The Institution of Bride Wealth - Australian Refugee Rights Alliance

Briefing Note on Southern Sudanese Women &
the Institution of Bride Wealth: The Changing
Nature of this Practice through Conflict,
Displacement and Resettlement
Sarah Shteir
Comments Invited
to crr@unsw.edu.au
Available at:
www.crr.unsw.edu.au
CONTENT
I. The Institution & Practice of Bride Wealth in Southern Sudan
II. Impact of the Conflict on the Practice of Bride Wealth in Southern Sudan
III. Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Refugees in Refugee Camps and
Settlements: Focus on Uganda & Kenya
IV. Bride Wealth Practices Among Resettled Sudanese Refugees in Sydney, Australia
V. Comparative Analysis of Market-Driven Resurgence of Dowry Practices in India
VI. Addressing & Challenging the Continued Practice of Bride Wealth
VII. Sources
BACKGROUND
This briefing note is intended to provide an overview of the practice of bride wealth among
Southern Sudanese communities in Sudan, and the changing nature of this practice due to the
impact of conflict, the experience of displacement to refugee camps, and resettlement to
countries such as Australia. This briefing note includes a comparative analysis of the marketdriven
resurgence of dowry practices in India in order to draw attention to the economic
influences on such a practice and the resulting monetisation of the practice and commodification
of women involved.

Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
I. The Institution & Practice of ‘Bride Wealth’ in Southern Sudan
To my mother, I am a beast of burden
To my father, a source of income
To my brothers and cousins, a servant
To a sugar daddy, a fruit
Who Cares?
(A poem recited by teenage girls during a visit to Kakuma Refugee Camp by the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees António Guterres in 2005. 1 )
Common among diverse ethnic groups of Southern Sudan is the institution of ‘bride wealth’ in
marriage practices, which some also refer to as ‘dowry’ 2 . Bride wealth refers to a payment by the
groom’s family to the family of the bride. The form of this payment varies among ethnic groups,
depending on the groups’ customs and economy of the area among other determining factors.
Among the Southern Sudanese, bride price is commonly associated with cattle, though it may
also take the form of sheep, donkeys, goats, agricultural tools, weapons, beads, increasingly
cash, or a combination of cash and other items.
The practice of bride wealth is governed by the customary law systems of Southern Sudan. There
are multiple customary law systems across Southern Sudan as most of the fifty-plus tribes in the
region have their own discrete body of customary law reflecting their own group identity. 3 There
are commonalities across these systems, however, such as the institution of bride wealth. In the
context of Sudan, ‘customary law’ refers to the “body of traditions, mores, social conventions and
rules that through long usage and widespread acceptance direct and govern traditional African
society.” 4
The basic “tenet” of customary law - common across all customary law systems in Southern
Sudan - is the need to achieve reconciliation and to ensure inter-community harmony. 5 These
beliefs or values are reflected in the manner in which customary law addresses various personal
issues, including marriage, adultery, divorce, and child custody. For example, the practice of
marriage is part of the larger effort toward harmony and cohesion, more specifically a means of
strengthening the bonds between families. Among the Dinka and Nuer, customary law stipulates
that they must marry outside their clan, thus promoting cohesion across the broader group. Not
only do the values of community and cohesion figure in the choice of marriage partner but also in
the payment process, as the bride wealth is often collected from many members of the man’s
family group, not solely the groom, thus further reinforcing the links and responsibilities of the
couple to a wider community of people. In this way, marriage is seen as “not simply a union of a
man and a woman; it is an alliance of two families or bodies of kin.” 6
According to Mary Anne Fitzgerald in Throwing the Stick Forward, "One of the driving cultural
premises throughout southern Sudan is that of survival through the redistribution and sharing of
wealth. The linchpin for this economic and social dynamic is bride-wealth.” 7 Given that the
practice of bride wealth involves the payment and woman moving in opposite directions, it
1
Quoted in McKinsey, Kitty, 2005, “First willing refugees could return to South Sudan after rainy season, says Guterres”,
UNHCR, August 30, 2005, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/southsudan?page=news&id=43148fed4
2
Influenced by the argument presented by Justice Aleu Akechak Jok in “A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary
Southern Sudan” (2004), this paper will use the term ‘bride wealth’ and ‘bride price’ rather than ‘dowry,’ as ‘dowry’ also
refers to the practice whereby a woman brings money or property to a marriage, which may lead to confusion as the
opposite practice is being addressed here.
