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south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

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QUILL IAM<br />

PART 1<br />

PROFILING OF MILITANT GROUPS<br />

Nature o f t h re a t<br />

The governments of Pakistan <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan, as well as the Coalition forces,<br />

have generally succeeded <strong>in</strong> both fractur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> weaken<strong>in</strong>g the centralised<br />

structures of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal Taliban <strong>groups</strong>. However, it is unclear whether or not<br />

structural <strong>in</strong>tegrity is needed for either the survival of these <strong>groups</strong>’<br />

ambitions, or their capacity for violence. This is the case because:<br />

Multiple social networks permeate different <strong>jihad</strong>ist <strong>groups</strong>.<br />

Moreover, the new ‘wave’ of <strong>global</strong> <strong>jihad</strong>ist enthusiasm (Part IV of<br />

our longer report) has been energized by the success of IS, allow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>groups</strong> to latch onto its symbolic capital.<br />

The <strong>groups</strong> that are profiled <strong>in</strong> the sections below have an unstable<br />

<strong>and</strong> ambiguous central structure that makes them difficult to<br />

defeat. This is what has made it unlikely that military action alone<br />

will end <strong>jihad</strong>ist violence; unaccountable military violence will<br />

entrench support for the <strong>jihad</strong>ist cause. Therefore, we recommend:<br />

a) Foster<strong>in</strong>g both local <strong>and</strong> regional civil society <strong>and</strong> grassroots<br />

<strong>in</strong>itiatives, <strong>and</strong> guarantee<strong>in</strong>g their safety, whilst also provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />

them with f<strong>in</strong>ancial support <strong>in</strong> order to provide effective counter<br />

narratives to the Islamist ideology,<br />

b) Monitor<strong>in</strong>g the use of video <strong>and</strong> propag<strong>and</strong>a as a product of<br />

<strong>in</strong>fluence. Prior to 2001, the Taliban declared suicide bomb<strong>in</strong>g un-<br />

Islamic. However, it has become a regular component of their<br />

attacks <strong>and</strong> propag<strong>and</strong>a over the last ten years 4 . As such, we<br />

suggest that the media, the government, <strong>and</strong> the civil society<br />

should be enlisted to build awareness on counter-extremism<br />

responses with<strong>in</strong> media outlets, <strong>and</strong> to prevent the circulation of<br />

these videos <strong>and</strong> to stop them from garner<strong>in</strong>g appeal.<br />

<br />

Difficulties <strong>in</strong> isolat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>militant</strong> <strong>groups</strong> <strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the forces<br />

they represent become clear <strong>in</strong> our profiles, which document webs<br />

of complex relationships between fighters (see Figure 2). Judg<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the “significance” of a group is equally difficult s<strong>in</strong>ce there are<br />

numerous criteria by which a group might present a security<br />

threat. Furthermore, there are hundreds of armed <strong>groups</strong> across<br />

our chosen areas of focus: Afghanistan, Pakistan, J&K, <strong>and</strong> India.<br />

These <strong>groups</strong> fracture, merge, <strong>and</strong> change their names on a regular<br />

basis, <strong>and</strong> can also seek out, or be courted by, <strong>global</strong>ly oriented<br />

12

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