Are-Both-Kiev-and-Moscow-Fighting-the-Wrong-Wars-Wikistrat-report

2
Are Both Kiev Who and 3D Moscow Prints What Fighting in 2033? the Wrong Wars?
With Russia and Ukraine deadlocked in the Donbass region, could it be that each is actually fighting the wrong war?
The conflict has set back the Maidan Revolution’s European ambitions, pushed Ukraine’s economy to the brink and
severely tested its new leaders, many of whom came to power unprepared to rule.
Russia is paying a heavy price as well. Economic sanctions imposed by Western countries after it annexed Crimea
combined with low oil prices and governmental corruption to produce the worst economic crisis Russia has seen since
Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. Economic growth almost came to a standstill in 2014, and between 3.5 and 4
percent negative growth is expected this year. The ruble lost 40 percent of its value against the dollar in six months.
Inflation hit 16.7 percent in February.
ABOUT US
Wikistrat is the world’s first crowdsourced consultancy. It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts
via a patent-pending “Collaborative Competition” methodology to provide a variety of analytic services. Scenario
generation, policy planning, risk assessment and red-teaming exercises are conducted by Wikistrat on a realtime,
interactive online platform.

3
WIN THE WAR, LOSE THE PEACE
Perhaps Kiev ought to hope it doesn’t win the war at all. Even if it wins on the battlefield, Kiev may then lose
the peace, being burdened with a war-ravaged region that needs to be rebuilt and an alienated local population to be
reintegrated. Its economy is already in free fall. Ukraine’s gross domestic product tumbled 6.8 percent in 2014 and the
International Monetary Fund predicts it will shrink another 5.5 percent this year. Its foreign reserves fell 64 percent in
2014 and declined from $7.5 to $5.6 billion in the first quarter of 2015. At this rate, they will be exhausted by the end
of the year.
It could even get worse, especially if Kiev holds on to the Donbass by acquiescing to Moscow’s demands and turns
away from the West. How much authority would the leaders in Kiev have then, as ultra-nationalists denounce them as
quislings – and local strongmen, populists and oligarchs marginalize the government in a country awash with illegal
guns, refugees and traumatized veterans? Ukraine could start to look like a failed state on the edge of Europe.
THE MAKING OF THE NEW UKRAINE
The freezing of the conflict would be a devastating blow to the identity of the “new” Ukraine, but it offers perverse
advantages. The war would grind to a stalemate, with Ukraine and the Russian-backed “Novorossiyan People’s Republic”
pseudo-state glowering at each other across an unrecognized but all-too-real border marked with barbed wire, trenches
and mined no-man’s-lands. Russia, suffering a serious economic crisis unlikely to soon resolve itself, would be forced to
arm, guard, feed and support its puppet fiefdom.
Admittedly, the worst case would be that Ukraine, haunted by its failure to hold its borders, slips into cycles of vicious
political squabbles and intolerance. Politics in Kiev could become dominated by a new wave of nationalism, which
would alarm its Western friends.
But losing the Donbass could just as easily be the making of the new Ukraine. The rump state could gain a new cohesion
through the shared experience of struggle, while the West – eager to teach Moscow a lesson – would both require
and support the often-painful processes of political and economic reform the country so desperately needs. Ukraine
would still be beset by problems of corruption and poor productivity, and – notwithstanding the efforts to diversify
its trading and energy partners – would need to maintain a relationship of some kind with Moscow. Yet, a younger
generation of Ukrainians would have embraced an ambitious national identity in which the struggle to modernize and
join a democratic, free-market Europe takes center stage.
In this context, the ideal for both Ukraine and the West would appear to be as neat a bisection of the country as possible,
leaving the aging industries and rubble-strewn cities of the Donbass for the Russians and their local proxies. Conversely,
Moscow’s interests are best served by forcing the rebellious regions back into Ukraine, like a rusty nail to poison the
country’s bloodstream.
What then can the various actors do to attempt to drive events in the directions of their choosing?
A FUTURE DEFINED BY ECONOMICS
Any actor wishing to win hearts and minds in Ukraine must provide an economic alternative. For example, if the
Russian economy manages to rebound more quickly and vigorously than expected, then it acquires new scope to win
Ukraine back into its fold through the offer of cheaper energy or wider trading opportunities within Putin’s Eurasian
Economic Union.
However, without such soft-power options, the Kremlin is forced to stick to its playbook of subversion, destabilization
and outright military intervention. It certainly has the capacity to maintain the current situation indefinitely, or even
escalate it by strengthening its own forces in the region or waging a campaign of terrorism in the rest of Ukraine.
However, these all have serious costs, from increased sanctions to the direct expense of fighting a war and supporting
the Donbass.

Likewise, if Europe and the United States want to reengineer Ukrainian politics, they need to be willing to underwrite this
process with very substantial aid and credit. There are historical models. A new “Marshall Plan,” inspired by the postwar
reconstruction of Europe, would mean not just massive and targeted aid, but a parallel requirement that Ukraine adopts
governance reforms to strengthen its democracy and address the serious problem of corruption.
It is possible to conceive of a rump Ukraine taking real steps toward European Union membership, or the government
taking the time to rebuild and restructure its army to be able to reconquer the Donbass – or even the Kremlin deciding
to cut its losses and withdraw. In each case, though, there is a great risk that other actors and events will interfere. The
rebels could make it difficult for Moscow to disengage, for example, while Russia could respond to any government
escalation with an escalation of its own.
Absent the economic resources and the political will for major, game-changing initiatives from any of the involved actors,
Kiev and Moscow are only locking themselves into destructively counterproductive strategies.
ATTRIBUTIONS
[Cover] This work, “cover”, is a derivative of “LKJUKL” by MARIAJONER, under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license; “Map of
Ukraine” by United Nations Cartographic Section, published into the public domain; “Adam Mickiewicz square in Lviv” by ru:Ipesin, under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license; “Visite officielle du Président de la République d’Ukraine Petro Porochenko au Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg 26 juin
2014.” by Photo Claude TRUONG-NGOC under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license; “Flag of Ukraine with clear background (for portal
banner)” by Alex Maisuradze based on 3d work by UP9 under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license. “Cover” is licensed under CC BY
by Daniella Mordehai.

June 2013