1 CA-CR 07-0177-91122

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED
EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF ARIZONA
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,
v.
STELIOS MALTEPES,
Appellant.
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1 CA-CR 07-0177
DEPARTMENT E
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication -
Rule 111, Rules of the
Arizona Supreme Court)
FILED 8-19-08
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Cause No. CR2005-111520-001 DT
The Honorable Bethany G. Hicks, Judge
The Honorable Robert L. Gottsfield, Judge
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Terry Goddard, Attorney General
by
Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Criminal Appeals Section
and Michael O’Toole, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
Law Office of Thomas M. Hoidal PLC
by Thomas M. Hoidal
Attorneys for Appellant
Phoenix
Phoenix
P O R T L E Y, Judge
1 Stelios Maltepes (“Defendant”) appeals from his
convictions for possession of marijuana for sale and conspiracy

to possess marijuana for sale. Because improper hearsay
evidence was admitted at trial, we reverse and remand for a new
trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2 On April 15, 2005, Phoenix Police Department
detectives executed a search warrant at a warehouse on West
McDowell. They found five men, including Lucio Lafarga, Roberto
Gonzales and Carlos Escarcega, along with approximately 1100
pounds of marijuana in the process of being concealed inside
pallets of bottled water. The police also discovered a
generator, a heat seal machine, rolls of plastic wrap, heat seal
bags, and a Pelouze scale, which is commonly used by drug
traffickers to weigh marijuana and other drugs.
3 Defendant was not present when the search was
conducted, but had been at the warehouse on two prior occasions
while the police were surveilling the premises. Two days
earlier, Defendant was observed exiting the warehouse with
Lafarga, Gonzales, Escarcega and Daniel Tovar. They stood
outside talking for a few minutes and then left.
Defendant
returned to the warehouse the following morning with Tovar and
Gonzales.
Tovar removed a large box from the vehicle’s trunk
that appeared to contain a generator.
Gonzales pulled the box
into the warehouse using a pallet jack.
Defendant followed
2

Gonzales inside while Tovar took four rolls of industrial sized,
clear plastic wrap from the vehicle and carried them into the
warehouse. About thirty minutes later, they exited the
warehouse and drove off together.
4 After executing the search warrant, the police
arrested Defendant at a hotel.
Inside Defendant’s room, the
police found approximately $6,000 in cash, cell phones, and a
piece of paper with the name “Paco” and a Phoenix phone number.
Paco, whose real name is Franciso Carella Flores, is one of
Lafarga’s drug associates.
5 The police subsequently located and interviewed
Tovar.
Tovar told investigators that he worked for Defendant;
that Defendant ran the operation out of the warehouse; and that
Defendant was transporting large quantities of marijuana to
Philadelphia.
Tovar further stated that Lafarga was supplying
the marijuana to Defendant.
6 Defendant and six co-defendants were indicted for
possession of marijuana for sale over the threshold and
conspiracy to commit possession of marijuana for sale over the
threshold, class 2 felonies. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to
suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the warehouse
and argued the affidavit supporting the search warrant was
3

insufficient. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the motion.
7 At trial, the State presented testimony from
detectives concerning their investigation of the marijuana
operation as well as testimony from Tovar on Defendant’s role in
the operation. The jury found Defendant guilty on both counts.
Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent mitigated 4.5-year
terms of imprisonment. Defendant appeals, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031 (2001), and 13-
4033(A)(1) (2001).
DISCUSSION
8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1)
denying his motion to suppress challenging the search warrant,
(2) failing to hold a hearing on an alleged violation of an
immunity agreement, (3) admitting testimony in violation of
Defendant’s right of confrontation, and (4) admitting opinion
testimony regarding Defendant’s role in the marijuana operation.
A. Motion to Suppress
9 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of
the warehouse.
He contends that the affidavit submitted in
support of the warrant contains false and misleading
4

information.
He asserts that when the false and misleading
information is redacted, the affidavit is insufficient to
support a finding of probable cause for the search.
10 In general, we will not disturb the denial of a motion
to suppress evidence absent “a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Crowley, 202 Ariz. 80, 83, 7, 41 P.3d 618, 621 (App.
2002). Furthermore, we view the facts in the light most
favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling on the motion
to suppress. State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 265, 921 P.2d 655,
668 (1996).
11 A warrant may be voided if the defendant shows by a
preponderance of evidence that (1) the affidavit contained a
false statement made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly by
the affiant; and (2) the false statement was necessary to a
finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
155-56 (1978). If a defendant establishes the first prong of
the test, the court must set aside the false information. State
v. Buccini, 167 Ariz. 550, 554, 810 P.2d 178, 182 (1991). The
court must then view the affidavit’s remaining content to
determine whether it establishes probable cause. Id. If not,
the search warrant is void and anything obtained from the search
must be excluded. Id.
5

