In the united states bankruptcy court - Northern District of Alabama

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

IN RE: 

JEFFERSON COUNTY, ) 

ALABAMA, a political subdivision ) 

of the State of Alabama, ) 

) 

Debtor, ) 

) 

) Case No.: 11-05736-TBB9 

) Chapter 9 Proceeding 

) 

) 

) 

OBJECTION TO AUTOMATIC STAY OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION 

AGAINST MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS, INCLUDING SHERIFF MIKE 

HALE AND CITY OF HUEYTOWN, OR IN ALTERNATIVE, MOTION 

FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY 

Petitioner Bill George (“Plaintiff”) by and through his undersigned counsel, 

respectfully files the following objections to the automatic stay of his pending civil 

rights lawsuit, case no. 2:10-cv-03389-AKK. Plaintiff’s pending lawsuit is brought 

1 

against Defendants City of Hueytown, Sheriff Mike Hale, and individual defendants 

Cynthia Davis and Karen Fowler. Jefferson County is not a defendant. 

In the alternative, Plaintiff moves this Court for relief from the automatic stay 

in order to pursue his claims. As grounds Petitioner states as follows: 

299). 

1Currently 

pending before this Court is Sheriff Hale’s “Motion for Clarification” (Doc.

I. Introduction 

On December 7, 2011, Judge Kallon stayed Plaintiff’s case against two 

defendants, Mike Hale and Cynthia Davis, pending this Court’s ruling as to whether 

the automatic stay applies to these defendants. In conjunction with Sheriff Hale’s 

Motion for Clarification (Doc. 299), Plaintiff seeks a ruling from this Court that the 

automatic stay imposed by Jefferson County’s bankruptcy does not apply to 

Plaintiff’s case against Sheriff Hale or any other Defendant in his case. First, the 

plain language of §§ 362(a)and 922(a) does not extend the stay to non-debtors. 

Second, the Eleventh Circuit has not recognized a “special circumstances exception” 

to the rule that actions against non-debtors are not stayed; even if such an exception 

existed, it would not apply to Mr. George’s case. In the alternative, Plaintiff moves 

this Court for relief from the automatic stay so that he may pursue his pending case. 

II. Summary of Plaintiff’s Claims Pending Before the Northern District of 

Alabama, and Procedural Status of Federal Court Case 

2 

On December 7, 2010, Bill George filed case no. 2:10-cv-03389-AKK. His 

Corrected Second Amended Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. In Count I 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated Title II of the ADA and the 

Rehabilitation Act by administering and applying their policies, practices and 

class. 

2 

Plaintiff brings claims solely in his individual capacity; he does not seek to certify a 

2

procedures in a method that discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his 

disability and denied him the receipt of services and benefits of the defendants. 

Defendant City’s discriminatory administration and application of policies, practices 

and procedures includes those regarding the arrest and transfer/transportation of 

persons with disabilities. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mike Hale’s discriminatory 

administration and application of policies, practices and procedures includes those 

regarding the arrest, booking, confinement, and provision of health services to 

persons with disabilities. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ application and 

administration of their policies, practices and procedures are the direct result of a 

failure to provide appropriate training to defendants’ employees. (Doc. 55 ¶¶ 39-40). 

In Count II Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived him of his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to adequate medical care while in the custody of the state, and that 

the actions as described in the complaint were taken under color of state law, and 

were the result of an official policy or custom manifesting deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or a failure to train; that the area of Defendant 

City’s custom or policy or failure to train includes the arrest and 

transfer/transportation of persons with disabilities, and that the area of Defendant 

Mike Hale’s custom or policy or failure to train includes the arrest, booking, 

confinement, and provision of health services to persons with disabilities. Plaintiff 

3

alleges that this failure to train occurred despite a pattern of constitutional violations 

or such a high likelihood of a constitutional violation that the need to train should 

have been obvious. (Doc. 55 ¶ 44-45). 

Jefferson County was initially and erroneously named as a defendant in this 

lawsuit; however, Jefferson County was terminated as a Defendant on 6/28/2011 and 

is not a proper Defendant in this case. (Ex. B, Docket Sheet). In a forty-page 

Memorandum Opinion issued on October 24, 2011, the Court ruled on motions to 

dismiss filed by all but one of the defendants. (Ex. C, Memorandum Opinion and 

Order). Pursuant to this Opinion, the Court ordered the dismissal of one Defendant, 

Hueytown Police Officer Brent Akin. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for 

damages under Section 1983 against Sheriff Hale, but the Court allowed Plaintiff to 

proceed with damages claims against Sheriff Hale under Title II of the ADA and the 

Rehabilitation Act. The Court denied qualified immunity to individual Defendant 

Cynthia Davis and denied the City of Hueytown’s Motion to Dismiss, holding that 

Plaintiff was entitled to pursue discovery on his claims against these defendants. 

The Court has entered a scheduling order setting a trial date of October 22, 

2012 in this matter. (Ex. D, Scheduling Order). Judge Kallon has stayed Plaintiff’s 

action against Defendants Mike Hale and Cynthia Davis only pending this Court’s 

resolution of whether the stay applies to Sheriff Hale and individual sheriff’s 

4

deputies. (Ex. E, Order Granting Stay). 

III. Plaintiff’s Objections to Automatic Stay 

Plaintiff objects to the automatic stay for the reasons set forth herein, and 

moves this Court for complete or partial relief from the automatic stay. None of the 

above-named defendants is a debtor before this Court, and the Eleventh Circuit has 

not recognized any exception to the plain language of the statute, which limits the 

automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code to claims against debtors. 

Accordingly, the automatic stay does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims, as no defendant 

in Plaintiff’s suit is a debtor before this Court. Alternatively, Plaintiff has shown 

“good cause” for relief from the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), as set forth below. 

A. None of the Defendants to Plaintiff’s Suit are Debtors Before this Court, 

and Thus Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Does Not Come Within the Plain Language 

of 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) and 922(a) 

Although initially and erroneously named as a Defendant in Plaintiff’s 

complaint, Jefferson County is not a proper party to Plaintiff’s lawsuit, and was 

terminated as a Defendant on June 28, 2011. 

The automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code states that a bankruptcy 

petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . (1) the commencement 

or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative or other action or proceeding against 

the debtor that was . . . commenced before the commencement of a case under this 

5

title.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (emphasis added). Section 922 additionally provides that 

in a municipal bankruptcy, “[a] petition filed under this chapter operates as a stay, in 

addition to the stay provided by section 362 of this title, applicable to all entities, of. 

. . (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of 

process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against an officer 

or inhabitant of the debtor that seeks to enforce a claim against the debtor.” 11 

U.S.C. § 922(a) (emphasis added). 3 

It is axiomatic that “[t]he automatic stay . . . affects only [the debtor]; it does 

not apply to plaintiff's claims against the [debtor]'s non-debtor co-defendants.” 

Chung v. New Silver Palace, 246 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also 

Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1196 (6th Cir. 1983) (“It is 

universally acknowledged that an automatic stay of proceeding accorded by § 362 

may not be invoked by entities such as sureties, guarantors, co-obligors, or others 

4 

with a similar legal or factual nexus to the Chapter 11 debtor.”) Nor should this 

3 

According to the legislative history, “[t]he automatic stay provided under section 362 

of title 11 is incomplete for a municipality, because there is the possibility of action by a creditor 

against an officer or inhabitant of the municipality to collect taxes due the municipality. Section 

85(e)(1) of current chapter IX [section 405(e)(1) of former title 11] stays such actions. Section 

922 carries over that protection into the proposed chapter 9. Subsection (b) applies the provisions 

for relief from the stay that apply generally in section 362 to the stay under section 922. 

(H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) p. 398.) 

4See, 

e.g., American Prairie Constr. Co. v. Hoich, 560 F.3d 780, 789 (8th Cir. 2009) ("It 

is well-established that stays pursuant to § 362(a) are limited to debtors and do not encompass 

6

Court find that unusual circumstances warrant extending the stay to non-debtor 

entities, as the Eleventh Circuit has not recognized any such exception to the plain 

language of the statute. See Robert W. Selgrad, IRA v. U.S. Lending Corp., 1996 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22927, 11-12 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 1996) (“[t]here is nothing 

ambiguous about the language of section 362(a)(1), which extends an automatic stay 

only to the debtor, not related third parties... [W]e have no reason to believe that the 

Eleventh Circuit would adopt the Robins principle as a judicially-crafted exception 

5 

to the plain meaning of section 362(a)(1).” Since the Eleventh Circuit has 

recognized no exception that would allow the automatic stay to apply to Plaintiff’s 

claims against non-debtor defendants, and since Plaintiff brings no claims against 

debtor Jefferson County or any of its officers, this Court should hold that under the 

non-bankrupt co-defendants.") Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17028, 

2009 WL 2342731 at *4 (3rd Cir. 2009) (citing First, Fourth and Seventh Circuit cases); Boucher 

v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009); In re TXNB Internal Case, 483 F.2d 292, 301 (5 th 

Cir. 2007) (“Section 362(a) . . . does not apply, however, to actions not directed against the 

debtor or property of the debtor.”; In re Sunbeam Securities Litigation, 261 B.R. 534, 536 (S.D. 

Fla. 2001) (“The law makes clear ... that the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a) are 

generally not available to third-party non-debtors.”) 

5 

See also In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 130 B.R. 603, 605 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) 

(emphasis added): “This Court is not unmindful of a view of some that under appropriate 

circumstances it is proper to ‘extend the automatic stay’ to protect the non-debtors against 

discovery proceedings in actions brought against officers, directors and former employees of the 

debtor. However, this Court is constrained to reject the proposition stated and the notion 

that the protection accorded by § 362 could be extended to non-debtors. There is nothing in 

the language of this Section or in the legislative history of this Section which warrants such 

a conclusion.” 

7

plain language of the statute, the automatic stay does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims. 

B. The Eleventh Circuit Recognizes no “Unusual Circumstances” 

Exception to the Rule that the Automatic Stay Does Not Apply to Non- 

Debtors, and Even if Such an Exception Existed it Would Not Apply 

Here. 

In seeking (and obtaining) dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims before the trial court, 

Jefferson County correctly argued that “Jefferson County cannot, under Alabama law, 

assert any authority over the operation of the Jefferson County Jail, or over the 

supervision of persons in the sheriff’s custody.” (Ex. E, Jefferson County Motion to 

Dismiss). Supporting Jefferson County’s argument that it was not a proper defendant 

in Plaintiff’s lawsuit, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that “Alabama sheriffs 

are considered arms of the state.” Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F .3d 1014, 1028 

(11 th Cir. 2001). As stated in Turquitt v. Jefferson County: 

Alabama's Constitution clearly denominates the sheriff as 

a member of the state's executive department. Ala. Const. 

of 1901, Art. V § 112. The Alabama Supreme Court, 

construing Art. V, § 112, as well as its legislative history, 

concluded that a sheriff is an executive officer of the state. 

Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 443 (Ala.1987). The 

court further held that because a sheriff is an executive 

officer, "a sheriff is not an employee of a county for the 

purposes of imposing liability on the county." Id. at 442; 

see also Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So.2d 209, 209 

(Ala.1991). 

... 

We recognize that Alabama counties possess some duties 

with respect to county jails. However, none of these duties 

8

elates to the daily operation of the jails or to the 

supervision of inmates. The duties of the counties with 

respect to the jails "are limited to funding the operation of 

the jail and to providing facilities to house the jail." Stark 

v. Madison County, 678 So.2d 787, 787 (Ala.Civ.App. 

1996). 

137 F. 3d 1285. Given the bright line rule of Turquitt, it is well settled that the 

Sheriff Mike Hale is not an officer of Jefferson County; moreover, the County cannot 

be liable for the deprivation of Plaintiff’s fundamental right to adequate medical care 

or for violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act that occurred during his 

incarceration at the County Jail, since the duty to provide such care and to comply 

with these statutes is vested by the Alabama State Constitution in the Sheriff, who is 

an officer not of the County but of the State. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s lawsuit does not 

constitute an action against the County or an attempt to enforce a claim against the 

County within the scope of 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) and 922(a). 

