israeli fortifications of the october war 1973

The Bar Lev Line was named
after the contemporary Chief
of Staff ofthe IOF (1968-71),
Lieutenant-General Haim Bar
Lev, shown here during the
Yom Kippur War when he
assumed overall control of
Southern Command after
the failure of its GOC,
Major-General Shmuel Gonen,
in the opening days of the war.
General Bar Lev confers on the
telephone in the IOF war room
deep underground in the
bowels of the Kiryah in Tel Aviv
on 19 October 1973 with the
situation map behind him
showing the expanding IOF
bridgehead across the Suez
Canal and the impending
breakout southwards to
encircle the Egyptian
Third Army. Furthermore, the Egyptian armed forces now enjoyed an absolute majority
in numbers of AFVs and artillery pieces, as well as a massive preponderance
of manpower. The creation of the Bar Lev Line and its tacit admission of a
static linear defence played into the hands of Egyptian material superiority.
High Israeli casualties along the Suez Canal would have a debilitating effect
on Israeli public opinion, while mobilizing the reserves to counter a protracted
Egyptian offensive would significantly damage the Israeli economy. Politically,
the Egyptians saw the line as an attempt to ensure the continuation of the
military status quo and the definition of the Suez Canal as the de facto border
between Israel and Egypt. This was utterly unacceptable. On 3 March 1969,
President Nasser announced that the ceasefire agreement of June 1967 with
Israel was null and void. Five days later, the Egyptians launched a massive
bombardment along the Suez Canal that was to last almost 80 days without
ceasing. The War of Attrition was resumed in earnest.
Boredom was a constant
enemy to the troops stationed
on the Bar Lev Line so anyone
with musical skills was always
a welcome addition to any
unit, such as these soldiers
relaxing in their sleeping and
living quarters at Maoz Milano.
These tubular steel structures
were immensely strong but
also c1austrophobically
cramped with hardly room
to stand upright.
24
Day after day artillery shells impacted on the newly constructed
fortifications. None were penetrated or put out of action although some
suffered serious damage. The armoured reserves were able to advance to their
firing ramps and engage the Egyptian positions according to plan. The
self-propelled artillery units were able to roam the front in response to the fire
direction from the observation posts along the canal while the IAF maintained
air superiority over the battlefield. The Navy continued to dominate the
extensive coastline of the Sinai Peninsula against Egyptian incursion.
Casualties were light and mainly among the exposed crews of the artillery
weapons. The concept of the Bar Lev Line seemed to be working, although
some strongpoints were incomplete when hostilities were renewed leaving
significant stretches without observation.
THE PURPLE LINE
Arguably, the IDF victory on the Golan Heights in the closing hours of the
Six Day War was of greater significance than that in the Sinai Peninsula. The
towns and villages near the Sea of Galilee below the Golan escarpment were
now safe from Syrian artillery fire while the vital head waters of the Jordan
River were in Israeli hands: as was the dominating feature of Mount Hermon
II FOLLOWING PAGE: MACHINE-GUN BUNKER
Fundamental to the construction of the Bar Lev Line was
the widespread use of prefabricated components that were
made in Israel and transported to the Suez Canal. A typical
machine-gun emplacement comprised a steel shell with integral
firing slits. Steel railway ties usually in two layers protected the
roof of the shell. These supported a layer of interlocking
concrete blocks above which were rock gabions as the final
level of protection against artillery fire. All sides of the steel
shell were lined with the standard concrete blocks that had
lifting holes in their sides and four holes through the top and
Women have always been an
integral part of the IOF and
they perform many important
support roles. Here, a corporal
telephonist named Fanny
hangs out her washing on the
Bar Lev Line or more exactly
at the Southern Command
headquarters complex at
Refidim that controlled all
the Maozim.
bottom faces. Through these were slotted steel 'rebar'
(reinforcing bars) to strengthen the whole structure. The
outsides were then lined with yet more rock gabions. Another
prefabricated item was the concrete funnel that was aligned
with the firing slits of the weapons. An emplacement
commonly had up to three firing slits but the number used
was dependent on the terrain and the fields of fire covered
by the position. This method of construction was typical for
many weapons emplacements and other structures such
as observation posts.