the french autumn riots of 2005 and the crisis of republican integration

FRANCIS MESTRIESliberty, and equality. In fact, until the1990s, education provided someNorth African youths with the meansto achieve social ascent: they becameprofessionals, businessmen,technicians, etc., the so-calledBeurgeoisie 3 (Castles and Miller, 2004).A study addressing the educationalproblems of second generationimmigrants revealed that, despitehaving the highest failure rate of inprimary school, this populationbecame more proficient than thechildren of native French duringsecondary levels. This was due to thefact their families showed moreinterest in their educationalachievements and made use of thegovernment’s special educationalassistance programs, which are meantfor students facing cultural difficulties(Lorcerie, 1999).There were attempts to institute abilingual and intercultural educationalpolicy during the late 1970s and the1980s; countries of origin financedlanguage and culture courses taught bynative teachers in an attempt tofacilitate the integration of immigrantchildren and adopt the multiculturalmodel favored in English-speakingcountries. This policy, however, wasnot implemented on a massive leveland was quickly abandoned when thechildren of immigrants became French.In the 1990s, this project gave way topolicies that attempted to balancequality standards through the use ofeducational aid and scholarships formarginalized areas, as well as thereinstatement of the notion of acommon culture (Lorcerie, ibid). Saidpolicies failed to curtail ethnicdiscrimination and professionalsegregation, and the children of Africanimmigrants showed comparatively lessschooling: 71 percent of Algerians olderthan 15 had no diploma, and only 3.1per cent had finished high school orhad some kind of technical certificate(Zehraoui, 1999). There was also anoticeable educational “ghettoization”:the more immigrant children a givenschool had, the more neglected, lowquality,and violent it was, all of whichaccelerated the French Gaul exodus.This was compounded with theconflict over Muslim girls’ use of theveil, which was banned in order toenforce the non-religious and mixedcharacter of the French school system.This triumph on the part ofconservative secularists only increasedexasperation among the Muslimminority.In fact, the school system isundergoing a profound crisis thatincludes serious authority problemsand lack of discipline; the intrusion ofanti-social and delinquent behavior; agrowing inequality of resources andstaff from one neighborhood andschool to another; programs andteachers who have failed to adapt toglobal realities, and early hyperspecialization.4 It is therefore not3From “Beur” (the verlan or French inverted slang term for “arabe”), which is the name given tothe French children of North African immigrants.4In fact, admission to the grandes écoles, or elite French schools, is even less democratic today thanit was twenty years ago.122SECOND SEMESTER 2007MIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO

THE FRENCH AUTUMN RIOTS OF 2005surprising that many young banlieueinhabitants fail at school. Reeve(2006) quotes a unionized teacher:“You really believe in school because itis supposedly a tool for social ascent.Burning it down symbolically statesits ineffectiveness. You turn against itbecause it has disappointed you.”LABOR DISCRIMINATIONAND UNEMPLOYMENTThe workplace provides the mostinsight into the latent racismprevalent in French society. Foreignimmigrants have played a crucialeconomic role in the development ofFrench industrialism since the early20th century: they comprised asubmissive, cheap, and flexibleworkforce that adapted to economiccycles and cost little since it wasamenable to indirect salaries; manywere single men of productive agewho often returned to their countryof origin when they grew old.They worked in the public servicessector as well as the automotive,metallurgical, chemical, textile, andmining industries, among others.They also took on menial jobs.Unfortunately (or not), the postindustrialrevolution led to a profoundindustrial restructuring andeliminated most low-qualificationjobs, as well as many of the sectorsand productive branches in whichthese migrants worked. Manyfound themselves unemployed whilethe programs for legal labor migrationwere cancelled in 1974. Legalimmigration continued throughfamily reunification because, sincemigrants form their own families orbring them from abroad, temporarycircular labor migration always givesway to permanent settling in thereceiving country.The children of these immigrantscould not take the jobs previouslyheld by their parents, nor were theyinterested in doing so. They had beeneducated in France, many werealready French, and they wished tobreak away from the sub-proletariat.Few were able to do so because ofgeneral unemployment, their limitedaccess to higher education, andpervasive, latent discrimination. Theeconomic crises and the subsequentstagnation increased competitionamong lowly qualified French whitesand the “new,” darker French withunpronounceable names andhybridized speech, who often lived inthe same sordid neighborhoods. Thiscompetition based on the fear of“those who have come to take ourjobs” has played a crucial role in theexacerbation of racism and thepopularity of the Front National, orNational Front (Castaingts, op. cit.).High unemployment rates havebeen a structural feature of Francesince the 1970s. They are the resultof several institutional factors such asstringent labor regulations; highemployment taxes; the high costs oflayoffs vis-à-vis the increasingpopularity of temporary hiring; asegmented labor market; reducedlabor mobility, and lack of adjustmentin terms of workforce qualification,2007 SECOND SEMESTERMIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO123

