[2011] 46 VST 1 (Bom) - RS Goyal & Associates
[2011] 46 VST 1 (Bom) - RS Goyal & Associates
[2011] 46 VST 1 (Bom) - RS Goyal & Associates
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
VATLaws (Readable Version) - Thursday, January 10, 2013<br />
regard. The authority has to determine whether a penalty should be<br />
imposed and if it decides to impose a penalty what is the extent of the<br />
penalty liable to be imposed. The Supreme Court held in its decision in<br />
Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1970] 25 STC 211 (SC) as follows<br />
(page 214 in 25 STC):<br />
1 Here italicised.<br />
Page No: 9<br />
". . . Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to<br />
do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a<br />
statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be<br />
exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances.<br />
Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority<br />
competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to<br />
impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the<br />
provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide<br />
belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by<br />
the statute. . ."<br />
The Legislature may of course take away that discretion and make the<br />
imposition of a penalty mandatory for certain violations. Whether a penalty<br />
is mandatory is a matter of construing the legislative provision. Here the<br />
State Legislature by the use of the word "may" has not departed from the<br />
ordinary rule that a penalty is discretionary. The discretion must extend<br />
both to whether a penalty should be imposed and on the quantum. The<br />
Legislature having used the word "may", a clear provision was required, if<br />
the Act intended to oust the discretion on the quantum, in a case where<br />
the Commissioner is of the view that a penalty has to be imposed. That is<br />
not the case.<br />
Having therefore, considered the submission which has been urged on<br />
behalf of the appellant, we are of the view that there is no reason to accept<br />
the contention that the discretion which is conferred by section 61(2) does<br />
not extend also to the quantum of the penalty. Under the substantive part<br />
of sub-section (2) of section 61 the State Legislature has conferred a<br />
discretion on the Commissioner before he imposes a penalty on the dealer<br />
for failing to furnish a copy of the audited report within the prescribed<br />
period. The proviso to sub-section (2) states that if the dealer fails to<br />
furnish a copy of the said report within the prescribed period but files it<br />
within one month of the end of the period, and the dealer proves to the<br />
satisfaction of the Commissioner that the delay was on account of factors<br />
beyond his control, then no penalty under this sub-section shall be<br />
imposed upon him. Hence, in the circumstances set out that the proviso to<br />
sub-section (2), no penalty can be imposed at all if the conditions therein<br />
are fulfilled. The proviso operates when (i) the dealer fails to furnish a copy<br />
of the report within the prescribed period but files it within one month of<br />
the end of the period; (ii) the dealer proves to the satisfaction of the<br />
Commissioner that the delay was for reasons beyond his control. Where<br />
the proviso applies, no penalty can be imposed on the dealer at all.<br />
The proviso is an exception and does not control the substantive part of<br />
section 61(2). The substantive part of sub-section (2) of section 61 also<br />
confers a discretion upon the Commissioner which is not diluted by the<br />
This copy was printed from VATLaws licensed to: R.S. <strong>Goyal</strong><br />
Page No: 10