Despite this authority, Bankruptcy Counsel for the County has indicated in 

correspondence that “[c]laims against the Sheriff are stayed by the County's 

bankruptcy. Because the Sheriff is funded by the County, an effort to collect from 

him is an effort to collect from the County.” This position is unsupported both by the 

plain language of the statute, as discussed above, and by the caselaw interpreting this 

provision. This argument boils down to the proposition that since Jefferson County 

9

is effectively a surety or guarantor for any judgment that Plaintiff may obtain against 

Defendant Mike Hale, actions against Sheriff Hale should be stayed; however, “[i]t 

is universally acknowledged that an automatic stay of proceeding accorded by 

§ 362 may not be invoked by entities such as sureties, guarantors, co-obligors, 

or others with a similar legal or factual nexus to the Chapter 11 debtor.”) Lynch 

v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1196 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis 

added). Similarly, as noted above, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized no “unusual 

circumstances” exception to the plain language of the automatic stay provision; 

moreover, even if such an exception existed, it would not apply to the case at bar. 6 

6 

The Fourth Circuit has noted that in "unusual circumstances," the automatic stay may be 

extended to enjoin litigation against non-bankrupt co-defendants of the debtor. A.H. Robins Co., 

Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986). However, the Eleventh Circuit has not 

recognized such an exception, and Courts applying this exception have generally held that the 

automatic stay is properly extended to non-debtor defendants only in a case of a suit against a 

third party who is “entitled to absolute indemnity by the debtor on account of any judgment that 

might result against them in the case.” See., e.g., Gulfmark Offshore, Inc. v. Benderr 

Shipbuilding & Repair Co., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67926 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2009). No 

contractual or statutory basis for “absolute indemnity” is apparent in the present case. Moreover, 

“the court in Robins reaffirmed the refusal to grant a stay to a non-debtor ‘where the debtor and 

[the non-debtor] are joint tortfeasors or where the non-debtor's liability rests upon his own breach 

of duty.’” Dewitt v. Daley, 336 B.R. 552, 557 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (examining Robins). In 

Plaintiff’s suit, where each defendant’s liability is premised upon his or her own breach of duty, 

the “unusual circumstances” exception recognized by the Fourth Circuit does not apply. 

See also Robert W. Selgrad, IRA v. U.S. Lending Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22927, 

13-14 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 1996) (“[p]ut simply, the individual Defendants' indemnity agreement 

with U.S. Lending is not so absolute or watertight that U.S. Lending unquestionably will be 

responsible for all of the damages and fees that Spielman and Hayes might incur in this lawsuit. 

Moreover, even if we were to accept the Defendants' argument as to Spielman and Hayes, 

Equityline Securities and Equityline Financial Group do not have indemnity agreements with 

U.S. Lending, and cannot avail themselves of Robins on this basis.); Lane v. Capital Acquisitions 

& Mgmt. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47663 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2005) (emphasis added) (“[t]he 

10

Consistent with this authority, Courts have held that mere financial ties 

between the debtor and a non-debtor defendant cannot justify extending the reach of 

the automatic stay beyond the plain language of the statute. In the recent case of 

Donarumo v. Furlong (In re Furlong), the First Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned 

that even financial ties involving 100% ownership of a non-debtor company by a 

debtor company did not justify extending the stay to the non-debtor: “we agree with 

the bankruptcy court that an automatic stay does not extend to the assets of a 

corporation in which the debtor has an interest, even if the interest is 100% of the 

corporate stock.” 660 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. Mass. Nov. 1, 2011). The Court of Appeals 

observed that “[t]his proposition is well-settled.” Id. 7 

In conclusion, the automatic stay imposed by Jefferson County’s bankruptcy 

does not extend to Plaintiff’s case against Sheriff Hale and the other defendants, none 

of whom are debtors here, because 1) the plain language of §§ 362(a) and 922(a) does 

"unusual circumstances" doctrine on which Defendants rely is an extremely narrow exception 

to the rule and does not apply here.”) 

7 

See also Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1205-06 (3d Cir. 1991) 

(formal distinctions between debtor and non-bankrupt corporation are maintained for purposes of 

the automatic stay); In re Winer, 158 B.R. 736, 743 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (regardless of a "close 

nexus" between debtors and non-debtor entity, non-debtor entity is not subject to automatic stay); 

Pers. Designs, Inc. v. Guymar, Inc., 80 B.R. 29, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (even where bankruptcy 

debtor is 100% stockholder in non-bankrupt corporation, automatic stay does not apply to 

corporation). 

11

not extend the stay to non-debtors; 2) the Eleventh Circuit has not recognized an 

“unusual circumstances exception”; and 3) even if it had, the defendants in Plaintiff’s 

actions are not entitled to “absolute indemnity” from the County, and their liability 

is not derivative but premised on their own breaches of duty. Accordingly, “unusual 

circumstances” warranting extension of the stay to non-debtors are not present here. 

C. The Alabama Constitution Establishes that Mike Hale and the Jefferson 

County Sheriff’s Department Are an Arm of the State, Not the County, 

and Principles of Federalism and Comity Dictate that this Court Must 

Give “Great Deference” to the State’s Exercise of its Sovereign Powers 

In the words of the Third Circuit, “formal distinctions between debtor-affiliated 

entities are maintained when applying the stay.” Maritime Electric Co. v. United 

Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1205 (3d Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit’s observation 

is even more apt when the “formal distinctions” in question are political distinctions 

enacted by the Alabama State Constitution. Noting the “federalism and comity 

concerns” that arise when a federal court contemplates disregarding a state’s own 

ordering of its political subdivisions, the Eleventh Circuit has reasoned that 

[w]hen it comes to creating subordinate public bodies and 

defining their relationship to one another and to itself," 

"the state is supreme and its legislative body, conforming 

its action to the state Constitution, may do as it will.' " City 

of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 186-87, 43 

S. Ct. 534, 536, 67 L. Ed. 937 (1923) (quoting [*1344] 

Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178, 28 S. Ct. 40, 46, 

52 L. Ed. 151 (1907)). Defining the nature and 

12

elationship of such bodies, no less than determining 

their level of funding, is "uniquely an exercise of state 

sovereignty." DeKalb Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 

680, 689 (11th Cir.) (quoting Stanley v. Darlington Cty. 