FRANCIS MESTRIESamong others (Pérez Pérez, 2006).Unemployment rates hovered above10 per cent for a long time and, in2005, they were still at 9.8 percent,the European Union’s sixth worst rate(Pérez Pérez, ibid). The situation wasquite different in the United Statesand United Kingdom, whereunemployment rates were less thanhalf and all immigrants, legal or not,were able to find employment. InFrance, unemployment mostly affectsthe youth, people older than 55, andlowly qualified workers.The suburbs of large cities are theareas hardest hit by unemployment:21 percent of their population isjobless (the overall national average is10 per cent); in the northeasternParisian banlieues where the riotsbegan the rate is as high as 26 percent(Boils, 2006). Young Maghrebians areparticularly affected: in 1992,unemployed youths of Algerian origincomprised 40 percent of the nationalaverage, while the jobless children ofnative French amounted to 11percent. Not even educated beurscould find work: 26.5 percent ofAlgerian men and 36 percent of Algerianwomen were jobless in 1996(Zehraoui, 1999), and discriminationplayed an evident role in this(Tribalat, 1999). It is common foremployers to refuse applicants on thebasis of skin color, surname, or placeof residence. As the leader of theFrench employers association openlystated, “The culture of the banlieues isantithetical to that of firms,” andchildren of immigrants are thought tohave difficulties adapting toworkplace discipline. In Clichy-sous-Bois, the area where the catalyticevents took place, unemployment hadreached 40 percent (Reeve, op. cit.).In such a context and with thewelfare state in the midst of a financialcrisis, subsidies and social educationand health policies “are not enough tobring about social integration,”especially “when prejudice and racial,ethnic, or religious stigmatization limitaccess to employment” (RincónGallardo, 2005).THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACTOF IMMIGRATION IN FRANCE.In 1999, 4, 310,000 of France’sresidents (or 7.4 percent of thenational population) had been bornoutside the country. More than 1.5million immigrants had becomenaturalized in the previous decades,and half a million were coloredcitizens hailing from the so-calledDOM-TOM. 5 The main sendingcountries were Algeria (576,000),Portugal (570,000), Morrocco(521,000), Italy (380,800), Spain(316,500), Tunisia (201,700) andTurkey (176,000). France had Europe’slargest Muslim population: 2.5 millionin 1990, 5 million in 2007. Between1980 and 2000, approximately 545,000foreigners entered France legally eachyear, which amounted to just 0.01percent of a total population of 62.75Départements d’outre-mer, or Overseas Departments, and Territoires d’outre-mer, or Overseas Territories.124SECOND SEMESTER 2007MIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO

THE FRENCH AUTUMN RIOTS OF 2005million in 2007. By the late 1990s andthe early 2000s immigrants werealmost twice that number. Over twothirds of them were reuniting withtheir families, others were marryingFrench citizens or seeking asylum,and only 12 percent were in Francefor work-related reasons (Le Monde,2006).Even though immigrant flow intoFrance is not massive, it nowcomprises 25 percent of the nation’sdemographic growth, which ischaracterized by low birth rates.Immigrants help counteract theaccelerated ageing of the populationand provide an economically activepopulation for the proximate future,as they tend to have 35 percent morechildren than French families (Boils,op. cit.). Even though this does notpose an immediate threat to Gauldominion, immigrants’ high birthrates worry the right wing and exert atoll on social services.The European Union has anestimated 3 million undocumentedmigrants, 500,000 of which currentlyreside in France. The country receivesbetween 10 and 20,000 of them eachyear (0.03% of the population). Mostare lowly qualified adult men whowork in the informal economy(domestic services, manufacture,construction, agroindustry, andagriculture) under conditions ofexploitation or near-enslavement, orformally unemployed people whosurvive by working on the streets andengaging in small-time trafficking.These undocumented migrants, betterknown as the sans-papiers (or “withoutpapers”), staged several protestsduring the 1990s, participating inchurch takeovers and hunger strikes.They managed to achieve someregularization policies under socialistgovernments but, since 2002, theyhave been systematically hunteddown and deported. The Frenchgovernment has complained thatSpain and Italy tolerate clandestinemigration that subsequently ends upin France.THE CRISIS OF INTEGRATION POLICIESThe youth riots in France’s urban andsocial periphery are the consequenceof a worn out institutional systemthat has exhausted its economic andcultural assimilation capacities, butthey also owe much to increasinglytyrannical measures of politicalcontrol and police repression. “Thecrisis is that of French Republicanism:the French Republic tells everyone that‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ is awonderful promise, but it is not therefor everyone; and when you areyoung, educated, and you know thatthe school system is going to besegregated in actuality (and not justin theory), this is going to be veryfrustrating. This is the only crisis ofsuch magnitude in Europe, a generalinstitutional crisis: it applies to thejustice system, the police, butparticularly to the school system”(Wieviorka, 2006).Indeed, social and politicalinstitutions are in crisis: the Frenchsocial welfare system, one of the most2007 SECOND SEMESTERMIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO125

FRANCIS MESTRIESadvanced in the world, already showsa big deficit in the pension and healthcoverage areas due to the ageing of thepopulation and their anticipatedretirement. The courts are backloggedwith trials, disarmed in the face ofdelinquents who are too young to goto jail and whom the system does notknow how to handle. The police lacksufficient resources to fight growingcrime, and families disintegrate asparents divorce, the gap betweenparents and children increases, andmonoparental households becomeincreasingly common. Nationalcultural integration is threatened bythe growing U.S. influence and thecommunal seclusion of ethnicminorities, who feel discriminatedagainst and seek to reaffirm theiridentity through religious conversion.This is the case of some Muslimcommunities whose religiousapproach sometimes takes an integristor political stance as a form of protest.On the other hand, racistattitudes and xenophobic politicalopinions boost the popularity of theFront National and other right-wingparties:The French Republic was the integrationmachine; when it broke down,all of its pieces stopped working atonce: the army, the family, and theschool system, which were the elementsthat passed on patriotic culture.The same thing happened to thechurch, the political parties, and theunions. Rule of law cannot existwithout common values, since citizensidentify with their fellowsthrough models that do not currentlyexist. This is why unconscious, religious,or ethnically-based identitiessurpass the feeling of republican citizenship.… Vertigo and anarchic revoltsare an expression of frustration(Debray, 2005, quoted in Cruz Zamorano,2006).And yet, the children of NorthAfrican immigrants did try tointegrate into French culture: manymarried native French citizens andwere institutionally incorporated. TheFrench naturalization policies (whichprivilege jus soli over the blood rightsstill recognized in Germany) and thewelcoming refugee programs werequite benevolent during the 1980s.Schools opened up to immigrants andtried to cater to their needs, but as thenation went into economic recessionand unemployment grew, the childrenof immigrants were subjected togrowing racism and became “secondclass citizens: France has not beenable to integrate them, neithersocially, politically, or economically”(Cruz Zamorano, ibid). These newFrench generations have been thevictims of latent racism on all fronts:the educational system (the ban onveils in schools), the cultural space(discrimination in the private laborsector), housing (limited access toliving quarters), and political racism(racist attacks and hate crimes;Bataille, 1999).Lacking a cohesive familystructure and human and parentalmonetary capital, most of them areunable to incorporate themselves intothe normative structures of the126SECOND SEMESTER 2007MIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO

