Second Russian National Dialogue On Energy, Society And Security

Green Cross RussiaGreen Cross SwitzerlandGlobal Green USASecond Russian NationalDialogue OnEnergy,Society AndSecurity21-22 April 2008Saint Petersburg, Russia

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYGreen Cross RussiaGreen Cross SwitzerlandGlobal Green USASecond Russian NationalDialogue OnEnergy,Society AndSecurity21-22 April 2008Saint Petersburg, Russia1

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYEditorial TeamSecond Russian National Dialogue onENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYEditor in Chief: Cristian IonEditors: Julia Berg, Wided KhadraouiTranslators: Megan Lehman, Eugenia TumanovaPhotography: I. PetrovaCover Design: L. SurkovaPage Layout: GRC Direct, A. ShkrebetsPrinting: GRC Direct471

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThis collection includes reports and speeches as well as the question-and-answersessions that took place at the Second Public Dialogue on Nuclear Energy, Society andSecurity, organized and held on April 21–22, 2008 in Saint Petersburg, Russia.The Dialogue participants included Russian federal, regional and localgovernment officials and public organizations, other Russian government agencies,non-governmental and media organizations, as well as representatives from scientificresearch and design institutes, managers and experts in the country’s fuel and energysector. International representatives involved experts from governmental and nongovernmentalorganizations in nuclear and alternative energy sources and nuclearnonproliferation, members of the G8 Global Partnership governments.The presentations at this conference provide an assessment of the key risks ofcivil nuclear facilities and the military facilities that have been phased out (includingnuclear submarines) and radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management. Theyalso address options for resolving today’s key problems in the safe use of nucleartechnology, including offering policies with regard to the environmental safety ofusing nuclear energy, and reaching an agreement with the public on various aspects ofnuclear and alternative energy developments.Dialogue Organizers: Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland and GlobalGreen USA (affiliates of Green Cross International), RosAtom and RosAtom’s PublicCouncil, in partnership with The Stanley Foundation.Dialogue Sponsors:The organizers would like to express their gratitude for financial support to:• AKB Elektronika• Government of Norway• Government of Sweden• Government of Switzerland• International Science and Technology Center• Ploughshares Fund• Rosatom• Rosatom’s Public Council• RosEnergoAtom• SOGAS Insurance Group• TekhSnabEksport• The Stanley Foundation• TVEL• VneshTorgBankSpecial thanks to the editing and translation team are noted on the last page ofthe book.The presentation texts and research papers published in this book have beentranslated and edited into English from original Russian versions, and are the soleopinion of the authors.© Green Cross Russia, 2008© Green Cross Switzerland, 2008© Global Green USA, 200821Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland and Global Green USA are the Russian, Swiss and Americanaffiliates of Green Cross International

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYForewordThe pace of modern economic development is leading to a rapid increase in energyconsumption throughout most of the world. Meanwhile, the limitations of the energyresources used are becoming ever more palpable. Some of the world’s top oil and gasdeposits are located in politically unstable regions. The increased use of oil and gas alsoruns counter to the Kyoto Protocol.The unresolved problem of nuclear waste has made it difficult for nuclear energyto garner broad public acceptance, and there is a need to create a new type of fuel cycle.There are many proposals for alternative energy resources, but none of them can generateenergy on the massive scale required, at the moment.The end of the Cold War put an end to the fifty-year arms race and stamped outthe threat of a massive nuclear conflict. The ghost of thousands of nuclear warheadscrushing out civilization has been supplanted by the belief that a new era of a multipolarworld is upon us.The end of the Cold War global conflict has truly reduced the risk of an all-outnuclear war, but, since then, other risks have emerged. Today, Russia must answer anumber of nuclear questions of both domestic and international significance. Howshould nuclear arms systems and their delivery vehicles be dismantled? Where shouldwe put nuclear waste and how should it be transported? What should we do with fissilematerial and how should it be treated? How can we effectively protect nuclear materialswhile adhering to the principles of nonproliferation? What role will the atom play in thefuture of energy? And, probably the primary question: how safe is all of this?After the Kyshtym and Chernobyl catastrophes, the public realized that the rightto nuclear and radiation safety is one of man’s main rights. The provision of safety forboth the environment and the public is currently the priority when destroying nuclearweapons and their delivery systems, as well as in the widespread proliferation of nuclearenergy.None of these problems can be resolved without the understanding and support ofthe Russian society, or without the approval and recognition of a national strategy.The objective of this Second National Dialogue on Energy, Society and Security isto establish agreement and mutual understanding in our society with regard to nuclearand radiation safety in the Russian Federation in relation to overcoming the legacy of theCold War and defining potential opportunities for paving the way to the safe developmentof alternative energy futures.Green Cross Russia Press Service3

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• The organizers of this Dialogue: RosAtom and its Public Council, Green CrossRussia, Green Cross Switzerland and Global Green USA (affiliates of GreenCross International), in partnership with The Stanley Foundation.• The Swedish Foreign Ministry• The Norwegian Foreign Ministry• The Embassy of Switzerland in Moscow• The International Scientific and Technical Center• RosEnergoAtom• VneshTorgBank• SOGAZ Insurance Group• AKB Elektronika, OJSC• TVEL, OJSC• TekhSnabEksport, OJSC• The Ploughshares Fund• RosAtom’s National Regional Educational Center.• A number of other small organizations that have contributed to the organizationof this Dialogue.5

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYOpening RemarksSergey MironovChairman of the Russian Federation Council of the Federal AssemblyChairman of Fair Russia: Motherland, Pensioners, LifeDear organizers, participants, and guests of the Second Russian Nuclear NationalDialogue: Energy, Society, and Security, this important forum is dedicated to one oftoday’s most pressing issues: ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy under theconditions of globalization.Modern economic development is leading to the rapid growth of energy needs inmost countries around the world. At the same time, unbridled growth in the consumptionof fossil fuels has led to resource depletion and the disruption of the planet’s climate.The world has turned to nuclear energy to relieve the energy situation, but thereare many burning unsolved problems, such as the safety of the reactors currently inoperation, the management of nuclear waste, and the decommissioning of old nuclearpower plants.A safe nuclear energy industry — one that solves the issue of nuclear nonproliferation,that uses a process with the highest level of safety, and that practicallyeliminates the production of nuclear waste — must become the top priority in thedevelopment of Russia’s nuclear industry.I am convinced that constructive dialogue between the Russian government andthe civil society on the subject of this difficult and multifaceted problem will both uniteRussia’s environmental community and raise our citizens’ level of understanding of thekey issues. The dialogue in which you engage today is a tangible, practical step in thatdirection.I wish all participants a successful and productive meeting.6

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYOpening RemarksHans Reudi BortisMinister and Deputy Head of Mission,Embassy of Switzerland in RussiaIt is both an honor and a great pleasure for me to be here today. First of all, I wouldlike to thank, on behalf of the Swiss authorities, Green Cross Russia for organizingthis second Nuclear National Dialogue. The first one took place just one year ago, inApril 2007, and was very interesting and successful. We remain convinced of the valueof such a dialogue and are delighted to co-sponsor again this event, with our modestcontribution.The impressive list of participants shows how useful such events are. The Dialogueis a unique opportunity to bring people together who, from a very different perspective,are all concerned with the issue of energy and security. Switzerland has a long traditionof co-operation with Green Cross Russia in a similar area, in the field of chemicalweapons destruction, for more than 10 years, since 1997. Switzerland has also supportedthe Green Cross Public Outreach and Information Offices program in various regions,where big arsenals of chemical weapons are stockpiled.Key priority of this conference is to establish a dialogue between all concernedstakeholders; the authorities and the civil society through public hearings. The importanceof access to information, open discussions and transparency cannot be highlightedenough. Green Cross Russia is very successful in the project implementation and weare proud to be associated with their efforts. The cooperation with Green Cross Russiais very pleasant, and, for Switzerland, the Director of Green Cross Russia, Mr SergeiBaranovski, has become more than just a project partner during all these years of our cooperation;he became a friend. So I wish to congratulate him personally in the openingof this Dialogue, and wish him all the best for the work during these two days, and thecontinuation of his work in general.Thank you for your attention.7

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Most Important Aspect of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia:A Legislative Solution for the Safe Management of Radioactive WasteEvgeniy EvstratovDeputy Director, RosAtomThe level of nuclear and radiation safety at nuclear power plants (NPPs), as wellas the companies involved in the nuclear fuel cycle and the nuclear research facilitiesin Russia have been evaluated and deemed satisfactory by RosTekhNadzor—a safetyregulator.In nuclear energy, quantitative production growth is achieved while maintaining orimproving safety indicators.Figure 1. Electricity at Russia’s NPPs.In fact, statistics on downtime at NPPs and other large nuclear installations andfacilities presenting a radiation hazard have been relatively consistent. There have notbeen any significant hazardous events since 2003 (INES ≥ 1). Over the last 10 years,the number of breakdowns decreased by 2.5 times. The environmental impact is withinpermitted standards. Since 2001, personnel have been exposed to average annualradiation doses of less than 3 mSv/year (the standard is 20 mSv/year). Occupationalhazards in the nuclear industry are now 3.5 times lower than in all industries combinedthroughout Russia.8

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYOver the past two years, nuclear power generation has grown by over 7% withoutthe addition of any new facilities. The number of serious breakdowns related to theautomatic shutdown of critical condition units is twice as low as the global NPP average.Based on this important indicator, Russian NPPs meet the world’s highest standards.We can notice a positive and sustainable trend in decreased personnel radiation,radioactive discharge and release into the air are sustainable, as is the maintenance oflower occupational hazard indicators.However, if one considers the full range of issues related to nuclear and radiationsafety, one will find that there are many pressing problematic areas today (indicatedin the darker color in Figure 2). One of the main problems involves the way in whichradioactive waste (radwaste) is handled. This is currently the weakest point.Figure 1. Electricity at Russia’s NPPs.As a result, despite the generally strong level of safety with regard to actual radiationrisks, potential risks are on the rise. For the most part, this is due to the decisions thatwere made and the approaches that were used in the early stages of the nuclear project.Some of these decisions included:• Keeping liquid radwaste in open storage, and the pollution of the TechaRiver;• Accumulating enormous volumes of high-level waste in storage tanks;in 1957, an accident at one such storage container led to the pollution ofnearly 20,000 square kilometers (1ku/km 2 at 90sr) in the South Urals;• Postponing work to phase out operations at first generation nuclearfacilities;• Accumulating spent nuclear fuel at NPPs with RMBK, AMB (slowneutron) and GBWR reactors.9

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYWe believe that the law needs to be tied closely together with issues of liabilityand property. Further, the draft law presumes the introduction of financial mechanismsand setting clear deadlines for each stage of creating a common radwaste managementsystem. Based on our estimates, passing this law will help bring down financial expensesby an order of magnitude and minimize risks related to radwaste management.At present, the bill is undergoing agreement with agencies. It will be submitted tothe Government and the State Duma for consideration in June 2008.The key components of the common system will be:• One government entity responsible for radwaste management, in addition toregulatory bodies for the use of nuclear energy;• A national operator, and• Specialized organizations and radwaste producers.The goal of this law is not to ease or simplify safety requirements, but ratherto institute the legal tools needed to motivate radwaste producers to do their part inmandatory and safe final containment and to clearly define the obligations of thegovernment with regard to all accumulated radwaste and its ultimate responsibilities ingeneral.The draft law defines the exclusive authorities of Russia as the owner of radwasteand all of its long-term storage facilities and final radwaste containment facilities.Considering the realities of today’s political situation, decisions on a number of issuesfor official bodies are being made in collaboration with local federal authorities.Progress in radwaste management, right up until final containment, is one of Russia’sfinancial obligations. Naturally, this includes creating final containment facilities andburial.Financial Mechanisms Are Different for Different Types of RadwasteAll efforts to make produced radwaste suitable for final containment are conductedat the expense of those companies that produce the radwaste. Regular radwasteproducers allocate funds to the radwaste management fund, while companies thatproduce radwaste sporadically will make one-time payments to the national operator.Specialized organizations will assist the latter in the process of making radwaste suitablefor final containment.Inflation risks affecting the radwaste management fund would be compensated forby the government from budget funds and from the regular review of the amount ofannual disbursements for each radwaste producer.Eliminating the problems of the nuclear legacy is done with government budgetfinancing and via the mechanism of the federal target program. At the first stage, a companywill only need to assure acceptable safety levels of the radwaste already accumulated.Later, as funds become available under the FTP, companies will treat radwaste in linewith the requirements set out in established regulations before transferring them to thenational operator.Bringing activated radwaste storage facilities up to standard with long-termenvironmental safety regulations is another aspect included within the FTP.About the National OperatorThe main functions of the national operator would be to plan, organize and carry outradwaste management operations, including the long-term storage and final containment13

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY(burial) of radwaste. It is important that the national operator be a constituent of thestate-run corporation. The national operator would bear the brunt of long-term radwastestorage and final containment facilities. With time, the national operator wouldFigure 5. Financial mechanisms.significantly improve the general placement and location of these facilities.Several different options have been reviewed for establishing a market of servicesat the stages of long-term storage and burial. Considering the idiosyncrasies of theprocesses and how they are perceived by the public, an option has been selected underwhich a regulatory body will make decisions on limiting the operations of the nationaloperator based on the level at which this service market is developed (i.e., stages of longtermstorage and final containment).In order to provide for practical efforts, the draft law proposes expanding theradwaste classification system. A general outline of the radwaste classification systemis shown in Figure 6.Operational and disposable radioactive wastes are currently classified under acommon system comprised of three main groups based on activity levels and threegroups based on half-value periods. A more subtle structure is proposed and wouldinclude other subgroups. Their descriptions and limits would not be set out in the lawitself, but in subordinate legislation. In order to demonstrate the importance of this work,let us review radioactive wastes with very low radioactive substance content.Today’s Situation is a ParadoxQuantification of the lower limits of radwaste for liquid wastes is based on potablewater requirements, using ten intervention levels. But there are also hygiene standards formaximum permissible concentrations of radionuclides in food products. The standardsmake it seem as if it is completely safe to drink milk with 100 Bq 137Cs per liter — but if14

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYlevels are at 110 Bq/liter, the milk is considered radwaste.Furthermore, in developed countries like Norway, for example, the maximumFigure 6. Radwaste classification.permissible concentration is 370 Bq/liter for milk, 3,000 Bq/kg for venison, gamemeats and fish, and 600 Bq/kg for other food products. If we do not eliminate theseinconsistencies, we will be surrounded by radioactive waste.In summary, and to emphasize the point once more: a legislative solution toradwaste management will create the conditions necessary first and foremost for aneffective solution to the problems that have accumulated, and will prevent them fromaccumulating in the future, in addition to providing a government guarantee in thisfield.What will be the Results of a Federal Law on Radwaste Management?Measures to protect public health and the environment will be included in all stagesof radwaste management. The risk of unauthorized use of radwaste, including the use ofradwaste for terrorist purposes, will be minimized. The law will also prevent accidentsand lower risks related to large, non-contained volumes of radwaste. Moreover, theincompleteness of the cycle will no longer be putting the breaks on developments in thenuclear industry. We will be able to increase exports of Russian nuclear technologies oninternational markets on legal grounds.By adopting this law, Russia will reaffirm its authority as a technological superpowerdedicated to the principles of sustainable development and the requirements of the15

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNuclear Waste Convention.There are two other draft bills in line after the law on radwaste management: one onspent nuclear fuel and on phasing out nuclear energy facilities. Work is already underway,and they are expected to be submitted to the Government and the State Duma in 2008.Thank you for your attention.Figure 7. The phases of creating a system for radwaste management.16

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYResolving Global Environmental Problems through theAcceleration of Nuclear Energy DevelopmentVladimir GrachevAdvisor to the Director of RosAtom,Member of the RosAtom Public Counciland Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of SciencesSince mid twentieth century, the degradation of the biosphere has grown ata threatening pace: two-thirds of forest lands have been destroyed, two-thirds ofagricultural soil has been lost, the bio-resources of the world’s oceans, seas and rivershave been depleted, and the planet’s biodiversity is threatened: 110 species of vertebrateshave disappeared from the face of the Earth, and another 600 species are expected tofollow in their footsteps. Mankind is consuming up to 40% of the world’s ecosystems,10% of which is used directly, and 30% of which is being destroyed. In the last quarterof the 20th century alone, one-third of all natural resources were destroyed. Manproduces organic waste more than 2,000 times faster than the entire biosphere. Globalenvironmental pollution in the 20th century has led to global warming. The averageannual temperature has increased by 0.3–0.6°С and is expected to rise by another 0.4°Сby 2020, up to 1.5–2°С by 2050. This will in turn trigger the mass melting of glaciers,which could lead to a rise of 1.5–2.5 meters in sea levels and the flooding of coastalareas and islands. Global environmental pollution is also accompanied by weakeningimmune systems and failing health, as well as the emergence of new illnesses. There isa shortage of potable water in many regions. In 2000, 1.1 billion people, or 18% of theworld’s population, did not have access to clean water, and that number will increase to2.5 billion people by 2050. Large cities lack clean air. Natural disasters such as floodsand earthquakes have become more frequent.Environmental threats to the existence of human civilization have been recognizedat the highest international level (i.e., “The Spirit of Rio” Conference in 1992). Scientificand technological progress has created the conditions for an environmental catastrophe,and the very concept of development is now in question. There is a fundamental need tore-examine human values.Man’s extensive economic activity over the past two centuries has soldiered onwithout any consideration for global environmental interests and is characterized by theunrestrained growth of both production and consumption, including wasteful consumptionof natural resources and energy. The United States alone annually consumes 25% ofthe world’s oil, over 40% of the world’s gasoline, 30% of fuel. In the next 20 years,consumption of oil and natural gas is expected to grow by 33% and 50% respectively.Russia holds 12% of global oil reserves. In order to live by American standards, Russiawould have to purchase as much as it holds, but there are no such resources available.Our consumerist attitude toward nature has brought it to the brink of destruction.The dominant models for production and consumption are leading to environmentaldevastation, increased risks for human life and health due the decreased quality of theenvironment. The very foundation of global security is at risk.17

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYBased on the UNEP Commission’s 2002 report, projected human developmentthrough 2032 is distressing. In the next 30 years, irreversible changes caused by mankindwill take place on the planet. One way or another, over 70% of the Earth’s surface willbe deformed and over one-fourth of the world’s animal and plant species will be lostforever. Clean air, potable water, and pristine lands will be in short supply, while nature’sability to regenerate after the anthropogenic impact diminishes.The high quality of the natural environment is truly mankind’s greatest treasureand an unquestionable value of the aspects that lie at the heart of global environmentalinterests. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), as much as 80% ofall illnesses today are the result of consuming poor-quality water. According to theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 5 million people die each year fromdiseases related to the consumption of polluted and poor-quality water. Water maybecome the leading cause of future armed conflicts, taking the place oil holds in today’sconflicts.The world’s environmental problems are all closely tied to the economic situation incertain countries, shown by key indicators such as per capita GDP and energy productionand consumption (see Table 1).18

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 1. Key Energy Statistics by Country:Top Consumers of Primary Energy(2002 Data Unless Noted Otherwise)CountryUnitedStatesPopulation(millions)GDP(per capita)(in USD)Primary energy(EJ/year/per capita)ConsumptionProductionPowerplantcapacity(GWe)Annual electricityconsumption(per capita)TJ/yr perpersonKWh perperson290.8* 37,840* 98.16* 70.16* 953.2* 0.34 94,440China 1,284 960 43.60 40.97 356.6 0.03 8,333Russia 143.7* 3,030* 28.23* 47.00* 216.4 0.20 55,560Japan 127.3 29,770 22.97 4.11 266.1 0.18 50,000India 1,042 440 16.59 12.66 108.0 0.02 5,556* Data from 2003Table 1 illustrates the fact that energy consumption in developed countries is 11–17times higher than in developing countries (such as China and India).If all of the countries in the world reach United States consumption levels over thenext 15 – 20 years, or even those of Japan’s “conservative” consumption levels, totalenergy consumption will rise in step with global population, or 15 times from today’slevel. Is global energy prepared for such an enormous surge? The planet simply does nothave sufficient organic fuel.This leads us to conclusion number 1: Energy production must move toward the useof new, powerful energy sources that do not burn organic fuel.Today, that means nuclear energy. The fossil fuel era will soon be coming to an end(see Figure 1, using data from reference [1]).19

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 1. The organic fuel era.The path to resolving global environmental problems is closely bound to thedevelopment of renewable energy (Figure 2).Figure 2. The path to resolving global environmental problems.20

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIt is all too clear that only a high level of preparedness in the fields of energyresources and energy use will help resolve the world’s environmental problems. Thereare already some examples to consider. Western Europe has taken a major step on theenvironmental front, and it would be silly to attribute these achievements exclusively tothe development of wind and solar energy. If you remove Europe’s nuclear energy fromthe map, then the region would find itself in an environmental crisis, garbage would pilehigh, people would suffocate on emissions, and the rivers and reservoirs would choke onthe waste dumped into the water.Continued growth in energy consumption inevitably leads to increased emissionsof greenhouse gases. If the current trends continue, annual carbon emissions will rise60% by 2020, and may even triple by 2050. Although developing countries todayproduce one-half of the world’s carbon emissions from fossil fuels, by 2020 they willbe responsible for 60%, and that trend may continue (see Table 2 for the world’s largestproducers of greenhouse gases).Table 2. The Largest Producers of Greenhouse GasesCountryTotal emissions(CO2 equivalent,billion tons)Emissions(per capita, CO2 equivalent,tons)United States 6.93 24.5China 4.94 3.9Russia 1.92 13.2India 1.88 1.9Japan 1.32 10.4Germany 1.01 12.3Brazil 0.85 5.0Canada 0.68 22.1UK 0.65 11.1Italy 0.53 9.2Global emissions 33.67 5.6We are observing the rapid growth of natural phenomena resulting in the loss oflife and considerable economic damages. These natural disasters, including flooding,forest and peat fires, deforestation, desertification, epidemics, etc., are caused, to a largeextent, by humans.In the second half of the 20th century, the number of extreme natural phenomenarose by a factor of six, and the average yearly volume of economic losses increased morethan ten times. (see Figure 3).21

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIn order to solve global climate change problems, we must decrease, rather thanincrease, fuel consumption. Meanwhile, global energy development forecasts are basedon the assumption that fossil fuel consumption will increase (see Figure 4).Figure 3. Trends in the number of major natural disasters and their consequences.22

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 4. A scenario of global electricity production (IAEA, 2003).23

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMeanwhile, the global community, at the Kyoto Protocol conference in Bali in2007, acknowledged that by 2050, CO2 emissions will need to be reduced by 50%. Inthis case, the forecast for Russia in 2050 (see Figure 5) shows that installed capacityand electricity production at nuclear power plants must be increased by seven times by2050.Figure 5. Predicted electricity generation in Russia.IAEA data shows that, in early 2007, there were 439 nuclear reactors in operationwith a total capacity of 367.77 GW. Another 29 reactors in 11 countries are currently invarious stages of construction. Today, NPPs produce 16% of the world’s electricity. Atthe same time, 57% of all “nuclear” electricity is produced by the United States (103reactors), France (59 reactors) and Japan (54 reactors).The countries that are currently developing most dynamically in terms of nuclearenergy are China (6 reactors under construction), India (5 reactors), and Russia (3reactors). New reactors are also being built in the United States, Canada, Japan, Iran,Finland, and other countries. A number of countries have also voiced their intentionto develop nuclear energy, including: Poland, Vietnam, and Belarus. In total, theconstruction of over 60 new reactors is under consideration. Over 160 projects arecurrently in the design stage.In Russia, nuclear energy accounts for about 16% of all generated electricity. Nuclearenergy represents 30% of all energy in Western Russia and nearly 40% in NorthwesternRussia. In 2006, Russia’s NPPs produced 154.6 billion kWh, or 4.8% more than in 2005.NPPs running on PWR reactors generated 83.1 billion kWh or 114.2% of the previousyear’s production. NPPs running on RBMK, FBR and GBWR reactors generated 71.5billion kWh, or 95.7% of nuclear power produced in the previous year. Overall, Russia’sNPPs executed 102.5% of the Federal Rates Service balance.At present, ten nuclear plants in Russia are using 31 reactors with an installed24

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcapacity of 23,242 MW. Of those, 15 are PWR reactors (9 PWR-1000 and 6 PWR-440),15 are boiling water reactors (11 RMBK-1000 and 4 GBWR-6), and one is FBR reactor(FBR-600).There are proposals to build another three PWR-1000 reactors in Russia at theBalakovsky, Volgodon and Kalinin nuclear stations by 2010. Furthermore, plans are alsoin place to launch one fast neutron reactor (FBR-800) by 2010 at the Beloyarsk NPP. Intotal, according to the federal target program, by 2030 there should be 40 new reactorsconstructed. That would bring nuclear-produced energy up to 25% of the country’s totalenergy generation.By 2050, Russia’s NPP capacity should increase even more significantly. However,it will be closer to 2030 that the country will have to deal with fuel reserves for nuclearenergy. Analyses show that it is necessary to transition to a new nuclear energy systemstructure that uses fast breeder reactors with expanded “breeding” capabilities and aclosed fuel cycle.As a result of doing so, resource limitations will cease to be a sword of Damoclesin nuclear energy production. The consumption of uranium would not exceed the limitsof known reserves, and its extraction, just like separation plant operations, could be allbut ceased by the end of the century.We will, of course, have to pay in order to see the atom become a quasi-renewableenergy source. The price is the development of capacities for reprocessing nuclear fuel,which even in best scenarios must be raised from today’s very restricted level.Making these development scenarios for peaceful nuclear energy a reality sets strictconditions for the rate at which technological innovations must be introduced. Theseinclude:1. A closed fuel cycle based on new fuel reprocessing technologies2. Reactors featuring efficient fuel breeding and use (fast breeder reactors with abreeding ratio that is considerably higher than one and thermal reactors with a breedingratio of ~0.9 and plutonium as the reactor fuel)3. Reactors for producing hydrogen, industrial and residential heat, and freshwater,as well as small- and medium-capacity reactors.The need for a solution to global environmental problems and a sufficient energysupply to meet the needs of human development inevitably leads to more globalconclusions concerning the need to use thermonuclear energy. Predictions say this willbegin in the mid-twenty-first century.But that is not all. It is also critical to pursue in-depth research on changing theenergy precepts for global development. It is always possible that scientific achievementscould lead to the discovery of new sources of energy and new methods of gleaningenergy by taking advantage of a variety of transformations of matter at the microlevel.Nuclear sources have emerged (separation of isotopes of heavy elements), ashave thermonuclear sources (synthesis of isotopes of light elements), and perhaps newpractically inexhaustible sources of energy will be found for supporting the sustainabledevelopment of mankind.However, neither thermonuclear energy nor new sources of energy, nor today’salternative resources will fully replace nuclear energy in the next one hundred years.The role of nuclear energy will only grow and the availability of raw materials needed to25

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYproduce it will become the focus of attention.And if today, uranium consumption in Russia is at 3,800 tons per year, and there are705 tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) being produced per year [see reference 2], then by2050, there will be a need for 16,400 tons of natural uranium to meet the needs of 100GW nuclear stations, resulting in 3,040 tons of SNF each year.Figure 6 illustrates the nuclear fuel cycle and resulting waste.Figure 6. The nuclear fuel cycle and waste generation process, using thermal reactorsа) at 2008 capacity (23.2 GW); b) at 2050 capacity (100 GW).Innovative development of nuclear energy must be founded on a closed nuclear fuelcycle (see Figure 7).26

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 7. A closed nuclear fuel cycle.Essentially, this is a transition to a renewable energy source. Now, in additionto wind, solar and hydro power, we have an incomparably more powerful source ofrenewable energy: nuclear energy using a closed nuclear fuel cycle.The nuclear renaissance has taken its first steps. Countries planning large-scaledevelopment of nuclear energy include the United States (+32 reactors in the next severalyears), Russia (+33 new reactors by 2020), China, India, Finland, France, Sweden, andothers.What are environmentalists saying? Patrick Moore, the founder of Greenpeace,says: “I find it logically inconsistent for people in the environmental movement whosay that climate change threatens the very existence of our civilization, and threatens todrive millions of species into extinction, and then they are opposed to one of the mostimportant technologies that could bring about a resolution to that problem — replacingfossil fuels with nuclear energy.” “Greenpeace made a fairly serious mistake by lumpingnuclear energy with nuclear weapons, as if all things nuclear were evil.”It is not evil, and for now, there is no other way out. Only the acceleration ofthe innovative development of nuclear energy can help resolve global environmentalproblems and support the sustainable development of mankind.References1. Velikhov, E.P., et. al, Russia and Global Energy of the 21st Century [Rossiya vmirovoi energetike XXI veka]. Moscow: IzdAT, 2006, 136.2. Asmalov, V. G., Zrodnikov, A. V. and Solonin, M. I., The Innovative Developmentof Russia’s Nuclear Energy [Innovatsionnoe razvitie yadernoi energetiki Rossii].Atomnaya energiya. Vol. 103, September 2007.27

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRosAtom’s Social and Environmental ProgramIgor KonyshevDirector, Department of Public Relations, PublicOrganizations and Regions Liaison Branch, Rosatom; andSecretary, Public Council of RosAtomDear Dialogue Participants!My presentation will expand on the topic Evgeniy Evstratov touched on in hispresentation and will focus on RosAtom’s efforts to address environmental and socialproblems in recent years.Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) disposal has been a problem in Russia since the earlydays of the nuclear program in the mid-20th century. It is also an issue facing othercountries, including the United States. Today we must all work to find a solution to thisproblem. Of the total volume of accumulated liquid radioactive waste (540 million m3)over half (330–340 million m3) is stored in service reservoirs at the Mayak complexin the Chelyabinsk Oblast. In order to solve the entire range of nuclear, radiation, andenvironmental safety issues, we need to decide on what approach to take, where thefunding will come from, and how we can resolve these issues. Last year, Russia adopteda revolutionary new Federal Target Program (FTP) on nuclear and radiation safety. TheFTP has identified two key points: the problems inherited from the Soviet Union in termsof radiation safety and radwaste are separate from the issues that will arise as new powerplants are put into operation. We all know that over 90% of high-level and low-levelwaste is left over from the nuclear weapons program, and so the government accepts thefinancial burden of any programs that will dispose of those wastes. What is new aboutthis approach is that the government has finally decided who will deal with these issuesand how, and determined the funds that will be used. The total funding allocated for theFTP will be over RUB 130 billion.I want to talk about the security problems at Mayak as examples of problems thathave been successfully resolved, or are being addressed most effectively. First of all,there are security issues concerning the Techa River reservoir dam, problems specific toLake Karachai, and social problems, which appeared as a result of operations at Mayak.From 1949 to 1951, the Mayak plant used the Techa River for the final disposal of lowlevelradioactive waste. This waste disposal method was based on the same principlethat was once adopted by the Americans, who used the Columbia River for the samepurpose. Unfortunately, in our case there was no such major river next to the complex,so all of the waste classified as low-level was dumped in the shallow Techa River. In1951, Mayak sharply reduced the amount of radwaste being flushed into the river andstarted building holding reservoirs. The Techa reservoir system now consists of fourponds and has accumulated around 330–340 million m3 of water containing low-levelradwaste. The first problems that emerged were associated with the durability of the 11threservoir’s locking dam. The first preventative measures that were taken by RosAtomin the last two years were aimed at building up and reinforcing this dam. The dam was28

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYexamined and it was found that as a result of the dam’s several building stages, therewere places where the dam’s construction material was decompacting. The decision wasmade to radically reinforce the dam, and in 2006–2007, a 7–13 m deep trench was dugalong its length, metal dowels were driven in, and the space between the dowels wasfilled with concrete. As a result, the dam was reinforced such that it became a Category1 structure and can now be compared to a hydroelectric plant dam in terms of durability.By the end of 2007, we had fully secured the entire Techa reservoir system againstaccidents or other incidents for the long term.At the same time, we reviewed the hydrological and geological studies in the region.We have over 400 boreholes throughout the area through which we are continuouslymonitoring the migration of the ground waters from the Techa reservoir system. At theRosAtom Public Council, the Gidrospetsgeologiya Institute, which is part of Russia’sMinistry of Geology, presented a detailed report on the subject. Their conclusion wasfairly optimistic: there is no significant migration of radionuclides through ground watersfrom the Techa reservoirs.The second stage of preventative measure involved reducing the load on the Techareservoir system itself. Every year, Mayak’s facilities flush around 6 million m3 of waterinto the reservoir system. Around 100,000 m3 contain low-level radwaste, while the restis regular industrial run-off which could be put directly into the water system after anadditional decontamination step. To separate out these two flows and reduce the loadon the reservoir system, a facility-wide plumbing water treatment system was installedfor the Mayak production site. The first stage will be completed by the beginning ofnext year. Once the system is operating, it will keep 6 million tons out of the Techareservoirs.Social problems, which appeared as early as in the 1950s in connection withactivity at the Mayak facilities, primarily concerned the communities downstream alongthe Techa River. Most of these communities were resettled in the 1950s, since the TechaRiver was taken out of public use. The only major community that was left close to theTecha River was Muslyumovo.The village, in line with Russian law, is one of several where residents have theright to voluntary resettlement. Government programs are not very effective in thisregard. In order to help people who want to move away from Muslyumovo, RosAtomand the government of the Chelyabinsk Oblast concluded an agreement to finance theresettlement. Here I would like to clarify one thing: the program initiated by RosAtomand the local government to resettle the residents of Muslyumovo is not a federalgovernment program. RosAtom is the entity providing the funding in the amount ofRUB 600 million. The targeted extra-budgetary financing for the social program comesfrom RosAtom profits. The money contributed by the Oblast is also not coming out ofthe federal budget, but from the region’s own profits. This is why you cannot use thesame measuring stick for this program as you would for federal programs. These are notequivalent under the law.What is Unique about this Program?Before starting the resettlement process, the Chelyabinsk authorities conducted asurvey among the residents. It turned out that far from all of the 741 households (over2,000 residents) wanted to move to a single specified location. Some wanted to move toChelyabinsk, some others wanted to join their relatives in Bashkortostan, someone else29

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYpreferred to stay in the Kunashir Rayon, where Muslyumovo is located. Consideringthe fact that we did not find a consensus, we made the decision to offer resettlementon a voluntary basis by paying RUB 1 million for each Muslyumovo household. Thegoal was not to simply destroy the houses that make up the old village, but to offer realassistance to the residents who actually live there. The environmental conditions on theterritory of the village were normal, the soil was clean, and all of the studies conductedup to 2006, as well as the ones conducted with the help of independent experts in 2006,showed that the soil met all safety criteria, including radiation standards. The onlycontamination noted is in the floodplain of the Techa River. It is obvious that the siltthat contains strontium and cesium has contaminated the bottom of the river and itsfloodplain. Hypothetically, the people that use the river on a daily basis may be subjectedto a greater radiation dose in one year than is permissible. No more than 45 people arein the risk zone. These people are primarily herders, their helpers, and people who liveright on the riverbanks. If one observes standard hygiene and safety guidelines, there isnothing else there posing a health hazard. Unfortunately, the warning was not heededby local residents and for 50 years, the residents continued using the river. Essentially,the decision to help people relocate was motivated by the fact that, when there is a river200–300 meters from home, people can’t help but use it.The following has been achieved by the resettlement project: 410 agreements havebeen concluded with private individuals. Of these, 170 have purchased apartments inChelyabinsk (RUB 1 million is sufficient for a 1-room apartment). About 100 familieshave stayed in the Kunashir Rayon while 70 individuals simply opted for compensationin the amount of RUB 1 million and moved away to live with their relatives.The problem we are now facing in connection to resettlement concerns theabandoned homes in Muslyumovo on privately-owned property.30

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYPress Conference– Alexander Nikitin: The Federal Target Program for Nuclear and Radiation Safetywas mentioned. Why was such an important program kept secret from the public? Howcan we be talking about this program needing to be made public if it is classified at thesame time?– Evgeniy Evstratov: No one classified this Program. The complete information isrestricted for internal use, but that’s not classified. The reason there is restricted accessis that the Program concerns dual-use facilities. If we removed certain numbers from it,it could be made completely public.– Alexander Nikitin: So let’s take out those numbers and let’s make the info on theProgram available to the public!– Igor Konyshev: RosAtom has not received a single request from public organizationsasking to comment on the Program. When such a request is submitted, we would be gladto respond to it.– Lina Zernova: I wanted to ask about the fund for decommissioning nuclear powerplants. Is this fund still receiving contributions? Where are these contributions comingfrom? What plans are there for this fund? Who controls it and is it open to the public?– Evgeniy Evstratov: All funds specified in Decrees 576 and 68 of the RussianGovernment are in operation today. In 2007, a total of RUB 2.5 billion was collectedby the four funds. These funds are being used to finance on-going security operations.Before we can create fully functional funds to pay for future decommissioning of nuclearfacilities and sites posing a radiation hazard, including nuclear power plants, we need acorresponding legislative framework. This framework does not exist today. We have beenworking on a law on facility decommissioning. This law would call for contributions tothe facility decommissioning fund in the amount that would be needed at the time of thedecommissioning, in accordance with project estimate documentation.– Tatiana Artemova, Posev Magazine: We know that Sergey Kiriyenko, the Directorof RosAtom, announced in one of his appearances that no NPPs would be built in anyparts of the country where more than half of the local population states that it is againstthe construction of new nuclear power plants. I wanted to clarify: are we talking aboutsome kind of referendum and public opinion survey in a small nuclear city that would beadjacent to the plant, or, in the context of Saint Petersburg, would this include the largercity, even though Sosnovy Bor is not right next to it?– Igor Konyshev: Permission for the placement of a nuclear energy facility would bemade by the municipality on the territory of which the facility is to be located.– Victoria, Interfax: I have a question regarding the law on radioactive waste. How is itdifferent from analogous laws that existed previously? And could you also speak aboutthe timeline for the creation of the national operator entity?– Evgeniy Evstratov: The law is scheduled for adoption this year. The national operatorwould be created in 2009. The main way this law differs from all its predecessors isthe recognition by the government of its financial and legal liability for all radioactivewaste accumulated during the Soviet era, for the nuclear program of those days. Thegovernment has also accepted the responsibility for designating radwaste producers,31

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYoperator companies, and their current financial liability. It also accepted responsibilityfor retaining ownership of radioactive in the context of long-term storage, which is aperiod of 50 or more years, and deep geological disposal.– Alexander Shkrebets, Transborder Ecological Information Agency, Saint Petersburg:How much is being done to develop an alternative energy program that does not involvenuclear power?– Igor Konyshev: As the state agency in charge of nuclear energy, we have great respectfor development of other sources of energy; however, we do not pursue the developmentof alternative energy programs ourselves.– Lina Zernova: In 2006, Sergey Kiriyenko stated that, starting in 2008, they will starttaking spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Leningrad Power Plant to Krasnoyarsk, wherestorage facilities will have been built for that purpose. When will this process begin?– Evgeniy Evstratov: Late 2009, early 2010.– Ekaterina Katkova, ITAR-TASS: This is a question about the construction of theKaliningrad NPP. This is the first time when foreign investors are given access to anNPP construction project? How will this be carried out and how will security be ensuredunder these conditions?– Igor Konyshev: This is the first time when 49% of the shares of the total capital canbe given to private investors, including domestic ones. Here the issues of security andcontrol over nuclear materials are still the responsibility of the Russian government.– Lina Zernova: The power generation capacities of the Leningrad NPP-2 currently beingbuilt are being called “replacement capacities.” Is there a timeline for decommissioningthe reactors currently in operation at the Leningrad NPP-1? What is it and will it bemade public?– Ashot Nasibov: Yes, of course there is a timeline, and it will be discussed in detail inmy presentation.– A. N. Frolov, Dom Prirody newspaper: This is a question for the defenders of nuclearenergy and nuclear neutrons who say it is the only option. I wanted to point out thatU-235, which is being used here, is the only material that can be used in the futurefor space flights. If we use it up now, we are effectively preventing humanity, for manythousands of years, from using power installations on space flight vehicles. There isnuclear power than can be generated from U-238 instead of thermal neutrons. Do youthink that, in an effort to save ourselves from an oil shortage, we will end up confininghumanity to staying on Earth in perpetuity?– Igor Konyshev: I believe that the fears are exaggerated. The natural uranium depositsin Russia are sufficient to sustain the nuclear energy sector in Russia at its current rateof growth for at least 100 years. By the time there really is a space flight program usingnuclear-powered vehicles, I think there will be some other way uranium would be usedin our thermal reactors.- [Unintelligible question from the public television security service]– Igor Konyshev: Because the residents of Saint Petersburg have recently been concernedover the transport of depleted uranium hexafluoride, I will repeat once more, to avoidany alternate interpretations: Russia has never imported, does not import, and has noplans to import radioactive waste. Second point: depleted uranium hexafluoride is not a32

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYform of radioactive waste. We consider it a raw material that we bring into the countryfor enrichment. The transportation aspect complies with all technical and securityrequirements in accordance with applicable regulations, including physical protection.– Sergey Baranovsky: This is why we have gathered here today, to discuss these details:what is safe, what isn’t? What must we do about it? What measures are needed, howmuch will it cost, and who will do the work? How will the public react: will it takea constructive approach or will it be confrontational? The public has a huge numberof reasons to be concerned. People live in environmentally poor conditions, both inlarge urban centers and any of the regions that have been affected by waste, whetherradioactive, chemical, or industrial. System-wide measures are needed, but they requireenormous expenditures. The government must spend a great deal to ensure environmentalsafety. Environmentalists, radical and otherwise, are all in favor of this. We must lookfor solutions to these problems, but we must do it in a civilized manner. We need to putforward constructive solutions, which were discussed at length at this event. A lot hasbeen done with respect to the Techa River and Lake Karachai, and this has been donefor the first time. For many years, during the Soviet years and in today’s Russia, theseproblems were left unaddressed. These are the first steps in the right direction. We mustwelcome them and help the government solve these problems.– Igor Konyshev: As for absolute numbers, I can give you a simple example: The effecton the general environmental situation in the region attributable to nuclear facilitiesand activities is no more than 0.5–3%. If we are talking about the Angar ElectrolysisCombine, for example, where nuclear raw materials are brought in for enrichment, itscontribution to environmental pollution has been estimated at 0.2%. Coal thermal powerplants, oil refineries, and the construction industry are responsible for the remainder of100%.- Kai Asbern Knutsen, Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature: I was sittingat Samson, a local cafe, and both the air conditioner and the heating were running. Doyou have any energy conservation programs? The population must understand that, ifenergy is conserved, then additional nuclear power plants might not be necessary.- Igor Konyshev: That is a bold statement, that if we fully implement an energyconservation program, we would not need to build more power plants. Whether welike it or not, the primary reason there is an increase in energy demand in Russia ishousehold energy use. The growth in that sector is significant: it is 5-6 times greater thanthe levels observed in the mid 1990s. I agree that energy conservation is one of the mostpressing issues around the world. Within the nuclear energy industry itself, we have longtransitioned to using energy efficient lighting and other energy conservation systems thatlet us to significantly reduce our energy use. As regards the general population, where thegovernment and the administrations of major cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburgare concerned, the issue of energy conservation is already in the public domain. It is notonly being discussed, it is also being addressed.- Alexander Shkrebets: If we consider that energy loss in the Murmansk Oblast is at30%, and if we do the math, we’ll see that the Kola NPP is heating the Far North. Takingthis into consideration, the issue of energy conservation ought to be given priority inyour work.- Igor Konyshev: There are two sides to the energy conservation issue. From the pointof view of the economic development of these territories, as much as we might not like33

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe idea, major metal processing plants and other facilities with complex technologicalprocesses require the construction of additional power-hungry facilities. We cannotcompensate the energy use of an aluminum processing plant by simply implementingenergy conservation measures. We can’t do it using wind or tidal energy either. Wecompletely agree that alternative energy technologies are necessary, but they are neededto serve as local energy resources for remote settlements. The energy consumption thereis low, but the cost of the infrastructure and the energy loss of those systems would bemuch higher than the amount of energy actually being consumed. As for major industrialcenters, we need a stable energy generation system; nuclear energy is one component ofsuch a system. The best scenarios would be to have the following power supply structureby 2025: nuclear power - 25%, thermal power - 25%, hydropower - 25%, and powerfrom natural gas - 25%. Right now we are favoring natural gas. It accounts for just underhalf of our power supply today, in terms of total power generated from it. In reality— and Mendeleev said it himself — if you are using natural gas as fuel, you might aswell just use banknotes. This is why nuclear energy needs to take over its share in thebalance.- Sergey Lisovskii, Ekologiia Society: This question concerns the personnel policy ofRosAtom. Kiriyenko said that just 5–7 years are left for the older generation to transmitits knowledge to the new generation. If they don’t make it, the nuclear industry will beleft in the lurch. There won’t be people to keep this massive infrastructure work smoothly.To what extend is this issue being addressed? It seems to me that RosAtom does not giveit the attention it deserves. It is feeding off of itself instead of trying to prepare peoplethat would understand all aspects of how nuclear energy works.– Igor Konyshev: The personnel issue has always had two parts. Yes, we must train thepersonnel, but then we need to recruit them and retain them. The nuclear industry ismaking efforts in both areas and has done a lot to both recruit and retain personnel. Inrecent years, the average salaries of nuclear industry employees have gone up significantly,especially in the peaceful-use sector. As for the second aspect, we conducted an auditof educational institutions where students who aim to work in the nuclear industry arestudying. We were happy with what we saw. The resources we had during the time of theSoviet Union have not disappeared; they have steadily grown. The main challenge is tobring the educational factor closer to the industrial factor, so that these young specialistsstay within the industry. This is the objective of the global social programs being carriedout within the nuclear sector.34

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYCivil Society and Nuclear Activities:From Risks Perception to a Strategy of Developing our TerritoryMarie Kirchner and Anne-Marie DucheminMembers of the Council of Development of thePays du Cotentin, FranceGood morning ladies and gentlemen. We are genuinely excited to be here today andto continue our progressive work with Russia.The President of Pays du Cotentin sent us a message to share with you:“Jean-Pierre Dupont, President of Pays du Cotentin, brings you his best regards.Since 2002, personal and fruitful relations have been built with Russian actors in thenuclear field and specifically with the Leningrad Region. These relations were driven byMrs. Marie Kirchner, who will speak today with Mrs. Anne-Marie Duchemin. They arecitizens from Pays du Cotentin, and Members of the Development Council. They willexpress their personal views, illustrating the diversity of opinions in our territory aboutnuclear activities. This sensitive topic brings forth various debates inside our territory,where different nuclear industries are implemented, which enables and encouragesprogression. May your Dialogue be successful and give the opportunity of fruitfulexchanges.”The topic for my speech today is identifying direct and indirect impacts that nuclearactivities entail on a region, and also how to recognize and comprehend accurate riskperception in creating a workable strategy of development in our territory. The creationof the mentioned strategy of development relies heavily on exchanges of experiences,strengthening the need to for nations to cooperate on various levels. This is not a forumto advocate democratic ideals, because, frankly, we have many political improvementsto undertake in France but merely attempting to elucidate on our local experience inexchange for the conception of new ideas and constructs. We are also not specialists withinternational laws but we can provide a quick overview concerning this topic in relationto our particular work.At the end of my presentation, Anne-Marie Duchemin will enlighten you on theperspective of a grassroots activist organization, which is involved in environmentprotection specifically. If you have any questions, we’ll be pleased to answer them afterthe presentations.A nuclear industrial project undertaking always commences with the sameimperative step: citizens are asked to give their opinion during a two phase process at35

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYeither a local or a national level. The questions consist of something along the lines ofwhether or not the citizens are pro or against the general idea, and, where there are anyproposals put on the table, citizens can submit their comments for the debate. Some ofthese pre-existing practices may be seen as stepping stone mechanisms for an alreadydecided agenda and that idea has to also be considered. The question of differentiatingwho actually has the final decision is very important because during a public debate, thedecision belongs to the private owner but during a public inquiry, the decision is madeby the State.At the very beginning of a project, the public often has expresses fears about it,and because nuclear projects are not widely understood at a technical level, there areoften misconceptions of risks that the public presumes. This hesitant behavior portrayedby the public is normal and frequent and it concerns most projects, not only nuclear, inall ‘high-level risk’ industries, for example, projects with risk of chemical pollution orindustrial accident.Let’s remember the principles and values of sustainable development:• Caution: Do not wait for an accident;• Prevention: Better prevent than cure;• Good management: He who takes it slow and steady goes a long way;• Responsibility: He who pollutes pays• Participation: All actors must be involved• Solidarity: Let’s give to our children a better world.The historical participation of citizens in state affairs come from Greece, at thetime of Eschyle and Platoon, who described the functioning of the Town of Athens. Herein Russia, we visited the town of Novgorod during our travel in 2005. It is an ancienttown, which always uniquely practiced democracy. Yet participative democracy wasactivated only very recently, and many improvements still need to take place. There arevarious texts written recently and organizations capable of providing better informationand better advice for citizen implication in public life, particularly concerning nuclearindustry which should be used. The main point, which must be insisted upon, is openness,that authorities exchange information with the public regularly and provide updates onrecent developments.• First of all, at European level, there is the Aarhus Convention. My colleague,Anne-Marie Duchemin will add some comments in a few minutes concerningthis Convention.• At State level, there is a Chart and an Environmental Code, a Parliament Officefor Scientific and Technical Choices, an independent Authority of Safety,which is a National Commission for Public Debate. Also, a High Committeefor Transparency and Information about nuclear safety has been created inMarch 2008.There were different ideals, primarily openness to more missions, better legitimacyand more independence, transparency and communication. I am merely mentioning theseorganizations for your broad information, but I’m not qualified to present the differentorganizations and their evolution.The otherwise isolated citizen is more than welcome in a public debate, but thepreference is usually to be represented or to act via various organizations. At a local36

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYlevel, in every territory concerned by one or more controlled nuclear areas, there isa Local Information Committee, composed of elected people, scientific members andorganization representatives. There are also environmental protection organizations,farmers, tourism actors, trade unions and trade centers. These people are gathered at anational level in an organization called the National Association of Local InformationCommittees (ANCLI). At European level, there is another organization, called theEuropean Commission of Local Information Committees (EUROCLI) with the sameobjectives. A Community of Practices Concerning Radioactive Waste Management(COWAM) also exists at European level.Our main local structure is called the Development Council of Pays du Cotentin.It is a forum to provide strong ideas and suggestions to elected officials. It’s composedof 4 chambers that include elected officials, local business owners, various organizationrepresentatives, and other qualified people who are not part of the above mentionedcategories, such as Directors of universities, hospitals or writers.When the treatment and recycling plant was built between 1964 and 1966 in ourregion, there was an offshoot of development as well due to an increase in population.Schools were created, the road network was modernized to facilitate mobility, theelectricity network was improved, houses and surrounding farms were renovated. Often,one person from each family was working at the plant, which played a role in the increasedemployment rate in the area. Essentially people’s standard of living improved.This influence of the public is favorable if the health and safety of workers andpopulation are insured. We faced controversy concerning health, for example, from thereport from the French Professor Viel about children’s leukemia. Today, we know thatthere is no influence of the plant on the local health. But the opposite is also a truepossibility: a decrease of nuclear industrial activity would have some consequences onthe society, such as the closure of classes in schools, decrease of financial compensation,shut down of local, grassroots businessesMoving away from fear and antagonism to an inquisitive yet open attitude requiresverbal communication and respectful and constructive exchanges, defined by a balancedrelationship. Finding out how to switch from a prolonged and negative situation to aproactive solution, which will be a positive change for the next generations, requires anexchange of experience with other territories. Not all elements in this conversation arepositive, of course, and we can talk more about our difficulties later on if you wish. Ialso fully understand that this is a time-consuming and lengthy process. I also want tostress the possibility of this process despite its’ apparent difficulty. The first step is thatfacilities must be safe. The public must not succumb to fear and has to understand themain risks and solutions found by the directors of the facilities and other individuals incharge to reduce all plausible risk. A long international reference of experiences existsin different countries. Through these tested techniques risks are now under control, andalthough they still exist they are more managed. The importance of crises exercises witha population, education in risk management, importance of training, quality of materialimplemented, facilities modifications, respect of usual operating procedures has to beunderlined.There must also be independent controls set up on different levels: internal andexternal. The results have to be communicated to population in a comprehensive way.Citizens and environment protection associations are aware actors that are concernedabout air and water quality and safety.37

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYI am partial to the method of participation of French citizens which consists ofthe public at large before the debate or public inquiry to maintain a questioning andmore importantly a non-aggressive attitude through the debates. We should rememberthat industrials are citizens. So they need a safe environment for themselves and theirfamilies as well, they are also part of our world.So in conclusion, I’d like to offer the audience a question: Let’s think about theconditions which are allowed to perpetuate a democratic functioning. Which guaranteedo we have that these conditions will be respected?And now, let me introduce Mrs. Anne-Marie Duchemin, member of Council ofDevelopment of Pays du Cotentin, belonging to an environment protection association,who will express her point of view.Aarhus Convention has existed since June 25, 1998 and it was signed by our twocountries. Its aims are to give the citizens the right to a healthy environment, informationconcerning the evolution of their environment and the access to justice, if the abovementioned regulations are not respected.The field of this convention is immense and critical for all of us, but its applicationsin the French laws are too far slow and absolutely unknown by the population. Thankyou so much for giving us such an opportunity to speak to you about these issues. Thisis quite unusual and I wish we could see this convention more accessible in the future.I’d like to share some examples of the application in France, some positive results andwhat other fields of thought that they can lead to. Although we are allowed to express ouropposition, to criticize, to suggest, as expected in the text, there hasn’t been any tangiblereal result so far.I’ll tell you some recent examples on our territory. First of all, there is the verysensitive topic of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). The access by publicto objective information is reduced by the industry. Through new technologies,organizations driven by private citizens try to share information they have, try to proceedin trial actions and to bring with them the necessary local documents. Another point:the building of EPR, the new reactor in Flamanville, France, illustrates a disregard ofthe Aarhus Convention. It was voted by our Parliament on May 20, 2004 in spite of theAdvisory Commission created the year before by the government, and before a publicdebate could take place. Now, our associations work with volunteers and scientists whoshare similar opinions to confirm the noxiousness of Very High Tension Lines.They will be built to transport electricity from the reactor through existing lines.We are confident in the professionalism of nuclear workers from different industries,because we live in the same territory; they share the same risks as us. Our questioningunfurl from the concern of a long term vision about the evolution of chemical andradioactive wastes.Access to information is very important for all of us, as well as how we should usethat information in realizing the ability of sustainable development and to respect thehealth of the citizens of our land today and in the future.Some less sensitive topics open some hope:• The improvement of the management of the drinkable water in the UrbanCommunity of Cherbourg, thanks to a local elected official. His managementof water, which is now under the responsibility of municipal authorities, hasimproved the quality and the price of the service for the citizens.38

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• The management of domestic wastes progressed under the pressure of localorganizations with a process of gas treatment, coming from the transformationof organic waste into production of energy. This new process calledmethanization was laughed at some years ago.• Reduction of release in atmosphere. The study of Jean-François Viel ten yearsago upset the conscience of The Hague inhabitants. They were in troublebecause he admitted the possibility that there were more leukemia casesin children observed for those who often frequented the beaches near thereprocessing plant. This development finally ended in a positive note. Theresults were not statistically significant, so the local population felt better.Since this incident, important efforts were made by the industry to decreaserelease in atmosphere. Also, in response, Local Information Committees werecreated.We are all on the same planet. We are all responsible for what we are doing nowand in the future. As far as we are concerned, in France, we have a lot of work to do, ifwe want the application of the laws concerning the quality of water to be ensured. Forinstance, one of our goals right now is to achieve the good ecological state of water in2015 yet important contradictions still exist between the targets of European regulationsand existing agriculture practices.If you have any question, I’ll try to answer them if I can, with the eye of a simplecitizen open to the world and full of determination, coming from the Pays du Cotentin.Conclusion Marie Kirchner:Ladies and gentlemen, now it’s up to us to transform each opportunity in a win-winsituation in our territories, taking into account the civil society, industry and the interestof future generations.Your future actions, like ours, whatever they are, will impact our planet. Becausewe understand both the interests and risks, we have to become actors of the strategy ofdevelopment of our territory.At the beginning, Anne-Marie Duchemin and I had a different point of viewconcerning nuclear activities. Now, we share the same interests concerning our territoryfor present and future citizens.I’d like to thank you so much for your kind invitation to share our ideas.Now, if there are any questions, we’ll attempt to answer them to the best of ourability.39

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYDevelopments at RosEnergoAtom and Its Public ImageAshot NasibovDirector, Public Relations Center, RosEnergoAtomAt present, RosEnergoAtom is the operator of 10 nuclear power plants (NPPs)in Russia (31 power units, over 23 GW of installed capacity). The company producesroughly 16% of the country’s electricity, and about 30% of electricity in Western Russia(40% in Russia’s Northwest).The events that took place in the late 1980s brought nuclear energy development inRussia to a halt. Right up until 2007, no new construction projects were started, and onlypower units whose construction was started in Soviet times were put into operation.The following events took place during 1998–2005:• Construction was completed & operations were launched at Volgodon NPP-1 and Kalinin NPP-3;• A modernization and service life extension program was initiated at:Novovoronezh NPP-3 and NPP-4, Kola NPP-1 and NPP-2, Leningrad NPP-1 and NPP-2, Kursk NPP-1 and NPP-2, and Bilibin NPPs 1-4;• Construction of radioactive waste (radwaste) treatment facilities began;• Investments increased from RUB 3 billion in promissory notes in 1998 toRUB 24 billion in 2005.The following events took place after 2005:• The Russian government adopted the Federal Target Program (FTP) for theDevelopment of Nuclear Industrial Energy in Russia (2007–2010 with anoutlook to 2015);• Development of the NPP-2006 project began;• Construction resumed at the Beloyarsk NPP facilities (BN-800), and work isunderway to complete construction at Volgodon NPP-2 and Kalinin NPP-4;• New premises were set up at Novovoronezh NPP-2 and Leningrad NPP-2;• Engineering companies were created;• A capacity expansion program was launched at operational NPPs;• Construction of the first floating NPP was started;• Investments in 2006–2008 nearly doubled each year: RUB 35 billion in2006, RUB 60 billion in 2007, and RUB 120 billion in 2008.Plans are in place to launch new power units starting in 2009:• One per year until 2012;• Two per year during 2012–2014;• At least 3 in 2015 (4 under the supplementary program);• In 2009–2020, 32 GW will be phased in, while 3.7 GW will be phased out;• By 2020, Russia’s installed NPP capacity will amount to less than 51 GW40

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY(or less than 59 GW under the supplementary program; currently it is lessthan 23 GW).The following expenses are envisaged in the 2008 budget:• Safe power unit operations: RUB 5 billion;• Extending operations at first and second generation units: RUB 17 billion;• Handling spent nuclear fuel and radwaste: RUB 13 billion;• New constructions: up to RUB 80 billion.The nuclear energy Federal Target Program (FTP) presumes expenses of RUB 1.5trillion between now and 2015. One condition that dictates the need to develop nuclearenergy in Russia is the increase in energy consumption, which amounted to 3.3% in2006 and 3.2% in 2007 (without accounting for seasonal factors). Energy consumptionincreased 5.5% in January – March 2008.The structure of energy consumption is also changing primarily due to growthin the commercial and residential sectors, in combination with maintained growth inthe industrial sector. For example, Dagestan is currently the leader in terms of relativegrowth: the lack of major industry has resulted in the rapid development of residentialconstruction. Another example is the Moskva Hotel across from the Kremlin. The oldhotel was hooked up to a 2 MW power source. Now that the hotel has been reconstructed,it requires 40 MW of power.Since July 1, 2008, after the restructuring process at RAO UES of Russia,RosEnergoAtom became the largest power company in Russia. There is growinginterest in the company and its role in business processes. The media are increasinglyless interested in the safety or radioactive levels of an NPP, and more interested in itsdevelopment, expenses and profits. Over the past year and a half, the public ceased tosee the company as a component of RAO UES of Russia.RosEnergoAtom is a socially responsible company. In 2007, the taxes owed by theSmolensk NPP to local budgets at various levels amounted to 28% of the budget of theentire Smolensk Region, and those of the Bilibin NPP represented 23% of the ChukotkaAutonomous Region’s budget.Over the course of 2007, average worker salaries at the company increased byapproximately 40%. For example, monthly wages at the Volgodon NPP increased 56%and reached over RUB 30,000.41

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYInnovative Nuclear Reactor ProjectsVyacheslav KuznetsovKurchatov Institute Russian Science CenterYuriy CherepninDirector of Research and Development, Dollezhal Researchand Design Institute for Power EngineeringAccording to published global development scenarios, during 2000–2050, globalconsumption of energy will increase by an average of 2.5 times, while demand forelectricity will rise by an average of 4.7 times (1, 2). At present, there are no universalmeans of resolving our energy problems. However, we do have a number of realisticopportunities to meet the energy needs for the sustainable development of mankind overthe next several decades:• Increasing production efficiency and using electricity based on traditionalfossil fuel resources;• Expanding the fields in which renewable energy sources can be applied, suchas: wind, solar energy, geothermal energy, and biomass;• Catching carbon dioxide emissions at power plants operating on fossil fuels(coal, in particular); and• Increasing the use of nuclear energy.Most development scenarios predict a major, steady increase in the use of nuclearenergy. During its relatively short history, spanning just over the last 50 years, theexpectations and predictions about the development and use of nuclear energy in differentregions around the world have dramatically changed from enthusiastic assessment tototal pessimism. Remarkably, the role of nuclear energy has undergone considerablereassessment, even in a number of countries where it was first used (3).The nuclear energy crisis began much earlier than the Chernobyl disaster. Forexample, in the United States in the late 1970s, there was virtually zero demand forNPPs. The most obvious reason was the Three Mile Island accident, which made badcircumstances even worse. This was the world’s first serious accident at a nuclear powerplant. Its psychological effect on those living near the NPP, and eventually the whole ofthe Western world, was enormous. The blow was felt by the plant itself and the reputationof nuclear energy in general was tarnished. However, on a global scale, the percentageof electricity generated at NPPs continued to rise, although the growth of the nuclearpower sector did begin to slow down. In 1981, the share of nuclear energy in electricitygeneration reached 9.1%. By 1987, that number grew to 16.2%. Later, the percentage ofnuclear energy generation stabilized, as the growth rate fell to equal the global growthrate of electricity generation. Over the past 16 years, the rise in electricity generation atNPPs has kept pace with growth in electricity production as a whole, and, as a result, bythe beginning of the 21st century, global nuclear electricity generation came to a stop at16% of global electricity generation (see Figure 1). According to data from the IAEA, 31countries around the world operated 442 nuclear reactors with a total generating capacityof 370 GW(e) in 2007.42

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 1. The percentage of different energy resources in global electricity generation(Nuclear Technology Review, IAEA, 2007).The United States, France and Japan are three countries accounting for nearly halfof the total number of nuclear reactors worldwide and 57% of all nuclear electricityproduction. The nuclear energy sector is most developed in the United States (103reactors), France (59), Russia (31), and Great Britain (23). Sixteen countries receiveat least 20% of their consumed electricity from NPPs. In a number of countries, suchas Bulgaria, Hungary, South Korea, Switzerland, Slovenia and Ukraine, nuclear energyprovides for over one-third of energy needs. The NPPs in Japan, Germany and Finlandsatisfy approximately 25% of electricity needs. In general, the countries of the EuropeanUnion (EU) currently have a cumulative 152 reactors producing 31% of all electricityin the EU (see Figure 2).Figure 2. The percentage of various energy resources in electricity generation in the EU.43

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe IAEA predicts that by 2020, the world will have an additional 60 reactors andNPP-generated electricity will increase by 65%. In 2007, 28 new reactors were built. Inaddition, 62 reactors are currently waiting for construction permits, while another 162are in the design stage. The NPP fleets in Japan and France are shown in Figures 3 and4.Figure 3. Nuclear power plants in Japan.Figure 4. A look at nuclear power in France.44

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNearly all of the world’s nuclear power plants outside of Russia are comprised ofwater-cooled thermal reactors. These are second generation PWR, BWR, and CANDUreactors, including their modified variants. Since the mid-1980s, the construction ofNPPs was suspended in the United States and in Western European countries for various,primarily economic reasons. During this period, the construction of nuclear reactors wasstopped on the territory of the former USSR, where the growing economic and politicalproblems did not permit the continuation of the large-scale energy program. Accidentsat the Three Mile Island (USA) and Chernobyl (USSR) contributed to the slowdown inthe development of global nuclear energy.Moderate growth in nuclear generation over these years was observed in Japan, theRepublic of Korea and several developing countries. The most developed countries interms of nuclear energy of North America and Europe have contributed almost nothing torecent growth. Countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) experienceda systemic decline in development as a result of the economic crisis and the fall of USSR,which became the main reason for suspending nuclear energy development there. Globalnuclear generation trends by region are shown in Figure 5.Figure 5. NPP capacity growth trends by region(including increased output of operating reactors).After a continued period of stagnation, the early 21st century is marked by theemergence of steady, positive trends in global nuclear energy development (see Figure6). Meeting increased energy demand will inevitably require the use of more accessibleopportunities for energy generation, including nuclear energy, which has huge potentialand can help meet future energy demands without increasing carbon dioxide emissionsand other pollutants (see Figure 7).A reevaluation of the role of nuclear energy in global energy generation has takenplace over the past few years. In many countries, including Russia, the energy deficithas become a reality much more quickly than was expected. Countries where nuclear45

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYenergy is well developed have kept abreast of modernizing reactors (second generation)and the construction, in this period of transition, of third-generation post-ChernobylNPP designs. These reactors (EPR, AP-1000 and ABWR) meet the appropriate safetyand environmental requirements and standards and resolve today’s energy problems.However, they do not fully meet the requirements that have been set out, first and foremostin terms of the cost efficiency, fuel supply, and protection against nuclear proliferation.They must be replaced with new reactors and nuclear fuel cycle technologies (fourthgeneration),which will facilitate a gradual transition to competitive and safe energygeneration with an unlimited resource base running on a self-generated supply of fissileisotopes (see Figure 9).Figure 6. Installed capacity of the world’s nuclear reactors over time (MWe).Figure 7. Relative energy potential of Russia’s natural resources.46

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYA government strategy for the long-term development of nuclear energy (Russia’sNuclear Energy Development Strategy in the First Half of the 21st Century) wasfirst developed in Russia (see Figure 10). At present, a number of countries havealso developed long-term national nuclear energy development programs. China, forexample, is planning the construction of new NPPs that will have a combined capacityof nearly 40 GW by 2020. China is laying in a diversification policy in the nuclearfield, which is why it plans to build reactors based on Russian, French, American andCanadian designs, in addition to own Chinese reactors. Japan has developed a baselinescenario for developing nuclear capacities up until 2150.Figure 8. A comparison of Generation II reactors with simpler Generation III reactors.Figure 9. A fast reactor using the U-Pu fuel cycle.47

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYBy the start of the 21st century, it had become clear that an option for developingglobal nuclear energy might become a reality only if it is more cost-effective, if safetyis increased, if radwaste is more efficiently dealt with, and if the risk of proliferationof nuclear weapons is reduced. Another important factor is that public policy ought tofocus on generating energy that does not result in the formation of carbon dioxide (seeFigure 11).International nuclear energy projects under the International Project on InnovativeNuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and Generation IV Initiative have analyzedmeasures that are crucial for retaining nuclear energy as a serious alternative to reducinggreenhouse gas emissions while meeting the growing demand for electricity. As a result,experts have come to the conclusion that, in order to achieve the successful, large-scaletransition to nuclear energy, there are four key issues that must first be resolved:Figure 10. The Federal Target Program roadmapfor developing the nuclear energy industry (RAEPK).48Figure 11. Global nuclear energy in 2007.

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY1. Cost. On the free market, the cost of energy generated at new nuclear powerplants will not be competitive with the cost of energy produced from coal and natural gas.However, this difference may be reduce d by rationally lowering capital and operationalexpenses, technical maintenance services, and by reducing the construction period. Thetrade-off with regard to carbon emissions, for example, if the relevant decision is takenby the government, could give nuclear energy certain cost advantages.2. Safety. The lessons learned from the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobylhave forced us to take additional measures to increase NPP safety around the world inorder to resolve the problem with the most probable (foreseen) and serious (unforeseen)accidents. Modern reactor design can help minimize the risk of major accidents. Save forreactor operations, we know little about the safety of the fuel cycle as a whole.3. Waste. The deep geological placement of waste is technically possible, althoughit needs to be refined and demonstrated in practice. There is no convincing evidencethat modern closed fuel cycles, including treatment of spent fuel and long-term wastemanagement, will have any advantages capable of outweighing short-term risks andexpenses.4. Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Today’s international guarantee-basednon-proliferation regime is not compatible with resolving the security issues associatedwith the expansion of nuclear energy as envisaged in global development scenarios.The treatment of irradiated fuel that is used today in Europe, Japan and Russia, whichinvolves extracting and treating plutonium, carries the risk of illegal proliferation ofnuclear weapons.The critical factor for the future development of nuclear energy is the fuel cycleselected, including the type of fuel that is used, the types of reactors used to “burn” thefuel, and the methods used to bury spent fuel. The choice of fuel cycle affects all fourof the key issues associated with nuclear energy: cost, safety, the risk of nuclear weaponproliferation, and waste burial. At the same time, there are three potential representativeoptions for fuel cycles:1. Traditional thermal reactors use an open fuel cycle, in which the spent fuel isimmediately sent for burial.2. There are also thermal reactors that use a closed fuel cycle, which means that thewaste is separated from unusable fissile materials and is reprocessed into reactor fuel.This includes the fuel cycle that is currently used in a number of countries, in whichplutonium is separated from the spent fuel and is then used to prepare a mixed uraniumplutoniumoxide fuel (MOX fuel) that is then reprocessed into reactor fuel for one-timeuse.3. Another option involves fast neutron reactors using a closed fuel cycle,which means the use of thermal reactors with the widely used open fuel cycle and acorresponding number of fast reactors that destroy actinides which are separated fromthe spent thermal reactor fuel. Fast reactors and installations for fuel processing andfabrication must be situated in close proximity to one another in the secure nuclearenergy fleets of industrially-developed countries.Nuclear energy could become a sustainable source of global energy for manydecades, if only it will be possible to resolve the problems we face today. Compared toother energy technologies, nuclear energy possesses important properties which allow49

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYit to take on a major part of growing energy needs, stabilizing or even reducing demandfor fossil fuels:• Nuclear fuel is potentially inexhaustible and offers millions of times moreconcentrated energy, which will drastically reduce volume and costs intransporting raw materials;• Waste from nuclear energy is produced in relatively low volumes and can besecurely contained, while more hazardous types of waste could be burned innuclear reactors.Global demand for electricity over the next 50–100 years can be satisfied with thehelp of fourth-generation reactors, which will not have the flaws of their predecessorsand will run on an inexhaustible supply of self-generated raw material (4). While thereare no such reactor systems in place today, the work has only just begun and is underwayas part of the international projects under Generation IV and INPRO, where Russia isan active participant. Today, concepts for six reactors have been selected; these reactorswill be capable of meeting the set requirements. One or two reactor systems of thesesix will be recommended for further development and expansion. It is expected thatthis selection will be made after research has been completed, no earlier than 2025 (seeTable 1).Table 1. A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy System(Source: US DOE, 2002).VHTR (Very HighTemperatureReactor)SCWR (SuperCritical WaterReactor)GFR (Gas-cooledFast Reactor)LFR (Lead-Cooled FastReactor)SFR (Sodium-Cooled FastReactor)MSR (Molten-SaltReactor)Range ofNeutronsFuel Cycle Capacity Usesthermal open averagethermal,fastfastfastfastopen,closedclosedclosedclosedlargeaverage –largesmall –largeaverage –largethermal closed largeGenerating electricity,hydrogen, industrial-useheatGenerating electricityGenerating electricityand hydrogen, burninglong-lived radioactiveisotopes (actinides)Generating electricityand hydrogen, burninglong-lived radioactiveisotopes (actinides)Generating electricity,burning long-livedradioactive isotopes(actinides)Generating electricity,burning long-livedradioactive isotopes(actinides)50

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe outlook for nuclear energy development is closely tied today to nucleartechnology based on fast reactors and a closed fuel cycle. The latter means reprocessingspent NPP fuel and using the resulting plutonium. This will help increase the energypotential of nuclear energy fuel resources by 100 times. It is important to note that theunique physical properties of fast reactors also facilitate the combustion of high-levelradioactive waste produced by nuclear energy generation, which complicates their burial.That is why fast reactors have been selected for Russia’s Nuclear Energy DevelopmentStrategy in the first half of the 21st century and as a promising energy technology underthe Generation IV international programs adopted by leading nuclear countries.As a result, the following stages of nuclear technological development can beexpected in the 21st century:• Short-term (10–20 years): The evolutionary development of reactors and fuelcycle technologies (LBR, water-based treatment methods), development andtest-regime use of improved and innovative reactor technologies and fuelcycle technologies (BN, BTGR, small reactors, dry treatment methods).• Mid-term (30–40 years): Active growth of nuclear energy, expansion of the totalscale by 4–5 times, demonstrations and mastering innovative technologies.• Long-term (50–100 years): The large-scale expansion of innovative fastreactor technologies and natural, safe fuel cycle technologies, the expansionof fuel production, closed U-Pu and Th-U cycles, the use of useful isotopesand combustion of hazardous isotopes, the long-term deep geological burialof radwaste, high-temperature reactors, small reactors, the production ofhydrogen and water desalination.References1. International Atomic Energy Agency, Guidance for the Evaluation ofInnovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles. IAEA-TECDOC-1362. June 2003.2. International Atomic Energy Agency, Methodology for the Assessment ofInnovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, Report of Phase 1B (First Part) of theInternational Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), IAEA-TECDOC-1434. Vienna: IAEA, 2004.3. The Future of Nuclear Power. An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, 2003.4. A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy System. DOEUSA. 2002.51

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe Krasnoyarsk-26, as well as graduates of Tomsk Polytechnic Institute, MoscowEngineering and Physics Institute, Moscow Power Engineering Institute, and St.Petersburg State Polytechnic University, among others.The key to attracting qualified personnel to work on problems of nationalsignificance at a potentially dangerous facility is to create elite conditions in smallnuclear towns and to train the employees to develop an internal need for safe workingconditions by unfailingly following regulatory and technical documentation. This createdthe conditions for the establishment of a selection process that attracted the top mindsfrom around the nation who are prepared to work selflessly and produce high-qualityresults within short timeframes.Today, the residents of Sosnovy Bor, a city of nuclear energy specialists, areready to engage in the construction of Leningrad NPP-2 in cooperation with externalspecialists. They have undertaken to deliver high quality results on schedule by relyingon the traditions of the Ministry of Nuclear Engineering and on Russian state support inaddressing the following issues:1. Reinstitute the “exempt” status from mandatory military service for graduatesof top schools and other institutions of higher education that are hired througha selection process by the management of the NPP now under construction andprovide new hires with housing in residence halls.2. Ensure a competitive wage for personnel and account for quarterly increasesin the cost of the consumer basket.3. Reinstate the allocation of funds for social spending equal to 10–20% ofconstruction costs, as was previously mandated by law.4. Out of safety considerations, reestablish the 30 km exclusion zone on theFinnish side of the border (the “fear tax” as it was once known).I would like to conclude by stating that the ultimate goal of all stakeholders andpublic interest groups is the same: everyone wants to ensure the well-being of our people.This can be achieved through the growth of industry and agricultural output, which inturn depends on the accelerated development of the nuclear energy sector. That is wherethe future lies. Only by uniting the efforts of all of the participants of the Leningrad NPP-2 project and the community leaders of Sosnovy Bor will we succeed in addressing allthe “sore spots” that have been identified by local residents.54

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYConditions for Building a New Nuclear Power Plantin the Tomsk OblastAlexei ToropovExecutive Director, Green Cross Russia Tomsk AffiliateRosAtom and the management of the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) arediscussing the possibility of building a two-unit Seversk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)with two PWR-100 reactors (see Figure 1) on the Seversk restricted access site. Materialspromoting the construction of the NPP might lead an uninformed citizen to conclude thatthe construction of the NPP is the main end goal of both the management of SKhK andthe local authorities.Figure 1. Seversk restricted access zone and Tomsk.55

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMain planned stages:2008: Submission of Declaration of Intention;2008–2009: Draft proposal, project elaboration, expert evaluation, and approvalof feasibility study documents;2009–2010: Project elaboration, licensing;2010: Preparation of the site;2011–2017: Main period of construction work;2015: Starting of operations of first power unit.The primary stated reason for building the Seversk NPP is that energy consumptionin the Tomsk Oblast will have tripled by 2020, and there is a large number of highlyqualified personnel for the NPP in the area combined with the need to create jobs forthe personnel of the plutonium ADE-4 and ADE-5 production reactors being shut downin 2008.The employment situation for nuclear facility personnel in the Tomsk Oblast can bedescribed through the following points:• The average age of those working at ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors is preretirement;• If funding is allocated to dismantle ADE-4 and ADE-5, this will not entailadditional lay offs at SKhK;• One of the leading institutions for training nuclear power engineers, TomskPolytechnic University (TPU), is having difficulty recruiting qualifiedcandidates in the nuclear field. The quality of the applicant pool has degradedeach year;• The demand for TPU graduates from Russian NPPs is several times thenumber of available graduates;• Will we have to invite Iranian engineers to fill in the gap?Building the NPP that we are discussing today in the Tomsk Oblast is not an endin itself. Besides the direct economic effect in the form of state investments in the localeconomy and moving away from importing electricity from other regions, the SeverskNPP construction project will need to meet the long-term goals for the sustainabledevelopment of the Tomsk Oblast and Russia as a whole.Consequently, I believe that we can only consider building the Seversk NPP if thefollowing main conditions are met:1. An alternate railway that would circumvent the city of Tomsk must be builtand put into operation for transporting hazardous chemical and radioactive materials.2. The design plan must include a process for decommissioning the nuclearpower plant and list the sources for financing these costly operations, which, in theexperience of certain countries in the West, account for close to half of the requiredcapital investments.3. All residents in the 30-kilometer zone around the NPP must be insured againstpotential harm to their health or loss of property in the event of a radiation accident atthe NPP. The insurance policy must provide non-claims-based payments and adequatelycompensate all health or material losses.4. The residents of Tomsk and Seversk, as well as the residents of other56

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcommunities in the Tomsk area within 30 km of the NPP, must be supplied withmodern protective equipment in the event of radioactive contamination resulting froman accident at the NPP (Figure 2). Israel’s system for providing the population withindividual protective equipment can be used as an example.5. The decision to build the NPP can be made only with the condition that theopinions of the residents of Tomsk, Seversk, and those residing in the Tomsk regionwithin 30 km of SKhK, are directly taken into consideration.Nuclear energy that can be embraced by environmentalists includes the followingpoints:1. An approach that solves the problem of how to handle spent nuclear fuel.Currently, all of the ways to solve this problem can be divided into “sci-fi inspired” andthose that simply shift the responsibility off onto the shoulders of future generations. Theclosed fuel cycle does not solve the problem, it aggravates it.Figure 2. Modern individual protection equipment2. An approach that excludes the possibility of an accident at the reactor withconsequent radioactive contamination of the surrounding area at the level of a globalcatastrophe.57

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYA Local’s Perspective on Peaceful Nuclear Energy: A Heavy HandLina ZernovaPublic Advisory Council, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Region,and Chairman of the Leningrad Oblast Green RussiaFraction, Yabloko Russian United Democratic PartyDialogue organizers and participants—thank you for giving me this opportunity tospeak at this important event! I live in Sosnovy Bor and, today, I will be speaking onbehalf of its residents.As you know, our town is the site where facilities are being built to replace powergenerating capacities, including the first section of the future Leningrad NPP-2. Localresidents were looking forward to this event, but, lately, they have begun to questionwhat the town may win or lose.First of all, we will lose our recreation areas. The woods where we used to pickmushrooms and berries will be replaced by reactor facilities. A decision had been made,not subject to discussion, that two new reactors will be built. Considering that four150-meter cooling stacks will also be built next to them, each of which will have its ownhealth protection zone with a radius of 1 km, it is evident that over 10 square kilometersof woodlands will be forever lost.The burden on the environment will also drastically increase. The operation ofthe Leningrad NPP, according to an environmental impact assessment of the LeningradNPP-2, has already disrupted the ecological balance of Kopor Bay. The planned coolingstacks will add to this by “bombarding” the atmosphere, “spitting out” 200,000 m3of steam and water every day. Since Kopor Bay is considered to be one of the mostpolluted areas along the gulf according to data collected by SevMorGeo, the chemicaland organic impurities contained in the water will thus be diffused into the atmosphere.We should also remember the issue of radioactive aerosol fallout caused by the emissionplumes from the cooling stacks as described in the aforementioned assessment. Ashorrifying as it may be, Sosnovy Bor finds itself within the fallout zone along with thevegetable gardens of local residents.The problem is further aggravated by an explosion of economic activity never seenbefore that has gripped the St. Petersburg region with the construction of ports along itsshores, railroads, highways, and deep-sea manganese mining. The planned constructionof Severny Potok, a natural gas pipeline that would run along the sea floor, is underway,along with the construction of new settlements and towns, and aluminum and metalprocessing plants. Petroleum shipments have been increasing in number. By 2010, up to200 million tons of hydrocarbons will be transported through St. Petersburg each year,turning the Bay of Finland into a veritable Suez Canal.The non-governmental organization Zelyony Mir estimates that over EUR 20 billionwill be invested in the region between the Estonia border and St. Petersburg, a short150 km stretch, averaging EUR 100,000 per linear meter of shoreline! All investmentpropositions will lead at breaking down the traditional way of life of the local population58

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYand destroying pockets of wildlife. All the while, the local government of the LeningradOblast has yet to approve the General Development Plan for the South Shore of theBay of Finland. Anyone can get their own piece of the so-called ‘Window on Europe.’The scenic shores of the Bay of Finland today, may become an odious industrial zonetomorrow.By qualifying the new NPPs as replacement plants, the true nature of the project isobscured. We still do not know when the reactors currently operating at the LeningradNPP will be decommissioned. Two of them have already been given a new lease on life,with the first of the reactors being scheduled for decommissioning ten years from now.However, Valery Lebedev, the Director of the Leningrad NPP, stated at a press conferencethat the RBMK-type reactors could continue to operate for as long as necessary.Resources are also lacking. Decommissioning a reactor is an expensive undertakingthat costs as much as EUR 1.5 billion (such was the case of the Ignalina NPP).Furthermore, there is still no funding for the decommissioning of old NPPs, since nocorresponding law has been passed.So it turns out that Sosnovy Bor has been given the role of being Russia’s nuclearheavyweight! No other Russian city can claim to have six giant reactors operating concurrently.Here we could add LenSpetsKombinat Radon, the regional burial facility forlow-level waste and medium-level waste, where Ekomet-S will bring radioactive metalfrom around the country for treatment in Sosnovy Bor. The town is also home to the reactorsof the Aleksandrov Research Institute and storage facilities holding spent nuclearfuel and solid and liquid radioactive waste from the Leningrad NPP itself. Meanwhile,RosAtom is making plans to build not two, but six new reactors!Would it be possible for the promoters of nuclear power to consider rewarding thelocal population with social projects?In 2000, taxes from the Leningrad NPP contributed 68% of Sosnovy Bor municipalbudget. By 2008 this percentage shrank to 13%. In 2006, the local budget stoppedreceiving property taxes from the Leningrad NPP and by 2007 it was deprived of collectingthe land tax from the NPP. Today, the municipal purse received just one third ofthe taxes from individuals at the Leningrad NPP.The depletion of the city budget is leading to the impoverishment of the city. Itcan no longer build pools, stadiums, or sports complexes. The city cannot afford to repairhousing, roads, assure waste management, clean drinking water for its residents, ormaintain parks, natural reserves, or beaches. The city is now witnessing housing developmentthat is increasing urban density and undoing the achievements of the Soviet-eraNuclear Power Ministry, which had built a city that was green and pleasant to inhabit.It is clear that tax legislation was not changed by RosAtom. But we are also awarethat there are Deputies in the State Duma representing the interests of the nuclear industryand that the legislation was indeed changed with active participation of its lobby.This is how the 30 km exclusion zone law was repealed, according to which the populationin the zone benefited from a 50% discount off the cost of electricity. In recent years,our local residents have watched any and all economic incentives for living next to thenuclear power plant get stripped away.RosAtom likes to reference its glorious history and the names of its great scientistdreamerswho stood at the origins of the Soviet nuclear complex. Today’s leadership inthe nuclear industry would like to think of themselves as similar to these heroic brightminds. In actuality, there is one very significant difference between today’s bureaucratsand their predecessors.59

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYWhen building Sosnovy Bor, the Nuclear Power Ministry spent up to one quarter ofthe annual program budget on social and cultural projects. One of the principle concernsof the agency was caring for their people. Secondly, the Leningrad NPP-1 was built tosupply power to the country. These “replacement” NPPs are going to be built for the purposeof selling surplus power abroad. We know that, as recently as the 1990s, RosAtomstarted working on the project to send an undersea cable along the floor of the Bay ofFinland to Scandinavia. This is why a half a dozen reactors are being built on our shoreand why the working life of four reactors is being extended.Of course, the “natives” will be left with the nuclear and radioactive wastes, aeutrophicated bay, saturated with steam and water emissions of the cooling stacks, anair filled with radioactive aerosols, and a shoestring city budget. The nuclear industry,on the other hand, will get pure profit. So it would be wise to think a little harder beforedrawing historical analogies.In conclusion, a few words about socially-responsible business. The construction ofthe Leningrad NPP-2 started with a scandal. The soil removed from the site of the futurereactor was initially dumped into the Kovashi fish ponds, just a few kilometers awayfrom Sosnovy Bor. The local government of the Lomonosov Rayon was outraged at thedestruction of agricultural facilities. The first pool was completely filled in before theOblast Governor, Valery Serdiukov, put an end to this lawlessness. Now the dump trucksare taking the soil to the Kingiseppsky Rayon — legally, we’d like to think.And so, does the nuclear industry building these hazardous facilities have a moralright to make such gross infractions and pursue its goals at such breakneck speed? Whowill guarantee that the nuclear reactors themselves will be built under better conditions?Local residents have cause to be concerned for their future.In light of what has been said here, below are a number of recommendations:1. Conduct an in-depth environmental analysis of the future construction site,taking into consideration pre-existing anthropogenic factors, and determinethe extent to which the ecosystem of this particular part of the Bay of Finlandcan accommodate more development. It is important to understand whetherthe construction of RosAtom’s six new reactors is permissible here.2. Publish the timeline for decommissioning old reactors and thereby eliminatethe ambiguity of the term “replacement capacities.”3. Scrap the plans for building cooling stacks for the second reactor of LeningradNPP-2. Direct seawater cooling of the reactor will become possible once thefirst reactor of the Leningrad NPP-1 is taken out of operation.4. Introduce mandatory, state-guaranteed health, property, and life insurancecoverage in the event of an accident at one of the nuclear installations.5. Re-establish the legislative status quo ensuring beneficial tax conditions forcities tied to the nuclear industry.6. Provide local residents with social benefits such as a 50% discount off the costof electricity.7. Establish a working group with representatives from RosAtom and communityleaders from Sosnovy Bor, to be tasked with developing mutually acceptablesolutions (municipal authorities, as a result of Russia’s idiosyncrasies, arenot in a position to engage in an equal-player dialogue).60

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYQuestion and Answer SessionPaths for the Development of the Nuclear Energy Sector– Dialogue participant: What is the future of the South Urals NPP project?– Аshot Nasibov: The South Urals NPP project has been approved by the governmentas part of its plan to increase energy generating capacity. Discussions are still underwayregarding the exact location of the NPP.– Valery Menshchikov: Regarding competition for NPP construction and operation:recently RosAtom Director, Sergei Kiriyenko, said that construction costs abroad willgrow to USD 5 billion per reactor unit. What is your assessment of nuclear power’scompetitiveness?– Yuriy Cherepnin: Right now it is hard to say anything about the competitivenessof nuclear power on the free market. The industry is tightly linked to politics, with itstraditional spheres of influence. I don’t think that Russian technologies will be able toenter those markets, which have been traditionally taken up by major companies suchas Westinghouse Electric Company, General Electric and Areva. As for the parts of theworld where Russia’s nuclear technologies are being used, it is true, we know that theconstruction of reactors in China and Iran was not priced according to actual prices onthe NPP construction market. In Bulgaria, they announced that the bidding price will behigher. It is therefore normal to declare that there is always bargaining between the clientand the contractor. Prices have been going up everywhere, including in this industry. Idon’t think these two sectors will be in direct competition anytime soon.– Аshot Nasibov: I just have a quick additional comment to make. Russia has enteredthe NPP construction market in the EU, and the first project is the construction of theNPP in Bulgaria. Additionally, as a competitive environment evolves in the engineeringindustry (in Russia, most of the companies involved are monopolies in their markets),the price will go down. One example is the creation of a joint venture with Alstom tobuild low-speed power turbines. The venture, due to start operations in 2010, has alreadycaused Silovye Mashiny to lower prices on its turbines.– Andrey Ozharovskiy: You raised the issue of civil liability insurance to cover the riskof damage to human health and property near NPPs. I know that in the United States,this issue has not been resolved, which is part of the reason why nothing is being built.We all know that, in April 1993, there was a terrible accident at the Siberia ChemicalCombine. Was an assessment made? If this accident had happened when everyone hadbeen insured, what would have been the damage and how much of it would have beenpaid for by the insurance company?– Alexei Toropov: No assessment was made. We just know that the accident affectedan area with low population density and the accident was rated a 3 on the INES scale.However, if instead of being a south-westerly it had been a northerly wind blowing towardsTomsk, then the accident would have been a 5 or 6 on the INES scale, requiringthe city’s evacuation.– Аshot Nasibov: A quick comment: We already have insurance covering residents livingin close proximity to NPPs. During recent comprehensive safety training, which we61

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYconducted in September at the Leningrad NPP, an assessment was underway of the compensationthat would need to be paid to victims and information was posted for victimsand evacuees about where to obtain their compensation.And some information for Ms. Zernova: in the last year, the Leningrad NPP madepayments in the amount of 1,273,455,000 rubles into local municipal treasuries alone.You should be asking your deputies where the money went.– Dialogue participant: As a former Director of the Leningrad NPP, what can you sayabout its impact today? Or do we only have science and numbers to go on? Because,regardless of all the presentations we heard here, the pollution is enormous, especiallyat Kopor Bay and in Koporye and Nezhnovo, among other locations.– Anatoliy Eperin: The comments we heard about aversion to nuclear power installationswere more emotional than objective. I spoke about using seawater and the storagecapacity of Kopor Bay. Water is drawn from the bay and heated by 8–10 degrees Celsius.We heard that blue-green seaweed can absorb bacteria and pass on infections, etc. Butin fact, the sea depth there is about 5–6 meters, and storms tear the seaweed out and tossit ashore. We haven’t had a single case of illness to this day. The fact that storm runofffrom the city is drained into Kopor Bay without prior treatment is a shortcoming.In addition, there are blackwater and other treatment facilities that are also along theshore and have some impact on the environment. So we cannot blame the pollution onheating the water since there is no data or facts to support that claim. I wouldn’t objectif environmental scientists started monitoring the sea water. Meanwhile, speaking ofmonitoring, we have people fishing along the cooling water canal. We have the cages setup. We were farming trout and carp there and using that fish for food. Doesn’t that saysomething about the quality?As for construction, any urban development or construction of new facilities meansthat trees will be cut down. Can’t the residents of Sosnovy Bor understand that theirtown was built in the middle of a forest to begin with? The forest was cut down, but notall of it; efforts were made to preserve it and those efforts were even recognized by anational award.About what lies ahead: I was in favor of the program that was approved by theinternational tender committee. It involved bringing in all leading countries in the worldwith an understanding of the topic at hand. Were there recommendations? Yes. They includeda recommendation to build graphite-moderated reactors with natural circulationas the replacement energy generation capacity. These are exceptionally reliable and safenuclear reactors. Instead of replacing parts and reactor units, the only components thatwould need to be replaced would be the fuel assemblies. Moreover, these reactors supporton-load refueling. It is a unique facility that operates splendidly for over 30 years.The most potentially dangerous projects were not associated with accidents resultingfrom nominal overload. And still, these reactors could have operated efficiently andcontinuously for four years at installed capacity. However, due to external pressure, itwas decided to use the tried and true PWR-1000 reactor model.As for the effect of the cooling stacks, environmental scientists claim that they donot have a significant effect, and there are studies that prove this. This will be verifiedafter the reactor is put into operation. Right now, they have no data to support their position,especially given that such cooling stacks have already been built and appear to beworking well at other NPPs. We believe that the future is in fast neutron reactors. These62

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcould be built on the stretch between Ust-Luga and the Leningrad NPP, where the waterdepth is sufficient. That would make it so that water could be drawn from greater depthsfor cooling and conditioning the turbines, and heated by 8–10 degrees Celsius. If thereis an oil spill in Ust-Luga, which is more dangerous, then the NPP would not suffer asa result, because it will be using water from deeper down and it would still maintain itsvacuum. I believe that Sosnovy Bor is a nuclear power city and should continue buildingnuclear power plants because electricity shortages are already being felt, particularly inthe wintertime.– Aleksandr Nikitin: You showed a table with next-generation reactors and said thatwater-cooled and water-moderated reactors are not among them. In that case, whatsense is there in building 40 reactors that are not next-generation reactors that couldoperate for 60–70 years at a price of USD 3–5 billion per reactor? Where is the logic?– Yuriy Cherepnin: The reactors of tomorrow are fourth generation reactors, a technologythat is being actively developed right now around the world and in Russia, butwhich will not become available before 2030. Those will be pilot projects that will needto demonstrate that they are qualitatively different from the old generation. But theywill only become widely available around 2050. Meanwhile, improved third-generationreactors that fully meet all safety standards are the recommended solution. The secondgenerationreactors were built without these standards. The standards were developedlater, starting in the mid-1970s, while the NPP designs date back to the 1960s. Nowthose reactors are being upgraded with great difficulty to make them comply with thesestandards. Third-generation reactors were designed after Chernobyl, and with such greatconcern for safety that they became too expensive, which is why they are not being built.There are already 3+-generation reactors that use new technologies and are less energyhungry.This is why we can really start to talk about the cost-efficiency of nuclear power.We’ll need another 30 years to complete research and testing for fourth-generation reactors.Right now, there are six directions, of which one or two will be retained, but firstthis would need to be done, the options compared, and significant funds will need to beinvested before the choice of technology is substantiated.This is a field that is very much inertia-driven and we cannot expect quick transformationsor miracles from any of the technologies.63

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Untapped Potential of Alternative Energy in RussiaAleksandr ChumakovCorresponding Member, Russian Academy of NaturalSciences; and Vice President, Green Cross RussiaThe way energy production in Russia is currently distributed is irrational. Out of1 TW of produced electricity, over 65% comes from power plants, of which 18% arehydroelectric plants and approximately 16% are nuclear power plants (NPPs), with allsources of alternative energy accounting for only about 1%. In light of this imbalance,Russia’s Energy Strategy also requires serious rethinking, as it is still focused on theever-growing consumption of non-renewable energy sources and does not presupposethe development of an alternative energy industry using renewable energy sources.Figure1. Energy needs and available capacity.Today, 70% of Russia’s land territory, with a population of around 22 million people,is not covered by — and ultimately cannot be covered by — a centralized powersupply. Over half of Russia’s power grids experience some sort of power shortages,while a quarter of regional power grids experience power shortages for 50% or more ofthe time (Figure 2). The energy consumption of a rural resident in Russia is twice as lowas that of an urban one, which is directly correlated with the low output of the agriculturalsector and associated industries.Meanwhile, experts have predicted a drop in fossil fuel production levels by 2010in Russia, starting with natural gas. Assuming that standing export commitments arekept, this would necessarily lead to a significant reduction of fossil fuel supplied to thedomestic market and would threaten economic development and national energy security.Today, over 16 regions in Russia experience power supply shortages. In the coming64

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYyear or two, this crisis will spread to affect most of Russia. The only way to avert thecrisis is to introduce new generating capacities using forward-looking technologies, firstand foremost those using renewable energy sources (RESs).All renewable energy resources combined offer more than 5,000 times the world’scurrent energy consumption of 13 TW. It is important to note that these resources aresignificantly more accessible and more evenly distributed on the Earth’s surface, andtherefore throughout Russia itself, than coal, oil, gas, and uranium deposits (Figure 3).Figure 2. Russia: A forecast of regional power shortages, by region/territory (GW).Figure 3. Russia: The economic potential of renewable energy sources.65

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe performance potential of solar power in Russia is at least 2 TW and approximatelytwice Russia’s total energy consumption (Figure 4). Until recently, the developmentof solar power in Russia was not given due attention. Starting in 2008–2009,Solnechnaya Energetika, a Russian company, will begin production of the main componentsfor the manufacture of solar panels with a potential annual output of 30–40 MW.Investments between now and 2009 for this project will total $114 million.Technically accessible wind energy resources in Russia are estimated to have generationcapacities of 16 billion MW. Russia is among the wealthiest countries with respectto wind energy (see Figure 5). It has the world’s longest coastline, a plentitude offlat, treeless expanses, and large water areas surrounding inland seas and lakes, all ofwhich are ideal settings for wind farms. Currently, all of Russia’s wind turbines generatea mere 15 MW. A project is currently underway to create the Lomonosov NorthernHydro/Wind Electrical Power System with a total capacity of up to 10,000 MW, whichwill be sent to Europe and to Russia’s central regions.Figure 4. Annual distribution of sunlight on Russia’s territory.Figure 5. Average annual distribution of wind speed on Russia’s territory.66

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRussia’s geothermal energy resource potential equals approximately 1.5 billionTWh (Figure 6). Less than 0.2% of this potential could meet national energy needs forthe next 1,000 years. Accessible artesian thermal springs have been found in the Sayano-Baikal mountain range, Buryatia has about 400 thermal springs, while Yakutia, northernWestern Siberia, and Chukotka are home to 13 known high-temperature thermal springs.The most promising area is the string of volcanoes on the Kuril Islands and Kamchatka.Kamchatka’s geothermal resources exceed 500 MW. The cost of geothermal power generationis ten times lower than in traditional boiler plants. Three pilot geothermal powerplants are currently operating in Kamchatka: Pauzhetskaya, Verkhne-Mutnovskaya, andVerkhne-Mutnovskaya-1. In the coming years, a cascade system will be installed for thepower plants/stations with a capacity of up to 300 MW. The European Bank for Reconstructionand Development (EBRD) will contribute to project funding.Figure 6. Russia’s geothermal energy resources, by region/territory.Since the discovery of fire, biomass, which is solar energy converted to chemicalform, has been the most traditional energy resource. Total accessible reserves of biomassin Russia are equivalent to 300 billion kWh (Figure 7). Merely re-processing waste fromlivestock and plant cultivation could increase Russia’s total energy output by at least25%. Organic waste produced through the consumption of a standard consumer basketcan be reprocessed to produce biogas, thermal energy, or electrical power equivalentto at least 9,000 kWh per person (Figure 8). This energy would suffice for heating andlighting houses, heating water, and would partially meet the energy needs of food producers.When organic waste is processed into energy, the byproducts are high-yield organicfertilizers, which increase the productive capacity of soil by many times than mineralfertilizer, and without its deleterious effect.67

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 7. Russia: Distribution of biomass (t/ha).Figure 8. Energy-producing potential of waste products generated by the consumer basket(S=9,000 kWh/yr).At this time, vertically integrated companies are emerging among Russia’s majorfood producers. These companies bring together plant cultivation, livestock farms, processingfacilities, as well as facilities for processing bio-waste into electrical energy,heat, and organic fertilizer. In addition, these companies can create “electrical powerfarms” and installations for producing motor fuels such as bio-diesel and methanol.The creation of self-sufficient companies of this sort may bring about a substantialsocial, economic, and environmental gain for both rural and urban populations. Thebenefits, including larger farm incomes, market diversification, an improved ability to68

