhibit innovation
and the flexibility necessary to effectively operate
Reviewed by First Lieutenant Nathaniel L. Moir
70 Military Intelligence

under conditions of uncertainty. Contingency theory
is the alternative organizational model for environments
where Weberian Bureaucracy falls short.”
Further, Rothstein spends a great deal of effort in
demonstrating how and why UW must not be diluted
by focusing on the attrition end of the spectrum
of operations, a fact that is of great importance
when conducting stability operations. The Special
Forces, it is argued, is being over-used for direct
action (DA) operations (due to there being many
other assets that can conduct DA) and it needs to
be tasked more usefully as practitioners of UW, a
niche skill unique to special operations.
When stability operations are considered in the
context of the War on Terror, urgency is added as
American public support is needed to continue
political support for the army’s work in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Rothstein supports the view that
success in those campaigns must be measured
by the confidence of the host nation populace:
“The war on terrorism requires the use of Special
Forces teams, and Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations units, all tasked to do UW. Success in
this war will require an emphasis on winning local
cooperation. Conventional and DA forces are least
likely to elicit this, while UW forces are most likely
to.” The dichotomy, as described by Mr. Rothstein,
of how conventional and unconventional capabilities
conduct stability operations elicits a historical
comparison of stability operations with the Gordian
knot. How to best metaphorically unknot that classical
enigma may be through the type of organizational
structure that best utilizes Contingency
Theory. However, it may also be the type of organization
that is structurally aligned with that theory
but still possesses the flexibility to incorporate
conventional capabilities and forces. In sum, Mr.
Rothstein’s work poses important questions that
may guide decision making and organizational
structure for conflicts, in Afghanistan and elsewhere,
that require UW capabilities.
April - June 2009 71

Intelligence Philatelic Vignettes
“Operation Ruthless”
by Mark Sommer
By 1940 the greatest threat to the Allies was U-boat attacks on North Atlantic convoys. If the Allies could
discover in advance where U-boat packs were assembling, they could direct convoys away from them.
Bletchley Park’s code breakers were not breaking German Naval Enigma code. It was essential that current
Naval Enigma material for them to work on should be captured from German ships. On 12 September
1940, Lieutenant Commander Ian Fleming, RNVR, Personal Assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence,
concocted an extraordinary plan to crash-land a captured German plane in the English Channel and overpower
the patrol boat crew that came to rescue its “survivors,” thereby gaining access to the much needed
code books. Fleming’s proposal, Codename ‘Operation Ruthless’ was as follows:
Fleming added that the pilot should be a ‘tough bachelor able to swim’; and that a German-speaker would
also be needed to travel on the bomber. He put his own name forward. Is it coincidental that Commander
James Bond, RN, 007, was also tough, a bachelor and an accomplished linguist? ‘Operation Ruthless’ was
quickly given the go-ahead. A plane and crew were procured and Fleming travelled down to Dover to put
it into practice. However, to the deep frustration of the Bletchley Park’s code breakers, the plan was abandoned
due to the lack of suitable German boats operating at night.
Frank Birch, Head of German Naval Section at Bletchley Park, lamented that “Turing and Twinn (both
key code breakers at Bletchley Park) came to me like undertakers cheated of a nice corpse ... all in a stew
about the cancellation of Operation Ruthless.” It now seemed that only the Naval equivalent of a miracle
would enable the code breakers to break into Naval Enigma but the prolific genius of Ian Fleming for writing
spy plots had been born.
The Bletchley Park Post Office, in cooperation with their Museum Trust, produces highly collectible philatelic items, and as
part of their fundraising functions, produced these stamps and commemorative covers, to honor the birth of James Bond
creator/author Ian Fleming, on his one hundredth birthday, January 8, 2008.
72 Military Intelligence

COntACt And ArtIClE
Submission Information
This is your magazine. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.
When writing an article, select a topic relevant
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Articles about current operations and exercises;
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as are lessons learned; historical perspectives;
problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on
better employment or equipment and personnel. Our
goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional
knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large.
Propose changes, describe a new theory, or dispute
an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken
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discuss how new technology will change the way we
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When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the
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ATTN ATZS-CDI-DM (Smith)
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
Box 2001, Bldg. 51005
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Contact phone numbers: Commercial 520.538.0956
DSN 879.0956.
April - June 2009 73