Sch. Dist., 84 F.3d 707, 716 (4th Cir.1996)), cert. denied, 

118 S. Ct. 601 (1997). We owe such determinations by 

the state legislature not only deference, but great 

deference. 

Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1343-1344 (11th Cir. 1999). The 

Eleventh Circuit’s broad deference to federalism in Lyes should apply equally here. 

Alabama has exercised its sovereign authority and decreed in its Constitution that the 

Sheriff’s Department should be an arm of the state rather than of the County. Along 

with the arguments discussed above, the federalism concerns discussed in Lyes weigh 

heavily in dictating that this court should give “great deference” to Alabama’s 

ordering of its own political systems and that it should not extend the stay to 

Defendant Hale, whom the Alabama Constitution dictates is an officer of the state. 

IV. Motion for Relief From Automatic Stay 

A. Even if the Stay Applies, this Court Should Find that Cause Exists 

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) to Lift the Stay as to Plaintiff’s Pending Civil 

Case Against Non-Debtors Sherriff Mike Hale, Cynthia Davis, Karen 

Fowler, and City of Hueytown 

Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the bankruptcy Court may 

grant relief from the automatic stay for “cause.” 11 U.S.C. §362(d). Likewise, 

Section 922 dictates that “[s]ubsections (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of section 362 of this 

13

title [11 USCS § 362(c), (d), (e), (f), and (g)] apply to a stay under subsection (a) of 

this section the same as such subsections apply to a stay under section 362(a) of this 

title [11 USCS § 362(a)].” 11 USCS §922(b). Accordingly, even if the Court rules 

that the automatic stay applies, the Court should grant Plaintiff relief under §362(d) 

and allow Plaintiff’s action to proceed in the District Court. 

This Court has broadly recognized that “‘[c]ause’ for granting relief from the 

stay may exist if the equities in a particular case dictate that a lawsuit, or some other 

similar pending action, should proceed in a forum other than the bankruptcy court for 

purpose of liquidating the claim on which the lawsuit is premised.” In re Marvin 

Johnson’s Auto Service, Inc., Debtor, 192 B.R. 1008, 1013 (N.D.Ala.Bankr. 1996) 

(collecting cases). As recognized by this Court, “Congress intended that the stay be 

lifted to allow proceedings to continue in forums other than the bankruptcy Court 

under appropriate circumstances,” and “[i]t will often be more appropriate to permit 

proceedings to continue in their place of origin, when no great prejudice to the 

bankruptcy estate would result, in order to leave the parties to their chosen forum and 

to relieve the bankruptcy court from any duties that may be handled elsewhere.” Id. 

at 1014 (citing legislative history). 

To determine whether cause exists under §362(d) for granting relief from the 

automatic stay, the Court “must balance the hardship to [the plaintiff] if he is not 

14

allowed to continue the lawsuit, against the potential prejudice to the debtor, the 

bankruptcy estate, and to other creditors.” Id. Factors considered by this Court in 

this balancing include: (1) trial readiness; (2) judicial economy; (3) the resolution of 

preliminary bankruptcy issues; (4) costs of defense or other potential burden to the 

estate; (5) the creditor's chances of success on the merits; (6) specialized expertise of 

the non-bankruptcy forum; (7) whether the damages or claim that may result from the 

nonbankruptcy proceeding may be subject to equitable subordination under Section 

510(c); (8) the extent to which trial of the case in the non-bankruptcy forum will 

interfere with the progress of the bankruptcy case; (9) the anticipated impact on the 

movant, or other nondebtors, if the stay is lifted; and, (10) the presence of third 

parties over which the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction. Id. 

“It is unnecessary for a court to find, before lifting the stay, that all considered 

factors weigh in favor of a party requesting relief from the stay.” Id. at 1017. Here, 

the equities decree that Plaintiff’s lawsuit against multiple defendants, none of whom 

is a debtor before this court, should be allowed to proceed. 

1. Trial Readiness 

“Since both parties to the litigation benefit if the case can be tried 

expeditiously, the bankruptcy court should take into consideration which of the 

competing courts is presently closer to being in a posture to try the case.” Id. at 1015 

15

fn. 8. After the Court’s ruling on several Motions to Dismiss, the parties have now 

initiated discovery, and the Court has scheduled this case for a trial date of October 

22, 2011. Accordingly, the federal court is closer to being in a posture to try the case 

than the bankruptcy court, and this factor weighs in favor of granting relief. 

2. Judicial Economy 

“Principles of judicial economy require that, without good reason, judicial 

resources should not be spent by duplicitous litigation, and that a lawsuit should only 

be tried once, that is if one forum with jurisdiction over all parties is available to 

dispose of all issues relating to the lawsuit.” Id. Here, if the Court does not lift the 

stay as regards to Defendant Mike Hale, and Plaintiff’s case proceeds against the 

other defendants, two trials will be necessary; one trial against the City of Hueytown 

and other defendants, and one trial against Defendant Hale. Accordingly, in the 

interests of judicial economy, the Court should grant Plaintiff relief from the stay and 

allow this action to be tried once in the court where it was filed, conserving the 

resources of the parties and this Court and avoiding the risk of inconsistent outcomes. 

3. Resolution of Preliminary Bankruptcy Issues 

No preliminary bankruptcy issues need to be determined before Plaintiff’s 

claims can be resolved. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh against relief. 

4. Costs of Defense or Other Potential Burden to the Estate 

16

“The cost of defense alone... is ordinarily not considered a sufficient basis for 

denying relief from the stay.” Id. at 1016. Moreover, there is no evidence that “the 

debtor’s defense costs will be appreciably larger if the case is tried in the [original] 

court rather than the bankruptcy court.” Id. Here, there is no reason to believe that 

Debtor Jefferson County will incur any expenses as a result of defending Plaintiff’s 

action: Jefferson County and its attorneys have been terminated as Defendants from 

Plaintiff’s suit. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh against relief. 