12 On appeal, when we review whether an affiant
knowingly, intentionally or recklessly misstated facts and
whether a redrafted affidavit would still establish probable
cause, we apply two different standards.
Unless we find the
court’s decision is “clearly erroneous,” we affirm the court’s
factual determination that the affiant did or did not
“deliberately include[] misstatements of law or exclude[]
material facts.” Id. (citations omitted). If the trial court
made a determination that there has been a knowing, intentional
or reckless misstatement of material fact, we apply a de novo
standard of review to decide the correctness of the court’s
determination that a redrafted affidavit sufficiently
establishes probable cause. Id. at 555, 810 P.2d at 183.
13 Here, the court made no specific findings when it
denied the motion to suppress. Nevertheless, we can affirm the
decision if it is legally correct for any reason. State v.
Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (1984).
14 The affidavit submitted in support of the search
warrant was prepared by Detective Valadez. The affidavit
details the investigation done by Phoenix police after they were
alerted by a shipping company that marijuana was secreted in a
package of freight to be delivered to Philadelphia. The
affidavit included information that the police gathered between
6

March 18, 2005, and April 15, 2005, that led them from the
warehouse on Montebello, where the shipment originated, to
another warehouse on North 51st Avenue, and finally to the
warehouse on McDowell that was the subject of the search
warrant.
The affidavit further provides information regarding
the activities of various persons, including Defendant, in
relation to the warehouses.
15 Defendant argues that the affidavit should be
redrafted under Franks because Detective Valadez (1) falsely
indicated there was a connection between the Montebello
warehouse and the 51st Avenue warehouse; (2) did not inform the
magistrate that some of the reported observations made at the
McDowell warehouse were made by non-law enforcement sources; (3)
failed to inform the magistrate when reporting on one suspect’s
involvement in prior drug trafficking that the suspect was not
prosecuted for the prior incident; and (4) falsely informed the
magistrate that Defendant was at the warehouse on the morning of
April 15, 2005.
16 To establish that an affiant’s statements were made
with “reckless disregard for the truth” requires a showing that
the affiant “entertained serious doubts about the truth of the
affidavit.” State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 109, 700 P.2d 488,
496 (1985). Mere innocent or negligent mistakes in an affidavit
7

will not satisfy the first prong of this test.
Id. (citing
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). Furthermore, to invalidate the
warrant, any “false statement” must not only be made knowingly,
intentionally or recklessly, it must also be a statement that
was necessary to the finding of probable cause. State v.
Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 245, 42, 25 P.3d 717, 733 (2001).
17 After listening to Detective Valadez’s testimony at
the Franks hearing, the trial court could have found that
Valadez did not make any knowing, intentional or reckless
misstatements or omissions of material fact in the affidavit.
There was nothing false or misleading in the affidavit with
respect to the first three items Defendant challenges.
First,
as Detective Valadez explained, the evidence connecting the
occupants of the Montebello warehouse with the 51st Avenue
warehouse included repair orders showing that a forklift present
at the Montebello warehouse had previously been repaired while
at the 51st Avenue warehouse.
18 Second, there was nothing in the affidavit that would
mislead the magistrate to believe that the information came only
from law enforcement personnel. The affidavit expressly refers
to certain information being obtained from workers in the area
of the McDowell warehouse. Moreover, the fact that the
information was derived from civilians would not have any impact
8

on the determination of probable cause. A citizen informant is
presumed to be reliable. State v. Harris, 131 Ariz. 488, 490,
642 P.2d 485, 487 (App. 1982). Although Detective Valadez did
not identify his sources with particularity in the affidavit,
they were not anonymous. The affidavit and Detective Valadez’s
testimony clearly indicated that he had personal contact with
the workers to obtain the information included in the affidavit.
“An unnamed individual . . . capable of being identified . . .
is not anonymous.” United States v. Brown, 496 F.3d 1070, 1075
(10th Cir. 2007).
19 Third, we also reject Defendant’s contention that
Detective Valadez misled the magistrate by failing to include
that Lafarga had not been prosecuted for his alleged involvement
with a 2002 marijuana shipping operation detailed in the
affidavit. Nothing in the affidavit indicates that Lafarga was
prosecuted. In fact, the language stating that the police
“believe[d]” Lafarga was one of the suppliers suggests there was
no prosecution with respect to his role in that prior incident.
As a result, the lack of a statement that he was not prosecuted
does not constitute a material omission. See United States v.
DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
reference to an earlier arrest while failing to relate that the
government subsequently declined to prosecute was insufficient
9