3
The information provided about the larger context of customary law systems in Southern Sudan is drawn exclusively
from Jok, Justice Aleu Akechak et al., 2004, “A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary
4
Quoted in Jok, Justice Aleu Akechak et al., 2004, p. 11
5
Jok, Justice Aleu Akechak et al., 2004, p. 6
6
Ibid., p. 33
7
Fitzgerald, Mary Anne, 2002, Throwing the Stick Forward: The Impact of War on Southern Sudanese Women, African
women for Peace Series, UNIFEM & UNICEF, p.15
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
effectively constitutes an exchange. 8 A 1988 study of The Customary Law of the Dinka People of
Sudan provides an explanation of the reasons for the institution of bride wealth:
• Bride wealth serves as compensation to the relatives of the bride for the expenses
incurred in raising her and reimbursement for expenses incurred at the marriage of her
mother
• Bride wealth serves as acknowledgement for the services to be rendered by the bride to
her husband and his family and the children she will bear
• Bride wealth brings stability to the marriage in the form of economic benefits acquired by
the parents and relatives of the bride 9
The practice of bride wealth clearly reflects the conflict between international human rights law
and the rights granted to women and children under customary law systems. According to Human
Rights Watch, traditional practices such as bride wealth have institutionalised the denial of
women’s rights. 10 The role of women within the institution of marriage is to cement family ties
through bride wealth and childbearing (which provides permanence and continuity to the
institution of the family). 11 The bride wealth system is based on the concept of girls as a family
“resource,” with marriage an important economic event, especially in times of scarcity. According
to a member of the Sudanese administration at Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, in Sudan, a
man’s daughter is his “bank.” 12 While there is no standard equation for determining bride price,
determining factors include beauty, education, 13 and wealth of her family. According to various
sources, bride price can range from 15 cows up to 400 head of cattle in prosperous times, or
more commonly, 80 to 150 cattle, 14
Given the role of marriage in families and broader communities in Southern Sudan, women are
generally expected to submit to marriage as a matter of custom and face significant pressure
from family and friends to marry at a young age. In a 2005 Washington Post feature on the lives
of former girl-child soldiers in Southern Sudan, one young woman, Mary, who dreams of
becoming a physician, struggles to stand up to her brother who is pressuring her to marry. She is
quoted as saying to her brother, "You just want the cows…You are always wanting my dowry
now to sponsor your life." 15 This comment speaks to a widespread belief that sisters are
16
expected to marry in order to provide for their brothers’ futures.
In this system, girls and women are relatively powerless to determine their own personal lives,
including their marriage partner, a decision made by other members of her family. According to
Fitzgerald, “women are hostage to power structures that are underpinned by material assets.” 17 If
a woman refuses to marry the person their family has chosen, it is not uncommon for families to
send her to jail until she changes her mind. In disputes over the size of the bride wealth, the
woman may again be sent to jail by one family to exert pressure upon the other, the woman thus
serving as a bargaining tool in the marriage negotiations. 18 In their 2006 report The Impact of the
8
Goody, Jack, 1973, ‘‘Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia’’, in J. R. Goody and S. J. Tambiah, eds., Bridewealth
and Dowry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1-58 referenced in Srinivasan, Sharada, 2005, “Daughters or
Dowries? The Changing Nature of Dowry Practices in South India,” World Development Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 593-615
9
This information is outlined in Jok’s Study.
10 Human Rights Watch, 2006, The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of
National Unity on Southern Sudan, March 2006, p.23
11
Ibid.
12
Quoted in Griek, Ilse, 2006, “Access to Justice in Kenyan Refugee Camps: Exploring the Scope of Protection, MSc
Thesis, Department of Public Administration, Leiden University, Netherlands (unpublished), pp 61-62
13
Educated girls are seen to be worth more in bride wealth, which ought to encourage families to send and keep their
daughters in school, however, there remain significant factors pulling and keeping girls out of school, including family
demands at home.