THE FRENCH AUTUMN RIOTS OF 2005middle class and are “assimilateddownwards” (Portes and De Wind,2006). They are also unable to join thetransnational ethnic networks thatprovide youths with family andcommunal support, maintain culturalvalues and behaviors belonging to thecountry of origin, and create ethniclabor markets through which theycould attain a modicum of economicwealth (García Borrego, 2006). In fact,most of them have been acculturated.[According to Le Monde, in 1995]only 24 percent of children born toAlgerian parents speak their parentslanguage and only 14 per cent werepracticing Muslims, while 50 percentof Algerian children born in Francehad had their first relationship withnative French (Le Monde, 1995).Nevertheless, in the banlieues, thisacculturation has not resulted in acomplete adoption of French culture,which is considered “second class.”There, youths cultivate an“Americanized culture, that of hiphop’s gangsta rap: they wear the sameclothes, use the same gestures, playthe same videogames, listen to thesame music, and organize in gangsthat are similar to those in the UnitedStates” (Castaingts, op. cit.). In fact,they are pushed toward a culture ofviolence.The great trap and paradoxinvolving the children of Africanimmigrants is that, even whenan individual integrates and becomesacculturated, “French society will stillconsider him inferior because he isdifferent, but he has already cut histies to his group of origin. He isdoubly guilty of treason: he is part ofhis group of origin without reallybelonging to it, and he is part of thereceiving society without reallybelong to it” (Lapeyronnie, 1999).These youths find discriminationmore difficult to bear than theirparents because they were born inFrance and no longer have ties toanother place of origin; they cannottake refuge in their roots (ibid) and, inresponse, try to build an identity thatexacerbates their difference. This,for example, is the case with radicalMuslims whose identity is based ontheir problematic experiences in thereceiving society and acts as a demandfor recognition (ibid). Ultimately,these approaches lead to clashes withpolice, reverse racism, and streetviolence.POLITICAL BACKGROUNDAND CAUSES OF THE RIOTSThe Parisian suburbs used to be thecapital’s “red belt,” the area where theParti Communiste Français (theFrench Communist Party, or PCF) hadsocial and political control. But,starting in the 1980s, the party grewso weak that it almost disappearedfrom the region, leaving a largeorganizational gap and a scarcity ofsocial and housing policies. A largepart of the PCF’s base moved to theFront National, inaugurating thedivision between the native andnaturalized French proletariats.During the 1980s, the frustrationand belligerence latent among the2007 SECOND SEMESTERMIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO127

FRANCIS MESTRIESinheritors of migration was channeledtoward civic and political venues. In1983, under the socialist governmentand after the first suburban riots, alarge anti-racist movement broughtthe French public and beur youthstogether on a 100,000 person marchfrom Marseille to Paris. Thismovement insisted on equality at thesame time that it demanded the rightto cultural difference, mixingrepublican ideals with communalforms of organization and culture(Wihtol de Wenden, 1999). Theundocumented immigrant protesterswanted to express their desire for akind of political conversation thatwent beyond full and participativecitizenship and addressed all levels,from the local to the national. Theyeven nominated candidates formunicipal elections. They werereceived by former president FrançoisMitterrand, who provided some withresident status and ten-year workpermits and naturalized many others.In exchange, the government and thesocialist party attempted to takepolitical control of the movement.They co-opted its leaders and cutthem off from their popular base, thusneutralizing the movement’s radicalpotential. The tradition of anticapitaliststruggle was lost after thedefeat of the last immigrant workerstrikes, which did not connect to theurban protests carried out by theimmigrant’s children or obtain thesupport of the unionized Frenchworkers (Dell’Umbria, 2006).By the 1990s and faced with thelack of political will on the part of thesocialist government, which failed tointegrate them into the politicalsystem, the beur activists had becomedisenchanted. The disappointment inboth the political left and the antiracistbeur movement, which had onlyfocused on one aspect of socialexclusion and had not solved theeconomic problems facing its youth,led to their loss of legitimacy and gaveway to Muslim associations, someof which followed communaltraditions and rejected integration:“the associative movement had torelocate or disappear” (Wihtol deWenden, 1999). The late 1990s sawthe emergence of the sans-papiers’movement, which gained the supportof French intellectuals, NGOs and thechurch, but did not achieve the kindof massive union between Frenchyouths of native and immigrant originthat had taken place in the 1980s.The process of socioculturalintegration maintained it course,although new hybrid models—such asa type of cultural integration that didnot completely relinquish familyidentity—were adopted. Economicinsertion, on the other hand, wasnegatively affected by the highunemployment rate and this created afertile ground for differentialism andcommunitarism (Wihtol de Wenden,1999), along with spontaneousmanifestations of rage. Today “we nolonger have a worker’s (or citizen’s)movement, or a political party thatcan politicize the frustration and rageexperienced by these youths, and theirrevolts take on a self-destructivetenor” (Noiriel, 2002).128SECOND SEMESTER 2007MIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO

