Harmful Non-Indigenous Species in the United States - Aquatic ...

24 I Harmful Non-Indigenous Species in the United States(83) (box 4-A). The pet industry, along withportions of the zoological and scientfic communities,spearheaded opposition in the 1970s (55).Marshall Meyers, general counsel for the PetIndustry Joint Advisory Council, articulates theindustry’s continuing opposition to regulationsviewed as overly restrictive, vague, or poorlyjustified (14), as they found previous clean listproposals. On the other hand, the pet industryrecently joined environmental groups in supportingtighter regulation of importation of wildcaughtbirds.11Both clean and dirty lists require determiningwhether species pose acceptable risks. Formaldecisionmaking protocols, risk analysis, costbenefitanalysis, and other techniques attempt toaccomplish this goal (ch. 4). Each has advantagesand disadvantages. For example, protocols likethe American Fisheries Society’s for the releaseof fish (51) represent a high level of decisionmakingrigor and best suit the most potentially riskytypes of introductions. Typically, these methodsrequire large amounts of highly technical informationand are therefore demanding in financialand scientific terms. Also, these methods arecontroversial because their usefulness has notbeen established clearly.No single method is ideal for assessing allFederal and federally funded introductions ofnon-indigenous fish and wildlife. However, formaldecisionmaking methods designed to morecarefully assess and decrease risks are consideredto be prudent alternatives to banning all potentiallyrisky introductions (83). Congress couldrequire that agencies develop and adopt either arecognized decisionmaking protocol or anotherformal and rigorous method suited to theirsituations. This was the approach taken in theproposed Species Introduction and Control Act of1991 regarding non-indigenous fish and wildlife.12DEFINING NEW STATE ROLES IN FISH ANDWILDLIFE INTRODUCTIONOption: Congress could address weaknesses insome States’ fish and wildlife laws byimplementing national minimum standards.These standards would provide legal authorityto regulate harmful NIS and be linked tofunding for States to implement them.Option: Alternately, Congress could encouragewider adoption of a federally developed modelState law to make legal authority among Statesmore comprehensive.The strength of the U.S. Federal system is thatthe 50 States provide a testing ground for newideas. Such new ideas turn up in the exemplaryapproaches discussed in chapter 7. On the otherhand, federalism leads to duplication of effortsand highly variable, and sometimes conflicting,regulations (72). This has been the case fornon-indigenous fish and wildlife.States’ standards vary considerably regardingwhich species and groups are regulated and howcarefully they are regulated; many State efforts toregulate importation, possession, introduction,and release are inadequate (ch. 7) (55). In somecases, the weaknesses of State programs stemfrom incomplete legal authority.The Lacey Act leaves decisions on almost allintentional introductions of fish and wildlife tothe States; only the relatively few organisms onthe list of injurious wildlife are prohibited. Thus,correcting problems would entail full exercise ofState prerogatives (83). However, Federal programssupport many State-sponsored introductions,so the Federal Government has a stronginterest in this area.A variety of approaches could be used toencourage improved State performance. Federalpre-emption of State NIS laws is unlikely to bejustifiable or politically feasible. Two more11 me wild Bl~d Comenation Act of 1992, ~blic ~WJ 102-440, Tifle 1, Smtion 102, Oct. 23, 1992; 106 stN. 2224.1’2 H.R. 5852, introduced by Rep. H. James Saxton.