14
Human Rights Watch, 2006, p. 22
15
Wax. Emily, 2005, “Girls From Sudan's War Now Fight to Learn: Effects of 21-Year Conflict, Patriarchal Tradition Hurt
Chance at School,” Washington Post
16
Refugee Law Project, April 2007, “Giving Out Their Daughters For Their Survival: Refugee Self-Reliance, ‘Vulnerability’,
and the Paradox of Early Marriage,” Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 20, p. 21
17 Fitzgerald, Mary Anne, 2002, p. 16
18
Human Rights Watch, 2006, p.22
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on Southern
Sudan, Human Rights Watch reported an incident involving a 14-year old pregnant girl
imprisoned by her father because he was angry with her for having sexual relations with her
fiancé - thus lowering her bride price - while the fathers were negotiating the bride price. 19
The practice of bride wealth is complex and it is designed as such in part to serve as a
disincentive to divorce and adultery. Since the purpose of the bride wealth is to cement family
ties, it is shared among the bride’s family; among the Dinka and Nuer, the bride wealth is shared
among the male relatives only. In the event of a divorce, the bride’s family must return the bride
wealth, which by that time may have been used to negotiate marriages for the male members of
the bride’s family. Commonly, the bride’s family is reluctant to return the bride wealth. The woman
is, therefore, at the mercy of her family’s decision, as she cannot seek a divorce without their
agreement and approval. 20
If a woman wishes to divorce her husband, it is not uncommon for her family to send her to prison
to try and pressure her to change her mind, so as to avoid having to repay the bride wealth. 21
Women may also end up in jail as a result of engaging in adultery 22 , not uncommonly used as a
tool to provoke the husband to divorce her, often the only way a woman can a seek a divorce in
the face of family resistance. For some women, this is the preferred alternative to returning to
their husbands. In fact, in police detention cells and prisons across Southern Sudan, there is a
regular presence of women and girls imprisoned for adultery.
A human rights assessment carried out in a community in Southern Sudan by the Human Rights
component of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) noted that they had met at least one woman
who preferred long-term incarceration for adultery over returning to her husband. One woman
unhappy in her marriage – in part due to the large number of wives her husband had and the
resulting dissatisfaction –had sought a relationship with another man, resulting in her
incarceration for adultery. After three months, the woman had been given the choice whether to
stay in prison or to return to her husband and she had chosen another prison term. The Human
Rights unit forwarded the case to the UN Mission’s Police component to be monitored 23 .
II. Impact of the Conflict on the Practice of Bride Wealth in Southern Sudan
Bride wealth persisted during the conflict in Southern Sudan, in part serving as a response to the
dynamics of the conflict and a survival mechanism for families. Raiding by one ethnic group
against another was a central feature of the conflict in many parts of the south following the split
in the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA). Cattle and other animals were looted leaving
communities without a significant source of livelihood. Bride wealth provided a means of
replenishing a community’s herd, thus families married off their girls – often at an earlier age than
during peace time - in order to acquire cattle. In recognition of the impact of the conflict on
communities’ livelihoods, in areas controlled by the SPLA, commanders attempted to limit the
size of dowry with mixed results. 24 Combatants also took advantage of the conflict situation to
avoid paying bride wealth; abduction of girls and women was common during the war, and it, not
only, relieved the kidnapper of paying a bride price, but provided a possible future source of
income for them from any girls born who could eventually be married off in exchange for bride
wealth. 25
19
Ibid., p. 22
20
IRIN, 2003, “SUDAN: Women and children in prison”
21
HRW 2006, p. 22
22
Interpretations of adultery seem to vary quite substantially; women have been accused of adultery for talking to another
man
23
Shteir, Sarah, 2006, “Gender Assessment Mission to Wau, Western Bahr Al Ghazal (19-25 April 2006),” prepared on
behalf of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Gender Unit
24
HRW 2006, p. 24.