74 Military Intelligence

April - June 2009 75

Nomination Information for the 2010
C SM Doug Russell Award
The annual CSM Doug Russell Award recognizes
the outstanding achievements of Soldiers within
or on the behalf of the Military Intelligence (MI)
Community. Eligibility criteria include:
Ê Rank of sergeant (E-5) or below.
Ê In the Active Army, Army Reserve, or National
Guard.
Ê Actions that directly contribute to the MI Corps.
Ê Must be fully eligible for re-enlistment.
Ê Does not have to hold an MI MOS.
Anyone may nominate a Soldier for this award.
There can be only one nomination from each of the
following:
Ê MI Group, Brigade, Battalion.
Ê Brigade Troop/Support Battalions within a maneuver
division.
Ê MI Support Elements (G2/Brigade S2/Battalion
S2) within a maneuver division.
Ê DCSINT oriented organizations (EAC units and
positions not formally assigned to a specific MI
Group/Brigade/Battalion).
Nomination packets must be unclassified. All
classified packets are automatically eliminated
from the award process. Nomination packets must
be submitted in hard copy only (No disk or email).
The only exception is the photograph, which must
be sent via email to the POCs, in addition to the
hardcopy. Packets must contain:
Ê Cover letter signed by the originator of the
nomination.
Ê Narrative specifically stating the nominee’s key
accomplishments and achievements, and the
impact on the MI Corps.
Ê Endorsement letter from the first 0-6 in the
chain of command.
Ê Biography of the nominee.
Ê 8" X 10" photograph of the nominee in Class A
uniform (DA Photograph preferred).
Ê Copy of the nominee’s Enlisted Record Brief.
Ê Completed DD Form 2266 Hometown News
Release Information (Unsigned).
Waivers for other than an 0-6 endorsement may be
requested from the POC below.
Unclassified nomination packets must be sent via
Certified Mail to the MI Corps CSM to:
Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence
Center and Ft. Huachuca
ATTN: CSM Doug Russell Award (ATZS-CSM)
Alvarado Hall 1903 Hatfield Street
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000
Nominations must be received by 15 December
2009. Nomination packets will be reviewed from
4 to 8 January 2010 by a board consisting of the
MI Corps CSM, Honorary MI Corps CSM, INSCOM
CSM, Army DCSINT G2 CSM, and CSM Doug
Russell, Retired. The Chief of the MI Corps has final
approval of the board results.
The winner will be invited to attend the MI CSM/
SGM conference in March 2010 to receive:
Ê The CSM Doug Russell Award.
Ê The Knowlton Award (Courtesy of MICA).
Ê A one year MICA membership (Courtesy of MICA).
Ê The American Military Society President’s Coin.
Ê A one year membership in the American Military
Society.
Ê A plaque inscribed with the MI Soldier’s Creed.
Ê A $150.00 gift certificate from AAFES.
The winner will be announced NLT 22 January
2010.
POC: CSM Wykoff at DSN 821-1145 or 821-1146;
Comm (520) 533-1145 or 533-1146 and via email at
gerardus.wykoff@conus.army.mil OR SGM Phillip
Sharper at DSN 879-1211; Comm (520) 538-1211)
and via email at phillip.sharper@conus.army.mil.
76 Military Intelligence

Sergeant Julian M. Jones
2009 Doug Russell Award Recipient
Sergeant Jones was born on 19 April 1985 in Boone, Iowa. He graduated from Basic Training at Fort
Jackson, South Carolina in June 2003 and went to the Defense Language Institute (DLI), Monterey,
California. At that time, he was a Signals Intelligence Soldier, but during the course of his Korean studies,
he switched to MOS 35M, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector. After DLI, he came to Fort Huachuca,
Arizona to complete his Advanced Individual Training.
His first duty station was Bravo Company, 524 th MI Battalion, 501 st MI Brigade, Republic of Korea. From
December 2005 until June 2006, SGT Jones served as a liaison officer in the Waegwan MI Detachment.
In 2006, he deployed to Afghanistan in support of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).
While in Afghanistan, SGT Jones served as a Tactical HUMINT Team Leader for fifteen months. He conducted
over 40 enemy prisoner of war interrogations at a field detention site and was responsible for maintaining
the site, enabling intelligence operations to occur at a remote firebase. The intelligence collected
at this location drove successful operations for CJSOTF-A forces. He was awarded the Bronze Star Medal,
the Purple Heart, and the Combat Action Badge for his accomplishments and contributions during this
deployment.
Upon returning from this deployment, SGT Jones was assigned to the Busan MI Detachment, also a
part of the 524 th MI Battalion. While assigned to the Busan detachment, he provided language support to
the Force Protection mission and was in charge of the Strategic Debriefing mission. From November 2007
until November 2008, he played a major role in the surge operations for Key Resolve and other operations
and exercises.
His dedication to the HUMINT mission, the combination of his experience, language, and strategic debriefing
credentials make him a major contributor to the 524 th MI Battalion’s and the U.S. Army’s tactical
and strategic missions.

ATTN: MIPB (ATZS-CDI-DM-12)
BOX 2001
BLDG 51005
FORT HUACHUCA AZ 85613-7002
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