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcompete on the global market, a general boost to the local economies in rural areas, anda reduced environmental footprint, are important reasons for using biomass as a sourceof energy (Figure 9).Figure 9. Vertically integrated agricultural companies.69

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAlternative Energy in Russia: Meeting Energy Needs WhileDecreasing Threats to the EnvironmentIgor BabaninCoordinator, Project on Resource Efficienc, GreenpeaceRussia, Saint Petersburg OfficeIn order to avert catastrophic climate change, global temperatures must not rise bymore than 2°С. We can only reach this goal, if the growth of greenhouse emissions stopsby 2015–2020, and if emissions are cut by 50% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels (seeFigure 1).Figure 1. Pattern of carbon dioxide emissions in countries with transition economies by sector,according to the energy revolution scenario(Efficiency = reduced emissions as compared to baseline scenario).The attainability of this goal (without the use of nuclear energy and technologiesfor the burial of carbon dioxide) was presented in the join report by Greenpeace and theEuropean Renewable Energy Council (EREC) titled “The Energy Revolution.” At itsbasis, it is a comparison of the suggested Energy Revolution scenario to the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency’s scenario taken from a 2004 report on the future developmentof the world energy sector (see Figure 2).According to the scenario, carbon dioxide emissions in countries with transitionaleconomies will decrease by four times by 2050.1The report was contracted to the German Aerospace Center (DLR), and was written in 2006. Source: http://www.energyblueprint.info.70

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 2. Use of primary energy under the Energy Revolution scenario (Energy Efficiency =reduction of energy use as compared to baseline scenario).Russia is the eighth most populous country in the world, and it is the third biggestemitter of greenhouse gases. Moreover, official strategies and forecasts suggest that energyconsumption and greenhouse emissions will continue to grow.According to Russia’s Energy Strategy, primary energy source use will increase by150% by 2030 (see Figure 3).Figure 3. Primary energy source use in million tons of fuel equivalent (“favorable” scenario)under Russia’s energy strategy through 2030(Gray — total primary energy fuel equivalent; Black — proportion of coal fuel).71

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThere is an alternative energy scenario for Russia, developed by NGO INFORSE(http://www.inforse.org/europe). The growth forecast for the main indicators of socioeconomicdevelopment is taken using official values or by extrapolating from currentdata.By 2050, the indicators will experience growth as follows (compared to year 2000):• Area of residential buildings — 191%;• Industry output — 842%;• Agricultural output — 457%;• Individual motor transport — 265%;• Storage of oil and gas: 52 and 167 times, respectively;Increase in energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of energy efficiencymeasures (zero option) will equal 350% by 2050. After 2020, Russia will becomea hydrocarbon importer (see Figure 4).Figure 4. Baseline scenario (business as usual): growth in energy use in theabsence of energy efficiency measures.The alternative scenario is based on the use of the following measures for improvingenergy efficiency:• Increased energy production efficiency by 50.1% by 2050 through the useof combined production (2000 — 20.1%) through the integration of steamand gas technologies;• Maximizing the share of joint production of heat and electrical power;• Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 37% by 2050 as compared to thebaseline scenario (see Figure 5);72

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 5. Implementation of energy production efficiency measures.• Lowering energy consumption for heating buildings from 570 to 165 kWh/m 2 (modern technologies could even completely remove the need for heating— “passive home”);• Creation of the factor four in the industrial and transportation sectors ;• Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 as compared to thezero option scenario (see Figure 6);Figure 6. Addition of energy use efficiency measures: energy-efficient buildings, factor four in theindustrial sector, factor two in agriculture, etc.2Weizsäcker, E., Lovins, A., Lovins, H. Factor Four. Doubling Wealth, Halving Resource Use. New Report tothe Club of Rome. Moscow, Academia, 2000, 400, or online: www.factor4narod.ru.73

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• Leveraging 20% to 100% of the available performance potential of non-traditionalrenewable energy sources, including currently available performancepotential of 20% in wind energy (170 GW found), 40% — geothermal energy,60% — biogas, about 70% — solar power, 100% — hard biomass and smallhydroelectric power plants;• Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 89% by 2050 as compared with thezero option scenario;• Share of renewable energy — 53% of the volume of primary energy produced(see Figure 7).Figure 7. Development of renewable sources of energy.Implementing these measures would lead to a reduction in the emission ofgreenhouse gases by 50% from 2000 levels (about 70% from 1990 levels).74

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYDevelopment of Renewable Energy in EuropeReinhard KochManaging Director, European Center for Renewable Energy,Güssing, AustriaGüssing is a small town in Austria with 4,000 inhabitants and is also the capital cityof the Güssing region, which has a total of 27,000 inhabitants. In the past, Güssing wasthe most impoverished region in Austria, but with the development of renewable energies,prosperity came to Güssing.Circuit of EnergyTwenty years ago the region of Güssing was compelled to purchase fossil fuel energysources in addition to energy production mechanisms. This reliance on fossil fuelenergy resulted in a drain of about 36 million euros. By implementing changes and utilizingour own renewable resources within our own energy production plants and, later,marketing and selling these forms of energy to our local population has lead to an increaseof revenue circulating within our own region. This model implementing changesand re-investing the profits into the locality is not new; it has been used for decades inGüssing with drinking water and sewage industries. This indicates that people know thebenefits of a renewable model and more importantly how to adequately utilize it.The EEE NetworkFigure 1The European Centre of Renewable Energies in Güssing (EEE) established a hugeinstitutional network and essentially became the network manager. The EEE is linked to75

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYevery energy production plant in the whole region, a total of 35 plants and with the tworesearch institutes in Güssing, both the national and international institute. The institutecoordinates research work at the plants, provides information on renewable energies toEuropean partners through an education center, works together with various regions ofEurope on energy concepts in the services sector that includes more than 100 EU projectswith 500 partners, and also organizes the eco-tourism industry in Güssing, whichhas over 50,000 visitors per year.The Triangle of GüssingFrom the beginning, most of the research has always incorporated the developmentof renewable energies in Güssing. At first, there were Austrian research institutes like theTechnical University in Vienna headed by Prof. Hofbauer that were involved in the workto address renewable energy issues. But over the last years, many international researchinstitutes have ventured into Güssing. In a cooperative effort in an industrial-operatedresearch plant, a lot of new technologies were developed, which now have a worldwideimplication in potential production and usage.Partners with larger sway power ensure that research grants are brought in andorganize their distribution to various research programs each with specializations. Inaddition, some companies in Güssing sell these developed technologies to interestedparties which also generate an added value to the region.General ConditionsThe development of renewable energies is moving forward rapidly. During the1990s, the production of heat out of biomass (district heating) and production of biodiesel out of rapeseed was in the front line of development. Since the year 2000, thefocus has shifted to efficient production of electricity out of biomass the main topicswere thermal and biological gasification. Many projects were begun, but, unfortunately,a lot of them failed. Yet both field plants developed in Güssing are counted as the bestworldwide. Also, at the same time, in 2000, the expansion of wind power was started.Since 2004 the plants have started to use other bio fuels beside the bio diesel, such as bioethanol. Güssing has a huge PV-production factory. It develops solar power, which hasFigure 276

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYbecome more prominent recently; there has been an increase in thermal energy obtainedfrom solar panels due to further development of the photovoltaic technology used.Figure 3The EU member states have started to invest in new fuel technologies because ofthe increasingly high price of oil and the reality of depleting oil resources. This newreality has enforced new general conditions for decreasing the dependence of oil andnatural gas imports in the future. There has been an increasing number of automobilesand trucks in Europe, and it is estimated that there will be twice as many automobiles inthe year 2020 than today. This estimation highlights the potential intense increase in fuelproduction. At the moment, bio fuels (bio diesel and bio ethanol) are not efficient formass production. There are, not only overall quality problems, but also competition withfood production, both of which are intensely criticized. Therefore, we currently have ahigh financial investment in trying to find new possible alternative energy sources.Figure 4Fuels of the FutureThe disadvantages of bio fuels can be balanced with synthetic fuels. In addition,synthetic fuels can be produced in form of gas (BioSNG) and also liquid (BtL). Syntheticfuels are produced out of coal, oil and natural gas worldwide but it is also possible toproduce it out of biomass. The bases for this are efficient technologies to convert liquidinto gas, as well as cleaning steps and adaptation of existing conversion technologies.Through the use of the whole plant or rather through the use of agricultural and forestwaste products, the efficiency is four times higher than that for bio fuels. The clarity ofsynthetic fuels is higher than that of fossil fuels.77

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 5At the moment there are two strategies in Europe. Shell, Volkswagen and Mercedeshave vied for advancement through immense plants to deal (500 MW) with theproblem of the biomass. However, logistically, the only downfall is the low efficiencyof 40%. Güssing chose the way of the local small scale plants (max. 50 MW) but withan increased efficiency of 85%. At the moment the first demonstration plants go intooperation for both strategies. We will have to see which strategy will work best. Expertsanticipate that, by 2012, the synthetic fuels will displace the biological fuels. Anotheradvantage of BioSNG is that it can be fed into the gas grid and it can be transporteddiscretionary.Strategy of the FutureThe strategy in Güssing is to produce local energy only from the available resources(waste materials) of our region. With the help of thermal and biological gasification asa compact energy center, we can produce every form of energy needed in the region afterthe conversion of biomass into gas, including heat, electricity, synthetic natural gas forthe gas grid or for gas stations, liquid fuels, and also hydrogen for the very close future.I would like to conclude by extending an invitation to all of you to visit Güssing,which should give you a good understanding of the future of energy sources.Figure 678

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYProspects for Developing Non-Traditional, Renewable EnergySources on the Kola PeninsulaNina LesikhinaCoordinator for Energy Projects, Bellona, Murmansk OfficeOver the course of many years, non-traditional renewable energy sources (NRES)— including solar, wind, tidal, wave, hydro and bio power — have not been consideredseriously as alternative sources of energy. Today, most of the world’s energy demandsare met with oil (38%), coal (26%), natural gas (23%), renewable energy sources (7%)and nuclear energy (6%) (International Energy Outlook 2007, EIA). Climate change,reduced fossil fuel reserves, and the negative consequences and risks related to the useof nuclear energy make the development of all types of renewable energy sources (RES)an urgent need in the 21st century. One of Russia’s regions, where the transition to cleansources of energy is most important today, is the Murmansk Oblast, where the KolaNuclear Power Plant (Kola NPP) poses a threat to the environment both within andoutside of Russia. A diagram of power generation in the Murmansk Oblast is shown inFigure 1.There are a number of reasons for using NRES. Unlike fossil fuels, the reservesof which are limited, renewable energy sources are inexhaustible and their use doesnot deplete natural resources. NRES can be used to ensure safe energy for the region,to provide a stable, reliable power supply for remote regions, and to protect consumersfrom power outages. Renewable energy is a lucrative sector capable of creating jobs andproducing profits. Compared to the nuclear power industry, renewable types of energyare not hazardous to human health, they are environmentally clean, they do not requiretreatment and they do not pollute the environment. Compared to fossil fuels—the use ofwhich results in emissions into the air and water, and contributes to climate change andchronic pollution of our water—renewable energy is not linked to CO2 emissions andtheir use does not result in any of said risks.79

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 1. Power generation in the Murmansk Oblast.A number of prerequisites for developing NRES on the Kola Peninsula are alreadyfulfilled, including an enormous resource potential and a scientific and technologicalbase. NRES also offer a combination of advantages: sustainability, accessibility, reliability,profitability, and environmental cleanliness. Renewable energy may be useful forboth consumers on and off the main power grid, and is sufficient to satisfy energy needstoday and in the future. Bellona elaborates on these details in its study titled “Prospectsfor Developing Non-traditional Renewable Energy Sources.”The cover of Bellona’s study:“Prospects for DevelopingNon-Traditional, RenewableSources of Energy on theKola Peninsula.”Solar EnergyOn the Kola Peninsula, solar energy resources are the mostprominent (see Figure 2). However, direct sun light is reduced to60–70%, due to the typically overcast conditions in the region.Difficulties involve accumulating and storing solar energy in largequantities during the summer months.The most promising use of solar energy is power supply forremote villages, for which fuel-based power supply is costly andcomplicated. Solar energy is also a promising option for southernregions with a more developed infrastructure. Over the pastseveral years, Russia and Norway successfully completed a jointproject on the replacement of radioactive strontium batteries atlighthouses located along the northern coast of the Kola Peninsulawith solar panels. According to data from the Kola Science Center(KSC) under the Russian Academy of Sciences, solar activity in the outskirts of thevillage of Umba (pop. 6,500 people) is comparable to the numbers in the small town of80

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIngelstad in Sweden, where solar power stations successfully supply heat for 52 homes.This makes Umba an ideal place to try solar power.Wind EnergyPossibilities for extensive development of wind energy in the Murmansk Oblast areas promising as in Denmark, Germany, Spain and the United States. Russia does indeedpossess the requisite scientific and industrial know-how for developing wind energy, andhas experience in operating pilot wind farms in Vorkuta, Kalmyk and Kaliningrad. Windresources on the Kola Peninsula are enormous and estimated at 360 billion KWh (seeFigure 2). The highest wind speeds are observed in the coastal areas of the Barents Sea,and are measured at 7–9 m/s along the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula. Maximumwind speeds are observed during cold weather and coincide with the seasonal peak ofheat and electricity consumption. The highs during winter are in a reverse phase of theannual river flow, i.e., wind and hydro power complement each other well. This createsfavorable conditions for their combined use. Under conditions of reduced levels of windintensity in the summer, the daily high for wind speed is strong enough for the efficientuse of wind power, since energy consumption generally tends to be higher during daylighthours.Figure 2. Wind power potential: average wind speeds over the course of many years (m/s) at aheight of 10 meters from the ground on flat lands.The high suitability of wind power on the Kola Peninsula is due to the fact thatmaximum wind intensity and maximum energy demands coincide during the winter,and there are 17 hydroelectric power stations with reservoirs that can accumulate waterduring active wind periods for later use when winds are less active. This creates uniqueconditions for widespread, systemic use of wind power. The most suitable areas for creatingwind farms are on the outskirts of the villages of Dalniye Zelentsi and Teriberka,near the Serebryansk and Teriberka hydroelectric power stations, which are connected81

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 3. Promising districts for wind farms.to the Kola power grid and will be useful in supplying large-scale use of wind energy inthe region (see Figure 3).There are also a number of good conditions in place for using wind power in orderto supply electricity and heat to remote villages without access to centralized utilities,meteorology stations, lighthouses, border posts, and Navy facilities in the north, whichreceive electricity from stand-alone diesel power generators. Due to their remote locationsand poor transport infrastructure, fuel costs are growing. Under these conditions,the use of wind power could help with the conservation of costly diesel fuel. Givenfavorable wind conditions, wind power installations could free up 30–50% of preciousfossil fuel now being used for power generation, while in areas with stronger winds thisnumber could be as high as 60–70%. During extended periods of low winds, specialwind energy batteries or auxiliary heating systems can be used.Power Generated by Small RiversA small hydroelectric power plant (HPP) has an output capacity that does not exceed20–30 MW. China is the world leader in terms of the number of small and microHPPs with over 100,000 plants currently in operation. Russian technology is used tomanufacture turbines for these HPPs.The Kola Peninsula has the capacity to generate up to 4.4 billion KWh/yr usingsmall hydropower, of which one-third is deemed as economically viable. A number offactors make the use of small hydropower in the Murmansk Oblast advantageous: thereare periodic shortages of fuel, increases in electricity rates, restrictions on building largeHPPs due to the negative impact on the environment, as well as progress in automationand remote operation of HPP operations.The areas that would be suitable for building small hydropower plants are locatedalong the following rivers: the Pirenga, the Bolshaya Olenka, the Ura, the ZapadnayaLitsa, the Titovka, the Tumcha, and the Umba (see Figure 4).82

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 4. Promising sites for small HPPs on the Kola Peninsula.Small HPP systems: 1 — on the Pirenga River; 2 and 3 — on the Bolshaya Olenka River; 4 and5 — on the Ura River; 6 — on the Zapadnaya Litsa River; 7 — on the Titovka River; 8, 9, and 10— on the Tumcha River; and 11 — on the Umba River.Autonomous small HPPs: 12 — on the Elreka River, and 13 — on the Chavanga River.The power generated by small rivers could serve as an inexpensive and independentsource of energy for remote areas. At present, roughly 80–100 villages and settlementsin the region are not covered by centralized power. Their consumption fluctuatesfrom 5–10 to 500–800 KW. There are three isolated villages, which are the primarycandidates for small hydropower: Krasnoschelye, Chavanga and Chapoma, in additionto the military border official village of Svetly. Fuel-based power supply in these areasis extremely difficult due to the lack of roads. Hydropower could be used as anothersource, in addition to diesel stations, during dry periods, and as a backup power sourcein emergencies.Tidal PowerTidal Power Plants (TPP) are another source of environmentally clean energy. Theydo not pollute the environment with hazardous wastes, which is an inevitable resultof typical thermal power plant operations. TPP also do not require that a territory beflooded, which is an inevitable condition for building large HPPs.The special features of tidal energy are its regularity throughout the course of amonth and its independence from water levels throughout the course of the year. Thesequalities make tidal flow a powerful source of energy which may be used in combinationwith river-based HPPs equipped with reservoirs.There are several locations that can be categorized as particularly promising fortidal energy: Lumbovsk with a 320 – 670 MW TPP, the Cape Abramova-Mikhailovsk(the planned output capacity of the Mezensk TPP is 50 billion KWh/yr), and the DolgayaBay (the site of the pilot Kola TPP project) (see Figure 5).83

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 5. Potential locations for TPPs on the Kola Peninsula.Finally, there is the Kislogubsk TPP, which was built in the Kislaya Bay in the1960s as a pilot project in order to gain the technical and scientific experience requiredto build larger plants, such as the Mezensk TPP. This plant is currently non-operational.The Sevmash facility in Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast) is currently developing apilot model of a water wheel for the Mezensk TPP, which will be tested in the KislayaBay.Wave EnergyThe ocean waves accumulate wind energy as they travel across a vast area. Theyare essentially a natural form of concentrated energy. Another positive factor of waveenergy is the fact that it is everywhere, and as a result is accessible to a wide range ofcoastal consumers. The average annual potential for wave energy in the Barents Sea isestimated at 22–29 KW/m, which comes close to the figures for the neighboring Norwegiancoast (25–30 KW/m). As regards the White Sea, the average annual potential ofwave energy is considerably lower at just 9–10 KW/m, due to the comparatively smallsurface area of the sea and ice cover during the winter.Wave energy has one of the highest real efficiency values among non-traditionalenergy sources. The overall real efficiency of a wave power plant generating electricityamounts to 30–80%. The power generating capacity of wave energy along a 10-kilometerstretch of the coast of the Kola Peninsula could amount to 1.2 billion KWh for theBarents Sea and 0.4 billion KWh for the White Sea. Wave power plants in these regionsare projected to have capacities of 230 MW and 100 MW.Bioenergy ResourcesCompared to other types of RES on the Kola Peninsula, there are relatively fewbioenergy resources. In the Murmansk Oblast, the bioenergy resource potential, in-84

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcluding agricultural and livestock wastes, amounts to approximately 1 billion KWh/yr.Reprocessing agricultural wastes using anaerobic fermentation will help resolve threeproblems: 1) the environment — the disinfection of livestock wastes and elimination ofpathogens; 2) food supply — the production of high-quality organic fertilizer, which willincrease harvests by 10%; and 3) the energy industry — a partial replacement of liquidand gas fuel with biogas.There are now fewer forests in the Murmansk Oblast than in the other Oblasts inNorthwest Russia. The potential of bioenergy resources from lumber waste is estimatedat just 1.5 billion KWh. That is why small villages and settlements that receive theirpower supply from local diesel facilities and heat from boilers represent a promisingsector for reusing lumber waste.Bellona recommends developing renewable energy sources in order to decommissionthe obsolete and hazardous reactors of the Kola NPP, and primarily to provide areliable and safe supply of clean energy which will boost the region’s economic growth.The government must take action as soon as possible in order to remove the legislative,economic and sociopolitical barriers hindering the development of renewable energy.In summary, Bellona is an advocate of the following measures aimed at developingrenewable energy sources on the Kola Peninsula:• Developing a federal and regional legislative base establishing specific targetindicators for NRES use;• Introducing economic stimuli for developing NRES;• Involving industry, scientific community and public organizations in a strategicalliance;• Creating pilot projects in the most promising regions in terms of renewableenergy under the Russian Academy of Science’s Kola Science Center;• Ensuring reliable financing by government agencies and financial institutions,involving private investors;• Establishing an agency for the support and propagation of information inNRES development that meets legal requirements and standards.Finally, Bellona hopes that increased profits from oil and gas trades will not leadRussia’s authorities to ignore the value of renewable energy sources as a means of fightingagainst the global problem of climate change.85

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Russian Biofuel ProgramVladimir KirilinDirector, EcoServiceNikolai ZubovChairman, Krasnoyarsk Krai Environmental UnionThe goals of the Russian Biofuel Program (RBP) are to:• Create a new environmentally-friendly fuel to support power supply in lowriseapartment buildings in Europe and Russia;• Achieve mass production of high-grade wood pellets;• Create a new industry for the complete, comprehensive and 100% reprocessingof hardwoods, such as birch and aspen.PreambleFirst. This program is not an alternative to developing nuclear energy in Russia.Nuclear energy is the [best choice for] large cities and industrial centers. What RBPaims to do is supply autonomous power supply for private, low-rise residential buildings.In its first stage, which is planned for 2009 through 2014, the Program will focuson European countries. During the second stage, after 2014, the Program will apply tonew low-rise housing in Russia.Second. This is an interesting factor for nuclear power engineering in Russia. TheRBP, given that it is actively developed, will help RosAtom indirectly (i.e., though thehelp of Europeans themselves) to squeeze out competitors in a number of Europeancountries. As a result, small energy will be lending a helping hand to big energy.Third. Work with this kind of Program may be useful in supporting the “green”image of the Atomic Energy Ministry. RBP truly offers an alternative energy source.We know that a number of countries in Europe have passed laws against the useof nuclear energy. Meanwhile, Western nuclear lobbyists are taking advantage of climatechange problems in an attempt to prolong the period during which nuclear reactorsremain in operation and are calling for a nuclear power renaissance. One of the mainarguments is the absence of large, lucrative projects, which focus on using an alternativesource of energy and show that it is capable of replacing nuclear power.We are submitting the Russian Biofuel Program for consideration. This is a major,profitable alternative energy program. The opportunities afforded by the Program are:• Wood pellet fuels could become a key fuel (equal to gas) for low-rise housingpower supply in Europe and Russia;• Overall, this Program will provide volumes of energy capable of replacingnuclear energy in a number of European countries;• Given the mass adoption of the Program, the results could be comparable tothe annual use of 300–400 million tons of brown coal by 2020–2025;• It could reduce CO2-equivalent emissions by 1 billion tons each year; and86

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIntroductionThere is growing talk in Russia concerning mass construction of low-rise housing.Truly, Russia’s expansive territory allows it to move forward with these projects, moreso than other countries. So what is the main factor holding everyone back? Today, theobstacle is obtaining land. But there is plenty of land in Russia. Tomorrow, the mainproblem will be power supply. Canada’s experience could be very useful. There, formost low-rise housing, centralized energy includes only electricity, while water, heat andsewage systems are autonomous.Today, Russia is already feeling the pangs of an electricity and thermal energy deficit.There are plans to fill in the gaps using coal-based and nuclear energy. And Russia isnot alone; Europe and many other countries are heading down the same path.This solution is fair and realistic, but it requires a great deal of time and money. Traditionalpower supply systems are based on large thermal power plants, and this meanscoal strip mines, the construction of enormous thermal power plants, long heating mains,losses due to transfer, maintenance, accidents, and so on and so forth. Compared to highriseapartment buildings, power supply for low-rise and private housing presumes evengreater expenditures for centralized electricity and heating grids.New Ideas for Small EnergyCompared to other approaches, the proposed Russian Biofuel Program presumesthe mass use of high-grade wood pellets and is 2–4 times more cost-efficient and energyefficient,while being in a class of its own in terms of environmental concerns, safetyand climate change.EcoService—a firm in the city of Krasnoyarsk—and the Krasnoyarsk Krai EnvironmentalUnion have developed and proposed a fundamentally new approach to masssupply of autonomous, alternative energy for low-rise housing. The approach is basedon the concept of reprocessing hardwoods. The first stage of the Program involves themass production of high-grade wood pellets from birch and aspen, which equals dozensof millions of tons per year.What contributes to the opportunities and practicality of the Russian Biofuel Program?1. Today dozens of firms in Europe have developed and are now marketing cogenerationand trigeneration systems, which run on wood pellet fuel. These are firmssuch as: Solo Stirling GmbH, Stirling Power Module, Energieumwandlungsges mbH,Mawera and many others.They have developed a number of autonomous energy installations which supplynot only heat, but also electricity and cooling. Modern automated boilers require that thewood pellets be very clean and produce minimal ashes, in addition to a number of otherparameters. They are capable of producing 1–10 KW(e) and 5–50 KW(t).These systems make it possible to make residences completely autonomous, safe,and environmentally friendly. The level of convenience is higher than installations runningon natural gas.2. Nearly ten years on the European market has demonstrated the success of woodpellets as a new fuel type. The technologies for producing and burning wood pelletshave already been developed. Wood pellets are an excellent source of alternative energy.They are:87

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• Renewable;• Safe;• Environmentally clean;• Carbon-neutral;• Convenient.These factors put this new fuel type far ahead of the competition, even compared togas. Why is it that autonomous energy that uses small cogeneration facilities and woodpellets has not become more widespread today? There is one reason: there is a deficit ofquality, i.e., “clean,” wood pellets that do not use admixtures of bark and other pollutants.A large amount of wood pellets on the market in Europe and Russia are “industrialclass”pellets, which means they contain bark, and they produce cinder when they areburned and are not suitable for use in small cogeneration and trigeneration facilities.Over 4 million tons of wood pellets, of 5 million tons used in Europe, are burned atlarge and mid-sized thermal power plants and boilers, while only 1 million tons are highgradepellets or first-class pellets that are used to supply power in low-rise housing.There is simply no raw material for mass production of quality pellets in Europe.Meanwhile, the power industry in Europe burns roughly 1.5 billion tons of various fossilfuels each year; it is therefore easy to understand how 1 million tons — just 0.07% of allfossil fuels burnt in Europe — is not enough to dictate energy policy in Europe.At the same time, the Russian Biofuel Program would help boost production levelsfrom 30 to 100 million tons of wood pellets over a relatively short period of time (10–15years) and replace brown coal and other fossil fuels used by energy systems in Europe,Russia and Japan with wood pellets.We compare pellets with coal precisely because burning brown coal causes themost damage to the environment and the climate. The fuel efficiency of wood pellets istwice as high as that of brown coal, and they have proven to be twice more effective inlow-rise housing than burning brown coal in large thermal power plants.The lack of any losses incurred in generating, transporting and transferring heat andelectricity over distances, of transforming it to electricity, and of accidents all contributeto making wood pellets considerably more energy efficient than brown coal. The safety,cleanliness, carbon-neutrality and sustainability considerably boost the value of woodpellets as a fuel.But how do we produce wood pellets in the volumes needed in Russia, Europe andJapan? The Russian Biofuel Program answers this question and asks power engineers,environmentalists and builders to turn their attention to birch and aspen, which are foundin abundance in Russia and for which there is low demand within the Russian industry.Recoverable oil reserves in Russia are measured at approximately 10 billion tons,and gas reserves are estimated at 35 billion tons. There are over 14 billion cubic metersof hardwood reserves, and they are renewable. Moreover, unlike coniferous trees, whichcan be harvested only after 80–100 years of growth, birch and aspen can be harvestedafter as little as 40–50 years. That means one plot of woodland can be used twice in a humanlifespan. As a result, birch and aspen reserves in Russia exceed oil reserves and areat the very least comparable with gas reserves. The opportunities afforded by advancedprocessing are considerably better.One of the main problems associated with processing birch and aspen is the wasteproduced. It is not common knowledge that only 10% of a fallen birch tree is used in theproduction of plywood. Fifty to seventy percent of the tree is left in the forest. Another88

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY30–50% is peeled off during the plywood production process. That means 90% of thetree ends up as waste. Over 70% of the tree also ends up as waste when birch is processedfor boards. A minor part of the birch tree is used for cellulose, but not more than4–5 million cubic meters each year. Birch is only used to produce high-quality paper.Most birch processed in Russia today is exported to China, Sweden and Finlandas round timber. Furthermore, of the approximately 240 million cubic meters of annualharvested area, only trees on an area of just 35–40 million cubic meters are harvestedeach year.The measures taken today by the Russian government to increase customs duties onlumber exports will further push birch harvesting down to 5–10 million cubic meters peryear. As a result, over 200 million cubic meters of birch growth are not processed todayand are not allocated for processing in Russia in the near future.What is going on? There is no technology in Russia today for advanced processingof hardwoods. The main reason is the large amount of waste created when processingbirch and aspen. Mass production of wood pellets from birch and aspen trees can solvethis problem. This means using birch and aspen trees will become lucrative, comprehensiveand one-hundred percent efficient.The approximate consumption of trees under the Russian Biofuel Program is asfollows:• Nearly 40–45% of wood (primarily of average quality) would be used forproducing wood pellets;• 20% is quality wood which would be used for traditional production: plywood,lumber, chopsticks, bonded construction, rounded logs, etc.;• 5–10% will be processed for the pulp and paper industry and biosynthesisproducts;• 30% would end up as waste (the bark, rot, small-diameter timber, etc.) andwill be used by the Program’s participating companies for their own needs toproduce heat and electricity.An annual cleared area of 240 cubic meters of birch and aspen trees means the opportunityto produce 100 million tons of pellets per year. Furthermore, over 70 millioncubic meters of aspen and birch would be used for plywood, boards, bonded constructionsand chopsticks, which increases the profitability of birch processing by 3–4 times.The sizable revenue will be generated by applying biosynthesis and the pulp and paperindustry technologies to birch and aspen. Even today, birch and aspen barks are used ina wide variety of medicines and cosmetic treatments.Until recently, it was believed that the properties of birch and aspen were not suitablefor producing wood pellets. Birch is a very dense wood (1.5 times denser thanpine and 1.75 times denser than fir). Aspen has very low lignin content. EcoService andthe Krasnoyarsk Krai Environmental Union have been working on this for over fouryears. Today, all of the wood pellet production problems associated with birch havebeen solved. A mass production technology for birch wood pellets has been developed.Equipment has been selected and pilot pellet batches have been produced. The pelletswere certified in German laboratories. Their quality is significantly higher than the requirementsof the DINplus standards, which are the most stringent standards in Europe.Today, negotiations with Western investors on financing the construction of the firstfactory for wood pellet production are coming to a close. The first factory will have anannual production capacity of 200,000 tons of high-grade wood pellets.89

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMeanwhile, work is underway to explore the possibility of producing plywood andbiosynthesis products from birch and aspen barks.A site has been selected, along with a felling area and key staff members. The firstfactory will be located in Krasnoyarsk Krai. This area is ranked first in Russia in termsof birch reserves, which are estimated at over 1 billion cubic meters. Meanwhile, theprojected felling area provides over 24 million cubic meters per year, and only 1.5% iscut in the region.Krasnoyarsk Krai is the most convenient starting place for this segment. It is alsovery convenient in terms of transportation. The distance to European countries and Japanis nearly the same. Complicated transport logistical issues have also been resolvedsuccessfully. This production will be profitable. The Russian Biofuel Program envisagesthe construction of five such factories in Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2009–2014.However, the main point is that birch and aspen resources in Russia and wood pelletdemand in EU countries will help increase the development of the Russian BiofuelProgram at any pace.Demand for low-rise housing in Europe and Russia means a need of dozens ofmillion tons of pellets. This market will be in development for 15–20 years. But in orderto conquer the market, environmentalists in Russia and Europe and their respectivegovernments need to contribute to these efforts. A Russia-EU Program for acceleratedintroduction of the Russian Biofuel Program in the energy sectors in Russia and Europeis needed.The Program is beneficial for everyone involved:• Russia and Europe (including the government and all involved ministries andagencies);• The hundreds of depressed districts in our country;• The green movements in Russia and Europe.This Program has everything required to become a major component of the KyotoProtocol and is capable of making Russia a world leader in the production of renewableenergy sources within a short timeframe.90

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYQuestions and AnswersSession on Alternative Energy Organizedby the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)– Dialogue participant: You mentioned that wind energy reserves are estimated at over100 MW. For example, the wind power turbine in Germany with the greatest outputproduces 5 MW, and it stands 184 meters tall, with three blades, 65 meters each, and afoundation that required 360 m 2 of concrete. What kind of funds are needed to pay forthe building materials for just one 5 MW turbine and how much power will it generateover the course of its service life?– Aleksandr Chumakov: I’d like to stress that I was talking about potential wind energyreserves and not about power generating installations that would allow us to access thatenergy. This is the key difference. You are talking about megawatts, and I am talkingabout megawatt hours. These are different units.– Igor Babanin: You are talking about the potential of wind power generation, i.e., willthe wind turbines require more energy than they produce? They’ve run the numbers andfound that they do not. All wind turbines produce from 3 to 20 times more energy thanwas spent on their construction. For comparison sake, an NPP produces twice the energyspent on the entire cycle, and that is probably an over-estimate.– Pavel Munin: You were talking about reprocessing of birch and the great profits to bemade. I don’t mean the pellets; that’s easy. I mean the advanced processing you mentioned.What exactly is implied by that?– Vladimir Kirilin: About three project stages are involved. The first stage is the basicproduction of fuel pellets, because the business will need a foundation. They will formthe financial, structural/technical, and forestry base. Afterwards, knowing what exactraw materials you have, you do your processing. Mainly, this is plywood and particleboard. The third step is more complex. A market needs to be created. But, today, thereprocessing market, the biosynthesis of birch and aspen in Europe and America is verybig. I’ll also mention that the birch’s white color is due to betulin, a crystalline substancethat our scientists learned to extract from birch bark 30 years ago. This is done with thechaga mushroom, which possesses medicinal properties thanks to betulin. Scientists atthe Novosibirsk Institute, Novosibirsk’s Akademgorodok, the scientific research city,and Koltsovo—once Russia’s most classified biological weapon production center—spent over 15 years developing a broad range of medicines containing the mushroom. Itsproperties include bolstering and strengthening the immune system and making it usefulin fighting AIDS, cancer, hepatitis, and other diseases. Similar things can be said aboutaspen. Aspen is first and foremost, a source of vitamin F—the vitamin of life. Aspenand birch can be used to make at least 100 promising pulp and paper and biosynthesisproducts.- Anatoli Matushchenko: Has progress been made in a draft document or can we lookforward to the adoption of a law on alternative energy?- Aleksandr Chumakov: The only document currently in existence is Russia’s Energy91

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYStrategy through 2030, which allots 1% to alternative energy. This is inadmissibly low,so I feel that we will all need to campaign for an amendment to the next energy strategy,the founding document in the field.- Igor Babanin: I’ll add a few words about the legislative aspect and give you Murmanskas an example. On April 3, a wind turbine was officially added to the power grid.It started operating in 2001, and the official paperwork was completed in time to connectit to the grid on April 3, 2008.- Aleksandr Chumakov: This happened after legislation was adopted on access to alternativeenergy through common power grids.- Albert Gozal: In early November, we held a meeting on alternative energy at the StateDuma. We decided to create an international group that would focus on alternative energy.It would include experts from Russia, Japan, and other countries. Last week, therewas a seminar at the State Duma, where Mr. Vasiliev talked about the Legacy Program.In conclusion I would like to say that the International Science and Technology Centercan help you find partners and programs. We have spent USD 930 million on environmentalcauses over recent years and have found many partners. If you would like to jointhis group of alternative energy experts, we would be glad to have you.92

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYWhat is the Meaning and Danger of Radioactive Disaster?Anatolii NazarovDirector, Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institutefor Natural History and Technology, Russian Academy ofSciences; Deputy Chairman, Public Council of RosAtom;Member of the Russian Academy of Natural SciencesViktor LetovInstitution for Continuing Professional Education;The Russian Medical Academy for Post-Graduate Education;Russian Ministry of Health and Social DevelopmentElena BurlakovaChairwoman of the Scientific Council on Radio-Biology,Russian Academy of SciencesDuring the long 20 years which separate us from the events at Chernobyl, one constantlyencounters diverse opinions and definitions on the nature of the catastrophe: wasit an accident or a disaster? Articles written by those in the nuclear industry always sayit was an accident. Representatives of environmental organizations and health servicessometimes say it was a disaster, but more frequently, an accident. It is clear that the questionas to which category this event should be placed in has deep social, philosophicaland technical significance, and demands particular attention.From the very birth of the nuclear industry, and at various stages of planning, constructionand subsequent implementation, the question of how to reduce the risk of accidentsin such a new and unusual technical area gained in importance. The militarynuclear industry played a leading role. During the arms race (1940–1960), when all talkwas of the fate of the state, the safety of personnel and the overall operation of the nuclearindustry were not among the state’s priorities. The focus was on eliminating technicaland engineering faults in nuclear installations and equipment. Accident prevention wasseen purely in the context of supporting the creation of nuclear weapons. The possibilityof a major accident with the emission of radionuclides into the environment and theproblem of radioactive waste was essentially not examined seriously, and even less sothe issue of a major nuclear disaster. It was accepted as axiomatic that nuclear energyis the safest and most environmentally friendly in comparison with carbon energy (1).The entry of humanity into the nuclear era from an environmental point of view canbe represented by a chain of unending radioactive accidents (2). The fact that many ofthem unfolded very rapidly excludes the opportunity to localize the disaster during itsinitial stages. This so-called “window” is a fundamental indicator of the fatal irrevocabilityof events as they grow into a catastrophe. In the case of the Chernobyl disaster,the “window” during which a technological accident grew into a radiation disaster wasall of 56 seconds, making it impossible for personnel sent to avert the disaster to takeany combative measures. So a man-made system that has reached an extreme, unstable93

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcondition and its transition through the “window” towards irrevocable destruction marksthe start of a disaster, the impossibility of stopping the process and returning the systemto its previous stable condition.An analysis of the events at Chernobyl, Kyshtym, Three Mile Island, Sosnovy Bor,Seversk and a dozen other radiation accidents and disasters and hundreds of man-madeaccidents, which are closely linked to the increasingly complex nature of technology andits management, shows that the world has entered an era of catastrophe. It is impossibleto brush this off and pass by on the other side. It is a threatening reality and demandsfundamental scientific investigation in order to develop practical safety measures. Becauseof this, it is more appropriate than ever to address the often-forgotten works ofGeorges Cuvier on the theory of catastrophe (3). The scientific concept of catastrophewas developed starting in the 1830s through the 1950s, when the important definingcharacteristics of the concept were identified. In Cuvier’s opinion, the essential nature ofcatastrophe is the complete, systemic, and irrevocable loss of organization. A total lossof structural-functional organization, ‘when only wreckage is left of the past.’ In ouropinion, the main distinguishing mark of a catastrophe stems from Cuvier’s ideas: theirrevocable development of events. The event vector points in a single direction. The oldtype of organizational function as a whole is lost. When only fragments are left of thepast, it is necessary to transition to a new type of organization of the parts of the wholewhich have fallen apart.An accident is always local, no matter how severe the consequences. Once thedamage caused has been cleared, it is possible to revert to the previous method of organization.A nuclear energy accident, involving the destruction of a nuclear reactor andthe emission of a large mass of radionuclides into the environment grows, if the processis not localized, into an irreversible radiation disaster, affecting large parts of the biosphereand enormous numbers of people. The distinguishing characteristic of the lastfifty years has been the demonstration of the global nature of catastrophe. The disaster atthe Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant was of a global nature – the consequences affectedalmost all continents and countries to the same degree as terrorism and other types ofglobal catastrophes.The disaster at the Chernobyl NPP was not tragic chance, as we are persuaded tobelieve, nor due to a combination of errors on the part of personnel. Its roots lie muchfarther back, as the consequences of the disaster affected all areas of the life of society,destroyed its ideology, economy and finances, and laid bare the extent to which the environmentand culture of the already fading Soviet system in Russia had been destroyed.The Commission created by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in1989–1991 to examine the causes of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP, and to assessthe activity of those responsible in the post-accident period, had the task of performingan analysis of the strategic development of nuclear energy, the study of the direct causesof the accident at the Chernobyl NPP and the problems of dosimetry. Apart from this,the Commission’s tasks also included assessing the medical and biological effects ofexposure on the NPP personnel, who led the clean-up efforts, and on the general population;the genetic consequences of the accident; and a comprehensive investigation intothe consequences of the disaster for Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as how theaccident developed and how it grew into a catastrophe. The first task was closely linkedto the social movement of those people who had suffered in the Chernobyl accident and94

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthose who wished to receive help from the state. A more pragmatic goal was the needto determine the real financial costs of the Chernobyl programs which, according to thegovernment of the USSR, “were excessive.” In addition, society as a whole — not justthe experts who were members of the Commission — were worried by the question as tohow the consequences of the events at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, only one of14 active RBMK reactors, should be assessed: as an accident or as a disaster?The Chernobyl disaster, often called the “accident in the fourth reactor,” fundamentallychanged the way in which the “peaceful” atom was viewed. It was impossible tohide the consequences of such an accident behind a veil of secrecy, as had been the habitof the Ministry of Atomic Energy in previous decades. Action had to be taken on a largescale to liquidate the consequences of radioactive pollution, to take urgent, non-standardaction to ensure radiation security throughout the nation’s complex nuclear industry. Thescale of what had happened could not be kept secret; it was impossible to hide it, just asit was impossible to return Chernobyl’s fourth reactor to its original functionality and tosay that the event was either an accident or a fuzzily-defined “radiation incident” in thehistory of the evolution of the nuclear industry.The intervention of science involving researchers from the academies and institutesof higher education was required; a historical and history of technology analysis wasused as the basic methodology. The relation of the events back to history and, aboveall, the history of science, is no chance here. Vladimir Vernadsky wrote: “…the historyof human civilization is linked to the ‘conscious survival’ of disaster and the ability toovercome such events.”During the first millennia of human evolution, disasters were exclusively natural.The most recent period in the history of humanity – the 19th, 20th, and first half of the21st century (let us suppose) will be characterized as the era of man-made disasters.This understanding can be seen as part of a wider concept: “catastrophes of civilization.”Moral catastrophes, which reflect the decline of moral ideals, the crisis of the family,marriage, traditional and religious institutions, drug addition, alcoholism, terrorism, andthe emerging crisis of the environment, or biosphere, with its unpredictable results, canall be placed in this category.In spite of many dramatic pages in the work of the Commission, (whose activityand disbanding coincided with the departure of the USSR from the world stage) it wasable to sum up the efforts of almost 200 experts and present the fruits “of reason’s icyintimations and records of a heart in pain.” But even back then, it was becoming clearthat the true causes of the Chernobyl disaster were elsewhere.In the 20th century, Russia has lived through several eras, and the era of socialplanning was the longest, spanning from 1917 to 1992. Above all, this period was astruggle towards a better life, which was shattered by the Solovetsky Special Camp andthe Gulag, and the exile of the country’s brightest minds. There were millions of ruinedlives, millions of “slaves” in camps and distorted human fates. However, our task doesnot include analyzing the project of social reconstruction of the world, which turnedinto a tragedy for the Russian people with the loss of more than 40 million lives duringthe Second World War (1941–1945). The building of hydroelectric power stations onthe plains of the black earth region can hardly be forgotten. The dismantlement of suchcyclopean installations, and the decommissioning of dozens of nuclear power plantsdemands huge financial investment from society, and it will be a long time before the95

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcountry is ready for that.The great construction projects of Communism and the presumptuous plans to divertSiberia’s rivers to the south have definite value. As do nuclear defense, space flights,and the construction of the BAM railway. There were, and are, many positives. And thiscannot be wiped from Russian past.But during the era of grandiose social transformation, there was a critical moment– Chernobyl. It was not an accident, as the event cast light on the impending catastropheof the mighty Soviet system. Inevitably, the words of Nikolai Ryzhkov, then-Chairmanof the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at one of the sessions of the Supreme Soviet onChernobyl, come to mind. He admitted that the country had not been prepared for sucha large-scale catastrophe as Chernobyl. Not prepared…Was it really necessary to create nuclear energy in the 1950s? In the opinion of IgorKurchatov, the leader of the nuclear project, in reply to a question asked by one of theSecretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union aboutthe viability and development of nuclear power plants, said that there was none at thecurrent time and that “for the next 30 years, it will be an expensive experiment.” He sawthe problem from inside, and understood, as no one else did, the complexity of the transitionand how unprepared the country’s economy and science was for the large-scaleconstruction of nuclear reactors. And he knew, as no one else did, that the USSR hadinvested almost all its financial resources in the creation of nuclear weapons. The priorityremained the development of nuclear weapons and the space program. These twoprograms were closely linked with the defense capabilities of the country. The pioneerRBMK reactors were designed to produce plutonium, while nuclear reactors were createdfor nuclear submarines. In the 1960s, these early reactors served as the basis for thedesign of RBMK and PWR reactors for generating nuclear energy. It should be stressedthat the USSR was not the first in this respect: both the US and England were followingthe same path. These were compatible technologies with a dual aim: to get explosivematerials and to get energy to create weapons from the same source.The first major nuclear accidents took place at military installations: at Windscale(in England) and in Russia at Chelyabinsk-40 (the Kyshtym catastrophe). These accidentswere what started the discussion on how to deal with nuclear waste.At the heart of the USSR’s social planning, and the impressive transformationswhich took place, was the illusion that large-scale civilian projects corresponded withthe level of international engineering achievements. One of these grandiose projects wasthe nuclear project. The multi-faceted investigation into the causes and consequences ofChernobyl shows that calling this the main reason was impossible (4). It lay in the inevitability(in the words of Ryzhkov) with which nuclear energy had moved toward thiscatastrophe. In the opinion of Boris Porfiriev, the social and economic development andprogress of science and technology in the USSR, as a whole, created inescapable preconditionsfor such events. One of these was the total secrecy of the military industrialcomplex, which assured a lack of scientific analysis of technical projects for developingthe nuclear industry, and the possible accidents linked to their implementation. Thecommand-and-control system excluded such an approach.Programs for similarly extensive implementation of economic projects with thesame directive nature and extreme secrecy from society inevitably led to disaster. As forthe causes of the accident, which transformed into disaster, experts came to the conclu-96

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYsion that the main causes were construction flaws in the reactor cores of RBMK reactorsand the system for managing security. These closely intersected with the unintentionalerrors of personnel who were not party to the design faults of the reactor (5, 6).The fact that the nuclear industry was closed to both the public and to nuclearindustry experts did, to a significant extent, cause the logical catastrophic developmentof events. The example closest in time to the events of Chernobyl was the accident atthe Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant in 1975, where a fuel channel in the reactor coremelted down. Back then, it was possible to shut off the reactor, probably due to moretechnically prepared personnel and happy circumstance. Information about the accidentin this type of RBMK reactor was, just as with Chernobyl, kept secret. It did not becomea case in point for serious consideration of the reasons at similar nuclear power plantsin the country.There were still more than ten years to go till the Chernobyl disaster!Mr. Yadrikhinsky, who worked as a nuclear safety inspector at the Kursk NuclearPower Plant, with the same type of reactor design, pointed out the construction flaws inthe design of RBMK reactors in 1985 (7). His work at this nuclear power plant avertedevents, which were then to unfold in the fourth reactor of the Chernobyl NPP a year later.The instability of RBMK reactors should have led to a detailed analysis of the projectand served as a warning to nuclear industry workers and regulatory bodies, but the latterchose to ignore this information. This example shows that the disaster could have beenavoided.The refusal of GosAtomEnergoNadzor to make changes to the construction of functioningRBMK reactors and to take the corresponding management decisions clearly hadfatal consequences. But this did not alter the possibility of similar accidents in the future.The causes of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP were systemic, merely the result ofdeeper social, economic, psychological and historic issues.Still, can Cuvier’s theoretical constructs (Discours sur les révolutions de la surfacedu globe), which take as their basis material on natural, catastrophic changes to animaland plant life during the history of the planet, be applied to man-made objects, and specificallyto nuclear energy? The short answer is probably yes.None of the currently known nuclear disasters happened by chance; each was precededby irregularities at nuclear installations. Such irregularities were cumulative, remaininghidden during planning or concealed during implementation and this, over time,had disastrous consequences.The establishment of the nuclear energy industry and its development over a longperiod of time was an extremely complex task with many unknown factors. The successfulfulfillment of this task a priori assumes a high level of technical knowledge andgeneral culture among project participants with professional training, and a well-developedsense of responsibility. In working with nuclear energy, the danger of irrevocablenuclear catastrophe is entirely real. This is axiomatic in terms of the natural sciences, andeven more so under real world conditions in relation to the dangers of man’s industries.Due to this, society is right to place the highest expectations on those working to createnuclear installations — from researchers to designers to service personnel. On thispoint, historical-scientific and expert research shows exactly the opposite — a lack ofresponsibility, low professional and general standards in the design and implementationof nuclear installations, and a corporate caste system operating against a backdrop of a97

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYlack of willingness and ability to see the broader issues (8, 9).This applies right at the start of the process when sites are selected for nuclearpower plants and other dangerous nuclear installations. There is hardly any need to repeatagain how inappropriate the choice of site for the vast majority of Russian nuclearinstallations was, including that of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, when they were‘bound’ to geological faults and sinkholes. Many geological and environmental errorswere committed in connection with the emission of nuclear waste into hydrologic networksor the pumping of nuclear waste into underground geologic formations. All themore so if the subject of the results of ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosions (approximately190) is addressed, which were aimed at creating underground reservoirs for pumpingliquefied gas, petroleum or the same liquid nuclear waste. All of these projects endedin the radionuclide pollution of significant portions of surface water and ground waterwatersheds (10).An analysis of the reasons for the errors committed in the construction of nuclearenergy installations shows that errors are various, with each covering a range of stagesin the creation and implementation of nuclear installations. The main reason for the tensionbetween the designers of technologies and their subsequent implementation in thenatural environment (more broadly, the biosphere), was that technical specialists eitherignored or were ignorant of the structure and functioning of the biosphere. More oftenthan not, this was a failure to understand that man-made, often dangerous radioactiveobjects, occupy the space-time of the biosphere and its natural ecosystems together withthe original inhabitants. The safety of organisms, and mankind itself, depends on theextent to which these objects are in harmony with the biosphere and its structure.Man-made disasters, particularly at nuclear energy and chemical installations,which are not an inherent part of the biosphere and its organization and its dynamicbalance, which has evolved over billions of years, are due to the lack of considerationgiven by the technical world to the fundamental achievements and laws formulated bynatural science and our understanding of the biosphere. Karl Ernst von Baer, one of theoutstanding Russian scientists of the 19th century, has the following words which arehighly relevant in today’s world: “Widespread knowledge of the natural sciences is ofessential importance for Russia in the development of many industries.”The biosphere and its microorganisms, soil, natural gases, water, flora and fauna,climate and penetrating radiation constantly “digests” invading foreign objects. However,the ‘answer’ of the Earth is often not appropriate, often resulting in catastrophicconsequences for construction and transport systems and numerous human victims. Inspite of the seeming fragility of the biosphere, thanks to its structure it is actually a stablesystem with many degrees of freedom. At the same time, the degree of freedom offeredto man-made objects is vanishingly small in comparison with that afforded to any naturallyoccurring object. And the larger a multi-functional man-made object (a nuclearpower plant, a nuclear submarine, a space station) or a radioactive installation that posesa threat, the higher the likelihood of catastrophic events developing.The number of industrial production facilities in the world is growing steadily,and many installations currently in use were constructed using old technologies and areno longer fail-safe. Therefore, an increase in the number of man-made disasters can beforecast over the next two to three decades. The issue of integrating nuclear energy andother radioactive installations which could pose a threat into the biosphere is of crucial98

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYimportance here, as is the need to identify effective ways of mitigating the effect of modernnuclear energy and the radioactive legacy of the Cold War on the biosphere.The issue of the biosphere is part of the broader question of general safety, which toa great extent determines the possibility of a radiation disaster occurring, and how such adisaster unfolds. Even considering the remediation of the consequences is almost impossibledue to the long half-life of many radionuclides. For instance, Pu239 has a half-lifeof 244,000 years, and I129 has a half-life of 17 million years. These radionuclides areonly created in nuclear reactors – they did not occur in nature prior to the nuclear era.Because of this, the radioactive effect of radionuclides on man and on living organismsof the biosphere will continue to be felt for many generations following a radiation accident.The concept of radiation safety still does not have a single scientific definition, inspite of the fact that its practical importance for society is obvious. However, it has notbeen the object of holistic examination by fundamental science. The secrecy of the work,connected with the production and testing of nuclear weapons, the development of thenuclear submarine fleet, with ‘peaceful’ nuclear energy and nuclear facilities has distortedthe system of values, in which nuclear safety was given extremely low priority (1).Going on what has been stated above, the answer to the question as to whether itwould have been possible to avert the Chernobyl disaster is undoubtedly an unqualifiedyes.However, this does not change the causes of possible major disasters in the future,which are part of the social, economic and psychological problems that played a majorrole in management decisions. The need to restructure the entire nuclear field, togetherwith the associated areas of engineering, materials science, research and development,and address the issue of professional training, was becoming urgent. Incidentally, thisapplied to activity in all areas of the national economy.Was the Chernobyl disaster a watershed moment in the era of social planning? Theauthors find it difficult to give an unequivocal answer.To some extent, it was. If we take into account the fact that public consciousnesshas been significantly raised, which makes it possible to address the danger inherent inthe evolution of civilization. Most importantly, the ideological basis of the bureaucraticcommand system, which lay at the heart of social planning and fettered free thought (anddissidence) for three quarters of a century, has been dismantled.In spite of the fact that the system is no more, many of its characteristics are stillin existence, as society is still made up of the same people. Because of this, a continuedcritical rethinking of the multi-faceted concepts of radiation, and therefore nuclear,safety is important. These concepts are only now starting to be covered by fundamentalscience and require detailed interdisciplinary research. Striving towards the continueddevelopment of the nuclear industry shows just how important a place radiation safetyshould take in Russia.Does an understanding of the causes and consequences of the Chernobyl disasterguarantee that it will not be repeated in the future? The era of social planning is definitelyin the past. However, it has left us a legacy in the form of projects which havealready been implemented, and these have to be secured to protect society. Our task isnot to forget the past, and using our knowledge as a foundation, solve the issue of howto implement social projects in the future.99

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIn conclusion, it can be asserted that the history of man entering the nuclear era,can, from an environmental point of view, be presented as a history of radiation disasters.Both large and small radioactive disasters are extreme examples of potentialenvironmental consequences. Many of them develop extremely rapidly, making it impossibleto manage the process of containment at the initial stages of the disaster. Theenvironmental consequences cannot be fully liquidated. They make themselves felt aftertens, hundreds, and thousands of years (the decay of plutonium, americium, curium,etc.). The effect of radiation on humans and organisms of the biosphere will continue toappear and make themselves felt over several generations.The examination of the environmental problems of the nuclear industry is part ofthe wider problem of safety, which determines the likelihood of a radioactive catastrophedeveloping and its subsequent liquidation. This is why it is vitally important, both intheory and in practice, to study the essential nature of catastrophe.References1. Porfiriev, B. N. An Analysis of the Strategic Development of the Domestic NuclearEnergy Industry in the Light of the Chernobyl Disaster [Analiz stretegii razvitiyaotechestvennoi yadernoi energetiki v svete Chernobylskoi katastrofy]. With Yu. I. Karyakin,V. V. Orlov et al. The Chernobyl disaster: causes and consequences [Chernobylskayakatastrofa: prichiny i posledstviya], part 1. Minsk: Test, 1993. 13–42.2. Mityunin, A. V. The Atomic Penal Battalion. The National Specifics of Liquidatingthe Consequences of Radiation Accidents in the USSR and Russia [Atomnyi shtrafbat.Natsionalnye osobennosti likvidatsii posledstvii avarii v SSSR i Rossii]. The NuclearStrategy of the 21st Century [Atomnaya strategiya XXI veka]. January 2005. 21–24.3. Cuvier, G. Discours sur les révolutions de la surface du globe [Discourse on theRevolutions of the Surface of the Globe]. Zhukovskii, D. E trans [French to Russian].Borisyak, A. A., ed. Moscow: Biomedgiz, 1937.4. Conclusions of the Expert Subcommittee of the State Expert Committee of theState Planning Committee of the USSR on State Programs of the RSFSR, the UkrainianSSR and the Belarusian SSR for the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Disasterat the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 1990–1995. Nazarov, A. G., Burlakova, E. B.,Florensky, P. V., Firsova D. S. et al. Moscow: Gosplan USSR, 1990. 52.5. Burlakova, E. B., Nazarov, A. G., Firsova, D. S., Nesterenko, V. B., Shechenko,V. A., Osanov, D. P. et al. The Chernobyl Disaster: Causes and Conclusions (ExpertConclusion) in Four Parts. Nesterenko, V. B., Firsova, D. S., Burlakova, E. B., Nazarov,A. G. et al. editors. Minsk: Test, 1992–1994. Separate edition in 1995. 875.6. The Chernobyl Disaster: Causes and Consequences (Expert Conclusion). In FourParts. Part 1. The Direct Causes of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.Nesterenko, V. B., ed. Minsk: Test, 1993. 216, illustrations.7. Yadrinsky, A. A. Nuclear Safety of RBMK Reactors. Gospromatomnadzor at theKursk Nuclear Power Plant [Yadernaya bezopasnost reaktora RBMK. Institut Gospromatomnadzorana Kurskoi AES]. Kurchatov, 1985. Also, The Nuclear Accident at theFourth Reactor of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and the Safety of RBMK Reactors[Yadernaya avariya na 4 bloke Chernobylskoi AES i yadernaya bezopasnost reaktorovRBMK]. Kurchatov, 1989.8. Moiseev N. N., Nazarov A. G., Burlakova E. B., Florensky P. V., et al. An Expert100

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAssessment of the Program for Liquidating the Consequences of the Chernobyl NuclearPower Plant Accident (in Russian and English). Moscow: Kniga, 1991. 178.9. Nazarov A. G, L’vova M. S, Starodubtseva S. A. et al. Radiation Disasters andTheir Consequences: Environmental-Psychological Motives in Decision Making (Usingthe Example of the Chernobyl Disaster) [Radiatsionnye katastrofy i ikh posledstviyaekolo-psikhologicheskie motivy prinyatiya reshenii (na primere Chernobylskoikatastrofy]. The Environment and the Development of Character [Ekologiya i razvitielichnosti]. Nazarov, A. G., PhD and member of RAN of Natural Sciences, ed. Stupino:2001. 223–242.10. Bulatov, V. I. Radioactive Russia [Rossiya radioaktivnaya]. Novosibirsk: Ts-ERIS, 1996, 265.101

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Impact of Low Doses of Radiation: Why is it Controversial?Vladimir N. SorokinProfessor, United Institute of Energetics and NuclearInvestigations, Minsk (Sosny), BelarusThe concept of low doses of radiation is controversial in the scientific community,because experimental data on the impact of small doses of radiation on the body, fromstudies conducted in countries around the world, have contradicted fundamental principlesof modern radiobiology. The latter traditionally applies the fundamental principlethat states that “for all types of high-energy particles, which ultimately give rise to abiological effect, there are the tracks of these high-energy particles passing through thenucleus of the cell.” This is why “an empirical assessment of the consequences of tissueexposure to small radiation doses should be conducted based on epidemiological exposuredata relative to the number of tracks per cell nucleus.”Meanwhile, precise experimental data shows that, first of all, a radiation effectcan take place in irradiated cells, if there are no tracks through their nuclei (1). Second,radiation effects may take place in cells neighboring those that have been irradiated,but through which tracks have not passed at all (1). Third, in the range of doses of ionizingradiation from close to zero to 10 mSv, where the number of tracks is minimal,the effects of radiation per unit of dose is higher than under large doses of exposure;furthermore, in this dosage range, the effects of radiation per dosage unit are higher aswe approach zero and as the number of tracks also gets closer to zero (2). Fourth, givenone and the same dosage and the same ionizing radiation dosage rate (i.e., approximatelyequal numbers of tracks received by a person), the radiation effects will not only differhundreds of times over, they will also demonstrate fundamental differences — radiationhormesis. Five: the impact of ionizing radiation on humans may take place even in theabsence of any sources of radiation in the area in which they live. In other words, therecould be no dose of radiation, while radiobiological effects are nonetheless observedamong the public (the border territory effect) (4).In the 1930s, radiobiologists had accepted the theory of the indirect radiobiologicalimpact of ionizing radiation. The key principle was the concept that the primary radiobiologicaleffects are caused chiefly by the products of water radiolysis: OH, H, -O2-,eaq- (a hydrated electron), and H2O2 (5).But in the 1980s, this theory was rejected by most radiobiologists, as they could notprovide an explanation for several facts that were established by experiments, such as:• Why, in the low-dosage range of up to 10 mSv, the relative biological effectincreases as the dose decreases;• Why the relative biological effect of low doses of ionizing radiation increasesas particle energy increases given the same dosage values and rates;• The role played by “negligible” (less than 10–13 M) amounts of chemical102

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcompounds synthesized by ionizing radiation;• The integral mechanism behind the indirect radiobiological effects of ionizingradiation.As a result, most radiobiologists have returned to the concept of the direct impacton the human body of low dose radiation. Today, the most outspoken opponents of theindirect impact theory are the very same people who supported and promoted the theorybefore the 1980s.At the same time, a minority of radiobiologists remained proponents of the indirectimpact theory and continued to work on it. In particular, they include Sergey Stepanovand Vsevolod Byakov, who added the hydroxonium (H3O) radical (5) to the list of waterradicals and made a significant contribution to the theory of the indirect impact ofradiation on the human body. However, no explanation for any of the five experimentalresults named above was discovered. At this time, foreign journals began to publisharticles with descriptions of toxic and carcinogenic substances, the concentrations ofwhich increased in organisms that had been exposed to radiation. Most of these substanceswere identified in Japanese studies. In order to examine the formation patternsof carcinogenic substances in both living things that had been exposed to radiation andin an environment with radionuclides, the proponents of indirect impact selected nitrosocompounds as the control group substances. Nitroso compounds cause malignant tumorsin the liver, kidneys, intestines, lungs and other organs. These tumors emerge duringthe appearance of nitroso compounds in the body from external sources, and from theirsynthesis from precursors in the body itself (6).In 2001, the National Russian Committee for Standardizing and Measuring certifiednine methods for identifying nitroso compounds in drinking water and natural water,the air, the soil, food products, industrial raw materials, and flora and fauna (7–15).By using these certified methods, a systemic analysis was conducted of the actualnitroso compound and nitroso-precursor content in the air, water, soil, food products,industrial raw materials, animal fluids and tissues, as well as in tissues and bodily fluidsof the residents of territories that are not polluted by radionuclides in Russia (theYekaterinburg Oblast) and Belarus (the City and Oblast of Minsk and in the BerezinskyBiosphere Reserve). The same studies were also conducted on territories that are pollutedby radionuclides, and with varying degrees of pollution (the cities and Oblasts ofGomel and Mogilev).Data from thousands of measurements was used to establish quantitative patternsof endogenous synthesis of nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) in the absence and in thepresence of a radiation factor. The main conclusions of the analysis measuring NDMAcontent in fluids and tissue samples from organisms that have been exposed to radiationand those who have not show that first of all, the energy of ionizing radiation or theradiation dose is spent on changing the structure and composition of the original amineand nitrite molecules and supporting HDMA synthesis. Second, radiation synthesizesthe same carcinogenic substances in organisms that form with background radiationfrom the very same precursors, but in a larger quantity.The measured amounts of NDMA in the environment (soil, air, water and plants)was noted at higher levels when the radiation pollution level was higher, and significantlyhigher relative to its content given background dosages. As a result, experimentalevidence has been obtained of the formation in the environment of molecules with new103

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYproperties due to the energy of ionizing radiation, including molecules with toxic andcarcinogenic properties (radiotoxins).With food products, water and air, these radionuclides may enter a human body andother biological organisms. Thus, an impact is indeed observed from ionizing radiationof polluted territories on the people residing in non-polluted territories, but located nearpolluted areas.Patterns in the synthesis of carcinogenic and toxic substances under the effect ofionizing radiation on humans and other organisms have been studied by researchers inmany countries. Using these experimental data as a reference point, we can address thefundamental questions named above as follows:1. For all types of high-energy particles of ionizing radiation, the final agentsthat produce a biological effect are toxic and carcinogenic substances that aregenerated by their energy.2. An empirical assessment of the consequences of exposure of tissues to lowdose radiation should be conducted based on examination of epidemiologicalexposure data with ratios of the number of toxic and carcinogenic substancesgenerated by the radiation dosages exposed to a cell.3. The above two principles will be supplemented by the experimental datanamed above, i.e., that the energy of ionizing radiation or a dose of radiationto which a living organism is exposed is spent on activating molecules andchanging their structures and/or composition.4. The energy of ionizing radiation in the environment is spent on activatingmolecules and changing their structures and/or composition.We then have the fundamental principles of today’s radiobiologists.The concept of the indirect impact of ionizing radiation via the synthesis of toxicand carcinogenic substances tackles the five paradoxes addressed above (in additionto another eleven) by modern radiobiologists (16), by transforming them into obviousconfirmations.In line with the fundamental principles of today’s radiobiology, the effects of lowdose radiation on the human body is a function not of two parameters — the dosage leveland the dose rate — but of at least eight different factors. Three of these are named by theUN’s Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (SCEAR): the selectionof food products, lifestyle, and the level of anthropogenic pollution. These indicatorssignificantly change the level of the negative impact of low radiation doses. That is whythe problem of the transfer of low dose radiation risks present in one geographical regionto other regions remains unsolved.Given equal dosage and dose rate, the radiation effect is higher if the radiationenergy is higher, and that means that the energy of photons and high-energy particles aswell as dosage ranges must be considered. The most important factor determining theeffects of low-dosage exposure in the body is a person’s level of antitoxin immunity.When a high-energy particle or a quantum moves through the tissues of a livingorganism, it results in molecule activation and ionization. This activated state may betransferred to neighboring molecules located away from the track — first in the cellthrough which the track passed, and then into neighboring cells. These waves of activationresult in the chemical transformation of some of the molecules with the correspondingbond strength with neighboring atoms and change in the way molecules interact.104

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTransformations in activation waves have the property of slowing down and stoppingonce the molecules capable of a reaction have run out. Estimates have shown that upto 90% of new molecules synthesized as the result of low dose ionizing radiation formunder the effect of waves of activation.The molecules that develop are peculiar in that they form not based on the geneticcode of the body’s cells, but in line with an induced, external factor. As a result, someof them turn out to be toxic and/or carcinogenic for the body. On the other hand, theradiation-induced toxins and/or carcinogens take shape from precursor substances containedin the cell. As a rule, a certain concentration of identical toxins and/or carcinogensexists in cells even without being exposed to radiation. One may speak of the synthesisof harmful substances in addition to those that already exist without any exposure toionizing radiation. The known carcinogens hydroxonium and NDMA are examples ofthese substances.Considering these facts, we can consider the following way in which low doseradiation affects the body: ionizing radiation leads to the synthesis of the additionalamount of toxic and carcinogenic substances that affect the body and cause a variety ofconsequences. Based on this low-dosage mechanism, it is possible to explain a multitudeof phenomena that were previously mysteries.The likelihood of ionizing particles hitting their target (in this case, the DNA) inthe context of low dose radiation is lower than the likelihood of DNA being damaged bycoming into contact with toxins and/or carcinogens. It is the other way around for largedoses. Correspondingly, the nature of the harmful effects of radiation from low dosesis mediated by the composition of the cell’s substances. This is why, first of all, giventhe same dosage and dose rates, the amount of synthesized toxic substances varies fromperson to person. Second, groups of people with different amounts of synthesized substancespresent very different reactions. Third, the impact of ionizing radiation is possibleeven without any exposure to radiation due to the appearance of radiation-inducedtoxins in the body from external sources.In order to perform a quantitative analysis of the effects of low doses with regardto the proposed system of fundamental principles, it would be advisable to consider theprocesses of ionization and the activation of low energy levels of complex moleculesseparately. The boundaries for classifying processes are unclear, and for ionization energylevels around 0.1–1 eV, and 0.01–0.1 eV for activation, are typical. On the onehand, one of the channels for relaxing ionization energy is activation, while on the otherhand, multiple consecutive activations can lead to ionization.Activation can move within a molecule and from one molecule to another andimpact, including selectively, the speed and direction of the reactions taking place. Asthe absorbed dose grows, the relative effect of activation decreases while ionizationincreases.Let us assume that the effects of low dosages are the result of activation. A modelbuilt upon this thesis presents a wide range of representative possibilities. Figure 1 illustratesthe relationship between activation effectiveness (Ei) (in relative units) andthe absorbed dose (D) of gamma radiation of different energies. Given equal doses, theradiation of the greater amount of energy generates a greater number of activated molecules.As the absorbed dose grows, the activation effectiveness rapidly decreases.Activated molecules of precursor substances enter into chemical reactions that gen-105

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYerate some toxic and carcinogenic products. The biological action of these toxic andcarcinogenic substances explains the effect of low doses of radiation. Figure 2 illustratesthe relationship between the effect of low dose radiation (E) (in relative units) and theabsorbed dose (D) of gamma radiation of different energies. Given equal doses, theradiation of the greater amount of energy generates the greater effect. As the absorbeddose grows, the effect of the dose rapidly decreases. Line number 4 (in red) reflects thecontribution in the ionization process.Figure 5. Potential locations for TPPs on the Kola Peninsula.Figure 2. The effect of small radiation doses.106

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYComparing Figure 2 with the data cited below (17) demonstrates that the proposedmodel accurately reflects the actual observed effects of small doses of radiation.Table 1. The Number of Deaths from Leukemia over 105 YearsRadiation SiteAbsorbedDose (mSr)The Numberof Deaths fromLeukemia over105 YearsPilgrim, 1983–1988 2 3.6* 31Operating UKAEA,1946–197920 (20–50) 4.3* 28Pilgrim, 1979–1983 20 14.4* 31Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory21 10.4* 29The US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission33.1 5.6 29Hanford 27 6 29The US Department ofDefense27.6 2.5 29The Population of Japan,Group I30 5.1 15Operating UKAEA 50 5.22 28Rocky Flats 35 4.0 29The Population of Japan,Group II80 1.4 15Operating UKAEA 100 3.0* 28Sellafield 139 4.2 29The Population of Japan,Group III150 5.7 15ReferenceThe Population near theTecha River, Group IThe Population near theTecha River, Group II176 3.8 30180 6.9 30107

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 3. The dependency of the number of deaths from leukemia over 105 years on radiationdoses (the numbers of the points in the Figure match the numbers in the table above.References1. Little, D. B. The Nonlinear Effects of Ionizing Radiation: Conclusions withRegard to Low-Dosage Impact [Nelineiyniye effeckty ioniziruyuschikh izlucheniy:vyvodiprimenitelno k nizokodozovym vozdeystviyam]. Radiation Biology. Radioecology. 2007.Vol. 47, No. 3, 262–272.2. Malenchenko, A. F., Sushko S. N. The Formation of Tumors Due to the CombinedEffect of Low Dose Ionizing Radiation and Chemical Carcinogens [Opukhleobrazovaniyepri sochetannom deystvii malikh doz ioniziruyuschego izlucheniya i khimicheskogokantserogena].. Izvestiya of the National Academy of Science of Belarus,Biological Science Series. 2002. No. 3, 77–81.3. Yarmonenko, S. P. The Crisis of Radiobiology and What Radiation HormesisMeans for the Future of the Field [Krizis radiobiologii i yeyo perspektivy, svyazanniye sizlucheniyem gormezisa]. Radiation Biology. Radioecology. 1997. Vol. 42, No. 2, 5–10.4. Burlakova, E. B., et al. The Effects of Low Doses of Ionizing Radiation andChemical Pollutants on Humans and the Ecosystem [Deystviye maloi dozy ioniziruyuschegoizlucheniya i khimicheskikh zagryaznitelei na cheloveka i biotu]. AtomnayaEnergiya. 1998. Vol. 85, Issue 6, 457–462.5. Byakov, V. M., Stepanov S. V. Toward the Mechanism of the Primary BiologicalEffects of Ionizing Radiation [K mekhanizmu pervichnogo biologicheskogo deyst-108

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYviya ioniziruyuschikh izlucheniy]. Ushpekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 2006. Vol. 176, No. 5,531–547.6. Zhigunova, L. N. The Formation Patterns of Nitroso-Compounds in the Environment[Zakonomernostic obrazovaniya nirozocoyedineniy v okruzhayuschei srede].Priodopolzovaniye. 1996. Issue 1. 43–48.7. Report 01.03.082/2001: “Drinking Water and Natural Water. Identifying NitriteIons Using Spectrophotometry and Applying the Griess-Ilosvay Reagent.” [Vodapitevaya i prirodnaya. Opredeleniye nitritionov spektrofotometricheskim metodom sprimeneniyem reaktiva Grissa-Ilosvaya].8. Report 01.14.165/2001. “Drinking Water and Natural Water. Identifying Nitrosodimethylamine.”[Voda pitevaya i prirodnaya. Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina].9. Report 02.14.167/2001. “Air in Our Atmosphere. Identifying Nitrosodymethylamine.”[Atmosferny vozdukh. Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina].10. Report 03.03.081/2001. “Soils: Identifying Nitrite Ions Using Spectrophotometryand the Griess-Ilosvay Reagent.” [Pochvy. Opredeleniye nitrit-ionov spektrofotometricheskimmetodom s primeniyem reaktiva Grissa-Ilosvaya].11. Report 03.14.164/2001. “Soils. Identifying Nitrosodimethylamine.” [Pochvy.Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina].12. Report 04.03.080/2001. “Food Products and Raw Materials. IdentifyingNitrate Ions Using Spectrophotometry and the Griess-Ilosvay Reagent.” [Pischeviyeprodukty i prodovolstvennoye syryo. Opredeleniye nitrit-ionov spektrofotometricheskimmetodom s primeniyem reaktiva Grissa-Ilosvaya].13. Report 04.14.163/2001. “Food Products and Raw Materials. Identifying Nitrosodimethylamine.”[Pischeviye produkty i prodovolstvennoye syryo. Opredeleniyenitrozodimetilamina].14. Report 09.03.083/2001. “Biological Organisms. Identifying Nitrate Ions UsingSpectrophotometry and the Griess-Ilosvay Reagent.” [Biologicheskiye obyekty.Opredeleniye nitrit-ionov spektrofotometricheskim metodom s primeniyem reaktivaGrissa-Ilosvaya].15. Report 09.14.166/2001. “Biological Organisms. Identifying Nitrosodimethylamine.”[Biologicheskiye obyekty. Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina].16. Sorokin, V. N. Theoretical Analysis of the Concept of Low Doses [O teoreticheskomanalize kontseptsii malikh dozi]. Proceedings of the Russian Nuclear NationalDialogue on Nuclear Energy, Society and Security. Moscow, April 18–19, 2007. Moscow:Green Cross Russia, 2007. 133–135. Or, see: www.green-cross.ru/FORUM-rus-fn.pdf.17. Burlakova, E. B., et al. The Idiosyncrasies of the Biological Effects of LowRadiation Doses [Osobennosti biologicheskikh deystivya malikh doz oblucheniya]. Burlakova,E. B., ed. The Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe: Human Health.Moscow: Rosselkhozakademiya, 1996. 149–182.109

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYReport on the Joint Agreement onTecha River Floodplain Rehabilitation betweenRosAtom and the Chelyabinsk Oblast GovernmentSvetlana KostinaDeputy Minister, Ministry for Radiation andEnvironmental Safety, Chelyabinsk OblastTatyana MeshkovaDepartment Head, Ministry for Radiation andEnvironmental Safety, Chelyabinsk OblastFigure 1. Public discussion of the program with Muslyumovo residents.In November 2006, Sergei Kiriyenko, RosAtom Director, and the ChelyabinskOblast Governor Pyotr Sumin signed the Agreement on Funding Projects to Rehabilitatethe Techa River and Provide Social Assistance to the Muslyumovo Village and Station.The Agreement provides for the joint funding of a corresponding range of projects,including the rehabilitation of the floodplain of the Techa River within the village andstation limits, resettlement of the residents of Muslyumovo and some of the residentsof the Muslyumovo Station (ul. Tselinnaya, junction [raz’ezd] 101 km) in the KunashakRayon of the Chelyabinsk Oblast. The plan includes the resettlement of 741 households,of which the expenses for 593 households will be covered by RosAtom, and 148 wouldbe paid for out of the Chelyabinsk Oblast budget. Abandoned residences would be leveled.RosAtom has agreed to allocate RUB 600 million in 2006–2007 on corrective socialand environmental projects to address the aftermath of Mayak plant activity. Theallocation includes:• RUB 7 million for Techa floodplain rehabilitation within village limits;• RUB 593 million for the resettlement of Muslyumovo residents, 593 householdsin all. One million rubles is allotted per household to be used either forthe construction of new homes, housing purchases, or monetary compensation.110

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFor its part, the Chelyabinsk Oblast government has agreed to:• Finance the construction and modernization of utility systems and the socialinfrastructure of the new village and the Muslyumovo Station in 2007–2008 inthe amount of RUB 450 million;• Oversee the completion of construction and modernization of the power supplysystem, water mains, the drainage system, telephone lines, and gas mains to thevillage and Station;• Oversee the reclassification of lands in Old Muslyumovo from the agriculturalland category to reserve lands;• Oversee the rehabilitation of the Techa River floodplain within Muslyumovovillage limits.RosAtom has created a special fund to administer the fulfillment of its responsibilities.The Fund has approved the Position Statement that identified several possible voluntaryresettlement options for the local population:• Monetary compensation upon proof of other housing (a share of living accommodations);• Independent purchase of housing or construction of a new home at a differentlocation;• Payment of costs of construction of a private home in the new division at MuslyumovoStation.By March 15, 2008, the resettlement of Muslyumovo residents followed the geographicdistribution showed in the table and in Figure. 2.Monetarycompensation, 17%Bashkortostan,Kurgan, 1%Other Rayonsin theChelyabinskOblast, 11%New divisionat theMusliumovoStation, 14%MusliumovoStation, 8%Chelyabinsk,29%KunashakRayon, 20%Figure 2. Geographic distribution of resettled Muslyumovo residents.111

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 1. Geographic Distribution of Resettled Residents (March 15, 2008)ResettlementLocationNumber ofFamiliesResettlementLocationNumber ofFamiliesChelyabinsk 120 Etkul’skii Rayon 1The Kunashak Rayon 78 Kopeisk 13Muslyumovo Station 32 Metlino 1New Division atMuslyumovo Station54 Emanzhelinsk 3Argayashskii 3 Zlatoust 1Sosnovyi Rayon 6 Korkino 2KrasnoarmeiskiiRayon8 Bashkortostan 2Ozyorsk 1 Kurgan 3Kasli 1Monetary Compensation69Novogornyi 1Figure 3. Housing construction in New Muslyumovo.112

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYCurrently, 153 new private homes are being built in the new division at MuslyumovoStation, along with utilities, a communications infrastructure, and roads (Figure 3). Thisnew division will draw its water from four wells. A water main and a water tower havealso been built. Construction has begun on the water supply system to individual sites. Inall, 6,110 linear meters of water pipes have been laid. Water supply to Muslyumovo as awhole will be improved thanks to these efforts. Biological wastewater treatment will beused for the new division and it has been designed to accommodate the increased loadfrom the new division.Works on the gas main started in 2007 and this year, the first set of homes in the newdivision will be connected to the main. In all, the gas mains will measure 9,927 meters.Road construction was also started in 2007. Road foundations were laid (gravel andcrushed rock) measuring 6.9 km. In 2008, the road building will continue. After the utilitiesare connected to the new division, the roads will be paved.In 2008, ten transformer sub-stations are scheduled to be built and homes will be connectedto the power grid. Radio links and telephone lines will also be installed.In fulfillment of the Position Statement, the Oblast government has initiated two projects:1. The rehabilitation of the floodplain of the Techa river within Muslyumovo Stationlimits (approval of the State Expert Commission Directorate of proposaldocumentation and regional plans submitted by the Oblast obtained on 02/18/08No. 129/2-552/07).Main project goals:• Preparing gravel in an open pit for conducting rehabilitation projects (neededvolume – 244,593 m³);• Repairing the road to the open pits from Muslyumovo Station for transportationof the gravel;• Shaping the Techa riverbed to prevent repeat contamination of the floodplainalong four sectors all together measuring 2 km;• Laying down isolating materials that prevent the effect of capillary action in thefloodplain;• Planting trees and shrubbery on the rehabilitated lands of the Techa floodplainon either side of the riverbed measuring 3,900 linear meters and numbering16,580 plants;• Conducting radiation monitoring and assessment of the effectiveness of the rehabilitationeffort. Total estimated cost of rehabilitating the area in 2008 priceswill be RUB 146,078,480.The planned floodplain rehabilitation efforts will help lower the risk of negative radiationeffects on local residents and will improve the environmental conditions of thecontaminated sectors of the Techa River within Muslyumovo Station limits (see Figure 4).This will be achieved by:• Containing contaminated river gravels and sediment in the Techa floodplain bycovering the contaminated materials with radiation-free gravel and shaping theriverbed by creating gravel and stone banks;• Lowering the radiation exposure rate to the maximum permissible level di-113

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYrectly on the floodplains;• Lowering the contamination level of the flora on the sectors of the floodplainbeing rehabilitated to permitted levels (to prevent the negative effects associatedwith isolated instances when cattle is left to graze in the area);• Lower public access to the river banks for the purposes of fishing, relaxation,hay preparation, or cattle grazing by using steep gravel and stone river banks anddensely planted trees and shrubbery, except on grass meadows.2. Rehabilitation of the Muslyumovo territory (approval of the State Expert Commis-Piled gravel/rock — 0.5 mCrushed stone — 0.3 mAny locally obtained gravel tointerrupt the layer of crushedrock — 0.3 mi=0.001Elevation of waterQ0.1= 143 m 3 /secElevation of waterQ0.1 = 226 m 3 /secClay layer — 1.0 mLayer of contaminatedgravelPre-existing riverbedCollector ditchContaminatedfloodplainNatural riverbottomContaminatedfloodplain~20.0~20.0Figure 4. Cross-section of the shaped Techa riverbed.sion Directorate of proposal documentation and regional plans submitted by the Oblastobtained on 02/18/08 No. 173/2-606/07).Main project goals:• Preclude the return of the current residents to their current location;• After all residents are resettled, level all structures and buildings remaining onthe grounds measuring 186,600 m³;• Bury all resulting building rubble;• Compact the disturbed ground to make it level;• Prepare gravel in an open pit for rehabilitation projects;• Deliver gravel;• Remove, transport, and distribute gravel and soil to the grounds under rehabilitation;• Plant over an area measuring 329.94 hectares for the purpose of increasing forestcover, improving the eco-health of the area, protecting soil from erosion.The total estimated cost of rehabilitation of the area in 2008 prices will be RUB187,721,150.After the completion of rehabilitation efforts on the former site of Muslyumovo Village,and partially on the grounds of Muslyumovo Station, the following will be accomplished:• Residents will not be allowed to move back into homes on the former village site114

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYor use the Techa River floodplain for agricultural purposes;• Radiation risks will be lowered for local residents living at Muslyumovo Station;• Environmental conditions will be improved thanks to rubbish burial;• Forest cover will be increased with resulting protection of land from erosionthanks to reforestation.115

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYEnvironmental Surveys and Inspections of Plots of Land for theConstruction of Single-Family Housing at the New Muslyumovo andOld Muslyumovo Resettlement ZonesVladimir KuznetzovDirector of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program,Green Cross Russia;Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences andAcademy of Industrial Ecology; andMember of RosAtom’s Public CouncilIn 2007, the staff and experts working on the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Programof Green Cross Russia conducted three environmental surveys (inspections) ofland plots, on which single-family housing will be built in New Muslyumovo, in additionto the resettlement zone of Old Muslyumovo. The surveys were commissionedby a non-profit organization called the Resettlement Assistance Fund for Residents ofMuslyumovo, Kunashak region, the Chelyabinsk Oblast.The study being discussed today was conducted from February to November 2007.The first inspection was conducted February 26 to March 1, the second inspection tookplace on May 15–19, and the third on November 21–23. The work was performed bythe Radiation Monitoring Laboratory in collaboration with the Heat and Energy Complex[TEK] Business Support Center [TsPB], a Federal State Institution [FGU], (FederalTechnical Regulation and Metrology Agency Accreditation No. 41761-2006 dated06/05/06).The inspections used the following measurement methods:• SRP-88N scintillation radiometer, factory No. 0933, verification certificateNo. 19/120-2005 valid through 08/08/07;• MKS-01R-01 radiometer dosimeter, factory No. 1005, verification certificateNo. 03-13 0380 01 valid through 08/17/07;• DBG-06T dosimeter, factory No. 3505, verification certificate No. 19/485-2006 valid through 02/15/07;• DBG-01N dosimeter, factory No. 1287, verification certificate No. 03-13 038003 valid through 08/17/07;• URS-71 specialized gamma-ray spectrometer assembly using a semiconductordetector, verification certificate No. 42010.7F539 valid through 05/25/08;• KAMERA-01 multifunctional measurement suite for radon monitoring,factory No. 0609, verification certificate No. 03 13 6124-256 valid through05/18/07.Site Information and Conditions of the First and Second InspectionsLand registered for agricultural purposes was inspected.Observations: level ground, vegetable gardens belonging to local residents, isolatedclusters of trees, household garbage and construction debris dumps were identified, areaequals 51 Ha.Meteorological conditions:• On 02/27/07, air temperature -12°С (10.4°F), no precipitation;116

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• On 02/28/07, air temperature -10°С (14°F), no precipitation;• On 03/01/07, air temperature -7°С (19.4°F), no precipitation;• On 05/15/07, air temperature 2°С (35.6°F), brief precipitation: rain andsnow;• On 05/16/07, air temperature 16°С (60.8°F), partly cloudy;• On 05/17/07, air temperature 24°С (75.2°F), no precipitation.Conclusions:1. The external gamma-ray exposure dose at the building site does not exceedthe value of 0.3 microsieverts per hour as established by Municipal RadiationSafety Territorial Construction Standards TSN PB 2003 MO (par. 5.6).2. Specific activity of naturally occurring radionuclides in the soil does not exceedthe value of 370 Bq/kg established in Radiation Safety Standards NRB-99 (par. 5.3.4) and in the Basic Sanitation Regulations for Ensuring RadiationSafety OSPORB-99 (par. 5.2.3). Displaced soil from the site can be used inagricultural activity without restrictions.3. No radiation anomalies identified.4. Radon flux density at soil surface at the site does not exceed the values establishedin OSPORB-99 (par. 5.2.3) for limit values at residential building andcommunity/consumer facility construction sites.Recommendations:1. Moderate anti-radiation protection of buildings should be used during constructionby a subcontractor.2. Control measurements of radon activity should be taken along the footprint ofthe buildings under construction.3. Implement radiation checks of property and building materials being takenout of the zone by the residents in order to prevent repeat contamination ofthe territory.Site Information and Conditions of the Third InspectionThe purpose of the third inspection was to obtain a threat assessment of contaminatedbuilding materials, household equipment and facilities, stocked animal and bird feed,pets. Other materials included other property being removed from the zone by its inhabitantseither during the process of resettlement to their new place of residence in NewMuslyumovo or in the form of items sold during the process of property liquidation, aswell as a general assessment of radioactivity of the plots of land being abandoned.The inspection covered farmland associated with the village residences. Observations:level ground, vegetable gardens belonging to local residents, isolated clusters offruit-bearing trees, residential homes and accessory structures are located on the plots.Meteorological conditions: on 11/21/07: air temperature -8°С (17.6°F), no precipitation;11/22/07: air temperature -12°С (10.4°F), gusty winds, partly cloudy; 11/23/07:air temperature -4°С (24.8°F), partly cloudy, no precipitation.Conclusions:1. The external gamma-ray exposure dose at the ground surface of a number ofproperties in Muslyumovo exceeds the value of 0.3 microsieverts per hourestablished by Municipal Radiation Safety Territorial Construction Standards117

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY2.3.4.TSN PB 2003 MO (par. 5.6).Wood components of houses, sheds, etc. that can be disassembled or are beingtaken down, can be used by the owners without restrictions.Stocked animal feed can be used by the owners without restrictions.The external gamma-ray exposure dose from foundations and brick ovens ofa number of houses in Muslyumovo exceeds the value of 0.3 microsievertsper hour established by Municipal Radiation Safety Territorial ConstructionStandards TSN PB 2003 MO (par. 5.6).Recommendations:1. Prior to relocating house materials and related objects from the contaminatedzone, it is advisable that control radiation measurements be taken of the property,building materials, etc. being taken out of the zone by the residents, withparticular attention to rubble stone taken from foundations and bricks takenfrom ovens.2. Prior to re-cultivating the abandoned land plots, control measurements need tobe taken of the gamma-ray exposure dose for soil.3. Conduct a radiation inspection of pastures parceled out to the residents ofNew Muslyumovo and set control levels for the gamma-ray exposure dose andradionuclide content in grass and hay.4. Compile and submit to the administration of New Muslyumovo a schematicmap of nearby areas with an indication of external gamma-ray exposure dosesand levels radionuclide content in the soil.5. Submit to the administration of New Muslyumovo and inform the residents ofthe results of prior technical and environmental inspections conducted at thesite of the new village during construction.6. Representatives of the Chelyabinsk Oblast RosPotrebNadzor—the FederalService for Oversight of Consumer Protection Rights and Welfare—togetherwith village administration must conduct an information campaign with thelocal residents, declaring the entirety of the floodplain zone of the Techa Riveroff-limits for any household or business purposes.7. Develop a set of visual aids and information materials discussing the detailsof living and household management in polluted territories with the goal ofreaching all population groups.8. Initiate systematic radiation monitoring of food products produced by theresidents of New Muslyumovo, especially dairy and meat. Local sanitationcontrol agencies must be brought on-board.9. Replace fencing marking the floodplain of the Techa River as an off-limitszone; put up new radiation hazard signs.10. Expedite protective measures such that the residents of the settlements alongthe Techa River stop considering the flood plain lands as attractive for agriculturalor other business activity.118

Registration of Dialogue participants.Exhibition stand detailing the work of RosAtom’s Public Council.

Natalya Brysgalova, Director of the Russian Ecological Congress, reads thegreetings to Dialogue participants from Sergei Mironov, Chairman of the RussianFederative Council.The panel at the opening of the Dialogue. From left to right: Evgeniy Evstratov,Deputy Head of RosAtom; Vladimir Grachev, Advisor to the Director of RosAtom,Member of RosAtom’s Public Council, and Corresponding Member of the RussianAcademy of Sciences; Sergey Baranovsky, President of Green Cross Russia; andIgor Konyshev, Director of RosAtom’s Department of Public Relations, PublicOrganizations and Regions Liaison Branch and Secretary of RosAtom’s PublicCouncil.

Conference participants just before the start of the Dialogue.Ms. Ola from Novgorod Slaviya TV and radio station prepares hermaterial for broadcast.

Marie Kirchner (left) and Anne-Marie Duchemin, Members of theCouncil of Development of the Pays du Cotentin, Francepresenting during the plenary session on “The Current State of andDevelopment Prospects for Atomic Energy.”Evgeniy Evstratov, Deputy Director of RosAtom, presenting his report: “ALegislative Solution for the Safe Management of Radwaste: the Most ImportantAspect of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia.”

Aleksandr Nikitin, Director of the Bellona Environmental Foundation, St.Petersburg, addresses a question to the panel.Press conference: Ms. Artyomova, from the Posev magazine asks a question.

Igor Konyshev, Director of RosAtom’s Department of Public Relations, PublicOrganizations and Regions Liaison Branch and Secretary of RosAtom’s PublicCouncil, answers questions from the audience.Ms. Katkova from ITAR-TASS asks about RosAtom’s plans for thedevelopment of nuclear energy.

Behind a photographer, Mr. Nasibov, Head of Public Relations for RosEnergoAtom(on the left) and Ms. Ulanova, from the AtomProf press office(on the right), lead the press conference.Mr. Frolov from the Dom Prirodi magazine addresses a question to the panel.

Everyone took advantage of the opportunities of the Dialogue in their own way.While most participants used the opportunity to get first-hand information and makethe necessary contacts for their work, the group EcoZashita preferred to use theirusual communication form to protest.Filming the Dialogue, for the Security Service TV station.

Ms. Yudina, Special Energy Correspondent for the Tribuna newspaper (in the leftforeground), listens closely to answers at the press conference.Kai Asbern Knutsen, from the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature,asks about RosAtom’s plans to implement an alternative energy program (toinclude wind, solar, tidal, etc.).

Mr. Shkrebets, of the Transborder Environmental News Agency (right).Panel presenters (from left to right): Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director of theNuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia, and Memberof RosAtom’s Public Council; Yuriy Cherepnin, Director of Research andDevelopment, Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering; and Mr.Nasibov, Head of Public Relations for RosEnergoAtom.

Yuriy Cherepnin, Director of Research and Development at theResearch and Design Institute for Power Engineering.Foreground from left to right: Andrey Ozarovskiy, Project Coordinator atEcoZashita, Ms. Fufaeva, Correspondent from the Bereginya newspaper, andIgor Babanin from Greenpeace Russia, St. Petersburg.

Ms. Androsenko, of Zhizin Bezopasnost, Ekologiya Publishing, St. Petersburg.At the podium – Aleksandr Chumakov, Vice President of Green Cross Russia.

