israeli fortifications of the october war 1973

EYES HAVE THEY BUT THEY SEE NOT,
PSALM 135: 16
Within two months of the ceasefire, President Nasser died of a heart attack
on 28 September 1970 and was succeeded by his vice president, Anwar
al-Sadat. Like his predecessor, President Sadat was determined to reclaim the
lost lands of the Sinai by any means possible be they political or military.
However, his extravagant pronouncements that he was willing 'to sacrifice a
million Egyptian lives' to achieve these ends and his continuing prevarication
when 1971 was to have been 'The Year of Decision' only tended to reinforce
Israeli perceptions that he was a weak leader. Nevertheless, with no political
progress through 1971 and into 1972, President Sadat decided that war was
the only remaining option in November 1972. His expulsion of thousands of
Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July had galvanized the Kremlin into
providing more sophisticated weaponry such as the T-62 MBT in large
numbers as well as the highly effective SA-6 anti-aircraft missile system.
Detailed planning for a limited war now began.
Despite a general improvement in the quality of the armed forces, the
Egyptian high command remained fully aware of the strengths of the IDF,
particularly their superiority in the air and in manoeuvre warfare. The former
was to be contained by the rapidly expanding Air Defence Command and
the latter was to be broken by an unprecedented deployment of anti-tank
guided weapons in the front lines, as discussed previously. In order to
maximize the performance of the Malyutka or Sagger missiles, these were
employed by highly trained soldiers from the artillery branch that were
attached to the infantry divisions as a concerted screen against any armoured
attack. Fundamental to the plan, codenamed High Minarets, was for the
Egyptian army to attack across the Suez Canal on a broad front and secure
an extensive lodgement in the Sinai Desert while remaining under the missile
umbrella of SA-75 and S-125 SAM sites on the western bank of the canal: a
distance of no more than 16km. The political logjam would thus be broken
and a negotiated settlement could then follow. The assault was to be
coordinated with a major offensive by the Syrian Army to regain the Golan
Heights so as to force the IDF to fight on two fronts simultaneously. But first,
the formidable obstacles of the Suez Canal and the sand ramparts protecting
the Bar Lev Line had to be overcome.
Major-General Gamal Mohamed Ali fought in the 1948, 1956 and 1967
Arab-Israeli Wars and was Commander of the Engineer Corps before and
during the October War of 1973, so it is only appropriate that his
recollections of Egyptian preparations should be recounted in what became
a remarkable feat of arms:
The crossing of the Suez Canal- the largest water barrier ever traversed in the
history of warfare - could not have been completed successfully without
overcoming another barrier on the eastern bank. This was the enormous
fortified artificial sand barrier that extended along the Bar Lev line. This
barrier ranged from eight to 20m in height and was eight to 10m deep. The
barrier was equipped with tank and direct fire positions and interspersed with
fortified positions at approximately four kilometre intervals along its entire
length from Port Tewfiq to East Qantara. It was made of a highly compact
mixture of sand and mud. The sand barrier was one of the greatest challenges
before the Egyptian command and military planners. We would have to create
breaches in order to allow for the passage of forces and military equipment,
without which we would not be able to mount a successful penetration of the
other side. So formidable was it that Moshe Dayan, former Israeli minister of
defence, said, 'It would take the American and Soviet engineer corps, together,
to break through the Bar Lev line.' Soviet experts at the time said that what
was needed was an atom bomb.
'We conducted numerous experiments in order to determine the best way
to overcome the barrier at a site on the Damietta branch of the Nile. First we
tried explosives, which were ineffective. Then we tried artillery and mortar
fire, but to no avail. Mechanical equipment was too slow and clumsy. It was
at this point that we thought of water guns. Many of our officers had
participated in the construction of the High Dam where they helped transport
five million cubic metres of sand using enormous hydraulic pumps that could
suck up 50 cubic meters of Nile water per hour, directing it in a powerful
The old military adage of
always occupying the high
ground is graphically illustrated
in these photographs of IDF
observation posts guarding the
vital Mitla and Gidi passes that
were the gateways to central
Sinai and from thereon to
Israel. From these heights it
was possible to see as far as the
Suez Canal. (Stuart Bracken)
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