25
Human Rights Watch, 1994, Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
III. Bride Wealth Practices among Sudanese Refugees in Refugee Camps and Settlements:
Focus on Uganda 26 & Kenya
The practice of bride wealth has persisted among Sudanese through their journey of
displacement to refugee camps and resettlement in neighbouring countries. News stories and
reports reference such practices in Kakuma refugee camp and in refugee settlements in Uganda.
In both countries, in the context of severe poverty, encampment and limited mobility, and
pervasive physical insecurity, the practice of bride wealth adopted a more desperate guise,
transforming into a coping mechanism and a survival strategy. In this more desperate climate,
bride wealth has become increasingly associated with girls being forced to marry at a significantly
younger age than was traditionally the norm, widely recognized among refugees as a harmful but
nonetheless necessary practice.
Refugee Settlements, Uganda
The Refugee Law Project (RLP) in Uganda has examined the widespread phenomenon of early
marriage in Uganda’s refugee settlements among refugees, the majority of whom are Sudanese.
Uganda’s refugee settlements are based on the concept of refugee self-reliance whereby
refugees are given tools, NFIs and agricultural plots within designated settlements. Despite the
admirable programmatic vision of self-reliance, the reality according to RLP is of declining
assistance, exhausted soil and poor agricultural productivity, compounded by their encampment
and limited mobility and exploitation by nationals, among other factors. The RLP study revealed
that refugees view early marriage as a negative but necessary alternative survival strategy and
response to poor economic conditions and physical insecurity in the refugee settlements. The
RLP describes this phenomenon as a paradox – “it is a response to widespread human rights
violations and the lack of livelihood options within settlements, and yet it is itself a rights violation
that in the longer term serves to perpetuate impoverishment and vulnerability.” 27
According to RLP, among refugees in Uganda’s refugee settlements, early marriage is often
viewed as an economic survival strategy for girls and their guardians. Without other financial
means, refugees may have little choice but to arrange marriages for themselves or their
daughters. According to a UNHCR official interviewed by RLP, the desire for bride wealth is “the
root cause actually [of early marriage], and what brings this up is poverty.” 28 A Sudanese woman,
interviewed by RLP, who came from a well-off family in Sudan and had herself been married at
17, acknowledged the possibility that her 13-year old daughter might not be able to marry at an
‘appropriate age’. She remarked “If somebody comes with money that I can use to eat and feed
the children, I will sell her.” She also explained that if she met a man with money to support her
family she would “go [with him] right away. 29 Girls living with guardians or foster families are
particularly at risk of forced early marriages, a strategy resorted to for the economic survival of
the guardian or foster family more often than the girl.
In this economically impoverished context, boys also find themselves not only pressured but also
forced into marriage. Early marriages are a common response to sexual relationships between
young people – at least one of whom is a minor - that have resulted in pregnancy. 30 It is not
uncommon for a girl’s family to force her ‘boyfriend’ to marry her under threat of reporting
defilement to the police. The threat of defilement is often used to force boys to pay bride price
and marry the girl or pay a fee to the girl’s family and remain unmarried. 31 The bride price
demanded often requires boys to leave school and seek out casual work. If boys are unable or
unwilling to pay, they may face imprisonment, violence, harassment and ostracism from their
26
All of the information on the Sudanese in refugee settlements in Uganda is drawn from Refugee Law Project, April
2007, “Giving Out Their Daughters For Their Survival: Refugee Self-Reliance, ‘Vulnerability’, and the Paradox of Early
Marriage,” Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 20
27
Refugee Law Project, April 2007, p. 9
28
Ibid., p. 19
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., p. 13
31
Ibid., p. 3
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
communities. It is not uncommon for boys to flee from their settlements as they see no other
alternative to their situation.