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRemediation of Polluted Areas in the Ob-Irtysh BasinValery BulatovProfessor, Yugra State University, Khanti-MansiiskIntroductionThe impact of the nuclear industry on the environment, despite the considerablescope of research that has been done, has still not been fully examined. We cannot besure about all of its negative consequences, nor do we have an objective assessment ofthe prospects for this type of natural resource management. There is a constant generationof ‘global’ ( 85 Kr, radiocarbon 41 C, tritium T 2), ‘perpetual’ ( 239,240 Pu, 129 I, 241 Am) andsimply long-lived radionuclides such as cesium, strontium, and technetium, among others.The harmfulness of tritium is universally recognized, and its high levels in waterreservoirs near all major nuclear fuel cycle facilities, such as Mayak, exceed the globallevel 3–10 times over. This is evidenced by data on the plutonium remaining after nucleartests at the Semipalatinsk test site and the plutonium that gradually accumulates in thenatural environments surrounding nuclear hubs.Unfortunately, today’s level of knowledge does not allow us to fully assess all ofthe consequences of radionuclides in the biosphere. The direct consequences of the absenceof objective information are, on the one hand, disregard for the true dangers ofliving in a zone of heightened radiation risk, and a staunch fear of radiation on the otherhand. Our many years of experience in evaluating the knowledge level in conditions ofrestricted information speak to these drawbacks (1, 2). Examples include the contradictionsbetween published data on victims of nuclear incidents, risk levels, health statisticsfor the employees of the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, and many other aspects. It sufficesto compare two of the most recent general publications in Russia, such as those of VladimirKuznetsov and Anatolii Nazarov (3), and Mikhail Tikhonov and Mikhail Rylov (4).All information on radioecology in nuclear regions must be made accessible.The Ob-Irtysh Basin as a Subject of Radioecological Research.The Ob-Irtysh basin covers essentially the same large area known as Western Siberia.In line with the principles of spatial analysis and the goals of radioecologicalresearch, the basin, the Gulf of Ob, the Kara Sea and the Novaya Zemlya archipelagoshould be considered part of the same territory. This meets the principles of aquaticterritorialdifferentiation and integration of the north of Eurasia, a once popular view ofthe so-called Middle Region, which included all of Western Siberia and the correspondingsection of the Arctic, the Kazakh Uplands and Central Asia, with its mountainousterrain.In fact, we are really introducing a new concept of a radioecological region. It iscommon knowledge that a region is, essentially, not something administrative, but rather119

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYa natural, historic concept that unites entire natural, territorial and historical regions,basins, natural zones that define the idiosyncrasies of different ethnic lifestyles, the waythey are formed, they way they develop, and the way in which different ethnicities migrate.Dividing up a region into federal districts and economic districts without anyaccount for the features of the biosphere can only produce temporary, transitory results,which is confirmed by recurring talk of administrative reforms. Anthropological activityconstitutes one integrating factor; in our case this means the varying degree of radioactiveimpact and related environmental, geographical, technical, energy-related, biological,medical, political and economic manifestations and influences on the biosphereand society in the region and at the level of the basin. Environmental management inline with ISO-14001 involves the analysis of the spatial organization of human activity,which is impossible without accounting for the existence of geological systems of riverbasins and beds based on topographical planning and zoning methods. The universalrecognition of the basin approach is based on the functional role of water ecosystemsand water as a component of the natural environment that sustains life, much like therole blood plays in the body.The Ob-Irtysh system is unique, because it is the first territory used for nucleartesting and where industrial production of radioactive materials was initially based. It isalso the first to experience a nuclear accident. The timeframes are as follows: the Semipalatinsktest site — 1949–1989; the Novaya Zemlya test site — 1954–1992; Lobnor(located outside of the region) — 1964–1995; Totsky (one nuclear test) — 1954; Mayak— since 1948; Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) — since 1953; Novosibirsk ChemicalConcentrate Combine (NZKhK) — since 1949; Urals Electrochemical Combine —since 1949; Ulbin Metal Processing Plant — since 1949; Beloyarsk NPP — since 1984;and, underground nuclear explosions — 1970s–1980s (see Table 1 and Figure 1).From the viewpoint of a geo-radioecological topographical analysis, the territoryhas the following distinguishing features:• Surrounded by three nuclear test sites that underwent many years of use:Novaya Zemlya, Semipalatinsk, and Lobnor (see Figure 2);• Two world-scale nuclear centers with both active and inactive nuclear reactors:Mayak (7) and SKhK (5), an accumulation of manmade biohazardousradioactive waste (radwaste) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) with activity measuredat several billion Ci;• The area also features major uranium metal processing, nuclear fuel, and highlyenriched uranium plants: Urals Electrochemical Combine (city of Novouralsk,the Sverdlovsk Oblast), Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Combine (Novosibirsk),the Kazakh Virgin Mining and Chemical Combine (Stepnogorsk) andUlbin Metal Processing Plant (Ust-Kamenogorsk);120

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 1. Pollution of the Ob Basin, by Republic and RegionRF Constituents / Country Reservoir Area Polluted Landskm 2 , in thousands % km 2 ,thou.% pollutionlevel, %Republic of Altai 92.6 3.0 0.8 0.3 0.9Altai Krai 169.1 5.4 10.2 4.3 6.0Republic of Bashkortostan 1.9 0.1 0.6 0.2 31.6Kemerovo Oblast 95.5 3.1 30.0 12.7 31.4Krasnoyarsk Krai 94.0 3.0 11.5 4.9 12.2Kurgan Oblast 71.0 2.3 8.9 3.8 12.5Novosibirsk Oblast 178.2 5.7 18.8 7.9 10.5Omsk Oblast 139.7 4.5 26.1 11.0 18.7Orenburg Oblast 2.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0Perm Oblast 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Sverdlovsk Oblast 164.0 5.3 40.3 17.0 24.6Tomsk Oblast 316.9 10.2 3.7 1.6 1.2Tyumen Oblast 161.8 5.2 6.6 2.8 4.1Republic of Khakasia 15.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.3Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous523.1 16.9 5.8 2.4 1.1OkrugChelyabinsk Oblast 57.0 1.8 24.9 10.5 43.7Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous111.1 3.6 0.2 0.1 0.2OkrugRussia 2,194.4 70.7 188.6 79.7 8.6Kazakhstan 784.1 25.3 47.7 20.1 6.1China 123.0 4.0 0.5 0.2 0.4Total Basin Territory 3,101.5 100 236.8 100 7.6• Operations at nuclear weapons facilities: Zlatoust-36 (city of Trekhgorny, PriborostroitelnyFactory), Sverdlovsk-44, Sverdlovsk-45 (city of Lesnoi, ElektrokhimpriborPlant), and Snezhinsk;• The Beloyarsk NPP (3 reactors) and potential construction of stations in theChelyabinsk and Tomsk Oblasts;• Mining and processing of uranium and other minerals (the Sverdlovsk Oblast,Novogorny), North Kazakhstan (Stepnogorsk), the Kurgan Oblast (Dolmatovo)(exploration);• Use of ionizing radiation sources and accumulation of low- and mid-level wastesat the regional Radon combines: Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, and Chelyabinsk;• Underground nuclear explosions: the Orenburg Oblast – 5; the Khanti-Mansiisk121

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 1. Location of key nuclear fuel cycle facilities and radioecological impact on the region.Autonomous Okrug, Yugra – 5; the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 2;the Kemerovo Oblast – 1; the Tyumen Oblast – 1; the Semipalatinsk Oblastand the Ust-Kamenogorsk Oblast in Kazakhstan (outside of the testing area atthe Azgir site – 5);• Scientific research centers and institutions with nuclear reactors and installations:Yekaterinburg, Tomsk, Novosibirsk;• Radiation accidents and incidents: Chelyabinsk (1950–1951 in Techa, 1957in Kyshtym and 1967 in Karachayevo); Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan), Altai(1949), Tomsk (1993), on-site at the 1980 Angara underground nuclear explosion(2001–2002, the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, Yugra);• Accumulated natural radionuclides as the result of oil extraction in the form ofoil slime, polluted formation water, salt sediments (up to 5% of deposits demonstrateanomalous emissions), continual contamination of industrial equipmentand pipes, clumping of natural radionuclides associated with mining andcombustion of black coal (drilling waste disposal sites, ash disposal sites);• The creation of manmade, unauthorized burial sites during geological surveyand exploratory works;• The transfer of radionuclides in rivers to a point of concentration via theSalekhard and further to the Ob Bay and the Kara Sea, which during the ColdWar was transformed by the military into the largest burial site for both liquidand solid radwaste.The south is a zone in which the following materials are actively transported: fissilematerial, fuel assemblies, SNF, and warehoused nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the north122

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYis where the nuclear fleet and nuclear submarines are active (the Kara Sea, the NovayaZemlya test site, the Ob Bay, and Yenisei Bay). Furthermore, the proponents of acceleratedconstruction of new nuclear icebreakers ought to hurry up, as the ice in the Arctic ismelting quickly; icebreakers will not be needed at all by 2020.Figure 2. The Novaya Zemlya test site.Another important issue is the emergence of objective data on the presence ofcause-and-effect relations between radionuclide pollution and the appearance of malignanttumors in the regions affected by nuclear testing and areas where nuclear installationsare located (Altai Krai, Tomsk, Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk, the Orenburg Oblast,the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and North Kazakhstan). The results of publichealth and medical and biological analyses show that to a large degree, the impact radiationhas on health strengthens the influence of poor public health factors. This requiresallocating additional funds for fundamentally improving the living conditions and qualityof life for those who live in polluted areas.Pollution and Radioecological Conditions in the RegionLet us begin with an analysis of the radioecological conditions in the Arctic North.Research in the Kara Sea conducted by Russian and Norwegian expeditions have pro-123

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYduced data indicated marked local pollution at 137Cs , 90Sr and Pu in all areas where radioactivewaste was submerged, in particular the submersion of a nuclear reactor containingSNF in the Novaya Zemlya trench. Additionally, research confirmed the radioactive pollutionof the mouths of the Ob and Yenisei rivers from past activity of nuclear fuel cyclefacilities in Siberia (see Figure 3). Studies show that radioactive pollution levels in theKara Sea are much higher than in the eastern section of the Barents Sea. These studiesare still underway (5).The use of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) at waterway facilities(radio beacon stations) and autonomous weather stations began in the 1970s. Generalactivity levels of the RTGs launched in the USSR (roughly 1,500), including 90 Y, amountto nearly 100 million Ci. Based on the most recent data, levels in the Arctic are at 381,303 along Northern seaway, of which about 100 in Taimyr, 153 in Northwest Russia (theBarents and White Seas), and about 100 in the Kara Sea. These are used by the RussianNavy, Rosgidromet and the National Hydrographical Company of the Russian Ministryof Transport, which services the northern seas. They run based on 90 Sr with an activitylevel of 5,000–170,000 Ci. There is a great deal of information about the problems relatedto lost, unclaimed, spent and broken RTGs, and adding some order to this particularaspect is one of the key factors in rehabilitating the territory.Now let us examine the continental north of Western Siberia. An inadvertent increasein the general ionizing radiation background on large territories may cause changesin the genotypic makeup of human populations, a phenomenon of which we wereforewarned by Nikolai Timofeyev-Resovsky, a Soviet geneticist. One example herecomes from research by the Novosibirsk Science Center under the Russian Academy ofScience branch in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, which leads to the followingconclusions (6):1. Study of radionuclides and heavy metals content in the ecosystem on an area ofover 230,000 km 2 (1/3 of the territory of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug) hasshown that long-lived radioactive isotopes of global, regional and local fallout fromnuclear testing at USSR and US sites, the largest and most frequent of which were conductedin the 1960s, constitute a key factor in anthropogenic pollution. The proximity ofthe Krasnoselkupsk and Purovsk districts in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug tothe Novaya Zemlya test site gives reason to believe that it is the main source of artificialradionuclides on the surveyed area. In general, strontium and cesium activity levels inthe ecosystem of northern West Siberia are higher than in the south of this region. Thatfact does not fit neatly into the universally recognized concept of lower pollution levelsin Russian territories close to the Arctic compared to regions along lower latitudes. Thecontribution of forest fires to secondary radionuclide and heavy metal migration, resultingin the pollution of new areas, has also been proven.2. Strontium and cesium were found to be present everywhere in venison, which isa key element in the lichen–deer–human food chain for the indigenous population, andas a result it was and continues to be subjected to chronic internal exposure to radiation(although to a much lower degree). Cytogenetic research both in the representativegroup of indigenous residents (tundra and forest Nenets, Selkup and Komi peoples) andthe group of migrants who settled in the North long ago have shown a considerable statisticallyreliable increase both in the general level of chromosomal aberrations as wellas specific radioactive impact markers (ring and dicentric chromosomes).3. Indicators gleaned from general blood analysis together with cytogenetic and im-124

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYmunological (secondary immuno-deficient conditions) are similar to those of residentsof areas directly affected by radiation. Especially pessimistic indicators have been notedamong the older generation, which may be explained by short-lived radionuclides thatdealt the main blow in terms of exposure during the years of active nuclear testing.4. The detection of circulating cesium in biological cultures, including from breastmilk, placentas and urine samples from the female population (1–44 Bq/kg) demonstratesthat a growing fetus, even at the earliest stages of development, is affected byionizing radiation, which could result in serious consequences for the gene pool of thefuture generations of the indigenous peoples. This is evidenced by an increase in the frequencyof fetal developmental defects and dysmorphogenesis. Also on the rise are visionproblems and the incidence of nervous and psychological disorders. Indigenous womenare experiencing a higher rate of pregnancy and labor complications (6).Lost sources of radioisotopes are scattered throughout the oil and gas regions ofthe north and middle areas of Western Siberia. In Yugra alone (Khanti-Mansiisk AutonomousOkrug) over 200 plutonium and beryllium sources of isotopic radiation hadbeen left inside exploratory and survey wells (7). Their total number in Western Siberia,based on estimates, is already over 1,000, and they are primarily concentrated in the oiland gas regions (see Figure 3). A source of increased anomalous accumulation of naturalradionuclides is the combustion of black coal at the heat power plants in major cities.The south and central areas of the Ob-Irtysh basin are encircled by emissions fromthe Siberian Chemical Combine in the southeast, and Mayak in the southwest. Theirconvergence and accumulation in the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, where theOb and Irtysh Rivers join, has only been examined in recent years (8). Calculations havebeen prepared of radionuclide migration and accumulation in bottom sediments. Eachyear, the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug receives 480 GBq of 137 Cs by way of theOb River, and 41 GBq through the Irtysh River. For 90 Sr those indicators are 15,744 GBqand 920 GBq, respectively. Total radioactivity levels in the Ob and Irtysh Rivers, are2–3 times lower than public health standards, but even then we can speak of the transregionaltransfer of radionuclides, namely through the Techa-Iset-Tobol river system.Concerted efforts are required to neutralize this phenomenon. Rivers, small waterwaysand lakes close to nuclear centers suffer from relatively high levels of pollution, which issubstantiated by no small volume of data. In addition to the rivers mentioned above, theShagan River (near the Semipalatinsk test site), the Chernilshchik waterway and the RomashkaRiver (Tomsk) are the other affected rivers in the Trans-Urals. The appearanceof radionuclides from Kazakhstan in adjacent areas of Russia is essentially cross-bordertransfer. Intergovernmental-level agreements are needed to resolve the issue of pollutiontransfer along the Tobol, Ishim, Irtysh and other rivers. The Irtysh River, which passesthrough the territories of three different countries, is unique in this regard.125

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 3. Lost sources of radionuclides in boreholes(Yugra, the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug).The Siberian Chemical Combine: Operations at the Siberian Chemical Combine(SKhK) generated a large amount of liquid and solid radwaste and aerosol emissions.Radwaste activity levels are estimated at 1,130 million Ci, of which 404.4 million cubicmeters are liquid radwaste stored in underground beds (900 million Ci). There are alsopulp storage facilities, storage pools, and reservoirs, for a total of 50 storage facilities.The polluted area is estimated at 1,039 hectares. The impact of atmospheric emissionshas been recorded within a radius of 30–40 kilometers from the Combine. Soil and plantsamples have yielded measurements of U, 239 Pu, 137 Cs, 90 Sr and 90 Y that greatly exceedbackground radiation levels. Furthermore, the accumulation level is steadily movingupward (9, 10). The components of the Nizhniy Tom ecosystem have been found toinclude 35 anthropogenic radionuclides of activated and fission-fragment sources; thewater and the flora and fauna feature both long-lived and short-lived anthropogenic radionuclides(11).The activity levels of the SKhK radwaste that is pumped to a depth of 280–400meters to the upper sediment layers of the lower Paleogenic era is measured at 900 millionCi and forms a complex hydro-geotechnical system, a detailed description of whichis available (12). The great optimism of the authors with regard to the stability of thesystem is challenged by the interconnection of buffer beds, poorly sealed injection wells,escaping gas, and radioactive liquid seeping to the surface over the years, accompaniedby high-temperatures generated by waste burial sites, polluting rivers. The accumulationof nuclear hazardous fissile nuclides in reservoir beds means the possibility of criticallyhigh concentrations and the possibility of spontaneous chain reactions of fissile materialsunder autocatalyst conditions (3).126

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMayak: The overall radioactivity of the waste produced at Mayak exceeds 37 EBq(1 bln Ci) and the increase in active waste, one-third of which are high-level liquidwastes, amounts to 4×10 6 Ci per year. Since 1948, 1.8×1017 Bq (0.9×10 7 Ci) radionuclideshave been introduced to the environment, and almost half a million people havebeen exposed to elevated radiation dosages. According to Bellona’s data, the pollutedMayak site measures 452 km 2 , and if you include the surrounding territories, that increasesto 25,000 km 2 (13). Other sources say that 1,680 km 2 of Mayak territory is polluted.The geological medium of Lake Karachai, which covers an area of 2,700 m 2 , ismassively polluted. Four million cubic meters of bedrock at depths of up to 100 metersare polluted, and the water lens is flowing toward the Mishelyak River.More precise data should be included in the total remediation plan for pollutedterritories, but it has never been included in the Ministry of Nuclear Energy’s information,nor is it included in current RosAtom’s concepts or regional programs. The fundsallocated for rehabilitation in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, which have been increasing overthe past several years, primarily concern the social infrastructure: housing, hospitals,roads and endless complaints about the lack of funds on the part of the key guilty partiesof this tragedy.Some cities are suffering from comparatively heavy pollution. In Novosibirsk, forexample, on the premises of the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Combine (NZKhK),19.8 hectares are polluted. The radioecological conditions in many cities require constantattention in relation to the use of ionizing radiation sources, the storage of hazardouswastes, and the proximity of hazardous industrial production, such as in Novoaltai,Ozyorsk, Tomsk, and other areas (1, 9, 10).It is known that radioecological problems, such as radionuclide transfer, are transborderproblems. That is why attention must always be focused on North Kazakhstan,as it comprises the southern underbelly of the radioecological region. The area of themining industry, balanced ores, and reprocessing tailings here cover an area of nearly30 km 2 , and their mass is measured at approximately 200 million m 3 . The AkmolinskOblast (in the Stepnogorsk Rayon) stands out among other administrative regions, as itfeatures 800 hectares with 45 million tons of fine-grained radioactive pulp that turns todust without constant water supply. This pulp has activity levels of 150,000 Ci.The following data have been found for the Semipalatinsk test site, which is nowin the Eastern Kazakhstan region: the volumes of debris and soil amount to 12.3 milliontons, and the activity level of the surface pollution was measured at 11,600 Ci, undergroundcavities formed by contained underground nuclear explosions (220 of them)measured 12.87 million Ci. The volume of the most hazardous plutonium-polluted areasis measured at 5,000 m 3 , including surface sediments on the sites of former thermonucleartests. As much as 100 km 2 of surface grounds require recultivation. Meanwhile,only 40% of the entire test site has been examined in detail for pollution (3).A considerable volume of radiobiological and radioecological research on the testsite was carried out by the Institute for Radiation Safety and Ecology under the NationalNuclear Center of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Institutewas established in 1993. The unique features of this facility, a former test site, is that itprovides an opportunity to study the natural population, the ecosystem, hydromorphicand water ecosystems under conditions of constant exposure to small doses of radiation,the migration of radionuclides in the soil and plant system and through the food chain.127

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAn assessment of the consequences of nuclear tests on the surface and subsoil watersis underway, with a special focus on the appearance of tritium in the Irtysh ecosystem,beyond the Semipalatinsk test site. An assessment of the radioecological conditions atBalapan, Degelen, Opytnoye Polye, and Atomnoye Ozero sites are of special interest(14, 15).Remediation ProgramsAs regards remediation programs, they should be defined according to their scientific,technical, industrial, territorial and social aspects, in terms of improving health andthe quality of life for local residents. This is well demonstrated in the example of thelong-term National Comprehensive Target Program for social and radiation rehabilitationof the public and territories of the Urals region affected by operations at Mayak.This program began in the mid-nineties and faces the same tasks today, confirming Engels’words that once we have committed a crime against nature, we will be forced toperpetuate it forever. A testament to this is the fact, for example, that since 1996, not oneradioecological problem faced by the South Urals has been resolved. These problemshave been discussed and written about, including by the author [of this presentation] inhis monograph entitled Radioactive Russia, published in 1996.Russia’s liquid radwaste situation is only growing worse and warrants attention(16). As Kuznetsov and Nazarov have noted, the problems of supporting today’s levelof safety and long-term safety in storage pools and reservoirs for this waste is a questionfor science. A few of them have been listed below as examples.1. Detailed studies [have been conducted] of qualitative and quantitative radionuclidemade-up of liquid radwaste in storage pools, as well as their morphological,hydrological and biological properties. An analysis has shown that plantoperators do not have sufficiently complete information about liquid radwastestorage pools. Data about their accumulating activity levels, the different typesof activity demonstrated by different types of radionuclides, and radionuclidecontent in water and floor sediments have not been examined sufficiently, andcontradictory data can be found in a variety of sources;2. Research on the behavior of radionuclides in radioactive nuclide storagepools, including studies of the radiation and chemical reactions of the macrocomponentsof liquid radwaste and radwaste in floor sediment, research of themigratory paths of radionuclides from reservoirs into the environment;3. Research of the processes that bring radioactive aerosols that form on the surfaceof the water in liquid radwaste storage pools into the surface level of theatmosphere and the wind processes that carry radionuclides away from thebanks of their storage facilities;4. Forecasting of long-term behavior of artificial and natural barriers, as wellas the potential radiation consequences given closed liquid radwaste storagefacilities under normal conditions and given unfavorable scenarios (3).The scientific and technical set of issues should include the development ofmethods and installations for reprocessing and conditioning liquid radwaste accumulatedin storage pools, including floor sediments and water, as well as methods and technologiesfor phasing out these storage facilities, determining the methods and parametersof radiation control at all stages of the phasing-out process for liquid radwaste storagepools, and subsequent monitoring.128

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYBut when the conditions are such that there are no opportunities to simply shutdown operations and remove the facilities, solutions must be found in order to accomplishthree main tasks, which are (3):1. Accident prevention and employee protection, protection of the public andthe environment against the consequences of potential accidents. The actionsthat are taken should be based on a hazard (risk) analysis specific to liquidradwaste storage pools and optimization studies (assessments of the impact ofalternative options on safety and the environment) aimed at lowering risks.2. Ceasing dumping into liquid radwaste storage pools. A thorough analysisshould be conducted of the sources of the waste, and detailed programs mustbe designed for lowering the quantity of waste until it is eliminated altogether.Remediation of territories housing liquid radwaste storage pools and subjected tothe impact thereof involves two main, related tasks:• Taking short-term and mid-term measures to rehabilitate the environment inorder to lower, or if possible eliminate, the most significant hazards (risks), forexample those related to the dispersal by wind and migration of radionuclidesin soil and subsoil water;• Taking long-term measures to resolve problems concerning the managementof accumulated radwaste and radioactive waste that forms during remediationefforts. These rehabilitation principles are repeated in dozens of publicationson the Southern Urals, a world leader in terms of radioactive pollution.The territorial and social component of the program includes several positions(17). The following measures have been proposed: lowering the level of public exposureto radiation and making agricultural production meet radiation contamination standards;step-by-step rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive pollution, bringing territoriesback up to agricultural standards; lowering the risk of forest fires and the transferof radionuclides from more polluted areas; increasing production of vitamin-rich foodstuffswith preventative and medicinal properties, lower vitamin deficiencies, strengthenimmunities, improve public health; gradually return radionuclide-polluted forest landsto productive use; ensure the best and fullest use of forest resources on polluted territorieswith account for radiation safety requirements; isolate areas with the highest levelsof radioactive pollution in the Techa River Valley, and cultivate pastures and meadowsalong riverbanks and degraded land areas.Other practical measures are planned to, first and foremost, ensure continuous monitoringof the state of environmental pollution, the levels of radioactive impact on thepublic in the Urals region, and monitoring of the local diet, drinking water, and food andproduce from local farms and businesses. Next, actions should be carried out in order tolower the risk of future radiation accidents at Mayak, thus preventing any possible futureradioactive impact on the public or environment. Third, we must lower the level of socialand psychological tension among those living on or near radiation polluted territories.The federal- and regional-level target programs for social and radiation rehabilitationof the local residents and the territory of the Urals affected by Mayak’s operationswould be of a compensatory nature. To fully restore life-as-normal, conditions must becreated for improving investment activities and developing the local economy. This alsorequires some additional research in order to deal with the economic advisability of extensiveagricultural use of lands, forests, and reservoirs experiencing different degrees of129

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYradionuclide pollution. It is advisable across all levels to begin to search for and consideralternative options for resolving this massive, complex problem (17).The need for these measures, which are absolutely correct, is voiced constantly atall different levels of management and scientific support for remediation. But how doesthe implementation of these measures look in reality? We can look to the example of theresettlement of Muslyumovo village on the Techa River. These actions are being takennow: 50 years too late.General Scientific, Financial and Social Aspects of RehabilitationMany scientific proposals, models and concepts are not used in assessing the nuclearindustry’s contribution to destabilization of the environment. At the Russian Academyof Sciences alone, nearly 400 projects on radiation and the environment are underway,but many environmentally significant works are traditionally not made accessible to thepublic. There have been almost no studies done on the real economics of the nuclearindustry, while talk of the low-cost of nuclear energy is for the simpletons. There is noresearch on external factors, the negative environmental and economic consequenceswhich have not been taken into account by the main players in these operations.The widespread use of nuclear energy in a number of countries has made it a relevantissue on the international arena in terms of its demand for natural resources. Thetopic at hand is the composition of national and regional “environmental legacies,”i.e., what is needed to provide sustenance for each person, and biological productivityin specific areas, including in basins and radioecologically defined regions. Since theecosystem possesses minimal abilities to assimilate nuclear energy waste, their accumulationdirectly demonstrates the need to search out sustainable energy alternatives.Environmental footprint numbers rise sharply in accident situations, and this is wherewe make our nuclear environmental footprint, including the accumulated levels of activityper capita, the area of affected land, and nuclear risk figures. On the other hand, onemust consider the lack of CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gasses that represent amajor drawback of traditional energy. These calculations still have yet to be completed,including as a part of the Global Environmental Footprint network.Any rehabilitation efforts, especially in such a complex and dangerous field, musthave a strong scientific and material basis. Scientific aspects have been covered above,let us now address the financial aspects.Considering the regional principle of building budget relations, it would be appropriateto say that radioecological problems in the territories of Russia and Kazakhstannear the Ob-Irtysh basin have reached an urgent, critical point (see Table 2). The cost ofthese measures as a whole is given in USD at an exchange rate of 25 rubles to the dollar.The following have been used in order to determine expenses: the author’s materials(18), Bellona’s data (13), information from the monograph (3), and actual expenses forclean-up efforts in the areas affected by the Angara underground nuclear explosion inYugra (19).In total, the rehabilitation efforts will require nearly USD 1.4 billion, which is comparablewith the cost of one nuclear reactor, and the program for nuclear energy development(the NPP Roadmap) already envisages about 15 new reactors. Overcoming thelegacy of the Cold War requires expenses – this holds true for all.130

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 2. Critical Radioecological Problems in the Russian Federation andKazakhstan in Areas Located in the Ob-Irtysh Basin.RegionAltai Krai and the Republicof AltaiThe Kemerovo OblastThe Novosibirsk OblastThe Tomsk OblastThe Orenburg OblastThe Chelyabinsk OblastThe Sverdlovsk OblastEstimatedExpensesUSD 4 mlnUSD 1 mlnUSD 6 mlnUSD 400 mlnUSD 12 mlnUSD 890 mlnUSD 10 mlnKey Problems and EffortsRemediation of land affected by nucleartesting at the Semipalatinsk test site;clean-up efforts at (containment of) theberyllium storage facility.Rehabilitation of dumping sites withnaturally-occurring radionuclides frommining and burning coal.Upgrading the Radon combine. Conservationof tailings storage facilities, cleanupefforts at industrial sites and publichealth zones at the Novosibirsk ChemicalConcentrate Combine.Phasing out nuclear facilities, eliminationand conservation of radwaste storagefacilities, rehabilitation of industrial sitesof the Siberian Chemical Combine andthe Tom River floodplain.Conservation and clean-up of undergroundcavities caused by undergroundnuclear explosions, decontamination ofoil and gas equipment, deep burial ofradwaste.Phasing out nuclear and radiation facilitiesthat present hazards, closing downor conserving radwaste storage facilities,open reservoirs with liquid radwaste, rehabilitationof industrial areas and publichealth zones near Mayak, the premises ofthe Russian National Scientific ResearchInstitute of Technical Physics, the radwastestorage facility in Trekhgorny, andmodernization of Radon.Modernization of the Radon specializedcombine, phasing out nuclear materialstorage facilities and the radwaste combinein the city of Lesnoi, conservation ofmonazite storage facilities.131

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Khanti-Mansiisk AutonomousOkrug and theTyumen OblastThe Yamalo-Nenets AutonomousOkrugKara Sea and the Gulf ofObNorth KazakhstanTotal Ob-Irtysh Basin areaUSD 6 mlnUSD 5 mlnUSD 15 mlnUSD 30 mlnUSD 8 mlnLand remediation and monitoring atunderground nuclear explosion sites;decontamination of oil and gas equipmentcontaminated with natural radionuclides,deep burial of radioactive waste, monitoringthe transport of radionuclides in theIrtysh and Ob rivers from Mayak and theSiberian Chemical Combine.Conservation and monitoring at undergroundnuclear explosion sites; decontaminationof gas and oil equipment.Survey and neutralization of nuclearinstallations and radwaste disposed underwater, general monitoring.Rehabilitation of the Semipalatinsk testsite, underground nuclear explosion sites,tailing storage facilities at the StepnogorskMining and Chemical Combineand the Ulbinsk Plant.Creation of a common basin system ofradioecological monitoring and accidentprevention (the EU’s TACIS project andTyphoon, Russia).As regards rehabilitation programs, one should bear in mind plans to develop anuclear complex along the borders of the Ob-Irtysh radioecological region: the Roadmapincludes plans for construction of a South Urals NPP near Mayak, a nuclear heatingplant in Seversk, and new reactors at the Beloyarsk NPP. In connection with thoseplans, there are also plans for a plant to manufacture MOX fuel at the Siberian ChemicalCombine and uranium mines in the Kurgan Oblast, the Pripolyarny Urals, etc. We won’tdiscuss the pressing environmental issue of radiation monitoring in the Ob-Irtysh basin(see Figure 4), although this international project is actively underway at the Russianand EU levels, which is why it is included in the summary table above.132

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 4. The sites of future radioecological monitoring stations.In conclusion, I would like to mention the need to include a radiation componentin all regional Russian and North Kazakhstan nature conservation programs and agreementson the protection of water resources, including intergovernmental agreements.It would be interesting to think through a potential Intergovernmental Ob-Irtysh Basinradioecological agreement on a scientific level, integrating the efforts of the scientificcommunity, independent experts and representatives of the public.References1. Bulatov, V.I. Radioactive Russia [Rossiya radioaktivnaya]. Novosibirsk: Ts-ERIS, 1996. 270.2. Bulatov, V.I. Tasks of Geography and Geoecology under Conditions of GrowingRadioactivity in Russia. Questions of Radioecology and Interdisciplinary Topics[Zadachi geografii i geoekologii v usloviyakh vozrastaniya pressa radioaktivnosti naterritorii Rossii]. Issue 11. Zarechny, 2008. 130–156.3. Kuznetsov, V.M. and Nazarov, A.G. The Radioactive Legacy of the Cold War.Historical and Scientific Research Experience [Radiatsionnoye naslediye “kholodnoivoiny.” Opyt isotriko-nauchnogo issledovaniya]. Moscow: Klyuch-S Publishing House,2006. 720.4. Tikhonov, M.N. and Rylov, M.I. A Comprehensive Assessment of the Nuclearand Radioactive Legacy in Russia. Problems Facing the Environment and Natural Resources.An Overview [Kompleksnaya otsenka yaderno-radiatsinnogo naslediya Rossii.Problemy okruzhayuschei sredi i prirodnikh resursov. Obzornaya informatsiya]. 2007.No. 3. 77–110.133

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY5. Environmental Studies of the Kara and Eastern Section of the Barents Sea[Issledovaniya okruzhayuschei sredi Karskogo i vostochnoi chasti Barentsoeva Morya].Bulletin l. Programs, Nuclear and Radiation Safety. 1999. No. 3. 16–18.6. Osipova, L.P., Ponomareva, A.V., and Matveyeva, V.G., et.al. As assessmentof the impact of manmade radionuclides on the genetic pool and health of the northernpeoples [Otsenka vliyaniya tekhnogennikh radionuklidov na genofond i zdorovye severnikhnarodov]. Radiation Safety in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): Materials from the2nd Republican Scientific Conference, Yakutsk, YaFGU Russian Academy of SciencesPublications, 2004. 134–168.7. Starikov, V.D., Merino, V.I. Radiation Ecology [Radiatsionnaya ekologiya].Tyumen: Tyumen Printing House, 2007, 400.8. Trapeznikov, A.V., Korzhavin, A.V., Nikolkin, V.N., et. al. Radioecologicaland hydrochemical monitoring of the Ob-Irtysh river system along the boundaries of theKhanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug [Radioekologicheskikh i gidrokhimicheskiy monitoringOb-Irtyshskoi rechnoi systemy v tranitsakh Khanty-Mansiiskogo avtonomnogookruga]. Questions of Radioecology and Interdisciplinary Topics. Issue 10, Nizhnevartovsk,2007. 76–102.9. Yazikov, E.G. The Ecological Geochemistry of Urban Territories in South Siberia[Ekogeokhimiya urganizirovannikh territoriy yuga Zapadnoi Sibiri]. Monograph:doctoral dissertation. geological sciences. Tomsk, 2006. 47.10. Arkhangelskaya, T.A. A Retrospective assessment of the radioecologicalsituation based on the results of studies of trees [Retrospektivnaya otsenka radioekologicheskoisituatsii po resultatam izlucheniya godovykh kolets sresov derevev]. Monograph:doctoral dissertation, geological sciences. Tomsk, 2004. 23.11. Toropov, A.V., Accumulations of manmade radionuclides by ecosystem componentsin Nizhny Tom [Nakopleniye tekhnogennikh radionuklidov komponentamy ekosystemyNizhnei Tomi]. Monograph: doctoral dissertation, geological sciences. Novosibirsk,2006. 22.12. Zubkov, A.A., Rybalchenko, A.I., Rumyantsev, V.G., et. al. An analysis ofthe geotechnological monitoring system on the site of deep geological burial of liquidradwaste from the Siberian Chemical Combine [Analiz systemy geotekhnologicheskogomonitoringa poligona podzemnogo zakhoroneniya zhidkikh radioaktivnikh otkhodovSKhK]. Mineral Resource Survey and Conservation, 2007, No. 11. pp 56–61.13. The Russian Nuclear Industry: A Need for Reform [Rossiiskaya atomnayapromiyshlennost: neobkhodimost reform.]. Bellona Report No. 4, 2004. 207.14. Sarsenbayev, K.N. Research conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Site bythe Institute of Radiation Safety and Ecology [Ob isseldovaniyakh, provedeyonnikhna Semipalatinskom ispytatelnom poligone Institutom radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti iekologiya]. Transforming Socioeconomic Space and the Outlook for Sustainable Developmentin Russia: Materials from the international scientific conference. Barnaul, 2006.235–243.15. Subbotin, S.V., Lukashenko, S.N., Sarsenbayev, K.N., Pestov, E.Y. On TritiumPollution of Surface Waters of the Shagan River and Radioactive Pollution of SubsurfaceWaters on the Degelen Site of the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site [O zagryaznienii tritiyempoverkhnostnikh vod reki Shagan i radioaktivnoye zagryazneniye podzemnikh vodna polschadke “Degelen” byvshego Semipalatinskogo ispytatelnogo poligona]. TransformingSocioeconomic Space and the Outlook for Sustainable Development in Russia:134

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMaterials from the international scientific conference. Barnaul, 2006. 255–243.16. Bulatov, V.I. Liquid Radioactive Waste in Russia. Science for Democratic Action.Vol. 7. No. 4. July 1999. р. 1, 15-16.17. Mayak: Rehabilitation for the Public and the Land. Civil Protection [Reabilitatsianaseleniya i territorii]. 2007. No. 3, 4. 42-43.18. Bulatov, V.I. Russia: The Environment and the Army [Rossiya: ekologiya iarmiya]. Novosibirsk: TsERIS, 1998. 152.19. A preliminary assessment of the state of radiation safety in the areas in whichunderground nuclear explosions were held on the territory of the Khanti-Mansiisk AutonomousOkrug and the Nature of the Measures for Ensuring Radiation Safety [Predvaritelnayaotsenka sostoyaniya radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti v rayonakh provedeniyapodzemnikh yadernikh vzryvov na territorii Khanti-Mansiiskogo avtonomnogo okrugai kharakteristika mer obespecheniya radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti naseleniya]. St. Petersburg:RadoMir Scientific Research Center, 2002. 12.135

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYProximity to a Nuclear Power Plant and the Occurrence ofLeukemia in Children under Five Years Old 1Andrey OzharovskiyProject Coordinator, EcoZashchita Public Organization,MoscowLeukemia in children could be caused by proximity to a nuclear power plant (NPP).Researchers in Germany have ascertained a 200% increase in the number of leukemiacases among children living in close proximity to NPPs. Politicians have promised toverify these results and draw the necessary conclusions.According to a study funded by the German Federal Office on Radiation Protection2 , the frequency of childhood leukemia cases among children under five years of ageincreases the closer the subjects live to one of Germany’s 16 operating NPPs. AlthoughGermany has made the decision to stop the use of nuclear energy, certain NPPs havebeen permitted to continue operating until they have completed their service life. Newevidence has become available indicating that even NPPs operating without incidentpose a grave threat to human health.The research results were published in specialized medical research publications,including the European Journal of Cancer and the International Journal of Cancer inJanuary and February 2008 3 . A statistical analysis showed that the risk for developingleukemia among children under the age of five — when children are most sensitive tothe effects of radiation — increases the closer they live to one of Germany’s operatingNPPs. Data was collected and analyzed from 1,592 children with cancer and 4,375healthy children, living in 41 districts near the 16 NPPs in West Germany from 1980 to2003. This is the first study that takes into account the exact distance from the subject’splace of residence to a reactor. For example, of the 77 children diagnosed with cancerliving near one of the nuclear power plants, 37 were diagnosed with leukemia. If thesechildren had been living far from the plant, then the statistical incidence of cancer wouldhave equaled 48, with 17 cases of leukemia, or half the observed level. The conclusiontherefore is that nuclear power plants are directly responsible for 29 cases of childhoodcancer, including 20 cases of leukemia among children under five. Furthermore, studiesshow that the increased occurrence of cancer cases is noticeable at a distance of up to 50km from operating NPPs.Sigmar Gabriel, the German Minister of the Environment, Nature Conservation,and Nuclear Safety, announced that his Ministry intends to carefully verify the resultsof the study and make a decision with regard to future actions. It is expected that direct1Based on articles published in the European Journal of Cancer.2Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, www.bfs.de.3Kaatsch P., Spix C., Schulze-Rath R., Schmiedel S., Blettner M. “Leukemia in young children livingin the vicinity of German nuclear power plants.” International Journal of Cancer. 2008 Feb 15;122(4):721–6.136

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYproof of the harm caused to the health of the population by normally functioning NPPscould serve as an additional argument in favor of shutting down all NPPs in Germanyand may even accelerate that process.The studies were conducted by the Institute of Medical Biostatistics, Epidemiologyand Informatics 4 at the Clinical Center of Mainz University starting in 2003. For eachof the 16 NPP locations, the researchers selected three adjacent districts and studied theassociated data.The source data used was taken from the official German Childhood Cancer Registry.The study was essentially a way to verify statistical trends observed previously thatestablished a connection between various types of cancer with the presence of differentkinds of nuclear power plants.One such earlier German study conducted in 1997 uncovered a significant (22–36%) increase in the incidence of cancer among children under 14 years of age and anespecially great increase (54%) in the number of cancer cases among children under fiveliving within 5 km from an NPP.The 70% increase of the number of leukemia cases among children under five wasespecially stark. More thorough studies have indicated that leukemia cases were twiceas likely. The same studies have shown that boiling water reactors are more dangerousthan pressurized water reactors.The connection between radiation and the increase in the number of cancer cases inthe population is known and has been confirmed by numerous studies. Internal radiationis particularly harmful, which happens when radioactive material enters the body. Forexample, in Belarus, according to the data gathered by specialized clinics in the GomelOblast, the increase in leukemia cases among children and adults in this region is 50%higher than before the Chernobyl catastrophe. In another example, the incidence of anumber of cancers (leukemia, lymphoma, cancer of the kidneys, and others) among Russianpersonnel involved in the clean-up effort following Chernobyl is 50% higher thanin the general Russian population. Experts believe that a number of cancers can take upto 20–30 years to appear.The German studies confirm that beyond radionuclides released during an accident,everyday, “permissible” radioactive emissions of a normally functioning NPP arealso hazardous. The technological process of any NPP involves the continuous emissionof radionuclides, which are the products of fission and activation of radioactive noblegases, radioactive iodine, and tritium (“heavy-heavy hydrogen”), into the environment.In the case of a Russian PWR-1000 reactor, during regular operations at nominal capacity,radioactive emissions through the vent stack can total up to 20 TBq per day (seeTable 1). We won’t go into a detailed discussion here of the isotope make-up of the “allowable”emissions. The German studies once again produced inarguable evidence ofthe mortal danger presented by even the smallest doses of radiation. We’ll simply notethat in light of the latest results of these studies, the very practice of allowing nuclearpower plants to produce daily emissions containing dangerous radionuclides appears tobe entirely unethical.4www.imbei.uni-mainz.de.137

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 1. Radioactive Emission Values for Inert Radioactive Gases andAerosols at Russian NPPs for 2006(Source: RosTekhNadzor Annual Report 2006)NPPInertRadioactiveGasesI-131 Co-60 Cs-134 Cs-137TBq (%) MBq (%)NPPs with PWR-1000 and PWR-440 ReactorsBalakovo 0.2 (0.2) 94.8 (0.5) 3.5(0.05) 1.8(0.2) 4.4(0.2)Kalinin 21.7 (3.1) 913 (5.1) 5.5(0.03) 0.4(0.04) 2.2(0.11)Novovoronezh45 (6.6) 1,900 (10.6) 290(3.9) 38(4.3) 71(3.6)Rostov 0.2 (0.03) 37.4 (0.2) 2.6(0.04) 0.2(0.02) 0.4(0.02)Kola 0.7 (0.1) 18.8 (0.1) 80.5(1.1)

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYoperation of NPPs in Russia is leading to an increase in the number of cancer casesamong children under five.I would like to thank Dr. Alfred Körblein for his assistance and for providing theillustrations.Brief Remarks on the Issue of Uranium Tailings:Depleted uranium hexafluoride (uranium tailings) is the by-product of the uraniumenrichment process that takes place during the production of fuel for an NPP. This byproductis toxic and radioactive. In a reaction with water (including moisture in the air),the tailings produce a toxic agent: anhydrous hydrogen fluoride. Russia and other countrieshave accumulated millions of tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride. There are noplans to use the material in the near future, as it is a kind of radioactive waste.Under Russian law, radioactive waste cannot be brought into the country. Nonetheless,uranium tailings are being brought in under RosAtom contracts with Urenco, a German,British, and Dutch company, and with Eurodif, a French company, among others.Waste is delivered to the Saint Petersburg port and then sent to Seversk (TomskOblast), Angarsk (Irkutsk Oblast), Zelyonogorsk (Krasnoyarsk Krai), and Novouralsk(Sverdlovsk Oblast) (see Figure 2).Uranium hexafluoride turns into gas at 54°С, and upon depressurization, escapesfrom its container in the course of several minutes.Figure 2. Monitoring radioactive materials in transit139

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYQuestion and Answer SessionRadiobiological Concerns, Rehabilitation of Affected Territories– Vladimir Kuznetsov: This is a question for Valeriy Bulatov. Could you please explainwhy there is such a large number of ionizing radiation sources found in oil and gasextraction operations?– Valeriy Bulatov: This is due to the fact that logging is done in each borehole. This isfairly labor-intensive work and is done in parallel with drilling. There is no boreholewithout logging; i.e., no geophysical measurement can be done without it.– Vladimir Kuznetsov: So they are not taken out afterwards?– Valeriy Bulatov: No. They are on a cable and are torn off once used.– Dialogue participant: Did you also measure the distance from harmful chemical substances?Did you examine just one factor or many? There are a lot of industrial operationsthere that produce heavy metals, which are also carcinogenic.– Andrey Ozharovskiy: When such shocking information was obtained, before it waspublished, people tried to find explanations other than the proximity to the NPP. However,they did not find other shared properties between areas where cancer morbidityrates spiked besides the presence of an NPP. Secondly, what they did was specificallymeasure the distance from the place of residence of each child to the NPP and looked atthe correlation to this distance. The correlation is statistically significant and is apparentat a distance of up to 50 km. Below 50 km, the incidence was twice the normal rate.– Dialogue participant: How do you explain the absence of a similar increase in leukemiacases, since relative to natural background radiation, this is a very small increase?Why don’t large doses have the same increase in leukemia morbidity as this small increaseover the natural background radiation level?– Andrey Ozharovskiy: There are different explanations offered; for example, the “permissible”emissions. The NPPs have stacks that release substances in amounts withinallowed standards. These standards are most likely unfounded. They should be significantlystricter, so that this effect could not occur. A second explanation is tritium. Herethings are complicated, because the correlation is based on distance, and the emissionsfrom the stacks, I imagine, would go further. So, there is no clear understanding. What’simportant is that the trouble stems from nuclear power. That much we understand and itis one more bit of evidence that nuclear power kills.– Dialogue participant: You used data for Germany, but here in the Chernobyl areathere are 1.5 million residents in Russia alone, and as many in Ukraine and Belarus.There are national registries monitoring the health of the population, including thehealth of children. Do you have data from these registries? Do they demonstrate thesame increase in morbidity rates?– Andrey Ozharovskiy: The shocking information about the German statistics is thatthey concern the effects of a properly functioning NPP. Chernobyl is another matter.140

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY– Anna Vinogradova: Why do you think the conclusions of radiobiologists mentionedby Burlakova and Koragodina do not apply to regulations on the adoption of new healthand radiation safety standards? The second question is for Vladimir Sorokin. Were theconclusions drawn from your studies taken into consideration in regulations?– Anatolii Nazarov: The idea of small doses is relatively new. Also, to prove the effectof any radiation factors, it is very important to include the genetic factor and the impacton heredity. All of the instructions from the United Nations Scientific Committee on theEffects of Atomic Radiation and other international organizations state that there are nogrounds for asserting that heredity is affected. So far, there is no proof – too little timehas passed. But experiments on animals are very disconcerting. And the great breakthroughhappening now with the human genome indicates that at some point, usuallythe 7th or 8th generation, the generation disappears entirely. The genetic material is thenweakened or genetic abnormalities appear. But no one can prove this right now, althoughwe definitely have data. The very concept of “small doses” is not explicit. One interpretationrelates it to cancerogenesis, to the appearance of those carcinogenic effects thatexist in addition to radiation.– Vladimir Sorokin: The data of the studies we conducted could not be included in regulatorydocuments because radiobiologists follow a different, though incorrect, dominatingconcept.141

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYImproving Public Outreach Using the Radiation Monitoringand Emergency Response System Being Created in theArkhangelsk OblastVladimir NikitinGeneral Director, Zvezdochka Shipyard, SeverodvinskAnatoly ShepurevDeputy Chief Engineer, Zvezdochka ShipyardNikolai ShcherbininDirector, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, SeverodvinskThe Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation(MNEPR) Framework Agreement came into force in April 2004. The objective of thisagreement is international collaboration in the safe management of spent nuclear fuel(SNF) and radioactive waste resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear submarines inRussia’s Northwest region.The funding for the Program is provided through the Northern Dimension EnvironmentalPartnership (NDEP), which collected the funds from European donor countries,Russia, and Canada. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)manages the fund.One of the first tasks facing NDEP with regard to nuclear and radiation safety inRussia’s Northwest region was the development of a Strategic Master Plan (SMP). Prioritieswere set during the first stage of that process. These include the creation of sitebasedand regional monitoring and emergency response systems for the ArkhangelskOblast.At this time, the Oblast is home to several sites that present a radiation threat,including sites where nuclear submarines are stored and dismantled, and SNF and radwastetreatment sites. The largest of these are:• Zvezdochka Shipyard;• Sevmash;• Mironova Gora, a solid radwaste storage facility.The existing emergency response system is outdated and in need of repair. The RussianInstitute of the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy (IBRAE), together with otherorganizations, has developed a proposal for a modern monitoring system. On February8, 2008, this proposal was discussed at a roundtable event by the Oblast administrationand received the approval of scientists, experts, and the scientific and environmentalprotection communities (Figure 1).142

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 1. The roundtable discussion on improving the radiation safety systemin the Arkhangelsk Oblast, February 8, 2008.The main goal of the project is the creation of a modern radiation monitoring systemthat will issue an early warning to personnel and the general population in the eventof radiation accidents at sites where waste disposal and environmental rehabilitationwork is conducted. The creation of an effective emergency response system that willalso minimize consequences in the Arkhangelsk Oblast and adjoining territories is alsoneeded. The system will meet the requirements of Russian law and follow internationalpractices in the way radiation monitoring and emergency preparedness systems are designed.Project Components:• Creation of a Regional Crisis Center for the Arkhangelsk Oblast;• Creation of Crisis Centers in Severodvinsk;• Creation of site-specific automated regional monitoring systems for Zvezdochkaand Sevmash;• Creation of the Arkhangelsk Territory Automated Radiation Monitoring System;• Creation of mobile radiation detection laboratories;• Research and technical support for entities overseeing accident prevention inthe Arkhangelsk Oblast provided by IBRAE and the Krylov Institute;• Creation and maintenance of communication lines and channels;• Personnel training and education;• Accident prevention drills involving all components of the emergency responsesystem.143

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 2. The Arkhangelsk Oblast radiation monitoring andemergency response system (2007 Proposal).Figure. 3. The Arkhangelsk Oblast radiation monitoring and emergency response system (2008).144

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe project’s main goal is to ensure that the public and the government entities atall levels can obtain comprehensive information on radiation conditions in the ArkhangelskOblast.The project will make the following possible:• Continuous radiation monitoring of the environment;• Taking measurements when short-term projects that may pose a radiation hazardare conducted at the sites;• Obtaining data on radiation dose levels in the area on request from local residentsand nongovernmental organizations.The project will ensure adequate monitoring of any radioactive nuclide during dismantlement,disposal, or environmental rehabilitation operations at the sites, effectivepreventative planning in case of emergency situations, and the necessary execution ofplanned measures, as well as early warning and emergency response for managing radiationaccidents and protecting personnel and residents.A smoothly operating monitoring system will help solve the problem of public accessto information on anthropogenic radionuclides in the region. It will also allow allinterested organizations to provide accurate information to the public regarding radiationissues.The following entities have expressed interest in obtaining information on radiationin the Oblast at observation zones belonging to sites where nuclear submarine dismantlementand SNF and radwaste processing takes place:• Enterprises that are part of the Russian State Center for Nuclear Shipbuilding(GRTsAS): Sevmash, Zvezdochka, Onega;• Local administrations and governments;• Government oversight and control agencies;• Citizens and civic organizations, international nongovernmental organizations;• Local and federal press services.Figure. 4. Zvezdochka Shipyard.145

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe 2007 proposal for improving the Arkhangelsk Oblast radiation monitoring andemergency response system included the creation of data analysis centers at Sevmashand Zvezdochka, and to build a special training and education centers in Severodvinskthat would have been used to prepare personnel for both the Arkhangelsk and MurmanskOblasts. Due to limited funding, these parts of the projects have been removed from theproposal.Although the accepted proposal does not include special entities for conductingpublic outreach, any of those interested can do so using existing public outreach services.The office responsible for interregional and public communication within the cityadministration, for example, could take on this role.Figure. 5. One of the sites where radiation monitoring sensors would be placed.Figure. 6. The Coastal complex for unloading SNF from decommissionednuclear submarines at Zvezdochka.146

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYBoth local authorities and GRTsAS enterprises will have access to needed datafor sites that pose a radiation hazard once the radiation monitoring system is in place.Information must be provided to the public on a regular basis. This work can only beperformed by a continuously operating data analysis center. Experience at the SeverodvinskGCR Public Outreach and Information Office (POIO) in its public outreach workon nuclear submarine dismantlement has shown that even with minimal funding and astaff of three, it is possible to organize a dialogue between experts from the nuclear industryand the public. The GCR POIO in Severodvinsk carries out its work as part of thecommitment of the GCR office to the local population. The GRTsAS enterprises and thelocal authorities should have the same level of commitment to the local population.Figure. 7. Liquid radwaste storage facilities.Under market conditions, efforts to sway the opinion of those who are prejudicedagainst nuclear technologies will require financial investment.Figure. 8. A liquid and solid radwaste treatment facility at the Zvezdochka Shipyard.147

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIt is obvious that the overhead costs, when building any nuclear energy facility —whether it is a floating nuclear power plant (FNPP), a nuclear submarine dismantlementfacility, or a SNF and radwaste treatment facility — should include expenses associatedwith public outreach to explain the goals and potential consequences of site operations.The history of the nuclear industry and the nuclear energy sector indicates that there isa real likelihood of radiation and nuclear accidents. In addition, there are the concernsof the population regarding potential radiation hazards. Public anxiety increases wheninformation from various official entities or the press is contradictory and disorganized.The era of secrecy has ended; it is time to make the information available to the public.148

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTerrorist Threats to Nuclear FacilitiesAnd the Role of the Public in Countering ThemIgor KhripunovAssociate Director, Center for International Trade andSecurity, University of GeorgiaThe general public is an important stakeholder whose vital interests are consistentboth with the prevention of terrorist attempts to attack nuclear power infrastructure andappropriate mitigation of their consequences if they occur. Such terrorist attacks caneasily bring about systemic disasters characterized by a series of uncertain; interconnectedand disruptive events that would affect the population at large and vital societalinstitutions. Hence, the public must no longer be looked upon only as potential victimsor panicked masses but rather as an important contributing factor for better nuclear securitythroughout all stages of a potential incident.In this sense, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of NuclearTerrorism which came into force in July 2007 provides a solid international legal basisfor the public in pursuance of this objective. Russia acted as the driving force behindthis convention and was one of the first to sign and ratify it. Specifically, under thisconvention, an offense is defined as acts by any person to use or damage “a nuclearfacility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material” with theintent to cause death or serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to theenvironment.The emerging threats of terrorism increasingly elevate security including physicalprotection to a more independent and unique status beyond traditional safety-securitysynergy. First, the difference between safety and security breaches is that terrorist attackshave the potential to increase significantly the impact of an accident, making routinesafety procedures inadequate. Second, as adaptive adversaries, terrorists not onlyhave the ability to change tactics as an attack unfolds but also are capable of concurrentand/or subsequent multiple attempts against infrastructures. Third, terrorist attacks arecriminal acts and, as such, include the additional complications of securing a crimescene and conducting an investigation during the response phase. Fourth, malicious actsin the nuclear field aggravate the psychological impact on the population. For effectiverisk communication, safety and security must be explained and presented to the publicas two sides of the same process which is trouble-free operation of the nuclear powerinfrastructure under any conceivable circumstances (see table 1). Hence, by getting thepublic on-board and recognizing it as an important stakeholder, a meaningful risk communicationstrategy can achieve five interrelated missions.149

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 11. Reach a common risk assessment enabling the public to be educated andprepared. For most professionals and experts, risk is the likelihood of an event multipliedby its estimated consequences, ranging from mild to catastrophic (risk = probabilityx consequences). The magnitude of a risk to laypersons varies depending on theirbackground and objectives leading to different interpretations of risk and vulnerabilities.Since the public often tends to base its views of risk on personal experience and priorknowledge, their perception of risk is much more emotionally driven. Factors that mayinfluence public attitudes include the perceived magnitude of the consequences, ignoranceabout the nature of the hazard, distrust of the institutions attempting to manage thehazard, the level of media attention devoted to an event and others. Even within a givenpopulation, risk perceptions are not uniform and may vary depending on experience,gender, social status and world view.Risk communication is vital in the process of achieving a common risk perception.It can be defined as a two-way process of information exchange that includes multipletypes of information with multiple purposes. As an important benefit, risk communicationhas the potential to build public trust and resilience in times of crisis. These areserious impediments, however, in the way of developing an effective risk communicationstrategy in the security domain, especially in Russia. First, most information,compared to the safety domain, is classified and there is little, if any, tradition of sharingeven generic information with the public. Second, the Russian public is largely split50/50 regarding the desirability of expanding the national nuclear power infrastructure.Third, the public has been consistently treating the likelihood of terrorism as a low priority“personal concern.” According to the January 2008 survey by the Moscow-basedLevada Center, only seven percent of the respondents characterized terrorist threats ashigh on their priority list while most others prioritized rising prices, impoverishment,drug addiction, poor medical service, environmental degradation and other items on thepersonal agenda. It is hardly surprising for Russia as a country in transition from onesocio-economic system to another.Still, public support is critical but requires a realistic portrayal of risk that is accurateand draws a fine line between hyping the threat to spur people to action and150

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYtrivializing it to provide them false reassurances. Preparedness would provide a wayfor the public to translate this new level of risk awareness into action and can consistof a range of activities, including developing and practicing contingency plans, such ascommunication, evacuation, or sheltering. Preparedness also serves as a bridge betweenrisk education which occurs in advance of an event and taking protective actions duringa crisis.2. Encourage a well-informed and well-motivated public to contribute to ahealthy nuclear security culture, not only at the nuclear plant and other associatedunit level but also nationally. Security culture at the facility level can be defined as alinked set of characteristics that together ensure that the workforce pays sufficient attentionto nuclear security. Shared beliefs, assumptions, principles which guide decisionsand actions, and patterns of behavior hospitable to security represent the ordered andhierarchical set of characteristics that make up nuclear security culture. It is importantto understand that most members of the nuclear plant workforce are part of the communityadjacent to the site. They have families there and socialize with local citizens ona regular basis. Hence a strong commitment to nuclear security on the part of the localcommunity heightens the public visibility of security-related issues, indirectly improvingthe motivation of the staff that operates that site.3. Build up public vigilance, persuading citizens to cooperate more closelywith law enforcement. This vigilance will manifest itself in reports of unauthorized effortsto gain access to sensitive infrastructure sites or breach the site’s boundaries. Thereis a niche for a security conscious public to fill. An engaged public will even reportsuspicious people or activities near the site. A small portion of local citizens could betrained to perform such functions on a voluntary basis, particularly in sparsely populatedand difficult-to-monitor areas. Training of local citizens, when and if it is deemed necessary,must be a well thought-out, stably funded, and widely publicized campaign.Russian leadership has been sending positive signals regarding the public involvementin preventing and combating terrorism. Speaking at the September 13, 2004 cabinetmeeting, President Vladimir Putin supported the idea of establishing a voluntarystructure among the public which would assist in information gathering and monitoringreports from the population regarding the preparation of criminal acts or their actualcommitment. The Russian legal basis explicitly authorizes the participation of the publicin this activity. Federal Law on Countering Terrorism (No 35-FZ) of March 6, 2006provides a set of incentives and rewards for people who help law enforcement agenciesprevent and investigate acts of terrorism, while Law of St. Petersburg Municipality (No561-57) of November 25, 2002 provides financial, legal and organizational support forthose who volunteer to cooperate to this effect with the city law enforcement authorities.4. Reduce the immediate and long-term physical and psychological impactof a terrorist incident by fencing off panic, boosting morale, maintaining credibility,and providing guidance. This emphasis is especially important while counter-terroristactions are underway or other terrorist acts are likely. These post-incident arrangementsconsist of steps that individuals and communities can take to save lives and reduce losses151

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYwhen an event occurs. The ultimate test is their effectiveness in a real crisis whentraditional societal institutions tend to unravel. Such actions include forms of sheltering,evacuation, and quarantine as well as using individual protective equipment and avariety of medical countermeasures. Ultimately, it all comes down to creating a moreresilient and prepared population in the face of terrorist adversaries. Resilience is usuallydefined as the ability to handle disruptive challenges, characterized as emergenciesthat can lead to or result in crisis. Technical solutions and competence can contribute toresilience but ultimately real resilience is about attitude, motivation and will. Engenderingsuch attitudes requires a cultural change and more focus on the mindset of people.Resilient citizens will be more than bystanders in the effort to deal with terrorist acts – beit nuclear power infrastructure or any other target – and will be less prone to fear andanxiety before and during crisis situations. Resilience-building and other public-relatedcampaigns, however, cost time and money, and they have to be sustained over the longterm. Careful forethought should go into the planning and execution of such campaignsin order to reap maximum benefits.5. Integrate acts of nuclear terrorism into the general scheme of All-Hazardsapproach. Despite the obvious and important differences among all types of terrorism,all of them require similar measures at the community level throughout the prevention,preparedness, emergency response, and post-disaster periods. Community educationand training, resilience building, vulnerability and risk assessment, communication, andhazard-control mechanisms are common. Including nuclear terrorism in this aggregatemodel can yield some benefits. Perhaps the most important is placing radiation and thefears associated with it on the same level as dangers that are equally life-threatening butmore easily intelligible. Also, this option would be more cost-efficient in terms of time,effort, money, and other resources because it would mobilize a wider range of disastermanagement groups, including the public, and create a more powerful constituency forthe process.Any effort to promote higher standards of nuclear security must place heavy emphasison Russia’s general public, a largely untapped stakeholder in the campaign tostrengthen nuclear security. The success of this campaign would depend on the public’sability to develop a balanced and realistic understanding of the risk. To this end, itis imperative to use as many public channels as possible, reaching groups that differeducationally, socially, professionally, and politically. Ultimately, public involvementin the efforts to improve nuclear security and their understanding of the importance ofthis mission must be regarded as part-and-parcel of building a civic democratic societyin Russia.152

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYOvercoming Contention between the Authoritiesand NGOs in Regional Radioecology Public OutreachSvetlana KrasnoslobodtsevaJunior Scientific CollaboratorCenter of History of the Chelyabinsk State and MunicipalGovernments, Urals Academy of Public ServiceIn today’s society, the problem of information and, more importantly, informingthe public, about any given topic has become the cause of clashing interests between theauthorities, political parties, non-governmental organizations, and different public andprivate constituencies. Meanwhile, a paradoxical situation has developed: the generalvolume of information is growing exponentially, while the level of public education interms of relevant information is either falling or remaining the same. This is the result ofan increased volume of information that is dumped into the public consciousness, whichconsiderably expands the opportunities to manipulate various public groups and societyas a whole. This contributes to the creation of a virtual world comprised of more or lessreliable information from which the public mind is meant to extrapolate other bits of informationthat seem true but are not accurate. In this case, access to reliable informationis closed off to rank-and-file citizens, especially if the information in question concernsthe interests of large and powerful organizations, in particular the government.Under today’s circumstances in Russia, the government has the exclusive rightsto information, and an individual has no way of obtaining accurate information exceptby uniting with others in a non-government organization (NGO). NGOs include publicgroups and organizations; they do not join just to increase personal profit.In each of the country’s different regions, there is always a clear hierarchy of topicsof particular local importance. The Chelyabinsk Oblast, for example, gives priority toinformation about the state of radioecology. The Oblast is home to especially hazardousnuclear industrial facilities in the cities of Ozyorsk, Snezhinsk and Trekhgorny. Thegravest harm to the region’s environment was caused by weapons-grade plutonium productiontechnology at Mayak during its first two decades of operation. The northeasternregion of the Oblast, where dozens of towns and villages are located, was subjected toradioactive pollution. At least 200,000 people suffered from radiation exposure. Theclearest example of radioecological damage was the nuclear accident on September 29,1957, which led to the formation of the Eastern Urals Radioactive Trace (EURT), whichmeasures 23,000 square kilometers.The most important source of information about radioecology in the Oblast is theMinistry of Radiation and Environmental Safety, which dedicates a great deal of attentionto educating the public and using a wide variety of formats and methods to do so.Information is provided regularly and promptly on the state of radioecology in the regionon the Ministry’s website. Periodically, the Ministry publishes overviews, monitoringdata, and analytical summaries about the government’s actions in the Oblast in terms of153

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYorganizing efficient control over radioecology in the region and the measures plannedfor remediation of polluted areas under the Federal Target Program.A considerable volume of information is contained in almanacs published annuallyby the Ministry. The almanac contains informative articles from the managers of Mayakand other key experts in radiation ecology, medicine and biology. Interesting and educationalmaterial was packed in the almanac published in commemoration of the 50thanniversary of the 1957 nuclear accident. In 2008, its pages were filled with exclusiveinformation about Mayak’s sixty-year-long history.An international seminar was held in November 2006 under the patronage of theMinistry, in addition to a scientific conference in September 2007 dedicated to the 1957catastrophe and an analysis of the experience of dealing with the consequences of theaccident. At the Ministry’s suggestion, non-governmental environmental organizationsbased in the Oblast played an active role in these events and led discussions on some ofthe most relevant problems facing those who suffered from radiation exposure. Beforethe conference, some of these NGOs organized a demonstration demanding better socioeconomicsupport for affected districts.As a result, over the past few years the Ministry has published a large amount of accurateinformation in a variety of formats on many important aspects of the state of radioecologyin the region. However, this information cannot fully satisfy non-governmentorganizations representing the interests of the people who have suffered from radiation.The public has yet to receive a founded answer to the questions about the reasons for thesystematic and lengthy radiation pollution in the area emanating from Mayak during itsfirst decade of operation.Would it have been possible to prevent the first two catastrophes at the first industrialreactor, or at least put filters in place to reduce the radioactive level of gas emissionsnot in 1958, but before the first reactors were even launched? It might seem as thoughthis question is no longer relevant, but that is not so. The public wants to know to whatextent past experience is acknowledged. If the main reason today behind radiation pollutionlies within the new technologies for industrial production of plutonium, then thatwill not hold as an argument.In today’s conditions, having quality information means seeing the hierarchy of thecause-and-effect connection of past events; it means having comprehensive knowledge,and it means understanding the history of a question, seeing where this issue fits inamong the other problems in the region.According to the sociological studies conducted by the Chelyabinsk Institute underthe Urals Government Service Academy, the region’s residents do not trust the informationthat is provided to them by the Oblast Government on this issue, and theyreasonably presume that much information is still kept secret. The people also put noconfidence in information coming from the managers or experts at Mayak; confidencewas ranked at just 8% for the former, and 12% for the latter. The public trusts what itsees on television, apparently as the result of the fact that alternative points of view arebroadcast on television. The most authoritative sources of information for the public arenon-government environmental organizations, such as Green Cross and Kyshtym-1957,and others, as they are the only ones who advocate public interests.It is clear that the public’s lack of trust in information about radiation and the environmentfrom the authorities is related to a deep-seated and steady distrust in all levels154

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYof government, from federal to regional. Russia’s political and socioeconomic developmentover the past 20 years demonstrates that the authorities are perceived by the publicas a ruthless exploitation machine, a system that does not have anything in common withthe interests of the average citizen. In this situation, NGos should serve as the link betweenthe public and the authorities, and not — under any circumstances — exacerbatethe contention between themselves and those affected by radiation, on the one hand,and the authorities on the other hand. That is why the Commission for Government andNGO Collaboration has been formed in the Oblast. The Commission has set out the firststeps to be taken toward pooling efforts in providing the people with comprehensive andaccurate information about the state of radioecology in the region.155

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNegotiation Power: The Significance of the Public as Demonstratedby Public Hearings on the Creation of Floating Nuclear PowerPlants and the Management of Unsafe VesselsSergey GavrilovDekom Technologies, MoscowMikhail RylovDirector, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety, St.Petersburg, and Vice President, Green Cross RussiaVyacheslav KhatuntsevSenior Lecturer, Northwest Academy of Public Service,SeverodvinskNikolai ScherbininDirector, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, SeverodvinskThe global economy’s high level of dependency on energy resources is one reasonwhy Russia’s Northwest and the north of Europe are currently in the center of attention.Development of new, large-scale oil and gas projects will begin in these regions in thenext 5–10 years along the continental shelf of the Barents Sea.Today, in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 394 (03/21/2007), the UnitedShipbuilding Corporation (OSK) will be created, and a Federal Target Program (FTP)for developing civil ship-building up until 2015 at the shipbuilding holding in the industrialdistrict of Severnaya Dvina will be drawn up and included in the 3-year budget.Furthermore, work is underway on establishing a manufacturing cluster for carryingout shipbuilding and submarine projects for the Russian Navy. Other projects includedeveloping civil shipbuilding, developing the continental shelf and the international seacargo market, and retaining competitiveness on global markets.The federal state-owned franchises that play the most important roles today in theregion’s economy will be transformed into open joint-stock companies. Work is in progressto transform the Sevmash Plant and the Zvezdochka Shipbuilding Center into theNorthern Shipbuilding and Repair Center (1). This structure will become a constituentof the OSK, which is being created in order to retain and tap into the scientific and industrialpotential of a united industrial corporation, ensure national security and defensecapabilities, and pool intellectual, industrial, and financial resources (2).One promising new project for Severodvinsk and the Northern Shipbuilding andRepair Center is the construction of a small-capacity nuclear thermal power plant. Thedesign has been finalized, all of the relevant conclusions have been prepared, and necessarylicenses and assessments have been obtained and conducted, including a governmentenvironmental study and the main government assessment. Ideally for RosAtom,the large-scale construction of small nuclear power plants (NPPs) will involve a separatefederal program with its own line of funding. The project was included by the RussianMinistry of Economic Development’s list of government-level projects and will be financedwith government capital investments under the FTP in 2006–2008. According to156

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMr. Zelensky, the Director of Malaya Energetika, “units with KLT-40S reactors with acapacity of 70 MW(e) and 140 Gcal(t) have enormous export potential.”The conclusion of an on-site meeting of the Commission for National IntellectualPotential under the Public Chamber of Russia, which was timed to coincide with the100th anniversary of the submarine fleet, was that this project will assure many of thecountry’s industrial companies in the high tech sector. Local power plants will reducedependence of the remote North and the Far East regions on the supply from the North.Furthermore, floating NPPs might be used to desalinate sea water. Demand on the internationalmarket for desalination in coastal areas is increasing rapidly and by 2015 willreach USD 12 billion per year.Interest in the project remains high among the environmental community. In July2005, Greenpeace Russia published a report on the dangers of this project in terms ofterrorism and piracy in Southeast Asia, and submitted this report to Russia’s Federal SecurityService (FSB) (4). Southeast Asia is an active location for terrorist groups, includingAl-Qaeda. Mr. El Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, has said that Al-Qaeda andother extremist groups want to get their hands on nuclear weapons. In terms of piracy,in 2003, 445 attacks were launched, 88 sailors were injured, 359 were taken hostage,and 71 others have gone missing. Information from the International Maritime Bureau(IMB) states that the most pirate attacks against ships in 2003 took place in Indonesianwaters (121 of 445). In 2005–2006, the design of the small NPP project was completedand KLT-40 reactor installations were modernized to use 19% enriched uranium in placeof 40% enriched uranium as fuel in the reactor core, which makes it impossible to usefor weapons purposes. This proves that by using a variety of methods, from informalnetworks to threats against reputation on the international arena, public associations arecapable of influencing the decision-making process of government bodies both duringpreparatory stages and at the final stages.The subject of this presentation, in light of relentless scrutiny, is an analysis ofmethods used to take public opinion into account with regard to project feasibility, analysisimprovement, and the risks of using it (5).The Sevmash territory features an open stretch of land along the coast (unused andwithout any structures) between the shallow and industrial seafronts. The depth of thewaters here reaches 7.5 meters, and this area could be an excellent location for a floatingnuclear power plant. For thermal transmission to be economically viable, the small NPPmust be located no more than 5 kilometers from the consumer.The floating NPP is a flush deck, rectangular, non-self-propelled, barge-mountedfacility with an advanced multilevel superstructure to house energy equipment in thebow and waist of the ship, and lodgings in the stern. The length of the floating NPP is144 meters, the width is 30 meters, the height is 10 meters, the draft is 5.52 meters, andthe displacement measures 21,000 tons.The floating NPP will carry two KLT-40S naval propulsion reactor installationswith PWR reactors and steam turbine installations with thermal turbines and electricitygenerators, each with a capacity of 35MW(e) and 25 Gcal/hr(t). The installations arekept in a durable, thick protective casing designed to contain accidents in which connectionswith the primary circuit conduits are cut off.By law, one of the stages of discussion of any project must be a public environmentalimpact assessment (EIA) (6). In order to identify environmental preferences and157

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYget the public involved in discussing this particular project, Malaya Energetika—thedeveloper—organized preliminary public outreach efforts via regular publications andinformative television programs, starting from the declaration of intent to build a floatingNPP with KLT-40S reactors.The Severodvinsk office of the National Russian Public Green Movement, withsupport from the Directorate of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Environmental Fund, acted asorganizer and coordinator of the public EIA and submitted the related materials for discussionby the scientific community and the public at large.A method for reinforcing the negotiation power of the public, which was proposedand approved in 2001–2003, was used when it was time to consider investment options(see Figure 1) (7).The Severodvinsk community, the Russian Government Center for Nuclear Shipbuilding(GRTsAS), and the residents of Arkhangelsk Oblast were informed via printmedia about the accessibility of information on the design documentation of the smallNPP project. In order to evaluate and account for the opinion of the “unorganized” publicand residents, several information materials and design documentation were madeavailable from December 2001 through April 2002. The design paperwork covered theproject specifications and was made available at the following addresses: 100 LomonosovaStreet at the Gogol Central Municipal Library in the town of Severodvinsk, and 18Popova Street in the regional Department of the National Russian Nature ConservationSociety (VOOP) in the city of Arkhangelsk. Sociological studies on environmental issuesin Severodvinsk were conducted in December 2001 (the first stage) and in March2002 (the second stage) (8).Figure 1. Strengthening the negotiation power of local residents when reviewing investment in theconstruction of facilities that present a radiation hazard at GRTsAS companies.158

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYA summary of the opinions and comments on the small NPP project, its declarationof intent and other materials related to the project (the feasibility study and investmentsubstantiation) were published in the magazine “Your Opinion” [Vashe Mneniye].Given the possibility of approving the public environmental impact assessmentcommissioned by the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources as part of the main governmentassessment summary, the nomination and appointment of experts to carry out theassessment were to be carried out in strict compliance with Article 30–34 of Russia’s lawon environmental assessments, with due consideration for professional capacity.Expert groups were put together to assess the risk involved with the main factorspresented in the design documentation (see Table 1). An assessment of the significanceof these factors with regard to environmental risk was carried out based on a 6-gradescale, where 1 represents the highest level of significance.Table 1. Construction of a Small NPP: Environmental Risk FactorsNo. Factor Positive Impact Negative Impact1 Socio-demographic2 Political3 Economic- High level of competition in thehigher education sector;- High level of social protectionfor company employees (adeveloped network of medicaltreatment institutions)- Political stability- High professional level ofexperts in administration- Existence of economic connectionswith countries in theBarents Sea region;- Possibility of obtaining a governmentorder- Low income amongthe population(1.1–1.3 times lowerthan average Russianincome levels);- High cost of living(1.5–2 times higherthan average Russiancost of living);- Outflow of workingageindividuals- Weak coordinationbetween GRTsASand the municipaladministration;- High level of dependencyof the decisionmakingprocess onthe federal center- Dependence ofpower supply on importedraw materials;- Low investmentactivity;- Mono-industrystructure of theeconomy159

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY4 Technological- Existence of enormous industrialpotential- High level ofdepreciation of fixedassets and engineeringinfrastructure (anaggressive environment,ageing);- Unreliable equipmentperformance5 Geographical- Low level of seismic activity;- Low probability of flooding;- Proximity to the borders ofnorthern European countries- Marshlands;- Extreme north6 Natural climate- Presence of natural resources;- Steady circulation of air anddistinguished seasonal patterns- Low temperatures;- High relative humidity;- Storm windsA list of documents dealing with the environmental impact factors of the small NPPconstruction project is shown in Table 2.The expert assessment of environmental risks was based on the results of an expertconsensus on the impact of various factors and the weight of each factor. The expertsattributed a level of importance for each factor independently of one another by rankingthe factors.Table 2. Documents Addressing Environmental Impact Factors inConnection with the Construction of a Small NPPDocument NameA substantiation of the selection of the constructionsite for a small NPPGeneral Provisions. Project Description. Book 1 (EnvironmentalImpact Assessment - EIA)A description of the natural environment in the area ofthe small NPP construction site. Book 2 (EIA)The current environmental and socioeconomic conditionsof the residents of the area of the constructionsite. Book 3 (EIA)Factors(see Table 1)1 2 3 4 5 6+ + + + + ++ + + + + ++ + + - + ++ + + + + +160

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAn assessment of the radiation and other factors onthe environment and the public in connection with theoperations of a small NPP. Book 4 (EIA)An assessment of the impact of the construction of asmall NPP on the water. Book 5 (EIA)An analysis of the socioeconomic implications ofcompleting the small NPP project. EnvironmentalMonitoring. (Appendices 1–6) Book 6 (EIA)A small NPP radiation monitoring program for the cityof Severodvinsk.The radiation hazard category of the small NPP onSevmash premises. A radiation and health-basedsubstantiation.Development of a health protection zone and an observationzone in the area near the premises of the smallNPP in Severodvinsk (a technical report)An overview of safety at the small NPP in Severodvinsk.Books 1 and 2 (sections 1–6)Details of the seismic conditions for the district, area,and the premises of the small floating NPP built inSeverodvinsk and a calculation of the seismic impacton archival and other materials. Books 1 and 2.Substantiation and assessment of the parameters ofprojected seismic impact+ + + + + ++ + + + + ++ + + + + ++ + + + + ++ + + + + ++ - + + + ++ - + + + +- - + - + ++ + + - + +The environmental assessment commission for design documentation for this projectwas registered in line with standard procedures. It was established to verify complianceof planned operations with environmental requirements, as well as to preventpossible negative environmental implications of the operations involved in the project,and any related social, economic or other consequences (9).The experts included representatives of the scientific community (“specialists”)and public organizations and movements (“public”). It was important to involve highlyqualifiedexperts specializing in scientific fields that were not already represented by thescientific centers in the Arkhangelsk Oblast or the city of Severodvinsk. As a result, the“Moscow Group” was formed and included seven highly qualified specialists: three doctors(medicine, physics and mathematics, and geographical science) and four doctoralcandidates (physics and mathematics, geographical technical and geological and mineralsciences). The Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk experts were represented in the Severodvinskand Deputy expert groups.The work was split up and represented by 5 groups. In order to ensure that the differentviews of the groups retained a measure of consistency, the Kendall coefficient ofconcordance was applied.161

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYWhere:n is the number of analyzed factors (=6)m is the number of expert groups (=5)Rij is the rank of the j factor, which is assigned by an i expertLi is the number of links, andni is the number of elements in the i link for the j expert group.The results of the expert assessments are shown in Table 3.The groups were formed in line with the assessment of factors based on the criteriashown in Tables 2 and 3. Furthermore, this allowed for links, i.e., equivalent values.Using the RANK PP statistical function in Excel, we move from the survey matrix tothe converted ranks (Table 4), where a number’s rank is determined relative to the othervalues in the list.According to the table of critical values, when significance level equals 0.05, thecritical value of the coefficient of concordance is equal to 0.4169 (10).Thus, the coefficient of concordance is W>0.6, and its value is greater than thecritical value (W>0.4169); correspondingly, the level of consensus among the expertsis fairly high. In other words, the factors most likely to pose an environmental risk arethe socio-demographic and technological factors. The experts’ assessments are shownin Figure 2.162

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFactors(j)PublicTable 3. Expert Assessment ResultsExpert Groups (i)FactorSignificanceSpecialistsTheMoscowGroupTheSeverodvinskGroupTheDeputyGroupAverageAssessment1 6 5 6 4 5 5.2 12 4 3 2 3 1 2.6 43 3 3 5 3 4 3.6 34 5 4 4 5 3 4.2 25 2 1 1 2 2 1.6 66 1 2 3 1 3 2.0 5Table 4. Rank MatrixExpert Groups (i)Factors(j)PublicSpecialistsTheMoscowGroupTheSeverodvinskGroupTheDeputyGroup1 6 6 6 5 6 132.25 12 4 3 2 3 1 20.25 43 3 3 5 3 5 2.25 34 5 5 4 6 3 30.25 25 2 1 1 2 2 90.25 66 1 2 3 1 3 56.25 5Number0 1 0 1 1 -oflinks(Li)Link 0 2 0 2 2 -size (ni)Tj 0 6 0 6 6 -163

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 2. An expert assessment of environmental impact risksBased on a summary of individual conclusions, a final conclusion on the key aspectsof the small NPP project was drafted and signed by all experts participating in thepublic environmental assessment. The experts’ comments and suggestions have beensummarized and included in the text of the final report.The materials of the public environmental impact assessment have been submitted,in compliance with the law, to the governmental Environmental Impact Assessment Departmentof the Chief Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protectionof the Arkhangelsk Oblast, Malaya Energetika (the primary client), and the Administrationand Municipal Council of Severodvinsk. As a result of discussion of the publicEIA materials, discussions in the press and round table discussions, the following wereadopted recommendations from deputy hearings in Severodvinsk (11), from a ruling ofthe Municipal Council of Severodvinsk (No. 28, dated 03/21/02) (12), from recommendationsfrom deputy (parliament) hearings in Arkhangelsk (13), and from a Decree of theArkhangelsk Oblast Deputy Assembly (14).The results of the participation of the public, experts and the administration of thecity of Severodvinsk in the EIA and discussion of the project and the feasibility study ofthe construction of a small floating NPP have received high marks by the governmentalEIA team, which also included Dr. Petrov. Dr. Petrov has a Ph.D. in physics and mathematics,and has also worked on the public EIA.From the recommendations and proposals from the public environmental impactassessment that were included in government commission’s environmental impact assessmentreport (15): “During the construction and operations of the small floatingNPP, it will be necessary to organize a full-time public outreach center in order to presentobjective information about environmental conditions and the plant’s impact on publichealth.”I would also like to draw the attention of participants to this Dialogue today that thisrequirement of the governmental EIA has yet to be met. In fact, this work is being tackledby the city’s environmental community and Green Cross Russia’s Public Outreachand Information Office for nuclear submarine decommissioning issues.164

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYI believe it is appropriate to discuss this situation and the proposal of the FirstNational Dialogue last year regarding the need to hold a conference or seminar on thissubject in Severodvinsk with the community and representatives of the authorities, aswell as industry representatives.The public hearings were attended by representatives of the community’s environmentalmovements and organizations (Ekologiya Severa, Raduga, the Forpost Fund,Arkhangelsk VOOP, the Council of the Severodvinsk Green Movement), the media(Argumenty i Facty in Arkhangelsk, Korabel, Korabelnaya Storona, Troitsky Prospekt,Severodvinsky Rabochii, Pravda Severa, Volna) including Severodvinsk city radio andthe television channel TVTs Arkhangelsk), the chief agencies for natural resources andenvironmental protection under the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and the cityof Severodvinsk, the municipal and Oblast Centers for State Health and EpidemiologicalMonitoring, the Arkhangelsk Oblast Chief Department for Civil Defense and Emergencies,the Severodvinsk Inspectorate of the National Nuclear Monitoring Servicesof Russia, scientific research and design institutes, the Onega Scientific Research andDesign Bureau, the Institute of Environmental Problems of the North, the state-ownedfranchise VNIPIET, the United Construction Bureau for Machine Building (in the city ofNizhny Novgorod), Kurchatov Institute Russian Science Center, Rosgidromet, the stateownedfranchise Zvezdochka, the state-owned franchise Sevmash Industrial Association,AtomEnergo, Arktika, the administrations of the Arkhangelsk Oblast and the city ofSeverodvinsk, the deputies of Severodvinsk and the Arkhangelsk Oblast Assembly.Overall, the community and the administrations of the city and the Oblast spoke insupport of the construction of a small, floating nuclear power plant on the selected sitein Severodvinsk.References1. Korotkov, O. Sevmashpredpriyatiye on the Road to Going Public. A DevelopmentStrategy [Ha puti k aktioninrovaniyu Sevmashpredpriyatiya. Strategiya razvitya].Korabel. No. 27, April 8, 2008. 1–2.2. The website of the Northern Shipbuilding Corporation, www.sevska.net/ssilki.php3. Evglevskaya, R. Under Whose Flag? The Continental Shelf and FNPP. Is thePublic Council Supporting Russia’s National Priorities? [Pod chimi flagami osvaivatshelf i PEB. Obschestvenniaya palata – za natsionalniye prioriety Rossii]. Severnyirabochii. June 25, 2006. 3.4. Greenpeace Press Service in Russia 11/17/05. Zelyony Mir. No. 7–8 2006, 29.5. Federal Law No. 174-FZ on Environmental Impact Assessments / SPS KonsultantPlus.6. General Post-Dialogue Discussions. The Nuclear National Dialogue on NuclearEnergy, Society and Security. Proceedings from the Dialogue, Moscow, April 18–19, 2007. Green Cross International, RosAtom, RosAtom’s Public Council, Green CrossRussia. 2007. 286–287.7. Gavrilov, S.D., Khatuntsev, V.V. Community Participation in Making Decisionson the Location and Construction of Hazardous Facilities: Ensuring Safety andImproving Effectiveness [Obschestvennoye uchasiye v prinyatii reshenii po razmescheniyui sooruzheniyu opasnikh obyektov: obespecheniye bezopasnosti i povysheniye165

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYeffektivnosti]. Foundations of Government Security Policy. Security and Emergencies.2007. No. 4 (July–August). 14–24.8. Dubinin, G.L., Khatuntsev, V.V. Considering Public Opinion in the Decision-Making Process for Building a Floating Nuclear Power Plant On-site at Sevmashpredpriyatiye[Uchyot mneniya obschestvennosti pri prinyatii reshenii o stroitelstve plavucheiatomnoi stantsii na FGUP PO “Sevmashpredpreiyatiye”]. Modern Development Trendsin a Single-Industry City in the Russian North: Problems and Prospects: Proceedingsfrom the Regional Science Conference. Editor-in-chief: Russova, O.N. Severodvinsk.St. Petersburg MGTU Sevmashvtuz Severodvinsk Branch. 2007. 55–63.9. Decree No. 552-r dated 11/01/01 issued by the Mayor of Severodvinsk onState Registration of the Application to Conduct a Public Environmental Impact Assessment.SPS Konsultant-Nord. Arkhangelsk.10. Baturin, L.A., Kokin, A.V. The Economics of Natural Resource Managementunder Conditions of Sustainable Development [Ekonomika prirodopolzovaniye v usloviyakhustoichivogo razvitya]. Government and Municipal Administration. Papers of theNorth Caucasus Presidential Academy of Civil Service. 2001. No. 4. 81–87.11. Recommendations from Deputy Hearings in Severodvinsk on building a smallfloating nuclear thermal power plant with KLT-40S reactors in the city of Severodvinsk(Arkhangelsk Oblast). Minutes of the Hearings, 03/13/2002. SPS Konsultant-Nord.Arkhangelsk.12. Ruling No. 28 (03/21/2002) of the Municipal Council of Severodvinsk (ArkhangelskOblast) on building a small floating nuclear thermal power plant with KLT-40Sreactors. Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast). SPS Konsultant-Nord. Arkhangelsk.13. Minutes from Deputy (Parliament) Hearings in the Arkhangelsk Oblast Assemblyof Deputies on 05/27/2002 on building a small floating nuclear thermal power plantwith KLT-40S reactors in the city of Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast).14. Decree No. 279 (05/28/2002) of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Assembly of Deputieson support for building a small floating nuclear thermal power plant with KLT-40S reactors in the city of Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast). SPS Konsultant-Nord.Arkhangelsk.15. The Conclusion of the Government Environmental Impact Assessment conductedby the expert commission: a feasibility study of the building a small floatingnuclear thermal power plant with KLT-40S reactors in the city of Severodvinsk (ArkhangelskOblast). Approved by Decree No. 447 (07/18/2002) issued by the Russian Ministryof Natural Resources.166

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYA Strategy for Eliminating ThreatsStemming from Decommissioned Facilitiesof the Russia’s Northern Nuclear FleetAshot Sarkisov, Member, Russian Academy of SciencesLeonid Bolshov, Corresponding Member,Russian Academy of SciencesSergei Antipov, RAS Institute for the SafeDevelopment of Nuclear EnergyValentin Vysotsky, RAS Institute for the SafeDevelopment of Nuclear EnergyProf. Remos Kalinin, RAS Institute for the SafeDevelopment of Nuclear EnergyPavel Shvedov, Engineer, RAS Institute for the SafeDevelopment of Nuclear EnergyVladimir Shishkin, Dollezhal Research andDesign Institute for Power EngineeringThe 20 th century saw the birth of nuclear energy, and most people today see it as apromising source of reliable, environmentally safer energy at this historically significantpoint in time. However, the use of nuclear energy (even if we forget nuclear weapons fora moment) has presented mankind with new threats related primarily to the emergenceof a great number of long-lived radionuclides; as a result, we now face both naturaland anthropogenic radiation exposure. These threats are new in terms of their source,but as 50 years of experience in nuclear energy has shown, these threats are much lessdangerous than the consequences of using fossil fuels.However, the threats related to nuclear energy stand out. They are currentlyrelatively easy to control and manage during a nuclear reactor’s service life, when theradioactive fission fragments from fuel and material with induced activity levels arefound beyond several safety barriers. They grow and remain intact for an extensiveperiod of time after the service life of a reactor or other equipment that used nuclear orradioactive substances. The completion of their life cycle is related to the need to extractnuclear and radioactive material from facilities, store and transport them across longdistances, consolidate solid radioactive wastes and reprocess liquid radioactive wastes.Until now, the idiosyncrasies of nuclear energy for many countries, including Russia,included the lack of a specially-designed storage facility for the permanent storage ofthe high-level radioactive wastes that are the by-product of nuclear reactor operation andthat cannot be put to further use. As a result, one very common radwaste managementapproach (also used with several types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is to arrange longtermstorage in specially-designed surface storage facilities for a period long enoughto arrange final containment. Based on the experience of a number of countries, suchas Sweden, the construction of underground storage and facilities for the containmentof radioactive waste and SNF over hundreds of years requires a great deal of fundsand time (50 years or more). Consequently, the most complex problems in providing167

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYnuclear and radiation safety have less to do with a reactor’s service life as with the periodduring which facilities are decommissioned (nuclear power plants, ships and vesselswith nuclear power installations, coastal bases, radwaste and SNF storage facilities, andother elements of the nuclear infrastructure). Table 1 lists key facilities left from theCold War.Table 1. A List of Top Problems Inherited from the Cold WarNo. Main Hazard Sources Qualitative Indicators12345Decommissioned nuclear submarines thathave yet to be destroyedDecommissioned ships with nuclear powerinstallations and SNF yet to be extractedReactor units that need to be sliced intoreactor compartmentsRetired reactor cores (containing SNFand PWR) now in temporary storage atAndreeva Bay and Gremikha, in nuclearsubmarine reactors and reactors from shipswith nuclear installationsReactor cores in temporary storage at Gremikhaand in No. 910 and 900 liquid metalfuel reactors6 Total volume of solid radioactive waste7 Total volume of liquid radioactive waste8Nuclear and radiation hazard assembliesdumped in the Arctic seas (nuclear submarines,ships, reactors, containers, etc.)9 Nuclear service ships15, including 11 with SNF179, including 2 with SNFOver 130 with an activitylevel of (A) > 3.6 × 1017 Bq10 with activity levels atnearly 2.5×1016 Bq51,000 m3 with activity levelsat approx. 7×1016 Bq7,200 m3 with activity levelsat approx. 4×1016 Bq17,000, including 3 nuclearsubmarines with SNF28, including the Lepse floatingstorage base10 Toxic waste rated at hazard classes 1–3 Approx. 160 tons11Territories and waters that require remediationAt the temporary storagesites at Andreeva Bay andGremikhaThere is another aspect that deserves special attention in terms of ensuring safetyduring the use of nuclear energy. This aspect is related to the state of public opinion onnuclear and radiation safety. People have had fairly calm reactions to the many increasesin emissions standards for toxic car exhaust fumes. At the same time, when radiationbackground numbers exceed the standards even slightly, this causes great concern among168

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe public, even if the figures remain considerably below maximum allowableconcentrations (MACs). There are a few reasons for this, ranging from the “ChernobylSyndrome” to insufficient public education about the nature of the impact of radiationon humans and the environment, as well as the actual radiation conditions in one regionor another.At the close of the 20th century, the most pressing problems related to SNF andradwaste emerged in Northwest Russia in connection with the mass decommissioningof nuclear submarines and other nuclear infrastructure elements. During the Cold War,this was the very site where a powerful fleet of nuclear submarines, ships and coastalmaintenance and storage facilities was established. Of the more than 260 nuclearships and ships with nuclear power installations built in the Soviet Union — includingicebreakers — over 160 were based in Russia’s Northwest.International efforts to dismantle the legacy of the USSR’s nuclear fleet beganover 25 years ago. The first example of international cooperation within the GlobalPartnership and cooperative threat reduction was the U.S.-Russian Cooperative ThreatReduction Program (aka. Nunn-Lugar Program), which was initiated in 1991. Startingin 1996, collaborative efforts were underway through the Arctic Military EnvironmentalCooperation (AMEC) Program. Under a variety of AMEC projects during that period,Norway contributed USD 10 million, the United States contributed USD 25 million, andRussia donated USD 6.5 million.Over the years, international aid, earmarked for environmental problems in Russia’sNorthwest, and comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear submarines and environmentalremediation of former fleet sites, increased due to expanded bilateral efforts not onlywith the United States, but also with Norway, Sweden, Germany, Great Britain, Japan(in the Far East), and other countries.Some of the most important projects that have been and will be completed throughinternational cooperation are:• Streamlining the industrial infrastructure of ship repair facilities that alsodismantle strategic nuclear submarines specifically under the US-RussianCooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program;• Increasing production opportunities in the technological transportation systemfor removal and management of SNF, as well as conditioning solid and liquidradwastes under bilateral agreements between Russia, the United States, andNorway;• Restoring the infrastructure of the Andreeva Bay temporary storage pointunder bilateral agreements between Russia and Norway;• Dismantling multipurpose nuclear submarines under bilateral agreementsbetween Russia, Great Britain, Norway and Canada;• Creating a land-based long-term storage point for reactor compartments inSayda Bay under an agreement between Russia and Germany;• Searching for an ideal means of handling SNF and solid radioactive waste atcoastal maintenance and storage facilities under bilateral agreements betweenRussia, Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden;• Creating innovative technologies for the temporary storage of SNF, conditioning169

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYsolid radioactive waste, creating a system for radiological monitoring(PICASSO), the buoyancy of decommissioned nuclear submarines inwaterborne storage, as well as their safe transport to dismantlement sites(under the AMEC Program).One special form of international cooperation in this field is the development ofa Strategic Master Plan for the comprehensive dismantlement in Russia’s Northwest,initiated by RosAtom and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development(EBRD) in early 2004.By late 2007, a group consisting of Russian experts from Russia’s leadingorganizations in the field (including the RAS Institute for the Safe Development ofNuclear Energy, the Kurchatov Institute, the Dollezhal Research and Design Instituteof Power Engineering, among others) developed the Strategic Master Plan (SMP) withinput from international consultants. This plan envisages the completion of a series oftasks toward ensuring the safe dismantlement of vessels in Russia’s Northwest fleetby 2025; these efforts are to include the removal or safe long-term storage of SNF andradioactive waste. At the core of the SMP is a strategy for achieving a complex end goalthat takes into consideration the multi-faceted aspect of the problem at hand such as:• An integrated review of all hazardous nuclear and radiation facilities in the region;• Risk minimization;• Disposal and environmental clean-up efforts that have been completed andthat are currently underway in the region;• Economic feasibility and many other factors.The SMP is comprised of two stages. The first and preparatory stage (SMP-1)was completed in late 2004. The most important results of SMP-1 include not only thedevelopment of all of the requisite baseline data and methodological foundations forfurther work, but also the development of a list of priorities for the immediate future.In early December 2004, the final SMP-1 report was approved by the Assembly ofDonor Countries, approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the NDEP,and brought into force by a Decree issued by Russia’s Ministry of Nuclear Energy(12/01/2004). On the recommendations of SMP-1, several priority projects were funded(such as a project to streamline the radiation monitoring system and emergency responsesystem in the Murmansk Oblast).SMP-2 proceeded in a very different way from SMP-1. Three leading organizationsin the field were involved with SMP-1. In contrast, SMP-2 was assigned to a programdevelopment group, which comprised leading specialists representing a number oforganizations in the field. This group was formed under the Environmentally SafeEnergy Fund of the RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy.Yet another important difference between the two project phases was theappointment of the international consultant comprised of representatives from Fluor andBNG. In line with technical specifications, the Consultant performed the functions setout for each of the tasks. Specifically, the role of the Consultant was to serve as reviewerand consultant and to transmit the latest Western experience in a wide range of issuesrelated to development of the SMP.The parties were to discuss several specific tasks, the completion of which facilitatedthe finalization of the SMP and its main components. As a result, the SMP was presented170

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYas a package of different components, the central of which is the ComprehensiveDismantlement Program (CDP), which includes a schedule of priority projects.The following factors distinguish the CDP from other programs in dismantlementand environmental rehabilitation of decommissioned vessels:• A focus on achieving strategic goals;• Review of all sources of hazard and decommissioned Northwest fleet vesselsposing a radiation hazard without exception;• An inventory of all key interrelations during strategic planning stages;• A substantiation of priorities and the ability to use an information system forCDP management;• The maximum use of modern quality assurance and risk minimizationprocedures.As confirmed in an analysis of current conditions, despite the large volume ofwork that has already been completed, the CDP’s goals require a substantial amount oftime and money — much more than was previously devoted to remediation in Russia’sNorthwest. Table 2 shows estimated figures on the volume of work that has yet to becompleted under the CDP as a percentage of total work volumes. It is clear that onlyprogress in nuclear submarine dismantlement exceeds 70–75%. For most other types ofvessels (nuclear maintenance and repair services, ships with nuclear installations, andthe Andreeva Bay and Gremikha temporary storage points) as well as the storage andburial of solid radioactive waste, work required to achieve the final goals is only about10–15% completed.As part of the SMP, an analysis was conducted and data has been presented onthe current technical conditions of the following (dismantlement, environmentalrehabilitation, and infrastructure):Table 2. Estimate of Work Remaining under the CDP (% of total)UnitNuclear SubsNuclearStorage VesselsShips withnuclearinstallationsGremikhaAndreeva BaySNF RemovalRadwastemanagement% 25–30 85–90 ~95 85–90 85–90 50–60 80–90• 23 nuclear submarines, including 18 with SNF;• 97 reactor blocks, including 1 with SNF;• Gremikha and Andreeva Bay temporary storage points;• 28 nuclear service ships;• 1 ship with nuclear installations (heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser).The main focus at the start of SMP development was preparing a substantiation forthe strategic goals. The goals were formed based on current concept-based decisionsmade by RosAtom and with consideration for Russian and international experience inthe field.171

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIn brief, the goals are:1. By 2015, all nuclear submarines, reactor units, ships with nuclear powerinstallations and nuclear service ships should be dismantled, and their reactorcompartments (onboard reactor facilities and service ship storage bases)containing solid radioactive waste are to be stored at the Sayda Bay long-termstorage facility (70–100 years).2. By 2025, the former coastal temporary storage points in Andreeva Bay andGremikha should be rehabilitated to conditions that are not harmful to peopleor the environment and make it possible to continue to use these territories forpurposes to be determined by the Government of Russia.3. By 2018, reprocessed, conditioned and defective SNF from PWR reactorsshould be safely removed and transported out of the region to Mayak.4. By 2015, all SNF that has not been treated should be rendered safe and placedin long-term storage until a final decision is made.5. By 2025, most radwaste should be appropriately contained and stored in safe,long-term storage facilities and be prepared for subsequent transfer to finalcontainment.The Comprehensive Dismantlement Program includes an extensive list of projectsaimed at achieving these strategic goals (see Figure 1).Based on an analysis of baseline data, the above principles and the results of strategicstudies for the entire set of tasks were drawn up into a high-level, integrated strategy.The strategy addresses all of the vessels and locations to be dismantled and rehabilitated,and also addresses the management of spent nuclear fuel, radioactive waste and solidwastes for the entire Northwest region of Russia.The integrated strategy is founded on the following key decisions:1. All fuel from nuclear submarines with PWR is to be transferred to Mayak —this is a priority.2. All U-Zr SNF will be collected for storage at AtomFlot for a period of at least50 years. Units that are decommissioned and dismantled and that hold liquidmetal will be assigned to temporary storage at Gremikha until a final decisionis made regarding technology for further management.3. After the dismantlement of vessels, the radioactive waste from nuclearsubmarines, heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers and SNF storage facilitiesfrom nuclear service ships will be transferred to long-term storage facilities inSayda Bay, where they will stay for at least 70 years.4. All other solid radioactive waste will be put in a regional center for conditioningand storage in Sayda for long-term storage over the same duration. During thattime, a decision will have to be made on the location and methods for finalradwaste containment.5. It has been proposed that the transfer of high-level waste (HLW) be minimizedby conditioning of HLW in Andreeva Bay, where most HLW is located.6. Low-level waste (LLW) obtained by rehabilitation of Andreeva Bay andGremikha will be transferred to specially designed containers located in theirrespective areas.This integrated strategy has become a foundation for developing strategies formanaging different objects of dismantlement and rehabilitation efforts as well as special172

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYstrategies for SNF, radioactive waste and solid waste management.The environmental rehabilitation of the Gremikha temporary storage point serves asone example of a separate strategy for a specific facility. This facility is one of the mostcomplex coastal facilities in the environmental rehabilitation program for NorthwestFigure 1. The strategy under the Comprehensive Dismantlement Program.Russia. Gremikha is home to 130 containers of PWR SNF with a total potential radiationdose of ~5.2х10 15 Bq, nearly 2,500 m 3 of a variety of solid radwastes, and about 300 m 3of liquid radwaste.173

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYHandling Alpha class decommissioned nuclear submarine reactors presents a specialproblem. There are eight decommissioned and removed components that are stored ina “frozen” Pb-Bi alloy, and they carry a total potential radiation dose of ~1.7х10 16 Bq.Individual buildings and section of the territory, including the water area, are pollutedwith radionuclides. Planning and carrying out the work is complicated by the lack ofaccurate information about the contents of many containers that are located in an openairsolid radwaste storage facility.The Gremikha rehabilitation strategy, like the strategy for Andreeva Bay, comesdown to resolving issues in four key areas (see Figure 2):Figure 2. Strategy for the Gremikha temporary storage point for SNF and radwaste.1. Creating an Infrastructure• Completion of a thorough study in order to establish baseline data on radiationconditions and the conditions of buildings and structures;• Modernization of general infrastructure (roads, berths, building repair, etc.);• Creation of a special infrastructure (measurement technology, robottechnology, decontamination methods, and temporary storage conditions fordecommissioned components, etc.).2. Spent Nuclear Fuel Management• Conditioned PWR SNF will undergo accelerated transfer on the Lotte toMurmansk (AtomFlot) and later to Mayak along the standard route.• Defective PWR SNF will undergo repackaging in special containers and willthen be transferred first to Murmansk on a specialized container ship beforefinal transfer to Mayak.174

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• In order to determine the feasibility of further treatment of SNF and liquidmetal coolant, there are plans to conduct an additional feasibility study, theresults of which will be used to prepare and remove the radioactive componentsto a treatment facility to be determined. The timeframe is 2010–2015.3. Radioactive Waste Management• Solid low-level waste (LLW) and medium-level waste (MLW) will be sent tothe Sayda center, while HLW and a reactor monitoring and protection systemwill be sent to Andreeva Bay for conditioning.• Liquid LLW will be reprocessed on-site at respective installations, whilesecondary solid waste will be sent to Sayda.• Liquid MLW and HLW will be reprocessed at mobile facilities from the Saydacenter.• Solid LLW resulting from the rehabilitation process will be buried on-siteunder an agreement with federal and regional authorities. The timeframe forthis aspect of the program is 2010–2023.4. Rehabilitating Buildings and LandRehabilitation of buildings, land and water areas will be carried out graduallyas buildings and land are needed for SNF and radwaste management purposes. Thetimeframe for rehabilitation is 2008-2025.The next step after establishing a foundation and adopting a strategy for all ofthe different objects of dismantlement and environmental rehabilitation (including SNF,radwaste and solid waste management) was to develop a functional system towardachieving the final strategic goals of dismantlement and rehabilitation for all CDPfacilities. The plan includes a list of all of the actions to be taken and in what order toachieve the final goals for each item under the CDP.The final planning stage was the development of the Comprehensive DismantlementProgram based on functional diagrams. Using computer software, the CDP was presentedin the form of a Gantt chart. The chart shows the start and progress of all multi-partand macro-scale projects, as well as all of the phases of each project. The timeframeand order in which the projects are to be completed were aligned with the previouslycompiled set of functional diagrams. The Gantt chart also illustrates the technologicalconnections between different projects (see Figure 3).The second phase of SMP development, including the CDP, was the first resultachieved in the integration of strategic planning for a variety of large-scale, long-termtasks related to the destruction of facilities remaining in Northwest Russia after the ColdWar. The subject of the strategic planning was the management of decommissionedRussian Naval vessels that presented radiation hazards during their dismantlement(environmental rehabilitation), as well as management of the infrastructure, SNF,radwaste, and solid wastes.The following tasks were completed during SMP development:• Baseline data was standardized for over 150 radiation hazards from the fleetand elements of the infrastructure located in various parts of Northwest Russia(in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts);175