to warrant a Franks hearing), amended by 777 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1985).
20 Defendant next contends that the affidavit falsely
identified him visiting the warehouse on April 15.
Detective
Valadez acknowledged the error that he had mistakenly believed
the person he saw that morning was Defendant.
The affidavit
reported that Defendant and Gonzales were observed carrying
containers of gasoline into the warehouse. The person
accompanying Gonzales was actually Kevin Goldsmith, one of
Defendant’s colleagues from Philadelphia, and was discovered
when the warehouse was searched.
Based on Detective Valadez’s
testimony, the trial court could have reasonably found that the
misidentification was simply an innocent or negligent mistake as
opposed to an intentional or reckless misstatement of fact.
There was no claim that the misidentification was anything other
than an honest mistake, and our review of the record does not
suggest a different conclusion.
21 Moreover, the identification of Defendant at the
warehouse on April 15 was not significant to the finding of
probable cause.
The operative fact for purposes of probable
cause was that subjects associated with the warehouse were
bringing gasoline. The misidentification of Defendant for
Goldsmith was immaterial to the determination of probable cause.
10

Thus, notwithstanding the admitted error, Defendant failed to
demonstrate that the affidavit contained any material
misstatements or omissions that would have entitled him to
relief under Frank.
Thus, we conclude that there was no clear
error by the trial court in denying the motion to suppress.
B. Immunity Agreement
22 Following his indictment, Defendant met with
prosecutors to determine whether a plea agreement could be
negotiated. Defendant engaged in a “free talk” interview and he
provided information regarding his conduct in the marijuana
operation.
A letter agreement was executed stating that the
State would not use Defendant’s statements or the fact that he
was interviewed in any litigation or proceeding against him
unless he raised an issue regarding the interview.
23 Defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude
Tovar, who was cooperating with the State, from testifying about
matters “brought forward” by Defendant during his free talk.
Defendant asserted that he believed the State had used his
statements to refresh Tovar’s memory in violation of the free
talk agreement. According to Defendant, when his counsel
interviewed Tovar following Defendant’s free talk, Tovar made
statements about his role in the marijuana operation consistent
with the statements that Defendant made during the free talk.
11

In particular, Defendant identified statements made by Tovar
that he introduced Defendant to “Paco” and Lafarga and that
Tovar was paid for his involvement in the operation.
Because
the discovery provided did not include those statements,
Defendant argued that either (1) the State failed to give
complete discovery of all information provided by Tovar to the
police, or (2) Tovar’s memory was refreshed by information
obtained from Defendant during his free talk. Defendant
suggested that the second possibility was the “more logical
inference” and requested an evidentiary hearing on whether the
State had breached the free talk agreement. After oral
argument, the trial court denied the motion.
24 Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to
hold an evidentiary hearing on the alleged violation. We review
a trial court’s ruling on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing
for abuse of discretion. State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565,
576, 48, 161 P.3d 608, 619 (App. 2007). However, construction
of the immunity agreement is a question of law, which we review
de novo.
See Ariz. Biltmore Estates Ass'n v. Tezak, 177 Ariz.
447, 448, 868 P.2d 1030, 1031 (App. 1993) (holding that the
interpretation of a contract is a legal issue).
25 As an initial matter, we reject the State’s contention
that the terms of the free talk agreement only restrict the
12

direct use of information obtained from Defendant. While
insisting there was never any use of Defendant’s statements to
refresh Tovar’s memory, the State argues that such use would
constitute “derivative use” and therefore fall outside the scope
of the agreement.
26 When enforcing an immunity agreement, we look to the
terms of the agreement itself, determined by applying general
contract law. See Brown v. Ariz. Dep’t of Real Estate, 181
Ariz. 320, 327, 890 P.2d 615, 622 (App. 1995) (“Agreements not
to prosecute a witness are viewed under contract law
principles.”).
A review of the free talk agreement finds that
it unambiguously precludes both direct and derivative use of
Defendant’s statements against him.
After providing that the
State “will not use the fact that he was interviewed, or any
statements made by him during the interview, in any litigation
or proceeding,” the next paragraph of the agreement reads:
[Defendant] understands that he will
probably reveal, during the interview,
information not previously known to the
[State] in connection with the abovedescribed
investigation. The parties agree,
in the event that no plea agreement is
reached with [Defendant] within a reasonable
time after the interview, the [State] can
use the “fruits” of statements made by
[Defendant] in any investigation and during
any litigation and prosecution of anyone
other than [Defendant].
13