5. Creditor’s Chance of Success on the Merits 

Mr. George has already litigated motions to dismiss from several defendants. 

In ruling on these motions, the Court held that Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed 

with damages claims against Sheriff Hale under Title II of the ADA and the 

Rehabilitation Act; in addition, the Court denied qualified immunity to individual 

Defendant Cynthia Davis and denied the City of Hueytown’s Motion to Dismiss. (Ex. 

C, Memorandum Opinion). Given the Court’s ruling on these motions, Plaintiff has 

demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, this 

factor weighs in favor of granting Plaintiff relief from the stay. 

6. Specialized Expertise of the Non-Bankruptcy Forum 

This case is a complex individual civil rights action. As discussed above, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Title II of the Americans With Disabilities 

17

Act and the Rehabilitation Act and, under color of law, deprived him of his 

Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care while in state custody; that 

these actions were taken with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s Constitutionally 

protected rights and/or were taken under color of state law, and were the result of an 

official policy or custom manifesting deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights and/or a failure to train; and that this failure to train occurred 

despite a pattern of constitutional violations or such a high likelihood of a 

constitutional violation that the need to train should have been obvious. 

None of the above issues requires the specialized expertise of the bankruptcy 

judge. Moreover, the original court has gained considerable familiarity with the facts 

and legal issues of this case, as reflected in the Court’s forty-page memorandum 

opinion. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting Plaintiff relief from the 

automatic stay so that Plaintiff’s case may be allowed to proceed in the original court. 

7. Whether the Damages or Claim that May Result from the Non- 

Bankruptcy Proceedings May Be Subject to Equitable 

Subordination Under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c). 

Plaintiff has claims for punitive damages only against Defendants sued in their 

individual capacity; accordingly, the possibility that punitive damages claims might 

be subordinated is not decisive in the Court’s ruling on the present motion. 

Moreover, “the possibility that the... jury may award substantial punitive damages 

18

against the debtor does not militate against lifting the stay.” Id. at 1017. 

8. The Extent to Which Trial of the Case in the Non-Bankruptcy 

Forum Will Interfere With the Progress of the Bankruptcy Case 

Given the size of Jefferson County’s bankruptcy, and given also that Jefferson 

County is not a Defendant in Plaintiff’s lawsuit, there is little chance that the trial of 

Plaintiff’s case in the non-bankruptcy forum will interfere substantially with the 

progress of the County’s bankruptcy case. Plaintiff’s case is against Defendant Hale 

in his official capacity, Cynthia Davis in her individual capacity, the City of 

Hueytown, and Nurse Karen Fowler; accordingly, any judgment would be against 

Sherriff Hale, Cynthia Davis, and/or the other municipal and individual defendants, 

not against the County or any of its officers. Moreover, “Section 502(c) allows this 

Court to estimate an unliquidated claim if liquidation would ‘unduly delay 

administration of the case.’” Id. at 1018. Allowing the trial of Mr. George’s case in 

the original court will not interfere with the progress of the present bankruptcy case. 

9. The Anticipated Impact on the Movant if the Stay is Lifted 

If the stay is not lifted, Plaintiff will suffer considerable hardship, as he “will 

be forced to try his case twice... with concomitant delay and additional... expense”: 

once against any defendants whom this Court determines are within the scope of the 

stay, and once against the remaining defendants in the original court. See id. at 1019. 

19

Moreover, as to any claims tried before the Bankruptcy Court, Mr. George will be 

denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury, as there is no Constitutional right to 

a jury trial for the allowance and disallowance of claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502. Id. 

As stated by this Court, “a claimant’s right to a jury trial should be accommodated if 

circumstances allow it to be done without substantial prejudice to estate 

administration.” Id. Given the prejudice to Plaintiff if the stay is not lifted, this 

factor weighs in favor of relief. 

10. The Presence of Third Parties Over Which the Bankruptcy Court 

Lacks Jurisdiction 

This Court has indicated that this factor concerns “[w]hether the relief will 

result in a partial or complete resolution of the issues.” Smith v. Tricare 

Rehabilitation Sys. (In re Tricare Rehabilitation Sys.), 181 B.R. 569, 573 (Bankr. 

N.D. Ala. 1994) (citing In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984)). As stated 

above, if the Court denies relief from the stay, Plaintiff will be forced to try his case 

twice, once in the bankruptcy Court and once in the original court against those 

defendants whom this Court determines do not fall within the scope of the stay, 

meaning that “the danger of conflicting verdicts is a real possibility.” In re 

Johnson’s, 192 B.R. at 1019-1020. Here, as in In re Johnson, “[o]ne trial... will be 

most beneficial to all concerned. This Court will be able to use its time and resources 

20

to resolve other matters... and [Plaintiff] will be able to cut expenses and time and 

will be able to try his case before a jury.” Id. Given this Court’s inability to achieve 

complete resolution of Mr. George’s claims, and the need to conserve this Court’s 

resources for other matters, this factor weighs in favor of granting relief. 

V. Conclusion 

As discussed above, this Court should find that the automatic stay does not 

apply to any of Plaintiff’s claims in his pending civil rights lawsuit, case no. 

2:10-cv-03389-AKK. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests that this Court grant him 

relief from the stay and allow him to pursue that case in the court where it was filed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

s/ L William Smith 

Jon C. Goldfarb 

Daniel Arciniegas 

L. William Smith 

Attorneys for Bill George 

OF COUNSEL: 

WIGGINS, CHILDS, QUINN & PANTAZIS, LLC 

th 

The Kress Building, 301 19 Street North 

Birmingham, Alabama 35203 

205/314-0500 

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I do hereby certify that I have filed today, December 7, 2011, the above and 

foregoing with copies being served on the attached master service list using the CM 

/ ECF system. 