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 3. Achieving the final strategic goals for all of the components of theComprehensive Dismantlement Program176The following tasks were completed during SMP development:• Baseline data was standardized for over 150 radiation hazards from the fleetand elements of the infrastructure located in various parts of Northwest Russia(in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts);• The final strategic goals for managing the facilities specified in the CDPhave been substantiated; their achievement will either eliminate threats forpersonnel, the public and the environment, or reduce threats to acceptablelevels;• Roadmaps have been drawn up to lead us from today’s conditions to theachievement of the final goals for all of the elements in the program withoutexception. In particular, the development of the SMP took note of the resultsof strategic studies on determining rehabilitation criteria for temporary storagepoints, the introduction of new categories for solid radioactive wastes — LLW,management of defective and unprocessed SNF, and other factors;• When forming a baseline for the CDP, the past experience of Great Britainwas used and adapted for Russia. This experience included the developmentof strategic programs for decommissioning nuclear facilities and radiationhazards, as well as strategic planning and project prioritization procedures;• The international consultations and consideration of international experiencein implementing similar projects contributed to the development andadaptation of an assessment methodology and lowering risks that may ariseduring completion of the CDP;

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• The international consultations and international and Russian experience indeveloping the CDP contributed to the implementation of quality assuranceprocedures while meeting ISO 9001.2000 standards;• Preparations for the program’s baseline took into account all of the mostsignificant industrial, technological and organizational connections among thefacilities to be dismantled and the resources that could be provided by theinfrastructure, which helped create an integrated, long-term plan of action.A total of 236 projects were defined in the CDP’s baseline. These projects setout the tasks for 11 subprojects to be competed in 2007–2025. Over this period, thefollowing results will be achieved:• Over 3,100 cases of dry fuel assembly with a total activity level ofapproximately 4×1017 Bq will be unloaded from nuclear submarine reactorsand heavy nuclear-powered missile carriers;• A total of 9 decommissioned Alpha class nuclear submarine reactors with atotal activity level of approximately 7×1016 Bq will be removed from theregion;• Roughly 70 TUK-120 casks with unprocessed SNP will be unloaded fromstorage facilities at temporary storage points and floating service bases, whichhave been prepared for long-term controlled storage, will be unloaded andtransferred to storage at AtomFlot for a period of up to 50 years;• A regional center for conditioning and storage for various categories of solidradioactive waste will be built in Sayda Bay;• All of the vessels decommissioned from the Russian Navy, nuclear submarines,ships with nuclear installations and nuclear service ships will be dismantled.Long-term storage points will be established for 120 reactor compartments, 2reactor rooms and 6 storage facilities with solid radioactive waste;• All spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste (save for LLW) will be removedfrom temporary storage points, and brownfield land will be formed in order toensure the radiological and technical use of these facilities; temporary storagepoints will have storage facilities for LLW. The waters at temporary storagepoints will be decontaminated.• One main condition for carrying out the CDP’s baseline is funding. Calculationsshow that the total program costs for 2007–2025 will amount to EUR 2 billion.A breakdown of funding by year is available.• During the prioritization procedures, 50 projects and mega-projects werescheduled for 2011. The cost of these priority projects amounts to overEUR 800 million.• A project management system was designed during the development ofthe SMP. The use of this program will help monitor and promptly adjustthe program as changes arise.• The CDP is not a program for direct action and does not presume securingtarget funding. It should be useful to RosAtom as:• A point of reference for launching short-term target programs, including theFederal Target Program for the dismantlement and environmental rehabilitationof decommissioned Russian Navy vessels;• A substantiation for making strategic decisions on the most important aspectswhen it comes to project funding in this field;177

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• A basis for making choices in international collaboration and cooperation withdonor countries.For international organizations and donor countries, the CDP should serve as afoundation for determining which projects should be funded, in addition to paving theroad for international cooperation in the comprehensive dismantlement of the nuclearsubmarine fleet of Northwest Russia.178

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRadiation Safety in the Region Affected by RadioactiveContamination from Operations at the Mayak ComplexVladimir NovosyolovProfessor, Center of History of the Chelyabinsk State andMunicipal Government, Urals Academy of Public ServiceSafety is the top prerequisite for human well-being. Any threat, even the smallest,to their safety, makes people stressed and afraid and creates conditions for aggressivebehavior. This is why our sense of safety to a large extent depends not on true safety buton our subjective feelings and emotions, which may or may not be well-founded.Radiation safety at the Mayak complex is a reality, made possible by the concertedefforts of the industry leaders, several enterprises, and numerous intermediaryorganizations. The enormous progress made in ensuring the radiation safety of operationsat Mayak is so obvious in the eye of an expert that further discussion might seem like awaste of time.Considering the persistence of Mayak’s management in continuously improvingthe radiation safety of the technologies used, in completely controlling radiation levelsat each point in the chain of production, in implementing 24-hour automated monitoringon the territory adjacent to the facility, and in providing online accessibility of radiationsafety information at the plant, one might think that there is sufficient evidence that ahigh level of radiation safety at the facility has been achieved. However, while expertsmight believe this is the case, sociological studies show that the absolute majority ofresidents of the areas that have been directly affected by radiation believe the exactopposite.Consequently, there is a patent discrepancy between reality and the perceptions ofthe affected population. One dangerous fact is that the residents of Chelyabinsk Oblastdo not have the same understanding of whether Mayak poses a heightened threat toradiation safety. Mayak’s own experts believe that they have done everything possibleto ensure that the accident of 1957 would be impossible today. Meanwhile, one-third ofthe residents of Ozyorsk who do not work at the facility stated that it would come as nosurprise to them if a significant breakdown took place, accompanied by uncontrolledradiation discharge into the air or water. In the Kunashak and Argayashsk districts, 50%of respondents believe that nothing can protect them from radiation.The absence of radiation safety has resulted in just 8% of the population in thecontaminated regions who consider themselves healthy. In addition, 42% consider thepsychosocial environment to be highly stressful, and 75% of the population considersMayak to be first and foremost a radiation threat for the entire area. However, 20% ofrespondents did recognize the major role Mayak has played in the defense potential oftheir country and that the facility is a natural product of scientific and technologicalprogress.An overwhelming majority of the population (85%) is convinced that currentoperations at Mayak are having a negative effect on the environment, and hence on the179

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYlocal population as well. This is one indication that public opinion of Mayak is negative.It has been noted in a number of recent publications that the negative perception ofMayak by the residents of the affected areas is the result of distorted facts. To a certainextent, this is true. But it is far from being the only reason.The radiation phobia of the local population is in large part due to the very lowquality of life there. Radiation safety will only enter the consciousness of the SouthUrals population when economic security and other forms of stability are achieved. Itis an illusion to think that people can understand the concept of radiation safety whenalmost all of their other basic needs are not protected.At the same time, it should be noted that the concept of radiation safety exists inthe human mind ungoverned by the rules of rational thought. Studies have shown thatbeing saturated with information on the dangers of radiation in the past could lead tothe development of radiation phobia. This is why we need to develop methods to swaypublic opinion using information that has been broken down in a specific way.The mass media —television especially — can play a considerable positive rolehere, because it is trusted by over 50% of people who have been victims of radiation.Mayak’s reputation could be improved through a series of special television programsor films that would relate the most captivating and instructive stories from the plant’spast and modern-day activities. The local population does not know about any of themost distinguished Mayak contributors and does not even understand why there is amonument of Igor Kurchatov in Chelyabinsk.Instead of taking a passive stance and isolating itself in Ozyorsk, Mayak mustbecome involved in the local civic community so that it may gradually supplant itsnegative image among the people of South Urals.Ultimately, it isn’t knowledge alone, but positive sentiment and gratitude for thepersonnel of Mayak, based on that knowledge, that are needed to replace the currentmindset, to stop people from saying, as they do now, without mincing words, that thegovernment subjected them to a scientific experiment to test survival rates and must beheld accountable. Just 9% of the population feels that Mayak is fully in compliance withtoday’s environmental laws, which is why individual residents have demanded that theplant’s operations be halted, or that the plant be demolished.However, half of the population of the affected areas is in favor of building goodneighborly relations with Mayak. A study found that if the facility helped create jobsfor men, contributed to children’s health in the region, ensured access to educationfor young people, improved access to information for all residents, and undertook therehabilitation of contaminated areas, etc., it would drastically reduce local population’sperceived level of the radiation threat posed by Mayak.The current radiation phobia observed among those living in the areas that wereaffected by radiation contamination from operations at Mayak is simply unfounded.The subjective grounds for fear of Mayak could, to a significant extent, be overcome bycreating close and permanent social and economic ties between the two sides.180

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRussia and the United States: Renewing the Strategic DialogueMatt MartinProgram Manager, The Stanley FoundationThe Stanley Foundation is happy to be co-sponsoring this conference. It fits in wellwith core Stanley values and goals. First, the Foundation’s programming is focusedon promoting and building support for what we call “principled multilateralism,” thatis, based on the understanding that many issues in the international arena require thecooperative efforts of many to find regional and global solutions, based on widely heldbeliefs and accepted practices. Secondly, The Stanley Foundation promotes publicunderstanding and constructive dialogue on critical international issues. Our workrecognizes the essential roles of both the policy community and the broader publicin building sustainable peace. Both of these approaches are directly relevant whendiscussing nuclear issues. Thank you for your participation in these two days, and forthe opportunity to discuss some of the work and concerns of the Foundation with youhere today.We have heard much so far in our discussions regarding the future of nuclear energyin Russia and around the globe and Russia’s role in creating and promoting that future.We all want a future that is safe, healthy, and provides a sustainable energy path whileprotecting our natural environment, even if we may at times disagree on how to getthere. The Stanley Foundation is engaged in a set of programming looking at variousnonproliferation concerns surrounding nuclear energy (such as fuel cycle policies,nuclear fingerprinting, and the role of UN bodies, such as the 1540 Committee), andit’s clear that any potential global future with nuclear technology in the mix—whetherfor energy, for agriculture, for medicine, for basic or applied research—will need to bea secure future in which we can be confident that dangerous material is not siphonedoff to be turned into weapons, nor that advanced know-how cannot be used to supportclandestine weapons programs.We will not achieve this secure future, though, without keeping the related issues ofnuclear weapons, nuclear arms control and disarmament, the critical strategic relationshipbetween Russia and the United States, and the important connection between nuclearenergy, our ongoing nonproliferation cooperation regarding Cold War remnants, andnuclear weapons disarmament in the forefront.During the Cold War, we in the United States and Russia could telegraph ourstrategic assumptions and intentions through the ether of the superpower standoff. Webuilt up dizzying stockpiles of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons on the one hand,while creating and monitoring strict nonproliferation and arms control on the other. Inthe nonproliferation realm, these efforts came to quintessential fruition in 1968 withthe drafting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—a multilateral agreementon a global nuclear framework that remains the basis for the entire nonproliferation181

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYregime that defines and balances the benefits and obligations on states regarding nuclearissues.Now nearly 40 years later, the NPT is under great strain, due to a wide varietyof factors, and we see the US-Russian strategic relationship suffer because of it.While Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts continue their invaluable work on thenonproliferation side of the issue, disagreements over issues such as missile defense,NATO expansion, and the use of outer space, threaten to overwhelm our commoninterests and cooperative efforts. Without dismissing those real concerns, let us turnour attention to the significant work that Russia and the United States can still map outtogether in the strategic areas of nonproliferation and bilateral arms control.While the NPT is under strain, the basic concept remains relevant: nuclear weaponstates must steadily move toward nuclear disarmament and provide civilian nuclearassistance to non-nuclear weapon states, as long as they themselves forego nuclearweapons development. The concerns that have arisen over the years—concerns overadherence to disarmament obligations, break-out of a nuclear weapons capability,and access to sensitive fuel cycle technologies—point to a need to reinvigorate thenonproliferation regime, not eliminate it.Particularly if we envision a global society that greatly expands its civilian useof nuclear technologies, we must be willing to look with a creative eye to means ofstrengthening and tightening the carefully-balanced provisions of the NPT, so that weencourage a safe and secure common future. Many have discussed the dangers associatedwith unfettered access by all to the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichmentand reprocessing technologies. Whether this is handled by the active denial of thesesensitive technologies, or, more preferably, by incentivizing the non-pursuit of thesesensitive technologies at a national level, these approaches will be strengthened if thenuclear weapon states—and moreover specifically Russia and the United States—worktogether. This cooperation will be important both on the fuel cycle issue itself, as wellas on the disarmament front, where stronger adherence will provide evidence that thenuclear weapon states are living up to their end of the NPT bargain, thereby pressuringnon-nuclear weapon states to do the same.The second large area of critical cooperation between Russia and the United States,besides pursuing our common nonproliferation goals, is in the area of the Russian-USstrategic arms control dialogue. The history of Russian-US agreement and progress onnuclear weapons arms control and disarmament issues shows great successes achievedthrough concerted diplomacy and technical dialogue, even in times of strain in theoverall strategic relationship.During the Cold War, Russia and the United States negotiated several landmarktreaties: SALT I, SALT II, and START. During the transition period moving out of theCold War, unilateral actions by both the United States and the Soviet Union dramaticallyreduced tensions at a moment of tremendous change. The United States returned allof its naval surface- and air-based tactical nuclear weapons, while simultaneouslywithdrawing most of its tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled overseas. In a reciprocalaction, the Soviet Union ordered the removal of all categories of nuclear weapons fromdeployment to “central storage facilities,” while between one-third and one-half of theweapons removed from deployment was scheduled for elimination.The relationship that developed between presidents Putin and Bush reflected a newera in the strategic relationship—one that sought to move past the engrained rivalries182

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYof the past by foregoing the formal apparatus that defined the Cold War relationship,in the spirit of one state dealing with the other as partners, if not allies. The “Moscow”Treaty signed between the two leaders was indicative of this attitude, outlining somechanges, but leaving each state to implement the terms of the treaty in its own manner,without explicit oversight and implementation measures. The treaty did produce somenew achievements, counting the nuclear warheads themselves instead of using deliveryvehicles as a proxy for the first time; and the treaty reduced deployed strategic weaponsdown to roughly 2,000 weapons on each side. However, critics argued that the largenumbers still possessed by each side and the significant supporting infrastructuresdemanded more explicit transparency in accounting and verification. As well, the treatyfailed to declare a total warhead count for each side, as the drafted-then-abandonedSTART III framework envisioned.Now the challenge is how to move forward, combining the positive aspects of pastagreements in a manner which is mutually reassuring and that strengthens the bilateralrelationship. The recent Russia-US strategic framework declaration from just severalweeks ago in Sochi, Russia on April 6th is just such a positive statement:“We acknowledge that today’s security environment is fundamentally differentthan during the Cold War. We must move beyond past strategic principles,which focused on the prospect of mutual annihilation, and focus on the very realdangers that confront both our nations.…[W]e reaffirm that the era in which theUnited States and Russia considered one another an enemy or strategic threathas ended. We reject the zero-sum thinking of the Cold War when ‘what wasgood for Russia was bad for America’ and vice versa. Rather, we are dedicatedto working together and with other nations to address the global challengesof the 21st century, moving the U.S.-Russia relationship from one of strategiccompetition to strategic partnership.”Without ignoring the impediments to better relations and the points of contentionbetween Russia and the United States, it is notable that in a larger sense, we are at amoment of ripe opportunity. As evidence of this, look at the political situation amongthe P-5: Russia will have new leadership in two weeks with the inauguration of PresidentDmitry Medvedev. Similarly, in nine short months, there will be a new president in theUnited States as well. At the same time, we also have new leadership in the UnitedKingdom and France. Finally, China, while not transitioning to new leadership, haslong been a strong proponent for progress on disarmament measures, being open tostrategic reduction talks as US-Russia talks make progress themselves, supporting theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and maintaining a reserved nuclear doctrineof minimal deterrence.Strategically speaking, this is also an opportune time to renew and strengthen theRussian-US strategic relationship regarding nuclear weapons. Increasingly, few in theUnited States see a role for nuclear weapons in US security strategy beyond the ultimatepurpose of existential deterrence, leaving significant strategic space between the currentand the ideal strategic posture. The key will be moving toward this new strategic realityin a manner which promotes international stability and security. The Sochi declarationprovides the rhetorical background and now the challenge is to match words withdeeds.183

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYLet me outline some specific options for Russian-US consideration.A number of immediately apparent opportunities for US-Russia strategiccooperation exist. START, which is the latest treaty to contain verification provisions,expires in 2009. While the Moscow Treaty agreement surpasses START in terms ofreductions, losing the verification and accounting of START would end a valuablestrategic communication link between the two countries and leave each much more inthe dark regarding the other’s activities. This unnecessarily dangerous outcome shouldbe avoided, by a bilateral extension of these specific provisions. Negotiations on suchan extension have begun, but it is likely that the final outcome will wait until a new USadministration. Work should continue on setting the stage.Another immediate opportunity is presented by the upcoming NPT ReviewConference, which will take place in the spring of 2010. Cooperative efforts on someof the points raised above, such as in mutual agreement on fuel cycle questions andcontinued bilateral progress on disarmament (most clearly enunciated in the “13Practical Steps” outlined and approved in the 2000 NPT Review Conference), will goa long way toward ensuring a successful outcome to the 2010 Review Conference. Thefailure of the 2005 Review Conference was a worrying indication of the fissures in thenonproliferation and disarmament regime, and a successful conference five years latercould do much to reassure the global community.Looking beyond the “low-hanging fruit” opportunities that present themselves,a series of additional measures could be pursued to improve the bilateral Russian-USstrategic relationship:• A US-Russian strategic dialogue to recognize new realities could provide thesetting for discussing these issues, using the Sochi declaration as the jumpingoffpoint.• Hearkening back to past arms control attempts that did not come to fruition,several components of the draft START III agreement could be resuscitated:• Disclosure of overall strategic stockpile inventories;• Increased transparency of doctrines and strategic deployments;• Discussions over tactical stockpiles transparency.• Continued progress could be made on the withdrawal of forward-basedweapons – NATO tactical weapons on the US side, and western borderdeployed weapons on the Russian side.• In the manner of the previous unilateral actions of Presidents George H.W.Bush and Boris Yeltsin, new unilateral actions on the part of the United Statesand/or Russia could help break the current inertia, while safely maintainingthe strategic concerns of each:• Further reductions below the roughly 2,000 warhead level outlined in theMoscow Treaty;• Doctrinal changes, such as in declaratory policy (moving away from hairtriggeralert status) and regarding negative security assurances (promisesto refrain from nuclear attack excepting as a response to a nuclearattack).• Broader engagement could improve along the lines of several related issues:• Multilateral fuel cycle arrangements may provide a way out of the trapencompassing the complete fuel cycle debate.184

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• As Russia has suggested, it could act as regional fuel provider forregions as dispersed as sections of Asia, South Asia, the Middle East,and Europe.• Russia’s offer to provide a long-term physical repository for spentfuel could be considered and evaluated.• Presenting a united front on the thorny issues of Iran and North Korea,with Russia and the United States agreeing on overall principles would gofar in moving the global community toward a new conceptualization of thenonproliferation and disarmament framework.Many wait to see where the global situation will go, and while change is alwayscertain, now seems like a particularly fluid time. Russia’s new President Medvedevwill soon have the opportunity to show his conceptions of Russia’s place in the globalcommunity and to develop a working relationship with the United States. In severalweeks, the NPT Preparatory Conference will meet in Geneva for its annual preparationfor the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Today in Pennsylvania, US voters are goingto the polls to participate in choosing the Democratic nominee for President. As in alltransitional periods, it is a time of great challenge, but also great opportunity. May theleaders of our two great countries—Russia and the United States—seek greater peaceand security not only for ourselves, but for our increasingly interdependent world, byrecognizing the role that improved bilateral strategic relations can play in bringing aboutthat secure future.Thank you.185

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe New US Nuclear Posture Review: A US PerspectiveJeffrey LewisDirector, Nuclear Strategy Initiative,New America FoundationThe United States is in the midst of a substantial debate about the future of itsnuclear weapons policy.This change is driven by a number of factors.First, a new President will assume office in January 2009. The new President will beaccompanied by significant changes in staff, including new officials at the Departmentsof Energy, State and Defense, as well as the staff of the National Security Council.Second, the US Congress has refused to fund several programs proposed by theBush Administration, including plans to develop a new generation of replacementnuclear warheads and plans to modernize the nuclear weapons complex. Congress iscurrently withholding some funds for the national laboratories, including Los Alamosand Lawrence Livermore, on the grounds that many programs cannot be evaluatedwithout a clear statement of US nuclear policy. Congress has created a “Commission onthe Strategic Posture of the United States” that will be co-chaired by former Secretariesof Defense, William Perry and James Schlessinger. Congress has also mandated that thenext President conducts a so-called “Nuclear Posture Review” in 2009.Although the Bush Administration has submitted unclassified and classifiedstatements on US nuclear posture to Congress, in all likelihood Congress will continueto withhold funding for many programs until the completion of the 2009 Nuclear PostureReview.Third, the United States is in the midst of a serious debate about taking steps towardthe elimination of nuclear weapons, led by former Secretaries of State George Shultz andHenry Kissinger, Secretary Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn.Although I do not expect the elimination of nuclear weapons in the near-term, theUnited States is seriously considering dramatic changes in its nuclear posture for the firsttime since the end of the Cold War.Past Nuclear Posture ReviewsNuclear Posture Reviews are a recent phenomenon in US defense planning. The2009 Nuclear Posture Review will be the third comprehensive review of US nuclearstrategy. Reviews were also conducted in 1993 and 2001. They were, however, verydifferent from each other.The 1993 Nuclear Posture Review was an effort by the Clinton Administrationto conduct a comprehensive study of US nuclear posture after the Cold War – acomplement to the so-called “Bottom-up Review” of US military capabilities. The 1993Nuclear Posture Review is widely seen as unsuccessful. President Clinton did not, forexample, sign new presidential decision on the U.S. nuclear strategy. Instead the ReaganAdministration directive would remain in place until November 1997. The November186

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY1997 presidential directive was written after an internal review led by the White Houseat the urging of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S.STRATCOM – the command responsible for US strategic force. The military arguedthat they could not meet the terms of the outdated Reagan guidance if the United Statesand Russia reduced nuclear forces below the limit of 3,000-3,500 strategic warheads setin the START II treaty.The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review is rooted in this decision. President Clintonintended to unilaterally meet the START II limits although, at the time, Russia had notyet ratified START II. The Republican Congress, in an effort to prevent the Presidentfrom unilaterally implementing reductions under START II, required that the nextPresident conduct a nuclear posture review before any further reductions could be madeto US strategic forces. That President, of course, turned out to be George W. Bush.The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review is also seen as having been unsuccessful.Congressional Republicans, eager to see its concept of the so-called “New Triad” createda Commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense to review the implementation ofthe Nuclear Posture Review.The two reviews, therefore, were very different. The 1993 Nuclear Posture Reviewwas proposed by the Clinton Administration as a voluntary measure to enable furthernuclear reductions. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was proposed by Congress todelay further reductions, until after President Clinton left office.The 2009 Nuclear Posture ReviewThe 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, like the 2001 version, was conceived by aCongress in opposition to the President’s nuclear policies – although in this case, it isa Democratic Congress unwilling to fund programs such as the Reliable ReplacementWarhead (RRW). Congress has set three requirements:• Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. A Congressionallyempaneled commission with six Democrats and six Republicans, selected bythe House and Senate, and chaired by former Secretaries of Defense Perry andSchlessinger that will complete its work in December 2008. This date willslip until March 2009.• Nuclear Policy Review. A review, led by the National Security Advisor, toconsider the purpose and role of nuclear weapons, to be complete by September2009.• Nuclear Posture Review. A review, led by the Secretary of Defense, to considerthe size, posture and planning for U.S. nuclear forces to be complete by March2010.Each exercise is designed to feed into the next. Although the 1993 and 2001Nuclear Posture Reviews were widely seen as being unsuccessful, there are reasons tothink the third review may succeed where the others failed.First, the United States must make a number of important decisions about USnuclear weapons in the next few years. Congress must decide whether to fund a numberof programs, while the next Administration must mount a diplomatic effort to secure asuccessful 2010 Review Conference of the NPT. I am fond of noting that November2009 will be the 20th Anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The President will haveto go to Berlin. He will be expected to say something about nuclear weapons.187

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYSecond, and most important, there is a widespread sense among both Republicansand Democrats that the United States should dramatically change its nuclear posture toreflect the threats we face today. These threats are largely related to terrorism and otherproblems that cannot be met with nuclear weapons. The bipartisan nature of this senseis illustrated by the Wall Street Journal op-ed and Congressional actions.Third, and finally, policymakers appear to have learned the lessons of the failed1993 and 2001 Nuclear Posture Reviews. The Strategic Posture Commission and thePresidential Review, if conducted wisely, should lay the foundation for significantchanges in U.S. posture.Russia will play an important role in these discussions. In particular, a key questionwill be whether Russia is interested in a follow-on treaty to the 2002 Moscow Treaty.I look forward, therefore, to our continuing dialogue during the questions and answerssession and the rest of the conference.188

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYPlenary Discussion on the Topic ofInternational Cooperation and Global Partnership inDisarmament and Non-Proliferation of WMDs– Paul Walker: My first question has to do with the disposal of waste from nuclearsubmarines. You were telling us about demilitarization and the destruction of oldstrategic Soviet nuclear submarines and that about EUR 2 billion must be spent ondemilitarization before 2012. What is the situation these days? How many nuclearsubmarines were there and how many will be destroyed? I would like to find out howimportant Western funding is for this process. When we first started working together15–16 years ago, our Russian colleagues said they needed funding to dismantlenuclear submarines. Over the time that the United States have been providing financialassistance, possibly 40 submarines have been dismantled in Russia’s Northwest and FarEast. Could you tell us the amount of Western assistance and how much of those EUR 2billion needed for submarine dismantlement and radwaste management will be fundedby Russia and how much will be supplied by partners and sponsors?– Remos Kalinin: I’d like to point out that I spoke about the future and did not aim toanalyze the past, so I do not have the numbers with me regarding who paid for what andhow much. But I’ll say that international assistance has made a big impact in this sphereof activity. It started with the Nunn-Lugar Program, as was duly noted, but at the time,the main objective was Russia’s demilitarization, the reduction of its military potential,and a joint threat reduction effort. We were dismantling completely new submarines,forgetting that we had old nuclear submarines that were rotting away and no one hadtime to worry about them. But, in general, the numbers you mentioned are close toreality. Thanks to this assistance, a lot got done.– Paul Walker: One more issue that deserves to be discussed here is internationalcooperation. It was started six years ago and planned for ten years through 2012.The United States and twenty Western nations pledged close to USD 20 billion to anassistance fund to help Russia destroy its WMDs. All of this must be completed withinthese ten years. The demilitarization of nuclear submarines will continue for four yearsand I believe that if we were to take into consideration the environmental threat and thedanger posed to society, this program must continue after 2012. The West will continueproviding assistance to Russia and Russia will undoubtedly continue its cooperationwith the West.– Paul Walker: As far as I understand, there were many problems communicating thedangers of radiation exposure to the local population. Do the residents of the ChelyabinskOblast sufficiently understand the risks?– Vladimir Novosyolov: Sociological studies conducted by our Institute starting in 1997indicate that anxiety is constantly in the back of people’s minds, both for the residentsof Muslyumovo, a backward rural area, and in the large urban context of Chelyabinsk.The slightest unconsidered communication is negatively interpreted by the populationand it takes little for panic to ensue. This is why the authorities are right in being veryvigilant in how information is provided to the public to avoid serious consequences ofwidespread panic. People have a sense that something could happen at any moment anda difficult situation could arise. Some, especially the residents along the Techa River,189

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYare constantly saying that they were used in experiments without being told, and thatthere is insufficient access to information. Exactly half of survey participants believethat no one truly wants to find a solution to their problems. Meanwhile, the problemsthere are not radiological; they are social and economic issues. Those regions where thenuclear project was based were poor and already dying out. A stark contrast revealeditself between Chelyabinsk-40 (Ozyorsk), where the Communist ideal was close tobeing achieved, versus the surrounding areas, where people were living in very poorconditions. This created the conditions for envy and hatred. The locals feel that they arekept in the dark, being told the wrong information or not being told anything. This iswhy there is anxiety.– Andrei Frolov: The discussions at conferences always focus on Russia’s effortstoward its goal of destroying nuclear and chemical weapons. It is true that the SovietUnion created more chemical weapons, nuclear arms, and nuclear submarines thanthe rest of the world. However, the stockpiles in the United States were also significant.It is unfortunate that we did not hear anything about the disarmament efforts that areunderway in the United States.– Dialogue Participant: First, with regard to the weapon stockpiles. This informationis unfortunately classified, but some general information is available. The BushAdministration states that by the end of the year, the nuclear stockpiles will be reducedto half or a quarter of the number of weapons that existed at the end of the Cold War orunder Eisenhower. I believe that at the end of Eisenhower’s administration, there wereabout 5,000 warheads, and in November there was a planned reduction of 15%, equaling800 warheads.In my opinion, there is no need to classify this information, and any Americancitizen should be able to obtain information about their country’s nuclear arsenal.General Habiger, the former Commander in Chief of the US Strategic Command, hasbeen taking steps in that direction. As for reducing armaments, I believe that the Treatyof Moscow must include the total number of armaments, not only strategic weapons. Wehave to consider the total number, and there is no reason for this number to be greaterthan one thousand. This does not mean that the current administration did not reducearmaments. It may have been done in a way that was not transparent for the public, butstill such actions were taken.As regards delivery systems and placement of armaments, including the stationingof nuclear submarines, the treaty on strategic offensive reductions was a very significantbreakthrough. The reduction applies not only to strategic delivery systems, but also thewarheads themselves, and this is a very important step that makes it possible to resolvespecific issues and these will have an indirect effect on the reduction process. However,there are certain side effects that are not sufficiently positive. Just last month, PresidentSarkozy of France announced that a new generation of submarines would be put intooperation and this is an important step in furnishing means of deterrence — nuclearweapons being one such means of deterrence. Another 15–20 years will be neededbefore the conditions are right for examining delivery systems as a topic of negotiationsover their reduction.– Dialogue Participant: More than once during the revision of the US nuclear strategy,the press brought up the idea of using nuclear weapons in localized conflicts. Do you190

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYbelieve that this issue was properly framed?– Jeffrey Lewis: I read the documents relating the 2001 revision process, and insofaras they accurately describe the revision, I believe that limited use is not part of it. Thepress incorrectly interpreted the position of the new strategy. There is also a differentproblem: the current administration was unable to formulate what role nuclear weaponshave today, twenty years after the end of the Cold War. Since the administration did notspeak up or take any measures to make its position public, the press interpreted this witha predictable measure of suspicion.– Dialogue Participant: In your opinion, what would be a good systemic approach tothe issue of radiation safety from the point of view of public relations? How can this beincorporated to achieve a breakthrough in informing the public of radiation safety?– Vladimir Novosyolov: Here’s the problem: the government and the general populationhave different interests at stake. The government will never be as open as we wouldlike — or as the people would like, as far from power as they are. This conflict ofinterest is a fact and cannot be overcome. This is why we have to approach the issue byway of compromise. We must work through non-governmental organizations, and theymust work together with those in power and look for areas in which there is agreement.Society should keep the pressure on those in power so that they think on their feet. Todo that, we must know what we need to ask of those in power: we need normal relationsbetween the government and the civic organizations that represent various groups insociety. Whenever RosAtom representatives come to visit, or just looking at the situationfrom Moscow, they think that the main radiation safety measures in the Techa Riverarea have been taken. However many more generations will continue to fear radiationin the same way, and for them the accident is not over, it will perpetuate itself in theirchildren, grandchildren, and future descendants. This is something that we must bringto the attention of those in power and keep reminding them of it. It is not enough tofind a technical solution to the issue of radiation safety. We must also change people’sminds. To do so, we need nongovernmental organizations and people who are persistent,respected and have the people’s trust.We must make sure that ideologues do not take leadership of this movement anddiscredit it, as often happens. The leaders must be people with nothing personal atstake.– Igor Khripunov: Sometimes experience can give us a framework for how to act in thefuture. I consider myself a veteran of the Cold War. I was in the thick of it with armscontrol and disarmament since the early 1980s. The point of contention between theSoviet Union and the United States was a question of priorities: disarmament or trustbuildingmeasures? At the time, both sides believed that it was necessary to engage inarms control and that this would improve relations and build trust. The decision of theUnited States was this: trust-building measures must be taken first, and they will lay thefoundation for significant reduction in nuclear arms and delivery systems on both sides.Last year and this year we saw a situation that reminded us of the past: NATO expansionand the placement of missile defense systems in Europe. Russia’s leadership is respondingwith the use of new weapons and its withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional ArmedForces in Europe. We should ask, what is more important? Continuing to move forwardwith arms control or engaging in stronger trust-building measures? What role shouldsociety play? Is there a third approach we could take to ensure that an environment191

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYconducive to arms reduction is established?– Marie Kirshner: I would like to respond to the question regarding the exchange ofinformation, when we don’t have the same kind of information. In truth, numbers haveno meaning. There is a global threat and we have felt this threat for many years and I amvery glad to be participating in this Dialogue and discussing these issues. This is veryimportant for the future of our planet.The second question was regarding the choice between disarmament andstrengthening trust building measures. These are two sides of the same coin: we mustcontinue the disarmament process and engage in building trust at the same time. Chinaand Tibet are in a situation where two sides are in opposition. The free world must workto develop measures for a safer environment. We must all work together to make thingsbetter. Thank you so much for organizing this conference as it will help improve thesituation.– Paul Walker: I wanted to respond to what Igor Khripunov and Marie Kirshner said.So, what is more important? Disarmament or building trust? We’ve come to a strangeplace in our journey. President Bush, at the beginning of his first term, and PresidentPutin looked each other in the eyes and found that they could trust one another and worktogether. One of the side effects of the rethoric was that nuclear disarmament issues weregiven separate attention. I cannot be the judge of how much of that is true, but these twoprocesses carried on separately until the current problems emerged, and now we are ina place where these two questions are tightly bound to one another. It is impossible toachieve progress in one area without making headway in the other one. I also wouldlike to say that we are now in a good place in terms of disarmament. There are certainmeasures in place that were used in 1991–1992 that could be taken unilaterally on bothsides and that would not affect the parties’ strategic security and would not have anyconsequences, but a step would be taken in the direction of creating and building trust.However, we must wait for new opportunities that the new leadership of the two countriesmight have. We all agree on one point: good, transparent collaboration between theUnited States and Russia is very important and it looked like all presenters were of thisopinion. Nobody wants a new Cold War. It is far too expensive a venture and it wouldbe foolish to start it.– Anatolii Nazarov: First I would like to echo the question brought up by my Russiancolleague. This is indeed the second such Dialogue. At the last one we brought youa huge volume titled “The Radioactive Legacy of the Cold War” along with otherdocuments that are now freely available. It is good that any American citizen can obtainthis information in the United States, but it would also be good if, for the next Dialogue,we could have some corresponding documents here so that any Russian citizen couldhave access to that information. That is my first request to the American side.The second question is for Jeffrey Lewis. You presented a brief historical analysisof the new disarmament doctrine, and, at the same time, you said that the Bushadministration has yet to formulate it. What do you think would be the significance ofthe new doctrine?It doesn’t matter if a new President takes his place. We now have President Medvedev,but we can say with 100% certainty that there will be no fundamental change in Russia’sdoctrine, that much is obvious. So what is the point of revising the new doctrine?– Jeffrey Lewis: The new revision will essentially be based on the 2001 revision,192

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYbecause it is initiated by Congress, as an excuse for not approving funding for severalprograms proposed by the administration. Congress has made the decision that theBush administration should not be trusted with the nuclear doctrine and that fundingshould be put on hold. The reason for this is that we need to wait for it. I was onlyspeculating as to what actions might be taken by the new administration. Everythingwill depend on which candidate is elected President. I believe that because the WallStreet Journal article that was mentioned discussed parts of the new doctrine, and a newnuclear weapon nonproliferation treaty conference necessitates a revision of the newdoctrine. A new bipartisan commission would be created. As for content, it is likely thata significant reduction of the nuclear arsenal would be on the agenda. The new Presidentmay announce new plans to halve the arsenal and set the number of warheads to 1,000.The issue of the doctrine would be more complicated. I noticed that there are no bilateralagreements concerning the reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear weaponssystems, though I would personally welcome any efforts in that direction. We can talkabout the use of nuclear weapons only as a response measure, especially at this time.Russia has not taken on any obligations of this sort, but of course these issues could bediscussed.– Dialogue Participant: I would like to add that, at this time, financial concerns are oftenthe deciding factor. The war in Iraq is a very expensive undertaking and Congress isconstantly asking: What purpose do nuclear weapons serve? Nuclear weapons are losingtheir priority status in the eyes of the US military. Nuclear weapons are almost a signof weakness rather than of force. I believe that the United States, like Russia, France,China, and the United Kingdom, must seriously look at ways to significantly decreasetheir stockpiles and other countries should join them in this process. However, it is hardto convince North Korea and Iran that they should not pursue the development of theirown nuclear arsenals if our countries continue to have them. Jeffrey is right that thisissue was raised and significant reductions will be made. Maybe in Russia this has goneunnoticed, but US Congress refused to fund the development of new warheads, which isa very significant change in US policy.– Anna Vinogradova: My question might seem of minor importance in light of thequestions being discussed, but it concerns a matter of great importance for regularpeople. The general public is frequently accused of radiophobia. In my opinion, the bestway to combat radiophobia is to give regular people open access to monitor radionuclidecontent and accumulation in their own bodies. I am talking about the people who liveclose to facilities that pose a radiation threat. All our inquiries at all levels of power,requesting equipment needed to conduct such examinations of the residents of Balakovo,to reassure them that the NPP is safe or, if it isn’t, to take some kind of measures, havebeen met with refusals. The authorities justify their refusal by saying that there havebeen no cases of radiation-related illnesses, and so this equipment is unnecessary. Dothe people living near nuclear installations in your countries have open access to suchexaminations and the ability to monitor their health this way?– Paul Walker: This will be discussed at other sessions, so let’s answer this question alittle bit later.– Rita S. Guenther: I represent the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C.,and wanted to respond to several questions that were asked here. I am very pleased to193

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYnote that we have been working with the Russian Academy of Sciences for 25 years now.Currently we are working on a third project, and Dr. Sarkisov is the Co-Chairman ofthis project. We are studying the nuclear fuel cycle and Dr. Nikolai Laverov is workingon it on the Russian side. We work very closely together, because this is an opportunityfor our Russian colleagues to obtain valuable information from American scientists.This information is published in Russian and American publications and is publiclyavailable.I also wanted to address another issue. Dr. Khripunov mentioned that trustbuildingmeasures and disarmament must have priorities, because otherwise it isunclear how we can find a solution to this issue. In our experience, NGOs work intandem with other organizations. There are groups of citizens, experts, and these groupscreate the opportunities for developing the measures for building trust and cooperationwith government bodies. This happened in the case of disarmament, and when we wereorganizing the collaboration between the two academies of science. How do you seethe role of NGOs and citizen groups, and how can these groups use or benefit from thedestruction of weapons, nuclear submarines, and so on? Is this considered in the contextof increasing security measures?– Paul Walker: As the head of an international program managed by nongovernmentalorganizations, I know that this is very important. I am very grateful for your question andbelieve that there are many ways to engage in a dialogue on international security withRussia. First of all, the contacts through national academies are critical, as well as contactsbetween the national laboratories, which are very important for relations between Russiaand the United States. This is one of the reasons why nuclear disarmament discussionsare continuing, despite the fact that conditions are not always favorable. One area ofconcern is that in the course of progress made in several areas, as a side-effect of sorts,we are losing some of the personal contacts in the United States and relationships thatwere established over many years among various individuals, at different levels. Thedifficulty in maintaining those relationships and the decreased interest in and attentionbeing accorded to nuclear disarmament are among our biggest challenges. It is necessaryto partake in the international dialogue, to improve the relationship and communicationbetween individuals, between government entities and the scientific community, in orderto ensure that the dialogue continues with the United States at the official level. We aregrateful that we are able to participate in this dialogue now. In the United States we oftenhear a very dangerous saying: “friends should not sign contracts.” One of my friends isa lawyer. He is constantly signing contracts that specify law-abiding behavior. I believethat official intergovernmental agreements, like a dialogue, are very important. Theyhelp provide a clear solution for how to fulfill certain commitments and all aspects of theagreement must have official approval.I would also like to add that I represent Global Green USA, which has beeninvolved in this process for over 12 years, and I consider the dialogue between theRussian and American sides extremely useful, as it continues within the framework ofthese agreements. There is also what we call hidden diplomacy. I would be the first tosay that much was achieved in the last decade and we can thank the nongovernmentalorganizations that this was made possible. This helped build trust between Russia andthe United States as well as between Russia and the West in general.194

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY– Sergey Baranovsky: Now I would like to conclude this session, which I believe hasbeen the most successful at this conference. First, because we had the perfect numberof presenters: two from Russia and two from the United States. Unlike the first day, weimmediately had a great discussion with Paul Walker’s help. One concrete suggestionmade was the request directed at Global Green USA and the Stanley Foundation toprepare a plenary report on the state of nuclear-related affairs in the United States for thenext Dialogue, which I am sure will take place. We are openly discussing the situationhere in Russia and know nothing about what is happening in the United States. Tellus how you are dismantling nuclear submarines, how you are destroying your nuclearwarheads, your public outreach efforts, and how the public feels about these issues.195

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTracking and Monitoring Radioactive Substancesand Nuclear Materials:Achievements, Challenges, and SolutionsViktor PetukhovSenior Scientific Collaborator, Scientific Institute forShipbuilding Technologies, Saint PetersburgMikhail RylovDirector, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety,Saint PetersburgThirteen years have passed since the adoption of the Federal law on the use ofnuclear energy in 1995 (1). Article 22 of the law states that Russia must possess twogovernment-managed centralized tracking systems: one for nuclear materials (NM)and another for radioactive substances (RS) and radioactive waste (RW). Both systemsdeal with NM and RS intended for peaceful uses and therefore are based on a set ofinternationally accepted principles of material checks and balances.State tracking and monitoring of NM, RS, and RW is conducted with the followinggoals in mind (2–4):• Determine their actual quantity at the sites where they are located, storage, orburied;• Prevent loss, theft, or unauthorized use of NM, RS, and RW;• Provide NM, RS, and RW inventory and transmit information to governmentagencies overseeing nuclear energy use, nuclear safety, and environmentalprotection;• Provide information to federal and local authorities for the purpose of makingdecisions on how to handle these materials to ensure the radiation safety of thepopulation and the environment.The goals of both systems, as defined by law, are fully aligned with one another.A significant effort has been made to create a set of standards to streamline the trackingand monitoring systems and ensure the physical protection of both NM and RS. In arelatively short time, dozens of documents have been developed that effectively lay thefoundation for standards for the safe management of these substances. The progress thathas been made was in large part made possible by the technical and financial support wereceived from the US Department of Energy. These funds were received as part of a jointeffort to reduce the nuclear threat and improve NM tracking and monitoring systems andthe physical protection of nuclear sites. One notable step was the introduction, in 2006,of revised federal standards and rules for tracking and monitoring nuclear materials (NP-030-05) and radioactive substances (NP-067-05).The main challenge in improving NM tracking and monitoring systems and thephysical protection of nuclear sites has always been the nonproliferation of nuclearweapons. Much national and international experience has been gained in this field andit has been incorporated into the revised standards. However, the growing threat ofinternational nuclear terrorism is associated not only with the possible use of NM to build196

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYexplosive devices, but also with the potential use of RS to build so-called “dirty bombs,”which are considered a type of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). It is worth notingthat only in recent years the international community has begun to truly understandthe danger of radiation terrorism, since the development of a nuclear device requiresthe involvement of highly-qualified experts and the use of advanced technologies;meanwhile, all it takes to build a dirty bomb is access to radioactive substances and aninsignificant quantity of explosives (5). An action plan for the non-proliferation of WMDand securing radioactive sources was adopted during the 2003 G8 Evian Summit.Considering modern terrorist threats, the goal of preventing the proliferation ofnuclear WMD must go hand in hand with the goal of preventing the proliferation of suchweapons using radioactive substances. However, to this day, there have been significantdifferences in how NM and RS tracking and monitoring systems are designed and whatset of standards they follow. This in turn has caused the cost of such systems to go up,without making them more effective.One good example is the transfer of NM to RW status. RosTekhNadzor hasdeveloped the NP-072-06 Standard, which defines the procedure for this process. Thedocument does not prescribe specific procedures and mechanisms for the transfer, withthe exception of a brief description of the work of the commission that would be incharge. Here, nuclear materials must leave one system while radioactive waste mustappear in the other system. If either system breaks down, radioactive or nuclear materialsmay be lost either on paper or in reality.The main document for tracking and monitoring nuclear materials is theRussian Federal Standard NP-030-05 (Basic Rules for Nuclear Material Tracking andMonitoring). The standard indicates that substances in the smallest quantities are subjectto government tracking and monitoring ( 235 U and Pu — 15 g, 241 Am — 1 g, 252Cf –0.001 g). However, all experts are perfectly aware of the fact that there are sourcesof ionizing radiation out there that contain quantities of nuclear materials in excess ofthe indicated values. For this reason, the standard automatically included the followingexception: these sources are not tracked as nuclear material — if they were, they wouldneed to be included simultaneously in both tracking and monitoring systems.Depleted uranium in particular is a constant headache. According to NP-030-05,the government nuclear materials tracking and monitoring system must include depleteduranium weighing over 500 kg, while smaller amounts of depleted uranium are trackedin the RS and RW system. However, there is yet another significant exception (a commontrend with federal documents of this sort): defense technologies are exempt from suchtracking regardless of weight. The authors also forgot that the keels of sailing yachtsare frequently made out of depleted uranium (6, 7). Consequently, according to ourlaws, nuclear materials are crossing into Russia without the knowledge of oversight orcustoms agencies. Meanwhile, depleted uranium is not as harmless as we’d like to think.It has been shown that under certain conditions, it can be used to build a dispersingdevice (8).Let us turn out attention to cases where radioactive substances slipped throughthe cracks in the monitoring system. In Russia, from 1996–2004, 180 instances werereported where sources of ionizing radiation disappeared (9). However, it turns out thatsources of ionizing radiation are frequently misplaced even in countries where a robustRS tracking and monitoring system has been in place for years.Over the period 1993–2006 in the United States, there were 1,080 cases where197

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYradioactive substances were stolen or lost in amounts sufficient to create a dirty bomb(10). Of these, 275 cases involved criminal activity and 15 cases involved the attemptedsale of radioactive substances.Commenting on the results of an investigation, Jim Turner, a Member of theCommittee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives of the United States,stated that the disappearance of radioactive substances posed a significant danger, sincethe potential acquisition of a dirty bomb by terrorists was a clear threat (11).According to 2005 data, there are two million units of radioactive materials in theUnited States that could be used to build a dirty bomb (12). The materials are stored ata total of 21,000 sites. In the last several years, there were 375 reported cases of theftand disappearance of these substances (107 cases in the last six months). According toDr. Richard Meserve, the [former] Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC) responsible for the security of nuclear materials, despite the fact that cases of lostor stolen radioactive materials are constantly reported, for the most part, the amountsare too small or their form is not suitable for the purposes of a dirty bomb (12). InEurope, radioactive materials are stored at close to 30,000 sites; about 70 radioactivesources disappear each year. This is also evidenced by a statement made by the IAEA atthe International Conference in Vienna in March 2003. The report on the “Security ofRadioactive Sources” admitted that 100 nations have no effective system for monitoringradioactive sources due to lack of an appropriate infrastructure. It should be noted thatthe frequency with which radioactive sources are disappearing is constantly growing:2005 — 102 sources, 2006 — 150 (13).At this time, the IAEA has a database (created in 1995) on the illicit trafficking ofradioactive substances. However, only 91 nations submit information to this database.In addition, the IAEA only records data on illicit radionuclide trafficking that is freelyprovided by nations. But why would they want to incriminate themselves? It shouldcome as no surprise that there are many discrepancies between the data reported byvarious organizations regarding the number of radioactive sources that have escaped thetracking system. For example, according to the EEC, 790 radioactive sources regularlyescape monitoring in Europe (15).According to the IAEA, over 10,000 medical devices and radiotherapy equipmentof types are produced around the world each year and up to 12,000 new industrialradiography sources (16). Once again, you have to wonder how all of this is in opencirculation and is not rigorously controlled by some international entity.These facts clearly indicate both the need to adjust the standards now in use and thecountry’s need for a centralized system to track and monitor NM, RS, and RW.Let us consider how such a government system would operate, since historically,the storage of nuclear materials has always been accorded due attention, while thestorage of radioactive substances and radioactive waste has become a matter of concernonly in the last two decades.The government system for tracking and monitoring radioactive substances andradwaste depends on a network of agency-specific and regional data analysis centers.Regional centers are dedicated to obtaining integrated information on nuclear andradiation safety relative to the presence and transit of radioactive substances and RWin the region. Meanwhile, agency centers monitor radioactive substances and RWspecifically at enterprises within a given industry (see Figure 1). This is a very relevantissue for defense industries.198

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAgency data analysis centers for tracking and monitoring RS and RW are animportant component of the government system, since they are linked to both RosAtomcenters and a federal agency.It is worth noting that Russia’s current system of RS and RW tracking and monitoringbenefits from a solid legal basis and operates in accordance with a set of special federallaws and other national legal instruments.From RosAtom’s point of view, practically all radioactive waste is located atenterprises and entities within the nuclear industry and just 2% is located withinother industries (17). This is how practically all RW in Russia is located at enterprisesoverseen by just a handful of federal agencies: RosAtom, the Russian Ministry ofDefense, the Ministry of Transportation, and RosProm. The particular way RW is storedat shipbuilding enterprises is also worth mentioning: a large proportion of RW (solidradioactive waste, specifically) is stored inside reactor compartments from dismantlednuclear submarines that are kept in floating storage.It is important to note the high level of radioactivity of the sources and wasteproducts being kept at the enterprises.Figure 1. A diagram of the government RS and RW tracking and monitoring system.According to the requirements of NRB-99 Standards, it is recognized that “...radiation exposure in the amount of 1 person-sieverts (SI) leads to potential damageequivalent to the loss of 1 human-year of life in the population (18). The monetaryequivalent of the loss of 1 human-year of life in the population is estimated at ...no lessthan one per-capita income.” The data on per-capita income in Russia is disparate, butwe can use the average figure for our purposes (19–23). The average annual per-capitaincome in Russia equals USD 5,000.199

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe existing system of RS and RW tracking and monitoring would both help avoidthe unauthorized use of radioactive substances and also help forecast radiation conditionsat enterprises in the event of an accident.Let us consider the case of unauthorized use of an un-tracked closed source ofionizing radiation (24). Most of these types of sources are used at industrial engineeringand shipbuilding enterprises that use the isotope 192 Ir for gamma ray defect detection andhave an activity level over 1,012 Bq, i.e., high-level sources of radiation.The equivalent dose rate from one of these sources at a distance of 1 meter equalsN = 10- 4 Sv/s (25). Consequently, in one month, the equivalent dose would be almost240 Sv (due to the short half-life of 192 Ir, it is not useful to consider longer exposureperiods).Thus, the potential damage from unauthorized used of just one source in an areawhere people are constantly present would have the economic cost of USD 120,000.It is much harder to evaluate the economic cost of the unauthorized use of RW.Relevant literature primarily discusses large-scale accidents, such as the Chernobylcatastrophe, or hypothetical NPP accidents (26–29). However, it is possible to use thestudies of these accidents to determine the monetary cost equivalent of unauthorizedRW use.What exactly is the “cost” of an accident or the unauthorized use of RW? Naturally,it is determined by the amount of money (expenses) that would be required to restoreaffected or damaged portions of the infrastructure to their original state. Even if damagesare compensated to all affected persons in the form of monetary payments, this doesnot means that the compensation has been paid in full to the society as a whole. Theconsequences of unauthorized use for society include the following factors:• Implementation of a set of organizational and technical measures to reduceradiation effects on personnel and the general population;• Consequences of radiation exposure on public health;• Psychological impact;• Effect on the operations of the enterprise in question;• Effect on macroeconomic indicators;• Impact on national income and employment rates;• Long-term social and political consequences;• Environmental consequences.It is clear that accounting for all of these factors is a complex task that must involveresearch organizations within various government entities. Nonetheless, it is possible toprovide some worthwhile assessments of individual factors here.In line with international assessments, we picked 137 Cs at 15 Ci/km 2 (5.55 × 10 4Bq/m 2 ) as a deactivation threshold, which corresponds to the definition of a “stringentradiation monitoring” zone used for areas affected by the Chernobyl accident. Accordingto the UN’s most recent studies of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, “...radiation monitoring and safety measures inside these regions were usually verysuccessful at maintaining the annual effective rate below 0.5 rem/yr….” This valuecorresponds to the NRB-99 Standard, which sets the main dose thresholds. However,American experts have found that in order to maintain the indicated effective dose, thetotal cost per capita equals USD 50,000–100,000 (28). The main expense is the cost ofwaste decontamination and disposal.200

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYLet us consider the unauthorized use of 10 m 3 of unaccounted-for liquid radwaste(LRW). As part of their production processes, enterprises that handle NM generate lowleveland medium-level radwaste (average activity А = 108 Bq/m 3 , primary radionuclide– 137 Cs). An area measuring 200–400 m 2 can be contaminated, meaning a minimumlevel of contamination of 2.5 × 10 6 Bq/m 2 . The cost of waste disposal alone (surfacesoil layer 15 cm thick + site cost) would be USD 300/m 3 for a total of USD 18,000. Ifwe take the cost of decontamination and any potential compensation payments to thelocal population or to the personnel, the costs would at least double in size. All of theother factors listed above, including the health consequences of radiation exposure tothe local population and personnel, are difficult to assess and they are not discussed inthis paper.In order to ensure security control over RS and RW at each concerned enterprise,the relevant government agencies and local authorities, and consequently the local dataanalysis center, must collect and track the following information:• Information about the enterprise, including any licenses and permits requiredto use nuclear power;• Data on the number of sources of ionizing radiation, RW, storage points,including the protection/containment methods used, and RW processingfacilities;• Data on radionuclide contaminated grounds and bodies of water within theperimeter of the monitored zone;It is worth noting that the government tracking and monitoring system includes8–20 indicators for each facility or site being monitored, and many of the indicatorsinclude verbal descriptions (names of chemical elements, etc.). This approach makes itmore difficult to complete the forms, the number of errors goes up, and the size of thedatabase also increases.In order to provide RS and RW tracking information in real time, modern computersystems that can perform the following are needed:• Comply with state and agency standards;• Ensure the company’s data security;• Allow easy retrieval of information on request from federal agencies;• Be compatible with the nationwide tracking system;• Have a straightforward, user-friendly interface;• Be capable of eventually assuring electronic document processing on anational scale.A study of information flows in RS and RW tracking was done both at a nationallevel and by RosProm data analysis centers (see Figure 2).201

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 2. A diagram of information flows on a national scale.Information from individual enterprises that use prescribed forms arrives at agencydata analysis centers, where it is verified and then submitted, in its entirety, to the centralRosAtom data analysis center. If questions arise regarding the submitted forms, a queryis sent to the enterprise. If an error is identified, the enterprise must resubmit the correctedform as soon as possible. Each form must be approved by the enterprise management.The RS and RW tracking documentation process comprises the following: initialinventory, statistical reporting, and routine reporting. For each of these components,there is a separate information processing procedure.This system is based on an initial inventory compiled when the enterprise is addedto the national tracking system. This initial inventory contains complete information onthe presence of RS and RW at the enterprise and how they are stored. From these data, thenuclear and radiation conditions at the enterprise can be deduced and the consequencesof potential radiation accidents can be forecasted.Once a year, enterprises submit the 2-TP radioactive substances form and 2-TPradioactivity form as part of statistical reporting, but the data is cumulative.Routine reporting is the most detailed source of information and is submitted to therelevant data analysis centers within 10 days of when an activity involving radioactivesubstances or radwaste is completed.Data analysis center programmers have developed the necessary software, but itdoes not meet the specific requirements of NM tracking, while the software developmentfor tracking NM cannot be used for tracking radioactive substances.Unfortunately, ever since 1994 when efforts to develop software for automatedtracking and monitoring systems began, and to this day, there has been no coordinationfor these projects. There have been numerous proposals to integrate Russia’s informationsystems into a single system by analyzing and selecting several of the most developed,202

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYready-made systems to build a unified information system, as our American colleaguesstarted doing as early as 1998. These proposals have been met with little positivefeedback. The integration of experts are various organizations in the development ofsuch a unified information system would make this is less costly problem to solve (30).The lack of coordination among experts, together with the shortage of targetedfunding, is not having a positive effect on how NM and RS are handled in Russia.Conclusions1. The current NM, RS, RW tracking and monitoring systems can help preventthe unauthorized use of these substances and can also forecast radiation conditions atenterprises in the event of accidents.2. At this time, the approaches used to design the NM and RS tracking andmonitoring systems and the set of standards they follow still differ considerably, raisingthe cost of these systems and preventing them from achieving optimal performance.The existing set of standards, including the revised IAEA recommendations, are seen ashaving been designed to ensure safe management of radioactive substances, but not toprevent their proliferation.3. Further improvement and unification of the standards governing the systems fornuclear material and radioactive substance tracking and monitoring is needed in Russia,as part of the effort to develop a better understanding of the need for safer NM and RSmanagement practices and greater NM and RS security.4. Judging by the commonalities between the goals of preventing NM and RSproliferation, it appears necessary to unify the standards governing the two tracking andmonitoring systems. The revised standards should be based on the concept developed bythe international community for NM, including the principles of a checks and balancessystem and the structure of a materials balance zone, quantitative criteria of appealand significance, physical inventory, tracking and reporting procedures, etc. Unifyingthe relevant standards would require developing unified international criteria to assesseffectiveness and support the replacement of existing approaches used to build thesesystem with a unified approach that is more in step with today’s realities.5. In order for there to be a greater awareness of how NM and RS should be handled,and for the cost of tracking and monitoring systems to go down, our experts need topool their efforts to develop and maintain automated software systems for trackingand monitoring and develop a new generation of software systems based on approvedsolutions. These software systems must be adaptable to the needs of any national entitiesusing them, whether large or small, including those where there is only one radioactivesource.References1. Federal Law No. 28-FZ on the Use of Nuclear Energy (10/20/95, as amendedon 02/10/97 ).2. Rules No. 746 Governing the National Nuclear Materials Tracking andMonitoring System (Russian Government Decree issued 07/10/98).3. Resolution No. 962 on National Nuclear Materials Tracking and Monitoring(Russian Government Decree issued 12/15/2000 ).4. Rules No. 1298 Governing the National Radioactive Substances andRadioactive Waste Tracking and Monitoring System (Russian Government Decree203

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYissued 10/11/97).5. Mohammed El Baradei, IAEA Director General, as quoted in Argumenty ifakty, No. 15, April 2004.6. www.enci.ru, Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya, entry on RadioactiveWaste.7. NEWSru.com, Novosti mira, report by the Belgian Nuclear Control Agency,01/13/01.8. Petukhov, V. V., Issues in Tracking Depleted Uranium [Problemy uchyotaobednyonnogo urana], Novosti FIS, No. 6, 2006, Moscow: TsNIIAtominform.9. CIS Commission on the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes. Reporton conducting an inventory and disposing of sources of ionizing radiation on theterritories of CIS states, 06/23/05.10. www.un.org, UN News Center, 09/11/07.11. NEWSru.com, Novosti mira, 11/11/03.12. nuclearno.ru, Russian non-proliferation website, 06/27/02 and 09/14/07.13. www.iaea.org/NewsCenter, IAEA14. news.nbc.com.ua, Novosti, 06/26/02.15. www.iaea.org, IAEA, Nuclear Safety Review for 2004.16. Proceedings of the First Russian National Seminar “State Radioactive Substanceand Radioactive Waste Tracking and Monitoring System [Sistema gosudarstvennogouchyota I kontrolya radioaktivnykh veshchestv I radioaktivnykh otkhodov], 07/05–08/04,Saint Petersburg.17. Radiation Safety Standards (NRB-99). Saint Petersburg: 2.6.1. 758–99.Russian Ministry of Health, 1999.18. Sakovich, V. A. Risk Reduction for Nuclear Energy Use—Is it Necessary?[Nado li snizhat risk pri ispolzovanii atomnoi energii].19. Second International Seminar “Issues in Risk Reduction for Nuclear EnergyUse [Problemy snizheniya riska pri ispolzovanii atomnoi energii], 09/07–06/04. Moscow,IBRAE.20. Goskomstat of Russia, Social status and quality of life of the Russianpopulations [Sotsialnoe polozhenie i uroven zhizni naseleniia v Rossii]. Statisticalpublication. Moscow: 2000.21. Avramova, E. M. et al. Middle Class in Russia: Quantitative and QualitativeAssessments [Srednii klass v Rossii: kolichestvennye i kachestvennye otsenki]. Economicanalysis bureau. Moscow: TEIS, 2000.22. Proceedings of a Russian-American joint seminar on “Inequality andDevelopment in Russia” [Neravenstvo i razvitie v Rossii], 10/10/03.23. Maleeva, T. The Middle Class in Russia: Economic and Social Strategies[Srednie klassy v Rossii: ekonomicheskie i sotsialnye strategii]. The Carnegie MoscowCenter, 2004.24. Rubtsov, P. M., Romanov, D. E., Musorin, A. I. Radioactive SourceCategorization and the Provision of Adequate Security in the Context of the Draftingof Technical Security Regulations for Commercial Sites where Radioactive Sources arePresent [Sootvetstvie mezhdu kategoriei radioaktivnogo istochnika i obespecheniemego sokhrannosti pri razrabotke tekhnicheskikh reglamentov dlya regulirovaniiabezopasnosti na radiatsionnykh ob″ektakh narodnogo khozaistva]. Vestnik GAN, No. 1,2004.204

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY25. Mashkovich, V. P. [Zashchita ot ioniziruyushchikh izluchenii]. Handbook.Moscow: Energoatomizdat, 1982.26. Margulis, U. Ya. Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety [Atomnaya energiya iradiatsionnaya bezopastnost]. Moscow: Energoatomizdat, 1988.27. J. Beyea, E. Lyman, F. von Hippel. Damages from a Major Release of 137 Cs[into] the Atmosphere of [the] United States. Science and Global Security, v. 12, 125–136, 2004.28. D. Chanin, W. Murfin. Estimation of Attributable Costs from Plutonium-Dispersal Accidents. Sandia National Laboratories, SND96-0957, 1996.29. Kovalevich, O. M. On Assessment of Risk [K voprosu ob opredelenii “stepeniriska”]. Vestnik GAN, No. 1, 2004.30. Rumyantsev, A. N. Nuclear Energy, vol. 101, issue 3, 2007.205

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRussian Federation Regulations Governing theManagement of Radioactive WasteAndrei TalevlinChairman of the Board, For Nature Charity Fund,Chelyabinsk; and Senior Instructor, Civil, Land, andEnvironmental Law Dept., Law School,Chelyabinsk State UniversityBroad tracks of land and large bodies of water are still contaminated by dangerouslong-lived radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants. These include wastes producedby both military and civilian nuclear installations. For the generation of people whowere involved in contributing to this contamination, this is a very serious matter. TheConstitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1993, protects the right of all citizensto a clean and healthy environment. How can we ensure and guarantee the health offuture generations, clean land and water resources, and ecosystems for thousands ofyears to come? In order to obtain the desired results and ensure that our resources arewell spent, we must take great care in the selection of the scientific tools used to evaluatethe health of future generations. A scientific approach must take into consideration pastexperience, which shows that the memory of past contamination is erased in governmentinstitutions every few decades. Laws and regulations change over time. The risksassociated with specific substances and combinations of substances and their effect onhuman health are reassessed regularly. Official assessments in the last few decades haveincreasingly concluded that the danger of radiation per exposure unit is in fact higherthat was previously thought. Environmental protection standards have become morestringent and public support for environmental protection measures has grown.The highly complex issue of nuclear power and its use is only beginning to beconsidered in a comprehensive manner. Now there is an effort to find a completesolution, instead of one that addresses selected concerns. One of the top issues is themanagement of radioactive waste (RW). Here, the real issue is identifying appropriatelegislative steps that can be taken to regulate this field.In describing Russian legislation on radwaste management, we can identify anumber of idiosyncrasies. First, the pertinent standards are scattered across legislation indifferent areas: use of nuclear power, environmental protection, natural resources, civil,administrative, criminal, and other areas. Second, most of the standards that governradwaste management are contained in subordinate regulatory acts. Third, a numberof guidelines for radwaste management developed within different legislative branchescontradict one another. Fourth, the legislative standards for radwaste management forma separate legal institution that plays an important role when it comes to legislation onthe use of nuclear power.There is no comprehensive legislative act in Russia that governs radwastemanagement, which makes it impossible to systematize laws in this field.Legal terminology in the field of nuclear power has its shortcomings, whichnegatively contributes to effective regulatory efforts. There is no single definition of206

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe concept of “radwaste” across all Russian legislative acts. Before a more detaileddefinition for the concept can be determined, the concept of managing radwaste must befinalized, but it has not been fully developed in Russia. One example of shortcomingsin nuclear power-related legal terminology is the use of the term “irradiated heatgeneratingnuclear reactor assemblies” rather than “spent nuclear fuel.” Based on thecurrent scientific approach to managing the nuclear fuel cycle in Russia, for regulatorypurposes, it has been suggested that spent nuclear fuel (SNF) be recognized as one typeof radwaste. It is the author’s opinion that the designation “spent nuclear fuel” should beused for nuclear fuel that has been irradiated in a reactor core, removed from it, and isnow subject to safe disposal.Russian federal law does not offer a mechanism that protects the safety of thepopulation or the environment in the context of radwaste management. The law containsonly general principles.Legal regulation of radwaste management displays two trends that are commonin environmental law. Amendments are made that weaken environmental protectionrequirements applicable to those holding natural resource management rights. Governmentoversight is weakened when the government’s role of environmental control is combinedwith a role in resource management, curtailing the authority of environmental protectionagencies and their access to financial and administrative resources.Amendments to radwaste management legislation are often dictated by political andeconomic goals to legalize specific, pre-existing legal relations concerning the import offoreign SNF, nuclear materials, and radioactive substances, and by customary practicesin radwaste management at Russian nuclear fuel cycle enterprises.Due to the economic changes in Russia over the last two decades, we should assigngreater importance to the use of a market mechanism to regulate environmental protection.If a polluting market player does not find it economically viable to continue making anegative impact on the environment, it will quickly cease any of its own practices thatpollute the environment. Of course, not all economic methods used to control radioactivecontamination agents can be used. For example, charging fines in compensation fornegatively impacting the environment would not be an option. Consequently, we mustinstitute a system for the compensation of environmental damages as a primary methodthat stimulates the natural resource managers to be economical and generally makeefforts to protect the environment. In today’s world, a regulatory mechanism combiningeconomic and legal components in environmental protection and the use of naturalresources, together with a system that enforces responsibility under the law, will make itpossible to enforce environmental protection measures.In today’s Russia, there is no systematic approach to dealing with radwastemanagement issues in legislative regulations; a system of legal standards governingradwaste management has yet to be created. Today’s legislation sets out generalrequirements to ensure that waste management does not pose a threat to the environmentor human health, but it is not aligned with modern regulatory requirements for themanagement of waste that requires special safety measures.In order to establish a regulatory system for radwaste management, a special wastemanagement regime and rules will be needed. There are rules in place and reinforcedin Russian legislation for the management of foreign SNF, nuclear materials, andradioactive substances. These regulations permit leaving all waste resulting from thetreatment of the abovementioned materials and substances on Russian territory and the207

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYlong-term storage of foreign spent nuclear fuel. This does not protect Russia’s people orfuture generations of Russian citizens from the detrimental effects of ionizing radiation.A solution to this problem using the legal framework would involve the introductionof standards into federal legislation on nuclear power prohibiting the import of foreignSNF, nuclear materials, and radioactive substances for the purposes of storage and/orburial, and prohibiting other countries from leaving radwaste from the treatment ofabovementioned materials and substances on Russian territory.The legal standards for radwaste management form a separate legal institutionthat plays an important role in nuclear power regulation. Certain rules for radwastemanagement that already exist in different legislative branches need to be reconciled.We must eliminate all regulatory contradictions with regard to radwaste burial.Along these lines, it is proposed that the Russian Subsoil Management Law, the WaterCode, and a number of subordinate legislative acts be brought into compliance with theRussian Federal Environmental Protection Law, which prohibits the burial of radwaste.208

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYDismantlement of Nuclear Service Ships in Northwest Russia:Environmental Problems and SolutionsSergei ZhavoronkinSecretary, Murmansk Oblast Public Council on NuclearEnergy Safety and Expert, Nuclear and Radiation SafetyProgram, Green Cross Russia Murmansk AffiliateOverviewThe USSR surpassed all other countries — including the United States — in termsof the number of nuclear ships and vessels it built. During 1955–2000, the USSR andRussia built 5 nuclear ships, 260 nuclear submarines, 9 nuclear-powered icebreakers,and one 1 nuclear-powered bulker.In terms of their construction and number, they have been categorized as eithermass-produced or one-off constructions. Over 30 different types of ships and vesselswere designed as part of the main projects. In order to maintain them, an auxiliary fleetof nuclear service ships (NSS) was built. This fleet is made up of specialized vesselsthat were built for the maintenance of nuclear-powered ships and vessels or reequippedfor these purposes from mass-produced tankers, dry cargo bulkers, lumber carriers, andbarges.Today Russia has more nuclear service ships than any other country in the world.The reason is the great number of bases in this large country with an insufficientlydeveloped (or in places even completely absent) transportation infrastructure (roadsand railways) in places that serve as bases for nuclear ship repair. In addition, coastalinfrastructure for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste is poorlydeveloped.Before 1992, NSS that came to the end of their service life — most of these beingRussian Naval vessels — were, as a rule, buried (sunken) in the sea in areas that werespecially selected for that purpose. Furthermore, due to the lack of infrastructure forreprocessing solid radioactive waste (SRW), they were loaded with as much solid wasteas possible. The burial was conducted in six areas of the Northern seas and four areasin Far Eastern seas. In total, nearly 60 different vessels were buried in Russia’s coastalwaters. This was the only way to dispose of NSS — if you can call that “disposal.”At present, a general concept and program for the dismantlement of nuclearsubmarines has been developed and involves financial assistance from Western investors.The program is already underway. However, no concept has been developed yet for thedismantlement of NSS. There are individual examples of dismantlement (conversion)performed because the ship in question posed a hazard, needed to be decommissioned,or additional quantities of radioactive waste needed to be placed on it. For some NSS,preparatory efforts have been made (unloading SNF and radioactive waste and preparingthe ship for decommissioning) based on these reasons.1. Description of the ProblemMost NSS were built or converted in the 1960s and 1970s during a period of mass209

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYconstruction for the military and civil nuclear fleets. The technical conditions of mostof these ships, primarily those in the Navy, are unsatisfactory, and many are consideredunsafe.Types of NSS1. Floating technical bases (FTB) are used to recharge (unload and load) nuclearfuel, and temporarily store SNF. This type of ship carries and stores liquidradioactive waste (LRW) and SRW during the recharging process. Extensivework has been done with specialized loading and unloading equipment toensure that nuclear ships and vessels are equipped with everything they need(special-purpose water, filter sorbents, etc.).2. Special tankers designed to transport liquid cargo. These are facilities forcollecting, storing and transporting LRW.3. Storage ships and barges are designed to store SRW.4. Ship radiation monitoring systems (SRMS) are used to arrange boarding onnuclear ships and vessels during recharging, personnel decontamination, andradiation monitoring (including individual radiation dosage monitoring).In the Northern region, various estimates say that the number of NSS ranges from40 to 70. Currently 39 ships are based here, and 26 have been decommissioned, declaredunsafe, and are scheduled for dismantlement.Unsatisfactory technical conditions (i.e. unsafe conditions) are determined primarilyby operating conditions. By using the same kind of ships all made in the same yearby the Russian Navy at Murmansk Sea Shipping, it is possible to determine standardtechnical conditions, even for veteran ships such as the Volodarsky (1929) and the Lepse(1934) (these ships were converted into NSS in 1961).The second condition determining the technical condition of NSS is the continued,long-term period during which it was common practice to dump LRW and bury SRWin the Northern and Far Eastern seas. The absence of any coastal infrastructure forreprocessing radioactive waste stimulated the practice of rapid collection of these wastesfor subsequent dumping and burial in sea waters. Meanwhile, principles that are criticalto ensuring safe operating conditions and waste storage, as well as waste sorting andsafe containment, were not observed. As a result, it became common practice on NSS —especially those under the Russian Navy — to mix different types of LRW with variousphysical and chemical properties in the same tank.In some cases, due to poor technical operations, when sea water and decontaminatedwater enter SNF containers, the result is an increased amount of high-level LRW and thecorrosion of storage casks, including those containing SNF.2. Conditions Determining the Environmental Risks of DismantlementThe key conditions that determine the environmental risks of dismantling NSS are:• The existence and state of SNF onboard the ship;• The quantity and state of SRW and LRW;• The technical condition of the ship;• The radiation conditions;• The availability of modern technical means of delivering other infrastructureelements to the dismantlement sites: tugboats and docks;210

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• The SNF and radwaste management structure;• The structures allowing environmental monitoring, including radiationmonitoring;• Monitoring and control over the work as it is performed.The Existence and State of SNF Onboard the ShipThe existence of SNF on a ship determines radiation conditions, and SNF removalshould be the first step in the dismantlement process.On the Lepse service ship, for example, the activity levels of the SNF held instorage containers currently measures approximately 2.5×10 16 Bq (680,000 Ci), whichis comparable to the activity levels of emissions from the 1957 Mayak accident.Calculations show that the fuel contains a total of 260 kilograms of uranium ( 235 U), 156fission products and 8 kilograms of fissile radionuclide plutonium ( 239 PU). The force ofthe gamma rays in the storage container and in adjacent premises exceeds the naturalradiation environment by hundreds of thousands of times.A considerable amount of SNF on NSS due for dismantlement has begun tocorrode, change in shape, and the fuel composition has begun to disintegrate, whichrules out any possibility of extracting spent fuel assemblies out of storage using theexisting technological procedures.Unloading defective fuel is an operation that is implicated in the radionuclidepollution of the nuclear service ship itself, loading and unloading equipment (technicalbase ships and coastal structures), the territory and premises of facilities, health andprotective zones and, in adverse conditions, villages and towns.Removing SNF is a complex technological, hazardous operation that requires thepreparation of individual rules for each different ship. Special equipment needs to be usedand decisions need to be made with regard to transport plans in the management process,including for the temporary storage of defective fuel and its subsequent transport. Inorder to complete this type of work on the premises of a company that deals in disposaland dismantlement, the necessary infrastructure needs to be put in place.3. Solving Spent Nuclear Fuel ProblemsWhen it comes to dealing with management of spent nuclear fuel, especiallydefective fuel, during the nuclear service ship dismantlement process, it is important toprepare and review at least two options: one that includes unloading the fuel, and onethat does not.One current example is the dismantlement of the Lepse, a technical base-type nuclearservice ship that has been prepared both technically and financially for dismantlement.This is an international dismantlement project. As the project was prepared andsubsequently underwent all requisite procedures, both of the aforementioned SNFmanagement options were considered and analyzed.The SNF is not unloaded from its storage containerThis option involves the creation of additional barriers to facilitate the safe,long-term storage of the fuel in the container. Such barriers would take into accountcalculations of the heat that would be generated. In this situation, the entire frame ofthe ship is sliced into segments and the SNF storage block and other large components211

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYare taken out and are moved to a coastal storage facility for nuclear submarine reactorcompartments at Sayda Bay. The construction of this facility is currently in progressthanks to contributions from Western investors (Germany). The second phase of theprocess involves building a storage facility for bulky components from auxiliary ships(NSS). Once the technical aspects are determined, the SNF may be unloaded directlyfrom the storage block, including at coastal locations (the back-up option).The SNF is unloaded from its storage containerThis option involves removal of the fuel from the storage container and thedismantlement and disposal of the ship in line with a part of the approved project. Adifferent problem altogether in this option is the research and grounds for safe storage ofso-called leaked SNF, which specialists say is already an issue and will continue to formduring the removal, especially the removal of defective fuel.At the feasibility study stage, a decision needs to be made about which dismantlementoption to choose. It is ideal to first consider all of the aspects of all project options duringproject development. It is important to bear in mind that spent nuclear fuel managementand ship dismantlement are related processes.The Work SiteFrom an environmental point of view, the site where dismantlement of a nuclearservice ship and the removal of SNF are performed is of the utmost importance. It is alsoimportant to assess previous experience in removing SNF from Russian Naval ships inthe Far East (unloading Russian Naval technical base ships: PM-80 and PM-32) andpilot SNF removal efforts on the Lepse.There should not be any secrets, nor should any information be withheld fromthe specialists or officials who play a role in the decision-making process. If radiationpollution does take place on a company’s premises and spreads beyond the healthprotection zone, these occurrences must be analyzed thoroughly and used as a foundationfor risk assessment in project development.Several experts believe that the best place to conduct SNF removal from the Lepsewould be a company located far from large cities, rather than AtomFlot, which is righton the edge of Murmansk, a city with a population of 400,000.The Quantity and State of SRW and LRWThe presence, quantity and state of solid and liquid radwaste constitute thesecond determining environmental factor for the dismantlement of NSS. The radiationconditions on NSS that do not have SNF storage facilities are determined by the contentsof the storage tanks and montejus.Over a long period of time it was common practice on NSS, particularly thoseoperating under the Russian Naval system, to mix different kinds of LRW. As aresult, radioactive sludge would form on the bottom of the tank accompanied by theaccumulation of radionuclides, increasing the radiation level at adjacent premises aswell. The collection of both alkaline and acidic waters in one tank also leads to a tank’scorrosion. Oil products from fuel tanks also turned up in LRW storage tanks.The removal of LRW from NSS in poor technical condition and considered unsafeincreases environmental risks, particularly in relation to additional radiation exposurefor staff and pollution of the environment. Another environmentally important task is the212

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYdisposal of LRW storage tanks with high-level radioactive sludge. The removal of thisradioactive sludge from the tank has been linked to radiation exposure among facilitystaff, but allowing this substance to accumulate and failing to unload it will lead toincreased formation of SRW.The removal of LRW and efforts to decontaminate tanks and montejus and removethe accumulated radioactive sludge from the tanks are all operations that constituteradiation hazards and require the development of an individual management plan foreach nuclear service ship.In some cases, low-level LRW, tanks holding LRW, and containers storing SRWsometimes contribute to the biological protection of crew members against SNF andother equipment onboard ship with higher radiation levels. This fact must be taken intoaccount when decisions are made about which tasks take priority.When tackling radioactive waste issues, it is crucial to consider the technicalconditions and the properties of the casing used to contain the SRWs that will beunloaded, arrange for an appropriate site for their safe, temporary storage, and preparethem for long-term storage.A Ship’s Technical ConditionsSome NSS were built under special projects (series), while others were reequippedand converted into NSS from mass-produced tankers, bulkers, icebreakers, and barges.Most became operational in the 1960s–1970s. Every third ship is now unsafe. A total of80% have already expired service lives and are due for dismantlement. These conditionsmake it impossible to use the equipment that is currently available to transfer radwaste,especially liquid wastes, using the standard system and mechanisms (pipes, pumps, etc.).This means that temporary systems and mobile facilities have to be used, which in turnmeans increased anthropogenic and environmental risks. The wide variety of ships doesnot make it possible to fully unify all of the equipment or create a standard coastalsystem.Lifting fully and partially immersed ships has been connected to risks of spreadingradiation as containers and pipes lose their water-proof properties. Lifting ships is alsoconnected to the radionuclide pollution of the equipment that is used (pontoons and tugboats) and the spread of pollution beyond nuclear service ship facilities.The technical conditions of ships that are used to store SNF (technical bases)pose environmental risks when the SNF is unloaded. This includes decommissionedequipment (both primary and auxiliary equipment) and decontamination systems,ventilation systems, etc.Another problem concerns the conditions of the protective casing of structureson the nuclear service ship (the deck, bulkhead, and deckhead), and equipment (tanks,piping, containers, etc.). These circumstances significantly increase the risk of spreadingradioactive pollutants and increasing the amount of secondary radwaste. Consideringthat, as a rule, radionuclides are found in places where protective casings are damaged,the risks of radiation exposure increase (both external and internal) at all stages of thenuclear service ship dismantlement process.Radiation ConditionsThe existence of SNF and radwaste and a ship’s history will determine its radiationconditions. The levels of gamma rays and radionuclide pollution of ship premises and213

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYequipment are not uniform onboard. The ship has designated “clean” and “dirty” zones.The “clean zone” includes premises and equipment that are required on any kind of ship:crucial units like the engine, electrical equipment, fuel tanks, life support supplies for thecrew (drinking water and water for cleaning, sewage water collection tanks). The “dirtyzone” is used to house SNF and radwaste storage containers and auxiliary systems, suchas: decontamination, collection of radwaste that is a by-product of the ship’s operation,the “dirty” zone ventilation system, etc.The gamma ray dosage in the storage compartment onboard the Lepse and adjacentquarters on the ship exceeds the natural radiation environment by hundreds of thousandsof times and has reached 3–80 μR/hr. High levels are also found beyond the boundaries ofthe ship: 110–2000 μR/hr (reaching the sides of the ship) and the berth area at AtomFlotmeasures 110–1500 μR/hr (radiation streaming).The radioactive pollution of the premises, which formed over the course of manyyears on NSS, is often found under a thick layer of paint (indelible pollution) in areas thatare difficult to reach for decontamination purposes. That is why during dismantlement,the quantity of SRW in the form of contaminated scrap metal increases considerably.Also, as ships are dismantled using torch cutting, the risk increases that radionuclideswith increased radiation exposure will enter the bodies of staff workers or pollute theenvironment.Recommendations for radiation environment normalization or the containment ofradioactive pollution should be carried out at the initial stages of development of the shipdismantlement program based on technical and financial calculations after an in-depthinvestigation of radiation conditions using standardized methods (including the use ofproper tools and laboratory facilities), and in line with set procedures, and submission ofstandardized report data. This is crucial, first and foremost for the detailed preparation ofrecommendations and in order to reduce the level of radiation exposure to staff membersand to minimize the environmental pollution risk.Modern Methods for Delivering NSS to Dismantlement Sites and RelatedInfrastructure for DismantlementThe availability of modern technology for delivering NSS to their dismantlementsites is an important factor in the dismantlement process and contributes to loweringenvironmental risks.Tugboats and DocksAs noted above, the condition of the overwhelming majority of NSS is unsatisfactory,and many of them are fully or partially immersed, making the delivery of these shipsto their respective dismantlement sites a very important issue. The disappointingexperience thus far in transporting the K-159 submarine to its dismantlement site is aclear confirmation of that fact.Bellona believes that a floating transport dock designed for these purposes isrequired in order to ensure safe transport in the North and the Far East (Figure. 1).The technical conditions of NSS and the potential radionuclide pollution of theenvironment dictate that dismantlement be carried out on floating docks that are equippedwith the requisite infrastructure: a decontamination room, a radiation monitoring station,a physical protection system, conditions for the temporary storage of polluted scrapmetal, and equipment that is safe for crew members and the environment.214

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe decision to supply this infrastructure, in our opinion, should be made only afterstronger radiation and technical monitoring is put into place for NSS in the regions andin agreement with the relevant regulatory bodies.Figure 1. Floating transport dock.The Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radwaste Management StructureModern technologies for SNF and radwaste management at dismantlement facilitiesconstitute one of the key conditions in keeping the nuclear service ship dismantlementprocess safe; they help lower environmental risks both during the dismantlement processitself and for the long term.It is our opinion that all SNF and radwaste storage and containment for storageneeds to be standardized for different agencies. The casings used to store high- andmedium-level SRW should take into account long-term storage periods in regionalstorage facilities. Their design should be based on environmental and financial criteria.Environmental Requirements include the total containment of SRW in isolation from theoutside environment over an extended period (at least 100 years). Financial Requirementsinclude maximum capacity for the best possible price as well as weight, total dimensionsand simplicity. Casks used to store SRW should be prepared in the region in which NSSare to be dismantled in order to lower costs.It is this absence of modern, quality infrastructure for SNF and radwaste managementseen in the Russian Navy in the 1970s–1980s that created the environmental problemsthat Russia is currently working to resolve with financial aid from foreign investors.The company that is assigned to dismantle NSS must have standards that are alignedwith current regulatory documents and the proper licenses from RosTekhNadzor.215

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYEnvironmental Monitoring, Including Radiation MonitoringCompanies that are commissioned to dismantle NSS should operate under anenvironmental management system that facilitates monitoring industrial factors onthe premises, health protection zones, and other monitored zones, including radiationmonitoring. Laboratories participating in the administration of such a system should beaccredited and prepared to work under normal and emergency conditions. They shouldbe well equipped with modern tools and staffed with qualified experts. It is the lack oftools and qualified staff that has led to radiation accidents that resulted in the baselessradiation exposure suffered by staff members working to rehabilitate the Russian Navybase in Gremikha.Dismantlement Monitoring and ControlFrom the very beginning, work on a wide range of tasks for the comprehensivedismantlement of the nuclear fleet involved many agencies and organizations. Theseinclude RosAtom, the Russian Navy, RosProm’s Shipbuilding Industry Department, theRussian Ministry of Transport, RosTekhNadzor, the National Department for MonitoringNuclear and Radiation Safety under the Russian Ministry of Defense, and others.The interests of these agencies, unfortunately, do not always coincide, and insome cases there are obvious clashes. We support the conclusions of the authors of theStrategic Master Plan, which state that RosAtom’s position should serve as a point ofreference in terms of a comprehensive approach, both for the dismantlement of nuclearsubmarines and other environmentally hazardous facilities: nuclear ships and vessels,NSS, and coastal technical bases.Furthermore, we believe that transferring the supervisory functions for nuclearservice ship dismantlement to RosTekhNadzor would be both logical and advisable.Practical experience in supervision could be gained in implementing the Lepsedismantlement project in the near future. Rostekhnadzor has already gained sufficientexperience in continuous supervision with this particular vessel.4. Nuclear Service Ship Dismantlement ExperienceBefore 1992, NSS with expired service lives — the most common type operatingunder the Russian Navy — were, as a rule, buried (sunken) in the sea in areas that werespecially selected for that purpose. Furthermore, due to the lack of infrastructure forreprocessing SRW, they were loaded with as much solid waste as possible. The burialwas conducted in six areas of the Northern seas and four areas in Far Eastern seas. Intotal, nearly 60 different vessels were buried in Russia’s coastal waters. These vesselshold over 20,000 cubic meters of SRW with total activity levels at over 5,000 Ci, whichamounts to over 40% of the total quantity of all of the SRW buried in Russian seas.Other examples of partial disposal or conversion of NSS have also taken placeunder the Russian Navy. This was primarily dictated by the unsafe state of vessels orthe need to prepare them for long-term inactive stationing (such as the Amur and TNT-5tankers).The civil nuclear fleet has achieved what is perhaps the only example ofcomprehensive dismantlement of a nuclear service ship at AtomFlot: the dismantlementof the ship radiation monitoring system (PKDP-5) that previously belonged to MurmanskSea Shipping, from project development right through breaking the ship down into scrap216

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYmetal (Figure 2).The dismantlement of the ship was carried out in line with current regulatorydocuments and began after the project details were approved by all regulatorybodies. Supervision of the project was carried out by Russia’s Maritime Register,GosAtomNazdor, GosSanNadzor, and other organizations.It bears mentioning that a thorough radiation inspection of the ship preceded thedevelopment of the project, and the most contaminated structures of the ship wereremoved before dock-based work began.ConclusionRussia’s Northwest currently has approximately 40 NSS of varying types. A totalof 26 of these ships have been decommissioned. Nearly all of them have already reachedthe end of their service lives and are due for dismantlement. Every third ship is in unsafeconditions.However, a concept has not yet been developed for the dismantlement of NSS.Furthermore, environmental risks are on the rise in places where NSS operate or aretaken out of service. These risks are primarily related to potential pollution of the landand water where they are stationed.Figure 2. A view of the dock after the dismantlement of an NSS.The dismantlement of several types of NSS — and primarily technical base shipsused to store SNF — is connected to substantial environmental risks, more so than thedismantlement of nuclear submarines.217

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe following factors are crucial to developing a concept for the dismantlement ofNSS and other projects:1. Determine criteria for decision-making with regard to priorities and projectstages (decommissioning, conversion, inactive stationing, and dismantlement).Priorities ought to include SNF and radwaste management and the conditionsof ships. First and foremost, unsafe vessels must be dismantled (those that arefully or partially immersed).2. Identify a specialized company in the area to conduct dismantlement andcreate an industrial dismantlement base on-site. The company must have thenecessary infrastructure and an effective environmental management system.3. Transportation to dismantlement sites should also be a priority. Unsafe shipsshould be transported using floating docks, where most of their dismantlementshould be performed.4. During the development of projects for the dismantlement of NSS with SNF,two options should be considered for SNF management: unloading the SNF,and not unloading the SNF. The key criteria for making decisions shouldinclude environmental risks, such as baseless exposure to radiation andenvironmental pollution.5. Dismantlement projects should envisage total, step-by-step dismantlement ofthe ship.6. Standardized casing for the transport and long-term storage of primarily highandmedium-level SRWs needs to be designed.7. Companies that deal in dismantlement should be equipped with the properequipment and facilities for SRW compression to reduce their volume as muchas possible.8. Burial grounds for radioactive waste need to be established in dismantlementareas;9. It would be wise to transfer supervisory functions for naval nuclear serviceship dismantlement to the local office of RosTekhNadzor.218

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYSubmersion of Materials that Constitute Nuclear and RadioactiveHazards: Past, Present and FutureYuri SivintsevSenior Scientific Collaborator and Professor,Kurchatov InstituteSubmerging radioactive wastes (RW, or radwaste) accumulated by the nuclearsuperpowers over the decades became a widespread practice in an attempt to disposeof nuclear and radioactive hazards. The considerable depths at which these items aresubmerged and the relatively low level of movement of the waters (compared to air)has provided additional protection of the public against the potential radiation impactof disposed RW. Preliminary studies helped select the areas that were best for dumpingliquid and solid radioactive waste (LRW and SRW), determine allowable activity levelsand the frequency of dumping and discharge, methods for keeping inventory of disposedradwaste, allowable concentrations of fission products and actinides, and monitor thecontent of radionuclides in sea water and bottom sediments.The Past: 1946–1993The United States was the first to use the sea to dispose of RW at locations closeto the Pacific Coast in 1946, and then moving on to the Atlantic Coast in the 1950s. Theconfidence in the safety of these operations was so solid that no data was recorded aboutactivity levels or the radionuclide content of the RW. A few decades later, when theUnited States needed to include this data in a national register, it could not be found. Avery similar situation developed in Russia during the earliest operations to dump LRWand submerge SRW.Soon, other countries also resorted to submerging RW in the seas. These includedGreat Britain (in the Northern Atlantic starting in 1949), New Zealand and Japan (closeto their respective shores in the Pacific Ocean starting in 1954–1955) and Belgium (in theEnglish Channel starting in 1960, near the coast of France) and many other countries.In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took the first steps towarddeveloping a new methodology for the safe disposal of radwaste in the sea. In 1975, theLondon Dumping Convention of 1972 came into force, which permitted and regulatedthe submergence (dumping) of wastes, including radioactive wastes. In 1983, themember countries of the London Dumping Convention, primarily due to pressure fromthe green movement, decided to voluntarily suspend dumping radwaste in the sea. Atthe same time, this document was renamed the Convention on the Prevention of MarinePollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. This convention was supplementedwith recommendations issued by the IAEA meant to ensure radiation safety in areaswhere RW had been disposed of in the sea (3).During 1946–1982, a total of 14 countries dumped radioactive wastes in 47areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. According to general data from the firstinventory conducted by IAEA experts in 1991, 1.24 MCi (46 PBq) of radwaste had219

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYbeen dumped into the world’s ocean over the course of 36 years. The overwhelmingmajority is concentrated in the northwest Atlantic. This area comprises 15 sections inwhich a total of 1.22 MCi (45.31 PBq) was buried, primarily SRW from Great Britain(77.5%). The United States is responsible for most of the radwaste dumped in the PacificOcean (97.1%). In the Far East, save for the RW dumped by New Zealand and Japan asmentioned above, radioactive waste was also dumped by South Korea, close to its owncoasts, and the Sea of Japan (Figure 1). The papers from the first inventory conducted byIAEA experts did not contain data about dumping along the coasts of the USSR.Russia, during 1959–1993, conducted operations to dump LRW and submergeSRW in the Arctic (the Barents and Kara Seas) and in the Far East (in the Sea of Japanand the Sea of Okhotsk, as well as the northwestern Pacific Ocean). This involved RWFigure 1. The results of the first inventory of radioactive waste dumping(not incl. the USSR. IAEA, 1991).produced by nuclear submarines and icebreakers. This RW was disposed at speciallydesignated areas of the sea that do not see heavy shipping traffic or fishing operations(see Figures 2 and 3).220

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 2: A map of the areas where SRW has been dumped in the Arctic:1 – The Novaya Zemlya trench; 2 – Sedova Bay; 3 – Oga Bay; 4 – Tsivolki Bay; 5 – Stepovy Bay;6 – Abrosimova Bay; 7 – Blagopoluchiya Bay; 8 – Techenii Bay.Roman numerals I, II, III, IV, V designate areas where LRW was dumped.Nuclear and radioactive hazards that were submerged by the USSR and still lie onthe bottom of the sea are:• 1 nuclear submarine;• 5 reactor compartments;• 1 nuclear reactor from nuclear submarine No. 421;• 1 container with a screen assembly from a nuclear ice-breaker;• 19 ships with SRW onboard;• 735 radioactive structures and reactors;• Over 17,000 containers with radioactive waste.Figure 3. A map of the sites where RW was submerged in the Far East (LRW was dumped at sitenumbers 1–5 and 7, SRW was dumped at site number 8, and both LRW and SRW were dumped atsite numbers 6, 9, and 10).221

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe launch of these operations was preceded by scientific research on allowableactivity levels, the ideal frequency of the dumping activities and selection of the bestsites for dumping in the Arctic and Far East seas. Results were used from hydrophysicsstudies, in particular regarding the speed at which radioactive substances diffuse insea water and the accumulation of radionuclides in the sediments of the seabed andthe sea’s flora and fauna. At this stage, the maximum allowable concentration (MAC)was determined — both theoretically and experimentally, including test dumping— forlong-lived radionuclides in sea water and in seabed sediments. In Russia, the limits onradionuclide dumping in the sea were based on the requirement that the radius of thepolluted zone of water with a radioactive substance concentration higher than the MACcould not exceed one kilometer. The MAC was set at 0.37 Bq/L, while the activityconcentration of naturally radioactive 40 K amounts to roughly 10 Bq/L of sea water.Calculations have shown that in order to meet the baseline conditions, the emissionslevels of 90 Sr at the outset should not exceed 35 mCi/hr (1,300 MBq/hr) or 300 Ci/yr (11TBq/yr). Under these conditions, the contaminated water zone with MAC amounts over1 would measure roughly 3 km 2 , sea water within 1 kilometer from the dumping pointwill contain radioactive contamination at concentrations that do not exceed 1 MAC,while water at a distance of 5 kilometers will measure 0.1 MAC, water at 20 kilometerswill measure 0.01 MAC, and water at 50 kilometers will measure 0.001 MAC, or almostthe natural radiation background. Limits have set the allowable dumping volume at90Sr within 100 Ci/year (3.7 TBq/yr) or the equivalent quantity of other radionuclides.The health requirements of 1960 set out extremely strict and baseless limits for totalactivity levels at radwaste dumping sites at 10 Ci/yr. Considering the calculations andfield studies that were conducted, these permissible levels were raised in 1966 to 1kCi/yr, and again in 1982 to 5 kCi/yr. Remarkably, much later, IAEA experts who hadbeen commissioned by signatories to the London Convention estimated the amount ofallowable radwaste dumped into the sea at an average of 1000 Ci (37 TBq) per year.That coincides with the figure that Russian Navy experts adopted at the earliest stagesof radwaste disposal preparations, which demonstrates the similarity of the approachesused by different countries.During 1959–1993, the USSR/Russia disposed of radwaste in 18 specially designatedareas of the Arctic and the Far East seas amounting to approximately 400,000 m 3 ofradwaste with total activity levels of 1.08 MCi (40 PBq) per year. Due to radioactivedecay, the activity level fell to 164 kCi (6.07 PBq) by 2000. The radwaste dumpedinto the Arctic included spent nuclear fuel (SNF), which is distinguished by very highactivity levels. As a result, the sites in the Arctic represent 97% of the radioactivity of alldumped LRW and SRW.In 1993, Russia saw the publication of an official report on the disposal of radwastein the seas bordering Russian territory, also known as the Yablokov Report or the WhiteBook (1). This information, in addition to new data about SRW and LRW dumpingoperations, determined the IAEA to conduct another inventory of the sources ofradionuclide pollution in the world ocean. These efforts were completed in 1999.We emphasize that, for the first and second international IAEA inventories, andthe 1993 White Book, the total activity levels of dumped wastes were derived fromtheir initial figures, usually without accounting for radionuclide decay before subsequentoperations. If this factor is taken into consideration, then we get a different picture ofthe distribution of dumped radwaste among the sites in the world ocean (see Figure 4).222

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYActually, the lowest activity levels are demonstrated by the radioactive waste that wasdumped in the Arctic: the radiation burden in the Arctic Sea is four times less than thatof the Northern Atlantic, while the highest activity levels are demonstrated by SRW thatwas dumped or lost in accidents in the Far East region (see Figure 5).Figure 4. Changes in the activity levels of radwaste dumped in the Arctic, incl. short-lived(curve 1) and long-lived radionuclides alone (curve 2).Figure 5. Total activity levels of SRW dumped and lost in accidents in the Arctic,the North Atlantic, and the Far East.223