In addition to economic motivations, refugees consider early marriage as a strategic response to,
and survival strategy within a context of, pervasive physical insecurity. Living in what the RLP
describes as a “sexually threatening atmosphere’ – with rampant peer pressure, verbal abuse
and sexual harassment, parents and guardians seek marriages for their daughters –whatever
their ages – as a means of protecting girls from SGBV. 32 Unaccompanied girls and women living
alone face a similarly sexually threatening atmosphere, though they are more at risk of sexual
violence including rape, as they are known to be without males to ‘protect’ them. In this
environment, unaccompanied girls and single women, including widows, are likely to marry early
as they have no other means of meeting their needs and men are viewed as necessary to protect
them from pervasive insecurity and are commonly considered an acceptable means to meet their
needs. 33
Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya
The observations and patterns described by RLP in Uganda’s refugee settlements apply well to
the situation of Sudanese refugees in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya.
While the Sudanese brought the practice of bride wealth with them to the camp, it seems to have
taken on a more desperate and violent form, adapting to the changed circumstances of the
community – the poverty, pervasive desperation and frustration, and idleness that characterize
Kakuma. Barbara Harrell-Bond describes refugee camps as “artificial environments where
everyone is restricted in their freedom of movement.” 34 Women in Kakuma face further
restrictions on their movement, due to the pervasive threat of abduction by family members
seeking to marry them off for bride wealth. 35
Unaccompanied girls/women are most at risk of forced marriage and related violence, and there
is a pervasive fear among unaccompanied girls of the threat of abduction for forced marriage 36 .
When the unaccompanied Sudanese boys arrived at Kakuma, they lived together in groups with a
few adult male caretakers, a distinct group, visible to the aid agencies. When unaccompanied
Sudanese girls arrived – smaller in number than the ‘lost boys’ – they were not allowed to live on
their own and were instead placed in ‘foster care’, with a distant relative, or perhaps member of
their community/region/ethnic group. These girls were absorbed into foster families, hidden from
view and potential support and services from UNHCR and other aid organisations in the camp.
For some unaccompanied girls, their foster placement is tantamount to indentured servitude,
whereby they are forced into the role of domestic servants, prevented from attending school, and
prohibited from accessing services or support from aid organizations, or information about their
resettlement options. 37 Forced marriages, arranged by foster families – especially those with no
connection with the girls’ families – are common because the financial incentives are strong for
the foster family who will collect the bride price in exchange for the girl. 38 The girls in these
situations have little to no recourse or support. A report by Refugees International referenced an
interview with Beatrice, 17, whose cousin, age 19, was taken back to Sudan against her will by
her “uncle” who had arranged a marriage with a wealthy Sudanese cattle owner for 20 cows.
Beatrice wanted to ask her relatives about her cousin but was afraid that they might see her as a
troublemaker and “sell her next.” 39
32
Ibid., p. 16
33
Ibid., p. 18
34
Harrell-Bond, Barbara, 2000, “Are refugee camps good for children?” New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper
No. 29
35
IRIN, 2002, “SUDAN: Focus on women and war”
36
Duncan, Julianne, 2000, “Sudanese Girls in Kakuma”
37
Refugees International, 2002, “Do Not Forget The Lost Girls of Sudan”
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid. Quoted from RI article, not direct quote from Beatrice.