/s/ L. William Smith 

Of Counsel 

23

VIA E-MAIL: 

Jefferson County, Alabama 

c/o Patrick Darby 

c/o Jay Bender 

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP 

1819 Fifth Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

pdarby@babc.com 

jbender@babc.com 

Jefferson County, Alabama 

c/o Kenneth Klee 

c/o Lee Bogdanoff 

Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff & Stern, LLP 

1999 Avenue of the Stars, Thirty-Ninth Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90067-5061 

kklee@ktbslaw.com 

lbogdanoff@ktbslaw.com 

Jefferson County Attorney 

Jeffrey M. Sewell, County Attorney 

Room 280, Jefferson County Courthouse 

716 North Richard Arrington Jr. Blvd. 


sewellj@jccal.org 

The Bank o f New York Mellon, as Indenture 

Trustee 

c/o Gerald F. Mace 

c/o Michael R. Paslay 

c/o Davie E. Lemke, Esq. 

c/o Ryan K. Cochran, Esq. 

Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP 

511 Union Street, Suite 2700 

Nashville, TN 37219 

Gerald.Mace@wallerlaw.com 

Mike.Paslay@wallerlaw.com 

David.Lemke@wallerlaw.com 

Ryan.Cochran@wallerlaw.com 

MASTER SERVICE LIST 

Jefferson County Special Counsel 

J.F. “Foster” Clark, Esq. 

Balch & Bingham, LLC 

1901 6th Avenue North 

2600 AmSouth Harbert Plaza 

Birmingham, AL 35203-4644 

fclark@balch.com 

Jefferson County Special Counsel 

J. Hobson Presley, Jr. 

Presley Burton & Collier, LLC 

2801 Highway 280 South, Suite 700 


hpresley@presleyllc.com 

Bankruptcy Administrator for the Northern District 

of Alabama (Birmingham) 

Office of the Bankruptcy Administrator 

c/o J. Thomas Corbett, Esq. 

United States Bankruptcy Court 

Robert S. Vance Federal Building 

1800 5th Ave. North 

Birmingham AL 35203 

Thomas_Corbett@alnaba.uscourts.gov 

The Bank o f New York Mellon, as Indenture 

Trustee 

c/o Larry Childs, Esq. 

c/o Brian J. Malcom, Esq. 

Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP 

Regions Harbert Plaza 

1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 1400 


Larry.Childs@wallerlaw.com 

Brian.Malcom@wallerlaw.com

U.S. Bank, National Association, as Paying Agent 

2204 Lakeshore Drive Suite 302 

Mail Code: EX-AL-WWPH 

Homewood, AL 35209 

felicia.cannon@usbank.com 

Bank of America, N.A. 

c/o David L. Eades 

c/o Daniel G. Clodfelter 

c/o David S. Walls 

Moore & Van Allen, PLLC 

100 North Tryon Street, Suite 4700 

Charlotte, NC 28202-4003 

davideades@mvalaw.com 

danclodfelter@mvalaw.com 

davidwalls@mvalaw.com 

Blue Ridge Investments, LLC 

Affiliate of Bank of America, N.A. 

c/o David L Eades 

c/o Daniel G. Clodfelter 

c/o David S. Walls 

Moore & Van Allen, PLLC 

100 North Tryon Street, Suite 4700 

Charlotte, NC 28202-4003 

davideades@mvalaw.com 

danclodfelter@mvalaw.com 

davidwalls@mvalaw.com 

Bank of America, N.A. 

c/o Joe A. Joseph 

c/o Clifton C. Mosteller 

Burr & Forman LLP 

420 North 20 th Street, Suite 3400 


jjoseph@burr.com 

cmostell@burr.com 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, as Liquidity Agent 

c/o Steve Fuhrman 

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 

425 Lexington Avenue 

New York, New York 10017 

sfuhrman@stblaw.com 

The Bank of New York Mellon 

c/o Thomas C. Mitchell 

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 

The Orrick Building 

405 Howard Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 

tcmitchell@orrick.com 

The Bank of New York Mellon 

Sirote & Permut, P.C. 

c/o Stephen B. Porterfield 

c/o Donald Wright 

2311 Highland Avenue South 


sporterfield@sirote.com 

dwright@sirote.com 

The Bank of Nova Scotia 

c/o James E. Spiotto 

Chapman & Cutler LLP 

111 West Monroe Street 

Chicago, IL 60603-4080 

spiotto@chapman.com

State Street Bank and Trust Company 

c/o William W. Kannel 

c/o Adrienne K. Walker 

Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, 

P.C. 

One Financial Center 

Boston, MA 02111 

wkannel@mintz.com 

awalker@mintz.com 

State Street Bank and Trust Company 

Sirote & Permut, P.C. 


c/o Donald Wright 





Societe Generale 

c/o Mark J. Fiekers 

c/o Joyce T. Gorman 

Ashurst LLP 

1875 K Street N.W., Suite 750 

Washington, DC 20006 

mark.fiekers@ashurst.com 

joyce.gorman@ashurst.com 

Financial Guaranty Insurance Company 

c/o Aaron Power 

King & Spaulding LLP 

1100 Louisiana 

Suite 400 

Houston, TX 77002-5213 

apower@kslaw.com 

JPMorgan Chase Bank 

c/o Steve M. Fuhrman, Esq. 

c/o Ian Dattner 

c/o Mary Beth Forshaw 

c/o Elisha David Graff 

c/o Thomas C. Rice 

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 


New York, NY 10017 

sfuhrman@stblaw.com 

idattner@stblaw.com 

mforshaw@stblaw.com 

egraff@stblaw.com 

trice@stblaw.com 

Regions Bank 

c/o Jayna Partain Lamar 

c/o J. Leland Murphree 

Maynard Cooper & Gale, P.C. 

AmSouth/Harbert Plaza, Suite 2400 

1901 6th Avenue North 


jlamar@maynardcooper.com 

lmurphree@maynardcooper.com 


c/o H. Slayton “Slate” Dabney, Jr. 

c/o Scott Davidson 

King & Spaulding 

1185 Avenue of the Americas 

New York, NY 10036-4003 

sdabney@kslaw.com 

sdavidson@kslaw.com 


c/o William H. Patrick, III 

c/o Tristan E. Manthey 

c/o Cherie Dessauer Nobles 

Heller, Draper, Patrick & Horn, L.L.C. 