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe different curves in Figure 4 are due to the fact that experts assessing the activitylevels of submerged facilities reviewed different groups of radionuclides. For theInternational Science and Technology Center project 101, it was decided that only longlivedradioecologically significant fission products, actinides and active radionuclideswould be included, while the IAEA’s International Arctic Seas Assessment Project(IASAP) also took into account short-lived radionuclides with a half-life of 1–3 years.Years of experience have justified these decisions and confirmed the practicalradiation safety of the radwaste submerged in the sea. It suffices to say that over theentire period during which operations were conducted to dump LRW and SRW, andfor over 20 years after these operations were conducted, no radiation incidents havebeen recorded, nor have any accidents been observed, and there has not been any casesin which fish were caught with radionuclide concentrations exceeding internationalstandards or domestic (Russian) standards for radiation safety.There has not been any increased radiation impact on the public that consumesseafood near the area, or from those who reside near the areas where the radwastewas dumped. Exposure levels for these “critical” groups of people barely differedfrom the natural radiation background and global fallout. Based on the results of theinternational CRESP and IASAP projects, which were carried out by the EU and theIAEA, respectively, the potential radiation hazard presented by the submerged RW isnegligible.What deserves special mention is the fact that facilities with SNF were waterproofedprior to being submerged: this is an important stage that involved filling available reactorspaces with a hardening radiation-resistant preservative which will prevent contactbetween nuclear fuel and sea water for at least 100 years. As a result of these measures,the radionuclides from SNF are not entering the environment. The concentration oflong-lived, anthropogenic 137 Cs in the Kara Sea is comparable with the levels that arecharacteristic of the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan; it is several times lower thanthe level in the Black Sea and dozens of times lower than the levels in the Baltic Sea andthe Sea of Ireland (see Table 1 and Figure 6).Table 1. A Comparison of 137 Cs Levels in Surface Waters in the 1990sSeaBq/m3137CspCi/LKara Sea, 1992–1994 3–9 0.08–0.24Black Sea, 1991 22–37 0.59–1.0Baltic Sea (central),1991 120 3.2Sea of Ireland (western), 1990–1997 40–92 1.1–2.5Mediterranean, 1990–1993 4–6 0.11–0.16Sea of Japan, 1994 2.8–3.6 0.08–1.0Pacific Ocean, coast of Guatemala 1995–1997 2.2–2.7 0.059–0.073[Per-98]224

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYDespite these figures, in 1993, the member countries of the London Conventionprohibited the dumping of any type of radwaste into the sea. An exception was madefor dumping LRW from Western European plants that reprocessed SNF in Great Britain(Sellafield, in the Sea of Ireland) and France (Cape la Hague, in the English Channel).Furthermore, it was taken into account that intensive work is underway to lower theactivity levels of disposed LRW, while current operations at these plants will not leadto extreme radiation hazards for the people of nearby countries or for the ocean’s floraand fauna.Figure 6. The yearly average concentration of 90 Sr in surface watersof the Barents Sea at the meridian of the Kola Bay.In 1993, radwaste dumping operations were ceased, and LRW dumping operationswere cut back significantly, and continued only in Great Britain and France. TheOSPAR-93 international convention envisages that by 2018, dumping radwaste andchemical substances into Europe’s seas will cease altogether.Key events in radwaste dumping• 1946: The first radwaste dumping operations were conducted in the PacificOcean (United States).• 1949: The first radwaste dumping operations were conducted in the NorthernAtlantic (Great Britain).• 1959: The first facility without SNF was submerged (United States, the reactorshell from the Seawolf nuclear submarine, the Atlantic Ocean).• 1965: The first dumping operations of facilities that did contain SNF wereconducted in the Arctic (the USSR, reactor compartments from nuclearsubmarine No. 901, Novaya Zemlya).• 1975: The London Dumping Convention came into force (aka. Conventionon the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and OtherMatter).• 1981: The last operations involving the dumping of facilities with SNF wereconducted in the Arctic (by USSR).• 1982: The last radwaste dumping operations were conducted in the NorthernAtlantic (by OECD countries).• 1993: The last LRW dumping operations were conducted in the Sea of Japan(by USSR).• 1993: The signatories to the London Dumping Convention of 1972/1975prohibited all radioactive waste disposal at sea.225

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe PresentRadiation conditions in the areas where LRW and SRW were dumped(including submerged nuclear submarine reactors with SNF) are no different from theanthropogenically altered radiation background caused by natural radionuclides ( 40 K insea water) and global fallout.Global fallout is caused by atmospheric nuclear testing. Even the first test of thenuclear bomb, which was conducted by the United States in the summer of 1945 in theAlamogordo Desert, caused a global radiation impact: clouds of fission products andactive radionuclides reached the stratosphere and encircled the Northern hemispheretwice over before dispersing into the air. This was followed by the nuclear bombing ofHiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and the first test of the Soviet nuclear bomb inAugust 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test field. In total, in the 1950s and 1960s, over 500nuclear tests were conducted in the atmosphere, outer space, and over and under water(see Table 2). This was accompanied by emissions of a great deal of artificial radioactivesubstances (fission and activation products) into the stratosphere, as well as a significantamount of long-lived alpha-active substances: uranium and plutonium that did not reactduring the nuclear explosions.According to data from the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of AtomicRadiation (SCEAR), which publishes regular reports, approximately 27,000 MCi (27GCi), or 1 million PBq (1,000 EBq) entered the atmosphere (primarily short-livedfission products). In addition, approximately 1% of the air was affected by long-livedbeta emitters such as 3 H, 14 C, 90 Sr, and beta-gamma emitters, in particular 137 Cs, inaddition to the alpha-active uranium and plutonium that did not undergo reactions (4).These particles were carried into the atmosphere across the entire Northern hemisphereby the constant stratospheric winds, and eventually made their way to the Southernhemisphere. Radionuclides that fell with the rain joined creeks and rivers, and those thatdid not settle in the bottom sediments ended up in the ocean. The planet experiencedthe appearance of artificial long-lived radionuclides in the biosphere and the ubiquitousgrowth of background radiation levels. The content of anthropogenic radionuclides inthe environment turned out to be irregular both in terms of time and space. Immediatelyafter the atmospheric tests, the concentrations of artificial radionuclides increased in thestratosphere, and then in the troposphere and finally to the atmospheric layer closest tothe Earth. The intensity of radioactive fallout rose sharply.As a result of the atmospheric nuclear tests that were conducted, the concentrationof long-lived fission products increased around the world, in particular 90 Sr and 137 Cs.According to SCEAR data, during the period of the most intensive atmospheric nucleartests in the 1960s, the annual radiation dosage reached 140 mSv, or 14 millirem, due toglobal fallout. This is a minor amount compared to the dosage caused by the radiationbackground, which in our day measures 2400 mSv or 240 millirem (see Figure 7).226

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 2. Nuclear Tests Conducted in the USSR and the United Statesin the Atmosphere, Outer Space, and Over and Under WaterNuclear testing methodNumber of tests(USSR)Number of tests (USA)Atmospheric 177 83Ground 32 84High-altitude and space 5 9Over and under water 5 41Total tests 219 217Total energy release (Mt) 247 142Notes:1. England, France and China conducted 21, 45, and 23 atmospheric tests,respectively (total 89).2. This table does not include data on the most numerous underground nucleartests (496 with 750 explosive charges in the USSR and 839 with 934 explosive charges inthe United States), as they have had practically no impact on pollution of the biosphere.These tests also demonstrated significantly lower energy releases, with approximately38 Mt in both the USSR and the United States. England, France and China conducted24, 147, and 18 underground tests, respectively (total 189).Figure 7. Average individual annual radiation dosages per person due to atmospheric nucleartests; the peak in 1986 was caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe (1).After the Moscow agreement on the cessation of atmospheric nuclear weaponstesting in 1963, space and the Earth’s waters began to cleanse themselves naturally fromthe products of the tests and gradually, the density of global fallout decreased. Their227

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcontribution to the dosage of anthropogenic changes in the natural radiation backgroundcurrently does not exceed 0.4% according to SCEAR (5). The primary source ofadditional radiation is the use of ionizing radiation in diagnosing and treating illnesses,not the use of nuclear energy for military or peaceful purposes.Natural radioactive substances have always been part of the ocean bed, bottomsediments, sea water, as well as the flora and fauna of the world ocean. Among naturalradionuclides, the largest contributors to the radiation background are the long-livedisotopes of chemical elements such as potassium, carbon, hydrogen, uranium, radium,thorium and polonium, which can be found all over the Earth and in the world ocean.Although potassium is categorized as a biological macro-element, it does not playa major role among stable chemical compounds present in sea water and representsjust 0.04% (see Table 3). Meanwhile, it is potassium that is of special importance asa source of natural radioactivity in the ocean, bottom sediments and all of the ocean’sflora and fauna — from whales to plankton and everything in between that makes up theecosystem of the seas (see Table 4).Table 3. The Chemical Composition of Sea Water with 35% SalinityConcentrationAbsolute (g/kg) Relative (%)Anions and moleculesCl‾ 19.35 45.09SO 42¯ 2.70 4.64HCO 3¯ 0.14 0.19Br‾ 0.07 0.07F‾ 0.001 0.01H 3BO 30.03 -Total anions: 22.291 50.00CationsNa+ 10.76 38.66Mg 2 + 1.30 8.81Ca 2 + 0.41 1.68K+ 0.39 0.82Sr 2 + 0.01 0.03Total cations: 12.87 50.00Total anions and cations 35.16 100.00228

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNot all potassium is radioactive (it is primarily composed of the stable isotope 39 K),only some of it, due to the 40 K radionuclide. The radioactive potassium isotope 40 K is anatural beta-gamma emitter with an enormous half-life of 1.28 billion years — comparethat with the Earth’s age of 4.5 billion years.Similar to other long-lived radioactive elements toward the bottom of the table ofelements — uranium, thorium, radium and others — 40 K was not able to decay since theera of the initial synthesis of atoms, which occurred at the various stages of the formationand development of stars. Although a tiny amount of 40 K is present in natural potassiumisotopes (just 0.012%), it is the source of almost all of the natural radioactivity in theocean. The radioactivity of potassium manifests primarily in the form of beta particlesand less often as gamma rays.A comparison with data on anthropogenic changes in the radiation background due toglobal radioactive fallout and natural radionuclides can help provide us with a qualitativeassessment of the impact of nuclear and radiation hazards on the environment.Table 4. Average Concentrations of Natural Radionuclides in theOcean and the Oceanic Ecosystem, Bq/L or Bq/kg of Green WeightRadionuclide Sea Water OceanFloraCrustaceans Mollusks Fish40K 11–13 90–350 40–240 60–270 90–15087Rb 0.14 ** ** ** **234U 0.05 1–2 0.25–0.5 0.5–1.5 0.03238U 0.04 0.8–1.9 0.2–0.4 0.4–1.2 0.03ЗH 0.01–0.11 0.01–0.1 0.01–0.1 0.01–0.1 0.01–0.114/~> 0.007 11 22 18 15210Pb 0.003 4–26 1.5–2.5 0.2–0.4 0.2(0.1–4.8)210Po 0.002 15–63 40–100 15–41 2(0.1–53)226Ra 0.001 0.7 0.1 0.1–1 0.1** = levels too low to detectIn the 1990s, international sea expeditions were conducted out to the sites whereRussian radwaste had been submerged in the Arctic and Far East regions. These included,in particular, three Russian-Norwegian expeditions in 1992–1994 in the Kara and BarentsSeas, three Korean-Japanese-Russian expeditions in 1993–1995 and 1997 in the Sea ofJapan and other waters in the Far East, among other international expeditions. Mostof these expeditions were conducted with the participation of staff members from theIAEA’s Marine Environmental Laboratory, which specializes in studying radioactivitylevels in the ocean. In all of these cases, it was established that there was no additionalradioactive impact on the environment caused by the submerged wastes. References tothe results of these and other international expeditions in the 1970s–1990s to the sites229

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYwhere SRW and LRW were dumped in the North Atlantic, the Arctic and the Far Easthave been included in the second inventory published by the IAEA. According to thesedata, the concentration levels of anthropogenic radionuclides, particularly 14 C, 60 Co, 90 Sr,137Cs, 239+240 Pu 241 Am in samples of water, bottom sediment and oceanic flora and faunataken from areas near the dumping sites are minimal and are no different from thosecaused by normal global fallout.Although in some areas of the Arctic and Far East close to RW dumping sites,some spots have been identified with increased radionuclide content due to nuclear andradiation hazards; even so, the maximum concentration levels at these areas are 137 Cs– 630 Bq/kg (17.5 pCi/kg) and 60 Co – 50 Bq/kg (1.4 pCi/g) below allowable standardsand do not present any danger. Today’s radioecological conditions in the ocean donot give any reason for concern. This is the conclusion that was reached by groupsof international experts working under the Marina projects run by the CoordinatedResearch and Environmental Surveillance Program (CRESP) for the North Atlantic andthe International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP) for the Arctic.The radiation dose for those who live in countries near the radwaste dumping sitesis much lower than the maximum allowable standard for humans.Periodic radiation monitoring of the RW dumping sites is conducted, and some areashave been found to demonstrate increased concentrations of radionuclides, includingradwaste with total activity levels of 1.08 MCi (40 PBq), which the USSR and Russiadisposed of in 18 areas of the Arctic and the Far East in 1959–1993. These levels do nothave a significant radioactive impact on the environment and do not pose any danger forthe residents of nearby countries or the ocean’s ecosystem.The FutureThe probability of the submerged radwaste presenting a radiation hazard isminimal. These conclusions were made based on extensive Russian studies and theresults of numerous international scientific projects and sea expeditions. The projectedassessments of the radioecological impact of radionuclides leaking from RW dumpingsites has shown that increased radiation exposure among sea fauna may only take placelocally (in a radius of 10,000 cubic meters). For natural habitats in the ocean, this smallvolume is not capable of causing any changes in the natural equilibrium in the oceanicbiosystem. The expected increased dose in typical local population groups caused by thedumped RW is extremely small (less than 1 mSv/yr) and does not exceed 0.1% of thedosage due to modern anthropogenic changes in the radiation background.For quantitative assessments of the impact of potential accidents in the radioecology,forecast calculations are used based on an analysis of physical, chemical and hydrophysicalinteraction processes of the submerged nuclear vessel (nuclear ice-breaker orsubmarine) with the environment.Along these lines, it should be mentioned that the potential radiation hazard of thenuclear military fleet is often overestimated. To a large extent, this is due to the factthat the number of reactors on Russian nuclear submarines alone is larger than the totalnumber of power reactors at all of the NPPs around the world. However, quantitativeanalyses show that the activity level of radionuclides that have accumulated in nuclearsubmarine reactors is several times lower than that caused by the operation of powerreactors at NPPs (see Figure 8). This is due to three key reasons. First of all, the capacityof reactors used on ships is several times lower than power reactors (for example, the230

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthermal power capacity of a RBMK-1000 is 3200 MWt, while the capacity of reactorsused on ships, specifically first and second generation Russian nuclear submarines, is70–90 MWt). The second reason is that power reactors are generally kept operating atthe highest possible capacity, while nuclear submarine reactors rarely operate at fullcapacity. Finally, the third reason is that ship-based reactors spend much less time inoperation than NPP reactors.Figure 8. Typical data on the activity levels of long-lived radionuclides in the SNF of the Kursknuclear submarine and a NPP reactor (PWR-1000), MCi.Generally, for the reasons noted above, there has been barely any radioactiveimpact on the environment from the six submarines that sank in 1963–2000. These weretwo nuclear submarines from the US Navy, three nuclear submarines and one dieselsubmarine with nuclear munitions onboard from Russia’s Navy. It is possible that in thedistant future, these sources of long-lived radionuclides may trigger local radioactivepollution of the ocean environment, although quantitative assessments have shown thatthe radioecological impact of these sources is negligible at most. The Komsomolets(1989), Kursk (2000) and K-159 (2004), all sunken nuclear submarines, have not hadany significant impact on radioecological conditions even in the areas close to thewreckage sites, and they have not had any impact on the ecosystem of the Arctic seasor the residents of the coastal regions. This conclusion indirectly confirms the resultsof many years of observations at the sites where the US nuclear submarines Thresher(1965) and Scorpion (1979) had sunk.In a number of cases, radiation accidents involving ship-based nuclear powerinstallations were accompanied by the radioactive pollution of the environment. Themaximum emissions were recorded in 1985 resulting from the reactor explosion onboardthe K-431 nuclear submarine from the Pacific fleet in Chazhma Bay. This incidentinvolved predominantly short-lived radionuclides, and the radioecological impact wasof a local nature and did not affect the public. Atmospheric emissions of long-lived231

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYfission products did not exceed 0.8 Ci (30 GBq), and the radioactive trail in the coastalzone of the Bay was primarily due to 60 Co.Of course, the potential radioecological consequences of an accident with asubmerged vessel or vessels with radionuclides onboard, especially containing SNF, arecharacterized by considerably heightened background levels of natural radioactivity inthe sea water and bottom sediments. An assessment of the radioactive hazards for seacreatures is being carried out and compared with data from actual measurements andobservations of the oceanic ecosystem in natural conditions during (and after) nucleartests and in special research laboratories.Submerging nuclear-powered icebreakers or submarines becomes potentiallydangerous due to the presumed simultaneous removal of barriers restraining radioactivesubstances, causing radionuclides to enter the ocean with the water flowing overand around the object in question. In this hypothetical scenario, a trail of radioactivepollution in the sea water appears, and the initial volume of water flowing over the objectwill contain the highest concentrations of radionuclides (although it would be localizedas compared to the entire area of polluted water). The initial volume of water in the trailcontaining heightened initial concentrations would not be greater that several times thevolume of the object itself. Even for an object as large as a nuclear-powered ice breaker,that is no more than 50,000 cubic meters, or less than 10,000 cubic meters for smallerreactor compartments used on nuclear submarines.It is known that a trail of turbulence will form in the wake of most movablefacilities. The area of the cross-section of this trail at a distance from the object equal tothe length of the object itself is roughly double the area of the cross-section of the objectand amounts to at least 100 square meters. The water flows around the object at the speedof 0.1–1 m/s. From that data, it follows that the volume of the water in the trail directlyfollowing the facility is at least 10 m 3 /s. This estimated amount of sea water in the trailwas used for assessing localized (highest) concentrations of radionuclides in sea water.As a starting point for a hypothetical accident, scientists used an external impact asa result of a direct side blow against an ice breaker at the junction of two compartmentsby a cargo ship or a collision with an iceberg (including underwater ice formations suchas a grounded hummock, an iceberg that ran aground in shallow water). This externalblow could create a hole in the two adjacent compartments, filling them with water andcausing the ship to sink to the bottom of the sea. On-board reactors are then automaticallyswitched off and enter a cool-down regime.Presumably, an external blow would lead to the pipe of the primary cooling circuittearing away from the body of one of the reactors. As a result, sea waster would comeinto contact with the fuel assembly contained inside the reactor. Before the pressureinside and outside of the primary circuit is normalized, liquid will flow out of theprimary circuit, and then sea water will gradually flow into the primary circuit and intothe nuclear reactor.This hypothetical scenario presumes that contact between sea water and the surfacelayers of the fuel elements that are under an internal load from the accumulation offission products would lead to fissured corrosion under stress. It is assumed that onemonth later we would see a major exposure of fuel element cores and the process oftheir destruction would begin. Based on the results of a long-term experiment with fuelassemblies from ships with nuclear power installations in sea water, the speed at whichfuel elements containing nuclear fuel are destroyed is 1% per year.232

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThere is no steady water flow inside the nuclear reactor or the primary circuit. Theseare blind volumes with air and gas pockets. Changes in hydrostatic pressure caused bythe periodic ebb and flow of sea water result in cross flows of water that replace oneanother from the outside of the reactor compartment and into the nuclear reactor, andthen back from the reactor to the reactor compartment and into the water containing thesubmerged vessel. The flow of water into the sea is accompanied by the evacuation ofradionuclides (see Figures 9 and 10).It is supposed that the accident would take place during the final stages of fuelconsumption as the result of continuous operation of the ship’s reactor at an averagethermal capacity of 80 MWt over a period of 25,000 hours. In line with the detailsdescribed above, it is assumed that the volume of water at the bottom of the sea thatwould wash over the body of the submerged vessel would measure 10 m 3 /s at the initialsection of the trail. In the event of such an accident, radionuclides would begin enteringseawater 30 days after the vessel sinks.Calculations show that the accidental leakage of radionuclides into the sea overthe first year would amount to roughly 1,600 TBq of beta emitters, which exceeds theamount of allowable emissions of beta-active radionuclides from Sellafield just fourtimes over (400 TBq/yr) and is several times lower than actual emissions in 1974–1980.The leakage of alpha-active nuclides into the sea over one year would exceed Sellafield’sstandards for allowable emissions by just 1.4 times. The expected baseline concentrationof beta-active radionuclides in sea water at the initial section of the trail amounts toapproximately 17 kBq/L, and later it would quickly drop as the result of dilution andradioactive decay. The concentration of alpha-active nuclides in sea water does notexceed 5 Bq/L, which is lower than the allowable levels (90 Bq/L) in water flows thatare dumped along pipelines into the Sea of Ireland from the Drigg Company, which isadjacent to the Sellafield radio-chemical plant.Figure 9. To assess radioecological implications of the way radionuclides enter sea water fromsubmerged facilities, such as a reactor compartment from a nuclear submarine. The diagram belowshows the way water is exchanged between the sea and the contents of a reactor on a submergedice breaker.233

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 10. How water may interact with a reactor compartment.In order to assess the radioecological implications of the release of radioactiveisotopes into the seawater, one important parameter is the level of radiation exposurereceived by a critical group of the population that consumes radioactively pollutedseafood, as well as by other elements of the oceanic ecosystem. Assessments of thesecrucial amounts also demonstrate that they are very minimal — even in the event of anaccident such as the loss of a nuclear-powered ice breaker. These levels are also low whenradwaste is submerged. In all of the scenarios that were considered, it had been shownthat none of the external or internal events involving a nuclear-powered ice breaker,nuclear submarine or submerged radwaste would lead to radiation implications for theoceanic ecosystem or the residents of nearby regions exceeding allowable standards.As noted above, in the early 1990s, contradictory statements emerged regarding theallegedly serious radiation implications of storing Russian radwaste in the Arctic andFar East seas. More reliable information has been provided since in the Yablokov Report(1). Unfortunately, this report contains information only about the total radwaste activitylevels, and there is no subsequent comparison with levels of natural radioactivity, globalfallout or quantitative criteria for radiation hazards with regard to people and the oceanicecosystem. Furthermore, the report contains a number of major errors.These gaps have been remedied in the 2000 White Book, which is dedicated toa detailed quantitative analysis of the radioecological implications of using the sea todispose of radioactive waste (2). This monograph contains reliable, official data aboutradwaste that has been submerged by the USSR and Russia, and provides an objectivedescription of the actual and forecasted radiation and environmental effect causedby the dumping. The book is written by leading staff members at Russia’s NationalEnvironmental Commission, the Kurchatov Institute, the International Center forEnvironmental Safety, Lazurit, Typhoon, the Dollezhal Institute for Power Engineering,and the Russian Academy of Science Institute for Safe Development of Nuclear Energy,234

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYwith support from the Ministry of Nuclear Power and the Russian Navy (the names ofthese agencies are included as they were during 2000 White Book preparations andpublication).The translation of the 2000 White Book into English was conducted with supportfrom the IAEA and the NRPA. The IAEA has published the English and Russian versionsof the White Book on CD.An important part of this report is the quantitative analysis of real and potentialsources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the Arctic and Far East seas and radiationthreat presented by radwaste submerged in these areas. By using information aboutthe mass, enrichment and burn-up rates of SNF, as well as neutron flux levels that hasbeen registered within the nuclear reactors, experts were able to assess radionuclidecomposition and total activity levels of the radioactive substances in potentiallyhazardous facilities that have been submerged. Comparisons with similar data on realsources of anthropogenic radionuclides have allowed experts to define a range of relativeradiation danger, the measurement of which resulted in the total activity levels of longlivedradionuclides. These data are illustrated in Figures 11 and 12.Figure 11. Actual and potential sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in theArctic seas bordering Russia.Figure 12. Actual and potential sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in theFar East seas bordering Russia.235

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIn comparing information for the Arctic and Far East regions, one should bear inmind that the total activity levels of nuclear and radiation hazards submerged in theArctic is significantly higher than in the seas of the Far East. As was noted above, themain reason for this discrepancy is that the Sea of Japan and the area close to Kamchatkawas used to submerge containers with radwaste and the bodies of ship-based reactorsthat did not contain SNF. On the other hand, the bays of the Eastern coasts of the NovayaZemlya archipelago and along the Novaya Zemlya trench in the Kara Sea were used todispose of facilities that did contain SNF.The key conclusion made based on reliable archives and the calculated andexperimental materials included in the 2000 White Book is basically that theradioecological implications of using the sea to dispose of radwaste produced bythe Russian Naval Fleet were minimal, and these operations did not result in a trueradiation hazard for the public or the environment. It is important to note that basedon the assessments, the construction of additional protective barriers near submergedradioactive waste is not worthwhile, as it would not lead to any significant decrease inthe already low amounts of exposure (2). Natural silting forms an additional protectivebarrier.Figure 13. Anthropogenic Radionuclides in Russia’s Seas. Radioactive waste disposal in seasadjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation (2000 White Book).References1. Facts and Problems Related to the Storage of Radioactive Wastes in Russia’s Seas[Fakty i problemi, svyazanniye s zakhoroneniyem radioaktivnikh otkhodov v moryakh,omyvayuschikh territoriyu Rossii]. (Report by the Government Commission for IssuesRelated to the Storage of Radioactive Wastes in the Seas, prepared by Presidential DecreeNo. 613-rp (10/24/92). Office of the President of the Russian Federation. Moscow:1993.2. Sivintsev, Y. V., Vakulovsky S. M., Vasilyev, A. P., Vysotsky, V. L., Gubin, A. T.,Danilyan, V. A., Kobzev, V. I., Kryshev, I. I., Lakovksy, S. A., Mozokin, V. A., Nikitin,A. I., Petrov, O. I., Pologikh, B. G., Skorik, Y. I. Anthropogenic Radionuclides in236

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRussia’s Seas. Radioactive waste disposal in seas adjacent to the territory of the RussianFederation (2000 White Book) [Technogenniye radionuklidi v moryakh, omyvayuschikhRossyu]. Moscow: IzdAT, 2005, p. 624, illustration p. 64.3. Information Circular INFCIRC/205/Add/1/Rev.1. The Convention on thePrevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter [Konventsiyapo predotvrascheniyu zagryazneniyz moray sbrosami otkhodov i drugikh materialov]..The definition required in line with Clause 6 of Appendix I to the Convention andrecommendations required in line with Section D of Appendix II. International AtomicEnergy Agency, Vienna, 1978.4. Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation. 1988 UN General AssemblyScientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (SCEAR) Report, withappendices (two volumes). Translation from the English [referenced in the originalRussian text] Kulakov, V. M. and Rozhdestvensky, L. M., eds. Moscow: Mir, 1992.5. Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation. 2000 UN General Assembly SCEARReport with appendices (four volumes). Translation from the English [referenced inthe original Russian text] under Editors Ilyin, L. A. and Yarmonenko, S. P. Moscow:RADEKON. 2002.237

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYA Unified Federal System for Radioactive Waste Management:A Prerequisite for the Development of Nuclear EnergyOleg MuratovExecutive Secretary, Northwest Branch of the NuclearSociety of Russia, St. PetersburgThe primary way in which human activity impacts the environment is throughindustrial solid and liquid waste and emissions. Today, of the 120 gigatons of fossilsubstances and biomass that are used in the world’s economy each year, only 9 gigatons(7.5%) are converted into useful output. Industrial waste on Earth continues to begenerated at an exponentially growing pace. Each year, 85 gigatons are added to wasterock dumps, junkyards and landfills.The creation of nuclear weapons, the development of nuclear energy, and the broadintegration of nuclear technologies in all scientific fields have brought about a completelynew type of waste product in the form of radioactive waste (radwaste), which cannot besafely destroyed or buried due to the radionuclides it contains. Although the volume ofradwaste, as compared to other anthropogenic waste, is extremely low—the volume ofradwaste produced each year comprises ≈ 0.5% of total industrial waste—its disposalcalls for the development of special technologies and the use of particular methods toensure human and environmental safety.In the early stages of development of these technologies, which had exclusivelymilitary purposes, radwaste was considered to be a special case, part of the generalproblem of environmental pollution caused by waste generated by human activity,making it an issue of secondary importance in all countries. The accumulation andstorage of radwaste was conducted without any accompanying measures to protect theenvironment, resulting in sites that are now polluted with radioactive waste. In Russia,Lake Karachai is the poster child for the shortcomings of early radwaste disposalmethods. In the 1940s and 1950s, liquid waste with activity exceeding 4.4×10 6 TBq wasdumped into the lake (1).The safe management of radwaste is a major challenge that affects the scale andpace at which the nuclear energy sector can develop, and the rate at which nuclear andradiation technologies can be implemented. The problem of final burial of radwastehas not been definitively resolved anywhere in the world. The incompleteness of theradwaste isolation process has been the main trump card played by the opponents ofnuclear energy and various “green” organizations.Throughout the world, the challenge of effectively managing radwaste is mademore difficult by the legacy of the arms race, which left numerous polluted sites in itswake (Hanford, Sellafield, Ozyorsk, and others). For example, there are 114 sites in theUnited States where pollution can be tied to government nuclear weapons programs.Hanford, like Mayak, was the site of several reactors for the production of weapon-gradeplutonium. Three of these used once-through water cooling and were placed along the238

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYColumbia River. Liquid radioactive waste from the radiochemical processes was alsoflushed into the Columbia River (similar to Russia’s Techa River).Radwaste is produced in a number of ways: through the operations of the operatingmilitary nuclear complex, by NPPs generating energy, through the operations ofnuclear energy installations for the transportation sector, and the use of radioactivesubstances and sources of ionizing radiation. In recent years, the widespread use ofnuclear submarines has made a large contribution to the accumulation of radwaste. Atthis time, sites belonging to RosProm Shipbuilding Agency are storing 3.8×10 3 m 3 ofliquid radwaste with total activity of 2.5×10 12 Bq and 2.5×10 3 t of solid radwaste withactivity of 4.8×10 14 Bq.A significant quantity of radioactive waste is also created in non-nuclear industriessuch as heat and power engineering, medicine, geology, and others. Today, sources ofionizing radiation in Russia are being used by more than 15,900 entities. Some of thesources behind the accumulation of a large amount of radwaste are coal, oil, and gasextraction operations due to the concurrent removal of natural radionuclides from theEarth. The volume of contaminated metal exceeds 1.5 million tons. The list of radwastesources is extensive:• Uranium mines;• Natural uranium production;• Natural uranium enrichment operations and nuclear fuel production;• Radiochemical enterprises;• Nuclear power plants;• Nuclear research centers;• Nuclear weapon test sites;• Peaceful underground nuclear explosion sites;• Contaminated sites of accidents in Kyshtym, Chazhma Bay, and Chernobyl;• Nuclear submarine and nuclear cruiser bases belonging to the RussianNavy;• The AtomFlot service base;• Shipbuilding and ship repair plants conducting the construction, repair, anddismantlement of nuclear submarines, ships, and vessels with nuclear energyinstallations;• Radioactive isotopes produced by ionizing radiation sources used in theindustrial sector and in medicine;• Sites and junkyards for military equipment and equipment used by researchinstitutions working with radioactive substances;• Oil and gas extraction operations; and• Ash dumps from coal power plants.According to data from Russia’s government tracking and monitoring systemfor radioactive substances and radioactive waste, sites belonging to various federalministries and agencies in Russia are storing close to half of the world’s total radwasteand its activity has exceeded 5.96×10 19 Bq (Table 1).239

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 1. Volume of Liquid Radioactive Waste and SolidRadioactive Waste in RussiaKind and Type of Radwaste RosAtom OtherIndustriesLiquidRadiation(m 3 )TotalHigh-level waste (HLW) 3.66×10 4 — 3.66×10 4SolidRadwaste(tons)Medium-level waste (MLW) 2.04×10 6 3.37×10 3 2.04×10 6Low-level waste (LLW) 4.13×10 8 8.32×10 3 4.13×10 8HLW 5.24×10 4 5.93×10 3 5.83×10 4MLW 6.12×10 5 6.57×10 4 6.77×10 5LLW 7.25×10 7 2.36×10 5 7.8×10 7Accumulated radwaste is stored at 69 sites in 33 regions across Russia:• European Russia: in 21 subjects (including regions, rayons and oblasts) ofthe Russian Federation, at 42 sites;• Urals: in 3 subjects of the Russian Federation, at 10 sites;• Siberia: in 5 subjects of the Russian Federation, at 10 sites;• Russian Far East: in 3 subjects of the Russian Federation, at 7 sites.The total volume of radwaste in Russia, its types, categories, and storage locationsare provided in Table 2 (2).Radwaste management is governed by federal laws on the use of nuclear energy,nuclear safety of the general population, the protection of the environment, as well asother regulatory documents, federal norms and guidelines. All of these documents weredeveloped in line with the following IAEA documents: the Joint Convention on theSafety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Managementand The Principles of Radioactive Waste. These documents provide guidelines forensuring the safety of personnel, the general population, and the environment, thereliable isolation of radwaste from the biosphere, the protection of present and futuregenerations, biological resources. They also forbid the submersion of radwaste in theworld’s ocean, dispatching radwaste into the outer space, or dumping it into surface orunderground water reservoirs.It is currently recognized that all produced radwaste must be stored for 30–50years with the possibility of extending this timeframe. This approach does not culminatein a definitively safe solution to the issue of immobilizing radwaste and calls forsignificant expenditures for storage facility operations, without a clear plan for theirelimination. Despite the fact that the requisite level of radiation safety is assured, asconfirmed by RosAtom’s annual radiation safety reports and by documents published byRosTekhNadzor, and that this level meets the requirements of the Joint Convention, weare seeing a rapid accumulation of problems in the field of radwaste management.240

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAgencyRosAtomMinistryof DefenseNavaland RiverCraftAgencyRosPromTable 2. Radioactive Waste Stored at Russian GovernmentAgency Facilities (1,3)RadwasteSourceExtracting andprocessinguranium andthorium oreUraniumenrichment andnuclear fuelproductionNPP operationReprocessingspent nuclearfuel andproductionof weaponsgradenuclearmaterialsOperationof nuclearsubmarines andnuclear-poweredshipsOperationof nuclearicebreakersand the lightercarrierConstruction,repair, and,dismantlementof nuclearsubmarines,nuclear-poweredships andvesselsRadwasteTypeSludge androck debris(LLW)Liquid andsolid waste(LLW)Liquidconcentrates(MLW)Volume(m 3 )Activity(Bq)Storage site1.0×10 8 6.7×10 15 Tailings storage androck debris piles1.6×10 6 1.5×10 14 warehouses,Tailings storage,production sites1.5×10 5 1.6×10 15 Containers, NPPstorage facilitiesSolid MLW 1.6×10 4 1.0×10 13 NPP storage facilitiesSolid LLW 1.2×10 5 1.0×10 13 NPP storage facilitiesLiquid HLW 2.5×10 4 2.1×10 19 SKhK, and MayakContainers at GKhK,Vitrified(HLW)Liquid andpulp (MLW,LLW)Solid MLWand LLW9.5×10 3 7.4×10 18 radwaste storageMayak vitrifiedfacility4.0×10 8 2.6×10 19 Containers,reservoirs, and pools1.0×10 8 4.4×10 17 storage facilities atGKhK, SKhK, andOpen air and surfaceMayakLiquid LLW 1.4×10 4 6.7×10 12 Coastal and floatingbasesSolid LLW 1.3×10 4 3.0×10 13 facilities and openCoastal storageair siteLiquid LLW 3.9×10 2 2.2×10 10 Coastal storagefacilities and floatingbasesSolid LLW 1.4×10 3 8.1×10 12 Coastal storagefacilitiesLiquid LLW 2.5×10 3 1.9×10 13 Coastal and floatingbasesSolid LLW 1.5×10 3 3.7×10 12 Storage facilities andopen air sites241

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRosStroiReceipt andprocessing ofall types ofradwaste andspent sourcesof ionizingradiation frominstitutions innon-nuclearsectorsLiquid andsolid waste,spent sourcesof ionizingradiation2.0×10 5 7.4×10 16 Radon storagefacilitiesThe resolution of the problem of accumulating radwaste, which is being left to futuregenerations, is directly linked to the entire history of how the nuclear power industrydeveloped. The operation of nuclear power plants was conducted under the conditions ofa centrally planned economy that did not plan for the creation of specialized enterprisesor individual entities for radwaste management. It was presumed that in the future, theseproblems would be resolved according to plan and paid for by the central government.The direct outcome of this policy of “deferred decisions” is the negative public opinionof the nuclear power industry.Radwaste storage facilities were created taking into consideration the particularneeds of the enterprise and the technologies used, resulting in a dearth of standard wastestorage solutions. The storage of solid radwaste uses over 30 types of facilities, most ofthem specialized buildings or spaces located inside main facilities, trenches, bunkers,containers, and open air sites. Liquid radwaste is placed in over 18 different types offorms of storage. These are primarily free-standing containers, open water basins, pulpstorage tanks, etc.Existing radwaste storage facilities were not designed to be securely insulatedfrom the environment for the long term. Most of these facilities do not meet safetyrequirements and do not have the necessary service equipment. Storage designs didnot consider phasing facilities out of operation or rehabilitating the surrounding areas.The radwaste management industry lacks standard solutions for radwaste treatment andburial. The technologies for radwaste treatment and conditioning, and therefore alsotreatment facilities themselves, were built specifically for the kind of radwaste that wasbeing produced at each individual enterprise, and most are not unified or universal.The radwaste facilities are not efficient and suffer from design and technologicalshortcomings.A variety of government agencies and other entities have become involved inradwaste management. Table 3 provides a list of the main radwaste “generators,” besidesRosAtom, in Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast (3).A single industry has been tasked with disposing both radwaste from past defenseprograms and radwaste produced by commercial activity. The rapid development of thenuclear sector in the 1950s was entirely dedicated to defense purposes; choices were242

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYmade that were problematic in terms of modern safety requirements and posed a seriousthreat to the environment. This conglomerated industry makes it difficult to effectivelytake advantage of international efforts to dispose of the radioactive legacy of the armsrace.The treatment of spent sources of ionizing radiation requires a particularly educatedand safety-minded approach. Currently, there are over 115,000 expired units of this typeof radwaste accounted for in the country, according to oversight agencies. In addition,there have been cases of sources that have been unaccounted for. During the processof privatization and business reprofiling, a large number of these sources of ionizingradiation were lost. This has resulted in constant discoveries in different parts of thecountry of spots with localized radioactive contamination.Table 3. Government Agency Affiliation of InstitutionsInstitutionAgency AffiliationKrylov Shipbuilding Research Institute RosProm (Federal Agency on Industry)St. Petersburg State Polytechnic UniversityFederal Education AgencySt. Petersburg State Technical InstituteEngineering Center for EnvironmentalStudiesRussian Scientific Center for AppliedChemistry (RNTs Prikladnaya Khimiya)Scientific Research Center for SystemSafety (NITs BTS)State Roentgenology and Radiology InstituteSt. Petersburg Institute of Nuclear PhysicsRADON Leningrad Specialized CombineEKOMET-SFederal Education AgencySt. Petersburg Municipal GovernmentNoneMinistry of DefenseMinistry of Health and SocialDevelopmentRussian Academy of SciencesFederal Agency for ConstructionJoint-stock companyTo collect, store, and treat radwaste produced by entities that were not part of thenuclear industry, GosStroy (aka. RosStroi), the Soviet-era agency for construction, hadset up special Radon waste management facilities in the 1960s. Currently, 14 of theoriginal 16 Radon facilities on Russia’s territory are still in operation. The facility inGrozny was destroyed by bombing during hostilities there, and the facility in Murmansk,which serviced about 70 clients in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, was closedwhen its storage facilities became full beyond capacity and due to non-compliance withcurrent RF safety regulations. Despite all of the agency-level and government changes,all Radon facilities, with the exception of the Moscow facility (which is managed by243

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe Moscow municipal government), are managed by GosStroy, for which radwastemanagement is not the main line of business and for which the agency uses unallocatedfunds.An important factor complicating safe radwaste management concerns the changesin the property status of the enterprises involved. When state enterprises were auctionedoff, only the parts that were most likely to be profitable were privatized, while storagefacilities for radwaste and sources of ionizing radiation, mines, etc. were left in thegovernment’s hands. At the same time, no single government entity is responsible forthese facilities. The problem has not been addressed through legislative means and callsfor speedy resolution.As you can see, radwaste management is a multifaceted and complex problemthat has to be addressed on many levels and involves not just RosAtom, but nearly allindustry, science, and medicine sectors. In our search for a solution, we must considermany factors, including the possible increase in the costs of electricity produced by NPPsand the products offered by enterprises as a result of new requirements for radwastestorage and management, the use of specialized radwaste management technologies,depending on its specific activity, physical and chemical properties, radionuclidecomposition, volume, toxicity, and safe storage and burial conditions. Ensuring the longtermenvironmentally safe management of radwaste is a top factor contributing to thedevelopment of nuclear energy technologies.In recent years, much has happened in radwaste management. Twenty-five RosAtomenterprises are operating 35 management systems for different types of radioactive waste,including 26 installations for managing liquid radwaste — immobilization of HLW withcement, bitumen, vitrification, evaporation, fractioning, etc. — and nine installations fortreatment of solid radwaste: incineration, compacting, smelting. RosAtom enterprisesannually process around 3.8 million m 3 of radwaste with specific activity of 1.3×10 18Bq (Table 4).Table 4. Radwaste Accumulation, Generation, and TreatmentCategoryAccumulated by01/01/07Vol.Activity х10 15 BqGenerated in2006Vol.Liquid Radwaste(thousand m 3 )Activity х10 15 BqTreated in 2006Vol.Activity х10 15 BqLLW 461 486 6.5 3,509 0.6 3,782 0.6MLW 15,051 22,900 174 244 16 1.3HLW 35 21,400 13 1,330 13 1,280Total 476,573 44,306.5 3,696 1,574.6 3,811 1,281.9Solid Radwaste(thousand tons)LLW 76,255 6.3 1,195 0.303 7.7 0.0004MLW 1,099 313 10 0.636 0.6 0.139244

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYHLW 61 14,700 1 48.8 0.003 27.4Total 77,415 15,019.3 1,206 49.739 3.3 27.54In comparison with 2000, the annual volume of treated radwaste has increasedby more than 200%. Treatment of high-level and low-level liquid radioactive wastehas been particularly effective. Table 4 shows that almost all liquid radwaste in thesecategories is being treated and it is not being accumulated.Furthermore, thanks to improved technologies and the implementation of newequipment, we have seen a significant drop in the generation of radwaste of all types andcategories in recent years. For the sake of comparison, Table 5 shows the accumulatedvolumes of radwaste for 2004. At the same time, it should be noted that the rate at whichradwaste is being treated is still insufficient. Although less radwaste is being generated,the total volume of accumulated waste is growing.Through the program for decommissioning nuclear submarines with internationalassistance at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk, a liquid radwaste treatmentfacility was built and put into operation. In the Far East, in the town Bolshoy Kamen,Landysh, a floating liquid radwaste treatment facility was built.ReportingEntitiesTable 5. Accumulated Radwaste in 2004Liquid RadwasteVolume (m 3 )Activity(Bq)Volume(tons)Solid RadwasteActivity(Bq)RosAtom 5.0×10 6 3.7×10 18 3.6×10 6 4.1×10 17Nuclear SubmarineDismantlement1.0×10 3 3.7×10 11 No data No dataRadon Facilities 2.0×10 2 1.9×10 11 2.4×10 2 7.4×10 9Russia’s only specialized metal radwaste treatment and disposal plant, EKOMET-S,is successfully operating in Sosnovy Bor. This enterprise’s main lines of business istreating low-level metal radwaste in order to reduce the volume of solid radwaste to beburied, and recycling metal for further unrestricted use. The facility can treat up to 5,000tons of low-level waste per year.The start-to-finish process developed at EKOMET-S for metal radwaste processingcan be used for carbon steel and stainless steel as well as non-ferrous metals and alloysand reduces the volume of solid radwaste that would otherwise be buried by a factorof 80. The method, which involves melting down scrap in the final step of the metalradwaste treatment process, fully complies with federal standards OSPORB-99 (BasicSanitation Regulations for Ensuring Radiation Safety) and SPORO-2002 (HealthStandards and Regulations for Radioactive Waste Management).A general analysis of radwaste treatment has shown that the specifics of radwastemanagement and the variety of waste types has resulted in a large number of uniqueradwaste management technologies and, for the most part, there exist methods for thesafe management of radwaste. However, despite the significant progress made in terms245

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYof developing modern radwaste management technologies and greater attention beingaccorded to the problem of radwaste disposal, primarily by RosAtom and the Ministryof Defense, the solutions for many radioecological problems, on the scale required to putan end to the continuing accumulation of radwaste, are unsatisfactory.The large volumes of radwaste, the shortcomings of radwaste managementtechnologies, the insufficiencies of the federal system for tracking and monitoringradioactive substances and radwaste, the need to ensure the physical security of thestorage facilities, the increasingly stringent international requirements with regard to saferadwaste management, the shortage of funding for radwaste management operations, andother contributing factors, indicate that radwaste is not, and cannot be, the sole burden ofjust one or even a few government entities. Radwaste management is a matter of nationalimportance and must be addressed through the creation of a unified government systemto oversee all radwaste management activity and, first and foremost, through the passageof a law on radwaste management.The absence of a common government radwaste management system has caused thetreatment of radwaste from past defense programs and waste from ongoing commercialactivity to be conflated within one treatment complex along with the near-complete lackof coordinated efforts among the government entities involved, numbering close to 20and including RosAtom, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry andEnergy, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Russian Academy of Sciences, andthe Ministry of Regional Development. Each entity has its own development programs,funding, vision, and priorities, which results in the duplication of solutions for standardproblems, and little to no use of cutting-edge technologies, etc. The lack of coordinationamong the various entities is demonstrable in the ill-fated law on radioactive waste,the draft of which was already under consideration by the Supreme Soviet in the early1990s.The ineffectiveness of radwaste disposal is also in many ways a result of theshortcomings of the existing system of standards and regulations. One example is theunwarranted increase in stringency of Russian standards for allowable amounts ofradiation exposure. Consequently, a large amount of funding has been spent on reducingradioactive substances in water, air, and materials where the excesses are minor. Theallowable radionuclide concentration in water is calculated based on the one-timeconsumption of two liters of this kind of water, while tritium content limits are 80 timeslower in Russia than in the United States.Another very important shortcoming of the current system of standards andregulations is the way in which radwaste is categorized and classified. The simplifiedradwaste classification system (LLW, MLW, HLW) makes it so no changes can be madeto the structure of accumulated radwaste or the basic pattern of “generation–treatment–final isolation” when making any financial or material investments. Currently, 358million m 3 of low-level liquid radwaste in the Techa reservoir system accounts for 77%of all accumulated liquid radwaste in this category in the country (Table 5). Naturally,the LRW contained in reservoirs should be put into a separate category with its own rulesand safety requirements.There is a similar situation with solid radwaste (SRW). The majority of low-levelSRW are tailing dumps resulting from uranium mining with activity levels of no morethan 104 Bq/kg. The introduction of a “very low-level radwaste” category with specificactivity level of less than 1.0×10 5 Bq/kg for artificial radionuclides and less than 5.0×10 5246

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYBq/kg for natural radionuclides (similar to France and some other countries) wouldmake it possible to apply simplified procedures when treating this particular radwastecategory.The “very low-level radwaste” category could include industrial waste containingsmall quantities of artificial and natural radionuclides (waste from oil and gas extractionoperations) that currently are not covered by any radwaste category but cannot, undercurrent regulations, be treated like ordinary industrial waste. With the creation of thisradwaste category, the volume of solid LLW requiring conditioning and placement infinal isolation facilities would be reduced to ~3,300,000 tons (a reduction of 95%) andthe positive change of the basic pattern of “generation–treatment–final isolation” couldbe made possible with large but reasoned and justified allocation of funds (4). In addition,this would put a large volume of valuable expensive materials back into circulation.The resulting situation, as well as the shortcomings and contradictions of the currentsystem of standards and regulations for radwaste management, provides yet more proofof the urgent need for a unified government radwaste management system that wouldinclude, as its most important step, the final isolation of radwaste. This is confirmedby the experience of other countries, with well-developed nuclear energy and nuclearindustry sectors, which have addressed the radwaste management issue at the industriallevel and which made the decision to create unified government radwaste managementsystems.The only missing link in the safe development of the nuclear energy sector is theissue of final radwaste isolation. The Federal Target Program (FTP) for Assuring Nuclearand Radiation Safety for 2008 and through 2015, adopted in 2007, was designed tofundamentally change the current situation, resolve the problems that have accumulated,and assure the sustainable development of nuclear energy technologies. The primarygoals of the FTP include the comprehensive resolution of nuclear and radiation safetyissues associated with radwaste management, the decommissioning of facilities thatpose a nuclear and radiation threat, and the modernization of nuclear and radiation safetysupport and control systems (5).For the first time in the 60-plus-year history of the nuclear industry, funding in theamount of RUB 131.82 billion has been set aside from the federal budget to pay for theexecution of the FTP, which calls for creating a radwaste management infrastructure,creating radwaste treatment, storage, and transportation capacities, and ensuring thesafety of previously accumulated SNF and radwaste. In terms of radwaste managementefforts, which are receiving RUB 29.7 billion in funding, the FTP envisages the followingmeasures:• Construction of SRW storage facilities measuring 165,000 m 3;• Renovation of temporary radwaste storage facilities for the purpose oftransforming them into near-surface burial facilities;• Creation of new technologies and installations for radwaste treatment andimmobilization;• Research and development of the methodology and economic mechanisms forthe safe operation of the government radwaste management system, nationaland regional long-term radwaste storage facilities and radwaste burial sites;• Scientific and analytical support in the field of safe radwaste management.The first stage in the implementation of the FTP between now and 2010 can bedefined as the time needed to develop the solutions for the main radwaste management247

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYissues and, most importantly, for the adoption of the federal law on radioactive waste,which would define the legal framework for radwaste management activity and set outradwaste management principles, approach, and procedures. The primary goals of thisinitial stage include:• Optimization of radwaste categorization and the development of standards formethods of final radwaste isolation;• Development of unified technical requirements for radwaste packaging forstorage and for final isolation;• Selection of sites and start of operations for the creation of a national (for HLW)and inter-regional (for MLW and LLW) sites for final radwaste isolation.At the present time, RosAtom has developed and distributed to all interestedorganizations a new draft of the law on radioactive waste. The law will regulate thecreation and functioning of a unified system for the management of radwaste created at allstages of mineral extraction and processing, nuclear materials and radioactive substanceproduction. It will also regulate the operation of nuclear installations and storage sites,the use of radioactive substances for industrial purposes, scientific research, medicine,and defense, assure government control and regulation of safe radwaste management,and structure the funding of radwaste management projects.The primary goals of the unified government radwaste management systemaccording to the draft law are:• Implement a national policy with respect to radwaste management;• Uphold the rights of the citizens under the Constitution to the protection of theirhealth, access to a clean and healthy environment, and reliable informationregarding its condition;• Ensure sustainable development and protection of national interests withrespect to radwaste management;• Implement a government-sponsored scientific, investment, and informationpolicy with respect to radwaste management;• Take a variety of technical, environmental, health protection, and organizationalmeasures for the protection of citizens and the environment at all stages ofradwaste management.A unified radwaste management system will make is possible to assess the costefficiencyof such an enterprise and optimize technological solutions in the nuclearpower industry in a way that would take into account radwaste disposal costs, determinethe financial responsibility of companies that produce radwaste and the responsibilityof the government for legacy radwaste from past defense activities, and improve theefficiency of research and development in the nuclear power industry.A significant step towards ensuring that such a system would function properly isthe introduction by this law of the concept of “legacy radwaste,” defined as the wastethat has been accumulated by a certain point in time, which falls under the responsibilityof government. This category would include radwaste from defense activity as well aswaste generated by enterprises during the era of centralized planned economic activity.At the time, radwaste disposal was not accorded proper attention and later the solutionof these problems was also planned centrally using budgetary funding. As a result ofthat approach, unlike in countries with market economies, no dedicated funds wereestablished for building up the financial resources that would be needed for radwastemanagement.248

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIn order to finance a unified government radwaste management system, a dedicatedfund must be created to ensure the accumulation of financial resources and overseetheir expenditure on radwaste management under government control. The fund wouldreceive allocations from the federal budget, consumers and producers of radionuclideproducts, radwaste producers upon the transfer of radwaste to the responsibility of thegovernment, and international environmental projects.The central entity of this government corporation would be a joint stock company(JSC) with 100% government capital ownership, which would have a natural monopolyand the status of operator. Regional facilities for final radwaste isolation and companiesspecializing in radwaste treatment, conditioning, transport, and burial site constructioncould be JSC subsidiaries.The JSC would have the following responsibilities:• Develop a system of standards and regulations for all aspects of radwastemanagement;• Track and monitoring radwaste and the condition of radwaste storage facilitiesand final isolation sites;• Provide method-based guidelines for the selection of final isolation sites for alltypes of radwaste, developing a database of natural barriers and their specifictraits present at final radwaste isolation sites;• Coordinate efforts to develop standard technologies for the final isolationof all types of waste, the optimization of technical solutions for all relatedoperations in the concluding stage of radwaste management, the assuranceof the safety of regional radwaste burial sites, analysis of existing liquid andsolid radwaste storage facilities at individual enterprises, and the justificationof local radwaste burial sites;• Organize competitive bidding for radwaste management system improvementprojects and oversight of such projects (R&D, construction, etc.);• Coordinate of public outreach efforts to inform the public of power radwastemanagement in compliance with Russian law;• Participate in international radwaste management projects.The creation of a unified government radwaste management system that wouldoversee the last stages in the lifecycle of fuel used in nuclear power generation andradiation technologies is the key condition for further development of the nuclearenergy and industrial sectors. This system would prevent the continued accumulationof radwaste, improve the cost-effectiveness of the nuclear industry, and ensure greatersafety of handling radioactive material at all states of its lifecycle, would significantlyimproving the environmental situation in the country. The development of efficientradwaste management will also enable Russia to become an exporter of leadingradwaste immobilization technologies, enter the international market for safe radwastemanagement services, and apply the resulting know-how to finding solutions for themanagement of other toxic and chemical wastes.References1. Tikhonov, M. N., Rylov M. I., A Comprehensive Assessment of Russia’s Nuclearand Radioactive Legacy. Topics in Environmental Protection and Natural Resource249

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYManagement [Kompleksnaya otsenka yaderno-radiatsionnogo naslediya Rossii.Problemy okruzhaiushchei sredy i prirodnykh resursov], 2007, No. 3, 77–110.2. Muratov, O. E., Dovgusha V. V., Tikhonov M. N., Radioecological Aspectsof Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Management. Expert EnvironmentalAssessment [Radioekologicheskiye aspekty obrascheniya s radioaktivnymi otkhodami iobluchennym yadernym toplivom. Ecologicheskaya ekspertiza], 2007, No. 6, 2–15.3. Muratov, O. E. The Need for a Unified Radioactive Waste Management System:Safety [O neobkhodimosti sozdaniya edinoi sistemy obrascheniya s radiaktivnymiotkhodami. Bezopasnost zhiznedeyatel’nosti], 2007, No. 12, 16–22.4. Linge I. I. Main Directions in SNF and Radwaste Management for 2008–2015.Environmental Safety [Osnovniye napravleniya rabot po obrascheniyu s OYaT i RAO na2008–2015. Bezopasnost’ okruzhaiushchei sredy], 2007, No. 4, 111–114.5. Agapov, A. M., D’yakov S. V., Bobrov N. G., et al. Main Directions in SNF andRadwaste Management for 2008–2015 [Osnovniye napravleniya rabot po obrascheniyus OYaT i RAO na 2008–2015]. Proceedings of the Second International Nuclear Forum,Oct. 2–5, 2007. Saint Petersburg, 2007, 237–239.250

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYProposal for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management in RussiaAlexander NikitinDirector, Bellona Public Organization, St. PetersburgProblems in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste (radwaste) managementhave accumulated for decades in the USSR, and later in Russia. According to RosAtom,Russia does not currently have a long-term official adopted and confirmed concept forSNF management; consequently, there is no effective approach to dealing with theseproblems.In late September 2007, the RosAtom Board reviewed and adopted a framework fora concept, which nonetheless has not been made available to the public.We believe that SNF problems are critical from the standpoint of environmentalsafety and public health, and propose that the public should not be left on the sidelinesduring discussions of these issues.An OverviewRussia’s Ministry of Nuclear Energy prepared and approved a strategy for thedevelopment of nuclear energy in Russia during the first half of the 21 st century. Thisstrategy includes a section on SNF and radwaste management, which states that “…thestrategic development of nuclear energy in Russia is moving towards closing the nuclearfuel cycle…” There are currently no other adopted or approved documents addressingthe strategy and concept of SNF management in Russia.It is common knowledge that Russia uses mixed fuel cycles in:• PWR-1000: open fuel cycle;• RBMK–1000: open fuel cycle;• PWR–440: tandem (partial);• FBR-350 (600): tandem (partial);• Transport and research nuclear reactors: closed cycle (under specificconditions).In order to fully close the fuel cycle for all types of reactors, we need to first justifythe political, technological, and economic grounds and other needs behind this decision.There are currently no such grounds, and we believe that it would be impossible toprepare a substantiation due to the following reasons:• Technological installations for closed fuel cycles will have to be built fromscratch;• Treatment of fuel from RMBK-1000 reactors is not advised, as the U-235content in this fuel is lower than that found in natural uranium;• Treating fuel from PWR-1000 reactors would require the construction of anew facility, which would cost approximately USD 3 billion.251

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFuel from PWR-440 reactors, FBRs and transport reactors is partially processedat Mayak’s RT-1 Plant (80 tons per year). Meanwhile, experts have calculated that thisprocess is only cost-efficient if more than 1,000 tons of SNF is treated annually. In orderto upgrade the RT-1 plant, roughly USD 1 billion is required, but there are no financialresources. That is why there are currently no prospects for increasing the plant’s output.By reprocessing spent fuel from the reactors named above, the nuclear fuel cycleremains open and the problem persists: how do we close the cycle? Today, the situationconcerning transport reactors has fundamentally changed compared to Soviet times. Thequality and number of reactors is changing, as is the quality of the fuel itself and the waythe Navy and RosAtom work together. That is why treatment for this type of fuel is verycostly and not especially relevant today.As a result, it is practically impossible to provide solid economic grounds provingthe need to close the nuclear fuel cycle. International experience has also shown thattechnological and technical grounds for doing so are also unacceptable for most countries.The only argument in favor of the need to close the nuclear fuel cycle is political, andthis approach can realistically be applied in Russia.SNF Management in RussiaAccumulationOver 60 years of using nuclear energy, Russia (and the USSR) has accumulatedover 18,500 tons of spent nuclear fuel (uranium). Total radioactivity is approximately 7billion Ku. The SNF was produced in NPP reactors, research reactors, and reactors onnuclear-powered ships. Each year, Russia produces about 850 tons of SNF. The isotopestructure of the fuel varies depending on the type of reactor that was used and its initialproperties.StorageMost of Russia’s SNF is accumulated in NPP storage facilities. Experts haveestimated that these storage facilities currently house approximately 14,000 tons ofSNF. The rest is stored at RT-2 in Krasnoyarsk (roughly 4,000 tons), Mayak (about 500tons), the Northern and Pacific fleets (about 130 tons) and research institutes (about 20tons). With few exceptions, all of these storage facilities are storage pools meant for thetemporary storage of spent nuclear fuels.TransportEach year many tons of SNF is transported across Russian territory, primarily byrailway. A special type of tank car is used for each different type of SNF. Today there are59 different types of tank cars for used fuels. The routes used for SNF transport generallyconnect the NPP to Mayak and the storage facility in Krasnoyarsk. Furthermore,approximately 700 kg of SNF (uranium) is transferred from the Northern and Pacificfleet storage facilities to Mayak annually.TreatmentMayak’s RT-1 plant only reprocesses fuel that is produced from PWR-440, FBR-350, and FBR-600 reactors in addition to transport reactors and a number of differentkinds of research reactors. Projected reprocessing capacity is 400 tons of SNF per year,but Mayak treats just 80 tons. The plant has been in operation for 25 years. Its equipment252

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYis both worn down and obsolete and requires upgrades.Construction of the RT-2 plant has not been completed. The technologies that areplanned for use at this plant are already outdated, which is why there are major doubtsas to whether or not construction should be completed, especially considering the heftyresources required to do so (about USD 4 billion).Cost of SNF Management OperationsSNF transport costs an average of USD 50 per kilogram, while storage of onekilogram over the course of one year costs USD 120. Consequently, the storage ofRussia’s accumulated 18,500 tons of SNF costs the country USD 2.22 billion eachyear.In 1998 there was an initiative to import 20,000 tons of SNF into Russia fromabroad in exchange for USD 20 billion over the course of 10 years.Estimates show that the average cost of reprocessing SNF at RT-2 has reachedUSD 750/kg. Considering that the average cost of vitrification of high-level waste (HLW)produced by SNF treatment has reached USD 340/kg, the entire treatment process for onekilogram of SNF runs about USD 1,340, while the entire management cycle, includingtransport and storage over the course of one year is about USD 1,500/kg.Proposals for the Main Principles and Approaches in SNF ManagementIn order to deal with current and future problems, we need to develop and approvea strategy and a long-term concept for handling SNF. It is our opinion that the strategyshould take into account three key current challenges with regard to ensuring nuclearand radiation safety in Russia today:1) The existence of civil and defense industry facilities where SNF is kept underconditions that do not meet modern nuclear and radiation safety requirementsand pose a threat to national security;2) The acknowledgement of the need to tackle SNF-related problems that haveaccumulated on a government level and to stop postponing these issues anyfurther; and3) A weak government system to ensure and oversee nuclear and radiation safetyin the use of nuclear energy (including in SNF management).The concept should incorporate fundamental principles and approaches in SNFmanagement that will lay the foundation for key administrative, legal and economicmechanisms.The main principles and approaches should include:• A total refusal to reprocess SNF, and, consequently, a refusal to build a researchand demonstration center for SNF reprocessing at the Gorno-KhimicheskyCombine;• The long-term, controlled storage of SNF in storage facilities that meet globalsafety standards;• Minimization of SNF transport; and• A refusal to import SNF into Russia from abroad.A plan for handling accumulated SNF should be as simple and safe as possible. Itmust be drawn up with due account for global practices and domestic realities.253

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYKey ActionsThe following actions are necessary for resolving the SNF management problem:• The creation of a government system for SNF management, which hasadministrative and economic independence from operators;• The creation of a legal base for ensuring safety in SNF management;• The creation of an infrastructure for regional dry storage facilities that meetinternational safety levels for long-term (at least 300 years) SNF storage;• The creation of interim storage facilities for short-term SNF storage beforetransfer to long-term storage;• The transfer of SNF that has been accumulated at NPP storage facilities to thefacilities at Gorno-Khimichesky Combine and other storage facilities;• The closure and phase-out of the RT-1 Plant at Mayak;• Full compliance with international conventions in nuclear and radiationsafety.ConclusionThe concept of the Federal Target Program for ensuring nuclear and radiationsafety (2008–2015) considers three options for a nuclear and radiation safety strategy.Unfortunately, none of the options provides for the opportunity to cease the reprocessingof SNF or ruling out the ideology of a closed nuclear fuel cycle.That is why our proposals are aimed at including an option to cease the treatmentof SNF in the FTP. We suggest that an option that rules out the introduction of a closednuclear fuel cycle will free up resources that could be redirected at remediation of theterritory and taking other actions set out in the FTP.Ceasing the partial SNF reprocessing and steering away from the idea of a closednuclear fuel cycle will produce considerable economic benefits. Most importantly, itwill help resolve the most critical problems we face today, and the problems we willface in the future, concerning environmental safety and the radioactive pollution of theenvironment.254

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYResults of the Sample-Based Radiation Inspection of theZvezdochka Health Protection and Observation Zones.Measurement of External Gamma Radiation Dose Equivalent andBeta Particles Flux Density on Yagry Island, SeverodvinskVladimir KuznetsovDirector, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program,Green Cross Russia, andMember of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciencesand Academy of Industrial Ecology, andMember of RosAtom’s Public CouncilVladimir NikitinGeneral Director, Zvezdochka Shipyard, SeverodvinskNikolai ShcherbininDirector, Green Cross Public Outreach Office,SeverodvinskIn December 2007, in accordance with the RosAtom Public Council plan and afterseveral meetings with the management of Zvezdochka Shipyard, the parties agreedto conduct a sample-based radiation inspection of the health protection zone and theshipyard’s observation zone.On March 18, 2008, the following locations were included in the radiationinspections: the grounds of School No. 4 at 4 ulitsa Gogolya, 24 proezd Mashinostroiteleiand the building’s stair landings, the grounds of the Rucheyok Kindergarten located at3A ulitsa Gogolya, and samples along ulitsa Korabelnaya.The following people participated in the inspection:• Staff and technicians from the Zvezdochka Shipyard Nuclear and RadiationSafety Department’s External Environment Laboratory (accreditationcertificate from the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department [OYaRB]No. SARK RU.001442055 dated 07/05/07);• Vladimir Kuznetsov, PhD, member of RosAtom’s Public Council;• Staff and experts Green Cross Russia Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program;• Staff from the Hygiene and Epidemiology Center No. 58 of the RussianFederal Medical and Biological Agency (accreditation certificate No. GSEN.RU.TsOA/TsA.3/46 dated 05/15/03, State Registry entry No. ROSS.RU.0001.513937 dated 05/15/03);• Members of the Environmental Council under the Office of the Mayorof Severodvinsk, representatives of non-governmental organizations andmovements of the cities of Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk.The inspection used dosimetry equipment that had gone through governmentverification and had been entered into the State Registry of equipment used to measureradiation. The equipment included the DRBP-03 dosimeter for measuring the external255

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYgamma-ray radiation dose equivalent, beta contamination, the DRG-06T (doseequivalent), and the DRG-06N (dose equivalent).Work was structured according to Radiation Safety Standards (NRB-99), BasicSanitation Regulations for Ensuring Radiation Safety (OSPORB-99), and EnvironmentalRadiation Monitoring at Enterprises Engaged in Building, Testing, Repair, or Disposalof Ship and Vessels with Nuclear Power Installations and Floating Support Structures(RD5.2946-99).Inspection Conditions and Results in Establishing the Gamma-Ray RadiationDose EquivalentInspection conditions: air temperature: -14°С (6.8°F), no precipitation.Open grounds along the perimeter of School No. 4 at 4 ulitsa Gogolya: 103 samplingpoints, maximum dose does not exceed 0.133 microsieverts/hour with p=0.95.Open grounds along the perimeter of 24 proezd Mashinostroitelei building:90 sampling points, maximum dose does not exceed 0.134 microsieverts/hour withp=0.95.Stair landings at 24 proezd Mashinostroitelei: 20 sampling points, maximum dosedoes not exceed 0.134 microsieverts/hour with p=0.95. No surface contamination bybeta-active radionuclides.Open grounds along the perimeter of the Rucheyok Kindergarten at 3A ulitsaGogolya: 75 sampling points, maximum dose does not exceed 0.131 microsieverts/hourwith p=0.95.Open grounds along ulitsa Korabelnaya: 75 sampling points, maximum dose doesnot exceed 0.135 microsieverts/hour with p=0.95.ConclusionNo radiation anomalies or levels exceeding NRB-99 or OSPORB-99 standardswere found.256

Valeriy Men’shchikov, Co-Director of the International Social Ecological Unionand the Russian Center for Environmental Politics’ Program for Radioactiveand Nuclear Safety, Board Member of the Center of Russian EnvironmentalPolitics, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council, comments on one of thepresentations.Igor Babanin, Greenpeace Russia, St. Petersburg, talks about alternativeenergy scenarios for Russia.

Lina Zernova, from the Public Advisory Council of Sosnov’y Bor,Leningrad Oblast.Panel of the International Science and Technology Center session on alternativeenergy. From left to right: Aleksandr Chumakov, Vice President of Green CrossRussia; Albert Gozal, Senior Program Manager, Partnering & SustainabilityDepartment, Commercialization Support Program (PCS), International Scienceand Technology Center; Stephan Robinson, International Coordinator of theLegacy Program for Green Cross Switzerland; and Nina Lesikhina, Coordinatorof Energy Projects, Bellona-Murmansk.

International Dialogue participants. From left to right: Igor Khripunov, AssociateDirector of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University ofGeorgia; Paul Walker, Director of the Legacy Program, Global Green USA andChairman of the international Legacy Program Steering Committee for Green CrossInternational; and Jurki Terya, Second Secretary for the Economy at the FinnishEmbassy in Russia.Nina Lesikhina, Coordinator of Energy Projects for Bellona-Murmansk, gives apresentation on “Prospects for Developing Non-Traditional, Renewable EnergySources on the Kola Peninsula.”

Pavel Munin, Moscow Academy of Business Administration and theEurasian Center of Continuous Development.Leaders of the plenary session on ‘Radiobiological Problems and Rehabilitation ofAffected Regions’, from left to right: Vladimir Sorokin, Chief Researcher, UnitedInstitute of Energetics and Nuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus;Anatolii Nazarov, Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Science, Directorof the Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History andTechnology, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Deputy Chairman of RosAtom’sPublic Council; Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director of the Nuclear and RadiationSafety Program, Green Cross Russia, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council;and Valeriy Bulatov, Professor at Yugorsk State University, Khanty-Mansiisk.

RosAtom employees at the Dialogue, from left to right: Igor Konyshev, Directorof RosAtom’s Department of Public Relations, Public Organizations and RegionsLiaison Branch and Secretary of RosAtom’s Public Council; Ms. Ulanova,AtomProf’s Press Service; and Marina Labyntseva, Head of the Public RelationsDepartment at the AtomProf Institute of Continued and Professional Studies.Svetlana Kostina, Deputy Minister for Radiation and Environmental Safety,Chelyabinsk Oblast, speaking about the experiences of RosAtom and theChelyabinsk Oblast government on their joint project to clean the floodplain ofthe Techa River.

Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program forGreen Cross Russia, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council.Valeriy Bulatov, Professor at Yugorsk State University, Khanty-Mansiisk, giveshis presentation on “Remediation of Polluted Areas in the Ob-Irtysh Basin.”

During a plenary session at the Dialogue.Sergey Vakulovskiy, Deputy Director of the Typhoon Company, comments on dataon the state of radiation near a nuclear explosion site.

Nikolai Shcherbinin, Director of the Green Cross Public Outreach Office inSeverodvinsk, talks about improving public outreach efforts by using existingsystems of radiation monitoring and emergency response in the ArkhangelskOblast.Svetlana Krasnoslobodtseva, Junior Scientific Collaborator at the Center ofHistory of the Chelyabinsk State and Municipal Governments at the UralsAcademy of Public Service, gives her presentation.

At the podium: Vyacheslav Khatuntsev, Senior Lecturer at the NorthwestAcademy of Public Service, Severodvinsk.Exchanging contact information: Norwegian journalist Morten Sickel (on theleft) and Denis Flory, Advisor on Nuclear Issues at the French Embassy inRussia.

Samat Smagulov, Senior Scientific Collaborator at the State Institute forApplied Ecology, Saratov.Sergei Zhavoronkin, expert with the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program,Green Cross Russia, Murmansk affiliate, follows the Dialogue presentations.

The panel for the plenary session on international cooperation and globalpartnership in disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.From left to right: Vladimir Novosyolov, Professor at the Center of History of theChelyabinsk State and Municipal Government, Urals Academy of Public Service;Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative,New America Foundation; Paul Walker, Director of the Legacy Program, GlobalGreen USA, and Chairman of the international Legacy Program Steering Committeefor Green Cross International; and Matt Martin, Program Manager, the StanleyFoundation, Muscatine, Iowa.During the plenary session on spent fuel and radioactive waste. From leftto right: Oleg Muratov, Executive Secretary of the Northwest Branch of theNuclear Society of Russia, St. Petersburg; Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director ofthe Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia, and Memberof RosAtom’s Public Council, and Aleksandr Nikitin, Director of the BellonaEnvironmental Foundation, St. Petersburg.

Dialogue participants: Anne-Marie Duchemin and Marie Kirchner, Members ofthe Council of Development of the Pays du Cotentin, France; in between them,Anatolii Nazarov, Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Science, Directorof the Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History andTechnology, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Deputy Chairman of RosAtom’sPublic Council; and on the right: Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of theInteragency Commission for Evaluating the Radioecological Safety of Full-scaleTests with the State-owned the Scientific-Research Institute, Moscow.Mr. Nasibov, Head of Public Relations for RosEnergoAtom (left), and Ms. Katkova ofITAR-TASS.

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYPlenary Session on Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive WasteAnatolii NazarovDirector, Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for NaturalHistory and Technology, Member of Russian Academy of Sciences;and Deputy Chairman, RosAtom’s Public Council; andMember, Presidium of the Russian Academy of Natural SciencesDear colleagues, I, as its Deputy Chairman, together with Vladimir Kuznetsov,Valery Men’shikov, and Albert Vasil’ev, Members of the RosAtom Public Council, canassure you that we have listened carefully to everything that was said at this Dialogue.The Council’s membership is made up exclusively of scientists and experts, and alsoincludes the heads of non-profit organizations that also have experience working in thefield of radiation and nuclear safety. As regards the presentations and discussions weheard today, these important contributions made this year’s Dialogue fundamentallydifferent from the first; the speakers covered a broad range of topics, provided in-depthinformation, and introduced proposals from their regions. Work is indeed underway andmoving fast toward the adoption of a law on radioactive waste, including how it ismanaged in Russia. The issue of spent nuclear fuel is left out, as was mentioned byAlexander Nikitin. It has been left out, because these are two completely separate issues.What can we do in this situation? We have the text of the draft law here, and the sectionchairman, Valery Men’shikov does too. We could re-write it right here on the spot and allthose interested should send their comments for consideration by the Public Council.My second comment concerns the fact that the draft law will be submitted to theDuma in June [2008] in accordance with due process. This is an extremely importantlaw. It is, in essence, seen as a new step forward by the public. It will then be submittedfor consideration by the regions, including the Chelyabinsk Oblast. Mr. Talevlin, youmust seize this opportunity! Every public organization and all Dialogue participants heretoday must take notice! This is a crucial decision, because the success of nuclear energydepends on how we handle radioactive waste. If we do not respond with suggestions, wewill miss this opportunity.I would like to thank the presenters for their highly professional presentations. Thehigh quality of the documents presented here is a significant achievement for grassrootsorganizations.257

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Nuclear and Radiation Legacy of Northwest Russia:Problems, Solutions, and the Role of the PublicMikhail RylovDirector, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety;and Vice President, Green Cross Russia, St. PetersburgI am convinced that mankind cannot do without nuclear power andmust be developed, but only in conditions of total safety.–Andrei SakharovThe Scale of the Regional Radioecological Safety ProblemNorthwest Russia (NWR) — like no other region on Earth — is saturated withindustrial, defense, and commercial firms and facilities that are potential sources ofnuclear and radiation hazards. Their number is reaching the tens of thousands, and atleast one-third of them conduct operations related to the military-industrial complex. Asa result, an analysis and assessment of the radiation conditions in NWR lead us to theconclusion that this region features an increased level of all radiation risk factors, bothnatural and anthropogenic. A detailed overview of the radiological situation brings us tothe obvious conclusion on the scale of the problem.The territory of NWR is home to a large number of companies that use nuclear andradioactive materials. These include the Leningrad NPP (4 RBMK-1000 reactors) andthe Kola NPP (4 PWR-440 reactors), shipbuilding and ship repair plants for ships andother vessels with nuclear power installations, the nuclear icebreaker fleet, the NorthernFleet (where over 60% of the ships are nuclear-powered, carry nuclear weapons andare equipped with the infrastructure to provide maintenance for nuclear facilities), andover 4,000 companies using radioactive substances and other sources of radiation fortechnological purposes.The facilities and infrastructure of the nuclear fleet include primarily nuclearsubmarines and ships, nuclear icebreakers, light carriers, nuclear service ships (NSS),as well as fleet bases, coastal maintenance bases and floating technical bases, technicalproperty bases, temporary spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transshipment points and nuclearsubmarine decommissioning and dismantlement bases.Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) have a special place in radioecologicalsafety. RTG were developed as autonomous sources of electricity for use in remoteareas. RTG have been the focus of much Russian and international attention due to thepotential dangers associated with them for humans and the environment, as their 90 Sractivity levels can reach 1x10 15 Bq.Other sources of radiation pollution that pose a potential threat to the environmentinclude:• Nuclear testing in Novaya Zemlya;258

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• Underground nuclear explosions for “peaceful” purposes;• Radioactive waste storage points;• Submerged nuclear ships and radioactive waste (RW) on the floor of the Karaand Barents Seas;• The consequences of radioactive fallout after the Chernobyl accident; and• The transportation of radiation hazards.Experts say that the Barents Sea gets nearly 20% of cesium and 30% of strontiumfrom radwaste dumped by European SNF reprocessing plants at Sellafield, Dounreayand Cape de la Hague (France).This list should also include companies where operations also have a negative impacton the region’s radiation conditions, as the radioactive products of their operations enterthe northern rivers and the Arctic Sea. These include the Siberian Chemical Combine inthe City of Tomsk, Mayak in the South Urals, and the Krasnoyarsk Mining and ChemicalPlant.The region has districts with increased natural sources of ionizing radiation. Theseinclude: the Baltic Klint (with of the layer black argillite [Dictyonema shale] at thesurface), the Medvezhegorsk Rayon of Karelia (high levels of equilibrium equivalentradon — up to 2,500 Bq/m 3 — have been found at most of the developed mines andshafts in Karelia).Increased radiation hazards are still in effect in the village of Vodny (in the KomiRepublic) within the boundaries of a former radium plant. Despite the fact that mostradioactive pollution has been contained and decontaminated over the past 50 years,there are still areas where people should not go.An extremely critical environmental situation has developed on the Kola Peninsula(the Levozyorsk and Kovdor Mining Plants), where high concentrations of industrial(mining, ferrous metals, machine building) is leading to rapid deterioration of theenvironment and negative impact on the health of local residents. This is because thecontent of radioactive substances in the ore, half-finished material and finished productsare close to the lower end of the range of radioactivity that requires special measures.A demographic analysis reflects the poor conditions of NWR’s large cities in themanifestation of a number of diseases (respiratory, nervous system, urogenital disordersand birth defects). The main reasons behind the mortality rate of the adult populationare circulatory diseases and malignant tumors. Those employed at nuclear complexcompanies have noted a growing trend in tumor cases. The increase in children’s diseasescaused by tumors is especially worrying.Overall, Russia’s Northwest can be characterized as a region with an increasedrisk of exposure of the public and the environment to damaging effects in the event ofaccidents at facilities that would require an emergency response or due to hazardousnatural phenomena.Approximately 8.5 million people (54% of the region’s population) live in NWR’srisk zones.Based on the presence of hazards and the calculated potential losses for the localresidents, the region’s territory is subjected to:• Radiation hazards: 300,000 residents (26%) in the Murmansk Oblast, and150,000 (8%) in the Leningrad Oblast.• Chemical hazards: 4.5 million residents (68%) in the Leningrad Oblastand the City of St. Petersburg; 500,000 (30%) in the Arkhangelsk Oblast;259

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY250,000 (33%) in the Novgorod Oblast; 480,000 (35%) in the Vologda Oblast;280,000 (33%) in the Pskov Oblast; 360,000 (40%) in the Kaliningrad Oblast;120,000 (15%) in the Republic of Karelia; and 290,000 residents (25%) in theMurmansk Oblast.Consequently, radiation hazard zones are home to 450,000 residents (3%), while6.7 million (42% of the region’s entire population) live in zones of potential chemicalthreat.The key issues in preventing radiation pollution of the environment while continuingto operate nuclear and radiation facilities are:• The acceleration of the rate at which SNF is being removed from nuclearsubmarine and nuclear ship reactors and support for SNF management;• The slicing of reactor compartments containing removed SNF;• Planned and organized removal of SNF to Mayak;• The burial of unsafe reactor compartments holding SNF;• The removal of SNF from floating and coastal storage points that poseradiation hazards;• The remediation of the land and decontamination of structures at the RussianNavy’s coastal technical bases;• The provision of all types of safety (radiation, nuclear, toxicological, explosionand fire hazards, durability and water-proofing) while keeping nuclearsubmarines and NSS in non-operating conditions;• The construction of an infrastructure for RW and SNF management, includingstorage facilities for reactor compartments;• The creation of installations for consolidation of liquid radwaste (LRW);• The construction of long-term storage facilities or regional burial grounds forRW;• The elimination of unauthorized RW burial sites and restoring territoriesaffected by radiation pollution;• The increase in effectiveness in cleaning gas emissions;• The introduction of a comprehensive system for decontaminating wastewater• The creation of a system for a closed water processing cycle with chemicalreagent disposal.Despite the wide range and large scale of radioecological problems, these are allthings that can be resolved. The nature of the specific measures that are taken should beestablished by the Russian Government based on the presence of sources of radiationand nuclear hazards that may affect humans and the environment.Views on the Development of Nuclear PowerAs a complicated technological complex, a nuclear power plant is a source ofincreased risk: there is a probability of damages, malfunctions or other bugs in plantoperations with unpredictable consequences. The close proximity of the Leningrad NPPto St. Petersburg and Russia’s borders require increased public attention to safety andenvironmental protection.However, the public understands that the risk of living without heat and poweris a major risk. Everyone understands that the country’s economy will fail to growwithout the development of power. Along these lines, the development of capacities260

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYat the Leningrad and Kola NPPs is a logical step toward solving the energy deficit inNWR. The administration and the public of the constituents of NWR are interested inimplementing NPP-2 projects in the Leningrad and Kola regions.On February 7, 2007, public hearings were held in Sosnovy Bor on the environmentalimpact assessments of the construction and operations of these new plants. The LeningradNPP-2-4, equipped with PWR-1100 reactors, will replace the current reactors at theLeningrad NPP with RBMK reactors and will become a reliable source of electricityfor NWR throughout the 21 st century. The expected state of the environment and livingconditions will help assess Leningrad NPP-2 as environmentally safe based on therequirements of current regulatory documents. The effects of radiation are minor, andthe consequences of chemical and thermal effects on the district’s microclimate do notpresent any danger.The construction of new reactors will provide many socioeconomic advantages: thecreation of new jobs, the construction of social and business facilities, and an increase inthe tax base. When the development of nuclear power becomes one of the priorities forthe authorities and for the country as a whole, changes in public sentiment with regardto nuclear power will inevitably result. Many of our compatriots (especially the youngergenerations) understand that the nuclear industry is the future of our country.This is why today, due to the sharp rise in the growth rate of electricity consumption,the public is beginning to view nuclear power in a better light. It has become a serious,respected and constructive option in most of the country’s regions. People understand thatthis is one of the economy’s competitive and environmentally safe industries today.The Role of the Public in Resolving Radioecological ProblemsThe systemic crisis that took shape in the early 1990s gave rise to a wide rangeof complex problems, including the sharp decline of in the state’s economic ability tocontinue the necessary financing of efforts related to large-scale reductions of nucleararsenals, the decommissioning of nuclear submarines and nuclear ships from Russia’sNavy, and the remediation of the consequences of the nuclear and radiation legacy of theCold War. Some of the defense facilities in NWR turned out to be in very poor, nearlyunsafe conditions, which is a major factor in radiation and nuclear risks for the publicand the environment.It is clear that in order to resolve issues at this level in a democratic country, publicopinion plays a considerable role, and that opinion could turn out to have the finalsay. One cannot deny the fact that the concerns of Russian people regarding nuclearand radiation safety after Chernobyl has led to a decline in the construction of newreactors. Furthermore, we must consider the international public response, since nucleartechnology is perceived as having the highest possible potential for destruction.Nuclear and radiation safety is basically the top issue in environmental safety andsociopolitical and economic stability. If one or several major accidents take place, thenthe public will stop seeing the use of nuclear energy as an acceptable option.Public opinion polls conducted recently have shown that people will changetheir stance on an issue depending on the related events taking place in the country.Considering the importance of the nuclear issue for NWR (the nuclear testing range inNovaya Zemlya, the construction and dismantlement of ships with nuclear installations,the construction of floating nuclear service ships in Severodvinsk, and facilities dealingin the management of SNF and radioactive waste, the second Leningrad NPP in Sosnovy261

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYBor, the second Kola NPP in Polyarniye Zori in the Murmansk Oblast and an FNPPsnear Arkhangelsk; the extension of the service life of operating NPP reactors, theenvironmental remediation of coastal maintenance bases in the Andreeva Bay and thevillage of Gremikha, the creation of complexes for reprocessing all types of radioactivewastes at the temporary storage point in the Andreeva Bay and the long-term storagepoint in Sayda), the local authorities and the public are speaking out openly about nuclearand radiation safety and the protection of personnel, the population and the environmentgiven so many large-scale projects in the region. In previous decades, nuclear expertsdid not inform society about what they were doing. The international community hasconstantly expressed concern about the situation developing in Northwest Russia.In 2003, a decision was made to draft the two-phase Strategic Master Plan (SMP)for the dismantlement of the nuclear fleet. The first phase was drafted by Russian experts.The final document includes a detailed analysis of the current situation and sets outlong-term goals for the comprehensive dismantlement of ships with nuclear installationsand remediation of coastal maintenance bases. The report also presents urgent measuresfor strategic solutions for the entire project, and priorities have been defined. Prioritymeasures include the creation of facility-specific and regional monitoring and emergencyresponse systems in NWR.While conducting the environmental impact assessment, the impact of the plannedactivity on the air, water, and soil as well as facility staff and the local population wasconsidered in order for company managers to make informed decisions toward reducingradiation and non-radiation risks at potentially hazardous facilities.Over the past several years, the public has voiced a strong interest in these problemsand expressed serious concerns about a number of topics; the public fervently supportsefforts to clean the region from the nuclear and radiation legacy left from previousyears, while accepting RosSudoStroyeniye operations. Overall, the level of nuclear andradiation safety in NWR meets the standards set out in regulatory documents and meetsthe recommendations of relevant international organizations.Working in what is now referred to as this “sensitive area” of these brewingproblems, it is time to work toward a constructive dialogue (consolidation) betweenpublic organizations and the regional authorities, RosAtom, and the Russian Naval Fleet.It is good that discussions are taking place, that they are transparent, open, and basedon a commitment to and deep understanding of the problems related to nuclear andradiation safety. The proponents of nuclear power do not need to give up their positions,neither do they need to go looking for trouble. One requisite condition for the sustainabledevelopment of nuclear power is greater ability to respond adequately to the continualchanges taking place in society and in nature. The constructive criticism of independentexperts and professionals is an objective necessity for the safe development of in thispower sector.Today, we can say that certain positive results have been achieved. However,there are still many unresolved problems concerning cooperation among NGOs onthe one hand, and RosAtom, the Russian Naval Fleet, and government authorities andagencies on the other hand. These include the problem of access to information andaccess to facilities. What is getting in the way are old foundations and traditions, andthe conservative views of officials. It is important to overcome aversions to and the lackof understanding of nuclear power, not by making things secret or covering things up,but by explaining, persuading, disseminating special knowledge, providing appropriate262

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYeducation and improving the awareness of all members of society. We must reconsiderold views and during preparations for new ideas and plans in Northwest Russia, holdbroader consultations with public organizations. This will reassure us that we are makingthe right decisions.NGOs should look to improve their corporate management culture and focus ona balanced approached toward introducing nuclear technologies in the power industry.We must pool our efforts to resolve nuclear and radiation safety problems productively.The assistance of the public and NGOs in doing away with the legacy of the Cold Warin Northwest Russia will be viewed positively.ConclusionThe use of nuclear energy for peaceful and military purposes is a fundamentallyimportant part of many operations that provide national security for Russia for thefollowing reasons:• The possession of nuclear weapons is currently (and will continue to be) themain guarantee of Russia’s status as a global superpower, while the presenceof a powerful nuclear fleet will maintain Russia’s status as a leading maritimepower. Russia’s Naval Fleet and the defense and military complex in NorthwestRussia play a major role in ensuring Russia’s national interests.• The nuclear industry is the most developed in terms of science and technologyand is at the forefront, both in Russia and in other countries. The products andservices produced by the companies of Northwest Russia’s nuclear industrycontribute significantly to Russia’s GNP.• Weakening scientific and technical potential in this field, reduced studies forstrategically important developments in science and technology are threateningRussia with the loss of its leading global position, the degradation of scienceintensiveproductions, a stronger dependence on foreign technology and thecurtailment of Russia’s defense capabilities.The accelerated pace of economic development in NWR and improved livingstandards for the local population have resulted in increased demand for electricity. Largemunicipal conglomerations, regions where hydrocarbons are mined and the location ofheavy industry firms and military and defense facilities have run into problems withinsufficient electricity. Under these conditions, the nuclear sector faces the majorchallenge of increasing electricity generation.Developments should be based on sustainable energy well-being, without whichit will be impossible to resolve problems in the industrial, transportation, and socialeconomic sectors. Under the Federal Target Program for the development of the nuclearpower industry complex in Russia in 2007–2010 with an outlook to 2015, Russia’sNorthwest region needs to take on the following tasks:• The construction of four new reactors with a design capacity of 1,100 MWt atLeningrad NPP-2 (Sosnovy Bor) with operations to be launched in 2013, 2014,2015 and 2016, in addition to reactor No. 1 with a design capacity of 1,100MWt at Kola NPP-2 (Polyarniye Zori, Murmansk Oblast), to be launched in2020.• The extension of the service life of operating reactors 2–4 with designcapacities of 1,000 MWt at Leningrad NPP-2, with operations to be launchedin 2007, 2009 and 2011, in addition to two reactors (3 and 4) with a projected263

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcapacity of 440 MWt at Kola NPP, with expected launch of operations in 2011and 2014, respectively.• The construction of a small-capacity nuclear power plant with a KLT-40Sreactor installation (Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast).• The construction of radwaste management facilities (Polyarniye Zori,Murmansk Oblast), with operations to be launched in 2008.• The construction of a complex for the reprocessing and storage of solidand liquid radioactive wastes, in addition to a complex of facilities for thereprocessing and storage of SNF (Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast) withoperations to be launched in 2008.• The development of a NPP-2006 baseline project for a mass-produced PWRreactor (AtomEnergoProekt St. Petersburg Scientific Research and DesignEngineering Institute, a federal state-owned franchise).Meanwhile, we must not forget that ensuring nuclear and radiation safety isfundamentally the most prominent issue for environmental safety as well as society’ssociopolitical and economic stability. Restricting the effects of radiation on theenvironment, minimizing the consequences of previous radiation accidents andcatastrophes, and a high-quality, streamlined system providing nuclear and radiationsafety in Northwest Russia are all priorities in the joint efforts of the government and thepublic in the field of environmental protection.264

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines and the EnvironmentalRehabilitation of Facilities Constituting Nuclear and RadiationHazards: Experience, Today’s Problems, and the FutureViktor KovalenkoAssociate Manager, RosAtom’s Department forSNF and RW Management and DecommissioningHazardous Nuclear and Radiation FacilitiesAlexander PimenovDeputy Senior Engineer, Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET),MoscowVladimir ShishkinSenior Engineer, Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET),MoscowThe scale of the nuclear submarine dismantlement project:• The total activity levels of nuclear submarine materials and accumulatedradioactive waste (RW) amounts to nearly 80×10 6 Ci;• The total weight of all radioactive construction material designated for disposalis at least 1 million tons;• It would take over 300 railway train trips to transfer all of the spent nuclearfuel (SNF);• Based on feasibility studies, in order to complete priority tasks in dismantlingnuclear ships and vessels, rehabilitation efforts for facilities will require atleast USD 4 billion.The state-run Dollezhal Institute of Scientific Research and Power Engineering(known as the Dollezhal Institute or NIKIET from its abbreviation in Russian) is:1. A scientific leader in the efforts toward the comprehensive dismantlementof nuclear submarines and ships with nuclear installations, nuclear serviceships, and the environmental rehabilitation of hazardous nuclear and radiationfacilities.2. The chief executor (in terms of nuclear and radiation safety and theenvironmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities in the RussianNavy) of the comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear submarines and shipswith nuclear power installations. The Institute also deals with the reductionof radiation hazard levels where these facilities are stationed, and theenvironmental rehabilitation of facilities that belong to Russia’s Ministry ofDefense (see Figures 1–3).265

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 1. Number of nuclear submarines being decommissioned (greybars) and number of nuclear submarines containing SNF maintainedin storage (white bars) (2000 White Book).The Federal Agency for Nuclear Energy serves as the government client andcoordinator and ensures:• The comprehensive dismantlement of decommissioned Naval nuclearsubmarines, ships with nuclear power installations and nuclear service ships,floating technical bases, tankers, and floating storage facilities;• The environmental rehabilitation of former facilities of Russia’s Ministryof Defense (under the Navy) used for temporary storage of SNF, solid RW(SRW) and liquid RW (LRW);• The funds derived from the sale of recycled materials from dismantled nuclearsubmarines and ships are used to finance the comprehensive dismantlement ofnuclear submarines and related work;• The stationing of nuclear submarines designated for dismantlement;• Unloading SNF from nuclear submarines and ships undergoingdismantlement;• Unloading SNF and RW from storage containers on nuclear submarinesundergoing dismantlement;• Transferring SNF from nuclear submarines, nuclear ships, and nuclear serviceships to Mayak;• Separating reactors and the ends of nuclear submarines;• The long-term storage of separated reactors;• Reconstructing and creating new solutions for unloading SNF from thereactors or nuclear submarines undergoing dismantlement;• Creating and using the structures and solutions for the safe temporary storageof SNF at sites where SNF is unloaded and transferred for treatment;• The conversion, temporary storage and subsequent dismantlement of nuclearservice ships;• The collection and reprocessing of RW that forms during the nuclear submarine266

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYdismantlement process;• The collection, reprocessing, conditioning and subsequent storage of all typesof RW accumulated at coastal maintenance bases;• The development and implementation of a flowchart for process stages andtransportation for the safe management of SNF and its transfer from bases totreatment sites;• A series of steps toward the environmental rehabilitation of buildings,structures and associated grounds;Figure 2. The location of decommissioned Naval nuclear submarines, dismantlementcompanies and temporary storage points for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastein the Northwest Region.Figure 3. The location of decommissioned Naval nuclear submarines, dismantlementcompanies and temporary storage points for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastein the Pacific Region.267

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Dollezhal Institute has developed and put into practice:• A concept for the comprehensive dismantlement of nuclearsubmarines and ships with nuclear power installations;• A concept for the environmental rehabilitation of coastal maintenancebases in the Russia’s Pacific and Northern regions;• Technology for conserving nuclear submarine reactors when it is not possibleto remove all SNF from the reactor;• General technical requirements for one-compartment blocks of reactorcompartments for nuclear submarines undergoing dismantlement;• General technical requirements for using reactor compartments fromdismantled nuclear submarines to store SRW;• Fundamental provisions for preparing reactor compartments from dismantlednuclear submarines for storage at Sayda;• Technology for using the Sayda long-term storage point (regulations);• Technology for using the Razboinik long-term storage point (regulations);• Technology for the environmental rehabilitation of unsafe nuclearsubmarines;• Technical feasibility studies for safely handling unsafe nuclear submarines(numbers 541, 175 and 533);• Instructions for maintenance of one-compartment reactors from dismantlednuclear submarines;• Instructions for the dismantlement of the barrels from safety control systemsfrom dismantled nuclear submarines during removal of SNF;• Additional measures to prevent simultaneous chain reactions whenconducting potentially hazardous work on nuclear submarines undergoingdismantlement;• Other work and removing SNF from reactors from nuclear submarinesundergoing dismantlement in contingency situations.Figure 4. Nuclear submarine dismantlement: process stages andtransportation flowchart.268

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYKey efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear powerinstallations, and Nuclear service ships as well as the environmental rehabilitation ofhazardous radiation facilities:1. The environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities.2. The safe storage of nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear power installationsdecommissioned from the Russian naval fleet, and floating three-compartmentreactor blocks at temporary storage points;3. Removal of SNF from reactors from nuclear submarines and ships withnuclear power installations, as well as coastal storage facilities for handlingSNF safely, its temporary storage, transport and treatment;4. Forming one-compartment (3-compartment) reactor blocks and dismantlementof the ends of nuclear submarines;5. Handling unsafe nuclear submarines and nuclear service ships;6. Creating long-term storage points and points of transport for reactorcompartments at coastal long-term storage points;7. The collection, conditioning and reprocessing of radioactive wastes thatform during the dismantlement process of nuclear submarines and ships withnuclear power installations and the rehabilitation of facilities presenting aradiation hazard;8. The collection and burial of harmful and toxic wastes;9. Dismantlement of nuclear service ships.Figure 5. Removal of SNF from nuclear submarine reactors, 1994–2007269

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 6. Storage containers for radioactive components of nuclearsubmarines.Figure 7. A storage site for radioactive components of nuclear submarines.270

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 1. Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement: Progress MadeNuclearsubmarinesRussian Ministry ofDefense, 1986–1998 (overa 12-year period)RosAtom (RussianMinistry of NuclearEnergy) 1999–present(over a 10-year period)Total (asofApril 15,2008)Decommissionedfrom the RussianNaval Fleet177 21 198Removed SNF 53 118 171Dismantled 39 125 164Designated for dismantlement, total(including those currently undergoing dismantlement).Designated for dismantlement with SNF not removed (including thosecurrently undergoing dismantlement)3427Summary of Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET) Operations:The following has been accomplished:• The safe dismantlement of 164 nuclear submarines;• The launch of operations at the first phase of the long-term storage point forreactor compartments from dismantled nuclear submarines in Sayda Bay;• The development, coordination and monitoring of the use of the infrastructureand equipment used to remove SNF from the reactors of dismantled nuclearsubmarines and transport it for treatment;• The development of economic indicators for the dismantlement of ships,actual quantitative and qualitative attributes for the products of dismantlementand the related costs;• Substantiation of a list of priority R&D tasks and coordination of R&Dco-executors working on the comprehensive dismantlement of nuclearsubmarines, ships with nuclear power installations, nuclear service ships andthe environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities, as well asthe management of unsafe nuclear submarines;• Comprehensive radiation and technical inspections of unsafe facilitiesdesignated for dismantlement (nuclear submarines) and environmentalrehabilitation (temporary storage points in Andreeva Bay and the village ofGremikha).271

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 8. Ships with nuclear power installations: the Admiral Lazarevbattlecruiser (left) and the Urals.Figure 9. A storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and solid radioactivewaste at a coastal maintenance base in Andreeva Bay.272

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 10. A storage facility for solid radioactive waste under constructionin Sysoyev Bay, 5,000 m 3 .Main research and development areas• Development of technical solutions and feasibility studies for contingencysituations in the dismantlement process for nuclear submarines, ships withnuclear power installations and nuclear service ships;• Developing technical standards and organizational documents supportingcomprehensive dismantlement and the environmental rehabilitation ofradiation hazards and functioning long-term storage points;• Development and launch of operations of infrastructure facilities and equipmentused in the dismantlement of nuclear submarines and SNF transport;• Development of projects and launching operations at long-term storage pointsfor reactor compartments from nuclear submarines in the Northwest andPacific regions;• Development of an enclosure at Ustrichny Cape for the containment of unsafenuclear submarines.Key strategic issues requiring solutions• The environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities;• Ensuring safe SNF management;• The completion of coastal long-term storage points for reactor compartments inthe regions, the construction of which is currently underway in the Northwestat Sayda Bay thanks to international aid (Germany) and in the Pacific regionin Razboinik Bay thanks to federal budget contributions;• The creation of regional centers for RW consolidation and long-term storage;• Ensuring the safe management of unsafe nuclear submarines and nuclearservice ships, and the creation of coastal storage facilities for unsafe nuclearsubmarines.Main unresolved problems slowing the pace of nuclear submarine dismantlementand the environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities• The lack of railway lines between the Zvezda coastal SNF removal complex273