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
Girls/women in Kakuma who refuse marriage are vulnerable to abduction and sexual violence. If
they are able to access support, they may be placed in the protection area. In a 2002 report,
Human Rights Watch described the experience of Awut S., a 16-year old Sudanese girl who was
placed in the protection area of Kakuma when she refused to marry a man in Sudan who paid
150 cows to her uncle. She told a Human Rights Watch researcher, “I don't want to get married. I
don't have money. We just have nothing. I have been in this place [Kakuma protection area] since
May 10, 2000. My uncle is so angry with me he beat Mom . . . he beat Mom until she was
admitted to the hospital [in Kakuma camp]. He tried to catch me when I went to school. I am
staying here because I have no place to go. I cannot go to school when I am here. I am missing
my school so much. I cannot ever leave this place to go to school because my uncle is looking for
me. I cannot walk outside the fence. He does not know that I am here.” 40
One strategy used by girls in the face of threats of forced marriage is to hide. The Boston Globe
interviewed a Sudanese woman, Rebecca Madut, about her experience of escaping from a
forced marriage: after returning to her hut in Kakuma to find her sister had been taken back to
Sudan for a forced marriage, Rebecca hid with friends and persuaded the UN to put her name on
the emergency resettlement list to avoid a forced marriage. 41 Apparently, it is common for the
names of girls like Rebecca to be blacked out to prevent abduction and/or detention by guardians
or distant relatives, prior to their departure from the camp for resettlement. 42
According to the Refugees International report referenced above, the case of the 19 year-old
Sudanese woman was reported to the UN, “but they can do nothing.” According to one
researcher, UNHCR camp staff have been wary of being seen to interfere in seemingly traditional
cultural practices such as forced marriage or abduction for forced marriage, helping create an
atmosphere of impunity in Kakuma to the extent that it has helped create an “institutionalised
patriarchal culture” in the camps which enabled male refugees and others to assault and abuse
Sudanese women with impunity. 43
Regardless of whether or not individual UNHCR staff have responded as is described above,
according to UNHCR, a number of programs have been established to respond to these cases,
including: increasing the number of female police officers to help encourage reporting; the
appointment of a magistrate from a nearby town who travels to Kakuma regularly to hear cases in
a mobile court, including abduction cases; the establishment of refugee women committees
throughout the camp which provide counselling and engage in community outreach on various
gender issues; and an incentive programme is being run in schools to encourage greater
attendance by girls. 44 Research undertaken by Eileen Pittaway and Linda Bartolomei in 2004
indicates that, despite good will and intent, the measures put in place were inadequate to deal
with the magnitude of the problem. 45
IV. Bride Wealth Practices Among Resettled Sudanese Refugees in Sydney, Australia
While it is known that Southern Sudanese refugees have brought the practice of bride wealth with
them to Australia, there is scant information about the dynamics of this continuing practice in their
new communities and the impact of their changed circumstances on the institution and practice
itself.
40
Human Rights Watch, 2002, “Why Refugees Leave Kenya’s Refugee Camps,” in Hidden in Plain View: Refugees Living
Without Protection in Nairobi and Kampala
41
Chanoff, David, 2005, “Out of Africa,” Boston Globe
42
Chanoff, Sasha and David Channoff, 2002, “Left Behind: Sudan's Forgotten Refugees,” Boston Globe
43
Kagwanja, Peter Mwangi, 2000, “Ethnicity, gender and violence in Kenya,” Special Feature on Gender and
Displacement, Forced Migration Review, Issue 9, pp 22-25
44
Clayton, Jonathan, 2002, “Feature: Jolie gives refugee girls a shot at school in Kenya,” UNHCR
45
Pittaway, Eileen and Bartolomei, Linda, 2004, ““From Asylum to Resettlement” Ensuring the Effective Protection of
Refugee Women at Risk: A Two Part Pilot Project Proposal based on continuing research in Kenya, Thailand and
Australia addressing offshore protection and resettlement/settlement needs,” UNSW Centre for Refugee Research
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
Statistics would suggest that the social environment in Sudanese refugee communities in
Australia is ripe for a resurgence or continuation of the practice. According to DIAC, males
outnumbered females in all age groups of Sudanese settlers in Australia from 2001 to 2006,
except in the 55-64 and 65 yrs+ age groups. In total, 55% of Sudanese settlers in Australia were
male, 45% female. Furthermore, more than 62% of all Sudanese settlers were 24 years old or
younger on arrival 46 , certainly considered an appropriate marrying age range for women. Given
the gender imbalance, considering the strict rules limiting interaction between unmarried men and
women, and the normative association between marriage and adulthood for men, it ought to be
considered that young Sudanese women resettled in Sydney are facing intense pressure to marry
from their communities.