(Emphasis added.)
The explicit reference to “fruits” clearly
indicates that “not only the direct products, but also the
indirect products” of Defendant’s statements would not be used
by the State against him.
27 Turning to Defendant’s claim of error, the trial court
could have reasonably concluded that Defendant failed to make a
sufficient showing that there had been a violation of the
agreement to justify an evidentiary hearing on his claim.
As
detailed by the State in the response to Defendant’s motion,
Tovar was interviewed by defense counsel the same day, but after
Defendant’s free talk session. Tovar was not present for
Defendant’s free talk and the statements were not recorded.
Thus, the only way that Tovar’s memory could have been refreshed
by Defendant’s statements was if the prosecutor informed him of
the statements.
The prosecutor avowed none of the information
provided by Defendant was conveyed to Tovar.
28 The record does not reflect any challenge by Defendant
to the facts described in the response or the prosecutor’s
avowal. A prosecutor’s avowal based on firsthand knowledge may
be properly considered in ruling on an issue. See State v.
Montano, 204 Ariz. 413, 424, 50, 65 P.3d 61, 72 (2003)
(relying, in part, on the prosecutor’s avowal that there were no
Brady materials in denying the Brady claim), supplemented by 206
14

Ariz. 296, 77 P.3d 1246 (2003); State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290,
304, 33, 4 P.3d 345, 359 (2000) (relying, in part, on the
prosecutor’s avowal that the witness’s remarks were unexpected
and unsolicited when determining whether the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial). Defendant,
on the other hand, merely surmises that Tovar’s memory was
refreshed using his free talk statements.
Based on the record
before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not
conducting an evidentiary hearing before denying Defendant’s
claim.
C. Hearsay
29 At trial, Detective Valadez testified about his
investigation of the marijuana operation at the McDowell
warehouse. He recounted the facts and circumstances giving rise
to the investigation including the earlier incident involving
the controlled shipment of marijuana to Philadelphia from the
Montebello warehouse. Detective Valadez had no personal
involvement in the prior incident and his testimony regarding
what occurred was based entirely on what others told him,
including the connection between the warehouses.
30 Defendant argues that the admission of the secondhand
testimony was hearsay and violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.
Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on
15

the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State
v. King, 213 Ariz. 632, 636, 15, 146 P.3d 1274, 1278 (App.
2006). However, we review whether testimony violates the
Confrontation Clause de novo. Id.
31 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
prohibits the use of testimonial out-of-court statements where a
witness is absent or unavailable and there has not been a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.
See Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The State argues that because the
challenged testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the
information Detective Valadez learned from others during his
investigation, the out-of-court statements did not constitute
hearsay and therefore did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
The State argues that these portions of the detective’s
testimony were merely provided as background information to show
the jury why the police ultimately focused on the McDowell
warehouse.
32 Generally, testimony that is not admitted for the
truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay and does not violate
the Confrontation Clause. State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 315,
61, 160 P.3d 177, 194 (2007). It is recognized that in
certain situations the State will need to provide information to
the jury as to why the police are present at a particular place.
16

See United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“If a jury would not otherwise understand why an investigation
targeted a particular defendant, the testimony could dispel an
accusation that the officers were officious intermeddlers
staking out [the defendant] for nefarious purposes.”).
This
should not be viewed, however, as providing an open invitation
to evade Crawford and the normal restrictions on hearsay.
As
one of the standard evidentiary treatises explains:
One area where abuse may be a particular
problem involves statements by arresting or
investigating officers regarding the reason
for their presence at the scene of a crime.
The officers should not be put in the
misleading position of appearing to have
happened upon the scene and therefore should
be entitled to provide some explanation for
their presence and conduct. They should
not, however, be allowed to relate
historical aspects of the case, such as
complaints and reports of others containing
inadmissible hearsay. Such statements are
sometimes erroneously admitted under the
argument that the officers are entitled to
give the information upon which they acted.
The need for this evidence is slight, and
the likelihood of misuse great. Instead, a
statement that an officer acted “upon
information received,” or words to that
effect, should be sufficient.
2 Broun, et al., McCormick on Evidence § 249, at 103 (5th ed.
1999).
33 The requisite factor for admissibility of out-of-court
statements for non-hearsay purposes is relevancy. State v.
17

Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 414, 678 P.2d 1373, 1378 (1984).
In
other words, there must be a showing of the relevance of the
non-hearsay use of the statement.
Where there is no relevant
use of the statement for other than the truth of the matter
asserted, it is hearsay. See id.
34 “It is the prosecutor’s duty to avoid the introduction
of out-of-court statements that go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to explain police conduct.”
Commonwealth v. Palsa,
555 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. 1989). The State does not explain why a
recitation of the complete investigation, including all the outof-court
statements made to Detective Valadez by others, leading
up to the surveillance of the McDowell warehouse was necessary
“background information.”
Any question about the reason for
police activity at that location could be readily explained with
the simple statement that it was based “upon information
received,” or similar words to that effect. As the court
observed in Palsa,
[I]t cannot be said that every out-of-court
statement having bearing upon subsequent
police conduct is to be admitted, for there
is great risk that, despite cautionary jury
instructions, certain types of statements
will be considered by the jury as
substantive evidence of guilt. Further, the
police conduct rule does not open the door
to unbounded admission of testimony, for
such would nullify an accused's right to
cross-examine and confront the witnesses
against him.
18

Id. at 118; see also Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020 (“Allowing [police]
to narrate the course of their investigations, and thus spread
before juries damning information that is not subject to crossexamination,
would go far toward abrogating the defendant’s
rights under the sixth amendment and the hearsay rule.”).
35 Moreover, it is not an absolute rule that admission of
a non-hearsay statement will never violate the Confrontation
Clause.
See Lee v. McCaughtry, 892 F.2d 1318, 1325 (7th Cir.
1990). Such testimony may be found to violate the Confrontation
Clause where the prosecutor destroys the non-hearsay nature of
the statement during trial by misusing the testimony for the
truth of the matter asserted. Id. at 1325-27. Notwithstanding
the State’s contention that Detective Valadez’s testimony
describing what he had learned from others was merely background
information, the record reflects that the prosecutor argued the
truth of the out-of-court statements during closing as evidence
of guilt. Because this testimony went far beyond what was
necessary to avoid misleading the jury as to why the police were
investigating the McDowell warehouse and included testimonial
hearsay used by the prosecutor during closing argument, the
admission of this testimony was error.
36 When the trial court errs in admitting evidence, we
review for harmless error. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588,
19

858 P.2d 1152, 1191 (1993). “Error, be it constitutional or
otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”
Id.
37 The State argues that any error in the admission of
the improper hearsay should be found harmless in light of the
other evidence of Defendant’s guilt presented at trial.
Even
though there was substantial evidence to support the verdicts,
“[t]he inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred
without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in
this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Id.
(quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).
38 Defendant was not present at the warehouse when it was
searched and the marijuana operation discovered.
While he had
been at the warehouse on two prior occasions in the company of
others involved in the operation, the evidence presented through
the police witnesses regarding his involvement was
circumstantial.
It has long been held that "mere presence of
the defendant where narcotics or marijuana is found is
insufficient to establish that he knowingly possessed or
exercised dominion and control over the drugs.”
State v. Van
Meter, 7 Ariz. App. 422, 427, 440 P.2d 58, 63 (1968). There was
20

direct evidence of Defendant’s participation in the marijuana
operation in the form of testimony from Tovar, but his testimony
was subject to impeachment based on his prior inconsistent
statements to investigators and the State’s agreement to dismiss
charges against him in return for his testimony.
Not only did
the hearsay testimony from Detective Valadez tend to inculpate
Defendant by implicitly connecting him with the marijuana
shipment that originated from the Montebello warehouse, it
further served to bolster Tovar’s testimony that Defendant was
involved in prior marijuana shipments made from the other
warehouses.
Indeed, the State specifically argued in closing
that Tovar’s testimony was corroborated by the “evidence” of the
shipments of marijuana from the other warehouses and the “common
theme” running through them of “marijuana, water, Philadelphia.”
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the admission of
the testimonial hearsay was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, Defendant’s convictions must be reversed and this matter
remanded for a new trial.
D. Expert Opinion
39 Defendant also challenges the admission of Detective
Valadez’s expert testimony about Defendant’s role in the
marijuana operation.
Defendant argues that Detective Valadez’s
testimony was improper because it involved impermissible profile
21

evidence.
Defendant did not raise that objection at trial; he
only objected to the “form of question.”
An objection to the
admission of evidence on one ground is insufficient to preserve
appellate review on other grounds. State v. Hamilton, 177 Ariz.
403, 408, 868 P.2d 986, 991 (App. 1993).
40 Because we are remanding the matter for new trial, we
will not review the issue. If the issue arises and there is a
different objection, the trial court can resolve it.
CONCLUSION
41 Because the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting testimonial hearsay regarding the investigation by the
police, we reverse Defendant’s convictions and sentences and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
CONCURRING:
___________________________
MAURICE PORTLEY, Judge
____________________________________
PATRICK IRVINE, Presiding Judge
____________________________________
PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge
22