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYand Smolyaninovo station, which transports SNF for treatment;• The absence of modern regional high-output centers for the conditioning andlong-term storage of RW in Russia’s Northwest and Pacific regions;• The absence of a final solution for selecting the best possible options for themanagement of SNF and RW accumulated at former coastal Naval bases,including defective SNF and SNF from Alpha nuclear submarine reactors; therehabilitation of the buildings and structures of these facilities;• Delays in resolving issues concerning the reconstruction of the bridge throughNikolskoye estuary into the town of Severodvinsk to facilitate the removalof SNF from areas of accumulation and enable operations at the coastal SNFremoval base;• The lack of any operating coastal long-term storage points for reactorcompartments in the Pacific region;• The lack of funds to support the safe shipment of nuclear submarines fromtheir stationed location to dismantlement companies;• The absence of full and reliable information on the quantity, type and stateof SNF and RW in temporary storage facilities, as well as the state of theirbuildings and structures;• The absence of modern methods for the safe management of toxic wastesproduced during the dismantlement of nuclear submarines and ships withnuclear power installations;• The lack of modern regional radiation and environmental monitoringsystems.Priority measures that will help resolve the problems listed above• Comprehensive engineering and radiation surveys of territories, buildings andstructures of former coastal Naval bases and adjacent waters;• The collection and analysis of information on the quantity, type and state of SNFand RW, and the creation of an industrial infrastructure for the rehabilitation offacilities and territories for SNF and RW management;• The development and implementation of projects for the optimum, safemanagement of SNF and RW located in storage facilities belonging to formercoastal Naval bases;• Maintenance of the achieved pace of dismantlement of nuclear submarines,ships with nuclear power installations and nuclear service ships at industrialcompanies;• Completion of the creation of coastal long-term storage points for reactorcompartments;• The reconstruction of railway tracks from Smolyaninovo station to Zvezda(the town of Bolshoy Kamen) to support the railway transport of SNF;• The reconstruction of the bridge through Nikolskoye estuary into the townof Severodvinsk in order to facilitate the removal of SNF from areas ofaccumulation and enable operations at the coastal SNF removal base;• The development of projects and construction of regional centers for radwasteconsolidation and long-term storage;• The creation of coastal enclosures for unsafe nuclear submarines;• The preparation and removal of SNF and the subsequent dismantlement of the274

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYLepse service ship;• The development and implementation of projects to create modern regionalradiation monitoring systems;• The creation and modernization of physical protection systems forcomprehensive dismantlement facilities.275

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe 1954 Nuclear Exercise at the Totskoye Test Range:How is this “Radiation Legacy” Dangerous?Sergei ZelentsovThe Government Institute for Strategic Stability,RosAtom, MoscowVadim LogachevCo-Chairman, Inter-Departmental Expert Commissionfor the Assessment of Radio-Ecological Safety of Full-Scale Experiments, Institute for Bio-Physics, MoscowAnatoliy MatushchenkoCo-Chairman, Interagency Expert Commission underthe Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering,Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom, Professor,MoscowThe Totskoye Nuclear Exercise: The Concept and the ProcessThe leadership of the Soviet Union learned that, in the autumn of 1949, the UnitedStates developed plans for a potential nuclear attack against USSR. One of these —“Operation Dropshot” — involved dropping 300 nuclear bombs on 100 Soviet cities.But, at the time, scientists did not yet fully understand the consequences of this kind ofattack on the perpetrator or on the planet as a whole. However, the consequences of thenuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, were horrifying.Our armed forces in the post-World War Two period, right up to 1953, were equippedonly with standard weapons and military technology used against Hitler’s Germany. Theway our troops were trained and led was based on the experience from the recent war.But intense research was already underway at test ranges and laboratories.In 1953, the USSR’s Army and Navy began to learn about using nuclear weapons.The troops were now being trained in military techniques in the event that nuclearweapons were used. The focus changed to creating missile technology, which was seenas the best means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target.The USSR had already gained experience from eight nuclear tests under Sovietprograms: one on August 29, 1949 (the first above-ground test, 22 kilotons, at theSemipalatinsk test range), two in 1951 (September 24, above ground, 38 kilotons;October 18, an air test (a 42 kiloton bomb was dropped, the explosion took place at aheight of 380 meters — note this one in particular!), five in 1953 (the most powerfulabove-ground test at 400 kilotons, and 4 air tests, ranging from 1.6–28 kilotons).Then another program was adopted in 1954: 10 nuclear tests were to take place overSeptember–November, and one of them was to take place at the Totskoye test range inOrenburg. This test was planned as a tactical exercise where a nuclear bomb would fallas close as possible to a military post.By 1954, the US Air Force boasted over 700 nuclear bombs and had conducted 45nuclear tests, including the bombing of two Japanese cities. What’s important, however,276

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYis that, by 1954 in the United States, eight exercises were conducted using nuclearweapons. At the test range in Yucca Flats, Nevada, during one tactical exercise thatinvolved the use of nuclear weapons under the codename Desert Rock IV, a nucleardevice of 30 kilotons was detonated on the ground. The troops were located 3 km fromthe explosion site. The offensive began eight minutes after the start of the operation.A Decree passed on September 29, 1953 by the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers approved holdingexercises involving the use of nuclear weapons with troops. Due to the difficulty inpreserving the secrecy of the exercise given the involvement of a large number of troops,and the need to select an area that in terms of terrain and plant life was closest to areasin the European part of the USSR, the decision was made to conduct these exercises atthe Totskoye Training and Artillery test range in the South Urals military district. Therange was a flat valley of the Makhova River measuring 15 km long and 2–3 km wide,and featuring shrubbery and wooded areas, with rugged topography on either side (1–3).The theme of the exercises was announced as “Breaking through the enemy’s preparedtactical defense using nuclear weapons” (1).The rugged terrain in the area, marked for the explosion of a 40 kiloton nuclearbomb at a height of 350 meters, was similar to the one conducted on October 18, 1951 atthe Semipalatinsk test range and supported multilateral testing of the impact of a nuclearexplosion on military facilities, equipment and animals and helped identify the effect ofthe terrain and the flora in the area on the spread of the shock wave, radiant flash andpenetrating radiation.The location of villages and settlements in the area of the exercises made it possibleto avoid causing significant harm to the interests of the local population during theexplosion and select a bomber route that would skirt the largest villages and that wouldensure safety as the radioactive cloud moved to the east, north, and northwest.The troops at the exercises were transferred to specially designated personnel groupsin line with the organization adopted in 1954 and provided with new arms and militaryequipment. The fact that the troops were being prepared for the upcoming exercises canbe gleaned from the report document materials: over 380 km of trenches were dug in theareas where the troops were set up, and over 500 dugouts and other shelters were built.In order to conduct research, a special group comprised of six generals, 207 officers,28 servicemen, and 23 soldiers and sergeants was put together. This group also includedrepresentatives from the Sixth Department of the Ministry of Defense, the SemipalatinskTest Range, the Central Scientific Research Institute No. 12, and representatives fromthe Central Departments of the Ministry of Defense, the 71 st test range of the armedforces, SredMash (the predecessor of the Ministry of Nuclear Energy), and even theSoviet Ministry of Culture (3).Some historical background: the Supervisor of this group was the Deputy Managerof Special Training, Lieutenant General V. Bolyako; his Deputies were: Major GeneralM. Kochergin, Major General B. Malyutov of the Engineering Troops, Major GeneralK. Pavlovsky of the Medical Services, Colonels V. Tyutyunnikov, A. Ivanov, and A. Osin,and Colonel Engineer I. Remezov. Scientific Research departments were headed by:Colonel S. Forsten, Colonel N. Smirnov of Medical Services, and Colonel Engineers P.Rusanov and I. Remezov.Colonel Engineer N. Kozin and Captain Engineer S. Zelentsov were assigned the277

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYtask of determining the coordinates and force of the explosion.All of the actions were reviewed and approved by a special commission headed byIvan Kurchatov. This group included: N. Semenov, Member of the Russian Academy ofSciences, M. Sadovsky, Correspondent Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, andGenerals V. Bolyako and B. Malyutov. SredMash was represented by V. Alfyorov andY. Gavrilov. The event was represented by G. Zhukov, Deputy Defense Minister andMarshal of the Soviet Union and V. Malyshev, representing SredMash at the CentralCommittee of the Communist Party and approved by Ruling No. P80/1 passed on August26, 1954 (3).The exercise documents confirm that planned safety measures prevented thedestructive aspects of the nuclear explosion from affecting those involved with radiationexceeding established allowable standards. In particular, this concerned the allowablecontamination levels of those involved and military equipment were lowered severaltimes from the standards that were issued by the Instructions on anti-nuclear defense.The areas of the selected territory with radiation levels over 25 R/hr during the exerciseswere declared prohibited zones, warning signs were posted, and the troops wereinstructed to avoid them. The strict enforcement of all rules and instructions left no riskthat any harm would be caused to the troops.The exercises saw the organization and actual implementation of a new type oftactical military support: anti-nuclear defense. Special attention was paid to engineeringequipment for the premises, dispersing and camouflaging the troops, observing andalerts, and radiation reconnaissance. Nearly 45,000 people, thousands of weapons, tanks,thousands of motor vehicles were sheltered and camouflaged in engineering structures.A site in the valley was designated for the approximate epicenter of the explosion.All other military components of the enemy (“Westerners”) and our front (“Easterners”)were determined relative to the epicenter. On the one side, at a distance of 5 km, a varietyof military equipment was placed: tanks, artillery weapons of varying calibers, airplanesof varying classes, armored vehicles and trucks. In order to evaluate the impact ofdestructive factors of the nuclear explosion on living things, animals were also placed inthe area: sheep, pigs, cows, and horses. A large number of devices were scattered aroundthe premises in order to register the parameters of the nuclear explosion: excess pressurein the shockwave, the fireball and temperature impulses, and the dose of penetratingradiation.Exercise Day: September 14, 1954By 9 AM, the wind was almost westerly, at speeds of 20 m/s. By the time thebomber was en route, the target was covered with medium level cloud cover of 5–7oktas.At 9:33 AM, the bomber was flying at an altitude of 8,000 meters and dropped thenuclear bomb, the explosion of which followed within 48 seconds and took place at aheight of 350 meters, at 280 meters northwest of the target.The explosion was accompanied by a blinding flash, and then followed by anincandescent, luminous area on the site of the explosion that quickly increased in sizeand took the shape of a ball before beginning to transform into an expanding mushroomcloud.Five minutes later, the 20-minute artillery preparation started. Then a bomber278

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYassault was launched.Those monitoring radiation reconnaissance near the epicenter of the explosionarrived in 40 minutes. They established that the level of radiation in that area, one hourafter the explosion, reached 50 R/hr; 25 R/hr within 300 meters of the epicenter, 0.5 R/hr within a 500-meter radius, and 0.1 R/hr within an 850-meter radius. The delimitationof the boundaries of the pollution zone was completed 1.5 hours after the explosion, orprior to the entry of the troops into the polluted zone.At approximately noon, the “Eastern” troops, having begun to enter the tacticaldefense zone and working their way through the fires, entered the area of the nuclearexplosion. The area was unrecognizable: trees had been cleared, only splinters remainedfrom the enormous oaks that had stood there moments before, all of the grass had been“combed” to one side, as if after a flood. During the exercise, nuclear explosions weresimulated twice more and were psychologically perceived as nuclear assaults.At 4 PM the exercises were completed. The lines of soldiers began to make theirway back to the field camps, where concluding operations were conducted to evaluatethe health of the participants and to decontaminate equipment and weapons.That was the USSR Armed Forces’ first experience with troops working underconditions involving the use of nuclear weapons (1–3).Radiation Conditions at the ExercisesImmediately before the “Eastern” troops played their role in the exercises, radiationreconnaissance established that at D+2.5 hours after the explosion, at a distance of 400meters from the epicenter of the explosion, the exposure rate did not exceed 0.1 R/hr. Inother words, moving by foot through the polluted area at an average speed of 4–5 km/hr,the participants could have been exposed to approximately 0.02–0.03 R of radiation, andthose in armored vehicles and tanks would have received 4–8 times less than that.Furthermore, the exposure rate near the nuclear explosion was measured withspecially-installed remote devices. For example at 750 meters from the epicenter, theremote gamma-ray recorded the following measurements: 65 R/hr 2 minutes afterthe explosion; 10 R/hr 10 minutes after the explosion; 2.4 R/hr 25 minutes after theexplosion, and 1.5 R/hr after 50 minutes, due to A1 decay with a half-life of 2.24 minutes.Another important detail: the aircraft that flew over to bomb targets on the ground 21–22minutes after the nuclear bomb were forced to cross through the stem of the mushroomcloud — the barrel of the radioactive cloud. Dosimetric monitoring of the flight staffand the planes after landing indicated insignificant levels of contamination Specifically,the exposure rate from pollution in the plane’s fuselage measured at 0.2–0.3 R/hr, and0.2–0.3 R/hr inside the cabin.The reason is that the exposure rate was measured based on the specific details ofthe explosion with radiation primarily from short-lived, induced-activity radionuclides:isotopes of aluminum, manganese, sodium found in soil. No fission products were foundnear the explosion zone. This conclusion has been confirmed by activity measurementsfrom soil samples from the explosion zone (1–3, 8).Thus, the Totskoye explosion, according to the standard classification system, is anexplosion at the scaled height of burst of 10.2 m/kilotons 1/3 . One of the distinguishingfeatures of these explosions is that despite the connection of the dust column with thecloud of the explosion, the soil and ground lifted from the surface does not react withradioactive products — the fragments of nuclear fuel fission. As a result, the formation279

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYof a source of radioactive pollution takes place only due to the condensation of thevaporized bomb construction materials and the subsequent coagulations of the dropsof the resulting liquid and the concentration of radionuclides therein. The largest sizeof radionuclide particles formed in this manner does not exceed 20–40 µm while themedian mass is 10 µm. These particles are dispersed and fall onto the Earth’s surface atdistances of up to several hundreds — even thousands — of kilometers from the placewhere the explosion takes place. Furthermore, the surface layer of soil in the epicentralzone experiences the impact of a flow of neutron radiation that triggers the activationof chemical elements in the soil. Activated particles in the surface layer of soil are thenpulled into the disturbed area of the atmosphere, and subsequently fall from the dustcolumn onto the areas closest to the epicenter as determined by the air current in thesurface atmosphere.On September 14, 1954, the fireball at the epicenter caused the moisture in thesoil to evaporate and incinerated organic substances, causing the ground to crack andcrumble. The result was the widespread formation of smoke and dust in the surfacelayer of the atmosphere and, as a result, a considerable decrease in visibility. This layerswallowed up part of the energy of the fireball and quickly heated up to 800°K within aradius of up to 1 km. As time passed, the temperature of the fireballs began to fall, andwithin 3.6 seconds, the surface began to grow dark and was marked by a number ofbright spots that began to spread and grow and soon encompassed the entire area. Thisis where it stopped expanding, and where the stage in which the explosion cloud beganto take shape and, triggered by the rising vortex flows, began to move upward into theupper layers of the atmosphere. Following the cloud, the dust column began to risefrom the epicentral zone. Having reached the cloud in 4–5 seconds, it lent the typicalmushroom shape. As it continued to rise, the upper part of the cloud was covered with awhite layer of condensed steam, which gradually enveloped the entire cloud and beganto pull inward, taking the shape of a bell. In one minute, the explosion cloud had shotup to a height of 4 km, and within 7 minutes, it had reached 15 km. In 15–20 minutesafter the explosion, the explosion cloud and the dust column began to disperse towardthe east (2, 3, 8).As a result of this process a 210 km “local” trail of the cloud also took shape.Radiation reconnaissance conducted by a Li-2 plane has established that the axis ofthe trail passes through the first 70 km along a 70° bearing, then an 84° bearing, whichcoincided with the trajectory of the drift of the air mass at a height of 7–9 km (8).In a period of 30 minutes to 24 hours, radiation reconnaissance indicated that thelevel of radiation at the epicenter was measured as 54 Mn (T d.p.= 2.58 hr) and 24 Na (T d.p.=14.96 hr). That means that the individual radiation dose received by exercise participantswould not have exceeded the allowable level (0.5 rem) for the category of people whowork permanently or temporarily with sources of ionizing radiation. Even if we wereto hypothetically state that all of the exercise participants (44,000 people) had enteredthe epicentral zone and each of them had received a dose of 2 rem, in this situationthe collective dose would be 88,000 rem, which is the maximum surplus of induced,radiation-caused cancerous illnesses over the spontaneous level of 0.8%. Given thenatural, non-recurrent volatility of the frequency of cancerous diseases up to over 50%lies below the acceptable risk level for society and cannot be singled out from studyingmedical statistics. Furthermore, document analyses have shown that no more than 1% ofthe exercise participants entered the explosion zone.280

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYLet us also consider the radiation conditions along the “local” and “distant” trailsof radioactive fallout that were formed by sources such as the dust column (inducedactivityradionuclides, particles from the surface layer of soil from the epicentral zone)and the upper part of the cloud (radionuclides produced in fragmentation, and particlesfrom the bomb’s construction materials).The local radioactive trail (within 210 km — the trail of the dust column) causedradiation conditions described by the data received as the result of direct measurementsfrom radiation reconnaissance (2, 3, 8 and 9). Processing these data based on mathematicalmodeling of the trail formation process in line with weather conditions and consideringthe radionuclide content of neutron activation products has shown that the maximumexposure rate (within 70 km from the epicenter) does not exceed 1.3 rem, while thecontribution of internal radiation is less than 5% (9).The distant trail of fallout was formed by the drifting of the explosion cloud in anortheastern direction. Mathematical modeling of this process has shown that radioactiveproduct fallout produced by fragmentation took place at a distance of up to hundreds ofkilometers from the explosion site, as a result of which radioactive pollution affectedthe territory of Western Siberia and resulted in a maximum accumulated dose of 0.1 remon the territory of the northern parts of the town of Krasnoyarsk. This is considerablylower than the amounts of radiation received by the population (Category B) set out inthe NRB-76/87 Radiation Safety Standards. The density of the pollution in the area bykey irradiating radionuclides ( 137 Сs, 90 Sr) is considerably lower — approximately by 60times — than the background levels that are typical for this region (4–7).Impressions of Radioecological Conditions: The Opinions of Interested PartiesIn line with a request from Mr. Chernyshev, Deputy of the Armed Forces of theRSFSR, which was originally initiated by the requests from veterans for benefits for thevictims of radiation effects following the Totskoye explosion (4, 5), RSFSR PresidentBoris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 40-rp on September 13, 1991 on protective measuresfor the residents of the Gorno-Altaisk Republic, Altaisk Krai and the Orenburg Oblastand those residing on the territories located within the zone affected by nuclear tests.A similar decree (No. 1041-r) was issued by the RSFSR Council of Ministers onSeptember 20, 1991. In order to enforce these decrees, it was necessary to evaluate theradiation and health conditions in these regions. This task was assigned to a commissionthat included representatives of the RSFSR’s GosKomGidromet, the Committeefor Eliminating the Consequences of Accidents at the Chernobyl NPP, the RSFSRMinistry of the Environment and Natural Resources, the Ministry for Health and SocialWelfare, the Government Committee for Health and Medical Monitoring, the CentralMilitary Medical Department, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the GovernmentCommittee for the Environment and Natural Resource Management. The members ofthis commission studied the documents available at the center and on location, such asin the Orenburg Oblast, on the Totskoye exercises and visited the Totskoye area. Theydrew the following conclusions (6, 7):• In all of the villages and settlements in the Totskoye, Buzuluk, and SorochinskRayons, the radiation conditions were deemed to be at normal naturalbackground levels and safe for the residents;• A retrospective analysis of the situation showed that calculated radiation dosescould not have affected the health of the people residing in the areas that were281

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYexamined;• The state of health of the residents of the areas that were examined, accordingto current key medical demographic data, are in line with average Oblastindicators, including oncological diseases and birth defects, and are no higherthan these levels in the control regions of the Oblast and of the RSFSR ingeneral.Furthermore, the members of the commission noted that the results of many yearsof observations of radiation conditions in the Orenburg Oblast have made it possible todraw a conclusion regarding the lack of “any local impact on the environment near theSemipalatinsk test range.”It should be noted that almost a year before these instructions were issued, in June1990, the radiation health experts at LenNII scientific research institute had conducted aradioecological study of the territory near the Totskoye exercises under the supervisionof the deputy head of the laboratory, Mr. Prokofiev (5). The report was objectively basedon the results of measurements of the exposure rate on-site, as well as radio-chemicalanalyses of environmental elements and samples from locally produced food productsand feed to determine their 137 Cs and 90 Sr content. Measurements of the exposure rateand collection of samples were conducted in villages and settlements near the epicenterof the nuclear explosion. The village of Novosergievka was chosen as a control point, asits territory did not feature any radioactive fallout after the Totskoye test.In the end, the researchers drew the following conclusion: as of 1990, any additionalexposure received by the residents of the areas adjacent to the Totskoye test range, wherean airborne nuclear bomb was detonated on September 14, 1954, is almost completelyabsent (5). Naturally, this report was submitted to the Chief State Medical Officer of theOrenburg Oblast, Mr. Vereschagin, who confirmed his consent and support by signingthe report.Everything seemed clear enough — but it wasn’t. In 1992, Tamara Zlotnikova,a Deputy of the Russian State Duma representing the 132nd district of Orenburgand school biology teacher, came onto the scene. She demanded that letters be madepublic by the higher authorities — letters that allegedly contained information aboutthe poor health condition of the residents of Orenburg due to the consequences of theexplosion at the Totskoye test range nearly 40 years prior. Her goal was to involve theOblast Administration and the management of the Orenburg medical Academy in thepreparations for a project to undertake a set of urgent measures to improve the healthof the local population and support social and economic development of the villagesin the Orenburg Oblast located within the zone affected by nuclear tests and peacefulunderground nuclear explosions. Soon, this project was approved by V. Vekhovy,the Head of the Oblast Administration. The project was comprised of five courses ofaction:1. Rehabilitating public health and improving healthcare services in the OrenburgOblast;2. Ensuring a greater general level of radiation safety for the population of theOrenburg Oblast;3. Investigating potential exposure to hazardous radiation effects of the populationof the Orenburg Oblast in the past, as well as any other effects that couldexplain the damage done to the health of local residents, including the generalenvironmental conditions in the Oblast (including scientific research);282

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY4. Taking measures to provide social protection for the local population;5. Major construction and investments.The appendix to the document provided the scientific grounds of the document.In just two years (1994–1995), RUB 772.2 million and USD 78.5 million wererequested. Incidentally, Professor Boyev, Doctor of Medical Sciences, CorrespondentMember of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Head of the Orenburg StateMedical Academy’s General Health Division was an active participant in the scientificsubstantiation for the “urgent measures” project. He is also one of the authors of thebook “Anthropogenic Pollution of the Environment and the Health of the Residents ofEast Orenburg” (10).The repeated requests submitted by Ms. Zlotnikova to the country’s authorities,scientists and scientific specialists at the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Ministry andMinistry of Health over the course of several years since her arrival in the Duma,including securing the status of Chairwoman of the Environmental Committee, weremet with a variety of report-type answers that provide assessments of the radiationconditions in the territory of the Orenburg Oblast, which in principle differ from thenegative assessments provided by the authors of the narrow-minded program.As the flames of this fire were being fanned, Russia’s Ministry for EmergencySituations, acting as a kind of arbitration court, submitted a set of documents for reviewby the Russian Scientific Commission for Radiation Protection (RNKRZ) (No. 6-41/156of January 22, 1996), including:• A draft of a 1996–1997 Program of urgent medical and public health measuresto improve the health of the local population of the Orenburg Oblast living nearthe area affected by the Totskoye nuclear explosion, and related expenses;• A reference report substantiating the project’s program from the OrenburgOblast Administration;• A draft of a decree issued by the Government of Russia on the program’sapproval.The RNKRZ basically denied the substantiation of the petitioners as scientificallyunfounded. The program was not adopted.The Oblast Administration, caving in to Ms. Zlotnikova’s persistent lobbying,decided to hold one scientific conference in Orenburg on the Medical and EnvironmentalAspects of the Consequences of the Totskoye Nuclear Explosion. The conferencewas held October 21–23, 1996 at the Optical Micro-Surgery International ScientificConference Hall and essentially resulted in nothing. Over the two days of the conference,7 reports and 25 statements were heard. The main report was the first: “Problems inAssessing Radiation Conditions and the Health of the Population in the Zone of theTotskoye Nuclear Explosion,” by V. Boyev, N. Vereschagin, S. Lebedkova, A. Rusanov,and Y. Kopylov. This report was based on materials from the aforementioned book (10),which had been released to coincide with the opening of the conference. In this work, theauthors attempted to prove the damaging blow dealt to the health of the population by thenuclear explosion with data on the population’s mortality rate: “Comparative mortalitydata of the Orenburg Oblast population from 1995 through 1991,” and “Mortalityindicators from malignant tumors among the residents of various areas in the OrenburgOblast (per 100,000 residents) from 1970 through 1991.” What can a person say aboutthese data? The reactions were simple:1. The medical statistics and data on the reasons for the mortality rate given283

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe absence of regular autopsies to confirm diagnoses must not be used forscientific research, not to mention to draw any significant conclusions. Thiswas set out by a special set of instructions issued by the USSR’s Ministry ofHealth.2. The book and the report include average mortality indicators for malignanttumors “throughout the Oblast,” which do not match up with “Rayon”-basedindicators. For example, in 1975, almost all of the Rayon indicators were lowerthan average Oblast-wide indicators, which points to the total absence of thereliability of these very significant indicators. These data can essentially beused to prove anything. That is why the data thrown about in the book cannotin the least be used to establish the level of impact caused by radiation factorsin the so-called “affected areas” of Buzuluksky, Sorochinsky, and Totskoye.3. The average increase in the mortality rate in the Oblast due to malignanttumors (103.6 in 1970, 173 in 1991 — per 100,000 residents) is equal toapproximately 3.5% per year, which matches up with the average nationalRussian indicators and the average figures for other European countries.4. Even in the central Orenburg area of the Oblast, the indicators are rife withdiscrepancies: in 1980, the mortality level was equal to 55.4 per 100,000residents, and in ten years, that number became 227.5 per 100,000, i.e., itchanged five times over. What does that then say about the “provincial”regions of the Oblast? There was no such this indicator did not change at allin the Yasnensky district.And another interesting fact: all of the mortality rate indicators for the population ofthe Orenburg Oblast after 1990 began to increase markedly. The reason is that the massmedia began at that time to fervently discuss the harmful impact of the Totskoye nuclearexplosion on the health of the Oblast’s residents. The responses noted above testify tothe irrefutable fact that the conclusions that are drawn in the book — and in most of thereports presented at the conference — cannot be trusted (11).In summary, in reviewing problems connected to the Totskoye explosion at theconference, it was once again proven that, unfortunately, poorly qualified representatives,who have their own interests at stake, are often the ones taking a populist approachto framing and solving complex problems. We’re lucky if they are only genuinelymistaken; these people do not want to hear what the experts have to say, and are clearlyopportunists (12, 13). Substantial funds were spent in vain by the government on theaforementioned conference. The conference only served to agitate the public and misleadpeople with regard to their expectations of receiving a variety of benefits or reparations.But the experts already knew what would happen (4–9): all of the decisions made at theconference remained only “wishes.” At least this prevented the irresponsible spendingof considerable funds, and most importantly, the people of the Orenburg Oblast havebeen calmed after having been recklessly punished by “radiophobia” under the influenceof a “biology” teacher with immunity privileges and opportunities to lobby for her ownambitions.Having demonstrated total incompetence in her official capacity, Ms. Zlotnikovahas faded into the background and has been off our radar for a long time.Moreover, this story has its own “curiosities”: for example, one of the dissertations,“A Radioecological and Genetic Assessment of the Long-Term Effects of the TotskoyeNuclear Explosion” deserves attention. It was presented by A. Korneyev under the284

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYscientific guidance of V. Boyev, the results of which, according to page 16 of thedissertation, “…have been included in the Russian Government’s project for urgentmedical and public health measures…” The scientific weight of the work is clearlyrevealed by the following passage: “Considering the experience that has been gainedin rehabilitating the territories that fell within the zone of the Chernobyl NPP disaster,one can propose the following measures: organizing food provisions for the residentsof the epicentral zone of the Totskoye nuclear explosion…by supplying foodstuffs tothe area… and, finally, resettlement into environmentally clean and healthy regions.”And that is what is proposed 43 years after an airborne nuclear bomb? Even amateursknow fairly well that, if the epicentral zone on the territory of the Totskoye test range,which is used only for artillery exercises, and not for residential housing, is practicallybereft of any local pollution, then, naturally, the local food products produced at asignificant distance from said zone where villages and settlements are located wouldmeet public health standards. This is supported by data from the Oblast ScientificProduction Veterinary Laboratory and research materials approved by N. Vereschagin,the Chief State Health Officer of the Orenburg Oblast. That is why Mr. Korneyev’srecommendation to “organize food provisions for the residents of the epicentral zone ofthe Totskoye nuclear explosion by supplying foodstuffs to the area” is both unscientificand immoral (2, 3).The Totskoye Test Range TodayThe most recent, in-depth examination of the test range’s territory was conductedin July 1994 under a program to prepare for joint peacekeeping exercises. Thepreparations were conducted by a joint group of Russian and American experts. Duringthe examination, a large number of measurements of gamma-radiation exposure wastaken, 38 soil samples were collected, and air samples from the surface layer of theatmosphere were taken as well. Furthermore, the flows of alpha-beta-gamma radiationwere measured along the surface of the soil as well as at a depth of up to 20 centimeters.The control points were the epicentral zone and several different spots on the test range’sterritory (9). The following was established:• The exposure rate in the epicentral zone and at other control points did notexceed 20 µR/hr, i.e., the levels were within natural radiation backgroundfluctuations;• Soil samples from the epicentral zone contained an extremely minimal numberof radionuclides that are typically the products of neutron activation (such as152,154Eu and 60 Co);137• The presence of Cs in soil samples and the nature of its distribution deeperin the soil are the same as global levels;40• K content is well within the range for average content in black earth samples,equal to 410 Bq/kg;239,240• There are no anomalies with regard to the distribution of Pu throughoutthe territory of the test site, attributed to global fallout.In order to evaluate the internal radiation dose received by the inhalation ofradionuclides, data were used on the mass concentration and physical and chemicalproperties of dust, as well as the results of determining the maximum specific activityof radionuclides in the surface soil level. Calculations were used to establish that theexternal exposure rate due to the effects of the radiation background (= 20 µR/hr) will285

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYbe 140 times higher than the internal exposure rate due to the effects of incorporatinganthropogenic radionuclides (9). This is a kind of opposition to the conclusions thatwere presented in Mr. Korneyev’s dissertation, defended at the Orenburg State MedicalAcademy on March 27, 1997, and which contained unfounded, clearly “commissioned”scare tactics with regard to the “radiation legacy” of the Totskoye nuclear test which, wewould like to repeat once again, took place over 40 years ago.But what really poses a danger to the health of the people of our country, and to thepeople of the Orenburg Oblast in particular?The answer is unequivocal: the low living standards and poor social protection thestate of the environment, and other factors. And no matter how much we want to, we mustadmit that is it not radiation; radiation’s effects on the human body have been studiedin more detail than the impact of other harmful factors, yet it is only in the top thirty ofthese harmful factors (14, 15) — and is the main reason behind the deteriorating healthof the population? Frankly speaking, it is high time that we stop blaming everythingon radiation. We must increase living standards and education among the people of thecountry, improve social provisions, lower the level of pollution caused by toxic chemicalagents in the air, water, food products and the environment in general. We must stampout our bad habits, and so on. In our opinion, people are already beginning to understandthis position.References1. Nuclear Tests in the USSR [ Yaderniye ispytaniya SSSR]. Volume 1. Chapter 6.V. Mikhailov, et al. Sarov, RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 1997, 286: ill.2. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. Modern Radiological Conditions at Test Ranges[Yaderniye ispytaniya SSSR. Sovremennoye radiologicheskoye sostoyaniye poligonov].Chapter 7. V. Logacheva, et al. Moscow: IzdAT, 2002. 639: ill.3. Nuclear Tests. The Totskoye Military Exercises [ Yaderniye ispytaniya.Totskoye voiskovoye ucheniye]. Book 2. S. Zelentsov et al. Moscow: Kartush Publishing,2006. 197: ill.4. Smirnov, Y., Prokofiev, O., Vereschagin, N. and others. A Report on theResults of the Work of the Commission Organized by Decree of the Council of Ministersof the RSFSR in line with requests from A. Chernyshev, People’s Deputy [Spravka porezultatam raboty komissii, organizovannoi po rasporyazheniyu SM RSFSR v sootvetstviis zaprosom narodnogo deputata RSFSR Cherysheva A.A.]. GNTs-IBF Fund, 1990.55. Prokofiev, O.N. A Report on the Radiation Conditions in the Sorochinsk,Totskoye, and Buzuluksk Rayons of the Orenburg Oblast [Spravka o radiatsionnoiobstanovke v Sorochinskom, Totskom i Buzulukskom rayonakh Orenburgskoi oblasti].GNTs-IBF Fund, 1990. 76. Bubliy, S. Meskikh, N., Meshkov, N., and others. A Report on the Results ofan Environmental Examination of the Territory of the Gorno-Ataisk Soviet SocialistRepublic, the Altai Krai and the Orenburg Oblast [Doklad o resultatakh ekologicheskoiekspertizy territoriy Gorno-Altaiskoi SSR, Altaiskogo kraya i Orenburgskoi oblasi].GNTs-IBF Fund, 1992. 187. Logachev, B.A. An Analysis of Data on Medical and Biological Researchand an Assessment of the Health of the High-Risk Population in the Chelyabinsk,Bryansk and Orenburg Oblasts Living in the Areas Affected by Radiation. An AnalyticalOverview [Analyz dannikh o medico-biologicheskikh issledovaniyakh i otsenke zdorovya286

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYkriticheskikh group naseleniya Chelyabinskoi, Bryanskoi i Orenburgskoi Oblastei,prozhivayuschikh v rayonakh radiatsionnikh vozdeystviy. Analitichesky obzor]. GNTs-IBF Fund, 1992. 448. Matushchenko, A.M., Sudakov, V.V., Khmel, S.I., and others. The ExpertsSpeak: Assessing the Radiation Consequences of the Nuclear Explosion of the TotskoyeMilitary Exercises [Svidetelstvuyut spetsialist: otsenivaya radiatsionniye posledstviyaatomnogo vzryva na Totskom uchenii]. Information Bulletin from TsNII-AtomInform,1993. No. 9, 68–72.9. Dyachenko, V.I., Kazantsev, V.V., Martakov, Y.P., Semenovikh, S.V. TheRadiation Conditions in the Area of the Nuclear Explosion on the Totskii Test Rangeon September 14, 1954 [Radiatsionnaya obstanovka v rayone yadernogo vzryva,osuschestvlyonnogo na Totskom poligone 15 sentyabrya 1954 g.]. Information Bulletinfrom TsNII-AtomInform, 1995. No. 5–6, 44–47.10. Boyev, V.M., Boyalnik, M.N. Anthropogenic Pollution of the Environmentand the Health of the Residents of East Orenburg [Antropogennoye zagryazneniyeokruzhayuschei sredi i sostoyaniye zdorovya naseleniya Vostochnogo Orenburzhya].Orenburg, 1995. 12711. Guskova, A.K. A Statement on the Clinical Section on the Boyev Reporton the Radioecological and Medical Assessment of the Consequences of the TotskoyeNuclear Explosion [Zaklyucheniye po klinicheskomu razdelu spravki Boyeva V.M.“Radioekologicheskaya i meditsinskaya otsenka posledstviy Totskogo yadernogovzryva]. GNTs-IBF Fund, 1997. 212. Smelayakova, T. The Crime that was Declared a Feat [ Prestupleniye,nazvannoye podvigom]. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 14, 1994.13. Zlotnikova, T.V. An Open Letter to Scientists and Nuclear Power Experts[Otkrytoye pismo k uchyonym i spetsialistam atomnoi energetiki]. Atom-Press, March1996, No. 9.14. Radiation. Doses, Effects, and Risks. Translation from the English. Moscow:Mir, 1988. 7915. Andreyev, F. A Diagnoses by Mathematicians. The Health of SocietyDetermines the Quality of Life [Diagnoz stavyat matematiki. Kachestvo zhizniopredelyayet sostoyaniye zdorovya obschestva]. Izvestiya, June 29, 2001.287

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYResolving Radiation Safety Problems in the Kurgan OblastIvan ManiloDirector, Kurgan Public Outreach and InformationOffice, Green Cross Russia, andMember, Russian Environmental AcademyLyudmila Ponomareva and Aleksandr RevyakinShadrinsk State Pedagogical InstituteThe accident at Mayak in 1957 and the many years of dumping radioactive wasteinto the Techa River before the accident have not only left the territory infested withradioactivity, but it has also left a permanent mark on the memories of more than onegeneration. For more than 50 years, the consequences of radiation pollution of the naturalenvironment continue to impact the health of those residing in the area, as well as thesocioeconomic conditions of the affected territory. The lands of five different districtsin the Kurgan Oblast have been subjected to radioactive effects, and two in particular— located along the Techa River — have borne the brunt of the impact (DalmatovskyRayon and Kataisky Rayon).The results of the accident continue to be relevant today. Higher morbidity rates ofa variety of illnesses have been observed among local residents. According to scientistsand experts from the Urals National Medical Academy for Continued Education and thesix years of experience in working with this problem under the Chelyabinsk-HanfordProject (Chelyabinsk), the medical implications of the accident are still unclear; theexamination of the residents of radiation-polluted areas was started late, and earlystudies were superficial and selective (1).According to data from the Department for Land Remediation under the Oblast’sGovernment, the average annual activity volumes of 90 Sr in the river’s water exceedsby 2–3 times the intervention level in drinking water and by 1,700–2,000 times overthe background radiation levels found in rivers in Russia (2). The Iset River’s averageannual level of radioactivity does not exceed radioactivity safety standards, althoughthey are still higher than the nationwide average by 250–480 times.The territories of the Kurgan Oblast that have been subjected to the effects ofradiation cover 95 towns and villages with over 140,000 people, in addition to 300,000hectares of arable land, and roughly 100,000 hectares of forest land. In the late 1950sand early 1960s, the populations of five towns were fully evacuated due to radioactivepollution. Another eight towns and villages underwent partial evacuation. The residentsof nine towns and villages located on the banks of the Techa River were exposed toradiation in doses measuring over 7 rem. At present, ten of the villages near the TechaRiver are home to 5,300 people, while the 77 towns and villages near the Iset River arehome to approximately 100,000 people.People began to speak openly about the Mayak accident and the consequencesof years of the unregulated dumping of radioactive wastes in the Techa River after theChernobyl disaster. Openness with regard to the implications of the accident and itsscale stimulated all levels of authorities to take action. In the early 1990s, a Federal288

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTarget Program (FTP) was drafted to overcome the consequences of Mayak operations.However, the period allotted for this project coincided with an extremely difficultperiod for the national economy. Financing the FTP was a disaster. The volume offederation investment in new constructions in 1993–1995 was at just 2–3%, and therewas no funding in 1997.Starting in 2002, the next, third FTP was put into place: overcoming the consequencesof radiation accidents, a program that was scheduled to run until 2010.One of the most complex issues is providing those in need of improved livingconditions with well-built homes.After the Oblast Government appealed to the Government Chairman and theRussian President several times, the federal budget for 2008–2010 finally earmarkedRUB 3 billion in funds for remediation efforts in the Kurgan Oblast.Today, as before, the source of a potential radiation accident and additional radiationeffects on the environment and the public of the five districts located near the Techa andIset Rivers is the Techa Reservoir, while the polluted valley of the Techa River and theAsanov Swamp are sources of secondary radioactive pollution.The factors that must be considered in resolving radiation safety problems in theKurgan Oblast are:• The complex socio-economic situation (the Oblast is subsidized);• The existence of a facility for the storage and destruction of chemical weaponsin the Oblast’s Northwest area, where the most highly five districts affected byradiation are located;• The set of regulatory legal acts that have been developed do not meet theneeds of the actual socio-economic and environmental conditions.In addition to the above, it is the opinion of the Oblast Government that it willbe impossible to overcome the consequences of the Mayak radiation accident byimplementing just one FTP (2).Today, the residents are concerned about a number of questions. These questionsare asked by visitors to Green Cross Russia’s Public Outreach and Information Offices(POIOs), and the participants of lectures and discussions, which are held regularly byGCR’s regional division.Some of these questions are:• What is being done to prevent another accident at Mayak?• What will be done with the enormous amount of radioactive waste that iscurrently located in the Chelyabinsk Oblast?• When will we start to see the regular supply of environmentally clean foodproducts and radiation monitoring for the people who live in polluted areas?• When will the living conditions be improved, and when will conditions be putinto place that will ensure satisfactory quality of life?In order to get remediation efforts going, one of the most important factors isenvironmental education, for both governmental and public structures.The complex environmental situation in the Northwest area of the Kurgan Oblast,the radioactive pollution of the land, and the existence of a CWD facility have becomesome of the priority issues being worked on at higher education institutions in the TransUrals (Kurgan State University, the Maltsev State Agricultural Academy, ShadrinskState Pedagogical Institute). These issues have influenced the selection of the key tasksby a number of leading public environmental organizations in the Oblast (the Kurgan289

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYregional affiliates of GCR, the Russian Environmental Academy, the Kurgan ScienceCenter under the International Academy of Environmental Sciences and Public Safety).These include (2, 3, 4):• The combined efforts of regional and municipal authorities toward eliminatingthe consequences of the effects of radiation in the Oblast;• Examining the effects of radiation factors on a variety of social groups and agegroups among the local population;• The problems and solutions for making agricultural and livestock technologiesmore environmentally friendly;• Educational and consulting work with the public on issues related to potentialaccidents and catastrophes and the possible consequences of the radioactivepollution of areas near the Chelyabinsk Oblast.In October 2007, the regional GCR POIOs, the Russian Environmental Academyand the Kurgan Science Center under the International Academy for EnvironmentalSciences and Public Safety, with assistance from the Oblast Government and ShadrinskState Pedagogical Institute, held a scientific conference dedicated to today’s problemsin setting up and developing a system for dealing with the consequences of the 1957Mayak accident and public education for those living in regions affected by radiation. Abook was published containing the results of the conference (2).In terms of public environmental education, GCR, the Russian EnvironmentalAcademy and the Kurgan Science Center (Members of Presidiums and Members of theBoards who are leading scientists and highly qualified experts from the Trans Urals) readlectures, hold discussions, and conduct targeted scientific research (3, 4).The subjects of the lectures and discussions include a wide range of problems andspecific tasks that require decisions with regard to remediation efforts:• An assessment of the environmental damages that have been inflicted byindustrial and business operations in a number of districts in the Oblast due tounauthorized dumping of radioactive waste in the Techa River, which is stillthe most radioactively polluted river in Russia;• Carrying out federal and Oblast target programs for remediation efforts;• The efforts of executive and legislative authorities of the Kurgan Oblast anda number of districts with regard to eliminating the consequences of radiationon public health;• The approaches and methods for building socially safe behavior skills forthose living in areas affected by radioactive pollution.In order to ensure safe living conditions in the Techa River valley, protect theenvironment and prevent catastrophic implications for the Iset-Tobol-Ob river system,we must not only stabilize the level of the Techa Reservoir as soon as possible, but alsolower it and fully eliminate the radwaste storage ponds that are the sources of radioactivepollution in the Chelyabinsk Oblast. Accidents similar to the Mayak disaster are amongthe main reasons holding back the widespread construction of NPPs (5).References1. Sharov, V. B. Environmental Education for the Public and Experts under theChelyabinsk-Hanford Project [Ekologicheskoye obrazovaniye naseleniya i spetsialistovv programme obschestvennogo obyedineniya].. Sharov, V. B. Public EnvironmentalEducation and Training: Papers from the IV International Conference on Environmental290

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYEducation. Edited by Moiseyev, N. N., Russian Academy of Sciences.–M.: MNEPU,1998. 314–317.2. Overcoming the Consequences of the Mayak Accident in the Kurgan Oblast(Problems and Solutions) (Overcoming the Consequences of the 1957 Mayak RadiationAccident) [Preodoleniye posledstiviy avarii na PO “Mayak” v Kurganskoi oblasti(problemy i resheniya) (predoleniye posledsvtiy radiatsionnoi avarii na PO “Mayak”].Papers from the Science Practicum / Conference. Edited by: Bukhtoyarov, A. I., Manilo,I. I., Ponomareva, L. I. Kurgan-Shadrinsk, the Shadrinsk State Pedagogical Institute,2007. 185.3. Kobyakova, T. I. An Environmental Assessment of Surface and Ground Watersand Snow Cover in the Northwest Area of the Kurgan Oblast [Ekologicheskaya otsenkapoverkhnostnikh, podzemnikh vod i snezhnogo pokrova severo-zapadnoi tekhnogennoiprovintsii Kurganskoi oblasti]. Dissertation for Candidacy in Biological Science.Yekaterinburg, 2005. 133 pages.4. Kuschedva, O. V. An Assessment of the Anthropogenic Pollution of Water,Soil, Feed, and Cow’s Milk by the Agricultural Companies of the Shchuchansk Rayon inthe Kurgan Oblast [Otsenka tekhnogennogo zagryazneniya vod, pochv, kormov i molokakorov selskokhozyaqsetvenikh predpriyatiy Schuchanskogo rayona Kurganskoi oblasti].Dissertation for candidacy in Biological Sciences. Yekaterinburg, 2005. 148 pages.5. Manilo, I. I. Restoring Trust in Nuclear Energy — Relevant Problems Today[Vosstanovleniye doveriya k yazernoi energetike – aktualnaya problema sovermennosti].Manilo, I. I., Usmanov, V. V, Manilo, I. I. Overcoming the Consequences of the MayakAccident in the Kurgan Oblast (Problems and Solutions) (Overcoming the Consequencesof the 1957 Mayak Radiation Accident): Papers from the Scientific Practicum /Conference. Edited by: Bukhtoyarov, A. I., Manilo, I. I., Ponomareva, L. I. Kurgan-Shadrinsk, the Shadrinsk State Pedagogical Institute, 2007. 177–184.291

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYComprehensive Radioecological Examination of the Territoriesand Surrounding Waters near Nuclear Submarine Stationingand Dismantlement PointsComprehensive radioecological examinations of territories and water areas nearnuclear submarine stationing points and dismantlement facilities beyond the boundariesof health protection zones (HPZ) are carried out regularly by Rosgidromet divisionsunder the management of Typhoon Company (Table 1). This report provides informationon the radiation monitoring systems in the Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and Kamchatkaoblasts, as well as in Primorsky Krai — all regions in which nuclear submarines arebeing dismantled. This report also includes a summary of regular observations offacilities that pose radiation hazards, including: volumetric activity (VA) of radioactivesubstances in the surface layer of the atmosphere, fallout onto the Earth’s surface, tritiumcontent in precipitation, VA of 90 Sr in the sea, and the exposure rate of gamma-radiationin 2003–2007 compared to data for all of Russia. These data indicate that the content ofradioactive substances in the natural environment on the territories adjacent to facilitiesthat present a radiation hazard outside of HPZ are no different from average levels acrossthe country and are significantly lower than the allowable levels set out in RadiationSafety Standards NRB-99 (see Tables 2 and 3).Table 1. The Structure of Rosgidromet’s Stationary Monitoring Networkin the Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Kamchatka Oblasts and Primorsky KraiRegionExposurerateSergey VakulovskiyDeputy Director, Typhoon Company, Obninsk,Kaluzhskaya OblastV. Kim, M. Propisnova, A. Nikitin, I. Katrich, V.Chumichyov, A. VolokitinTyphoon Company, Obninsk, Kaluzhskaya OblastObservation type, number of pointsAtmosphericfalloutVA inthe air3H inprecipitation90Sr in theoceanArkhangelskOblast*34 9 2 1 5MurmanskOblast35 9 3 1 1KamchatkaOblast12 7 - 1 1Primorsky31 10 1 - -Krai**Notes:* In addition to the observations noted in this table, monitoring is conductedannually in the Arkhangelsk Oblast to measure the content of radioactive substances in292

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe bottom sediments near the city of Severodvinsk in Dvinsk Bay of the White Sea;** In addition to those noted in this table, field studies are being conducted inPrimorsky Krai’s territories along Chazhma Bay, in addition to data collection in thePeter the Great Gulf.Table 2. A Summary of Data on Radioecological Conditionsin the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts, 2003–2007Zones within 100 km ofradiation hazardsYearExposure rate, μR/hr∑β,×10 -5Bq/m 3137Cs,×10 -7Bq/m 3VA of radionuclides in the air90Sr,×10 -7Bq/m 37Ве,×10 -5Bq/m 3∑β,Bq/m 2 ×DayRadionuclide fallout137Cs,Bq/m 2 ×YearVA of 3 Н in precipitationBq/LVA of 90 Sr in sea watermBq/LSevmash 1 2006 11 3.8 2.3 0.45 191 0.77 0.41 2.0 3.62003 11 3.7 2.6 0.51 153 0.61 0.48 2.2 3.4Arkhangelsk 2004 11 4.2 2.1 0.69 166 0.63 0.37 2.1 3.8Oblast, 2005 11 3.9 2.3 0.44 184 0.77 0.27 2.2 3.42007 11 4.2 4.4 0.41* 188 0.74 0.29 2.0 3.0MurmanskOblast 1, 2 2005 8 7.9 1.6 0.17 102 1.53 1.0 1.8 2.02003 11 6.7 1.5 0.45 75 0.82 0.96 2.4 3.62004 10 5.3 1.7 0.08 82 0.67 0.71 1.9 2.82006 9 6.1 1.1 0.17 61 1.28 0.43 1.9 2.32007 9 4.3 0.55 0.046* 112 1.26 0.36 1.9 2.1Russia 3 2006 10.8 2.8 0.90 223 1.0 0.55 2.82003 10.1 4.2 1.36 205 0.9 0.63 2.5Averagedata for2004 10.4 3.2 1.19 210 1.0 0.67 2.4all of 2005 13.2 3.5 0.87 221 1.0 0.54 2.82007 9.7 4.6 0.71** 253 1.0 0.32 2.4Notes:1. The VA of radionuclides in the air in the Arkhangelsk Oblast is shown for thecity of Severodvinsk, and the city of Murmansk for the Murmansk Oblast.2. For the Murmansk Oblast, data are shown for zones beyond the 100-km zoneof the Kola NPP.293

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY3.The VA and fallout in the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts is comparableto the average data for European Russia.* Data over three quarters; ** Data over two quarters.In 2006, under a joint Russia-Norwegian monitoring project to study theradioactive pollution of the Barents Sea, work began on tracking trends in radiationconditions, both in the coastal regions of the Barents as well as in the open sea.Zones within 100 kmof radiation hazardsKamchatkaOblastTable 3. A Summary of Data on Radioecological Conditionsin the Kamchatka Oblast and Primorsky Krai, 2003–2007YearExposure rate, μR/hrVA of radionuclides in the air∑β,×10 -5 Bq/m 3137 Cs, ×10-7Bq/m 390 Sr, ×10-7Bq/m 37Ве,×10 -5Bq/m 3Radionuclidefallout∑β,Bq/m 2 ×Day137 Cs,Bq/m 2 ×YearVA of 3 Н inprecipitation Bq/LVA of 90 Sr in sea watermBq/L2003 10 - - - - 0.80

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYwere examined in areas that are affected by (or may be affected by) the impact of localsources of radioactive pollution of the Kola Peninsula. Radionuclide analysis results areincluded in Tables 4 and 5.The data from the radionuclide analysis of samples from the sea environment(water, bottom sediments, flora and fauna) conducted at a Russian coastal monitoringstation (near the village of Teriberka) during the first year of the project demonstrate thelack of any impact from facilities that present a radiation hazard in the Kola Peninsulaor from the sunken K-159 nuclear submarine in 2003 on the radioactive pollution ofelements of the sea environment.Table 4. Radionuclide Content in Samples of Sea Water and the Surface Layer ofBottom Sediments in the Area near Teriberka Village in September 2006SampleSea Water, Bq/m 3 :Radionuclide137CS 90 Sr239,240Pu 3Н– suspension

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 5. The Specific Radioactivity of Radionuclides in Biological Samples Takenfrom the Area Near Teriberka Village in August– September 2006, Bq/kg of dry massBiota(sampling location)137Cs90SrRadionuclide239,240Pu,241Am,×10 -3 ×10 -3Sole* 0.18±0.02 - - -Catfish* 0.12±0.01 - - -Cod* 0.24±0.06 0.034±0.017 0.72±0.2 -Herring* 0.13±0.01 0.23±0.11 1.6±0.3 -Mussels (meat)*(at the fish processing plant wharf)< 0.04 - - -Mussels (shells)*(at the fish processing plant wharf)< 0.1 - - -Crab (meat)* < 0.03 0.02±0.01 1.1±0.3 -Crab (shell)* < 0.03 - - -Bladder wrack(at the fish processing plant wharf)0.51±0.07 0.2±0.1 69.4±10.3 < 11.3Bladder wrack(near the weather station)0.39±0.08 - - -Kelp (leaves)(near the weather station)0.69±0.08 0.31±0.15 32.2±5.6 10.4±3.1Kelp (stems)(near the weather station)1.05±0.13 - - -Kelp (at the fish processingplant wharf)0.80±0.08 - - -Cladophora balls(near the weather station)< 0.09 - - -* Unit of measurement is in Bq/kg of dry mass- No measurements taken.Annual radionuclide content monitoring of the bottom sediments in the waterareas adjacent to Sevmash, a state-run industrial complex in the town of Severodvinsk,demonstrates the presence of 137 Cs in quantities that are typical for global sources ofpollution (see Table 6).296

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 6. Average Samples Across Ten Sampling Sites of Specific Activity of 137 Csin the Bottom Sediments of Dvinsk Bay (White Sea) in 1998–2007, Bq/kg of DryMassIndicatorYear1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007Specific activity 10.9 6.6 8.6 5.9 7.1 3.1 - 4.7 5.8 5.4– no samples takenReferences1. Radiation Safety Standards (NRB-99). SP 2.6.1.758-99. Moscow: RussianMinistry of Health, 1999.1372. Сs, 90 Sr, 239,240 Pu, and 238 Pu Content in the Sea Environment (Water, BottomSediments, Biota) in the Coastal Areas of the Barents and Azov Seas. [Soderzhaniye137Сs, 90 Sr, 239,240 Pu, 238 Pu v obyektakh morskoi sredy (vode, donnikh otlozheniyakh,biote)]. R&D (conclusion). UDK 504.4.064:621.039. Typhoon Company; Manager:Nikitin, A.I.; Executors: Valetova, N.K., Kabanov, A.I., Chumichyov, V.B. Obninsk,2007. 21. No. GR 0120.0510426. Inv. No. O-899.297

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYQuestions from the Roundtable Discussion on the RadiationLegacy of the Cold War– Alexander Nikitin: This question is for Anatoliy Matushchenko. As I understand it,you are not a participant of the Totskoye tests. In 1954, 31,000 soldiers and officersand others took part in these tests. The soldiers that were sent there were just 17 and 18years old. In 1992, Tamara Zlotnikova, who was a Deputy in the Russian State Duma,decided to look into just exactly what was going on there. Since the explosion, of the31,000 participants, only one thousand were still alive. She decided to arrange for somebenefits for the thousand survivors, to try to make things right. And today you are sayingthat she built her political career around this.Could you please elaborate on your views that you just stated — not as an expertfrom RosAtom, but as a human being?– Anatoliy Matushchenko: All I said was that [Tamara Zlotnikova] is clearly incompetentin this field. The court in Elektrostal heard the case of these 1,200 survivors, and thecourt’s ruling was clearly not in the favor of Ms. Zlotnikova.Who are these 1,200 people? These are test participants who were found by theCommittee of Veterans from high-risk divisions in order to recognize them and providethem with benefits. These people are still coming to us, even if they are few and farbetween. That is why I asked Tamara Zlotnikova in court if 31,000 people were suddenlyrising from their graves. Technically speaking, only 400 people who crossed the epicenterof the explosion are eligible for the benefits that are in place today. This is set out bythe legislative base by law and by the decree on high-risk division veterans. Right now,there are 1,200 or 1,400 of these former participants, i.e., three times the eligible number.Let’s look at it like this: the state decided to increase the number and nobody has anyobjections. Mr. Venetsianov, the Committee Chairman, is in charge of it all. That’s whywhen you turn the numbers around and say that 1,200 survived, that is actually a lie,misinformation.– Alexander Nikitin: Let me clarify. There was a search for people, and these werethe only ones they found. And the ones that they found — for everything that they wentthrough — received benefits.– Anatoliy Matushchenko: Before 1990, veterans who participated in the Totskoye test— and they are not such an impoverished lot as you say they are — and who were at thefront, were well equipped and morally prepared. And before 1990, they were proud ofwhat they had done. We know this from their letters, their comments and their memories.Ms. Zlotnikova turned the whole thing on its head when others turned up with illnesses,problems, complaints, etc. This kind of situation, when the subject under discussion issubverted by populism, is both easy and difficult to explain. What is the value of ourDialogue? Its value is that in discussing these subjects, we begin to see things from aprofessional point of view: both from the point of view of those who pressed the button,and from the point of view of people who appreciate the obvious consequences andimpact that it has had on public health and public opinion. I filed a request to removemy name from the radiation registry run by A. F. Tsib, Member of the Russian Academyof Sciences, for one simple reason; I suffered from my own form of radiation phobia inthe sense that I, a tester, was not afraid of radiation. I respected it. It is my own kind of298

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYradiation phobia in that I do not want my surname there. What if biologists suddenlyprove that in the seventh generation my descendants will suffer defects, and attributeit to me taking part in nuclear testing, in which I have been taking part since 1960? Wehave people on the testing ranges who have become very fearful of becoming affected byradiation. This is the Hibakusha syndrome, the syndrome of the Japanese who suddenlyfound that they were being watched. Suddenly, a Japanese woman cannot marry anAmerican, or vice versa, due to a variety of reasons. They say if your grandmother orgreat-grandmother suffered in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then don’t get married, don’ttake a bride: seven generations from now, your descendants will suffer from defects. Ithink that is the crime of the century. This illness is radiation phobia. What happened atTotskoye does not need to be blown out of proportion. And that is my firm position onthe matter.– Vladimir Baskakov: You just stated that Zlotnikova turned the issue on its head andthat Professor Boyev wrote false data. Can you explain exactly what it was that he did?And what information was falsified?– Anatoly Matushchenko: There is a lot that can be said about this. There is a nationalcommission for radiation protection. When reports were submitted for analysis, theCommission drew its own conclusions. Therefore, the conclusions I am presenting todayare those of the Commission, not mine. I am a physicist. The Commission’s documentsform the basis for claiming that Boyev’s data was falsified. I can give you the example ofthe Kazakh scientists. They conducted analyses of all of their works under the Instituteof Medical Statistics, and they were excluded from the PROTECT project (concerningradiation from test ranges) due to the falsification of data practically at an internationallevel. That document is available for review.– Dialogue Participant: One of your slides in the presentation showed a dry storagepoint for single reactor compartments in Sayda Bay. How are these transported from thewater to the dry storage site?–Alexaander Pimenov: Due to time constraints, it wasn’t possible to go into detailabout certain technological aspects and subtleties in all of the processes and technicalsolutions that are taken during each stage of disposal. At Nerpa we were using threecompartmentunits, and now we have begun slicing just the reactor compartment directlyfrom the nuclear submarine. This constraint of the three-compartment system is now athing of the past. The plant slices out just the reactor compartment, after which these arecombined into batches — in this case there were three batches, 2 batches with 7 unitsand 1 batch with 8 units — and they were loaded onto the PD-42 floating dock andtransported to the portside long-term storage point at Sayda. The dock is connected withthe wall of the berth and ship haulers are used to roll the compartment from the dockonto the turn-out tracks. Then, the ship haulers are put on a rail system and transportthe compartments, they are place onto stationary support structures and the haulers areremoved. The maximum weight of a compartment at the portside long-term storagefacility was calculated at 1,800 tons.- Mr. Cherezov, from the Institute of Radiology: My question is for Sergei Zhavoronkin.He spoke in detail about the dismantlement of nuclear submarines and everything related299

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYto that process, but he did not mention where or how the docks where the submarines arebroken down will be dismantled. Or are they clean?- Answer missing from proceedings.- Dialogue Participant: Regarding the unsafe or submerged No. 159 nuclear submarine,is there any certainty with regard to the timeframe for lifting and dismantlement? Thelifting of submarine No. 159 is the duty of the Russian Navy, and this issue is fully withinits authorities and abilities, and since this submarines was not transferred to RosAtom— rather, to a firm that deals specifically in dismantlement — the Russian Navy will bedetermining the timetable for these operations, as well as the necessary technical andfinancial means.- Answer missing from proceedings.– Valery Menschikov: Could you please explain just what is inside the reactor that isgoing to be stored for 70 years and will there be any commissioned inspections after acertain period of time?– Alexander Pimenov: Unfortunately, I was not able to address one-compartment unitsin greater detail in my report. One of the documents that was prepared by NIKIET duringpreparations of the standards for comprehensive nuclear submarine dismantlementis a directive that makes it possible to store solid radioactive waste (SRW) insidereactor compartments. As a result, the reactor compartments house power installationequipment and radioactive waste that was put there in containers in accordance with thedocumentation of the ship designer and in accordance with the standards that make itpossible to store the wastes there. The standards for waste containers that are put inside thecompartments are the same as the standards for external radiation from the compartmentitself. That is why the storage of radwaste cannot serve as a reason for increased radiationfrom the compartment surface. At the end of the 70-year storage period, an investigationwill be conducted and the reactor compartment will be taken apart, after which the plansare to arrange final containment from the external environment only for the body of thereactor, while the rest of the metal will be recycled and put back into the industrial usecycle. As a result, today we are lowering the radiation burden on staff members; thereactor compartments cannot be taken apart at this time without exceeding standardlevels, and there is no sound reason to do so. We are dealing with the issue of storagein these compartments and freeing up the coastal facilities of the Russian Navy as wellas industrial enterprises where these wastes have been accumulated from the repair andmodernization of nuclear submarines.- Stephan Robinson: I was at the Baltic shipyard last year, the former staff centerthat serviced maritime reactors. This center is closed today. We examined the reactorand the staff working there and we were told that they know when these reactors weredecommissioned, and that they added a lot of equipment, but that they don’t know whatkind of cocktail is inside today. Is it hazardous or not? They were also closed for 70years, but I think that the people who will deal with it 70 years from now will be veryinterested in this documentation, a type of archive or inventory reports.– Alexander Pimenov: The same directive documentation governing the storage ofadditional waste in reactor compartments has established a passport system for all loadedcontainers and all of the additionally loaded equipment in each reactor compartment.300

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThis is strictly monitored and verified, including by NIKIET. Each reactor compartmenthas its own documentation that is sent to the military, the manufacturing plant, and thefacility itself. There is also a backup system in place for this documentation to preventthe loss or damage of this valuable information that would force people to inspect thecontents of these compartments from scratch. Furthermore, companies often approachus, as the scientific manager and the developer of the document, with requests to storesomething in reactor compartments that we have not specified, such as a variety ofindustrial sources. We categorically speak out against storing anything that could result ineither the decay of the bottom and the bilge of the compartment, or something that couldlead to spoilage, since that would later pose problems for handling the compartments.As the head organization, we are enforcing a very strict policy on compliance with allrequired rules and the conditions for handling these compartments.301

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Global Consequences of Nuclear TestingPavel MuninHead of Department, Moscow Academy of BusinessAdministration,Eurasian Center of Continuous DevelopmentAccording to a well-known model, the global consequence of maximallysynchronized mass bombing of large areas of the Earth’s surface could be a so-called“nuclear winter” (6). Along these lines, we can expect that the impact of local, butregular nuclear explosions at known testing ranges, which is essentially what happensduring nuclear tests, will most likely also have an impact on the geosphere (5).The energy release of these tests in 1945–1980 changed from one kiloton to 50megatons in TNT equivalent. Over these years, there was approximately one atmosphericnuclear test per month with a force of roughly one megaton. Over the entire period, atotal of 520 nuclear and thermonuclear explosions were conducted, and the United Statesand the USSR accounted for over 210, while 21 took place in Great Britain, 50 in France,and 23 in China (4). The overall energy release over this period of time amounted toapproximately 400 megatons (8).Figure 1 gives some sense of the regularity of nuclear tests.Figure 1. Global nuclear tests, 1945–1998 (11)An interesting fact is that the average global temperature, as we can see from Figure2, nearly stabilized during this very period. Its steady growth, later qualified as globalwarming — and which began in 1910 — was interrupted. It recommenced only after302

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY1980. It was at this moment that the world’s last atmospheric nuclear test was conducted(China).Figure 2. Changes in global temperature, °С (10) 1 .On this basis, one can draw the conclusion that nuclear tests have somehowcurbed global temperature growth by disrupting some process that accompanies globalwarming.A similar curtailing influence on the increase of the global temperature was alsocaused by the ordinary explosives used during WWII, which left Europe in ruins.However, a string of three nuclear explosions — one test in the United States and twodestructive blows in Japan — had the same effect, if not stronger, on the climate system,and the temperature continued to drop.Nevertheless, when the moratorium on nuclear testing was announced in 1959–1960, the Earth’s climate system in 1961 more or less took up where it left off in 1939.However, the subsequent “test” explosion of a 50-megaton thermonuclear “TsarBomb” once again put the climate system into a state of shock, which led to a significantdecrease in the global temperature.Overall, if one were to make a connection between the nature of changes intemperature with anthropogenic processes (economic, political, social and technological)in the 20 th century, then we find a surprising synchronization between destructive forcesand the periods during which the global temperature stabilized, such as during WWI in1914–1918.More dramatic events came into play during the Cold War, when empires wererazed, new states emerged, and international tension reached new highs. All of this tookplace against the backdrop of globalization in science and technology, which had a rapidimpact on the state of the environment. “Environmental problems” began to take shapein the form of a bitter conflict between man and nature.1 (See also: Vozmozhnosti…, 2006: p. 10, Figure 1; p. 62, Figure 1)303

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNevertheless, by the time atmospheric nuclear tests had come to an end, progressivetrends had taken over, since high technology and space development had garneredstrength. It was the beginning of a new order with the help of computers, i.e. industrialmethods, but in the field of information. And, as a result, the temperature again resumedits climb.This is why there is an impression that the nature of changes in the globaltemperature is closely tied to the appearance and dominance in the geosphere of one oranother order. Correspondingly, the combination of changes in the temperature and thedegree of chaos could serve as an indicator of the direction in which the developmentprocess is moving.This combination, if one were to envision the biosphere as a closed system, thetemperature of which (T) stabilizes due to heat exchange with the environment, isrepresented as the product (TS) in the well known free-energy (F) formula, namely:F=U – TS, (1)where U – internal energy, S – entropy.Since free energy must strive to reduce itself to a minimum, in the formula (1), asentropy decreases, which serves as the disorder metric, temperature increases.This model (1) helps provide a qualitative description of the nature of the linkbetween entropy and temperature in a closed system, if they change given a comparatively“constant” temperature.A constant temperature can be supported by following, for example, the wellknowntheory put forward by Professor Budyko (1), “by introducing into the lowerstratosphere (12–20 km) finely dispersed and aerosol substances” (2: 403). This theoryfound development and support in a decision issued by a Council seminar held by theRussian Academy of Sciences (2: 406), as well as in the report “Climate Change 2007:The Physical Science Basis,” published by an international group of experts on climatechange (13).From the perspective of this proposed model (1), at first glance, the consequencesof this kind of heat regulation would quickly manifest itself in the increase of freeenergy, which means hurricanes and other phenomena would grow stronger, i.e., in thedisruption of the existing order. In other words, entropy would begin to increase, and thiswould then have to be compensated for by introducing another, harsher “new” order.Nevertheless, if this kind of regulation is conducted slowly and consistently,ensuring a smooth readjustment of social-ecological and economic processes, it couldtruly make a global contribution to the global community’s transition toward sustainabledevelopment. In this case, the temperature may serve as the main indicator of thistransition or the “order parameter,” as these values have come to be called in synergetics,Entropy, as it is wont to do, will serve as a measure of disorder, or chaos.For example, a sharp drop in temperature in the third part of 1986 2 , was most likelya result of the Chernobyl NPP explosion, and was accompanied by major disruptions.A similar collapse seen in 1991–1995 can naturally be linked with the fall of the USSR,while the 10-year cold spell in the early 20 th century is associated with agricultural2 Measured value304

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYreform 3 .Meanwhile, what follows from the nature of the changes during the Cold War, thetemperature — followed by entropy — reveals low sensitivity to progress related todevelopments in science and technology. This is why for the purposes of describing thedifferences between the emerging new “orders,” or rather a description of the process ofdevelopment itself, including sustainable development, a more sensitive and appropriateindicator is needed.According to the author’s proposal (7), information could actually serve as thisindicator.From a formal point of view, this development indicator may be introduced, if weare to adhere to the ideas of Ralph Hartley (9), in defining the quantity of informationand consider the global population |N| as a certain number of identical elements {N}.Then information obtained by each new member when entering society is expressed asfollows:I=Log 2|N|. (2)Consequently, changes in information (∆/) and the population (∆N) are related toone another as follows:These changes are achieved via the reception of an external flow of informationgenetically, which fully matches up with the view of modern demographers. They believethat human society is a complex self-organizing system that is constantly processing anenormous volume of information. This information reflects the state of the system’sexternal and internal environments and, thanks to the existence of a number of channelsof direct communication and feedback, corrects the behavior of the system’s elements.Part of the general flow of information pertains to demographic behavior and controlsit (3: 546–547).However, while information flows may be difficult to measure, the growth rate ofthe population is known (see Figure 3).(3)3 See: (2: 10, Firugre 1; 62, Figure. 1), where the referenced ten-year period has been brokendown into two parts: the cold spell in 1900–1904, and temperature stabilization during1905–1910. In this case, agricultural reform took place over only five years, before the onset ofindustrial development and a transition into growth that was interrupted by the war.305

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 3. The growth rate of the world’s population (12)From this graph, it follows that the flow of information reached its peak inapproximately 1963, and then began its decline, as it had achieved the required level ofprogress. Then replication began, or the growth of the number of achievements made asa result of so-called “globalization.”A sharp drop in the growth rate in 1959–1960, according to demographers, tookplace due to the so-called “Great Leap Forward” in China, when the level of agriculturalproduction and natural calamities, which had coincided with this massive social reform,together led to a sharp rise in the mortality rate, while fertility was nearly halved (12).From an information point of view, the “Great Leap Forward” period saw theredistribution of the flow of information taken in by the population, between geneticand cultural channels in favor of the latter, which led to a drop in the growth rate of thepopulation of China 4 .Consequently, I would volunteer this very unusual hypothesis: the so-called“demographic explosion” is synchronous with the nuclear testing, if not actuallytriggered by it.Furthermore, it is striking how synchronized nuclear explosions, includingunderground explosions, are with the growth rate of the Earth’s population. Meanwhile,global temperatures only seem to be affected by atmospheric explosions.Conclusions1. The population of the Earth, having ceased nuclear testing, matured sufficientlyin order to enter the final stage of the “demographic transition” and stabilize its ownpopulation at a comparatively high level.2. The opinions of some politicians that nuclear weapons have already playedtheir main role in modern civilization seem altogether reasonable.3. We can now expect the expansion and relatively safe use of nuclear reactionsfor the purposes of electricity generation.4In connection with this, it is interesting to note the synchronization of the sharp declineobserved in the growth rate with the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing in 1959–1960, seeFigure 1.306

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYReferences1. Budyko, M. I. Climate Change [Izmenenie klimata]. Leningrad:Gidrometeoizdat, 1974. 280,2. Opportunities to Prevent Climate Change and its Negative Consequences: theKyoto Protocol Problem: Materials from the Board Seminar under the President of theRussian Academy of Sciences [Vozmozhnosti predotvrashcheniya izmeneniya klimatai ego negativnykh posledstviy: problema Kiotskogo protocola: materialy Sovertaseminarapri Prezidente RAN]. (Izrael, Y. A., ed.); Russian Academy of Sciences.Moscow: Nauka, 2006. 408.3. The Demographic Modernization of Russia, 1900–2000 [Demograficheskayamodernizatsiya Rossii, 1900–2000]. Vizhnevsky, A. G., ed. Moscow: NovoyeIzdatelstvo, 2006. 608.4. Kaurov, G., Stebelkov, V. Toward the 40 th Anniversary of the Nuclear Test BanTreaty [K 40-letiyu vstupleniya v silu Dogovora “O zapreshchenii yadernykh ispytaniiv tryokh sredakh”]. Moscow: Nuclear Energy Bulletin, October 2003.5. Mikhailov, V. Nuclear Weapons – Scientific Problems and a Search forSolutions and Experiments with Models [Yadernoe oryzhie – nauchnye problemy,poiski reshenii i eksperimenty s modelyami]. Atomnaya energetika, Issue 5 (5),November 1991.6. Moiseev, N. N., Alexandrov, V. V., Tarko, A. M. Man and the Biosphere:Experience of Systemic Analysis and Mode—Based Experiments [Chelovek i biosfera:Opyt sistemnogo analiza i eksperimenty s modelyami]. Moscow: Nauka. 1985.7. Munin, P. I. Sustainable Development, Demographics and InformationTechnology [Ustoichivoe razvitie, demografiya i informatsionnaya tekhnologiya].Problemy regional’noi ekologii]. 2001. No. 4, 30–33.8. Science and Society: The History of the Soviet Nuclear Project (1940s–1950s)[Nauka i obshchestvo: Istoriya sovetskogo atomnogo proekta (40–50 gody)]. InternationalSymposium Works, ISAP–96. Moscow: IzdAT, 1997. 608.9. Hartley, R.V.L. (1928). Transmission of information. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 7,535–563.10. http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/tadjik/vitalgraphics/rus/html/c6.htm11. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/27/worldwide_nuclear_testing.png12. http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.html13. IPCC: The Fourth Assessment Report “Climate Change 2007: The PhysicalScience Basis.” http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu307

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNuclear Tests on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and theNuclear Cultural LegacyAnatoliy MatushchenkoCo-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commissionunder the Scientific Research Institute for PulseEngineering, and Advisor to the Department Head,RosAtomA. VolkovThe BTS Scientific Research Center under the RussianDefense Ministry, St. PetersburgVladimir SafronovRadon Federal Scientific and Industrial Association,MoscowNadezhda ShusharinaThe Global Climate and Environment Institute underRosGidromet and the Russian Academy of Sciences,MoscowPetr BoyarskyThe Likhachev Russian Cultural and Natural LegacyScientific Research Institute, MoscowIntroductionAfter the Limited Test Ban Treaty (prohibiting air, space and underwater nucleartests) was signed in August 1963 in Moscow by the USSR, the United States and GreatBritain, the amount of radioactive products that entered the environment decreasedmarkedly. France and China continued to conduct nuclear tests — their last nuclear testsin the air were conducted on September 14, 1974, and October 16, 1980, respectively.Nevertheless, the radioactive products accumulated by that point in the environmentcreated and continue to create a certain level of radiation background.This explains the public’s justifiable concern in the radioecological consequencesof nuclear testing, including at the Novaya Zemlya test range located on the NovayaZemlya Archipelago. As the topic is periodically raised by representatives of variousenvironmental unions and organizations it is often perceived with a great deal of concernand is often politically loaded and approached from a populist standpoint. That is whyaccurate information about the state of radiation conditions and the consequences ofnuclear tests for human health has become more important and more relevant.The beginning of nuclear activity on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago dates back toSeptember 21, 1955, when the USSR’s first underwater nuclear explosion was detonated(3.5 kilotons of TNT equivalent at a depth of 12 meters off of Cape Cherny). Later308

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYin the mid-1970s, the systematic radioecological monitoring of the territory beganwith a specific goal in mind: identify the consequences of nuclear tests. Meanwhile,an extensive archive of data on radiation conditions resulting from previous testexplosions was analyzed and standardized. These data had been obtained from a varietyof radioecological studies conducted by organizations and institutes under the USSRAcademy of Sciences, GosKomGidromet, the USSR Ministry of Health, and the USSRMinistry of Defense (1955–1957, 1958–1963, and 1964–1968). This program wascarried out over the course of several years under assignment by the Russian Navy andincorporated the use of modern scientific research methods.Professor V. Chugunov, PhD, recalls: “…Since then, the operationsof various agencies in this field have been almost non-stop and receivegovernment support. However, its ‘flaw’ prior to 1992 was the generalsecrecy of the work related to nuclear weapons. That is why the data onthe actual state of affairs at Novaya Zemlya remained inaccessible tothe curious public. This gave rise to a number of myths and fabrications,which at times were really quite odd (such as “hairless deer” and “mutantfish”).After the accident at the Chernobyl NPP, the attention paid to radioactive pollutionskyrocketed. In 1990, RosGidromet and the USSR Ministry of Defense arranged detailedaerial photographs of the extensive territory adjacent to the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago,the results of which were immediately submitted to elected officials and a variety ofmedia outlets, as well as interested “environmental movements.” From that year on,a targeted, comprehensive interagency program for radioecological monitoring of theRegion-2 Northern test range has been underway. The program was initially conductedunder the auspices of the Nuclear Ministry while today it is overseen by RosAtom andthe Russian Ministry of Defense. The Khlopin Radium Institute leads the monitoringefforts.For the purposes of parliamentary hearings held on June 16, 1992 by the RussianSupreme Soviet Committee for the Environment and the Rational Use of NaturalResources and the Committee for Defense and Security Issues, to consider the advisabilityof continuing operations at the Novaya Zemlya test range, a group of experts from theNuclear Ministry, the Environmental Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Health Ministryand RosGidromet presented a report called “The Northern Test Range: Nuclear WeaponsTesting and Environmental Pollution.” In 1992, the Environmental Ministry conducteda state-sponsored environmental study of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, headed byProfessor Yuriy Sivintsev. The October 13, 1992 report summary was published byEurasia issue number 2 in 1993, and in Moskovskiye Novosti on January 17, 1993.Since 1993, interagency research on the radioecological effects of nuclear bombs hascontinued under the federal target program on Russia’s environmental safety (1–10).As a result, we have every reason to believe that the radioecological consequencesof nuclear testing are receiving due attention from government bodies. However, thefact is that accurate, proven, and methodically justified information is still highlyinaccessible to a wider public, since, although it is now unsealed, it is generally publishedin specialized scientific journals, books and collections.Gratefully taking up the organizers of this Dialogue on their suggestion, the authorsof this report have striven to shed light upon this rather technical issue in a way that isaccessible to a wide range of people, including those who do not have any specialized309

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYbackground, and on the premise that you’ll “take our word for it.” Those who areinterested in learning about this issue in greater depth will inevitably have to refer to themain cited publications, which in turn point to extensive resources on this topic (1–10),which will ultimately confirm that there is every reason to trust the authors of this report,who were all directly involved in nuclear testing in 1961–1990.Some BackgroundThe Birth of the Novaya Zemlya Test RangeOver 50 years ago in January 1954, the design team headed by Nikolai Dukhov—who was declared three times a Hero of Socialist Labor—completed the creation ofthe nuclear warhead for the T-5 torpedo. The next step was to test it. From the verybeginning the plan was to get a test done, but they expected to conduct only one test.With this one test, they needed to study the impact of an underwater nuclear explosionon ships, other vessels, and nuclear submarines. Next, they had to determine the impactof the bomb’s destructive effects on coastal facilities, the structures and buildings of theanti-airborne defense, and minefields. Third, they hoped to make progress in solving anumber of scientific problems related to the further study of the physics of the nuclearexplosion. Fourth, there were the ambitious goals of politicians who were responsiblefor Russia’s nuclear prowess, as well as the senior commanders, who were meant to‘bring up’ the naval military nuclear experts with an eye to the possible future use ofnuclear weapons by the USSR Navy.The Semipalatinsk test range could not, naturally, support this kind of test.Eyes were then turned to the remote areas of the northern seas and a reconnaissancecommission was sent out via the Northern Fleet. On July 31, 1954 a secret Decree wasissued by the USSR Council of Ministers (No. 1559-669), which ordered the creationof Novaya Zemlya Facility No. 700, which would report to the USSR’s Ministry ofDefense (Department 6 of the Navy).On September 17, 1954, a directive from the General Headquarters of the SovietNavy was signed. The directive set out the organizational structure of a new unitof troops (No. 77510). This date also became known as the anniversary date of thefounding of the Sixth State Central Test Range of the Defense Ministry of the USSR.The first Commander, between November 1954 and August 1955, was Captain FirstClass Valentin Starikov—a Hero of the Soviet Union.But the first to arrive at Belushya Guba on the southern island of the NovayaZemlya Archipelago were military construction workers led by Colonel EngineerYevgenyi Barkovskiy, who was appointed Head of the Special Construction Unit No. 700(August–November 1954). Under his command, in the summer of 1954, the membersof ten construction battalions arrived at the archipelago. Against the severe conditionsof the Arctic, they worked selflessly to prepare a variety of structures, laboratories andresidential premises, as well as other facilities related to the test range’s operations.In line with Presidential Decree No. 194 on the Novaya Zemlya test range (February27, 1992), the range has been given the status of a Central Russian Test Range.Nuclear Tests at the Northern Test RangeOver the course of 35 years (September 21, 1955 through October 24, 1990), atotal of 130 nuclear tests were conducted at the Northern test range — that’s 18% ofthe total number of nuclear tests conducted by the USSR. Of these tests, three were310

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYunderwater and two were above water, one was a land test, and 85 were atmospherictests, including:• Only one land-based nuclear explosion (32 kilotons on September 7, 1957),while the Semipalatinsk test range had been the venue for 25 powerfulexplosions, which are the type responsible for considerable radioactivepollution;• The most powerful atmospheric nuclear explosion in history (50 Megatonsat an altitude of 4,000 m on October 30, 1961), where the fission reactionaccounted for only about 3% of the yield; this was the “Tsar Bomb” and it isthe Guinness Book of World Records.These tests were conducted at three different sites: Cape Cherny (Zone A), the areanear the Matochkin Shar (Zone B — only underground tunnel explosions) and nearSulmenova Bay (Zone C — a number of atmospheric and high-altitude explosions).No full-scale nuclear tests have been conducted at the Northern test range sinceOctober 25, 1990. No further tests are planned, as Russia, in its position as a nuclearnation, signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on September 24, 1996, and ratified it in May2000 (something the United States has yet to do).However, it should be noted that for Russia, the fundamental condition under whichit agreed to sign and ratify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty were the positive results ofthe tests at test range mock-ups in hydrodynamic “non-nuclear explosive experiments”(NNEE), or in US terminology, “sub-critical” experiments. These experiments began onDecember 24 and 27, 1995 (four of them were carried out prior to the Nuclear Test BanTreaty’s signature) and continue to this day.Along these lines, Federal Law No. 59-FZ (May 27, 2000) on the ratificationof the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty notes in Article 2 that the Treaty is to be carried out“based on supporting the fundamental potential for the possible recommencement ofnuclear research activity should Russia elect to withdraw from the Treaty, support forthe preparedness to conduct fully-fledged tests at the Russian Central Test Range, andprepare it for conducting work with nuclear charges and warheads when said work is notprohibited by the Treaty.”In line with a directive issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense on March 28,1998, the test range was transferred from the supervision of the Russian Navy to thesupervision of the 12th Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense.A few non-standard inspections of its battle-readiness were conducted in September2004 and 2007, when traditional scientific practicums were held; they were dedicatedto the 50 th anniversary of the test range and the 110 th anniversary of the village ofBelushya—the test range’s main settlement.The challenging task of maintaining this test range located beyond the Arctic Circlecontinues accompanied by consistent radioecological monitoring of the conditions onthe territory.The Radioecology of Novaya ZemlyaIn the foreword to the Russian edition of the book “Ecocide in the USSR” (authorsMurray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr. Moscow: 1992, p. IX), Sergei Zalygin, Memberof the Russian Academy of Sciences, took a populist stance: “I have not yet namedanother environmentally criminal organization — our hydrometerological service, whichhas hidden and continues to hide the truth from the people… when it comes to Novaya311

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYZemlya, the Semipalatinsk test range, etc.” He was completely wrong, since, if one wereto carefully and objectively review the references cited for this report, it will becomeclear that information regarding the truth of the radiation conditions at the archipelagoand Russia’s northern territories had already been published openly. But there had notbeen, so to speak, a widespread public demand or interest for this information (evenon the part of Mr. Zalygin), and when demand and interest did emerge, they cameaccompanied by some reasons for concern. Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, whose fatewas very closely connected to the Novaya Zemlya test site, assessed the situation asfollows: “I want to just come out and say it: we are partly to blame for these concerns— everything was made top secret. Of course, even now the test range is not a place onegoes to take a stroll, but we will deliberately remedy the situation and provide the peoplewith accurate information about everything that is happening there...” We have sinceseen confirmation of what he said.Atmospheric nuclear explosions — and there were 85 of them over the Northerntest range — do not involve the ball of fire touching the surface of the Earth. Theepicentral zone features only some small areas of radioactive “stains” that are pollutedwith radionuclides with induced activity — these are formed as the result of a reactionof the neutron flow during the explosion with the underlying soil. During this kind ofexplosion, micro- and submicro- radioactive particles form when evaporated materialsfrom the construction of the nuclear device begin to condense and then coagulate,which explains their small size. If one were to consider that by time the explosion cloudstabilizes it is in the stratosphere, then the radioactive particles are held at very highaltitudes for a relatively long period of time, while the tropopause (the border betweenthe stratosphere and the troposphere) acts as a natural barrier blocking the particles frompenetrating the lower levels of the atmosphere and subsequently falling onto the surfaceof the Earth. This results in a kind of stratospheric conservation of particles, the partialejection of which from the stratosphere can range anywhere from three months to twoyears, while their total activity decreases considerably due to radioactive decay. Thefallout of these kinds of radioactive products onto the Earth took place over the course ofseveral years, mixed with the fallout from explosions at other test ranges (Semipalatinsk,as well as test ranges in the United States, Great Britain, France and China), whichcombine to form the “global” background.From the point of view of radioactive pollution of the atmosphere and the land,the “dirtiest” tests are surface nuclear explosions, during which direct contact is madebetween the fireball and the underlying terrain. This results in the activation of roughly200 tons of soil per one kiloton of the explosion’s capacity. As a result, a local “radioactivetrail” takes shape over dozens, even hundreds of kilometers, starting from the test rangepremises; this is exactly what happened as the result of the only surface nuclear testconducted at the Novaya Zemlya explosion on Cape Cherny on September 7, 1957.During underwater nuclear explosions, the cloud usually rises to a very low altitude.Literally within several seconds after it breaks into the atmosphere, most of the waterfalls from it, “cleaning out” most of the radioactive products that formed.The radioactive products that form during an underground nuclear explosion remainwithin its central zone: 80% in the form of refractory radionuclides stay within the massof molten rock in the main explosion cavity. However, in 30% of all cases, streams ofinert radioactive gases (IRG) have leaked into the atmosphere. These have contained133,135Xe isotopes (their half-life is 5.2 days and 9.1 hours, respectively), and their decay312

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYproducts are stable 133 Cs and the extremely long-lived, and therefore practically nonradioactive,135 Cs, which has a half-life of over two million years. The streams of IRGalso include 88 Kr (half-life of 2.3 hours) and its by-product 88 Rb (17.8 minutes). In theory,all of these radionuclides cannot trigger radioactive fallout and, as a result, they cannothave any kind of harmful impact on humans. Based on data on aerial radiation control,the transfer of IRG from the territory of the North test site via air currents has taken placeat altitudes of 1,000–1,500 meters and the levels of radiation they contain when theyreach the mainland have not exceeded several dozens to several hundreds µR/hr. That iswhy even if the IRG streams pass over a village or settlement, the exposure received byits residents would be negligible at most. Nevertheless, each time an underground test isconducted, a great deal of attention is paid to the selection of the best possible weatherconditions in order to prevent gaseous radioactive products from being carried from thetest range territory to the west or the south in order to avoid the risk that the IRG steamsmay pass over any populated areas. This is also justified if one considers the risk ofexplosion products in the vapor phase being accidentally released. Such situations havehappened twice out of 39 underground nuclear tests conducted at the Northern test range(in the A-9 tunnel on September 14, 1969, and in the A-37A tunnel on August 2, 1987).Based on the results of the radioecological inspections conducted on the test range,we can state the following:1. The overall exposure rate (radiation level) on the premises of the test rangeamounts to 7–12 µR/hr, the average 137 Cs pollution density does not exceed0.06–0.09 Ci/km 2 , 90 Sr density levels are at 0.04 Ci/km 2 and these are bothclose to the average level of the background surface pollution of the soil acrossthe territory of the CIS at 0.08 and 0.05 Ci/km 2 , respectively. In WesternEurope 137 Cs levels are at 0.13 Ci/km 2 .2. On the southern island of the testing range, there are two health protectionzones (HPZ). One of them is at the site of an underground test conductedon August 2, 1957 (Zone B, near the Matochkin Shar measuring less than0.3 km 2 . In the near future, given the density of the surface pollution and theexposure rate, the area’s status will be revised to that of an observation zone.The second area, which is less than 0.5 km 2 , is at the site of a surface nuclearexplosion conducted on September 7, 1957 (Zone A, near Cape Cherny). Themaximum exposure rates at these two sites do not exceed 1 mR/hr and 0.5 mR/hr, respectively.3. The southern part of the southern island has another four plots where the levelof surface activity and the exposure rate exceed background numbers for theNovaya Zemlya archipelago as a whole:• The site of the first underwater nuclear explosion on September 21,1955. It is polluted by 137 Cs, 90 Sr, and 60 Co. The maximum exposurerate amounts to nearly 30 µR/hr, and the width of the trail is 2 km, thelength is 10 km. The 137 Cs pollution density is 0.8 Ci/km 2 , and the 60 Codensity level is up to 0.3 Ci/km 2 .• The trail from a low atmospheric nuclear explosion that has maintainedthe form of a “stain” with a diameter of 0.5 km. The maximum exposurerate in the center is approximately 30 µR/hr. The radioactivity of thesoil is caused by 152 Eu and 60 Co. The contributions from 90 Sr and 137 Csare significantly lower. The maximum pollution densities are: 0.6 Ci/313

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYkm 2 for 60 Co, 3.5 Ci/km 2 for 152 Eu, and 0.05 Ci/km 2 for 90 Sr and 137 Cs.• The trail from the on-water explosion in Cape Cherny that stretchesfrom the bay to the northeast. The maximum exposure rate is 25 µR/hr.Radioactive fallout here contains 90 Sr and 137 Cs at a density of 0.1–1.2Ci/km 2 .• The trail from an underground explosion in a cavity caused by the early(defined as within 20 minutes) escape of IRG. The maximum exposuredose in the cavity is 25 µR/hr. The pollution density of residual 137 Csdoes not exceed 1 Ci/km 2 .4. The gamma-radiation survey and an analysis of samples taken in the northernisland have shown that there are four “stains” at Sukhoy Nos, in the center of whichthe exposure rate is higher and is more than double the natural radiation background.The areas of the stains measure 0.5, 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4 km 2 . The maximum pollutiondensities are as follows: 0.05 Ci/km 2 for 60 Co, 0.5 Ci/km 2 for 137 Cs, and 0.6 Ci/km 2for 152 Eu.5. On the site of underground tests near the Matochkin Straight, in addition toone HPZ, there are other zones with increased radiation levels compared to theglobal pollution level: these are the epicentral zones of individual explosions. Themaximum exposure rates of these relatively small areas are 0.7 Ci/km 2 for 137 Cs and0.8 Ci/km 2 for 90 Sr.Assessments of the possible and actual spread of atmospheric masses from all of thenuclear tests that were conducted at Novaya Zemlya have shown that the dose receivedby the population over the period of time since the nuclear explosions were conductedand to the present time do not exceed several rem, which is lower than the doses receivedfrom natural radionuclides present in the Earth’s crust and the atmosphere.One could also say that these parts of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago near the testrange, and the absence of any regular population on the islands has actually improvedthe conditions for the flora and fauna and have made it possible to essentially make thetest area a natural preservation area with a relatively wide variety of wild animals andbirds. The islands are inhabited by reindeer (the rare Novaya Zemlya reindeer), arcticfoxes, lemmings, and polar bears. The lakes and rivers are home to a variety of fish. Inthe summer, seagulls, willocks, kiddaws, geese, ducks, swans and other birds come tonest.About the Nuclear Cultural Legacy at Novaya Zemlya: A Monument to theHistory of Nuclear WeaponsIn 1995–1998, the Russian Scientific Research Institute for Cultural and NaturalLegacy published several unique volumes edited by Petr Boyarsk, Candidate of Physicsand Mathematics, and Professor Aleksandr Lyutyi (11–13). These publications were thefirst to showcase nearly 200 historical and cultural monuments of the Novaya Zemlyaarchipelago, including those dedicated to the history of the Russian nuclear program.These monuments were indicated on a map of Novaya Zemlya Titles “A Natural andCultural Legacy,” co-authored with Anatoliy Matushchenko).This map was made possible by contributions from the Russian National Atlas ofCultural and Natural Heritage, the Center of Comprehensive Expedition Research [Tsentrkompleksnykh ekspeditsionnykh issledovanii], and the Russian Scientific ResearchInstitute for Cultural and Natural Legacy, which seeks to develop unique historical and314

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYnatural territories based on original materials from the Arctic Maritime Expedition from1988–1995. This was the first publication of its kind in 1995, and it opened the doorto a series of maps highlighting the natural and cultural legacy of the Arctic based onexpedition reports.In particular, the map’s index includes site No. 68 (D-2 on the map) described as:“Historical monuments to the nuclear weapons program: a complex of structures from1957 (two bunkers, an aerial lift bridge, and a settlement of the automatic commandcenter “D” for conducting atmospheric nuclear explosions until 1962. The Northwestcoast of Gribova Bay. Arctic Maritime Expedition, 1993–1995 (12).”In turn, in another publication (13) the figures and photographs show: “the remainsof the structures of the nuclear test range, located on the northern coast of the GribovaBay, 25 km from its neck, in the depression in the southernmost edge of the eastern slopeof the Klochkovsky peninsula (the base of the peninsula is located between the mouthof the Promyslovaya River to the east and the Brach Bay to the west) near the coast ofMityushikha Bay, west of Klochkovsky mountain, at the top of the hill.”A Description of the MonumentThe main part of the structure is located near a wedge in the pier in the bay builtfrom boulders. By the base of the ledge of the pier, 16 meters from the coastline, thereis a wooden structure with a slanted roof — this was a radiation monitoring point. Thewalls of the building and the entryway from the outside are more than halfway coveredin gravel. The structure has two rooms, divided in the middle by a foyer with an entrancefrom the northwest and a stove across from the entrance. Doorways lead from the foyerinto the rooms. There are wooden plank bunk beds along the walls of the rooms.The structure also marks the beginning of a dirt road that leads to the southwesttoward a reinforced concrete bunker that served as a shelter for equipment. Along bothsides of the road, stretched out along the southeast and northwest lines, there are anumber of rectangular platforms with wooden rostrums, apparently the remains of a tentcity. The platforms are the bases for canvas tents with wooden frames, some of whichhave remained intact. There are two structures that share a vestibule lined with boards.One of the buildings still has a red brick stove and part of a timber frame.Forty meters to the east from a series of platforms, there are two iron cisterns lyingon their sides with the openings positioned upward. To the northwest of the group ofstructures (500 meters along the bottom of the depression) there are a number of woodenposts that end at two wooden sheds. One of the sheds stands 17 meters from the coast. Atthe bottom (also in the space between the structures and the sheds) there are two largecone-shaped piles of gravel, about five meters across. The entire area of the depressionis littered with 200-liter barrels that were used to contain flammable liquid. To the southfrom the piles of gravel, the coast is strewn with bits of metal constructions, woodenboxes, scraps from electric and telephone wires, and construction and household trash.Approximately 45 meters to the north of the platforms, not far from the edge of thewater, there is a wooden drum dug into the pebbly soil. The remains of the gate are postswith crosspieces.The remains of the facilities include the following structures: entrance structures,structures for the transport and storage of freight (a berth), a reinforced concrete bunkerused to shelter equipment, structures for official and residential purposes, an explosionobservation point at the top of the peninsula, and other parts of the infrastructure315

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY(communications and power supply).The territory of the berth is located to the very south of the eastern coast of thepeninsula on the first and second terraces (in the southern area) and is easily visiblefrom the bay thanks to other free-standing structures, albeit in poor shape, and scatteredunused construction materials.The site comprises the remains of several structures, warehouse space, a radiationcontrol point, beams, household structures, power line posts, scattered constructionmaterials (bricks, cement (over 200 sacks), wooden constructions, metal scraps, wires),etc.We have included this historical information in order to give you a feel for theatmosphere of the military life of the people involved in testing nuclear weapons duringatmospheric nuclear explosions. This is also important for coming to grips with thespiritual legacy of past efforts to create the USSR’s nuclear shield. This speaks to theneed for historical monuments to the nuclear weapons program, nuclear testing, and thetesters themselves, who worked under such “exotic” conditions. Without a doubt, theefforts of scientists and historical and cultural monument experts to preserve this “layer”of manmade facilities deserve encouragement and assistance.ConclusionIn late September 2007, celebrations were held at the test range in honor of the110 th anniversary of the Belushya Guba village, now the main settlement of the CentralRussian Test Range. Again, experts and veterans from past nuclear tests noted that underthe conditions of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, this test range is serving well as a militarywatch point and fulfilling its primary purpose: ensuring support for the battle-readinessand safety of Russia’s nuclear capacity, but now by conducting experiments that do notinvolve nuclear energy release. Both Russia and the United States have the technologyfor conducting these tests. Consequently, in the present and foreseeable future, the testrange may no longer be exclusively associated with the “nuclear genie,” which due to itsnature inevitably pollutes our environment.ReferencesEarly Sources1. The Northern Test Range: Nuclear Explosions, Radiology, and RadiationSafety. [Severniy ispytatelniy poligon: yaderniye vzryvy, radiologiya, radiatsionnayabezopasnost]. Issue 1. Reference Material. Misc. authors, Ed. V.N. Mikhailov, Y.V.Dubasov, G.A. Zolotukhin, A.M. Matushchenko. St. Petersburg. The Khlopin RadonInstitute. 1992, 195 pp:ill. Republished with support from the IAEA in 1999 in bothRussian and English.2. The Northern Test Range: Expert Materials from the Russian Federationfrom Conference, Meeting, Symposium and Hearing Proceedings. [Severny ispytatelniypoligon: materiali ekspertov Rossiiskoi Federatsii na conferentsiakh, vstrechakh,simpoziumakh i slushaniyakh]. Issue 2. Misc. authors, Ed.: V.N. Mikhailov, Y.V.Dubasov, G.A. Zolotukhin, A.M. Matushchenko. St. Petersburg. The Khlopin RadonInstitute. 1993, 405:ill.3. Novaya Zemlya. Volume 3. Ed. P.V. Boyarsky, A.M. Matushchenko, G.A.Kaurov, G.A. Krasilov, K.V. Kharitonov. “The Nuclear Test Range without the TopSecret Seal (Dates and Events, May 1990–December 1992) [Yadnerny poligon bez grifa316