THE FRENCH AUTUMN RIOTS OF 2005The right-wing governmentalpolicies implemented by JacquesChirac and Sarkozy starting in 2002reduced the amount of socialprograms and increased repressive andsecurity measures, amplifying thesense of moral wrong and injury.Locally subsidized youth employmentprograms, which hired secondgenerationbanlieue youths as socialmediators, were suppressed; thepublic health budget for impoverishedareas was reduced; economic supportfor neighborhood social workers wascancelled, and local police forces, whohad gained the trust of the residentsbecause they lived in the sameproblematic areas, were disbanded.This urban policy was limited to anincrease in policing activities and astance against terrorism anddelinquency: youths were bannedfrom meeting around tower entrancesto “stop the creation of gangs” (or,more to the point, to keep them fromthinking and acting collectively), andrenovation programs in highlydeteriorated buildings wereabandoned, leading to accidents andthe death of 60 people. Race conflictsincreased and, two months before theriots, a purportedly accidental fire in amigrants’ dwelling caused the deathof 14 people, including two children.Similar fires had happened before,killing 24 Africans in the outskirtsof Paris.In addition to a restrictiveimmigration policy and very toughsecurity measures, Sarkozyimplemented a U.S.-stylecommunitarian integration policy.He supported the building of mosquesand recognized all Muslim leaders—including some integrist associationswithout much representation—aspolitical interlocutors in an attemptto control them. France’s formerMinister of the Interior and,unfortunately, its current president,seems to derive more of his ideas fromAnglo-Saxon multiculturalism (whichhas been questioned and even partiallyeschewed in the United States) thanfrom the homogenizing, assimilationist,and lay republican model.SOME CLUES INTO THE MEANINGOF THE RIOTSThe riots were the marginalizedFrench youth’s demand foracknowledgment, an affirmation oftheir dignity and social and politicalbeing. They were a protest againstconstant police abuse, arrests basedon ethnic profiling, and “accidental”beatings and deaths that always gounpunished. These youths wanted tobe French citizens as much as anyoneelse, and enjoy the employment,consumption, cultural, andgratification rights they cannot accessbecause of their race or origin. In thewords of J. Railte, Seine St. Denis’communist senator, “The demand ofsecond generation youths is to enjoycomplete citizenship in their diversity,and not belong to this or thatcommunitarian, ethnic or religiousgroup” (2005). “What they cannotbear is the breach between theory andpractice, between the motto of2007 SECOND SEMESTERMIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO129

FRANCIS MESTRIESrepublican equality and a destiny ofunemployment. […] All they dreamabout is having money so that theycan consume like everyone else”(Bouzour, 2005).The lack of criminal recordsamong the riots’ detainees invalidatesthe notion that these revolts were theresult of gang wars over drugterritory. The religious factor does notexplain them either, as the violencedid not have any sort of Muslimcomponent (Wieviorka, op.cit.); infact, some Muslim associations triedto create protection militias, whichwere repudiated by the rioters. Thesame happened with left-wingorganizations, which had nothing todo with the riots, did not foreseethem, and did not understand them.This can partially explain the lack of apolitical agenda in a movement wherethe only demand ever (and onlyoccasionally) voiced was the removalof Sarkozy. This would also explainthe absence of any sort of socialutopia or networks with other popularsectors. In any case, the targets of therioters’ attacks leave little doubtabout the fact that their demands andire were directed at the state.The sociodemographic andsocioeconomic profile of these youthssheds light on the nature of theirmovement: 50 percent of detaineeswere underage, averaging between 14and 22 years of age—some weremerely 11. This explains, for example,the ludic character of the fires, whichwere set by unemployed teenagerswith no access to recreationalactivities. It also shows that thesuccession of riots partially resultedfrom acts of emulation, which werepropitiated by mass media coveragethroughout neighborhoods and cities:“let’s get on TV with more fires.”Thirty-two percent of detainees onlyhad primary education and manywere failing at school, which, inturn, explains their lack of educationalexpectations. Those who were notstudents and were held for trial hadprecarious and badly paid jobs: errandboys, carriers, movers, bakers, etc.(Jeremie, 2006). In short, they werepart of the sub-proletariat.According to a 2006 survey carriedout by sociologist H. Lagrange, theneighborhoods that experienced themost violence during the riots sharedthe same main characteristics:• A high unemployment rate amongthe young.• A high underage population; childrenand teenagers could comprisemore than 35 percent of the population.• A very high rate of large families(over 6 people per family, especiallyamong immigrants from Sub-SaharanAfrica, who have many children andlittle money). This can lead to veryserious family problems, and 83 percentof the rioters lived in small welfareapartments: “They live on top ofeach other; when they grow up theyhave problems with their siblings.Family income is quite reduced andthere is no money left for entertainment(M. Lahtifi, educator, 2005). Accordingto Lagrange, this explosivecombination is the most significantvariable.130SECOND SEMESTER 2007MIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO

