egan to exp<strong>and</strong> the definition of the “whole record” before the court, but at the same timec<strong>and</strong>idly recognized the narrow scope of review. Pub. Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791,793 (9th Cir. 1982). See also County of Suffolk v. Sec’y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384 (2d Cir.1977) (acknowledging the rule of limited record review, then recognizing that the focus ofjudicial inquiry is not necessarily restricted to the administrative record). Indeed, the UnitedStates Supreme <strong>Court</strong> has long held that expansion of the AR is appropriate when the recordsubmitted fails to explain the basis for the agency’s action, thereby frustrating judicial review.Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973).Thus, the AR may be “supplemented, if necessary, by affidavits, depositions, or otherproof of an explanatory nature.” Arkla Exploration Co. v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347,357 (8th Cir. 1984). “The new material, however, should be explanatory of the decisionmakers’action at the time it occurred. No new rationalizations for the agency’s decision should beincluded.” Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 772-73 (1st Cir. 1992).When adverse impacts are set forth in great detail in extra-record written submissions,“the court properly can consider this record in determining whether there exists a rational basisfor the [agency] decision.” Exxon Corp. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 398 F. Supp. 865, 874 (D.D.C.1975). But cf. Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1008 (D.C. Del. 1975) (holding that, becausethe scope of review of agency matters is confined to the administrative record, discovery in theform of depositions from agency officials was improper <strong>and</strong> irrelevant).A court may also elect to allow extra-record evidence to determine whether an agency’sfinal action meets the test of rationality under the following circumstances:1. when agency action is not adequately explained in the record before the court;20
2. when the agency failed to consider factors which are relevant to its final decision;3. when an agency considered evidence which it failed to include in the record;4. when a case is so complex that a court needs more evidence to enable it tounderst<strong>and</strong> the issues clearly;5. in cases where evidence arising after the agency action shows whether thedecision was correct or not;6. in cases where agencies are sued for a failure to take action;7. in cases arising under NEPA; <strong>and</strong>8. in cases where relief is at issue, especially at the preliminary injunction stage.ITT Fed. Servs. Corp., 45 Fed. Cl. at 185. Thus, an adequate record can sometimes only bedetermined “by looking outside the [AR] to see what the agency may have ignored.” County ofSuffolk, 562 F.2d at 1384.It is well established that “[t]he burden of proving that an agency decision was arbitraryor capricious generally rests with the party seeking to overturn the agency decision.” VanWinkle, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (citing Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 1995)<strong>and</strong> N.C. Alliance for Transp. Reform v. United States DOT, 151 F. Supp. 2d 661, 679(M.D.N.C. 2001)). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1975) (holdingthat plaintiffs bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that defendantshave failed to adhere to the requirements of NEPA).In determining whether an agency’s action was arbitrary or capricious, the court mustconsider “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors <strong>and</strong> whetherthere has been a clear error of judg[]ment.” Dombeck, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (quoting Marshv. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)). The agency must examine the relevant21
- Page 3 and 4: Dale and Susan Toone; Tim and Rexan
- Page 5: would cause a potential disturbance
- Page 8 and 9: Fourth:Violation of NEPA, Failure t
- Page 10 and 11: Eleventh:Violation of NEPA, Commitm
- Page 12 and 13: October 22, 2001. Plaintiffs’ Fir
- Page 14 and 15: Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summ
- Page 16 and 17: not arbitrary and capricious.” Id
- Page 18 and 19: 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 1995). The EIS
- Page 22 and 23: data and articulate a satisfactory
- Page 24 and 25: impacts on livestock and poultry pr
- Page 26 and 27: of the Lancer MOA would have a sign
- Page 28 and 29: values beneath MTRs and/or MOAs. Ra
- Page 30 and 31: specking.” Lathan v. Brinegar, 50
- Page 32 and 33: this Court’s review of the AR rev
- Page 34 and 35: elevant to a “significant” effe
- Page 36 and 37: evidence does not invalidate the [a
- Page 38 and 39: analysis, especially in light of De
- Page 40 and 41: following which Defendants held ano
- Page 42 and 43: of the RBTI. Therefore, to the exte
- Page 44 and 45: 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20.D. Reducing or
- Page 46 and 47: D. Untimely Participation of FAAPla
- Page 48 and 49: and use of IR-178. Consequently, Pl
- Page 50 and 51: considered the adequacy, practicabi
- Page 52 and 53: evaluation of the benefits of the p
- Page 54 and 55: However, when considered in conjunc
- Page 56 and 57: Accordingly, this Court finds that
- Page 58 and 59: Judicial Determination“The purpos
- Page 60 and 61: Here, this Court finds that Defenda
- Page 62: Further, after considering all the