Concern has been voiced by some members of a Sudanese community in Sydney regarding the
changing nature of the practice, with specific reference to the link between income generation
among resettled Sudanese men and bidding wars for Sudanese women. A similar phenomenon
has been noted in refugee camps and in Sudan, where resettled men are returning to find wives
and are causing a surge in bride prices. A briefing paper 47 on Southern Sudanese culture,
prepared for a training offered by the Migrant Information Centre (Eastern Melbourne), which
details a typical Nuer or Dinka marriage ‘dowry’ in Australia reflects the change in income
generation among resettled Sudanese:
Dowry for the bride’s sister $ 2500
Dowry for the father $ 800
The cost of the marriage ceremony $ 3500
Dowry for the mothers of the bride $ 2000
Wedding dress for bride and dresses for maid $ 3000
Car for bride and music systems $ 3000
Australian wedding ceremony $ 5000
The total cost of the cows $ 6000
Total cost $25,800
Rather than a bride price comprising cows, bride wealth in Australia is commonly paid partly as
money and partly as cows (or money) to relatives back in Sudan. The money component is
determined by a standard value of cows. 48 While the total cost itemized above may not be
uncommon among Sudanese, including those in the camps and back home, a comparative
analysis of the market-driven resurgence of dowry practices in India draws attention to the
inclusion of the commercial items listed above, specifically the car and music system.
V. Comparative Analysis of Market-Driven Resurgence of Dowry Practices in India
“Earlier people were poor, now they can afford. So what is given has changed.” 49
Analysis of the phenomenon of dowry across India demonstrates the importance of
understanding such a practice as multifaceted, a point of intersection between social, cultural,
political and economic dynamics. In 2001, the All India Democratic Women’s Association
(AIDWA) and Indian School of Women’s Studies and Development conducted a survey
confirming the rise and spread of dowries including in communities where it was relatively
unheard of before. In 2002, at a national workshop, AIDWA adopted a resolution on dowry noting
“The combination of the consumerist economy and cultures and retrograde antiwomen practices
in the name of tradition promote the practice of dowry.” 50
46
Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Sudanese Community Profile, p. 7
47
Nyawaragak Dei Wal, 2004, “Southern Sudanese Culture,” for Migrant Information Centre (Eastern Melbourne), p. 2
48
Ibid.
49
A respondent from the study village, quoted in Srinivasan, Sharada, 2005, “Daughters or Dowries? The Changing
Nature of Dowry Practices in South India,” World Development Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 605
50
Ibid., pp. 607-8
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
Unlike the practice of bride wealth in Sudan, the practice of ‘dowry’ in India refers to a transfer
from the woman’s family to the woman, her husband and his family at the time of marriage. 51 The
term ‘dowry’ refers to a tradition and institution for transmission of property to a woman at her
marriage and generally took the form of gift-giving by the bride’s family provides at various
milestones, including marriage. The practice was outlawed in 1961, with additional amendments
made thanks to the efforts of the women’s movement in 1984 and 1986. 52
While the practice has persisted over the decades, despite the prohibition, it has become an allcaste,
all-class countrywide phenomenon in the past approximately 10-15 years, coinciding with
economic reforms in India, spreading to communities that never engaged in the practice before
and to communities that cannot afford it. As the AIDWA resolution noted, this phenomenon is the
direct result of the impact of globalisation, market liberalisation, and economic reforms on the
population of India. Globalisation has led to increased monetisation and commercialisation of life,
increased availability of consumer goods, and fuelling the commercialisation of aspirations across
castes and class. While social standing and mobility have always been critical motivating factors
in the practice of dowry, the forces of globalisation and modernisation and accompanying social
pressures have redefined the nature of dowry.
Where dowry used to resemble voluntary gift-giving and token payments of gold and household
items, dependent on what the woman’s family wanted to and could afford, 53 it has since become
a non-negotiable, coercive transaction, a “dowry trap,” 54 where the dowry total has become
synonymous with the woman’s value, 55 forcing women’s families to pay huge dowries including
gold, cash, and consumer goods, such as cars, and modern appliances, leaving the poorer
landless families indebted for years following. It is this monetisation and commercialisation that
draws similarities to the kinds of items included in the sample Dinka/Nuer dowry list copied
above.
The resulting monetisation and commercialisation of dowry practices has had a direct bearing on
the lives of women, increasing the reasons for son preference 56 and comprising the number one
cause for the unwantedness of daughters 57 - given dowry expenses, and contributing to
incidence of gender-based violence, such as bride burning and other forms of torture, a common
strategy for demanding a higher dowry. According to an article in The Hindu newspaper, “The
burning of women for inadequate dowry is generated by a very contemporary, modern and
market-driven approach to consumerism, courtesy globalisation.”