650 Poydras Street, Suite 2500 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70130-6103 

wpatrick@hellerdraper.com 

tmanthey@hellerdraper.com 

cnobles@hellerdraper.com

Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. 

c/o Winston & Strawn LLP 

Lawrence A. Larose, Esq. 

Samuel S. Kohn, Esq. 

Sarah L. Trum, Esq. 

200 Park Avenue 

New York, New York 10166-4193 

llarose@winston.com 

skohn@winston.com 

strum@winston.com 

Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. 

c/o Mark P. Williams 

Norman, Wood, Kendrick & Turner 

Financial Center – Suite 1600 

505 20 th Street North 


mpwilliams@nwkt.com 

Syncora Guarantee, Inc. 

c/o Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP 

Jonathan E. Pickhardt 

Jake M. Shields 

Susheel Kirpalani 

Daniel Holzman 

Eric Kay 

Katherine Scherling 

51 Madison Avenue, 22 nd Floor 


jonpickhardt@quinnemanuel.com 

jakeshields@quinnemanuel.com 

susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com 

danielholzman@quinnemanuel.com 

erickay@quinnemanuel.com 

katherinescherling@quinnemanuel.com 

Receiver for County’s Sewer System 

John S. Young, Jr. LLC, as Receiver 

c/o Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & 

Berkowitz, P.C. 

Timothy M. Lupinacci, Esq. 

W. Patton Hahn, Esq. 

Max A. Moseley, Esq. 

Daniel J. Ferretti, Esq. 

Bill D. Bensinger, Esq. 

Joe A. Conner 

1600 Wells Fargo Tower 


tlupinacci@bakerdonelson.com 

phahn@bakerdonelson.com 

mmoseley@bakerdonelson.com 

dferretti@bakerdonelson.com 

bbensinger@bakerdonelson.com 

Receiver for County’s Sewer System 

John S. Young, Jr. LLC, as Receiver 

c/o Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & 

Berkowitz, P.C. 

Joe A. Conner 

1800 Republic Centre 

633 Chestnut Street 

Chattanooga, TN 37450 

jconner@bakerdonelson.com 

Jefferson County Personnel Board 

c/o Lee R. Benton 

c/o Jamie A. Wilson 

Benton & Centeno, LLP 

2019 3 rd Avenue North 


lbenton@bcattys.com 

jwilson@bcattys.com

National Public Finance Guarantee 

c/o Adam Bergonzi 

Chief Risk Officer 

113 King Street 

Armonk, NY 10504 

adam.bergonzi@nationalpfg.com 

Bayern LB 

c/o Edward A. Smith 

Venable 

Rockefeller Center 

1270 Avenue of the Americas 

Twenty-fifth Floor 


EASmith@Venable.com 


c/o Jack Rose 

Ashurst LLP 

Times Square Tower 

7 Times Square 


Jack.rose@ashurst.com 

Jeffrey Weissman, D.D.S. 

Jeffrey Weissman, D.D.S., P.C. 

Keith Shannon 

Individually and as Class Representatives 

c/o Wilson F. Green 

Fleenor & Green, LLP 

204 Marina Drive, Ste. 200 

Tuscaloosa, AL 35406 

wgreen@fleenorgreen.com 

City of Birmingham 

c/o Michael M. Fliegel 

Assistant City Attorney 

Legal Dept. 



Mike.Fliegel@ci.birmingham.al.us 

Bayern LB 

c/o Joseph Campagna 

Vice President 


New York, New York 10022 

jcampagna@bayernlbny.com 

Ambac Assurance Corporation 

c/o Charles L. Denaburg 

Najjar Denaburg, P.C. 

2125 Morris Avenue 


cdenaburg@najjar.com 

Ambac Assurance Corporation 

c/o Miles W. Hughes 

c/o William P. Smith 

c/o Robert A. Dall’Asta 

McDermott Will & Emery LLP 

227 West Monroe Street 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

mwhughes@mwe.com 

wsmith@mwe.com 

rdallasta@mwe.com 

J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 

c/o Clark R. Hammond 

Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose, LLP 

569 Brookwood Village, Suite 901 


crh@johnstonbarton.com 

Cooper Shattuck, Esq. 

Legal Advisor 

Office of the Governor 

State of Alabama 


State Capitol, Room N-104 

600 Dexter Avenue 

Montgomery, AL 36130 

cooper.shattuck@governor.alabama.gov


c/o Donald M. Wright 


Sirote & Permutt, P.C. 





National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. 

c/o Benjamin S. Goldman 

Hand Arendall LLC 

1200 Park Place Tower 

2001 Park Place North 


bgoldman@handarendall.com 


c/o Mark A. Cody 

Jones Day 

77 West Wacker 

Chicago, IL 60601-1676 

macody@jonesday.com 


c/o Matthew Scheck 

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP 

865 South Figueroa Street, 10 th Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90017 

matthewscheck@quinnemanuel.com 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

Atlanta Regional Office 

3475 Lenox Road, Suite 1000 

Atlanta, GA 30326-1232 

Attention: 

Susan R. Sherrill-Beard, Senior Trial Counsel 

David W. Bradley, Senior Trial Counsel 

sherrill-beards@sec.gov 

baddleyd@sec.gov 

City of Center Point, Alabama 

c/o Robert C. Keller 

Russo, White & Keller, P.C. 

315 Gadsden Highway, Suite D 


rjlawoff@bellsouth.net 


c/o Richard P. Carmody 

c/o Henry E. Simpson 

c/o Lawrence J. McDuff 

c/o Russell J. Rutherford 

Adams and Reese LLP 

2100 Third Avenue North, Suite 1100 


richard.carmody@arlaw.com 

henry.simspon@arlaw.com 

laurence.mcduff@arlaw.com 

russell.rutherford@arlaw.com 


c/o Amy Edgy Ferber 

Jones Day 

1420 Peachtree Street, N.E. 

Suite 800 

Atlanta, GA 30309-3053 

aeferber@jonesday.com 

The Securities and Exchange Commission 

SEC Headquarters 

100 F Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20549-9040 

Attention: Morgan Bradylyons, Senior Counsel 

bradylyonsm@sec.gov 


c/o Laura E. Appleby 

Chapman and Cutler LLP 

330 Madison Ave. 

34 th Floor 


appleby@chapman.com

Lloyds TSB Bank PLC 

c/o Laura E. Appleby 

Chapman and Cutler LLP 

330 Madison Ave. 

34 th Floor 


appleby@chapman.com 


c/o Ann E. Acker 


Chapman and Cutler, LLP 

111 W. Monroe St. 

Chicago, IL 60603 

acker@chapman.com 

spiotto@chapman.com 


c/o Donald M. Wright 


Sirote & Permutt, P.C. 