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYsekretnosti (daty, sobytiya, mai 1990–dek. 1992)]. Moscow: Russian Scientific ResearchInstitute for Cultural and Natural Legacy, 1994. 54–67.4. Novaya Zemlya. Volume 3. Ed. P.V. Boyarsky. K.N. Adrianov, V.G.Safronov. “Radioecological Conditiosn at the Russian Federation’s Central Test Range.”[Radioekologicheskoye sostoyaniye Tsentralnogo poligona Rossiiskoi Federatsii].Moscow: Russian Scientific Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Legacy, 1994.68–75.5. The Nuclear Archipelago [ Yaderny arkhipelag]. (Compiled by B.I.Orogorodnikov). Moscow: IzdAT, 1995 256:ill.Monographs6. The Northern Test Range (Novaya Zemlya). The RadioekologicalConsequences of Nuclear Tests [Severniy poligon (Novaya Zemlya). Radioekologicheskiyeposledstviya yadernikh ispytanii.] Ivanov, A.B., Logachev, V.A., Matushchenko, A.M.,Safronov, V.G., et al. Moscow: State Institute for Applied Ecology, 1997. 85:ill.7. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. The Novaya Zemlya Test Range. Ensuringthe General and Radiation Safety of Nuclear Tests. [Yaderniye ispytaniye SSSR.Novozemelsky poligon. Obespecheniye obschei i radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti yadernikhispytanii]. Misc. authors, Ed. V.A. Logachev. Moscow: IzdAT, 487: ill.8. Novaya Zemlya. Book 2 Part 2. Ed. P.V. Boyarsky. Matushchenko, A.M.,Naglis, Y.A., Zolotukhin, G.E., Kovalev, V.I., Popov, P.M., Solomonov, A.A., Chernyshev,A.K. “The Nuclear Test Range without the Top Secret Seal (Dates and Events, January1993–December 1998)” [Yadnerny poligon bez grifa sekretnosti (daty, sobytiya, yanv.1993–dek. 1998)]. Russian Scientific Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Legacy,2000. 87–109.9. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. Modern Radioecological Conditions at TestRanges. [Yaderniye ispytaniye SSSR. Sovremennoye radioekologicheskoye sostoyaniyepoligonov]. Misc. authors, Ed. Logachev, V.A. Moscow: IzdAT, 2002. 639:ill.10. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. Nuclear Tests in the Arctic, Scientific Publicationsand Monographs. [Yaderniye ispytaniya SSSR. Yaderniye ispytaniya v Arktike, nauchnopublits.monografiya.] Book 1, Volume 2, Section 1. “Radioecological Conditions at theRussia’s Central Test Range and the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago [Radioekologicheskiyeobstanovka na Tsentralnom poligone Rossii i arkhipelag Novaya Zemlya]. Variousauthors, Ed. Logachev, V.A. Moscow: Kartush Publishing, 2006. 9–201.Historiography11. Map of Novaya Zemlya. A Natural and Cultural Legacy [Prirodnoye ikulturnoye naslediye]. Ed., P.V. Boyarsky, A.A. Lyuty. Moscow: RNII KPN, 1995.12. Novaya Zemlya. A Natural and Cultural Legacy. A History of Discoveries.Map Legend and Explanations. [Novaya Zemlya. Prirodnoye i kulturnoye naslediye.Istoria otkrytii. Ukazateli, poyasnitelny tekst k karte]. (11) Reference material. Ed., P.V.Boyarsky, A.A. Lyuty. Moscow: RNII KPN, 1996. 212: ill.13. Novaya Zemlya. Nature, History, Archeology, Culture. [Novaya Zemlya.Priroda. Istoria. Arkheologiya. Kultura]. Book 2, Chapter 1. Ed. Ed., P.V. Boyarsky.Moscow: RNII KPN, 1998. 275: ill.317

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYPeaceful Nuclear Explosions in the USSR: Hopes and RealitiesAlbert VasilyevDirector, International Center for EnvironmentalSafety under the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, MoscowVladimir KasatkinDepartment Head, PromTechnologia ScientificInstitute, MoscowWe begin with a brief overview of the industrial nuclear explosions that wereconducted. Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were conducted in the USSR overthe course of 23 years. The first explosion took place in January 15, 1965 in order toform the artificial reservoir at the Semipalatinsk testing range. The last explosion tookplace on September 6, 1988 near the City of Kotlas in the Arkhangelsk Oblast for thepurposes of deep seismic sounding in the Earth’s crust. A total of 125 1 explosions wereconducted using 135 nuclear explosive devices, including:• 81 tests (84 devices) in Russia;• 39 explosions (46 devices) in Kazakhstan;• 2 explosions in Uzbekistan;• 2 explosions in Ukraine;• 1 explosion in Turkmenistan.Table 1 shows a breakdown of peaceful nuclear explosions in the USSR by theirpurpose. Twenty years have passed since the last explosion. The results are now clearer,and one can compare what has been achieved with the intended goals and identify thesuccesses and the failures.Both in the United States and the USSR, peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) wereprimarily used to create canals, reservoirs, harbors, etc. (i.e., these were excavatingexplosions). “Clean” devices were needed for these projects — where the energy releasewas caused primarily by thermonuclear reactions. This complex task was quicklyaccomplished in the USSR thanks to the efforts of the All-Russian Scientific ResearchCenter for Technical Physics (a state-run nuclear center known as VNIIEF) and All-Russian Scientific Research Center for Experimental Physics (a state-run nuclearcenter known as VNIITF), which competed as rivals. The nuclear device tested at theSemipalatinsk range (~140 kilotons) was comprised of an initial assembly (by VNIITF),1A number of publications say that there were 124 explosions. The difference is whether to considerexplosions detonated under the same name using two devices located in two holes, as in thefirst test to improve the Grachev oil deposit, as one or two explosions (the Butan test, March 30,1965). We count them as two explosions, since two independent cavities formed underground.318

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYa transition module (by VNIIEF) and a primary module that ensured the assignedcapacity was achieved (by VNIITF). Thermonuclear energy accounted for ~99.8% of thetested device’s energy. Furthermore, the use of gaseous deuterium ensured a minimumof residual tritium. The construction of the nuclear device included materials that gaverise to the least possible amount of induced activity.Table 1. A Breakdown of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions by PurposeExplosion PurposeNumber ofExplosions (devices)Project Codesand Number ofExplosions1 2 3 41. Industrial Research and Industrial Explosions1. Deep seismic sounding2.3.Creation ofindustrial testingpremisesOil and gas wellstimulation39 (39), Russia – 33,Kazakhstan – 626 (26), Russia – 20,Kazakhstan – 621 (21), Russia – 21Globus (4), Region(5), Meridian (3),Gorizont (4), Rubin(2), Kimberlit (3),Kraton (4), Batolit (2),Shpat, Rift (3), Kvartz(3), AgatMagistral, Sapfir (2),Neva, Vega (15), Lira(6), TavdaButan (5), Gryphon(2), Benzol, Geliy (5),Angara, Oka, Vyatka,Sheksna, Neva (3),Takhta-Kugulta4.Elimination ofaccidental gasblowouts5 (5) Uzbekistan– 2, Turkmenistan – 1,Ukraine – 1, Russia – 1Urta-Bulak, Pamuk,Krater, Fakel, Pirit5.Burial of industrialwaste2 (2) Russia – 2 Kama (2)6. Breaking up ore bodies 2 (3) Russia – 2 (3) Dnepr (2)7.Creating waterreservoirs1 (1) Kazakhstan – 1 Chagan8.9.Preventing gasfrom escaping incoal bedsCreating parts of thePechora-Kama Canal1 (1) Ukraine – 1 Klivazh1 (3) Russia – 1 (3) Taiga319

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY10.Creating dams fortailings ponds1(1) Russia – 1 KristallSubtotal 99 (102)1 2 3 42. Tests and Scientific Experiments (all in Kazakhstan)1. Creating premises 9 (14) Azgir2. Creating sinkholes 4 (4) 1-T, 2-T, 6-T, A-93.4.5.6.Creating waterreservoirs andcanalsForming an incline forthe construction of adamDevelopingtechnologies for theburial of radioactiveproducts of theexplosionScientificexperimentsSubotal 26 (33)TOTAL 125 (135)3 (5) Sary-Uzen, Telkem (2)1 (1) Lazurit2 (2) Shtolni 148-1, 148-57 (7) AzgirFurthermore, in order to ensure that a special burial system was developed for thedevice that would help remove most fission fragments and unreacted material from theexplosion zone, which can reduce the atmospheric emissions produced by the explosiondozens of times over. This system was used in the Dnepr project.The device that was created was a good one, one that we can be proud of. It isdisplayed in the VNIITF museum. But its use is prohibited by the Test Ban Treaty of1963, which does not allow any release of radioactive products into the atmosphere.The techniques used to detect them achieved such a high level that we can now detectindividual radionuclides at state boundaries. That is why the “nuclear lake” that wascreated in 1965 at the Semipalatinsk test range has remained the only used result ofexcavating explosions.Proposals had been made to use nuclear explosions at the Pechoro-Kolvinskelevation in order to construct the Pechora-Kama canal. As part of a test explosion, three“clean” devices with a capacity of 15 kilotons each were planted at a depth of 128 metersand formed a part of the future canal (a trench) measuring 700 meters long, 300 meterswide and 10–15 meters deep. The next test was supposed to use improved devices thatwould produce four times less the amount of fission fragments. But the test was notpermitted due to the potential detection of radionuclides beyond the boundaries of the320

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYUSSR; the Nuclear Ministry’s team, which had already arrived at the site, was forcedto return. The boreholes were filled in, and the devices were not planted. However, as aresult, a number of articles about “forgotten” nuclear devices left in boreholes appeared,as well as articles about heavy pollution of the area in the explosion zone and a largenumber of radiation victims, etc.Contained explosions were the most successful. The first contained explosionswere conducted by VNIIEF and used modifications of nuclear devices created originallyfor defense purposes. This use was justified, as it was important to assess the generalcapabilities, financial factors and environmental safety of nuclear explosive technologies.Only real tests could demonstrate the accuracy of calculated estimates, including ofradiation and seismic safety.In order to support the widespread use of peaceful nuclear explosions, it wasnecessary to create specialized nuclear devices that would take into account therequirements of clients, such as the minimization of total (production and drilling)expenses, which could withstand high pressure and temperatures, which could betransported on all modes of transportation, and be safe and convenient to use in remoteregions of the country.These devices were produced at VNIITF. The most commonly used (55 explosions)were 260-mm caliber devices that could work at temperatures of up to 80°С and pressureof up to 500 atm. It had more than a dozen different modifications and a wide rangeof capacities. The most frequently used capacity modifications were 3.5, 8.5 and 13.5kilotons of TNT equivalent. One of the modifications has, regardless of the capacity, arecord low amount of residual tritium at less than 0.1 grams, which is an important factorwhen working at oil and gas deposits when developing hydrocarbon deposits.A device with 182 mm caliber can withstand pressure of up to 700 atm andtemperatures of up to 150°С. It is irreplaceable for geophysicists, since a drilling rigcapable of drilling a hole for it can be delivered via helicopter to even the most remotelocations, just like borehole casing and the device itself. During development, thedesigners managed to ensure the safety of the nuclear explosions even in emergencyconditions, including the crash of an airplane or helicopter.As a result, Sredmash (the Ministry of Nuclear Energy) provided the opportunity touse nuclear explosion technologies in order to meet client needs.The use of complex scientific technologies requires compliance with strict nucleardiscipline and a high level of preliminary analysis of all potential consequences.Unfortunately, not all of the participants of these projects met these requirements. Theproblem itself was relatively complicated. The impact of a powerful explosion on arock bed, complex physical and chemical processes and the interaction of the resultingcompounds, and their migration from the explosion zone could not be preciselycalculated, even using the best calculation methods of the time. Many clients did nothave these kinds of mathematical capabilities or even solid computer systems. Thebest options for calculations were seen at the nuclear centers — VNIIEF and VNIITF.But unfortunately, they were not kept very involved in the development of the projectsthemselves.The most effective use of peaceful nuclear explosions was to put out accidentalgas blowouts that burned millions of cubic meters of gas daily and struck an enormousblow to the country’s economy and environment. The explosions were detonated at a321

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYsubstantial depth (1.5–2.5 km) in a thick, low-permeable rock bed (salt or clay), which iswhy the products of the explosion were safely entombed in the molten rock. However, intwo of five tests, the blowouts were not put out permanently and again rose up, althoughwith significantly smaller output they made it easier to eliminate using traditionalmeans.The main reason these tests did not succeed was insufficiently precise knowledgeof the location of the problem borehole. Its location was determined with a large marginof error, since the drillers were not overly concerned about being exact. As a rule, bythe time the device was planted in the borehole, the space between the device and theborehole in question was much greater than the one for which the device’s capacity wasselected.The most common use was for deep seismic sounding of the Earth’s crust. A totalof 39 explosions were conducted for these purposes, and even concurrent explosionswere used under other programs, in addition to test explosions at the Semipalatinsk testrange. The large capacity of the seismic source, the precise knowledge of its locationand the exact moment of the explosion made it possible for geophysicists to determinethe boundaries of layers and their properties with great precision. The large depth atwhich the devices were placed, the ability to select the requisite layer of rock and fillthe borehole with a cement mixture should, it seemed, fully rule out the escape of evennoble gases to the surface. Unfortunately, the poor quality of the cementing — especiallyat the mouth of the borehole — the poor selection of the location and technical violationsduring drilling led to the pollution of a territory measuring 60×100 m 2 around theborehole during the Globus-1 test near Kineshma. That happened even when the device— with a force of just 2.3 kilotons of TNT equivalent — was detonated at a depth of577 meters. The proximity to the banks of the river means that additional protectivemeasures must be taken to prevent radionuclides from entering the water.An even more dangerous situation arose during the Kraton-3 test in Yakutia. There,geologists had proposed an abandoned damaged borehole for the test, and only the upperpart of the borehole, which was permafrost, was cemented closed; the permafrost meltedunder the heat of the cement. As a result, the borehole was barely sealed at all, andwhen the explosion took place, radionuclides were released. A radioactive trail roughly30 kilometers long resulted. The external radiation dose received by the experimentparticipants amounted to 90–150 mSv. The level of radiation measured 9 days afterthe explosion was ~1 R/hr near the borehole, ~10 mR/hr within 10 km along the trail,and ~50 µR/hr at a distance of 30 km. The territory surrounding the borehole has beenrecultivated, the polluted soil has been removed, and a burial ground — a flat hill 2meters high and measuring 10×30 m 3 — has been formed.Then-Minister Yefim Slavsky issued an order forbidding further use of oldboreholes.The technology used to create storage cavities in rock salt was primarilydeveloped in tests performed at the Galit range (Azgir, Kazakhstan, the GurievskOblast). The earliest uses of underground nuclear explosions for the purposes of creatingunderground storage facilities for gas condensate close to the city of Orenburg confirmedthe high level of cost effectiveness and environmental safety. Explosions and fires thatsometimes occurred in metal container lots were thereby ruled out, and the burning of322

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYgas condensate, a valuable chemical raw material, and the pollution of the air by thehydrogen sulfide contained in gas condensate ceased.The device created by VNIITF could withstand an impact from an explosion inneighboring boreholes, which made it possible to conduct group explosions — 2, 4 and6 explosions with intervals of 5 minutes between them. This was done first during theVega tests at the Aksarai gas condensate field in the Astrakhan Oblast. This providedan additional economic and psychological impetus, since the cessation of hazardouswork at nearby companies, the warnings issued to people in nearby villages — andsometimes their evacuation — took place once a month instead of six times each month.Interestingly enough, our colleagues in the United States never did decide to use thismethod of group explosions.However, the Vega tests did involve some miscalculations that resulted from theselection of the location of the 15 reservoirs. Calculations had the ideal depth for thereservoirs at 700–1,000 meters. With great depths, increased lithostatic pressure and theplasticity of the salt lead to a gradual decrease in the volume of the cavity. The speed ofthis process grows as temperatures rise and given the absence of any internal pressurewithin the cavity.Sufficient studies of the properties of the salt were not conducted at the selectedsite. As it turned out later, both the temperature and the pressure at a depth of ~1,000 kmwere higher than usual for this depth, while the salt layer featured a number of seamsof anhydrite and gypsum, in addition to water lenses. Furthermore, the explosions wereconducted precisely according to plan, while operations at the facility for processing gascondensate were delayed. As a result, the empty cavities began to gradually fill in, andwater entered some of these cavities, which led to radionuclides being washed out of thesalt that covered the molten rock.Nevertheless, an analysis of the results of all of the tests to create storage facilitiesin rock salt confirm that, given the proper selection of location, the technology usingthe timely sealing of cavities and their pressurization and filling with gas or anotherhydrocarbon under pressure is very cost effective, ensures radioactive safety, and makesit possible to create storage volumes in very short periods of time. The volume of eachcavity depends on the power of the explosion (~3,000 m 3 /kiloton) and may amountto dozens of thousands of cubic meters. Suitable salt deposits can be found in manyRussian regions. In total, 26 cavities were formed, one of which was formed in clay (theTavda test in the Tyumen Oblast). This test demonstrated that durable cavities that arepreserved long after the explosion can be created only in rock salt. Clay is not suitablefor these purposes.Well stimulation for oil and gas extraction (21 explosions) was one of the first usesof contained explosions (the Butan test at the Grachev deposit in Bashkortostan, 1965).The first explosions at the depleted Grachev deposit helped increase well capacity, slowthe decrease in extraction and increase the rate of oil recovery. Even better results wereachieved by the combined use of explosive impact (1980) and subsequently pumpingcasinghead gas into the well.The cost-efficiency of technologies strongly depends on oil prices. A more objectiveand independent assessment compares electricity generated from burning additional oilat thermal power plants (~150,000 tons per explosion) and electricity generated fromburning fission products of nuclear devices at an NPP. This assessment showed the high323

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcost-efficiency (3–7 times) of well stimulation technology.Unfortunately, after the start of perestroika and President Gorbachev’s policies, notonly were nuclear tests ceased, but peaceful explosions were also stopped, which led tothe end of efforts to introduce new applications for nuclear explosions or research intothe additional effects of explosive impact on oil beds discovered in a number of tests.Furthermore, as often happens when introducing new, complex technologies, someflaws were discovered that led to the spread of radionuclides ( 137 Cs and 90 Sr) in theextracted products and the contamination of equipment. Although this contaminationdoes not present any danger to the health of the workers or the environment, it has beenand continues to be one reason for the inflation of radiophobia in newspaper articles.Strict compliance with all technological requirements and the proper selection offacilities for its use (nuclear explosions can’t be detonated just anywhere!) will providea substantial economic effect and ensure the radiation safety of personnel.The burial of industrial biohazards (2 explosions in the Kama-2 and Kama-1tests near the towns of Sterlitamak and Salavat in Bashkortostan) in deep geologicalformations can help prevent or significantly reduce the pollution of surface waters.Experience gained in the use of two boreholes over the course of 30 years has proventhe cost-effectiveness of this technology and its safety. As per the request of clients, aproject to extend the service life of both of these facilities is currently underway. Over30 years, over 35 million cubic meters of highly-mineralized waste was buried at Kama-2, and every day the borehole receives 4,000–5,000 cubic meters of waste, or whatwould ordinarily require 10–15 ordinary boreholes. Unlike ordinary boreholes, thesecavities do not require regular breaks for washing out the borehole. Several additionalexplosions were planned so that all of the waste produced by the Sterlitamak sodiumcarbonate plant and the Salavat petrochemical plant could be dumped into the boreholewithout dilution with water. These plans were stymied by both objective and subjectivereasons.Breaking up ore bodies using nuclear explosions was done in two Dnepr tests atthe Kuelpor apatite ore deposit near the town of Kirovsk on the Kola Peninsula. The testsused “clean” devices with a minimum of fission fragments and incorporated a systemfor the removal of fission products and remaining fissile material in the burial chamberoutside of the explosion zone and outside of the ore body. The studies conducted afterthe explosions showed that 85–90% of the radionuclides escaped the burial chamber.The ore was broken down into smaller fragments than they would have been usingtypical mining technology, and the ore poured freely from the taphole onto to the lowerlevel in the required volumes.In the Dnepr 1 test, the device explosion (powered at 2.1 kilotons) broke down ablock of ore measuring 50×50×50 m 3 .In Dnepr-2, two devices measuring 1.7 kilotons each broke up an ore blockmeasuring 50×125×90 m 3 .An analysis of the samples of the ore showed that the concentration of radionuclideswithin them did not exceed allowable levels.Radiation conditions at work places were the same as background radiation levels.Only the concentration of tritium in mining water exceeded allowable levels for drinkingwater by 1.5–2 times. After it came into contact with the local stream, the tritium324

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYconcentration became significantly lower and within allowable levels for drinking waterdue to dilution.As a result, the peaceful nuclear explosions that have been conducted have shownthat on the one hand, it is possible to use nuclear explosions to resolve a full rangeof important issues, affirming their high cost-efficiency given that both seismic andradiation safety is ensured.On the other hand, some concerns were also confirmed: procedural violations,insufficient knowledge of the properties of the environments in which the explosions areconducted, or the lack of consideration for these factors can lead to potential pollutionof the environment and contamination of extracted resources.And although there was not one case in which pollution presented a considerablehazard, it did serve as a reason for protests against the use of nuclear explosions, andsuspicions about the harm to the health of the local residents and personnel working atthese facilities. These concerns and suspicions of trickery on the part of the “nuclearpeople” and the authorities gave rise to more worry, which caused more harm to thehealth of local residents than the actual radiation.As we have gained more knowledge and experience, nuclear explosives and relatedtechnologies have improved. Experience has shown us that not all of the proposedtechnologies provide the expected results, although we do hope that the same positiveeffects that were achieved during the course of peaceful nuclear explosion programswill be examined in depth and standardized, so that it will be easier to implement themin the future.Below is a brief overview of the current state of peaceful nuclear explosion facilities,the protective measures that have been taken and the rehabilitation efforts conducted atcertain facilities in Russia.Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in the Russian Federation: Today’s Conditionsand ProblemsFrom 1965–1988, a total of 81 underground peaceful nuclear explosions wereconducted on Russian territory. The explosions were detonated at 50 different sites in18-21 of the subjects of the Russian Federation in all seven federal districts (see Figure1 and Table 2).After the introduction of the moratorium on underground nuclear explosions, thefederal-owned VNIPI-PromTechnology continued, as the primary entity, to researchradiation conditions and the design of rehabilitation efforts at the facilities whereindustrial underground nuclear explosions were previously conducted. This workincluded geo-radioecological monitoring research, research into the conditions ofradiation safety, assessment of radiation conditions and radiation certification of miningoutput, designing subsurface storage facilities for radioactive waste, special miningsections, designing decontamination measures, recultivation, monitoring, industrialradiation monitoring and drafting of safety regulations.325

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 2. Peaceful Underground Nuclear Explosions on Russian TerritoryFederal District(number ofexplosions)Subject of the RFSites of PeacefulNuclear ExplosionsNumber ofExplosionsCentral (1) Ivanovsk Oblast Globus-1 1Northwest(10)The North Caucasus(17)Privolzhye (20)Republic of KomiGlobus-3,4,Gorizont-1,4Kvartz-2Arkhangelsk OblastAgat, Globus-2,Rubin-13Murmansk Oblast Dnepr 2Nenets AutonomousDistrictPirit 1Republic of Kalmykia Region-4 1Stavropol Krai Takhta-Kugulta 1Astrakhan Oblast Vega 15Republic ofBashkortostanOrenburg OblastPerm OblastThe Urals (8) Tyumen Oblast Tavda 1Siberia (13)Butan (5explosions), Kama-1, Kama-2Magistral,Region-1,2, Sapfir (2explosions)Geliy (5 explosions),Taiga, Grifon (2explosions)Khanti-MansiiskAutonomousDistrictYamalo-NenetsAutonomousDistrictUst-OrdynskBuryatskAutonomousDistrictAngara, Benzol,Kvartz-3, Kimberlit-1,Kraton-1Gorizont-2, Rubin-2 2Meteorit-4, Rift-3 2Krasnoyarsk Krai Kraton-2, Rift-4 2Chitinsk Oblast Meteorit-5 17585326

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Far East (12)Kemerovo Oblast Kvartz-4 1Taimyr AutonomousDistrictEvensk AutonomousDistrictRepublic of Sakha(Yakutia)Gorizont-3,Rift-1,Meteorit-2Meteorit-3,Batolit-1,Kimberlit-3,Shpat-2Oka, Gorizont-4,Kraton-3, 4,Kimberlit-4, Kristall,Vyatka, Sheksna, Neva(4 explosions)3412Total: 81Figure 1. The locations where underground nuclear explosionsfor peaceful purposes were conducted in the USSR.Based on the potential radiation hazards presented by the sites where peacefulnuclear explosions were conducted, they can be placed into 3 categories (see Table 3).327

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTables 4 and 5 include data on the current state of radiation safety at a number of thesites.Problems Ensuring Safety of Peaceful Nuclear Explosion SitesAll underground nuclear explosion facilities are potential radiation hazards. That iswhy regular radioecological monitoring of these facilities is mandatory.In order to prevent the spread of anthropogenic radionuclides, it is necessary todesign and organize a special mining section in the protected block. One challenge is thelack of clarity in terms of how the molten rock containing plutonium would behave afterlong-term contact with water.The main problem is the uncertainty of the legal status of underground nuclearexplosion facilities. Regular radiation monitoring has been assigned only for thosefacilities that operated within the central zones of the explosions (Butan, Vega, Geliy,Grifon, Kama-1, and Kama-2). At the other facilities, radiation monitoring is conductedperiodically by the radiation safety laboratory under VNIPI-PromTechnology ascommissioned by RosAtom and in some cases, as commissioned by the administrationsof the respective constituents of the Russian Federation or a resource manager.Below are descriptions and photographs of the different peaceful nuclear explosionfacilities.Globus-1In 2002, VNIPI-PromTechnology designed the Globus-1 Rehabilitation Project,which envisaged the construction of a canal to redirect the Shacha River (Figures 2 and3) and some work to contain the boreholes and install a containment screen.Table 3. Classification of Underground Nuclear Explosion Sites:Potential Radiation HazardsFacility ClassFacilities and Influencing FactorsHigh risk– Sites where the premises are polluted by radionuclides as the resultof accidental or planned emissions of some radioactive productsfrom explosions (Taiga, Kristall, Globus-1, Kraton-3)– Sites where parts of the premises are polluted and which featuresubsurface storage sites for radioactive waste that formed as theresult of research in central explosion zones or during boreholerepair work (Globus-1, Kama-1,2, Kraton-3, Sapfir, Vega, Grifon,and others)– Sites with the continued escape of radionuclides from fluidsthat are extracted or escape onto the Earth’s surface and into theenvironment (Butan, Geliy, Grifon, Globus-1, Dnepr, and others)– Sites where the central zone is being used for a project (Kama-1,Kama-2)– Sites where brine created by salt formations is “pressed out” fromthe central explosion zones (Vega, cavities 1T, 2T, 5T, 7T, 8T, 9T,Sapfir, Magistral)328

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYProblematicPotentiallyhazardous–Sites located within resource exploration and development zoneson licensed territories (Kvartz-3, Kimberlit-1, Rubin-2, Rift-1,Gorizont-2, Tavda, Benzol, Angara, Pirit, and others)– Sites where the central explosion zones are impacted by artesianpressure while the cement inside the stemming structure and thehole clearance is cracking and ageing, and the metal is corroding– All underground nuclear explosion sites in the event ofunauthorized intended or accidental drilling or other work in theexplosion zonesFigure 2. The Globus-1 water drainage channel (2004).329

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 4. Key Data on Unsafe FacilitiesFacilityMain Radioecological Factors that DetermineRadiation ConditionsGlobus-1,Ivanov OblastAn explosion for deep seismic sounding of the Earth’s crust.An explosion resulting in a critical radiation situation. Theearly escape of gaseous and volatile explosion products wasobserved. The escape of radioactive water and slime tookplace during examination of the explosion zone. Radioactivewater could potentially leave the cavity and enter the activewater cycle zone through the casing of the borehole where thedevice was buried. Along the stems of the boreholes that wereexamined, radioactive water is escaping from the explosionzone onto the Earth’s surface. There are surface storage areasfor radioactive soil that are not serviced, and are erodedby atmospheric precipitation, which leads to radioactivepollution of the Earth’s surface (up to 50 µSv/hr in 2005). Thedesign of a water drainage channel from the river has beencompleted. A project for the physical containment of buriedradioactive waste has been drafted, as well as waterproofingthe shafts and mouths of the boreholes and rehabilitatingthe area and monitoring the facility. This project has beenpartially completed.Kraton-3, Republic ofSakha, (Yakutia)A deep seismic sounding explosion resulting in an unexpectedradiation situation. The early escape of undissolved explosionproduct mixtures was observed, including plutonium isotopes,and the formation of an extensive trail of contaminated soil.Decontamination of the area has been conducted. Thereare surface burial areas for radionuclide-polluted soil andequipment that has been subject to erosion from atmosphericprecipitation. In 2006, work was conducted on additionalwaterproofing of the burial area. Large areas of the territoryare polluted with T, 137 Cs, 90 Sr and in some places Pu.330

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYKristall, Republic ofSakha (Yakutia)A test explosion for the construction of dams by looseningbedrock. The heap is contained by a clean layer of rock severalmeters deep and is an improvised burial area of radioactivecarbonate rock. In 2005–2006 additional decontamination ofthe territory of the nearest radionuclide pollution (includingplutonium) trail was conducted by using clean soil forcontainment. The facility has been fenced off and warningsigns have been put in place. In July 2002, experts fromVNIPI-PromTechnology detected traces of tritium in samplesof mineralized water from the sides of the pit at UdachninskMining Plot (2 km from the facility) The migration of thetritium had been predicted. Geo-radioecological monitoringis required.Taiga, Perm KraiAn experimental explosion for the construction of a canal inwater-bearing cavities. As a result of the excavating explosioninvolving three nuclear devices, a heap and a water reservoirwere formed. Part of the heap is polluted with radionuclideproducts from the explosion, including transuraniumelements in the form of varying levels of disruption of slaggranules. The exposure rate measures up to 14 µSv/hr. Theactivity of the water in the reservoir is primarily caused bytritium. Measures are needed to contain the territory aroundthe facility to close it off from recreational or business use. Aproject has been drafted for creating a health protection zone.This project has not been completed due to lack of funding.FacilityTable 5. Key Data on Facilities with Radioactivity on theEarth’s Surface (operational and preserved facilities)Main Radioecological Factors that DetermineRadiation ConditionsButan, Republic ofBashkortostanExplosions for oil well stimulation purposes andincreasing well output at dry deposits. The products thatare extracted, primarily associated gas, are polluted withtritium. The pollution of the water that forms during gasburning exceeds allowable levels.331

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYGrifon, Perm KraiGeliy, Perm KraiExplosions for oil well stimulation and increasing welloutput at a flooded well. The use of the facilities withouta planned burial system for associated water in specialboreholes led to the spread of T, 137 Cs and 90 Sr throughoutthe entire deposit and the contamination of equipmentand the land. At present, planned decontamination of theterritory and the burial of soil in an equipped solid wasteburial site.Explosions for oil well stimulation and increasing well outputat a deposit supported with pressure pumping. Productsextracted in the explosion zone are polluted with tritium.At present, these zones are not operational. The reason theproject was halted is the lack of gas pumping. This led tothe appearance of tritium in extracted resources in 2006 (inassociated gas) and may lead to flooding of the explosionzones and to contamination of the territory, the industrialzone equipment, the oil pipelines and beyond.Kama-1, Republic ofBashkortostanAn explosion with the purpose to create a facility for the burialof liquid industrial runoff. Planned pumping with petrochemicalproducts is underway. When this area was being developed, therewas an accidental emission of radioactive water. The territorywas decontaminated and an improvised surface burial area forsoil polluted with radionuclides and equipment was formed.Magistral,Orenburg OblastSapfir, OrenburgOblastAn explosion to create a cavity in a salt rock formation. Thefacility was used for 18 years, and is currently being containedand prepared for closure. There are surface burial areas forradionuclide-polluted soil on site. If unauthorized drillingtakes place, it could lead to the escape of radioactive brine tothe surface.Explosions with the purpose of creating cavities in a rocksalt formation. This facility is currently in operation. Thereare surface burial areas for soil polluted by radionuclides.Radioactive brine is stored in the cavities. Procedural ortechnical failures could lead to the escape of radioactive brineto the surface.332

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYVegaAngara, Khanti-MansiiskAutonomousDistrictPirit, NenetsAutonomousDistrictExplosions meant to create cavities in a rock salt formation.Of 15 drilled cavities on the territory, six have an increasedradioactive background. Most significantly, contaminationlevels of up to 90 µSv/hr have been recorded of the groundsurface and equipment at three production units. Plans toeliminate a number of cavities also pose a radiation hazard andrequire protective measures. A project to close the 2T cavityand bury part of the brine in 12T has been completed.One explosion meant to extract oil from low-permeabilitycollection layers. Two boreholes drilled into the cavity wereconnected with the upper strata of the water table. Casingheadgas from the explosion zone and water escaping duringthe unsealing of the boreholes were polluted with tritium. Thedeposit is being developed without any regard for the presenceof the Angara facilities at the site. In 2002, containment anddisposal efforts related to the boreholes were completed at thefacility.The Kumzhinsk gas condensate deposit. An explosion meantto close the boreholes of an accidental gas blowout. Requiresradiation control at the deposit, organization of a special miningarea and a number of rehabilitation efforts. The facility is locatedon the territory of the Nenets State Preserve.Benzol, Khanti-MansiiskAutonomous DistrictTavda, TyumenOblastAn explosion for the purposes of oil well stimulation. TheSrednye-Balykskoye oil deposit. The borehole in which thedevice was placed did not explode. The nearest lot of operationalboreholes (3,140) have been preserved and are not being used.Requires a special mining area. At present, repair, containmentand disposal works are underway.The facility is located in Protected Zone 3 of the Velizhanskwater intake, which supplies the city of Tyumen withdrinking water. Requires continuous radiation monitoringand a ban on drilling in the protected area near the centralexplosion zone.333

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 3. The general view of the territory of the Globus-1 facilities (2001).The water drainage channel should play a positive role and prevent streams fromapproaching the industrial zone. This project has undergone the required approvalprocess. The Governor has assigned temporary responsibility for the maintenance of thefacility to the administration of the Kineshma Rayon in the Ivanovsk Oblast.In 2003–2004, the water drainage channel was equipped. Further progress on theproject was halted due to a lack of funding.Kraton-3In 2001, VNIPI-PromTechnology projects were drafted, agreed and approved forthe rehabilitation of the Kraton-3 facility. In 2007, the project was partially completedwith the contribution of ALROSA’s Aikhal Mining Plant and the participation ofVNIPI-PromTechnology representatives. Other exploratory work was conducted, andthe waterproofing of the waste storage facility was improved (see Figures 4 and 5).Furthermore, the offtake shaft was reconstructed, warning signs were posted aroundthe health protection zone, and some of the planned observation wells were drilled andequipped.334

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 4. A view of the industrial zone and the radioactive trail at the Kraton-3 facility (1999).Figure 5. The waterproofing cover of the trench storage facility for radioactive waste at theKraton-3 facility (April 2007).KristallIn 1992, decontamination of the subsidence craters in the epicentral zone and apart of the radioactive trail by filling these zones with a layer of waste rock from theUdachnaya pipe pit. The filled area formed a mound of waste rock in the form of atruncated cone with a diameter of 220 meters and a height ranging from seven to 20meters (see Figures 6 and 7).335

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 6. A view of the Udachnaya pipe pit.In 2006–2007, using a design by VNIPI-PromTechnology, ALROSA’s UdachninskMining Plant conducted additional rehabilitation efforts to reinforce and expand theprotective screen, fence off the facility and establish a health protection zone.Figure 7. Photographs of the “sarcophagus” over the epicentral zone of theKristall facility after rehabilitation efforts (December 2006).TaigaAs of July 2001, this facility looks like an oval, closed water reservoir in theform of a natural lake measuring up to 750 meters in length and 350 meters in width.Radiometric scans have revealed the radioactive properties of the area. Compared to theresults of a 1990 study, the radiation level has fallen 5–7 times.A project to delimit a health protection zone measuring 1000 × 600 m 2 had beendrafted. It includes the water reservoir, a heap and part of the surrounding territory.336

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure. 8. A view of the Taiga facility (July 2001).)DneprFigure 9. The production layout after the explosion at theexperimental bloc at the Dnepr facility.337

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 10. A view of the area before the bridge to the closed gangwayat the Dnepr facility (2002).GrifonFigure 11. Unloading polluted soil and equipment into solid waste storagecontainers at the Grifon facility.338

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 12. Unloading polluted soil and equipment into the solid waste storagepoint at the Grifon facility.Deep Seismic Sounding Facilities (“abandoned”)Figure 13. The Rift 3 facility, Irkutsk Oblast (July 2003).339

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 14. The Meteorit-5 facility, Chitinsk Oblast (2003).Figure 15. The Rubin-2 facility, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District (2006).340

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 15. The Angara facility (2001).341

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Semipalatinsk Test Site, Exploring the Nuclear Underworld:A Beginner’s Guide to Radiation Levels in Cavities Created byUnderground Nuclear ExplosionsSamat SmagulovSenior Scientific Collaborator, State Institute forApplied Ecology, SaratovAnatoliy MatushchenkoAdvisor to the Department Head, RosAtom;Co-chairman, Interagency Expert Commission onAssessing Radiation Safety of Underground NuclearTests; Professor, Scientific Research Institute for PulseTechnology, MoscowAleksandr KiryukhinRosAtom Situation Crisis CenterIntroductionEighteen years have passed since the last nuclear test was conducted at Borehole1365 on October 19, 1989 at the Semipalatinsk test site. That day the Soviet Unionceased to exist, while its member republics became sovereign states. On August 29,1991, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev issued an order to stop testing at theSemipalatinsk test site.Before the site was closed, members of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk social movementspoke about the possibility that local residents may have been irradiated during the timeperiod when testing was conducted at the site. These people needed financial support,social assistance and rehabilitation. Since those days, no one has thought about thepeople who participated in these tests or what assistance they might need. There havebeen no publications about the conditions under which they worked or what radiationexposure they received.The first part of this report presents experimental data on the radiation doses receivedby test participants under different scenarios that took place during underground nucleartesting in the Degelen Mountain tunnels at the Semipalatinsk test site. The second partof this report takes a look at the cavities created by underground nuclear tests conductedin the tunnels.Contributing Factors in the Irradiation of Underground Nuclear TestParticipantsThe Degelen Mountain is located approximately 100 km south of the Semipalatinsksite administrative and residential zone. Five staging areas were built for conductingunderground nuclear tests. Over the years of testing, a dense network of 181 horizontaltunnels was built here (4).The first underground nuclear test using a tunnel in the USSR was held at the342

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYSemipalatinsk test site (also known as Ministry of Defense National Central Test Site 2)on October 11, 1961. The last explosion at the site was held on October 19, 1989. In all,209 tests took place here (1).There were two years when there was an especially high number of test explosionsconducted at the site: 13 explosions were organized in both 1965 and 1978. Certaintunnels were used more than once.Salvo (multiple-device) explosions were also tested. Several nuclear charges wereplaced in the same tunnel or in two separate tunnels. The first salvo test was held onDecember 3, 1966, when two charges were placed in the same tunnel. The maximumnumber of charges detonated in the same tunnel was five.The first salvo explosion with one charge placed in each of two tunnels was heldon December 10, 1972. A total of 223 test devices were detonated at Semipalatinsk ina total of 209 tests conducted in tunnels (1, 3, 4). The main goals of these explosionswere to test nuclear devices and nuclear charges and to study the effects of explosionson surrounding rock formations and underground structures. The number of nuclear testsconducted in tunnels at the Semipalatinsk test site year to year is shown in Figure 1 (4).We know that there were a number of different radiation scenarios during theunderground nuclear tests that were conducted during this period. Let us look at theworking conditions of the personnel involved in the testing. The escape of radioactivegases, such as xenon and krypton isotopes, to the surface is not a violation of containmentrequirements. In terms of residual radioactive contamination, the early emission ofradioactive substances shortly after the explosion was particularly undesirable. Earlyemission carries with it 137 Cs and 89 Sr isotopes, which are the decay products from theirisobaric analogues, and 137 Xe and 89 Sr isotopes (1, 3, 4).Figure 1. The number of underground nuclear tunnels tests atSemipalatinsk through the years.The release of radioactive gases into the atmosphere during tests using boreholesoccurs either through cracks in the ground, the stemming complex, or along the cables.The latter is the most likely, which is why during the last tests, the top portions of theshafts were reinforced with cement. In addition to radioactive inert gases, tunnel teststypically could also release radioactive isotopes 131–135 I (1, 3).The direction of the released radioactive substances into the atmosphere (throughthe tunnel outlet or through the epicentral zone) depends on the temperature difference343

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYbetween the escaping gases and the ambient air. During cold weather conditions in thewinter, fall, and spring, radioactive gases escape through the epicentral zone, while inthe summer the radionuclides are more likely to escape through the tunnel opening. Justlike during borehole testing, the isotopic makeup of the radioactive substances enteringthe air of the work area depends on the initial release time and its age. For typical (safe)radiation conditions, there is no persistent contamination of the area due to the shorthalf-life of the resulting radioactive aerosols or the dispersion of the gases into theatmosphere (3).When examining factors that contribute to radiation exposure during undergroundnuclear explosions, we must first consider the specific conditions under which radiationlevels were achieved. All tunnel tests were divided into five groups according to intensityand the location and timing of the radioactive release into the atmosphere (2, 3, 5).The first group includes tunnels where radioactive substances escaped under pressureor almost immediately through the surface openings of the underground structures(see Table 1). In these situations, the staging areas at the head of the tunnels receivedpractically all of the radioactive products that normally accompany nuclear explosions.This happened mostly during the very first underground nuclear tests while differentstemming designs were still being developed. To this day, samples taken from soil atthose sites indicate the presence of fission and activation products and fissile material.Table 1. Classification of Underground Nuclear Explosions in Tunnelsby Type and Location of Radioactive Emission(based on the total number of tunnel explosions)PressurizedRadioactiveEmissionEarlyRadioactive GasEmission withRelease throughthe EpicentralZoneEarlyRadioactiveGas Emissionthrough TunnelOpeningMedium-Termand LateRadioactiveGas EmissionNoRadioactiveGasEmission11 11 14 155 334.9% 4.9% 6.3% 69.2% 14.7%When test explosions were accompanied by the early emission of radioactive gases,within the first few minutes following the explosion, the contaminated air and the areaclose to the test site contained 140 Ba and 89 Sr, which are relatively long-lived fissionproducts of 140 Хе and 89 Kr (3).The fourth group combined tunnels with “safe” radiation conditions, where theemitted gas mixture was found to contain radionuclide of noble gases, radioactiveiodine, and short-lived radionuclides, which are the products of radioactive inert gasfission. No persistent contamination of the area was observed for these tests. It is easyto see that the tests in the fourth group account for 69% of all tests conducted in themountain tunnels. Assuming that each individual test involved approximately the samenumber of participants, we can conclude that the most of those who worked close towhere the underground explosions were staged received radiation exposure under “safe”radiation conditions. The fifth and final group included all tests for which no radioactive344

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYemissions were detected.The most detailed analysis of radiation factors that determine the level of exposureduring contained nuclear explosions was carried out by Mr. A. P. Martynov (2). Bycombining methods for calculating exposure rates, studies of radioactive contaminationof air of the work area, and tests done to determine external beta-gamma radiationdoses, the author of the study was able to determine the significance of external gammaradiation, external beta radiation, and internal radiation under tunnel test conditions.Based on this analysis, which used testing data collected at Semipalatinsk 1964–1973,external radiation doses received by personnel under normal (“safe”) radiation conditionsare dependent on the emission of radioactive inert gases and aerosols with short-livedfission products.The risks associated with various radiation factors during tunnel nuclear testsdepends on the time when emissions occur, where the people are located (in the tunnel,in open air, or at the staging site next to the test tunnel), where radioactive emissionsemerge (through the tunnel opening or through the epicentral zone), and whether thepersonnel are equipped with gear ensuring skin and respiratory system protection. Duringthe first 24 hours following the explosion, the highest risk associated with working in thetunnel is the effect of the maximum beta radiation dose on internal organs. Afterwards,for as long as 700 hours following the explosion, thyroid gland irradiation becomes themore significant risk. On the staging platform at the tunnel opening, in the event thatradioactive gases take this route, for the first 24 hours following the explosion, gammaradiation and beta radiation risks are on roughly the same level, after which thyroidgland irradiation becomes the more significant risk. In open air, for up to 1,000 hoursfollowing the explosion, external gamma radiation poses the highest risk.Table 2 shows the test data for thyroid gland radiation doses for certain participantsthat were working during the test. The analysis shows that underground nuclearexplosions, in addition to the risk of full-body gamma ray exposure, there is a real risk ofthyroid gland irradiation as a result of inhaling iodine radionuclides. In contrast, nuclearexplosions conducted in boreholes under safe radiation conditions result in internalradiation doses due to radioactive inert gases and short-lived fission products that are10–100 times smaller that associated external gamma radiation doses.Table 2. Thyroid Gland Radiation Doses in Test ParticipantsFull NameInternalRadiationDoseradremExternal RadiationDose1 S. Semyonovykh 2.81 1.5 2.12ActivityMeasurementof dose rates,collection ofair samplesProfessional Group2Tunnel No.175-2P, 164,138, 132, K-85,169/2, 129P,704, 901, 169/1345

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY2 A. Prozorov 2.5 1.3 3.85Radiationsafetymanagement2175-2P, 164,138, 132, K-85,190, 129P3 N. Posokhov 0.43 0.26 1.39 Dosimetry 2130, K-85, 901,169/1, 169/2,К-854 N. Chupis 2.36 1.23 1.15 Dosimetry 2132, 169/2,129P, 200-ASM5 V. Polekhin 0.38 0.24 0.145Remotesamplecollection and3 130, 704spectrometry6 A. Kiryukhin 0.112 0.12 1.7Remotedose rate 3 130, 132measurement7 S. Karasev 2.69 1.38 1.54Technicalsupport forthe sample 3 130, 132, K-85collectionsystem8. N. Seretkin 4.87 2.55 0.89 Dosimetry 2 169/2, 704, 9019. S. Smagulov 1.29 0.68 0.37Radiationsafetymanagement2 90110 L. Vlasenko 1.78 0.95 0.205 Dosimetry 2 132, 200-ASMCavities Created by Underground Nuclear ExplosionsThis portion of the report discusses the goals and tasks of scientists that examinedthe epicentral cavities created by tunnel explosions, the kind of work this involved, andthe working conditions these individuals faced. We will use one of the tunnels (No.148/5) as a case study.Table 3 contains the data on radiation conditions inside the cavities formed by thenuclear explosions.The first underground nuclear explosion in the USSR was conducted atSemipalatinsk tunnel V-1 (10/11/61). In order to study the radiation and mechanicaleffects of the underground explosion, a tunnel was made reaching the center of thecavity. Anatoliy Matushchenko and Yuri Dubasov, researchers with the IndustrialScientific Research Institute Project (PromNIIProyekt), the Khlopin Radium Institute,346

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYand the Semipalatinsk test site, used the tunnel to access the cavity in August 1964. Bythis time, the original cavity created by the explosion was found to have been filled byrubble. Because of this, the initial inspection concluded that the cavity itself had notbeen reached or that the access tunnel had significantly deviated from its course. Oncesurveyors demonstrated twice that this was the exact location where the test device hadbeen placed, all doubts vanished. An inspection of the cavity showed that its crosssectionhad increased significantly. After the rubble was cleared, a dome 7–8 meterstall was revealed. Amid the rubble, scientists found pieces of vitrified rock in the shapeof icicles 4–5 cm long. The placement of the boundary where finely crushed rock metblocks of unchanged granite measuring several cubic meters in volume, as well as thepresence of molten rock that had trickled down the walls of the cavity, indicated that thecavity wall was located 8 meters from the epicenter (4).TunnelNo.Table 3. Inspection of Cavities Produced byUnderground Nuclear ExplosionsTest DateВ-1 10/11/1961Radiation ConditionsThe radiation dose rateincreased to 0.2 mR/hr within 70 m from theepicenter. Approachingthe cavity the dose rategrew from 1 to 25 mR/hr. Maximum values of25 mR/hr were recorded34 m from the epicenter,at the cavity boundary. Inthe center of the cavitythe exposure rate was 10mR/hr.InspectionDateAugust 1964InitialRe-entryInspectionTeamYu. DubasovA. MatushchenkoV. GusakV. SemyonovE. Stukin347

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY504 10/29/1968The larger part of thevisible surface of thecavity, to within 4meters of the equatorialplane, is covered withhardened molten rock inthe form of stalactites.The vitrified rock layerranged from 1–20 cm.The exposure rate right atthe molten cavity wallsranged from 20–40 mR/hr, and measured around20 mR/hr on top of therubble chimney.The temperature insidethe burial chamber wasaround 30°С. Exposurerate in the cavity atheight of 1 m varied from20 mR/hr to 200 mR/hr.On the floor of the cavityit was ~ 250–700 mR/hr(N=0.1 m), at samplingpoints it equaled 60—1000 mR/hr.1971, 1972A. MatushchenkoYu. DubasovV. SemyonovR. BlinovV. GusakL. Solovyov148/5 12/16/1974Summer1975R. BlinovYu. DubasovV. SemyonovS. SmagulovYu. Fedotov103 11/20/1981Temperature measured at35–40°С. Exposure rateequaled 100–250 mR/hr.Temperature 30–35°С.Exposure rate in thecavity equaled 5–25 mR/hr.February1982July, August1982R. BlinovYu. DubasovA. MatushchenkoS. SmagulovYu. Fedotov348

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY190 04/15/1984Cavity measurementsmatch expected values,radius of the cavityequals 25 m. At the timeof re-entry, the cavitytemperature equaled30–35°С. Exposure rateat cavity entrance: 45–60mR/hr; at the top of therubble chimney: 30–40mR/hr; for N=1 m fromthe cavity wall: 50–150mR/hr; for N=0.1 m:150–200 mR/hr.July, August1984R. BlinovY. DubasovV. SemyonovS. SmagulovA. MatushchenkoThe radiation dose rate increased to 0.2 mR/hr within 70 m from the epicenter.Upon approaching the cavity, the dose rate grew from 1 to 25 mR/hr. Maximum valuesof 25 mR/hr were recorded 34 m from the epicenter and at the cavity boundary. Inthe center of the cavity, the exposure rate was 10 mR/hr. The high radiation dose rateobserved at the 34-meter mark was due to the presence of a vein of molten rock, 40 cmwide, spanning 6 meters along the cavity wall. This vein contained a melted metal pipe,30 cm in length, weighing 1 kg. The number of exposed small (1 cm) and medium (upto 10 cm) vitrified veins sharply increased in the 12–6 m section.The next opportunity to enter an explosion cavity was during the test at tunnel504P, which was also conducted at the Degelen Mountain on the Semipalatinsk testsite on October 29, 1968. The tunnel reached the cavity 457 days after the explosionin the winter of 1970. The initial inspection of the cavity’s measurements and radiationparameters was conducted by test site experts with Anatoliy Matushchenko at the helmand PromNIIProyekt staff.The last portion of excavated tunnel rubble was pushed into the cavity, addingmore material on top of the rubble that had formed. To the team’s surprise and delight,the cavity was almost completely intact. It was half-full of rubble from the cavity wallsand ceiling.A detailed inspection of the cavity, complete with sample collection, was done byKhlopin Radium Institute staff with Yuri. Dubasov leading the team, as well as local testsite experts, Anatoliy Matushchenko, PromNIIProyekt staff, and researchers from theFyodorov Applied Geophysics Institute in 1971 and 1972 (4, 5).The bottom section of the cavity, up to 3 m from the floor, was found to be full ofradioactive monolithic dark vitrified rock with a greenish color, reminiscent of obsidian.The spherical segment with hardened molten rock was covered by a thick layer of rubblewith pieces of varied sizes. Fissures up to several centimeters thick were observed inthe cavity dome, filled with molten rock. Most of the visible cavity surface up to 4 mwithin the equatorial plane was covered in the molten rock, taking on the appearanceof stalactites. It was clear that the molten rock had trickled down and hardened in theform of threads and icicle formations. The thickness of the vitrified rock layer rangedfrom 1–20 cm. The layer is vesicular, with the long axis of the gas pockets pointing inthe direction of the flow. The pockets measure up to 2 cm, and the volume density of349

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe vitrified material is ~ 600–1400 kg/m 3 . The exposure rate right up against the cavitywalls ranged between 20–40 mR/hr and measured approximately 20 mR/hr at the rubblecolumn.The molten rock mixture was found outside of the cavity boundary in the form ofsolitary thin veins that reached no more than 7 m beyond the cavity walls. The moltenrock traveled along fissures created by the explosion and pre-existing cracks in the rock.Close to the cavity boundary, new fissures were more common, while pre-existing crackswere more frequent the further one went from the cavity. The following tools wereused to study the level of contamination of the rock: gamma-ray logging, spectrometergamma-ray logging, radiometric sampling, gamma-ray profiling, and spectrometersampling together with radiometric sampling.Later inspections were conducted on the cavity in tunnel 190, tunnel 103, burialchamber (5) of the explosion in tunnel 148/5 and others. These inspections collectedunique data on the effect of high temperatures and pressure on rock formations. Theresults obtained from the tests were used in predicting radiation levels and geologicalchanges, and to design nuclear tests for both research and peaceful use.Inspection of the Tunnel 148/5 Burial ChamberThe test was conducted on December 16, 1974 in a Degelen Mountain tunnel forthe purpose of developing a technique for the peaceful use of nuclear explosions as away to bury radioactive products of an explosion in a separate chamber (see Figure 2).The difference in this scenario was that for the purpose of burying the radioactiveproducts of the explosion, the burial chamber [5] was directly connected to the endchamber [1] where the test device was placed. The compartment was the shape of awidening horizontal tunnel that was connected to the epicenter of the explosion. Thetest designers expected the chamber to become filled with molten rock and radioactiveproducts of the explosion. The inspection of the explosion cavity and the burial chamberwas to determine what really happened (6).350

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure. 2. A diagram of Tunnel 148/5, with the burial chamber.1. End chamber2. First stemming segment3. Radiation release channel4. Hermetic seal5. Burial chamberThe first inspection, led by Rudolf Blinov, took place in the summer of 1974. Theinspection was conducted by resident experts (R. Blinov, A. Andreev, Yu. Fedotov,S. Smagulov, A. Solomonov), V. Semyonov and V. Vertrogradov from the All-RussiaScientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16) and a mine rescuerteam headed by Gennady Larin from the Leninobadsk Mining and Chemical Combine.Re-entry into the burial chamber was to go through a bypass tunnel made possible bythe mine rescuer team. The plan for this tunnel was developed by a group of researchersfrom PromNIIProyekt (MSM) under K. Myasnikov.Rudolf Blinov and the mine rescuer team developed a plan for going from thebypass tunnel into the burial chamber.The main goals were:• Collection of representative samples,• Description of the sample site and identification of the site using surveytools,• Measurement of gamma-ray dose rates at sampling sites.Later, the samples would undergo radiochemical and gamma-ray spectroscopy testsat the Semipalatinsk Third Research Division.After training, we entered the bypass tunnel. Each participant had an assigned spotin the order in which we moved through the tunnel, and the order could not be changed.We followed the tunnel to the main section of Tunnel 148/5. Along the way, the tunnelvault collapsed in a several places and the tunnel was filled with rubble. We continuedover the rubble a bit further. When we stopped, Gennady Larin told us that there was anobstruction ahead. Once we cleared it, we would be at the point when the burial chamberbegan. The entrance to the burial chamber was prepared, but we had to be careful, sincenot much time had passed since the explosion (it had been a little over a year), themountain was still “breathing,” which meant rock formations could shift.We came to the end of the bypass tunnel and the chamber entrance, if you couldcall it that. The entrance was a gap about 0.6–0.8 m tall and 2 m wide. One by one, weclimbed in through this gap and saw the burial chamber. Our first impression, when weturned on our flashlights, was that we had penetrated into a magical, crystal cave, whereslag and glass icicles reflected all the colors of the rainbow. Unfortunately, we had notime to admire this sight.Primary Findings Inside the Burial ChamberThe temperature in the chamber was about 300°С. The exposure rate in the chamberat the height of 1 m varied from 20 mR/hr to 200 mR/hr. At floor level, the rate was ~250–700 mR/hr (N=0.1 m); at sampling points, the rate varied from 60–1000 mR/hr.An inspection of the burial chamber showed that close to the entire length of itssurface was covered in a vitrified radioactive mixture. It covered the dome, walls, and351

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYespecially the floor of the chamber, which was called K3 in the design. The molten layeron the floor became thinner toward the epicenter. Judging by the radiation dose rates andthe distance between the floor and the dome, a large proportion of the molten materialhad been collected at the back. The dome of the tunnel was also covered in “icicles.”Some of these measured 20–30 cm in length and were 2–5 cm thick. It should be notedthat the “icicles” were bent away from the epicenter and toward the back of the burialchamber.The molten rock in the burial chamber included both vesicular and dense vitrifiedrock of two grades, one of which was fragile, with numerous, very fine vesicles, similarto pumice stone.Above two hours later we were given the order to wrap up and come out. Theradiation dose of the participants did not exceed 2 rem. That was the conclusion of thefirst stage of field work: the inspection of the burial chamber of Tunnel 148/5.Tests and in-depth study of burial chambers and explosion epicenters have shownthat it is possible to control how radionuclides are distributed inside a rock formation. Theconcentration of 90 Sr and 137 Cs, along with other radionuclides with gaseous analogues,was much lower in the space immediately near the cavity than in a standard symmetricspherical explosion. In some cases, 90 Kr and 137 Xe went beyond the boundaries of the endchamber, turning into 90 Sr and 137 Cs (3–6).The specific activity in the burial chamber turned out to be 1–100 times higher thannext to the rock in the explosion cavity. Later inspections determined that the burialchamber contained over 90% of the nuclear explosion’s products.ConclusionThe intention of this report was to provide a brief overview of the work ofSemipalatinsk testers, which involved radiation risks during the nuclear tests themselvesand also provided them with opportunities to do fascinating research inside undergroundnuclear explosion cavities.By inspecting the epicentral zones of underground explosions, we were able tobetter understand the processes that affect rock formations, learn more about certainprocesses in nuclear physics and mechanics, and to make significant changes to how thetunnels used to conduct underground nuclear tests are designed.Beyond this, the experimental data we obtained was used to develop and implementthe use of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses. One such example is the use of a nuclearexplosion at the Kola Peninsula apatite deposits where a burial chamber was used tocontain the resulting radioactive products.Finally, the researchers’ unique experience under non-standard radiation conditionswas also useful during the clean-up effort following the Chernobyl accident.References1. Gorin V., Matushchenko, A. M., Smagulov, S. G., et al. Semipalatinsk TestSite: A Chronology of Underground Nuclear Tests and their Primary Radiation Effects[Semipalatinskiy poligon: Khronologiya podzemnykh izpytaniy i ikh pervichnyeradiatsionnye effekty] (1961–1989), Byulleten’ po atomnoi energii, No. 9, 1993, Moscow,TsNIIATOMINFORM.2. Martynov, A. P. A Study of Radiation Factors Affecting Irradiation ofParticipants during Contained Nuclear Explosions. [Issledovanie radiatsionnykh352

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYfaktorov, opredeliayushchikh obluchenie lyudey pri kamufletnykh yadernykh vzryvakh].Doctoral dissertation, 1975.3. Safonov, F. F., Smagulov, S. G., et al., Overview and Conclusions Based onAvailable Documents on Radioactive Environmental Pollution at Nuclear Test Sites[Sbor i obobshchenie imeyushchkhsya materialov po radioaktivnomu zagryazneniyuprirodnoy sredy v mestakh provedeniya yadernykh vzryvov]. Kurchatov, military unit52605, 1992.4. Nuclear Tests in the USSR [Yadernye ispytaniya v SSSR], Mikhailov V. N. ed.,RFYaTs-VNIIEF, Sarov, 1997.5. Matushchenko, A. M., Aidin, A. I., Smagulov, S. G. Converting theSemipalatinsk Test Site to a Peaceful Nuclear Test Site [Semipalatinskiy poligon:konversiya v oblast’ mirnykh yadernykh vzryvov]. Conference paper, Kurchatov, NYaTsRK, 2005.6. Smagulov, S. G. Development of Nuclear Explosive Technology for PeacefulUses at the Semipalatinsk Test Site [Otrabotka yaderno-vzryvnoi tekhnologii v mirnykhtselyakh na Semipalatinskom poligone]. Byulleten’ po atomnoi energii, No. 1, 2005.353

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Nuclear Explosion in the Aral DesertAlexander AidinState Science Center Institute of Biophysics at theFederal Medical and Biological Agency of Russia,MoscowSergei ZelentsovThe Federal Institute of Strategic Stability, RosAtom,MoscowAnatoliy MatushchenkoCo-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commissionunder the Scientific Research Institute for PulseEngineering; Advisor to the Department Head,RosAtomThe Forging of the Nuclear SwordOn July 16, 1945, at 5:30 AM near the town of Alamogordo, New Mexico, the firstnuclear device test in the history of mankind was conducted — with a yield of nearly20 kilotons of TNT equivalent — under the codename “Trinity.” This occurred shortlybefore the Potsdam Conference, which brought together the leaders of the USSR, USA,and Great Britain. Exactly three weeks later — on August 6 and 9 — the Japanese citiesof Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wiped off the face of the Earth by nuclear bombscodenamed “Little Boy” and “Fat Man,” which were dropped from a B-29 bomber. AsIvan Kurchatov vividly put it, “this was a nuclear fist in front of our face.” In an addresson American radio, US President Henry Truman stated, “We thank God that it has cometo us, instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His waysand for His purposes.” The planet’s nuclear arms race had begun.In response, the Soviet government decided to accelerate uranium research, whichhad been interrupted by the war; this task was entrusted to Ivan Kurchatov (in nonconfidentialcorrespondence named Borodin). On September 28, 1942, Joseph Stalin hadalready signed the Order from the State Defense Committee regarding uranium research:“Instruct the USSR Academy of Sciences (specifically Abram Ioffe, a prominentphysicist and Member of the Academy) to recommence researching the feasibility ofusing nuclear energy through the expansion of uranium nuclei and report to the StateDefense Committee by April 1, 1943, on the possibilities of creating a uranium bombor uranium fuel…”This was an important political turning point that predicted the future aggressivebehavior on the part of anti-Soviet powers. And so, under the extremely turbulent settingof World War II, the USSR took on the challenge of the United States, which was alreadysecretly and actively working on the A-bomb (1).In 1944, Winston Churchill wrote to Joseph Stalin that the Germans were conductingexperiments with missiles at the test range in Debica (Poland). He requested that, after354

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYSoviet troops take over the region, English specialists be allowed to study the seizedmachinery and devices.In Germany, the missile center was located in Peenemünde. On May 2, 1945, itsmanagement, headed by Wernher von Braun, the “father” of V-2 missiles, surrendered tothe United States. In effect, that day marked the beginning of the race to create effectivemissile weaponry. Yesterday’s allies found themselves on opposite sides of the barrier.On August 20, 1945, the State Defense Committee resolved to create an institutionto oversee uranium research — a special committee within the USSR’s State DefenseCommittee (Chairman: L. Beria; Members: M. Pervukhin, N. Voznesensky, G. Malenkov,B. Vannikov, V. Makhnev, P. Kapitsa, I. Kurchatov, A. Zavenyagin) (1).The formation and development of missile armament simultaneously began inRussia in accordance with Decree No. 1017-419 of the Supreme Soviet and Council ofMinisters of the USSR issued on May 13, 1946, on missile weapons issues. The decisionwas made to establish the State Central Missile Test Range in the interest of all theministries participating in the creation of this armament. Major General Voznyuk wasappointed commander of the State Central Missile Test Range. The facility was located100 kilometers east of Stalingrad, near the Kapustin Yar rail station in the AstrakhanOblast.On August 29, 1949, at 7:00 AM local (Kazakhstan) time, the first Soviet nuclearexplosive was tested at the Semipalatinsk test range, with a yield of 22 kilotons of TNTequivalent (2).The Soviet leaders also learned that in the autumn of 1949, the United Statesdeveloped nuclear strike scenarios against Russia. One of them, codenamed OperationDropshot, involved the launch of 300 nuclear bombs onto 100 Soviet cities. At the time,scientists did not yet know the full consequences of such an attack on the aggressor, oron the entire planet for that matter. However, the aftermath of the nuclear attacks onHiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan on August 6 and 9, 1945 was horrifying.Up until 1953, Russia’s armed forces in the post-war period were armed with onlystandard weaponry and battle technology, such as had been used during the war againstHitler’s Germany. Military training was based on the experience of that war. But on thetesting grounds and in laboratories, intense research was already underway.Sergey Korolev began designing the R-5 missile in 1949. The missile’s firingdistance needed to be two times greater than the distance of the operational-tactical R-2missile. By October 1951, an outline for the R-5 missile project had been drafted, andin 1952, a government decree was issued ordering the creation of a ballistic missile witha flying distance of over 1,000 km. Dmitrii Kozlov was appointed lead designer. Thiswas the first Russian-designed missile. Its first successful launch was conducted at themaximum distance (1,200 km) on April 19, 1953.To quote from “Strategic Ground Missile Complexes” (3): “…On April 10, 1954,a decree was issued by the government to use the R-5 missile as the basis for creatinga nuclear weapon. In October of 1955, tests were conducted on the missile’s nuclearexplosives haul. Based on the results, a warhead was developed for further modification.Sergey Korolev’s new creation was indexed as 8K51 (R-5M). Dmitrii Kozlov was thelead designer for both this missile and the R-5.”Beginning in 1953, the Soviet Union Army and Navy had begun practical nuclearweapons testing and related exercises. The armed forces began to study how to maintaincombat operations in the event that nuclear weapons were used. Missile technology355

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYresearch and development was in full swing and was seen as the most promising way todeliver nuclear weapons to their targets.No Room for ErrorCreating nuclear missile technology became a priority. In the future, an aggressorwould be unlikely to attack a country holding such powerful weapons, as it wouldultimately suffer the greater damage. The first successful launch of an R-5M missileequipped with a nuclear warhead was conducted on May 20, 1955. The final series ofmissile launches, using missiles equipped with imitation nuclear warheads (securitytesting), began on January 11, 1956 (3).At the insistence of the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, OperationBaikal took place on February 2, 1956. This was the first and only experimental launchof a R-5M ballistic war missile with a real nuclear warhead, the force of which equaled0.3 kilotons of TNT equivalent (until then, 14 missiles were launched with conventionalwarheads). The nuclear explosive was a modified explosive of the first generation ofRDS-4, developed at KB-11 (currently, the Russian Federal Nuclear Center – All-RussiaResearch Institute of Experimental Physics) for air bombing, and successfully tested onAugust 23, 1953 at the Semipalatinsk test range from an Il-28 airplane. The reliability ofboth the missile and the nuclear warhead dispelled any lingering doubts (3).As a result, a guided missile system with a 4R R-5M warhead was approved forarming the engineering brigades of the Supreme Command Reserve on June 21, 1956.The following individuals were honored with the title “Hero of Socialist Labor” fortheir contribution to the missile system: designers S. Korolev, V. Mishin, V. Glushko,V. Barmin, M. Ryazansky, N. Pilyugin, V. Kuznetsov, and scientists Y. Khariton, Y.Zeldovich, A. Sakharov, and M. Keldysh.Lieutenant General Sergei Zelentsov (one of the co-authors of this presentation)was a direct participant in this event and stated that:The battle launch of the missile was carried out from the missileand artillery test range at Kapustin Yar, located between the cities ofAstrakhan and Stalingrad, at maximum distance onto the battlefields ofthe opposition forces located 1,200 km away from the test range, 160 kmnortheast of the city of Aralsk. A special group of researchers measuredthe parameters of the 0.3 kiloton nuclear explosion in at the impact site:penetrating radiation, shockwave, a fireball, video and photography ofthe mushroom cloud, as well as the radiological conditions that tookshape in the sandy desert setting. This group was headed by MajorGeneral Benetsky (Chief of the 6 th Department of the USSR Ministryof Defense); the group included both myself and Alexander Aidin –another of the co-authors of this presentation. The group maintained anuninterrupted connection with the launching base. (8)While the battlefield was being prepared for the tests, temperatures were belowfreezingand the air temperature was roughly –30 C ◦ . The uninhabited steppe was coveredwith 1.5–2 meters of snow. Strong winds also posed a complication. Barracks for theexperimenters were located about 10 km from the target, consisting of two Finnishhouses and barracks with storage. The roads from this settlement were buried by snow356

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY(there were simply no roads). Transportation was conducted using two T-34 tanks.Sergei Zelentsov continues:The day before and the day of testing, the target region andsettlement were covered by fog, which meant that the visual recordingsof the nuclear explosion set up several kilometers from the border ofthe impact site might be compromised. These recordings were a kindof express method of confirming that the explosion had taken place anddetermine its force with the express method. The cold had done its job:the equipment had frozen.The right decision was made: they sent me to the border of theimpact site on a tank with optical equipment. But there were some smallproblems with this as well: the tanks would not start because of the cold,and only one of them was finally started in the early morning hours. Inaddition to the crew, the tank fit only one person – me – and the equipment(film cameras, batteries, a radio set). We drove without any roads andoriented ourselves by the markers sticking out from under the snow, butthe tank crew lost the markers and went in the wrong direction. However,after overcoming these worrisome difficulties, we eventually arrived atthe border of the impact site in time. By this time, the fog had dissipatedand the “center” became visible. After establishing a connection with thelaunching base, I informed A. Osin, who confirmed the calculated timeof the missile launch, and coordinated my further actions to set up theequipment on the tank and maintain an uninterrupted radio connectionwith him for all of the remaining time right up to the explosion.“T” time had arrived. A. Osin began the countdown: …three, two, one, zero, bang!It occurred at the calculated time. The recording equipment worked as expected.I informed A. Osin that everything on our end was going as planned. After this, G.Benetsky got on the radio to say that helicopters would be arriving at the impact site inabout 1.5–2 hours, which is what happened. I was loaded into one of them along withthe equipment; they brought me to the airfield in the city of Aralsk, where a plane wasalready waiting to take me to Bagorovo (in Crimea), to the 71 st Air Force Division.There, the film was developed and color photographs were printed, which allowed meto determine the force of the explosion: approximately 300 tons of TNT equivalent. Thefollowing morning, I was in Moscow, at the 6 th Department of the Ministry of Defense,where we prepared a presentation for the Central Committee of the USSR and an albumwith photographs of the explosion.”And so, on February 2, 1956, the first test of an R-5M nuclear warhead missile waslaunched from the Kapustin Yar missile test range at 10:30 AM Moscow time (StateCommittee Chairman – Marshal Nedelin). Development of the R-5M missile – thecarrier of the nuclear warhead – began in 1953. The framework for its design was adraft of a single-stage R-5 missile, already completed in S. Korolev’s design studioat Scientific Research Institute No. 885 in 1951. During the summer tests conductedin 1953 at the Kapustin Yar facility, R-5 missiles were about 90% reliable: out of 15missiles, only two did not reach the target. The R-5M nuclear warhead missile traveled357

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYa distance of 1,200 km through space in under 11 minutes without breaking down orfalling in the Aral Karakum region (1).Development continued, and in December 1959, a decision was made to create theStrategic Missile Forces. The first missiles with nuclear components were positioned onalert status in the Baltic and Far East regions.Individuals who made a significant contribution to the development of the nuclearmissile system include S. Korolev, V. Mishin, L. Voskresensky, Y. Khariton, N. Petrov,K. Shelkin, S. Kocharyants, E. Negin, N. Dukhov, V. I. Zuevsky, V. Glushko, V. Vizhna,M. Ryazansky, N. Pilyugin, M. Borisenko, V. Kuznetsov, V. Barmin, G. Katkov, A.Goltsman, N. Leykin, V. Petrov, B. Zhdanov, F. Kurbatov, G. Bazhanov, M. Kulakov, P.Khodos, and others.Radiation in the Aral Karakum DesertOne important element of the nuclear explosion in the Aral Desert is its force,which was 0.3 kilotons of TNT equivalent, but certainly not 80 kilotons, as describedin the book “The Ecological Dangers of Space Activity” (1999) by cosmonaut andresearcher Sergey Krichevsky, who worked under the supervision of Aleksey Yablokov.The attempt to augment the yield of the explosion so significantly is a purely populistmove, arguably even a provocation. We can confirm the yield of the explosion was 0.3kilotons according to official data published in a number of official publications (2, 6).The explosion was detonated on the Earth’s surface. Accordingly, this is usedas the source in the assessment of post-explosion radiation conditions, which is veryimportant for radioecologists. This explosion was discussed openly in the press for thefirst time when the first expert version of the Catalogue of Nuclear Testing in the USSRwas presented in September 1994 at the 2 nd International Seminar on the RADTESTproject in the city of Barnaul (presentation by Anatoliy Matushchenko). The Republicof Kazakhstan’s Ministry of the Environment and Bioresources asked questions aboutthe radiological consequences of this explosion in the Aral. A detailed answer was givenin a statement at the International Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in 1998, inthe city of Kurchatov — the capital of the former Semipalatinsk test range facility. Itsauthors (Anatoliy Matushenko (Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy), Vadim Logachev(The Institute of Biophysics State Science Center under Russia’s Ministry of PublicHealth) and G. Krasilov (Institute of Global Climate and the Environment at the StateCommittee of Hydrometeorology and the Russian Academy of Sciences) carefullycalculated the main properties of the 0.3 kiloton radioactive footprint and assessed thepossible doses of radiation, as the initial measurements were not found in the archives.Therefore, the decision was made to use existing design methods to determine thescope and extent of the radioactive pollution in this region (5, 6). As we all know, thebaseline data for evaluating radioactive conditions after the surface nuclear explosion areits yield during fission (in this case, 0.3 kilotons), the average wind speed (24 km/hour),and the distance from the epicenter on the axis of the localized radioactive footprint.The results of the calculations helped establish that a surface nuclear explosion ona soft surface (sand) would create a 6–8 m deep crater with a diameter of 20 m. After theexplosion, the top of the radioactive cloud at the moment of its stabilization could reacha height of 3–3.5 km, with a horizontal diameter of about 0.4–0.5 km.A radioactive trail may have formed as the result of fallout from the explosion asthe cloud moved in the direction of the wind. The main features of this trail, based on358

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYmathematical modeling, are as follows: the exposure rate at the location at the timethe pollution occurs (cGy/hr, R/hr) at varying distances from the epicenter along thetrail’s axis: 1 km – 30,000; 2 km – 950; 5 km – 90; 10 km – 10; 20 km – 1.3; 50 km –0.03 R/hr. In the same location after 10 hours: around 5; 3; 1; 0.2; 0.06 and 0.005 R/hrrespectively. The dose at the location before complete radionuclide decay (cGy, R) at thesame distances would be 700, 380, 90, 20, 5 and 0.3 R (4).These data prove the small size of the radioactive trace formed in the sand desert.Based on the public health standards in effect in the 1950s and 60s, when the permissibledose level of radiation was 15 R (cGy) per year (4, 5), the danger zone on the territorywhere the radioactive trail appeared could not be greater than 12–15 km.On desert terrain with shifting sands, the radioactive trail can exist for a shortperiod. Calculations allow us to draw the conclusion that, considering the radioactivedecay of the explosion’s products and the shifting sand, the trail would not have beenable to last longer than one year. That is to say, the risk of radioactive exposure wasnegligible. Any expeditions to that region for studies on the radioactive aftermath of thisexplosion would have yielded absolutely no results (4).There are witnesses to everything that occurs in history. Retired Colonel AlexanderAidin happened to be such an eyewitness, unexpectedly even for us. He was a directparticipant in and organizer of the radiological investigation after the explosion, andserved for a long time afterwards at the Semipalatinsk’s Radiation Safety Services. Heunambiguously confirmed our estimates, putting an end to any speculation regarding thisold story: “…at the time of this test, I was the Head of a radiation patrol that operatedspecifically in the region of the explosion’s epicenter and the neighboring area. As theresult of such heavy activity, I received a cumulative dose of radiation equivalent to 18roentgens, which is on record in the official documents preserved in my archive.” (7).This also concluded the disagreement with A. Yablokov, who was very sensitive to ourreproaches regarding the pointless misinformation on the yield of the warhead delivered50 years ago. In the end, however, the main goal of this brave and risky experiment,where a warhead was delivered to an assigned location with the use of a first-generationmissile, was to irrefutably demonstrate that the USSR now also possessed a “nuclearsword.”References1. The Nuclear Age. Events, People, Work [ Atomniy Vek. Sobitiya, Lyudi, Dela].Massovo-politicheskoye Publishing. Moscow: Atompressa, 2005. 457: ill.2. Nuclear Tests in the USSR [ Yadernye ispytania SSSR] V. N. Mikhailov. ed.Sarov, Russian Federal Nuclear Center and All-Russia Research Institute of ExperimentalPhysics [RFYaC-VNIIEF], 1997, 286: ill.3. Strategic Surface Missile Facilities [ Strategicheskie raketnye kompleksynazemnogo bazirovania]. Moscow: Voenniy Parad, 2007. 248: ill.4. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. The Current Radiological Conditions atTest Ranges [Yadernye ispytaniya SSSR. Sovremennoe radiologicheskoe sostoyaniepoligonov] / Chapter 8: Missile Launch into the Sands of the Near-Aral Karakumdesert [Raketniy pusk v peski Priaralskikh Karakumov] Misc. authors, Professor V. A.Logachev, ed. Moscow: IzdAT, 2002. 639: ill.5. Report on the Destructive Effects of Nuclear Weapons [ Spravochnik po359

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYporazhayuzhemu deystviyu yadernogo oruzhiya]. Part 2. Identifying and Evaluating theSurface Radiation Conditions [Vyyavlenie i otsenka nazemnoy radiatsionnoy obstanovki].Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1984. 159.6. Sanitation Standards in Designing Companies and Laboratories [ Sanitarnyenormy proektirovaniya predpriyatiy i laboratoriy]. Approved by A. I. Burnazyan onApril 11, 1954, and put into force by the USSR Ministry of Defense on November 10,1954, signed by V. A. Malyshev.7. Matushenko, A. M. Remembering the Test Range: an Echo of Kapustin Yar inthe Karakum Desert. [Vspominaya poligon: ekho Kapustina Yara v pustyne Karakumy],No. 8. Moscow: Atompressa, 2001. 4.8. Zelentsov, S. A. The Beginning of the Nuclear Missile Era. Recollections ofa Participant in the Events. [Nachalo raketno-yadernoy ery. Vospominaniya uchastnikasobytiy] No. 6. Moscow: Atompressa, 2006, 6.360

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYEvaluating the Consequences of the Totskoye NuclearTests in 1954Vladimir BaskakovPresident, Green Cross Russia Orenburg AffiliateThe intellect of man created a new world, taming Nature and populating the worldwith monstrous inventions that began to change man’s environment with the sheer scaleof their activity. During the general military exercises that took place in September 1954at the Totskoye test range in the Orenburg Oblast, a nuclear bomb was detonated. As theresult of this explosion, two main zones of pollution took shape: the epicenter area of theexplosion and the radioactive trail, spreading 210 kilometers. In addition to radionuclidefallout, the pollution of this area was caused by the products of the neutron-activation ofchemical elements contained in the top layer of the soil at the test range. Considering theprinciples of international environmental law, the situation surrounding the events of theTotskoye nuclear explosion of 1954 deserves special attention from the President, theGovernment of Russia and the global community. At the center of a densely populatedarea, a nuclear bomb twice as powerful as the one dropped on Hiroshima was detonated.The impact of the radiation on the Orenburg Oblast is considerably higher than that ofthe Chernobyl catastrophe.Information in the archives and scientific research confirm the fact that the radiationhas had varying degrees of impact on the population, which matches the conservativehypothesis accepted by the global community, under which any small level of radiationincreases the probability of negative implications.Over the course of the past 30 years, we have seen a negative trend in keydemographic indicators. The birth rate fell 2.6 times, while the mortality rate increased1.8 times, and the high morbidity rate and death rate among children remain high.According to experts, Russia has the highest levels of radioactive pollution of allthe countries in the world. The environmental conditions on the territory of the Totskoyenuclear test have already led to inevitable consequences, not just for the area’s floraand fauna, but for human genetic makeup. This demonstrates the critical role of thegovernment and society in protecting and improving the environment. That means thata variety of different measures need to be taken, with a special focus on legal aspects, inaddition to political, economic, and ideological measures.Each branch of Russian law governs the environmental activities of the state to oneextent or another, starting from constitutional law and ending with the punitive branchesof administrative and criminal law. For the first time in history, Russia’s current CriminalCode now dedicates a separate Section to environmental crimes. In 1981, by specialresolution of the UN General Assembly, the Declaration on the Prevention of NuclearCatastrophe was adopted, under which “States and statesmen that resort first to the useof nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity.” A numberof international agreements on limiting and prohibiting nuclear weapons testing should361

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYalso be noted: Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Spaceand Under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty) of 1963, the Latin American Nuclear Ban of1967, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, the Treaty on the Prohibition of theEmplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty) of 1971, the SouthPacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1985, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test BanTreaty of 1996. The residents of the area used in the Totskoye nuclear test have fulfilleda Biblical mission: they have saved the world from nuclear madness. After the test, manycountries came to the conclusion that a nuclear war should never take place — no onewould come out on top.A review of legislation on the consequences of nuclear weapons testing at theTotskoye test range speaks to the need to adopt new laws and increase the effectivenessof laws. At present, the entire legal framework is summarized in Order No. 354 issued bythe Russian Ministry of Defense on August 18, 2005 on the procedures and conditionsunder which citizens from Special Risk Divisions are to be recognized. The state ofprotection of today’s generations and future generations against health-damaging factorsdepends directly on the effectiveness of legal regulations with regard to the response toissues concerning the nuclear weapons test at the Totskoye range.During the Soviet era, health was not a vital priority. Government control overthe state of the environment was patently insufficient. Today, we must actively help thepopulation become healthy and rehabilitate polluted lands. An equally important issue iseducation about radiation conditions, social and medical support for the public who havesuffered from the Totskoye nuclear tests in 1954. The development and adoption of newstatutory provisions, in addition to conducting nature conservation efforts on pollutedterritories will help fully assess the extent to which the government is concerned aboutRussians’ health and the state of the environment.First and foremost, measures for social medicine and environmental protection ofthe people of the Orenburg Oblast must be put into place. This includes dealing withfunding problems:• Diagnostic and preventative healthcare, with a special focus on the immunesystem, allergies and health and hygiene;• Genetic health passports for each Oblast resident;• High-tech equipment for a center specializing in the immune system, allergiesand endocrinology;• Development of the population’s environmental education.For the purpose of improving the economic, environmental, social and medicalhealth of the territory and the residents of Orenburg, the country needs to recognize theOblast as a zone affected by radiation as a result of the Totskoye nuclear test (addendumto Decree No. 864 of the Russian Government issued December 12, 2004).In their responses to requests to take legislative measures to support those whohave suffered from the tests, many agencies point to the need for further studies ofthe long-term effects of the Totskoye nuclear explosion on the environment and humanhealth. However, none one of these agencies are able to provide even minimal fundingfor these studies. We are now dealing with a vicious circle: in order to prepare the laws,new studies are needed, but in order to conduct studies, funds are needed and no fundsare being allocated.Additional studies are of critical importance, as is the participation of international.362

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThese steps will help change the government’s attitude toward this very important socialproblem.There is no doubt about it: the environmental function of the government is oneof its primary and most important functions. A solution for the problems stemmingfrom the Totskoye test will facilitate the achievement of environmental safety for all ofRussia’s citizens.363

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYPost-Plenary Discussion on the Consequencesof Nuclear Device Testing– Sergei Baranovsky: I should say a few words in conclusion, because this is atypical example of a topic where we see opposing views of the events that happenedduring the lives of several generations and the consequences that several generations,apparently, will experience. Here we need to focus on the scientific aspects on both sides.Accusations of politicking or distorting the facts have to be backed up with evidence.On the other hand, the facts that were stated in the last report on the probable impact ofthe consequences of the Totskoye explosion on the health of the local population andthe state of the environment should also be confirmed scientifically. The goal of ourDialogue is to identify different approaches toward events that have become known.I am thankful to our speakers who have for the first time voiced their points of viewbased on personal experience, but in my opinion, this is insufficiently objective data forestablishing a discussion. Each side will remain right where they are, because each isconvinced of what he/she has already stated publicly. What is important here is the factthat this information has become open and the property of civil society, and we are nowseeing an opportunity to ask questions of representatives of the RosAtom system and ourrespective local authorities.– Yuriy Sivintsev: As I understand it, the positions of the sides are irreconcilable,and moreover, they are antagonistic, which is the worst part. In order to have a discussionwe need to at least respect each other. I would like to say that I, unfortunately, found thatmany do not know about the international, generalized experience with the assessmentof the biological impact of radiation on humans. These works are regularly publishedin reports from leading scientists around the world under the aegis of the UN GeneralAssembly. They are also published in Russian. These are reports of a scientific committeeon the effects of nuclear radiation. A two-volume report was published in 1988–1992 inRussia, and last year another issue was released for the year 2000. These works includeeverything that we are discussing, including a large section on the only experiment onpeople — Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There is no better basis for discussing these issues.I would like our audience to first read those documents and then, later, based on thatscientific foundation, attempt to present an argument. This would prevent starting with ablank slate, as the previous report did, where a lot of emotions run deep, but where thereis little evidence.– Vladimir Baskakov: I would like to add something. We published a book in 2006and I would like to present it. It includes the latest data and research, including somevery interesting documents.– Anatoly Matushchenko: There is the Russian Science Commission for RadiationProtection, and papers on the Totskoye tests were reviewed in detail by this commission,but I, as a member of this commission, am prepared to put you in contact with membersof the Russian Academy of Sciences and Professor Tsib. He will request that all papersand materials be reviewed one more time at a special meeting and he’ll appoint relevantspeakers. Please come and we will see whose side comes out on top. I do not wantto be accused of providing unverified information, although it is already publishedeverywhere. As per your request on behalf of the residents of Orenburg, we will set up aspecial meeting of the Science Commission for Radiation Protection.364

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY– Anatolii Nazarov: Colleagues! Among those here today, I am one of a handful ofradiobiologists, a Doctor of Sciences who has been working in the field of radiation fordozens of years. In our time, we have attempted to discuss the concept of “the Totskoyetests” within our professional circle. It seems to me that we need to identify two moralpositions here. The first was expressed by Anatoly Matushchenko. We must respect thegreat human feats of those who took part in the special risk divisions. This was a hugeact of courage. If we do not accept that now, the rest of the discussion will be for nothing.That is the first thing.The second thing is that there is no serious radiobiological data that we can use asa scientific reference point today for situations in which a mass of people have passedthrough the site of a nuclear bomb explosion and it is clear that we are not going to havethat, since these people do not exist. I know other sources, and you have spoken aboutthis, that the position of Marshal Zhukov, the outstanding military leader, was negative.I would not dismiss the last speech from our Orenburg colleague simply because it wasemotional. In fact, there is data for the Orenburg Oblast stating that the condition of theparticipant survivors of the Totskoye test is not all that optimistic. Of course, there is ahuge amount of factors at play here, and the issue of small doses, where we don’t knowwhere the lines are. There will never be a definitive answer here, just like there won’t beany data for direct measurements. But the work on shedding light on this problem needsto continue, because there isn’t any open publication anywhere, we have only publishedhalf a page from thousands of pages.– Sergei Baranovsky: We will definitely continue this discussion at the nextDialogue. I would like to ask all of our environmentalist colleagues to get ready for thisdiscussion, to select some objective arguments, and be ready to cite precise data. I wouldlike everyone, both environmental activists and nuclear experts, to carefully read thebook that was mentioned, so that we can determine a potential platform for a commonapproach to the consequences of the Totskoye tests.365

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYA Nuclear Aluminum Investment Project for BalakovoAnna VinogradovaHead, Balakovo Affiliate of the All-Russian Society forNature Conservation, Saratov OblastIn April–May 2007, the Russian government approved a program for Russia’sdevelopment of nuclear energy through 2015 (with an outlook to 2020). This programdoes not envisage the construction of the fifth or sixth reactors for the Balakovo NuclearPower Plant (BNPP).This decision is both founded and appropriate, as the scientific, social andenvironmental assessment of the project to build the fourth BNPP reactor, which wasconducted as per the ruling of the Balakovo City Deputy Council in 1992, found that theintroduction of the fourth reactor at the NPP would reach the environmental thresholdfor Balakovo’s industrial hub (and BNPP). The grounds behind the decision against theconstruction of these reactors were confirmed by highly qualified experts who conducteda second social and environmental assessment of the BNPP in 2005. The experts’ analysisidentified numerous facts indicative of extreme hazards and the economic inadvisabilityof building the plant’s fifth and sixth reactors and could not guarantee a sufficient levelof radiation and environmental safety.According to available information, one of the reasons that the second phase ofthe BNPP was not included in the nuclear energy development program is the need tobuild additional power lines stretching 700–800 km in order to transmit the electricitygenerated from two reactors (with a capacity of 2 million kWt/h). The approximate costper kilometer of these power lines is USD 1 million, which will increase the expensesof construction immeasurably. Furthermore, the region is not expecting any electricityshortages over the optimal planning period (through 2020).Balakovo is an environmentally polluted city where the atmospheric pollutionindex has reached 15–20 (high or very high). There are many companies producingenvironmentally hazardous chemicals, petrochemical products, energy, etc. A dangerousquantity of wastes containing radionuclides is located on-site at the NPP, including aspecial storage facility for solid and liquid radioactive wastes, storage ponds for holdingspent nuclear fuel (SNF) (where it spends three years in storage after every batch of freshfuel is unloaded), and a storage facility for eight steam generators that wore out beforethe end of their guaranteed service lives. This is also where sludge deposits that containradionuclides from cooling ponds are being kept in open storage with no protectionagainst the elements. All of this, save for the SNF, is designated for permanent onsitestorage, directly along the banks of the Volga River, just 8 km from a city with apopulation of 206,000.366

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 1. The fourth reactor of the BNPP.Independent studies of the area indicate the presence of anthropogenic radionuclidesin all samples from water, air, soil and plant life. Scientists based in Saratov believe thatover years of nuclear tests, nuclear accidents and other nuclear incidents, the backgroundgamma radiation in the area increased 3–4 times from natural levels. It is scientificallyproven that low dose radiation and chemical pollution feed off of one another, aggravatingthe effects on humans and the environment.As a result of these environmentally poor conditions, Balakovo is affected by a highmorbidity rate (70%), as well as a high mortality rate (14.1 per 1,000 people). Oncologicaldiseases are among the most frequent among the population. The infant mortality rate is11.6%. Balakovo’s children suffer from perinatal illnesses (ranked first at 46.2%), birthdefects (second at 38.6%) and malignant tumors (ranked third at 7.6%). There has beenno response to the appeals of the residents and public organizations requesting aid fromthe authorities to supply Balakovo with medical diagnostics equipment to help monitorthe content and accumulation of radionuclides in the human body.In August 2007, Pavel Ipatov, the Governor of the Saratov Oblast and the formerDirector of the BNPP announced the beginning of a large-scale and unprecedentednuclear aluminum investment project for the Balakovo Rayon. The Russian AluminumCompany (RUSAL) is expected to invest in the construction of the fifth and sixth NPPreactors at a complex with a high-output aluminum factory with a capacity of 1.050million tons/year.The placement of new industrial firms in the Balakovo Rayon, with its uncleanand unhealthy environmental conditions and a local population in a terrible state ofhealth that is actively protesting the construction of new NPP reactors and the aluminumplant will only lead to the aggravation of the environmental conditions and intensifysocial tension in the area. The latest data as of December 2007 from the Balakovo Cityindependent institute for sociological studies shows that 80.2% of surveyed residents areconcerned about the environmental conditions of the area, and 64% actively speak outagainst the construction of a nuclear aluminum complex.367

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYOn December 13, 2007, a group of media journalists and correspondents fromSaratov and Balakovo visited RUSAL’s Moscow office and its aluminum plant inSayanogorsk (Khakassia). Russia consumes just 12% of the aluminum produced atthe plant, while the remainder is exported. In addition to its plants, RUSAL also ownsmines in equatorial countries. Furthermore, in order to gain independence, the companyintends to acquire its own power facilities, which is why the proposal coming from theGovernment of the Saratov Oblast caught the interest of the corporation’s management.Figure 2. Protest by the residents of Balakovo.As it turns out, RUSAL is aware of the protests of the Balakovo residents, of theenvironmentally poor conditions of the area, and of the extremely poor health conditionsof the residents. Ms. Vera Kurochkina, the company’s PR Director, confirmed this andstated that the space that the Oblast’s government offered the company is ideal for theirneeds, and that the plant will be built there. She was unfazed by a question about whetherRussian law prohibits private investments in the nuclear industry, since constitutionally,this industry runs under the aegis of the state. Ms. Kurochkina boldly stated that they willeither change the legislation or find another way to resolve the issue. Apparently, this isalready being accomplished, since Internet sources are reporting that RosEnergoAtomhas approved a construction project in the Saratov Oblast for a power and metalprocessingcomplex and is now waiting for investment proposals from RUSAL.No one among those making the decisions is the least bit interested in the opinion ofthe Balakovo residents. Apparently there are already “tried and true” methods that willagain be employed to secure the “consent” of the residents when needed. The populationof the city and the rayon, in line with the law, intend to conduct a referendum in theBalakovo municipal rayon on the construction of the aluminum plant. Yet how can thereferendum expenses from the local budget be justified, if it is clear that:1. Russia’s nuclear energy development program does not envisage theconstruction of the fifth and sixth BNPP reactors;2. The construction of a nuclear aluminum complex in Balakovo poses anenvironmental threat to the area, all of Povolzhye and is economicallyinadvisable for the government; and3. The announcement of the intent to build this complex in Balakovo has alreadyled to social tension in the region, and stand-off between the residents and theauthorities is growing, which is not contributing to stability in the region?368

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe way in which this issue is ultimately resolved, in the opinion of many Balakovoresidents, will demonstrate whose interests are protected by the authorities: the healthand safety of the population or the profits of the privately-owned RUSAL.369

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Uranium Tailing Pit in Tien Shan and EnvironmentalConsequences for the Local PopulationIgor KhodjamberdievCoordinator of the Toxic Action Network for Central Asiaand Co-Chairman of the International Social-EcologicalUnion, Kyrgyz RepublicTien Shan and Pamir were the sites of uranium piles in the USSR in the 1950sand 1960s. Order of Stalin awards were given out to 17 scientists and engineers forcontributing to the development of the uranium industry in the region. There are stilldozens of old Soviet uranium repositories in Tien Shan and Pamir. Unfortunately, inthe 1960s, obsolete methods were used to store uranium waste. Uranium tailings pastewas left in mountain gorges, covered with a thin layer of sand and about 6–10 metersof soil. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a special security service that prevented anyhuman or animal contact (with the exception of miners) with the uranium tailings. Butthis system was discarded in the early 1990s. Today, we have not found any protectiveservices in the areas in question (see Figures 1–3). There are 48 uranium tailing pits inTien Shan, which contain hazardous radioactive compounds. In Kyrgyzstan alone, thevolume is 70 billion m 3 , with an activity level of 5,500 Ci. In the Mailuu-Suu Valleyin 1958 and 1994, several accidents involving breach took place. The health-relatedhazards are considerable, particularly for those using the land illegally. The soil and thewater have significant uranium concentrations, and in several places the radon contentin the air is very high.Figure 1. The former uranium combine along the Mailuu-Suu River.370

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 2. A valley settlement below a uranium tailings pit.This article will address our observations in the most hazardous zone of uraniumpollution.Figure 3. Illegal scrap metal collectors at the tailing pit.Study Materials and MethodsRadiometric equipment manufactured in the USSR was used to detect radiation,namely a SRP-68-01 radiometer with a BTGI-01 sensor, which registered gammaradiation at a discrimination level of 20 keV and a range of up to 3000 μR/hr. The tracequantity of radioactive elements was measured using a JMS-01-BM2 mass spectrometerwith gas chromatography (with participation of the Ilim independent laboratory underthe Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Organic Chemistry under the371

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRussian Academy of Sciences). We applied a mathematical comparison to identifyzones and sub-zones based on health and environmental conditions and the originaleco-geographical classification of the territory. Previous (latent) manifestations of healthconditions were assessed based on original, tested surveys.Health conditions were examined among the adults living in polluted areas,including pregnant women, and infants. Tests to determine health conditions included:surveying expecting mothers (latent illnesses), an evaluation of the pregnancy on theApgar scale, an assessment of depression symptoms, a polygraph analysis recordingchanges in the cardiovascular system, an examination of the kidneys (residual ammonia,creatinine clearance), an analysis of the blood from the liver, for example measuringglucose, cholesterol, asparagine transaminase enzyme and alanine transaminase (ALT)content. Other tests included gel immunodiffusion (the Mancini technique), a count ofthe number of E and M lymphocyte rosettes, theophylline incubation, etc. It was foundthat in the observation areas, latent illnesses are widespread among pregnant women.Early stages of diseases are usually not officially registered as medical statistics.A chemical analysis of human blood samples (measuring glucose, cholesterol,asparagine transaminase enzyme and alanine transaminase (ALT) content) was conductedunder the new management of the International Association of Chemical Analysts.Results and DiscussionUranium tailings in Mailuu-Suu are in the form of sludge. Sludge tailing piles numbers3, 7, 8 and 18 contain 0.1–0.15% uranium (the result of incomplete uranium extractiontechnology used in 1950–1960). High content of other toxic agents were also found in thesludge (copper, cobalt, chromium, molybdenum and zinc). Our study has shown that themost hazardous uranium content in soil is found in the outskirts of tailing pit number 3 inthe Mailuu-Suu district, where uranium concentration reached 35×10 -6 g/g at a depth of onemeter from the surface. That is 35–50 times higher compared to the general trend in the area.It is likely that as a result of landslides and ground water movement uranium and the othertoxic agents named above have made their way onto the fields and into plant life.Our preliminary studies showed that uranium content in grassy plants (based on dryweight) in Mailuu-Suu is widely varied, but sometimes it is very significant. For example,2.29±0.03 × 10 -6 g/g in Taeniatherum crinitum and 2.27×10 -6 g/g in Aegilops triuncialis,while levels are lower in Cotoneaster suavis (0.28 ± 0.001 × 10 -6 g/g).The highest rates of accumulation in grass have been noted in plants with a powerfulroot system. Feed is one source of substances from which animal organisms are built (cowsand camels), and consequently a source of contamination of meat and milk. the currentsituation could lead to the development of chronic illnesses both among animals and humans.One clear symptom of damaged health among the local residents was disrupted liver function(Figure 4).Lamb meat contained 1.2±0.15 mg/kg of uranium in the Min-Kush area, and0.06±0.0002 mg/kg in Mailuu-Suu. Beef and cow’s milk in Min-Kush contained2.27±0.031 (P

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable 1. Uranium Storage Areas in Mailuu-Suu, KyrgyzstanName and PlaceYear Put intoStorageVolume,thou. m 3Exposure dosemin./max.(µR/hr)No. 2a, Ailampa 1967 85 20/40No. 2b, Ailampa 1967 65 20/40No. 3, Izolit 1954–58 110–150 20/800No. 4, Ailampa ? 115 25/330No. 5, Mailuu-Suu, right riverbank ? 111 20/400No. 6, same location 1970 35 15/30No. 7, same location 1958 600 15/55No. 8, same location ? 90 15/30No. 9a, Mailuu-Suu, left riverbank ? 115 30/60No. 9b, same location ? 50 40/70No. 10, Mailuu-Suu, rightriverbank? 70 20/30No. 12, Ailampa-sai ? 62 20/30No. 13, same location ? 40 30/360No. 14, same location ? 99 15/30No. 15, Sudzhet-sai ? 47 15/90No. 16, Ashvaz-sai 1968 303 16/20No. 17, Mailuu-Suu, left riverbank Destroyed by landslides in 1994No. 18, next to number 3 ? 3 25/800No. 19, Mailuu-Suu, left riverbank ? 1 15/25No. 20a, Mailuu-Suu, rightriverbank? 1 15/25No. 20b, same location ? 2 18/85No. 22, Mailuu-Suu, right riverbank ? 2.2 25/18Several diseases were found among the population both in early and advancedstages in two sections of the Mailuu-Suu Rayon, where uranium mining was conductedfor a long time. It was established that undetected illnesses in early stages are verywidespread among the local residents, but that illnesses in early stages were not takeninto account in official medical statistics.373

