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Organizational Atmospheres: Foam, Affect and Architecture

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<strong>Organizational</strong> <strong>Atmospheres</strong><br />

Christian Borch<br />

Architectural <strong>Atmospheres</strong>: <strong>Foam</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Affect</strong><br />

It was mentioned above that Sloterdijk argues that the relation between the<br />

co-isolated foam cells is characterized by imitation dynamics <strong>and</strong> mimetic<br />

infiltration. I will now discuss this relation in more detail <strong>and</strong> associate it<br />

with the discussion of the spatiality <strong>and</strong> architecture of organizational foam.<br />

The starting point of this discussion is Sloterdijk’s own major source of<br />

inspiration, namely, Gabriel Tarde. As demonstrated previously, Tarde<br />

conceives of imitation as a kind of somnambulistic suggestion. Suggestion<br />

has two important implications in Tarde. First, it undermines the notion of<br />

individuality (this was shown above). Second, suggestion emphasizes affect<br />

rather than deliberation <strong>and</strong> conscious choices. Since the social individual,<br />

for Tarde, is akin to a sleepwalker, his or her behaviour is not a result of<br />

purposive action, but rather of ‘semiconscious suggestion’ (Borch, 2007;<br />

Williams, 1982). This means that when Sloterdijk argues that the relation<br />

between foam cells is characterized by imitation, he in fact stresses how crucial<br />

affect is to underst<strong>and</strong>ing foam sociality: the semiconscious imitationsuggestion<br />

addresses rather directly the import of affect, emotions, etc. <strong>and</strong><br />

how these <strong>and</strong> related qualities are transmitted from one cell to others. But<br />

how does this transmission take place more specifically? To answer that<br />

question, Teresa Brennan’s brilliant book on The Transmission of <strong>Affect</strong><br />

(2004) proves helpful. Indeed, I will argue, Brennan offers an important<br />

way of underst<strong>and</strong>ing the link between foam theory’s focus on imitation<br />

<strong>and</strong> the sphereological interest in atmospheres.<br />

Brennan opens the book by relating architecture <strong>and</strong> affect, asking ‘[i]s there<br />

anyone who has not, at least once, walked into a room <strong>and</strong> “felt the atmosphere”?’<br />

(2004: 1). What she claims is that this atmosphere is constituted,<br />

in part at least, by affects. To be more specific, the atmosphere is comprised<br />

by the affective state of those present, <strong>and</strong> this state can be transmitted to<br />

people who enter the room. This is what happens when you feel the atmosphere.<br />

Crucially, Brennan continues:<br />

The transmission of affect, whether it is grief, anxiety, or anger, is social or<br />

psychological in origin. But the transmission is also responsible for bodily<br />

changes; some are brief changes, as in a whiff of the room’s atmosphere, some<br />

longer lasting. In other words, the transmission of affect, if only for an instant,<br />

alters the biochemistry <strong>and</strong> neurology or the subject. The ‘atmosphere’ or the<br />

environment literally gets into the individual. (Brennan, 2004: 1)<br />

It is important to stress that no biological reductionism is at play here. Quite<br />

the contrary, the argument is that social <strong>and</strong> psychological factors generate<br />

specific biological reactions, not the other way around. 7 Further, it is interesting<br />

to note that Brennan’s discussion is aimed in part as a critique of<br />

the notion of self-contained individuality. According to Brennan, it is too<br />

often taken for granted that emotions can go ‘no farther than the skin’ of<br />

the individual person (2004: 2). But, she demonstrates, this assumption<br />

is undermined by a plentitude of studies <strong>and</strong>, indeed, by the argument<br />

on the transmission of affect. This critical perspective on self-contained<br />

233<br />

Downloaded from<br />

org.sagepub.com at Stockholms Universitet on March 30, 2011

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