2311 Highland Avenue S. 




Appellant William Casey 

Appeal No. 1101361 in Supreme Court of Alabama 

c/o Matthew Weathers 

Weathers Law Firm, LLC 

P.O. Box 1826 


mweathersmatt@gmail.com 

U.S. Bank National Association, in its capacity as 

Indenture Trustee 

c/o Charles R. Johanson III 

Engel, Hairston, & Johanson, P.C. 

4 th Floor, 109 20 th Street (35203) 

P.O. Box 11405 


rjohanson@ehjlaw.com 

1 


c/o Ann E. Acker 


Chapman and Cutler, LLP 

111 W. Monroe St. 

Chicago, IL 60603 

acker@chapman.com 

spiotto@chapman.com 

Appellant Carmella Macon 

Appeal No. 1101270 in the Supreme Court of 

Alabama 

c/o Matthew Weathers 

Weathers Law Firm, LLC 

P.O. Box 1826 


mweathersmatt@gmail.com 

U.S. Bank National Association, in its capacity as 

Indenture Trustee 

c/o Clark T. Whitmore 

c/o Kesha L. Tanabe 

Maslon Edleman Borman & Brand,LLP 

3300 Wells Fargo Center 

90 South Seventh Street 

Minneapolis, MN 55402-4140 

clark.whitmore@maslon.com 

kesha.tanabe@maslon.com 

Beckman Coulter, Inc. 

c/o Kirk B. Burkley 

Bernstein Law Firm, P.C. 

Suite 2200 Gulf Tower 

Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1900 

kburkley@bernsteinlaw.com 

The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 

A Party in Interest 

c/o Sheldon I. Hirshon 

c/o Adam T Berkowitz 

c/o Lawrence S. Elbaum 

Proskauer Rose LLP 

Eleven Time Square 

New York, NY 10036-8299 

shirson@proskauer.com 

aberkowitz@proskauer.com 

lelbaum@proskauer.com

David Perry, Esq. 

Finance Director 




State Capitol, Room N-104 

600 Dexter Avenue 


david.perry@governor.alabama.gov 

VIA U.S. MAIL: 

Luther Strange, Esq. 

Attorney General 


501 Washington Avenue 


Environmental Protection Agency 

Ariel Rios Building 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20460 

JPMorgan Chase Bank 

Attn: Michael Mak 

60 Wall Street 


The Depository Trust Company, on behalf of the 

holders of the Jefferson County, Alabama, General 

Obligation Capital Improvement Warrants, Series 

2003-A and 2004-A 

55 Water Street 


Shoe Station, Inc. 

Attn: Michael T. Cronin, Esq. 

Johnson Pope Bokor Ruppel & Burns, LLP 

911 Chestnut Street 

Clearwater, FL 33576 

City of Birmingham, Alabama 

c/o U.W. Clemon 

White Arnold & Dowd P.C. 

2025 Third Avenue North, Suite 500 


uwclemon@waadlaw.com 

Alabama Department of Environmental 

Management 

c/o Tom Johnston, Esq. 

General Counsel 

1400 Coliseum Blvd. 

Montgomery AL 36110 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Atlanta Federal Center 

61 Forsyth Street, SW 

Atlanta, GA 30303-3104 

Internal Revenue Service 

Centralized Insolvency Operation 

600 Arch Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

Bayerische Landesbank 


18 th Floor 


Attn: Francis X. Doyle 

Second Vice President 

National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. (f/k/a 

MBIA Insurance Corp.), as insurer of the 

General Obligation Capital Improvement and 

Refunding Warrants, 2003-A and Series 2004-A 

Attn: Daniel McManus, General Counsel 

113 King Street 

Armonk, NY 10504

The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, 

N.A. (f/k/a The Bank of New York Trust Company 

of Florida, N.A.), as registrar, transfer agent and 

paying agent 

Attn: Charles S. Northen, IV 

505 N. 20 th Street 

Suite 950 


Morris & Dickson Co LLC 

410 Kay Lane 

Shreveport, LA 71115 

University of Alabama Health Services 

Foundation, P.C. 

Attn: Patricia Pritchett 

500 22 nd Street South, Suite 504 


AMT Medical Staffing, Inc. 


Suite 1360 


UAB Health System 

619 19 th Street South 

Jefferson Tower, Room J306 


AMCAD 

15867 North Mountain Road 

Broadway, VA 22815 

John Plott Company Inc. 

2804 Rice Mine Road NE 

Tuscaloosa, AL 35406 

Universal Hospital Services 

Legal Department 

700 France Avenue South 

Suite 275 

Edina, MN 55435 

City of Hoover 

100 Municipal Lane 


Teklinks Inc. 

201 Summit Parkway 

Homewood, AL 35209 

AMSOL 

4194 Mendenhall Oaks Pkwy. 

Suite 160 

High Point, NC 27265 

Augmentation, Inc. 

3415 Independence Drive, Suite 101 


Brice Building Co., LLC 

201 Sunbelt Parkway 


Laboratory Corporation of America 

430 South Spring Street 

Burlington, NC 27215 

Attention: Legal Department 

John A. Vos Esq., Interested Party 

c/o John A. Vos, Esq. 

1430 Lincoln Avenue 

San Rafael, CA 94901 

Medical Data Systems Inc. 

2001 9 th Avenue 

Suite 312 

Vero Beach, FL 32963

In the united states bankruptcy court - Northern District of Alabama

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