THE FRENCH AUTUMN RIOTS OF 2005• These are poor neighborhoods inrich cities, and the youths resent thesocial contrasts they face on a dailybasis.• The housing complexes are extremelydeteriorated and waiting tobe demolished.• Black youths were overrepresentedamong the rioting population, afactor that could be linked to theproblems caused by large families livingin small spaces (Lagrange, LeMonde, 2006).CONCLUSIONSThe 2005 riots can be seen as anexplosion of irrational rage involvingpsychological mechanisms of “stigmaretrieval” (Morice, op. cit.), a processwhere the victims of discriminationadopt the characteristics of theascribed stigma and use them as aform of vindication (e.g., thoseclassified as violent gang membersbecome more violent, thosedisparaged as native or black proclaimtheir indigenous character or theirblackness). This mechanism wasanalyzed by Frantz Fanon in histreatise on colonialism, The Wretchedof the Earth.Another possible interpretation isthat provided by Wieviorka, whorefers to floating subjects that cannotquite become actors and insertthemselves into a social, political, orintercultural relationship because theyfeel rejected and unrecognized assubjects. This can lead to angry anddestructive or self-destructivebehaviors when an individual oranother member of the group issubjected to abuse or injustice. Thisviolence can act as a cathartic toolthat tears the individual away from adaily state of passivity and alienationand can lead to a subjectivationprocess that, stemming from aspontaneous feeling of solidarity,could become the first step towardcivic, cultural, sportive, or politicalparticipation on the one hand, anddelinquency and antisocial behavioron the other (Wieviorka, 2005).These riots, however, can alsobe seen a pre-political and antiauthoritarian(rather thananti-capitalist) revolt that seeksrecognition, equal opportunities, andrespect for difference in a society andstate that exclude and humiliate theirbastard children after having exploitedand marginalized their parents. Theviolence enacted by these marginalsubjects represents both protectionand freedom, at least for a while. “Theviolence of the subject is located inthe lacks, the gaps, the decompositionof societal complexes on all levels,from the local to the global”(Wieviorka, 2005).BIBLIOGRAPHYBATAILLE, Philippe (1999), “Racisme institutionnel,racisme cultural et discriminations,”Immigration et intégration:l’état des saviors, Paris, Edit. Dewitte,La Découverte.BODY-GENDROT, Sophie (1999), “Ghetto,mythes et réalités,” Immigration et Integration:l’état des saviors, Paris, Edit.Dewitte, La Découverte.2007 SECOND SEMESTERMIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO131

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THE FRENCH AUTUMN RIOTS OF 2005voirs, Paris, Edit. Dewitte, La Découverte.RINCÓN GALLARDO, Gilberto (2005), “Enseñanzafrancesa,” Mexico, Reforma,November 12.TODD, Emmanuel (1994), Le destin des immigrés,Paris, Seuil.TRIBALAT, Michele (1999), “Définir, quantifier,sérier les mécanismes d’intégration,”Immigration et Intégration: l’étatdes savoirs, Paris, Edit. Dewitte, La Découverte.WIEVIORKA, Michel (2005), La Violence,Paris, Hachette Littératures, Pluriel.(2006), Interview, Mexico,Departamento de Sociología,UAM-Azcapotzalco, October 20.WIHTOL DE WENDEN, Catherine (1999), “Lesjeunes issus de l’immigration entreintégration culturelle et exclusionsociale,” Immigration et Intégration :l’état des saviors, Paris, Edit. Dewitte,La Découverte.ZEHRAOUI, Ahsene (1999), “Les Algériens,de la migration a l’installation,”Immigration et Intégration : l’étatdes saviors, Paris, Edit. Dewitte,La Découverte.2007 SECOND SEMESTERMIGRACIÓN Y DESARROLLO133