Dynamic Pricing and Auction - Department of Industrial Engineering ...

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The concept of efficiency and profitmaximization i and three popular mechanisms• Efficiency◦ All the major action formats are efficientassuming the bidder is truthful• Optimality◦ First price auction and English auctionsare optimal.◦ What about the second price auction?◦ It becomes optimal if an appropriatereserve price is set.
Modeling the basic auction mechanisms• Auction is a Bayesian game◦ Bidders are the players◦ The problem is either to find a Bayes-Nash equilibrium point forefficient allocation or to propos a mechanism based on revelationprinciplep◦ Incentive-compatible direct mechanisms yield the same Bayes-Nashequilibrium point as the original problem• The formulation help finding the efficient allocation• Assumptions of the basic model◦ n bidders◦ Bidder’s values are independent and identical random variables withdistribution function F(V) and density function f(V)(symmetric, independent bidders)◦ Bidders are risk neutrality◦ They show no collusion or predatory behavior• Under this assumption all the basic auction formats are efficientand generate same revenue
Page 4 and 5: Understanding the scope fordynamic
Page 6 and 7: Advantages of ffixed pricing• Con
Page 8 and 9: A six step procedure forsetting up
Page 10 and 11: Determining demand• Estimating de
Page 12 and 13: Analyzing competition• Competitor
Page 14 and 15: Was the traditional pricingreally f
Page 16 and 17: E-Commerce as a driver ofdynamic pr
Page 18 and 19: Price dispersion• Spatial◦ Seve
Page 20 and 21: Price DifferentiationBased on one p
Page 22 and 23: Dynamic pricing failure stories•
Page 24 and 25: Models for dynamic pricing• Inven
Page 26 and 27: Auction• An oldest form of market
Page 28 and 29: Classification based on the resourc
Page 30 and 31: Classification based on Bidding rul
Page 32 and 33: Classification based on Bid structu
Page 34 and 35: Classification based on Matchingsup
Page 36 and 37: Issues involved in onlineauction•
Page 38 and 39: Auction Design Problem• Design au
Page 40 and 41: Game theoretic/mechanismdesign appr
Page 42 and 43: Auction mechanism designgoals• Pa
Page 46 and 47: Bidding Strategy in second priceauc
Page 48 and 49: Revenue in second priceauctionn bid
Page 50 and 51: Bidding Strategy in 1 stprice aucti
Page 52 and 53: Eq. 3Eq. 4
Page 54 and 55: tRevenue in 1 st price auction• T
Page 56 and 57: Strategic equivalence of the auctio
Page 58 and 59: More Bidders=higher Expected Payoff
Page 60 and 61: Why set a reserve price?• Conside
Page 62 and 63: Calculating the optimal reserve pri
Page 64 and 65: Interdependencies• Interdependent
Page 66 and 67: Winner’s Curse• The winner curs
Page 68 and 69: A simple winner determination probl
Page 70 and 71: Multi unit auctions• Forward auct
Page 72 and 73: Multiunit auction with indivisible
Page 74 and 75: Multi -item forward auctionsSet of
Page 76 and 77: Adding Business rules as side Const
Page 78 and 79: Determining the equilibrium point i
Page 80 and 81: Other Considerations During Doublea
Page 82 and 83: Online design issues• Choice of a
Page 84 and 85: Fraud in online auctions• Auction
Page 86 and 87: Types of fCheatingCheating inAuctio
Page 88 and 89: The Proxy Bidding and BidIncrement
Page 90 and 91: Bidding Strategies• Single bid en

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