58 Another newspaper reported
that a scientific study undertaken by the Punjab State Chemical Laboratory to examine the
causes behind the unnatural deaths of 1,000 married women, aged 18 to 35, revealed that on
59
average one woman falls victim to dowry every week.
In communities across India, marriage, as among the Southern Sudanese, is a means to ensure
harmony and kinship among groups. Marriage is central to defining a woman’s identity and is
considered the socially acceptable means to ensure a woman’s security and happiness, 60 not
unlike many Sudanese who see marriage as a necessary survival strategy and means to ensure
a woman’s security from gender-based violence. Furthermore, according to Srinivasan, a
daughter is considered a mirror of her family’s status, therefore, ensuring she is “presented well”
is critical for the whole family. 61
51
Ibid., p. 595
52
Ibid., p. 608
53
Ibid., p. 599
54
Ibid., p. 608
55
Ibid., p. 600
56
Ibid., p. 607
57
Ibid., p. 594
58
RoyChowdhury, Supriya, 2002, “Where women bear the brunt...”, The Hindu,
59
Editorial, 2007, “Dowry deaths in Punjab Greedy in-laws must be tackled,” The Tribune
60
Ibid., p. 607
61
Ibid., p. 604
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
VI. Addressing & Challenging the Practice of Bride Wealth
“We must leave the customary law for the time being; you cannot impose something from
outside. You cannot expect this to happen overnight. But alternatives to cattle should be
explored and some states may experiment with dowry limits. Even some are using pigs
and goats.”
Judicial officer, Rumbek, Southern Sudan 62
Regardless of the concerns voiced by a few members of a Sudanese organisation, any
discussion on the practice of bride wealth with Sudanese communities would be fraught with
difficulty. A debate on the practice of bride wealth between women’s rights advocates and
Sudanese elders would inevitably transform into a clash of cultures, whereby the rights of the
individual would stand up against a culture based on the concept of collective identity and
security. Any attempt to either challenge or stop the practice of bride wealth will face significant
resistance given the large number of people who benefit from the bride wealth system. According
to Human Rights Watch, “…the task of overhauling a dowry system in which all Nilotic families,
especially men, have strong economic interests will take more than willingness on the part of the
educated elite, as this will require significant political, community educational and other action.” 63
There is wide recognition, however, including among Sudanese elders, of the inevitability of
change to customary law systems in Southern Sudan, including such practices as bride wealth. In
2006, UNDP’s Rule of Law programme in Wau, a town in Southern Sudan, spoke with one male
Chief who recognized that aspects of Customary Law are problematic for women, revealing an
entry point for dialogue with some Chiefs on this sensitive issue. In response, UNDP’s Rule of
Law programme began planning to establish a formal dialogue with community chiefs on issues
of customary law. 64 There are pressures and influences from many sides, including the
international community and the cultural influences of Sudanese returnees, bringing not only cash
with them but also different cultures values, a “social revolution”, according to one Sudanese
Justice. 65
To further complicate the effort, any attempt to address and challenge the practice of bride wealth
must regard this practice within the broader context of pervasive gender inequality that women
experience in their lives. This broader context is articulated by Sandanshiv and Mathew, with
specific reference to dowry death cases:
“…dowry and the increasing demands related to it, are not the sole exterminators of
women in this country. Instead, it is the unjust social pressure on women to stay in
abusive, unwelcome homes when their lives are clearly in danger.” 66
62
Quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2006, p. 24
63
Ibid., p. 17
64
Shteir, Sarah, 2006, “Gender Assessment Mission to Wau”
65
Jok, Justice Aleu Akechak et al., 2004, p. 27
66
Sandanshiv, D.N., and Mathew, Jolly, 1995, “Legal Reform in Dowry Laws,” in Rani Jethmalani (Ed), Kali’s yug:
Empowerment, law and dowry death, New Delhi, quoted in Srinivasan, Sharada, 2005, p. 609
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
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Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
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DRAFT 12

Research on Bride Wealth Practices Among Sudanese Communities
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DRAFT 13