Dynamic Pricing and Auction - Department of Industrial Engineering ...

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Fraud in online auctions• Auction frauds constitute the largest part of all Internet frauds(60 %)(Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC))• IFCC classifies auction frauds into six categories◦ Non-delivery of goods◦ misrepresentation of the items◦ Triangulation• The perpetrator buys items from an online merchant using stolencredit card number and then sells them to unsuspecting buyers.◦ Fee staking• Fee stacking occurs when a seller keeps adding hidden charges◦ Selling of black-market goods• Illegally copied software packages, audio CDs, movie CDs andgames• Improper packaging and does not offer any form of warrantee orinstruction manual that may have come along with the originalgoods.◦ Multiple bidding and Shill bidding (Cheating)
Cheating• Cheating unlike other fraud categoriesleaves no direct evidence of itsoccurrence• Some of the reasons that encouragecheating over the Internet◦ Cheap pseudonyms◦ Greater information asymmetry◦ Lack of personal contact◦ The tolerance of bidders
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Understanding the scope fordynamic
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Advantages of ffixed pricing• Con
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A six step procedure forsetting up
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Determining demand• Estimating de
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Analyzing competition• Competitor
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Was the traditional pricingreally f
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E-Commerce as a driver ofdynamic pr
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Price dispersion• Spatial◦ Seve
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Price DifferentiationBased on one p
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Dynamic pricing failure stories•
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Models for dynamic pricing• Inven
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Auction• An oldest form of market
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Classification based on the resourc
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Classification based on Bidding rul
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Classification based on Bid structu
Page 34 and 35: Classification based on Matchingsup
Page 36 and 37: Issues involved in onlineauction•
Page 38 and 39: Auction Design Problem• Design au
Page 40 and 41: Game theoretic/mechanismdesign appr
Page 42 and 43: Auction mechanism designgoals• Pa
Page 44 and 45: The concept of efficiency and profi
Page 46 and 47: Bidding Strategy in second priceauc
Page 48 and 49: Revenue in second priceauctionn bid
Page 50 and 51: Bidding Strategy in 1 stprice aucti
Page 52 and 53: Eq. 3Eq. 4
Page 54 and 55: tRevenue in 1 st price auction• T
Page 56 and 57: Strategic equivalence of the auctio
Page 58 and 59: More Bidders=higher Expected Payoff
Page 60 and 61: Why set a reserve price?• Conside
Page 62 and 63: Calculating the optimal reserve pri
Page 64 and 65: Interdependencies• Interdependent
Page 66 and 67: Winner’s Curse• The winner curs
Page 68 and 69: A simple winner determination probl
Page 70 and 71: Multi unit auctions• Forward auct
Page 72 and 73: Multiunit auction with indivisible
Page 74 and 75: Multi -item forward auctionsSet of
Page 76 and 77: Adding Business rules as side Const
Page 78 and 79: Determining the equilibrium point i
Page 80 and 81: Other Considerations During Doublea
Page 82 and 83: Online design issues• Choice of a
Page 86 and 87: Types of fCheatingCheating inAuctio
Page 88 and 89: The Proxy Bidding and BidIncrement
Page 90 and 91: Bidding Strategies• Single bid en
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Dynamic Pricing and Auction - Department of Industrial Engineering ...

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