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 4. The balance of enzymes (intra- and extracellular) indicating damaged human livercell membranes in Mailuu-Suu.Uranium content (in soil, plants and teeth) on the one hand, and disrupted liverfunction among local residents and the consequences thereof (tachycardia, migraines,insomnia) on the other hand, must be related. Laboratory analyses have identified hypererythrocythemia,neutropenia, monocytosis, lymphocytosis, and low total protein levelsin blood. The low level of immune system function among the region’s residents wasalso evident (lymphocytes, blood proteins, etc.)A recent article is based on an extensive three-year study on migration in theenvironment, including effects on human skin.Childhood illnesses were 55–67% more common in the affected areas. We havefound a confirmed correlation (from r=0.72 to r=0.80) between the concentration ofpollutants and disease markers (liver enzymes, thyroid function, and leukocyte count).Ethnic factors (the region features Mongols (Kyrgyz), Caucasians peoples (Turks),Slavs, and mixes of these genetic groups) do not influence the results.Newborns and young children are the most sensitive, therefore impaired immunesystem function will contribute to the spread of diseases.ConclusionAn assessment was conducted regarding the links between uranium-polluted waters(resulting from seepage in areas close to tailing pits) and human health conditions. Perhapstotal removal of resistant mutagenic pollutants from the environment is impossible. Butwe must continue to make all possible efforts toward this goal.374

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMuslyumovo: Yesterday, Today and TomorrowMilya KabirovaTecha Environmental Organization, ChelyabinskThe village of Muslyumovo is in the Chelyabinsk Oblast. Some of you may bewondering whether this village in the Urals isn’t getting too much attention. It all started17 years ago in 1991. Then-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin signed intolaw bills concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe. That was when public attention turnedto certain communities in the Urals and their residents, who had been adversely affectedby the nuclear industry.In 1993, a federal law was passed on social assistance for citizens affected by theconsequences of the 1957 radiation accident at the Mayak plant and the radioactive wastebeing flushed by the plant into the Techa River. An official list of affected communitieswas compiled.In 1994, a government decree added both the village and the station of Muslyumovoto the list of population centers where the average annual effective dose equivalent isgreater than 1mSv. That same year, in November, the Head of the Chelyabinsk Oblastadministration signed an order to resettle the residents of Muslyumovo Village andStation in the Kunashak Rayon, but nothing happened. No one started the resettlementprocess.Three years later, in July 1997, Pyotr Sumin, the re-elected governor of theChelyabinsk Oblast, issued a new decree on the resettlement of the residents ofMuslyumovo Village and Station in the Kunashak Rayon to replace the first one,considered expired. Voluntary resettlement lists were then compiled of residents inMuslyumovo Village and Station, with those living in houses along the Techa River atthe top of the lists. By that time, the Federal Target Program (FTP) for the social andradiation rehabilitation of local residents and territories of the Urals region that had beenadversely affected by operations at the Mayak Plant had been drafted. The FTP wasscheduled through the year 2000 and financing of the program has begun. The rayon andvillage administration were consulted over the choice of new site for the villages and theresettlement process began. Some families bought apartments in Chelyabinsk, privatehomes were built for others in Kunashak. The building designs for these homes weresuch that the houses were uninhabitable in the winter. I know a large family where someof the children discovered that, while they slept, their pajama tops would freeze to thewall by morning. They didn’t know how to keep their new homes warm. Water wouldfreeze in the basement and the governor sent his representatives to deliver oil heaters inperson. But the most bizarre and incomprehensible part to us was the fact that the newsite selected for resettlement of those who had lived right along the river was just a littlefurther from the river, on the other shore, closer to the woods. They had done everything:they built good housing, invested a lot of money from the federal budget, and provided375

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe people with all of the benefits and compensation that come with living in a pollutedzone. But we just couldn’t figure out: If you are going to spend so much money, why notresettle people onto clean land? They finally resettled more or less all residents of oneriverfront street and never got to the second one. They probably ran out of money. That’show things stayed for nine years, until 2006.In July 2006, RosAtom Director Sergei Kiriyenko visited Mayak. The visitagenda included a meeting to discuss the Techa reservoir system, the resettlement ofMuslyumovo residents, and the construction of the South-Urals Nuclear Power Plant.Mr. Kiriyenko was accompanied by Petr Latyshev, the Presidential representativefor the Urals Federal Okrug, Pyotr Sumin, the Governor of the Chelyabinsk Oblast,Vladimir Grachev and Mikhail Grishankov, both Duma Deputies, and Vitalii Sadovnikov,General Director of Mayak.The agenda item that was discussed in the greatest detail was the resettlement ofMuslyumovo residents. Vladimir Dyatlov, the Governor’s First Deputy, brought up twooptions:1. Resettlement to a new location of the entire village, or 741 households, at acost of approximately RUB 1.8 billion.2. Resettlement of the residents of the two riverfront streets and the junction, ata cost of RUB 500 million.In his comments on the presentation, Sergei Kiriyenko stated that RosAtom is readyto allocate RUB 600 million and that Governor Pyotr Sumin would allocate RUB 450million. The money was real and the first transfers could start as early as the followingmonth. He also said that people had to be given options. Here is one million rubles forhousing. You can use it to have a house be built for you in a place of your choosing, oryou can take that million and go wherever it is you need to go.However, the main condition was that this transaction comprised a purchaseagreement of the original house, to be torn down and bulldozed. The land would then beplanted over and rehabilitated. All of the decisions on RosAtom’s end had already beenmade and they were prepared to start making payments starting in the fall of 2006. Thosewho will want to take just the monetary compensation could do it within a few months.Those who choose to move into a new home would have to do so by 2008 at the latest.And so it was decided.During his next visit, in October 2006, the RosAtom Director and the OblastGovernor signed the timeline for addressing environmental problems of the Techa Riverand the social issues associated with the Muslyumovo Village and Station residents. Atthat same time, the Resettlement Assistance Fund for the Residents of MuslyumovoVillage, Kunashak Rayon, the Chelyabinsk Oblast, a not-for-profit organization, wascreated. The Fund operated under an agreement with Mayak to carry out the instructionsof the corresponding government decree from October 19, 2006.On November 28, 2006, the Fund’s Board passed a resolution on the procedurefor buying out the residential homes from resident owners in Muslyumovo Village.According to this resolution, the resident buyout agreement can be concluded if:1. Ownership rights to the home are in order;2. The home is located within the administrative boundaries of MuslyumovoVillage;3. The home is residence-worthy (walls, windows, roof). RosAtom funds wereused to set up an Information Center at the village, complete with office376

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYequipment, and lawyers who were supposed to work at the Center to advisethe residents on any issues that may arise and assist in the drawing up ofbuyout applications.In order to submit an application, a Muslyumovo resident had to decide on theresettlement package and bring a set of documents to the Information Center. Thesedocuments had to include:• Proof of state registration of ownership rights to the residence in question;• Certification of legal basis for acquiring the property;• A home inspection report;• Proof of ownership of the lot by the owner of the home;• Proof of no arrears on utilities payments or taxes at the time of applicationsubmission.Within 30 days of application submission, the Fund’s authorized representative(staff member) makes a decision regarding the buyout agreement or provides specificreasons why no such agreement can be made. The Fund must inform the applicant of itsdecision within three days. The initial refusal is not final and the applicant may resubmitthe application to the Fund after addressing the reasons for the refusal. The Fund makesthe resettlement payment available in three ways:1. The Fund pays monetary compensation (RUB 1 million), if the individualhas a residence in a locality other than Muslyumovo. In this case, theindividual must provide the Fund proof of ownership rights to that propertyand a document certifying legal basis for its acquisition (purchase and saleagreement, exchange agreement, etc.).2. The Fund pays for a new residence to be purchased by the individual in adifferent locality. In this case, a three-way purchase and sale agreement isconcluded. The Fund pays the buyout sum for the new housing. In the eventthat the cost of the new housing is less than one million rubles, the differenceis deposited into the applicant’s bank account.3. The Fund pays a contractor to build a new home for the applicant in NewMuslyumovo. In this case the applicant may choose a house design fromamong the ones provided by the Fund.It seems like a straightforward process that offers several options. People have achoice, except that New Muslyumovo will be built on the same exact territory as the oldvillage, just next to the Muslyumovo Station. Muslyumovo Station residents have allthe same papers and receive the same (miserly) benefits and compensations as any otherresident living on land with radiation pollution. When the people being resettled startedto object, the authorities said: “Don’t you understand? This option is in your favor. Weare leaving you all your benefits and compensations for living on polluted land.” So theresidents asked again: “Why does the government want to spend billions just to keep usliving on polluted land?”As of today, according to Maria Sobol, Head of the Environmental Safety andEnvironmental Protection Commission under the Public Chamber of the ChelyabinskOblast, 54 buyout agreements have been drawn up and honored (RUB 1 million each).However, over 150 houses have been built at New Muslyumovo. That is to say, theagreements have not been drawn up, but the houses have already been built. What happensif a person makes a different choice and asks for monetary compensation instead? The54 home owners in New Muslyumovo account for just 7% of the total population to be377

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYresettled. The infrastructure of the new village will also require an additional RUB 450million from the Oblast treasury. Does this mean the investment is at the rate of overRUB 8 million per agreement?There are also doubts over how clean the territory is. Perhaps it is clean now, beforethe residents move in, but, trust me, after several years the [radiation] measurements willbe completely different. This is because the livestock and poultry will be going to theriver. The best meadows are along the river banks and the locals simply have no betteroption. The Muslyumovo Station has yards where the radiation background measuresover 120 μR/hr, instead of the permitted 17–20 μR/hr. The same will happen at the newsite in a few years!The drinking water does not meet the SanPiN 2.1.4.1074-01 Standard’s requirementsin terms of total alpha and beta activity levels, opacity, and color. There is an officialDirective from the Chelyabinsk RosPotrebNadzor—the consumer protection agency—to immediately stop using drinking water from underground sources in MuslyumovoVillage and Station and to organize an external supply of drinking water. However,nothing was done about it. The residents, uninformed, continued to use the water as usual.In response to our insistent questions, the local Administration said that supposedly theyhad plugged up any wells that contained radioactive water. My question was: where didthey get any other kind of wells?They said that they had dug new ones in New Muslyumovo. However, there is noguarantee that the ground waters feeding these wells are not the same in both places,given that the distance between the new and old village is so small.These are the concerns of those who did make up their minds and decided to stayin the village.Meanwhile, if a person decided to get his million rubles and leave the villagebehind, according to RosAtom Director this can be done in just one month. Clearlythis is the most reasonable solution. In that case the applicant would need to submit thenecessary paperwork showing that he has housing available at another locality. Thisway he would keep some belongings and won’t be left out in the cold, but what is reallygoing on here?At the Information Center the staff started requiring that individuals have permanentresidency in Muslyumovo.At the same time an Inventory Commission, created by decree of Tanir Yanbaev,Head of the Kunashak Rayon, is hard at work. New lists are being compiled, whichinclude the new residents at their discretion, but those who were previously in the oldlists, which included 741 households, are excluded. The Commission explains this bysaying that the people in question are not actually residing in their homes at the time ofthe inventory. It was getting to the point where, if the snow was piling up in the frontyard and no smoke was coming out of the chimney, they would say the house wasuninhabited. They went through the properties, checking if the owners had stocked up oncoal and firewood, and when they found nothing, the residents were out of luck: you werecrossed off the list and no one at the Center was going to sign a buyout agreement withyou, regardless of whether you had all the papers in order and this was your property.It smacked of 1937. People started panicking. They would sit at home all day, waitingfor the Commission members, stoking their stoves, and leaving notes on their doorswhenever they stepped out reading: Went to Kunashak, Went to the hospital.The most persistent were told by the Inventory Commission that the right to378

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYconclude agreements lay with the Resettlement Fund while the lists being drawn upby the commission were only for recommendation purposes. The result was a viciouscycle.Luckily, there is such a thing as the rule of law, so people started turning to the courtsto help resolve the resulting problems with concluding sale-purchase agreements. Withthe court’s assistance, a person hopes he can leave the village behind without abandoninghis belongings and property. The government had guaranteed resettlement and createdthe Resettlement Fund, opened the Information Center, and drafted documents signed bythe top people in the country and the oblast, all for this purpose.However, even a court ruling in favor of the home owner means nothing. Thereason for this is that your buyout agreement, where in exchange for RUB 1 million yourproperty is razed, is concluded with the not-for-profit Resettlement Assistance Fund forthe Residents of Muslyumovo Village, and the Fund can do whatever it pleases.I can give many examples. In one case, 16 months had passed since the firstcontact with the Information Center and the elderly couple, themselves invalids, went tosubmit the paperwork, accompanied by two representatives of the Techa EnvironmentalOrganization and a representative of the regional office of the Lawyers’ Association,carrying a video camera and a voice recorder. This was just to submit the document forconsideration, not to sign the agreement itself. The Fund’s top staff member was notvery welcoming. She did however, after consulting with someone by phone, accept thedocuments for consideration. But first, she ordered the applicants to renew a bunch ofthe documents since they had expired. Of course they had expired! Almost a year and ahalf had passed!As we left, we politely thanked her for being so helpful. She grimaced in response,saying that the acceptance of the documents meant nothing. Her words verbatim: “IT’SNOT A DONE DEAL”We were bewildered. What could that mean? Is our entire existence to be spentfighting? What is the point of all these agreements, decrees, laws, timetables, if oneperson already decided that you WILL live on polluted land to the end of your days.379

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYEnvironmental Aspects of Radiation Safety near the Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical CombineTamara AshikhminaDirector, Laboratory for Bio-Monitoring, Vyatka StateHumanitarian University;President, Green Cross Russia Kirov AffiliateA large radiochemical company has been in operation in the town of Kirovo-Chepetsk (Kirov Oblast), near the Vyatka River, for ten years. This was a nuclear fuelcycle enterprise and the largest source of radioactive chemical waste in Europe. In 1944,this company was the first in Russia to produce hydrofluoric acid, and it was there thatoperations continued for a long time producing hexafluoride and uranium tetrafluorideby fluorinating uranium metal and uranium oxide. It was also here that it became possibleto achieve a reaction without adding chlorine as a catalyst.The territory of the Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Combine measures 4.5 × 4.5 km 2(20.25 km 2 ) and is located south of the town of Kirovo-Chepetsk, near the floodplainterrace of the Vyatka River (Figure 1).Figure 1. The location of the Combine sludge dumps in the town of Kirov.The western end of the chemical combine’s industrial zone is adjacent to a territoryalong the upper floodplain and first terrace above the floodplain of the Vyatka River thatis used to store radioactive waste (RW, radwaste). The combine’s industrial zone featureseight storage facilities for radwaste, storing a total of 784,500 tons. The accumulatedmass of radwaste has reached a total radioactivity of 1,176.7 Ci. The wastes contain:238-235U, 232 Th, 239 Pu, 240,60 Co, 90 Sr, 137 Cs and several short-lived 134 Cs isotopes and theirfission products.The storage facilities for radioactive and other toxic wastes are within theboundaries of the town of Kirovo-Chepetsk, within 2 km from the residential zone. Thechemical combine and its storage facilities are just 1.5–3.0 km from the Vyatka River.380

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe Elkhovka River flows to the northwest across the entire territory; this river is usedas a collector for dumping industrial and storm sewage from the Combine and flows intothe Prosnoye Lake in the west of the territory.Also in the area near the Combine, there are a large number of swamps and groundwaters are very close to the surface (Figure 2). At low summer levels, the soil watercan be found at a depth of 1.5–3.5 meters, while in the swampy depressions it comesvery close to the surface. Ground water flows primarily east to west, away from thechemical combine’s storage facilities and towards the Vyatka River. The water tablefeeds deeper formations in this area, determining the natural and industrial resourcesof the ground waters they contain. Most of the soil water is discharged in the VyatkaRiver, and partially in the floodplain lakes of the Elkhovka River. Its mineralization fromnatural chemical composition changes from 0.08 to 0.34 g/L. When the water table ishigh, some of the territory is subject to flooding by the surface waters from the VyatkaRiver. Another negative physical and geological factor is the area’s seismic activity.Figure 2. The runoff collector at the Combine.Currently, this is a large chemical combine that uses special technology tomanufacture complex fertilizers, ammonium, nitric acid, chloride, and lye. The Combinealso includes Russia’s largest polymer plant, where 96% of all Russian fluorocarbonpolymers are produced.Despite the fact that the Combine has not dealt with nuclear fuel cycle issues forover 60 years it remains one of the most worrisome sources of potential environmentalpollution due to the fact that radioactive and toxic substances have been detected in soilwaters, soil, bottom sediments and waterways located near the radioactive waste storage381

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYfacilities. Alpha-active nuclides (plutonium and uranium) have polluted nearly 17.5hectares at an average density of 0.7 Ci/km 2 , and 137 Cs has polluted nearly 53 hectaresat a pollution density of up to 50 Ci/km 2 . It is possible that radionuclides may pollutesoil waters due to the long service live of the storage facilities. The chemical combine’spremises and the waste storage facilities are located in the second belt of Kirov’s healthprotection zone, where nearly 600,000 people reside. The population of the town ofKirov gets its drinking water primarily from the Vyatka River.Data from monitoring soil water, soil and bottom sediments near the bed of theElkhovka River in previous years pointed to radioactive pollution in specific lowerareas, which was the result of dumping radioactive materials. For a more in-depth andindependent assessment of the radioactive conditions in the Kirovo-Chepetsk and Kirovzone, samples have been taken from the bottom sediments of the rivers and lakes nearthe Combine (the Elkhovka and Prosnitsi rivers) and near these cities.The gross uranium content is generally low, and in most cases lower than 2.5 g/T(dry weight) with maximum concentrations reaching 4.5–6 g/T seen in the lower andmiddle currents of the Elkhovka River, and further along the current where the solidradioactive waste storage facilities are located. In addition to gross uranium, mobileuranium and the general mineralization of aqueous extract were also measured. In mostcases, mobile uranium content amounts to (1.9–4.6) × 10 -6 g/L in four points of thelower currents of the Elkhovka River, where gross uranium content reaches a maximumof 4.5–6.0 g/T and mobile uranium increases up to (24.0–30.6) × 10 -6 g/L. These arealso the spots where very high mineralization has been observed (210–230 mg/L). Asa result, one could state that there is some uranium pollution of the bottom sediments,presumably from the RW storage facilities. More specifically, the source of the pollutioncan be identified by testing bottom sediments for radioactive isotope content ( 90 Sr, 137 Cs,and 60 Co or 239 Pu and 235 U). In all samples, thorium content was low and did not exceed5–7 g/L. Water at two control points (the water intakes for the cities of Kirov and Kirovo-Chepetsk) is annually tested for 90 Sr and 137 Cs content. Both intakes are located withinthe zone of potential impact from the Combine’s industrial waste (see Figure 3) and thewaste from the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant.In line with Russian Government Decree No. 484 (dated April 19, 2007) and theprocedures approved by Decree No. 594 of the Russian Government (June 26, 1995)for preparing and implementing federal target programs and interstate target programsin which Russia participates, the Federal Target Program for Ensuring Nuclear andRadioactive Safety in 2008 with an outlook to 2015 was drafted. The plans for thisprogram involve efforts in five different areas. The second area, “practical solutions forproblems related to past activities,” includes, in addition to a number of other measures,ensuring safety in handling previously accumulated radwaste and rehabilitation ofterritories, buildings and structures contaminated by radiation. This project focuses onthe Combine, the past operations of which were connected to its role in the nuclear fuelcycle as Europe’s largest source of radioactive chemical waste.382

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 3. The Konstantinov Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Combine.There are three decrees passed by the Oblast Administration currently in force in ourregion aimed at regulating radiation safety, including radiation monitoring efforts: one onintroducing radiation health passports for companies and territories in the Oblast, one onensuring the radiation safety of the population, and another on the further developmentof public health monitoring. Each decree has approved targeted action programs.Radiation monitoring in the region began back in 1961, when the health andmedical service began to analyze the indicators of the frequency of x-ray proceduresand dosage rates received by the population during these procedures. Since the 1960s,ongoing studies have been examining atmospheric precipitation and the air. Since 1990,monitoring has been held to observe the gamma exposure rate at open areas (the gammabackground) throughout the entire territory (see Figure 4).Considering that the main rivers — the Vyatka and the Cheptsa — supply drinkingwater for the towns of Kirov and Kirovo-Chepetsk, a comprehensive evaluationof the potential pollutant content in the natural resources and an examination of theimpact of pollutants on the ecosystem and human health are crucial. In order to ensurerepresentative monitoring of the water systems of these rivers, additional researchexamining water reservoirs is needed in addition to selecting the key parameters formonitoring the natural environment and facilities.At present, a great deal of work has been completed. The pollution of the land islocal. The radiation conditions are monitored by the Oblast’s GosSanEpidNadzor Centerand the Oblast Center for hydro-meteorology and environmental monitoring. Studiesthat are part of the territory radiation monitoring program needs to be prepared and putinto practice.383

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFigure 4. Gamma background fluctuations in the town of Kirov.In order to ensure environmental sustainability of the natural resources, as wellas the safety and health of local residents in the central areas of the Oblast, we havedeveloped a comprehensive environmental monitoring program for the areas near theCombine. A systemic approach has been adopted as the methodological framework andthe focus will be on examining the state of natural resources in the area impacted by theradioactive waste storage facilities.This system should serve as a set of subsystems: controlling and monitoring sourcesof anthropogenic effects of radwaste storage facilities, environmental monitoring andmonitoring the health of local residents. The tasks of each would vary depending onthe agency, yet they should be organized into a common body. The system is foundedon the principles of integration, structural unity, priority parameters, analysis methods,the location of monitoring sites, and mandatory scientific support for all stages ofwork. Furthermore, we envisage the creation of monitoring subsystems based onspecific methods: comparison, responsiveness, continuity, sensitivity, and forecasting.The organization of these subsystems should provide for the systematic registrationand control of indicators relating to the state of the health of local residents and thestate of the natural environment, predictions of potential changes, the preparation ofrecommendations and proposals to reduce and prevent radiation from affecting thenatural resources in the area, and monitoring the effectiveness of the actions underwayto normalize environmental conditions.One of the main issues — and one of the most complex — concerning comprehensivemonitoring of the territory near this kind of chemical plant is determining the mostimportant parameters for chemical pollutants for establishing cause-and-effect relationsbetween anthropogenic effects and the ability of the natural ecosystem to reproduce itsstructure and functions. Priority parameters ought to be defined for all of the componentsof the natural environment, and along these lines it will be necessary to conduct monitoringof the air, the state of the soil, bodies of water on the surface, bottom sediments, ground,384

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYsoil water and drinking water, and woodland and meadow plant life.An important element in organizing a comprehensive environmental monitoringsystem is its efficient special structure, i.e., determining the best, most informativelocations for setting up monitoring points, key areas, and observation wells within theterritory affected by the facility. In selecting key areas, one must consider all of theoptions of potential radiation effects caused by radwaste: its position, the direction ofthe wind, the distance of the storage facility from the river and residential housing, andthe density of forest cover on the territory. It would be wise to compare indicators of thehealth of the local residents with that of the residents of a different territory with similarbackground and population levels for the purposes of achieving an accurate statisticalevaluation.Since 2000, the biomonitoring laboratory under the Institute of Biology at the KomiScientific Center, part of the Russian Academy of Sciences Urals Branch, and VyatGGUhave been studying the soil, flora and fauna and precipitation (snow), surface waters andbottom sediments near the Combine. The studies involve active use of bio-indicationand bio-testing techniques. Research has been completed on mercury content, fluoridecontent, and strontium content in the local flora.Undertaking a variety of different tasks as part of carrying out a comprehensiveenvironmental monitoring program will help develop scientifically-founded, long-termpredictions regarding the state of the health of local residents and the environment in thearea surrounding this source of radioactive pollution.385

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNuclear “Red Herrings” Along the Eurasian CanalVladimir LagutovChairman, Green Don Environmental Movement,Novocherkassk, Rostov OblastThe latest campaign for a new, massive project led by the heirs of Russia’s original“conquerors of nature” aims to construct a Eurasian canal from the Caspian Sea to the AzovSea. This project has the very specific goal of destroying everything that lives within theSouthern Federal District (SFD). This can be seen from the intentions of Russia’s senior-mostleaders, who mean to have it out with the environment once and for all using an electionscampaign involving the Government Council and Russia’s Security Council. It can also begleaned from the behavior of administrative officials. In fact, their intent is to fool the publicto get exactly what they want. You can judge for yourselves.In the lower Don River and the lower Volga, we have observed degraded floodplains,destroyed river ecosystems, destroyed migration routes used by fish, and the slow death ofthe Azov and Caspian seas. We can add the loss of these two to the loss of the Aral Sea.The service life of the hydropower generating complexes that were built to regulatethese rivers expired long ago and they ought to be either dismantled or rebuilt. The waterresources are fully claimed by water consumers and further river operations will requiretransferring water from the Volga to the Don and to the Volga from the Northern slope ofRussia’s European territory — projects that had been suspended as too environmentallyhazardous.The number-one water consumer on the list of environmental threats against riverecosystems are power companies in general, and nuclear power plants in particular.The oil and gas sector is another interested party when it comes to these typesof construction projects and has gone mad from the savagery of the profits market.Its companies have been exploiting the ecosystems of the Caspian and the Azov forexploratory works, oil extraction, shipment via water and pipeline transport in a way thatdoes not take the interests of the people into consideration.The illegal launch of the first reactor of the Rostov NPP is an environmentalcrime, as it stands in the way of resolving the issue of dismantling and rehabilitating theTsimlyansk hydropower plant on the Don River, which is both obsolete and decrepit.Nevertheless, the Rostov Oblast and Russian authorities are preparing for the launch ofthe second Rostov NPP reactor, this one not reliant on water from the Don but rather onwater transferred from the Volga.In order to ensure sufficient water supply, [the authorities] are doing everything intheir power to steamroll the option to build the Volga-Don-2 canal, which falls neatlywithin the interests of the oil mafia, as it is seeking to double oil tanker traffic by doublingtheir tonnage from 5,000 to 10,000. A new shipping lock has already been built and put intooperation at the Kochetovsk hydropower complex accommodating the doubled dimensionsof the tanker fleet. All that is left to do is to launch the twinned lock of the Volga-Don-2386

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYshipping canal to accommodate doubled tanker tonnage of up to 10,000 tons.Moreover, the entire Administration of the Rostov Oblast is petitioning for thesoonest-possible launch of two additional reactors at the Rostov NPP (numbers 3 and4), as evidenced not only by their election speeches, but by the election speeches madeby Russia’s upper hierarchy. Here, one should bear in mind that economic arguments infavor of the project are based on the findings of an independent environmental assessmentand the Rostov NPP environmental impact assessment, which imply that there is somesort of short-lived return on investment (ROI) for the Rostov NPP — but only if thereare at least six operational reactors. If it takes 30 years or more to complete construction,the project will no longer be viable.In order to shift public attention away from the nuclear adventures on the DonRiver, the “next Panama” project is being aggressively promoted: the Eurasian Canalfrom the Caspian to the Azov that will transport oil via a shorter route thanks to thetotal destruction of the last remaining ecosystems in the SFD and the desertification ofKalmykia and the Manych Depression.Naturally, during future investigations, it will become obvious that the oil depositswill have been exhausted by the time the construction of the canal is finished, and thatthe situation will need to be rectified by the launch of the Volga-Don-2. Shortly after,they will recommence the transfer of water from northern rivers in order to save thelower Volga.The fact is that the true goal here is to destroy the river ecosystems and the entireenvironment of the SFD, and we can see that from the actions of RAO UES, the energymonster, with its rate policy and the degradation of the SFD, the refusal even of the ideaof recultivating and reviving the Don and the Volga, which they killed, by ignoring theDeclaration on Fishing.The report of the Legislative Assembly of the Rostov Oblast to the public reads:“ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.” The President’s addressdescribed the largest structural reform in the last decade. Essentially, what we are talkingabout is the second largest power supply project in the nation’s history. There are plansto increase Russia’s electricity generation by two-thirds by 2020. In order to do this, thegovernment and private companies will invest about RUB 12 trillion. In the next 12 years,Russia plans to build 26 [nuclear] power plants using the latest technologies.Considering the plans for the socioeconomic development of the Rostov Oblast andRussia’s south by 2020, the political party United Russia has reviewed ways for developingthe NPP in Volgodonsk and ensuring its reliable and safe operation. The party came to thefollowing conclusions:• The construction of the third and fourth reactors of the Rostov NPP is necessary,and it must be done by the deadlines set out in the Federal Target Program forDeveloping Russia’s Nuclear Power Industry in 2007–2010, with an outlook to2015 (2010–2015);• Discuss RosAtom’s participation in financing the development of a comprehensivesystem for the use of water resources in the Don River basin.Then, without any qualms, we see the phrase: “The United Russia Party has takencontrol of the process of restoring irrigated farming at minimum to regain lost capacity.”At one time, for the sake of the light bulb, all of the rivers of the European part of theUSSR were destroyed. Likewise, the “builders of Communism” received one light bulbas part of pension payments if they were recognized veterans of labor and had damaged387

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYtheir health in the process. For example, victims of repressions that supplied the labor forthese projects were rewarded with a standard allotment of 28 kWt/hrs per month, whichmeans just a few hours of light from that light bulb each day.And here we see the task set by the President: increase electricity generation bythree times. One might be inclined to ask why, if in the beginning of the Dark Ageswe had more than enough energy to power Russia’s industries, [are we now] the mostenergy-hungry in the world? We need to bear in mind that industry has decreased by70% as well since the beginning of perestroika. In other words, only 15% of the energyproduced is for our own needs. They will destroy the entire biosphere for peanuts.They don’t even understand that no modern technologies exist for 26 NPP reactors,they haven’t even figured out how to reprocess their waste and use a closed cycle, eitherfor fuel or for water. The level of technical illiteracy is shocking among regional deputieswho don’t know anything about their own country. Especially in Don’s case, the riverdoesn’t even have enough water to support two reactors at the Rostov NPP, and now weare supposed to build another two and restore the land reclamation system in full, whichis mutually impossible given the limited water supply.Moreover, they are going to raise the issue of financing the development of thewater resources of the Don River with the gains from selling nuclear power. As iftheir development will result in an excess of water resources! Is it really so difficult tounderstand that the water resources of the Don River are already completely exhausted,and that it is already necessary to bring water from the Volga, and that will result in thedeath of the lower Volga? Just as the Communist functionaries of the Soviet Union wasuneducated, so is its spawn, making the same old mistakes with the new Volga-Don andthe manipulation of the northern rivers.We ought to recall some of the notes from the Rostov NPP Environmental ImpactAssessment (EIA) on the final statement of the expert commission of the publicenvironmental inspection of the Rostov NPP, dated December 22, 1999. In terms of thewater supply for the Rostov NPP, leading Don River scientists made the following pointsand conclusions, taken from the EIA:“2.1. Regarding the negative (possibly catastrophic) impact on the entire basin of theTsimlyansk water reservoir and the lower Don River, the only source of water supply forthe population, and on the numerous recreational areas;2.3. Regarding the negative impact on the dam side of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir(directly and via the cooling pond), which will result in the destruction of the fish population;fish productivity has already decreased several times since the construction of the RostovNPP.2.4. Due to the extremely strained and insufficient water balance of the lower DonRiver and the need to ensure reservoir releases from the Tsimlyansk water reservoir for thefishing industry to regularly fill the river floodplains;THERE ARE NO RELEASES IN THE SPRING, WHICH HAS CAUSED THEDEGRADATION OF THE FLOODPLAINS AND ALL OF THE ECOSYSTEMS,RESULTING IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF LOCAL SPECIES.2.5. Due to the inevitable need to decide the fate of the Tsimlyansk hydropowerstation (the state of the dam was not examined) and rehabilitate the degraded floodplainsof the Don River this issue was raised by the Environmental Commission of the RostovOblast Council in the early 1990s, which has now fallen silent, an inaction wrought withcatastrophic consequences.388

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY4. In assessing the project in terms of water resource issues, thermal load and climateeffects, the EIA did not consider the already negative environmental conditions in thearea of Volgodonsk and the basin of the lower Don River, described in the EnvironmentalAtlas of the Rostov Oblast (1996) and in the Assessment of the Conditions of the WaterEcosystems of the Basin of the Lower Don River (1996). Nor was the anthropogeniccongestion of the Don River’s water basin and the assessment of the drinking water asextremely dirty (water quality rated at 5–4), as reported in the Russian Water QualityAlmanac in 1998, taken into account. The conclusions drawn by the Rostov NPP EIA isbased on inaccurate data and is rife with errors:…4.2. Inaccurate data was submitted on the filtration of the water from the coolingpond at the Tsimlyansk water reservoir;4.3. The thermal pollution of the cooling pond was inaccurately assessed, as wasthe water closest to the dam of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir due to the absence ofany analysis of the monitoring results for the cooling ponds at other NPPs operating insimilar climates; the pollution of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir by blue-green algae andincreased concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the water were not considered;4.4. The consequences of pollution by salts in the cooling ponds and the dammedstretch of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir were not assessed correctly.”All of these issues remain unresolved today.The EIA is peculiar because the design basis accidents and beyond design basisaccidents were considered for all of the components of the ecosystem, save for the waterreservoir, the conditions of which are reviewed in-depth ONLY in for normal operationof the Rostov NPP. The design-basis accidents are reviewed in much less detail, primarilyin the form of tables. Finally, in the case of beyond design basis accidents, the only thingit indicates is that the drinking water supply for the plant’s staff will be supplied from anartesian aquifer reserve. Clearly, the problems of the lower Don River, the Azov Sea andthe Black Sea basin will cease to exist in this case. In other words, the EIA fails to addressthe impact of the Rostov NPP on the Don River basin, which constitutes criminal intent.As a result, the assessment of the project with regard to water resources, thermalpollution and climate factors makes it impossible to come to a positive conclusion.THE DEFICIT OF WATER RESOURCES OF THE DON RIVER CANNOT BECOMPENSATED FOR BY WATER FROM THE VOLGA.The official stance of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Supply regardingthe water supply of the Don River is simple: “The water resources of the Don River arepractically exhausted and the further development of irrigation and other water consumersmay take place based only on Volga water, the reserves of which are similarly not withoutlimit. Today the issue of transferring water from northern rivers into the Volga, and fromthe Volga into the Don, is under real consideration.” This statement was made in the early1990s, but it is relevant today.Having not found a suitable use for their earth-moving capabilities, those involvedin land reclamation came to a mutual agreement with the power sector and attempted tobestow another two large trenches upon the North Caucasus, which they quickly beganto dig. A lot of force was required to put an end to these murderous projects. This holdsequally true for the canals for transferring water from the Volga. The first of the canals,the Volga-Chograi, is meant to supply water to the North Caucasus NPP, planned to bebuilt at the Chograi water reservoir. The second, the Volga-Don-2, was built expressly tosupply water to the Rostov NPP; based on the plant specifications, from which it follows389

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthat the water in the Don and the Tsimlyansk water reservoir is guaranteed to suffice onaverage for only one-and-a-half of the reactors at the Rostov NPP.The problem of putting an NPP in the Don River area is closely tied to water fromthe Volga. First of all due to insufficient water resources in the area for supporting eventwo reactors at the Rostov NPP, and second due to the planned construction of the NorthCaucasus NPP along the Chograi. The first involves the construction of the Volga-Don-2canal, and the second presumes the construction of the Volga-Chograi canal.Moreover, the design of the North Caucasus NPP envisages measures to prevent thedumping of radioactive water into water reservoirs; there are no such conditions for theRostov NPP project — they were omitted either in error or intentionally.A decision needs to be made regarding the fate of the Tsimlyansk reservoir, as itsservice life has already exceeded the standard of 40 years. In 1991–1993, the regularcommission for nature conservation and the rational use of natural resources of the RostovOblast Council of People’s Deputies tried several times to force the administration andthe Oblast’s Committee for Nature Conservation to make a decision about the reservoir.Even competitive bidding was announced for carrying out work in relation to theTsimlyansk reservoir problem, but the last military coup in 1993 and the total dissolutionof councils deprived the situation of any kind of leadership or coordination in terms ofenvironmental work on an Oblast-wide scale. Yet the problem hasn’t gone anywhere: adecision is still needed. Fifteen years have passed, and the problem remains.And the possibility of releasing water from the reservoir contradicts the requirementsof the Rostov NPP, in particular, when the level is reduced from the standard headwaterlevel down to inactive storage capacity, the cooling pond will also be emptied. Thispossibility is not even mentioned in the design of the Rostov NPP, nor is any othercatastrophe involving the Tsimlyansk dam and the breakage of the waterfront and a rapiddrop in the water level.On the other hand, the designers did not resolve the problem of preventing thecontamination of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir during normal NPP operations with afilter dam, nor did it address any emergency scenarios in which the dam might wash outor be destroyed by an explosion.The town of Tsimla itself has been damaged by the emergence and intensive growthof blue-green algae during warm periods, and this algae is toxic to all living things. Asfar as the cooling pond is concerned, the expectations are that it will receive up to 80tons of salt combined with the evaporation of 172,000 cubic meters of water daily, whilethe salt needs to be removed from the pond in order to supply cooling water to the NPPreactors — the pond needs to be washed out regularly.The launch of the Rostov NPP guaranteed the destruction of the Don River basin andthe Azov Sea, which was once richly populated with fish. There will not be any naturalreleases or flooding of the river’s plains to aid the fishing industry. The Don River hasbeen transformed into your typical run-off trench used for water transport and thermalpower. The outlook is the same for all of the regulated rivers of the USSR: Don, Kuban,Volga, Dnepr Rivers, etc. This is an example of environmental ignorance in policymakingand demonstrates the lack of the responsibility of the authorities, fraught withthe destruction of Russia’s most fertile area. The rate policy of the Russian governmentalso indicates that the stage is set for “the abomination of desolation,” to use a Biblicalreference, where the South of Russia, a potential breadbasket, may crumble under theeconomic destruction caused by maximally hiked rates of 8–9 cents per kilowatt hour,390

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYas opposed to 2–3 in the West.Incidentally, issue 44 of the newspaper Argumenty i Fakty na Donu includes anarticle by Oleg Bessonov, Doctor of Geological and Mineral Sciences, entitled “Doesthe Southern Federal District Need its Own ‘Panama Canal’?” This article containsa surprising statement of a particular opinion voiced by the Rostov Oblast GovernorVladimir Chub. The excerpt in question reads:“The Administration of the Rostov Oblast, in response to a message from PresidentVladimir Putin to the Federation Council of Russia, insists on the implementation ofthe construction project to build the second branch of the Volga-Donsk Shipping Canal,including the simultaneous modernization of the hydrological structures that are in placetoday. Arguments in favor of this decision have been voiced recently by the Governor ofour Oblast, Mr. Vladimir Chub, in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, issue No. 230 (October 16, 2007).It is the opinion of the Governor that the construction of the second branch of the Volga-Donsk Shipping Canal will tackle the full set of national development goals while meetingthe region’s socioeconomic and environmental interests. The approximate cost of theconstruction is RUB 60 billion.”That gives rise to the question: Why did the governor suddenly take a stance againstthe next Panama Canal and what is he hiding? Based on documents, it is our opinionthat:• There is a close tie between the purely commercial interests of the OblastAdministration and the federal authorities with the interests of regional powercompanies;• There is an equally strong tie between the interests of Governor Chub and themanagement of Rostov NPP, to which he gave the green light to launch thefirst reactor, is preparing for the launch of the second reactor, and wants toobtain consent from the Oblast’s Legislative Assembly for the third and fourthreactors;• We can presume the following: the Rostov NPP resolved the issue ofresponsibility for the destruction of the fish reserves (estimated at RUB 700million) by offering RUB 200 million in compensation, which theAdministration then allocated to the construction of the Aksai-Donsk sturgeonfish farm and, essentially, for the commercial complex at the Bagayevskstation.As a result, of the two versions of the canal scam, both address only the interests of thepower sector, the water sector, and the oil sector. Both destroy the surrounding landscape, thewater resources and all living things. But the northern version also destroys the floodplainsof two major rivers, the upper Don and the lower Volga, while the southern version deals thefinal blow to the ecosystem of the Manych Depression. The fact that the version includingthe North Caucasus NPP in Chorgai was not adopted has to do with the inaccuracy ofthe calculations made by the designers, who did not consider that the water transferredfrom the Volga via the Kalmyk wasteland, which is undergoing intense mineralization andis not suitable for irrigation or use. It is also not much use for the NPP. Here is a quotefrom the 1983 feasibility documentation for the Volga-Chorgai canal: “Development inthis zone will receive energy from other sectors of the economy. In 1990, the constructionof a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 6,000 MWt is planned. It will be located in therear area of the Chorgai water reservoir, the water for which will be supplied via the Volga-Chorgai canal.” In other words, talks were underway about the ROI of the NPP, but only391

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYgiven six operational reactors running on million-kilowatt mega turbines. That idea alreadydied a natural death, while the Rostov NPP, despite the reality of the situation, will keepplugging in the reactors until the Don and Volga Rivers have dried up for good.There is another interesting quote that addresses the fishing situation: “The sourceof the canal’s water supply is the Volga River, which has an average annual flow of 250km 3 and flow rate moves at 8,100 m 3 /s. After building the Kuibyshev and Volgograd waterreservoirs, the lower reaches of the Volga have been regulated with releases from thereservoirs, which simulate the springtime flood patterns for fishing industry needs and theminimum water flow for shipping at 4,000 m 3 /s.” That is an odd release if it is less thanhalf of the average flow rate. What exactly they were simulating now, three decades later,is unclear. All we know is that all fish resources will have been lost. So, it was poorlydesigned, poorly operated, and the errors are irreparable. Instead of placing another noosearound the neck of the entire Don-Volga river system, someone should be held accountablefor the harm already done.Thirty years have not yet passed and new benefactors have appeared who feign theirconcern for the territories that have been entrusted to them and who peddle the need for newmassive construction projects, which are grandiose only in their degree of absurdity.The fact that the Eurasian canal is merely a “red herring” used to distract attentionis supported by the fact that it does not resolve the primary goal at stake here: reliableshipping. The problem of shallow waters of the Azov Sea remains for shipping vesselscarrying their capacity, i.e., the need for new shipping channels starts here. Or there isthe possible construction of a new Manych-Taman canal along the eastern coast, via theTaman peninsula through the old Kuban riverbed and ending directly in the Black Sea.This idea is also technically possible, but it is patently economically and environmentallyill-conceived. As a result, the advertising campaign for the Eurasian canal is beneficial onlyfor the purpose of detracting attention from the new Volga-Don-2 canal, since yesterday’sCommunist conquerors of Mother Earth, and today’s regional leaders, have earmarkedtheir piece of the pie not only in the power industry, but in the oil sector as well. Those arethe true reasons behind the “Eurasian Panama Canal.”But the most distressing aspect of this story of the conjoined interests among thewater industry and the nuclear sector is the way they both thrive off of the demise ofthe environment. Both the NPP and the water reservoir are facilities with exceptionallyhigh environmental hazards, and not for their use of primitive technologies that exploitthe ecosystem, but for the lack of any technologies that could be used to dismantle thesefacilities and rehabilitate the biosphere that they destroyed. Neither the nuclear sectornor the water industry have any promising technologies or any finished technologiesto rebuild the destroyed ecosystem, and they are forced to extend the service lives ofthese facilities endlessly, a kind of life after death, until there is an accident or a naturaldisaster. Extending the standard service lives of water reservoirs and NPPs cannot beseen as normal from any point of view; it can only lead to an unavoidable cataclysm.392

Sergey Baranovsky, President of Green Cross Russia, asks a question.Igor Khripunov, Associate Director of the Center for International Trade andSecurity at the University of Georgia, USA.

Yuriy Sivintsev, Senior Scientific Collaborator at the Kurchatov Institute, gives areport about the submersion of nuclear and radioactive objects.Oleg Muratov, Executive Secretary of the Northwest Branch of the NuclearSociety of Russia, St. Petersburg.

Anatolii Nazarov, Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Science, Directorof the Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History andTechnology, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Deputy Chairman of RosAtom’sPublic Council.Milya Kabirova, Techa Environmental Organization, Chelyabinsk.

Discussion among participants during a break. In the middle: Miles Pomper,Editor of Arms Control Today; and Cristian Ion, Senior Associate, LegacyProgram, Global Green USA.Stephan Robinson, International Coordinator of the Legacy Program for Green CrossSwitzerland, speaks on behalf of Reinhard Koch, Managing Director of the EuropeanCenter for Renewable Energy, Güssing, Austria.

Roundtable discussion on the Cold War’s radioactive legacy. From left to right:Stephan Robinson, International Coordinator of the Legacy program, GreenCross Switzerland; Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the InteragencyCommission for Evaluating the Radioecological Safety of Full-scale Tests withthe State-Owned the Scientific-Research Institute, Moscow; and Ivan Manilo,President of Green Cross Russian, Kurgan Affiliate.Ivan Manilo, President of Green Cross Russia Kurgan POIO, shares hisexperience in solving radioactive safety-related problems for the population ofthe Kurgan Oblast.

Mikhail Rylov, Director of the Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety,and Vice President of Green Cross Russia.Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the Interagency Commission forEvaluating the Radioecological Safety of Full-Scale Tests with the State-OwnedScientific-Research Institute, Moscow, presenting one of four reports at theDialogue, prepared with co-authors.

In the middle, Rita S. Guenther, Senior Program Associate, Committee onInternational Security and Arms Control, U.S. National Academy of Sciences.Albert Vasil’ev, Director of RosAtom’s International Center forEnvironmental Safety.

Tamara Ashikhmina, Director of the Laboratory for Bio-Monitoring at the VyatkaState Humanitarian University, and President of Green Cross Russia, KirovPOIO (on the right), shares her thoughts with a colleague.Vladimir Baksakov, President Green Cross Russia Penza POIO (standing in rearcenter), asks a question about nuclear testing ranges.

Anna Vinogradova, Head of the Balakovo Affiliate of theAll-Russian Society for Nature.Lina Zernova, from the Public Advisory Council of Sosnov’y Bor, LeningradRegion, asks about the Leningrad NPP-2.

The Dialogue’s official exhibition stand.The Dialogue official photographer, Irina Petrova.

The chief organizer of the St. Petersburg Dialogue, Marina Labyntseva, Headof the Public Relations Department at the AtomProf Institute of Continued andProfessional Studies.Matt Martin, Program Manager, The Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa.

Paul Walker, Director of the Legacy Program, Global Green, USA, andChairman of the international Legacy Program Steering Committee for GreenCross International (right); and Jeffrey Lewis, Director, Nuclear Strategy andNonproliferation Initiative, New America Foundation.Veronica Tessler, Program Associate, The Stanley Foundation

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNuclear Energy, Society and SecurityAndrei FrolovUnion of Public Environmental Organizations, MoscowI have been leading the Union of Public Environmental Organizations for the past15 years, and before that, I worked for 15 years with the Special Control Services underthe Defense Ministry. Anatoliy Matushchenko was the supervisor for my dissertation.That explains why I can represent both parties present at this Dialogue.We have gathered here to discuss nuclear energy, society, and security. Withregard to security, I would like to note that neither RosAtom nor the proponents ofthe development of nuclear power have argued against nuclear safety. Everyone knowsfairly well that this is a dangerous thing. And maybe in the big picture, it would bebetter for mankind if it did not exist. We can understand why: all of our arguments areovershadowed by the enormous black cloud of Chernobyl. The damage that was causedby Chernobyl cost us much more than any potential revenue from the use of nuclearenergy in the foreseeable future. This is what makes the issue of safety and security sorelevant today.Another element is society. Here we have reached the understanding that thereis significant distrust of nuclear power on the part of society. There is distrust of thepeople toward the ruling elite, including the American people toward our elite, and ofour people toward the American elite. To a large extent, our Dialogue, organized byGreen Cross/Global Green, diminishes that distrust. This is purely a human problem ofcommunication and solutions can only be reached by using tools such as this Dialogue.We must remember that all of the problems related to nuclear power are problems causedby human error, be they nuclear explosions, Chernobyl, radioactive wastes—it all comesdown to typical human foolishness. It could all have been avoided by using the properapproach. Unfortunately, that is not what happened. That is why the human factor hereis key, and it needs more attention in order for us to achieve a balanced decision-makingprocess.The final element is nuclear energy itself. In its basic form, it has to be acknowledged— including by its proponents, they probably will take no offense — that it is doomed.Even Hegel said that everything that exists will have a rational, dignified death. So, theform in which it exists today will not last forever. A certain kind of transition stage istaking place, and it is not the most favorable.We do not need to fight for its approval and declare that it is the best option.This is simply the transitional phase toward generating normal energy. It needs to beacknowledged that nuclear power is the bastard child of the arms race. If there had beenno arms race, there would be no nuclear power.Let us try to imagine that mankind rejects the arms race in the next 10–15 years.This development of events is altogether possible, since, for example, the United Statesdoes not need nuclear weapons for domination. The situation would be much more stableif there were no nuclear weapons at all. The American strategy is indicating a rejectionof nuclear weapons, and in fact we have been moving in the direction over the past 30years. All international agreements, including START, are a gradual approach toward thedestruction of nuclear weapons in general. If such a decision were to be made and Russia393

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYwere to support it, then together with the United States, these two countries would forcethe rest of mankind to forego nuclear weapons.What will happen to nuclear power then, if it remains in the form in which it istoday? These issues are connected: the destruction of nuclear weapons will lead to theneed to destroy modern nuclear energy. And the question of its future will be closed.This is just one of the ways in which mankind may develop. It is certainly not the worstoption.This is why RosAtom must speak today, and not about how nuclear power willsave mankind, etc. There are questions that must be asked and discussed at these typesof conferences, including:• Further developments in space exploration cannot be made today withouturanium-233, which is related to the creation of long-lived energy systemswithout any threats of exposing the crew; “burning” uranium rules out thatpossibility for us.• It would be possible to create nuclear power that does not result in thecreation of fissile materials using accelerator-driven nuclear energy systems.Making this possibility a reality put a stop to the accumulation of radioactivewastes in the quantity that is poisoning us today. I do not understand whynuclear experts do not speak about this.The new method for generating nuclear power must not produce wastes and mustrule out the possibility of using it to create nuclear weapons.394

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYDialogue Closing Discussion- Albert Gozal: This comment is for Tamara Ashikhmina. Your report was very clear.You named the problems but you should also say how much it would cost. If you have aclear program with the costs identified, you will easily find the means.- Dialogue Participant: I have information about Kirovo-Chepetsk. The area hasan anthropogenically reinforced background of natural radioactive isotopes, as Iunderstand it, and uranium enrichment is taking place. Where did you get the fissionproducts cesium and strontium? You have a nuclear reactor and critical assemblies? Youdon’t have anything there at all!- Tamara Ashikhmina: It is all there, I will provide explanations individually.- Marie Kirshner: My first comment is that we have seen footage where water is collectedfrom the river. People must be made to wear masks and gloves, because [collecting thewater] is very harmful, and protective measures need to be taken. It will be good evenif we save just one life.My second comment concerns civil and military cooperation in the nuclear field.Please, do not compare peaceful power and the use of nuclear power for military purposes.Civil use is developing a closed fuel cycle. If everything is carried out as planned, thenthe well-being of the people will improve. If we talk about weapons, this concerns morethan just the collaborative programs between the United States and Russia. These weretwo superpowers before, but today we live in a multipolar world. Personally, I believethat there should be no weapons.I have spoken with Professor Rimsky-Korsakov in St. Petersburg, and he told usabout the closed nuclear fuel cycle that prevents pollution, and he confirmed that thiswill also prevent proliferation in the future. He believes that it will never be possible topersuade the people who are set on becoming terrorists to do otherwise. But if someonein your bathroom or your kitchen creates a nuclear explosive and plans on using it asa weapon, the problem lies in how to stop terrorism. We need to share experience andspeak with people about what needs to be done and how and always take deliberatemeasures. I have experienced terrorism myself — my relatives died in 1983 from theOrly airport bomb. I have been working on these issues and making real efforts to helpchange the world a little bit at a time.- Igor Konyshev: I have a small suggestion for Milya Kabirova. No matter how we tryto deny the less-than-perfect social situation in Muslyumovo, we cannot, unfortunately,continue to deny it. There are drugs and there is alcoholism. My suggestion is this: thereis an organization called Nabat, and there is one called Techa, and there are severalother organizations, including some in the Chelyabinsk Oblast. Why not come up with asocial project that would involve, among other things, aid for the people in Muslyumovowho need it? It is something we could do this year or next year. Soon, we will stopcalling Muslyumovo a village, it will only be a station. Society and the breakdown of theproblem are approximately the same. Let us work together on this.– Andrey Ozharovsky: I would like to reiterate that the name of this portion of the395

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYDialogue is “Sustainable Development,” and move away for 30 seconds from theindividual presentations — which have been very appropriate — to tell you how it cameto be that I took part in the work of the UN’s Sustainable Development Commissiona number of times. This is the only specialized body of the UN that deals with thesequestions, and I am happy to report that nuclear power has not been declared a requirementfor sustainable development for the reason that most of the problems, and especiallynuclear waste, is being laid upon the shoulders of future generations. The SustainableDevelopment Commission has adopted the Brundtland Commission’s definition ofsustainable development: development that “meets the needs of the present withoutcompromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” As the problemof nuclear weapons unfortunately is not resolved in any one country of the world, despitethe efforts of lobbyists and despite the presence of a large IAEA delegation, nor the pastsessions that were dedicated to power or the 9 th session on sustainable development,nuclear power has not been adopted as a criterion.– Tamara Ashikhmina: Someone asked how much it will cost. If one were to speak ingeneral about resolving the problems related to the tailing pits that we have, that wouldbe roughly several million rubles. The construction alone of one storage pit is currentlyestimated at approximately RUB 157 million, and the government is searching outfunds to support this. As far as inspection of the territory around the pollution source isconcerned, this project will cost approximate RUB 2–2.5 million and will help completeour task in the near future.– Dialogue Participant: Of the number of those who were part of the Totskoye tests,eight live in St. Petersburg, and three remain from the tank regiment. I, on behalf ofthe person who wrote to me before the Dialogue, will tell you that he fell ill one yearafter the tests. He has had one lung removed, and he has Class II disability status. Hesays that if they had proved that his illness was related to the Totskoye nuclear tests, hewould now have a larger pension. But there are no such documents. I would like ourDialogue to provide some answers for these people. This is important. And what willhe get from the materials of our Dialogue? Materials that say that nothing happenedthere, that there are thick volumes in Russian from the International Commission forRadiation Protection? What about this person who wants to live longer? I have a letterfrom someone who ran a biostation during the tests. He is from Saratov. He had tocut up animals that were exposed there and fed them to the soldiers. And he observedthem. Those were his orders. That’s why no documents are left, because those kinds ofexperiments were conducted.– Vladimir Kuznetsov: The documents exist. They are sitting pretty and marked “TopSecret.”– Sergei Baranovsky: Please do not overestimate our capabilities. We are at least doingwhat no one has done before, and we are discussing things that neither civil society, norregular people, or even officials knew before. They are not black and white issues. Weneed to continue our discussions and try to achieve some kind of consensus. We are inno situation to make any decisions, and we have no mandate to do so. Please addressyour difficulties with your local deputies, for whom you vote and whom you should396

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYtrust. We were not elected by the people and cannot decide things for them. We can onlymake recommendations to the people who make the decisions. And we need to raisethese issues and inform the public. That is why everything that you have said todaywill be published in two languages. There will be a Russian-language collection thatthe deputies, the officials and the decision-makers will have to read, including those inRosAtom and the Presidential Administration. And we will publish an English-languageversion for our colleagues in the global community.397

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYClosing StatementSergei BaranovskyPresident, Green Cross Russia; Member of GreenCross International’s Board of Directors;Professor and Member of the Russian Academy ofNatural SciencesI would like to say a few words to conclude this event.Our ambitious project, the National Dialogue on Nuclear Energy, Society andSecurity, originally focused on two fundamental themes, and now a third has beenbrought up as well. We have had a two-day forum. The first day was mainly dedicatedto problems related to the development of nuclear energy and communication withthe public on this important topic. The second day provided a platform for dialoguebetween strident supporters and opponents of nuclear energy and the attempt to find acompromise or any key solutions. The second and most important theme of the GreenCross Russia and Green Cross International is the legacy of the Cold War and ridding theworld of weapons of mass destruction. There is also a host of environmental problemsabout which none of the people who created nuclear, chemical or biological weaponsever thought; they didn’t consider the possibility that sooner or later, these weaponswould have to be destroyed at high cost, both financially and environmentally. This topicis addressed by the Green Cross/Global Green Legacy Program, which we are trying toimplement with the public. We would like to invite not only Russian activists, but ourinternational colleagues and citizens as well to help us in achieving our goals.Today we have also addressed a third topic. No matter what the UN Commissionfor Sustainable Development has said, ignoring what has already taken place and whatwill be taking place, even if we decided today to forever ban everything nuclear, itwould still take us about 100 years before we are relieved of the legacy of what hasalready been done, and we must still live and implement sustainable development withthis problem present. That is why discussions on what accompanies the resolution ofproblems related to nuclear issues ought to take place. The discussion of these threemajor issues represents the uniqueness of our Dialogue.I have asked many people: “Do we need this Dialogue?” Everyone has answeredyes. So we will keep working! As the Vice Chairman of RosAtom’s Public Council,I will propose that the Council and our international sponsors hold a third Dialoguein 2009. I believe that it will take place and will become as much as a tradition as theinternational Chemical National Dialogue, which we hold every year in the fall and willcontinue until the very last milligram of chemical weapons have been destroyed. Onehundred percent destruction of chemical weapons is planned for 2012. What will happenwith nuclear weapons and how much time is required to solve all of the problems relatedto nuclear power and weapons remains to be seen. The next hundred years may not beenough.398

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAt one of the RosAtom Public Council’s recent meetings, Anatolii Nazarov spokeduring a discussion on collaboration between the public and the nuclear industry.We were looking for ways we could make an impact on the situation in the regions.After these discussions, I suggested — and was supported by all of the members ofthe Council and the management — that there is one way besides a national-levelDialogue, or even an international-level Dialogue. Regional forums must be held, andGreen Cross has experience in organizing such events. Tamara Ashikhmina organizedthe first regional Dialogue, which addressed the problems in the Kirov Oblast. IvanManilo organized a similar forum in the Kurgan Oblast. Our proposal is to continueholding the National Dialogue once a year and accept proposals from you regardingwhich Russian regions should see regional forums. Regional forums should be held witha focus on problems related to nuclear power, the legacy of the Cold War and previoustesting, major catastrophes such as Mayak or Chernobyl, dismantlement facilities, etc.The first suggestions were of Tomsk, an area that faces a number of problems, and theMurmansk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts. The Public Council must consider this, but it is timeto branch out at the regional level. We have high hopes for the regional authorities; wewill speak with governors and regional legislators, the media, and public organizations.These forums have a worthy purpose, and I will do everything I can to make sure ithappens. However, it is very important to consider what topics should be addressed atthese regional forums. At the first Dialogue last year, the session dedicated to differenttechnologies was difficult to understand. This subject turned out to be too specializedand did not resonate with the public or the other participants.We need your feedback; we have email and a website. Please don’t be indifferentand let us know what you would like to see. It is no easy task to organize this kind offorum, and we need your ideas. We need your intellectual assistance. I believe that GreenCross and all of us have received a necessary mandate issued by the RosAtom PublicCouncil and by society, and we are supported by public organizations. No one has toldus that we are doing anything harmful. The Dialogue and forums will continue, both ona national scale and on a regional scale.I would like to thank our sponsors once more, and especially those from abroadwho I named during my opening remarks, as well as our Russian sponsors; it is noeasy feat to gather 150 people in Moscow, St. Petersburg or Chelyabinsk and give theman opportunity to work. Again, my gratitude goes out to those who have helped, a bigthanks to all of those who found the time to put everything aside and come here for3–4 days, and to everyone who spoke honestly about what they think and believe. Wemay not all agree, but at least we have said what we came to say. Thank you to ourinterpreters, and especially to those who conducted the Dialogue: RosAtom’s GROTs,the staff at RosAtom, and the staff of Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland andGlobal Green USA.I hope to see you all again next year in April.Good luck to you all!399

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTHE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION WAS NOT DELIVEREDAT THE EVENTThe Widespread Effects of “Peaceful” and “Non-Peaceful” Uses ofNuclear Energy in the Orenburg Oblast on Humans and NatureValentin DombrovskyChairman of Green Committee, OrenburgThe Orenburg Oblast stands out among Russia’s regions due to the widespreadeffects on humans and the environment of both the “peaceful” and “non-peaceful” useof nuclear power. The consequences of these experiments have been made only partiallypublic only decades after the events took place, when the “top secret” label was finallyremoved from documents with environmental data.One of the largest military experiments took place on September 14, 1954 at theTotskoye Nuclear Test Range, where a nuclear bomb weighing 40 kilotons was explodedat a height of 350 meters. This is comparable to the combined power of the two nuclearbombs dropped by the US Armed Forces on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima andNagasaki during WWII. The Totskoye explosion was the eighth for the Soviet Union,but it was the only one in history conducted for general military training purposes. Theadvisability of conducting these studies was explained by the similarity of the area toGerman terrain.At the beginning of the exercise, Khrushchev and his entourage walked along thefront line and introduced the soldiers, sergeants and officers participating in the exerciseto Ivan Kurchatov, who explained the details of the planned nuclear explosion andguaranteed the safety of all participants (?!). But witnesses say that neither the soldiersnor the officers had dosimeters, or that there was only one dosimeter for a large group ofpeople. The clothing contamination process consisted of beating the dust off of uniforms.After returning from the exercise, many of the soldiers began to experience vomiting.According to official data, no more than one percent of those taking part in theexercise were affected at the epicenter of the explosion — roughly 450 people.After the explosion, a near wake in the form of a dust cloud measuring 210 km by28 km took shape over the territory of the Orenburg Oblast and Bashkortostan.The radiation dose within 70 km from the epicenter was measured at no more than1.3 rem. Radioactive pollution from the fallout from the explosion cloud spread overthe territory of West Siberia, north of Omsk, Novosibirsk, and Krasnoyarsk, where themaximum radiation dose recorded was 0.1 rem. With such low official levels of exposureand pollution, the morbidity statistics for the participants of the Totskoye exercise arehard to explain. Furthermore, after the explosion, there was a sharp increase in cancermorbidity among the local population — up to 103–152 people per every 100,000 peoplein 1955–1960.The external radiation dose received by the residents of the Orenburg Oblast afterthe Totskoye nuclear test was a maximum of 13 mSv and an average of 0.1 mSv peryear. From there, in light of modern official views on the effects of ionizing radiation onhuman health, the average annual effective dose was exceeded by a factor of 13! That400

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYmeans that given an average effective radiation dose over the course of a person’s life(70 years) of 70 mSv, among people who have been exposed to these levels of radiation,the result is a shortened life expectancy of 57 years.The residents of Orenburg who live within 30 km from the Totskoye explosion hadlong observed oncological disease among cattle and increased mortality rates of theirsheep.While it is well known that high-dose radiation causes radiation illnesses andlesions in the body’s organs, the effects of low doses remain highly controversial. It hasnot yet been scientifically proven whether or not there is a defined lower limit belowwhich radiation poses no danger. According to the “no-threshold concept” for radiation,infinitesimal doses of radiation are amplified by other effects, such as chemical effects.The servicemen who took part in the Totskoye exercise signed 25-year nondisclosureagreements. That is why information about the studies only began to appearin the press in the late 20 th century. In order to provide mutual assistance and support, inthe late 1980s, the surviving veterans established the Special Risk Divisions Committee.Today, the veterans of special risk divisions, including the participants of the Totskoyetest, have been put into the same category as the survivors of the Chernobyl disaster.In July–August 1971, [when I was a university student], I attended military trainingexercises near the Totskoye range next to the Pristantsionnaya train station where thesappers barracks were located. Upon completion of the drills, the servicemen offered totake us on a tour of the epicenter of the nuclear bomb. No one, however, volunteered.The instructors were puzzled — they had never witnessed this kind of “indifference” toradiation before.In September 1994, Russian and US army peacekeepers participated in joint tacticalexercises at the Totskoye training grounds, but the Americans call their participants“nuclear guinea pigs.”In 1991, the HydroMetCenter of Russia conducted measurements of the residualactivity levels at the epicenter of the Totskoye explosion, where they found 152 Eu (1.23Ci/km 2 ), 154 Eu (0.03 Ci/km 2 ), Cs and Pu at global background levels. The Eu isotopesare the products of activation of stable 151 Eu, which is found in soil. Activated Eu and Csare concentrated in the surface level of the soil, reaching a depth of 5 centimeters. Theradiation levels under normal conditions and with anthropogenic pollution are measuredusing dosimeter devices. The exposure dose is often measured in microroentgens perhour (μR/hr) and ranges from 5 to 30 μR/hr, creating a background radiation dose of0.03–0.06 rem.The last four decades have seen an increase in mortality rates among those aged0–14 years by 117–145% in the city, and 127–164% in rural areas. Malignant tumorsare the second most common reason for deaths. Each year, oncological institutions inthe Oblast diagnose over 6,000 malignant tumors. As compared to data from 1950, thenumber of first-time diagnoses has grown 2.7 times. Overall, the incidence of oncologicaldisease has increased 6.3 times since 1950.Another radioactive addition to the steppes came from the testing of 100–120 mmcaliber artillery shells with uranium tips at the Donguz military range in 1981–1982,located 26 km to the south of Orenburg. If you consider the number of shots based on thedeformation of the barrels of the weapons used, approximately 2,000 shells were fired.These types of tips on shells increase precision. Apparently, the tests were a success.According to a variety of sources, based on stories and the retelling of the events by401

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe local population, it appears that the officials overseeing these tests received medals,awards, and early promotions in rank. The shots were fired at the targets without anyregard for the requirements in place to protect the land from radioactive pollution.The firing range was not equipped with any shell traps or other means of catching ordisposing of the spent shells. Inspections discovered this abuse on the part of the militaryby accident, but clean-up efforts of the test range were not conducted for a number ofreasons.The Donguz River is the left tributary of the Ural River, and joins the latter at anorthwest angle, with the village of Nizhnepavlovka being located at the confluence.The general public was not provided with any information about the environmentalconsequences of these types of tests, nor was civilian medical personnel who began toobserve new illness patterns in their respective areas.This information is not precise and does not claim to be so, because official data onthe tests that were conducted has yet to appear in the open press.It is known that 20 years later, similar shells with uranium tips were used by NATOtroops during operations in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, no one is bearing the responsibilityfor the spread and the introduction of this type of “radioactive fertilizer” in the soil withvarying levels of radiation doses or the harm done to the health of the local population.After the USSR signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, tests wereconducted underground. These nuclear explosions “in the interests of the economy”began in 1965 and were carried out on a large scale in many of the country’s regions, butwere only made public after the fall of the Soviet Union.In 1970–1973, five underground nuclear explosions were conducted in Orenburg.These were categorized as “peaceful” explosions: 9 kilotons in 1970, 15 kilotons in1971, and 6 kilotons in 1972 (two tests of 3 kilotons each). The total force of all of theunderground nuclear explosions amounted to 40 kilotons, resulting in cavities measuringapproximately 195,000 cubic meters, or a sphere measuring 72 meters in diameter! Theexplosions beneath Orenburg with a force of up to 25 kilotons alone created a cavity ofup to 125,000 cubic meters — equivalent to a sphere with a 62-meter diameter. Thus, theregion was shaken four years in a row without a break.It should be noted that underground nuclear explosions generate seismic waves inthe Earth’s crust. The greatest danger comes from longitudinal waves, which pass alongthe change in volume in the soil environment and create additional forces of compressionand expansion. These “seismic” blows result in the deformation of the Earth’s surfaceand interrupt the hydrological system of rivers and lakes, provoking artificial earthquakesat considerable distance from the site of the test, and more. The results are landslides,splits in original ground, and the destruction of buildings that were not constructed towithstand such strong vibrations. As far as we know, no monitoring of the impact of theOrenburg underground nuclear tests on the environment was conducted.The Orenburg gas condensate field is located 30 km from Orenburg. It is the site oftwo underground nuclear explosions that were conducted in salt domes. Due to disruptiveflooding of the wells and the sharp drop in strata pressure in the gas condensate deposits,increased rock fissuring and the migration of radionuclides from the explosion zones, aworrying situation has developed as underground gas deposits are developed. Explosionsof 15 kilotons (10/22/1971) and 10 kilotons (09/30/73) took place at a depth of 1,140meters, but in direct proximity of the village of Nikolskoye, which is located about 10km from the epicenters. Having ended up in the zone of direct radiation impact from the402

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYunderground nuclear tests, the villagers were neither evacuated nor resettled to a morefavorable location.In spring of 1995, under coercion from protests organized by the Green Committeeof Orenburg, aided by pressure from the Oblast’s Environmental Enforcement Office,OrenburgGazprom immediately switched off the gas pipe system from undergroundreserves, which are now conserved and will not be developed any further.Another side of the problem is the lack of any kind of environmental control overthe shipment of gas, at the time. As far as I can remember, in 1971–1972, people inSamara, where I was studying at a construction institute, refused to accept Orenburgnatural gas due to its radioactivity. Gas by itself does not transfer radioactivity, but ifit is mixed with impurities and water, an induced radiation reaction occurs. One canimagine the tragedy of the situation in which the Orenburg companies and residentsused radioactive gas for industrial and household purposes over an extended period oftime. Radiation won’t cause your home to go up in flames, but it does enter the naturalenvironment.The combined impact of “peaceful” and “non-peaceful” nuclear energy plays aclear role in the disruption of the health of the local population, which is observed inthe growth of the number of inpatients at oncological clinics and the recent opening oftwo specialized children’s hospitals in Buzuluk and Orenburg. Time has shown that theproblem will not disappear on its own, and it will actually bring more and new, negativehealth surprises.The total force of all of the nuclear explosions conducted in the Orenburg Oblastamounts to 80 kilotons. That means an average of 36 kilograms of TNT explosivesfor each person residing in the area. Suffice it to say that that amount is sufficient totransform every single Orenburg resident into dust!ConclusionThe Totskoye Rayon accounts for 50.6% of the “nuclear bludgeon,” theOrenburg Rayon represents 38%, the Kurmanayev Rayon accounts for 7.6%, and theOkilotonsyabrsky Rayon accounts for 3.8%. In other words, the main blows were dealtprimarily against the Western and Central rayons of Orenburg — those with the highestpopulation density. The uranium-coated debris from the Donguz test range is not evencounted in that calculation.The products of nuclear fission and fallout move from the atmosphere into the soil,surface and ground waters, entering the food supply for both humans and animals. Thequantity of emitted products and their half-lives are not the only factors that determinethe degree of hazards that they present. It is important to know how they are concentratedin the bodies of animals and humans, the volumes in which chemical elements in thebody are absorbed, as well as where and when they accumulate in individual plant andanimal cells. There are no data for these indicators.In the Soviet Union, there was no environment. There was no radiation, there was noaccountability for the grave harm suffered by the people at the hands of the government.It seems as though the largest anthropogenic accident at the Chernobyl NPP in 1986became a starting point and the last straw that triggered the subsequent fall of the USSR,in combination with other economic, social and environmental reasons.It is important to remember that, in our country, before 1995 legislative effortsin the realm of nuclear energy use, the field was not regulated at all, if you do not403

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcount ministry orders (for example, the well-known Ministry of Machine Building, thepredecessor to the Ministry of Nuclear Power known by its abbreviation, SredMash) andagency provisions that were not discussed.For information, the Law on Nuclear Energy was adopted by the United Statesback in 1946, four years after the launch of a nuclear reactor. Nothing similar waspossible in Russia until almost 50 years later. Russia adopted the Federal Law on theUse of Nuclear Energy on November 21, 1995. This law set out the legal basis andgeneral principles governing the relations arising from the use of nuclear energy for bothpeaceful and national defense purposes — save for operations related to the development,manufacturing, testing, use and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and nuclear powerinstallations designated for military use.An important moment in Russia’s legislative history is the adoption by Russia’sState Duma of the Federal Law on Public Radiation Safety on December 5, 1995. Thislaw came into force on January 9, 1996. It defines the legal framework for ensuringradiation safety for the Russian people in order to protect their health. This promisingdevelopment did not begin until the post-Soviet period.404

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTHE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION WAS NOT DELIVEREDAT THE EVENTNuclear Tests in the USSR: The Red Book(From Nuclear History: Fear, Horror and Nuclear Blackmail)Anatoliy MatushchenkoCo-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commission under theScientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering, and Advisor tothe Department Head, RosAtomSamat SmagulovSenior Scientific Collaborator, State Institute for Applied Ecology,SaratovVadim LogachevCo-Chairman, Inter-Departmental Expert Commission for theAssessment of Radio-Ecological Safety of Full-Scale Experiments,Institute for Bio-Physics, MoscowWe are gathered here on the eve of the 45 th anniversary of the Partial Test BanTreaty (August 5, 1963). Let us think back to this and other memorable events and datesin the history of nuclear tests.August 6 th , 1945: the US delegation, led by President Harry Truman, was returningfrom the Potsdam Conference on the USS Augusta. The Commander of the ship reporteda telegram received from Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Truman rushed to get themessage and read it louder and louder to those around him: “Big bomb was droppedon Hiroshima, August 5, at 7:15 pm Washington time. First reports indicate completesuccess which was even more conspicuous than earlier test.” Truman beamed glass ofchampagne in hand, and announced: “This is the greatest thing in history!” Several hoursearlier, heroic US pilots had dropped a nuclear bomb on Japan. The bomb had incredibledestructive force — more than that of two thousand of England’s most powerful GrandSlam bombs. The United States now had the most powerful weapon in the world. Trumanthan made a toast to this amazing bomb and its possession by the greatest country inthe world. The president made this toast as the champagne spurted out, and essentially“raised the sword of a new nuclear arms race,” just as the Japanese children’s writerTakeshi Ito had prophetically written. Truman never regretted the decision to put half amillion civilians to their death: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomicbomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a militaryweapon and never had any doubt it should be used.”But even earlier, the physicist Leo Szilard recalled: “During 1943 and part of1944 our greatest worry was the possibility that Germany would perfect an atomic-405

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYbomb before the invasion of Europe. In 1945, when we ceased worrying about what theGermans might do to us, we began to worry about what the Government of the UnitedStates might do to other countries.”During 1945–1949, the American ruling elite for some reason got the idea thatit could do away with the USSR by destroying nearly 100 of its towns and industrialcenters with nuclear bombs (in November 1945, American Joint Intelligence CommitteeReport 329 on the Strategic Vulnerability of the USSR to a Limited Air Attack, the HalfMoon emergency war plan in May 1948, Operation Dropshot in 1949), and other plansthat emerged later (15 in all).On August 6 and 9, 1945, the flashes “brighter than a thousand suns” and the howlof the kamikaze, was made known to the entire world: the nuclear bomb was a horrificreality. Twenty years later, the former chaplain of the US Armed Forces Father GeorgeZabelka repented; it was he who had blessed the Enola Gay and Bockscar aircraft beforetheir departure to Japan with the bomb. He did not suspect that the result would be hellon Earth—twice. In a speech on the twentieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima,Father Zabelka said that after twenty years his soul and his conscience forced him torecognize the sin of war and begin preaching the total amorality of nuclear weapons.At the time of the bombing, Igor Kurchatov described this situation as vandalismand a monstrous act and drew his own conclusion: “I believe this is a nuclear fist in ourface.”Rapid Response: Russia Gets the BombRussia had only one thing left to do: take proactive measures toward creating areliable, domestic nuclear shield. Efforts in this area were led by Igor Kurchatov.He worked closely with selfless, renowned physicists including A. Alexandrov, A.Alikhanov, L. Artsimovich, Y. Zeldovich, I. Kikoin, I. Pomeranchuk, A. Sakharov, Y.Khariton, G. Flerov and many, many others.On April 9, 1946, the USSR’s Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 805-327ss/op,appointing Yulii Khariton Chief Engineer of KB-11 (design bureau) responsible for jetengine design and manufacture. A decision was also made by the Commission (comradesVannikov, Yakovlev, Zavenyagin, Goremykin, Meshik and Khariton) regarding placingKB-11 at Factory No. 350 under the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building andusing adjacent territories for KB-11 purposes.On June 21, 1946 the Soviet Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 1286-525ss/op, ordering KB-11 project members (namely comrades Khariton and Zernova) underthe management of Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences (the KurchatovInstitute) to construct two types of RDS jet engines: one that would use heavy fuel (RDS-1) and one that would use light fuel (RDS-2).The ambitious excitement among the ruling circles of the United States and GreatBritain fizzled out when anthropogenic radioactive particles appeared in the atmospherein early September. These particles were gathered by the US Armed Forces B-29 flyinglaboratory. President Truman, concerned, could draw only one conclusion: on August 29,1949, those “Russian Asians” had conducted their own nuclear bomb tests. These werefrom the RDS-1 (officially an acronym for the Russian phrases “Special Jet Engine-1,”unofficially — “Made in Russia,” “Russia Strikes Back,” and known in the United Statesas Joe-1 in reference to Joseph Stalin).This test was conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Range, located in the Semipalatinsk,406

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYPavlodar and parts of the Karaganda Oblasts of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,stretching over roughly 18,500 km 2 .Some background information: The Semipalatinsk Test Range was built in justtwo years with the efforts of 15,000 military construction workers and cost the country,which was torn and suffering after the blood spilled during WWII, a total of RUB 80million, which was an enormous sum at the time and did not include the expenses for allof the preparations for testing the bomb.From August 29, 1949 through December 24, 1962, a total of 116 land andatmospheric nuclear tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Range, plus twounderground tests (26% of all of the tests conducted at this site). Later, from March 15,1964 through October 19, 1989, only underground tests were conducted (74%). In total,this site saw 456 nuclear tests (i.e., 64% of the USSR’s total of 715 tests).Nuclear Scientists Break Their SilenceSince 1991, a substantial number of interesting collections, books, monographs,memoirs, articles, reports and other publications have been made available on the historyof the USSR’s nuclear tests.Let us turn to the pioneer efforts in 1992–1993 in the “Nuclear Tests in the USSR”series, dedicated to the Northern Test Range (the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago), whichcurrently operates as the Central Russian Test Range (Presidential Decree No. 194, datedFebruary 27, 1992, the text of which has been included below):1. The Northern Test Range: Nuclear Explosions, Radiology, and RadiationSafety. Reference Information [Severny ispytatelny poligon: yaderniye vzryvy,radiologiya, radiotsionnaya bezopasnost. Spravochnaya informatsiya]. Issue1. Moscow: 1992, 195. Mikhailova, V., Matushchenko, A., Zolotukhina, G.,general eds. Dubasov, Y., Krivokhatsky, A., Bazhenov, V., Kharitonov, K.,science eds.2. The Northern Test Range: Reports from Russian Experts Presented atConferences, Meetings, Symposiums and Hearings [Severny ispytatelnypoligon: materialy ekspertov Rossiiskoi Federatsii na konferentsiyakh,vstrechakh, simposiumakh i slushaniyakh]. Issue 2. St. Petersburg: 1993, 405.Bogdan, V., Dubasov, Y., Zolotukhin, G., Krivokhatsky, A., Matushchenko,A., Mikhailov, V., Kharitonov, K., Tsyrkov, G.; Mikhailova, V., Zolotukhina,G., Matushchenko, A., eds.Only 200 and 230 copies respectively of these two publications were made available,and basically as Xeroxed copies, thanks to the efforts of the staff at the Khlopin RadiumInstitute and enormous support from the legendary G. Tsyrkov (November 28, 1921–June 20, 2001), the Head of the Fifth Head Department of the Russian Nuclear EnergyMinistry (1965–1996). The publication of the first issue was timed to coincide with theinternational conference on Environmental Problems in the Arctic and Prospects forNuclear Disarmament in the town of Arkhangelsk (see October 14–18, 1992). But theauthors only managed to bring the first 20 copies to the event. At the conference, the“interested parties,” as it has become common to say, prepared for a serious discussionon the affairs at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range, right up to insisting that it be closed(this was initiated by A. Emelyanenkov and N. Yakimets, leaders of the environmentalmovement K Novoi Zemle [To Novaya Zemlya]). And there was already a precedent:407

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe Semipalatinsk Test Range would no longer be used for nuclear testing, due to aninitiative from the international anti-nuclear movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk (theleaders of this group were O. Suleymenov and V. Yakimets) and under Decree No.409 issued on August 29, 1991 by Mr. Nazarbayev, the President of the Kazakh SovietSocialist Republic.As a result, these groundbreaking collections and publications became in highdemand and were nurtured in a context where fresh information was being dug up. TodayI’ll try to give the younger members of the audience an overview of those publications,although today, they are essentially inaccessible, since they are now rarities. Just asthe physicists L. Landau and E. Livshits joked, “the last edition sold out long ago, andit looks like the readers still have a need for this book,” (Physicists Laugh. But TheyAren’t the Only Ones Laughing. Moscow: Sovpadeniye, 2006). Which is why it is sonice to recall that in 1999, with support from the IAEA, the first part of the series wasrepublished, both in Russian and English (1,500 copies). But back then in 1992, underDecree No. 322 issued by Mr. Mikhailov, the Minister of Nuclear Energy, on September15, 1992, these republished copies could only be distributed one by one to strictlydefined organizations under a variety of ministries and agencies, libraries, journalssuch as Energiya and Atomnaya Energiya and high-ranking personnel, where they werepromptly lost. However, those in the nuclear industry and the nuclear defense complexstill have theirs.The degree of openness of the materials achieved in these early publications is anotherinteresting detail to consider; let us take a look at the contents of these publications (whichwe borrowed from Vitaly Khalturin, Tatiana Rautian, Paul G. Richards, and William S.Leight, the authors of the article “A Review of Soviet Nuclear Tests at Novaya Zemlyain 1955–1990” [Obzor sovietskikh yadernikh ispytaniy na Novoi Zemlye v 1955–1990godakh], in which they presented the contents of these publications. “Science and GeneralSafety. Technical Requirements for an Initiative to Control Weapons, Disarmament, andNonproliferation” [Nauka i vseobschaya bezopasnost. Tekhnicheskiye predposylki dlyainitsiativ po kontrolyu nad vooruzheniyami, razoruzheniyu in nerasprostraneniyu], Vol.13, No.2, October 2005).Contents of Issue 1:• Introduction (written in July 1992 by V. Mikhailov, who was appointed Headof the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry in March 1992 for a total of six years,until March 1998).• Radiation Safety Standards and Radiation Loads from Sources of IonizingRadiation (Anatoliy Matushchenko).• The Northern Test Range: Basic Information about Nuclear Tests (1955–1990),K. Andrianov, V. Vyskrebentsev, Y. Dubasov, V. Dumik, G. Zolotukhin, V.Ivanov, V. Karimov, G. Kaurov, G.Krasilov, V. Kozlov, G. Kudryavtsev, V.Kulikov, A. Matushchenko, V. Mikhailov, P. Ramzayev, V. Safronov, V. Strukov,V. Filippovsky, K. Kharitonov, G. Tsyrkov, A. Chernyshev, V. Chugunov (theunderlined names indicate those who have passed away).• The number of nuclear explosions (the Northern Test Range as of 01/01/1992).• Details of the nuclear tests.• Primary baseline data for assessing the radiation consequences of nuclearexplosions.408

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• Modern radioecological conditions in the Extreme North.• Criteria for radiation and seismic safety of underground nuclear tests.• Scientific support for today’s radiological studies in relation to the operations atthe Northern Test Range.• Information about the Northern Test Range.• “Novaya Zemlya – Nevada.” V. Dumik, N. Filonov, K. Kharitonov, Y. Shipko.• The Northern Test Range: A Chronology of Radiation Phenomena fromUnderground Nuclear Tests. V. Bazhenov, V. Dumik, G. Kaurov, G. Krasilov, A.Matushchenko, V. Safronov, V. Filippovsky.• A Chronology of Underground Nuclear Explosions at the Northern Test Range(1964–1990).• The Study of Radiation Phenomena of Underground Nuclear Tests at theNorthern Test Range.• Expert reports.• The Northern Test Range: A Chronology and Examination of the Phenomena ofNuclear Tests at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range. A. Matushchenko, V. Dumik,V. Mikhailov, V. Safronov, G. Tsyrkov.• Containing Radioactive Products from Underground Nuclear Explosions in theGeological Formations of Novaya Zemlya. A. Matushchenko, V. Chugunov, G.Krasilov, A. Maltsev, A. Pichugin, V. Safronov.• About the Polar Test Range. P. Ramzayev.• The Polar Test Range: Aspects of Environmental Monitoring. Y. Doskoch.• Nuclear Tests: Radiation Monitoring and Safety. Y. Dubasov, A. Krivokhatsky,A. Matushchenko, V. Filippovsky.• Peaceful Underground Nuclear Explosions beyond the Arctic Circle. K.Myasnikov, V. Kasatkin, K. Kharitonov.• The Northern Test Range: A Basic Bibliography and Other Sources ofInformation. A. Matushchenko.• A Bibliography (192 references).• Other sources of information (an additional 19 sources, making a total of 211 —unique, original, and very educational).Contents of Issue 2• Introduction (including information that this issue includes reports and materialsthat were presented at different meetings).• The Soviet-Finnish Meeting of Experts, February 28, 1991.• The Environmental Safety of Underground Nuclear Tests (Moscow).• The All-Soviet Conference of the Soviet Committee of International Physicians forthe Prevention of Nuclear War, April 4–6, 1991; The Medical and EnvironmentalConsequences of Producing and Testing Nuclear Weapons (Kurgan).• The International Symposium in Canada, April 21–26, 1991 on UndergroundTests of Nuclear Weapons: the Potential Impact on the Environment andLimitations (Ottawa).• The International Conference of the Nuclear Community of the USSR, June25–28, 1991, Radioactive Waste: Problems and Solutions (Moscow).• The First Constitutive Meeting of the Public Environmental Movement “ToNovaya Zemlya,” November 17–18, 1991 (Arkhangelsk).409

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• The International Conference in Norway on November 22–23, 1991 on ProblemsConcerning Radiological and Radiation Protection in the North (Troms).• The International Conference on the Democratization of Civil and MilitarySafety, June 1–2, 1992 (Moscow).• Parliamentary hearings at the meeting of the Committee for EnvironmentalIssues and the Rational Use of Natural Resources and the Committee forDefense Issues and Safety under the Supreme Soviet of Russia, regarding theadvisability of continuing operations at the Novaya Zemlya test range, June 16,1992 (Moscow).• The International Conference on Environmental Problems in the Arctic andProspects for Nuclear Disarmament, October 14–18, 1992 (Arkhangelsk).Russia did not conduct any nuclear tests while these collections were being prepared.However, studies were continued with regard to radiation, public health, medicine, andgeological monitoring in the areas affected by the tests that were previously conducted.These studies made it possible to generalize or adjust previous views, from both scientificand social standpoints.Overall, the general concept behind preparing these and two other collections (IssueNo. 3 on the Semipalatinsk Test Range and No. 4 on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions) basedon the reports by Professor Matushchenko was approved by the Inter-Agency ExpertCommission for the Evaluation of the Radiation and Seismic Safety of UndergroundNuclear Explosions (MVEK-PYaV), co-chaired by G. Krasilov, A. Matushchenko, and V.Filippovsky) and the National Commission for Radiation Protection (chaired by L. Ilyin)as a part of the Comprehensive Target Program for Studying the Radiation and PublicHealth Conditions of the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya Test Ranges and AdjacentTerritories.Five months after his appointment as the Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy, ViktorMikhailov noted the following in his introduction to the first issue (July 1992):“The key political goal of our military doctrine is to eliminate war from the experienceof mankind, and to strengthen international stability and safety. The world is changingin leaps and bounds. The large-scale actions of Russia and the United States towardreducing their nuclear arsenals are a strong example of these changes. The onlydeterrence strategy that can be an alternative to nuclear parity is a regime of totaltrust, openness, and complete and total destruction of all nuclear weapons, followedby the prohibition of their development. That is our goal. Nuclear testing has a placehere as well.By the end of 1991, a total of 2,053 nuclear tests had been recorded. They wereconducted in five countries: the United States (since 1945), the USSR (since 1949),England (since 1952), France (since 1960) and China (since 1964). During thesetests, designs for nuclear warheads were developed, the phenomena that accompanynuclear explosions were researched, as were the effects of the destructive impact onweapons, equipment, facilities and the environment. Experiments were conductedwith anti-nuclear protection, means of detecting and intercepting explosions, andways to conceal nuclear tests. Meanwhile, since the emergence of nuclear weapons,our country has been persistently fighting for its total prohibition, starting with the410

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcorresponding UN proposal back in 1946.”He goes on to say:“A control mechanism over the number of nuclear tests can be put into place— a very important step — on a widespread international basis by pluggingnational oversight systems into the international network and conductinginspections at test sites.Today, ceasing all nuclear tests means preventing the third generation of nuclearweapons and preventing them from progressing beyond the research stage intothe development stage. Third-generation weapons feature new qualities interms of effectiveness and reliability, and in terms of the global consequences oftheir use. On the one hand, they can produce radioactive pollution in volumeshundreds of thousands of times smaller than existing weapons. On the otherhand, they are capable of destroying strategic targets both in space and onEarth. This is what causes concern, since someone may be tempted to use themin a local conflict. Prohibiting the use of these weapons is the duty of all ofmankind.”An attentive and interested reader should compare these words with the realities ofour time in order to make an educated assessment of today’s nuclear challenges and theneed to adequately respond to external threats, considering the geo-political position ofRussia and its rich natural resources across a vast territory.If you recall, the last underground nuclear test in the USSR was conducted onOctober 24, 1990 at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range. Russia has not renewed testingsince, as it signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty on September 24, 1996,later ratified by Federal Law No. 72-FZ on May 27, 2000. But the United States hasstill not taken this step, conditioning its political action on the fulfillment of a mass ofprovisions about “guarantees.” We would also like to remind the reader that on August29, 1991, President Nazarbayev of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan passedDecree No. 409, closing the Semipalatinsk Test Range. Later, on October 26, 1991,President Yeltsin of Russia passed Decree No.76-rp (see below), announcing a unilateralmoratorium on nuclear testing at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range for one year, whichwas, naturally, then extended again on November 19, 1992 by Decree No.1267 and onJuly 5, 1993 by Decree No.1008, “...until such a moratorium, announced by other stateswho posses nuclear weapons, is de jure or de facto enforced by said states.” Anotherprovision instructed “the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hold consultations withthe representatives of other countries that possess nuclear weapons in order to beginmultilateral negotiations on developing an agreement on the comprehensive ban ofnuclear testing...” which was completed with the multilateral signature on September24, 1996 and subsequent ratification by the countries involved, as noted above by Mr. V.Mikhailov. Thus in this race for peace, not nuclear arms, Russia is the clear leader. Letus add that by today, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (signed 45 years ago!)has been joined by over 170 countries and ratified by over one hundred. However, of the44 countries in which ratification is required in order to validate the Treaty, it has yet tobe signed by three countries: India, Pakistan, and China, and it has not been ratified in411

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYabout ten countries, including the United States!Is this not because, after its musical series of “subcritical” tests (codenamed “Oboe”and “Bagpipe”) at the Nevada test range, the United States intends to replace thesestudies with a cacophony of full-scale tests of a new generation of nuclear weapons?That leaves us with the question: Should the Novaya Zemlya test range stay or go?But let us return to our overview and note the following:It is important to bear in mind that Issues 1 and 2 were preceded by a concerted anddedicated effort to disclose information in relation to nuclear tests and the consequencesthereof. These efforts were made in line with Decree No. 882 passed by the Supreme Sovietof the USSR on November 27, 1989 on urgent environmental improvement measures forthe country, in addition to Decree No. 198 passed by the USSR Council of Ministers onFebruary 11, 1990 on enforcing Decree No. 882. Other related legislation includes theruling of the Commission led by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers,Mr. I. Belousov, on May 30, 1990 (Minutes BI-2259) on preparing media publications onradiation conditions at the Northern Test Range and its environs compared to other regionsof the country and countries in the North and providing this information to centralized,republican and Oblast newspapers. This is how it started for the first time, including withrespect to the Novaya Zemlya test range, which was still operational (up until October 25,1990) as a facility used to conduct full-scale underground nuclear weapons testing andwhich then joined the long-term moratorium. The following excerpts illustrate how themain findings were provided to the general public with its wide range of interests:• December 12, 1989 marked the second convention of the People’s Deputies of theUSSR. This event saw the intense exchange of opinions and discussion of questions regardingthe Novaya Zemlya Test Range during which the Deputies and media representatives wereoffered detailed information about the operations of such a secure facility, the radiationconditions at Novaya Zemlya and its environs, and the plans for future tests. Reports andpresentations were made by experts from the USSR Nuclear Energy Industry Ministrytogether with representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Gosgidromet and theUSSR Ministry of Health.On a side note: In 1989, the nuclear superpowers conducted 28 underground nucleartests: 7 in the USSR (only at the Semipalatinsk test ranges, none at Novaya Zemlya), 11 inthe United States, 9 in France, 1 in Great Britain, and none in China (the test range nearLobnor Lake was not used this year, either).• May 24–25, 1990, in Syktyvkar: Reports of nuclear tests at the Novaya ZemlyaTest Range were presented by experts from the USSR Ministry of Defense (AnatoliyMatushchenko from the 12th Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and V.Tereschenko from the 6 th Department of the Naval Fleet) and the USSR Goskomgridromet(Mr. G. Krasilov) at the May session of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous SovietSocialist Republic of Komi. For the first time, a televised broadcast was held on thetest range with a roundtable discussion in the autonomous republic which (we mustgive credit where credit is due) was led by the head of the television group, Mr. A.Poshumyansky, with great tact and without making any jabs at nuclear “hawks” or theirfilibustering, which was quite noticeable at the session itself where for some reason412

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYeveryone was unshaven and the deputies fought tooth-and-nail for the microphone tomake derogatory comments and ask clownish, denunciatory questions.• May 29–30, 1990: The village of Belushye in Novaya Zemlya. A governmentalcommission was led by Mr. I. Belousov, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministersof the USSR and included Mr. Konovalov, the USSR Minister of the Nuclear EnergyIndustry and Admiral Gromov, the decorated Commander of the Northern Fleet, as wellas a group of People’s Deputies from the USSR’s Supreme Soviet and the SupremeSoviet of the RSFSR: A. Butorin (Severodvinsk), A. Vyucheiskiy (Salekhard), A.Emelyanenkov (Moscow, the Assistant Editor-in-Chief of the weekly paper Sobesednik),A. Zolotkov (Severodvinsk), I. Shpektor (Vorkuta, a People’s Deputy of the AutonomousSoviet Socialist Republic of Komi), and P. Balakshin (Chairman of the ArkhangelskOblast Executive Committee), E. Alekseev (Chairman of the Nenets Okrug ExecutiveCommittee), Y. Romanov (Arkhangelsk, Secretary of the Okrug Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union), and I. Ventsa (Naryan-Mar, Correspondent fromthe Pravda Severa newspaper). Reports about the test range’s history, its operations, andthe radioecological and seismic and mechanical consequences of the tests were presentedby: Rear Admiral V. Gorevy (Head of the Test Range), and other experts, such as RearAdmiral V. Vyskrebentsev, Professor V. Chugunov and Candidate of Technical SciencesV. Safronov, as well as by Professor Matushchenko from the Special Control Service ofthe USSR Ministry of Defense, and by Candidates of Technical Sciences G. Kaurov andE. Kozlov from the USSR Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry, Candidate of TechnicalSciences Y. Tsaturovy from the USSR Goskomgidromet, and V. Devyatov from theUSSR Ministry of Health. The People’s Deputies were provided with an opportunity tolearn about the different facilities on the test range and what life was like for the militaryservicemen and their families.• On July 15, 1990, an analytical scientific report was presented for the People’sDeputies of the USSR, the RSFSR, and media outlets from the Arkhangelsk Oblast,the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Komi, and the Nenets and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrugs. This report addressed the modern state of radiation andenvironmental conditions on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the surroundingareas of the Extreme North (in line with the ruling passed by the Commission underI. Belousov, No. BI-2259, May 30, 1990). The report included results of researchconducted under the Region-2 sub-project, which brought together the efforts of thefollowing: scientific managers Y. Dubasov (PhD in Chemical Sciences, representative ofthe Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry and the non-profit Khlopin Institute), Professor A.Matushchenko (representing the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Scientific ResearchCenter under the Special Control Service of the Ministry of Defense), Professor P.Ramzayev (USSR Ministry of Health and LIRG), K. Andrianov (USSR Health Ministry,the Institute of Biophysics) and Candidate of Physics and Mathematical Sciences G.Krasilov (Goskomgidromet, the Institute of Applied Geophysics).• On July 19, 1990, the paper Komsomolskaya Pravda published an article from V.Mikhailov, the Deputy Minister of the USSR Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry, underthe threatening headline “The Third-Generation Bomb.” The author dotted all of his ‘i’sand addressed the role of nuclear weapons in various countries and the inevitability of413

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe perfection of nuclear weapons. He continued on this same subject on August 28 th thesame year in the newspaper Rabochaya Tribuna in an editorial discussing “The Problemof Nuclear Tests.”On another side note, Viktor Mikhailov was right back then, if you bear in mindthat on October 9, 2006 North Korea conducted its own underground nuclear test, thusannouncing its membership in the nuclear club.• On August 20, 1990 in Geneva, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ReviewConference took place. The Treaty had come into effect in 1970. V. Pokrovsky, the DeputyUSSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Soviet Delegation, emphasized:“One of the main goals is to reduce nuclear tests as soon as possible. Not so longago and over a course of a year and a half, from August 1985 through February 1987,Moscow complied with a unilateral moratorium. And again since November 1989, ourtest ranges have not been used. Tests have been reduced in the United States.Washington and Paris have stated that these tests are necessary in order to verify theeffectiveness of their stockpiles and battle-readiness, as well as to improve technology. Thisis why all of our relevant initiatives are turned down by the West. Under these conditions,banning nuclear tests once and for all is hardly a possibility. But what is possible is movingforward in terms of limiting the force of nuclear explosions, and limiting their number.”And it was at this wave of the hand that an emergency situation suddenly presented itself.Some background information: October 8, 1990: the “Emergency.” A group raidtook place, led by representatives of Greenpeace, on the territory of the Novaya ZemlyaTest Range near the Matochkin Shar bay and the zone in which underground nuclear testshad been conducted. They were well informed that only days before, an undergroundnuclear test was meant to take place (conducted on October 24, 1990, the last in USSR).It is not difficult to imagine just how much this demonstration irritated those who hadundertaken enormous responsibility in conducting such a complex test. Furthermore,the raid — so closely tied to Greenpeace — also involved some of our familiar facesfrom the People’s Deputies: A. Emelyanenkov and A. Zolotkov (see May 29–30, 1990).Naturally, they played their deputy immunity cards.• On October 24, 1990, the news agency TASS reported: “at eighteen hundred hoursMoscow time in the Soviet Union, an underground nuclear test with a force ranging from20 to 150 kilotons was conducted at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range in order to confirmthe reliability and increased safety of nuclear weapons. The radiation conditions at thesite of the test are normal.”This statement was later confirmed by those invited just a few days later tothe opening of the A13N tunnel. Invitees included media representatives (and A.Emelyanenkov, naturally), correspondents V. Bentsa (Pravda Severa), A. Rastorguyev(Molodyozh Severa) A. Pokrovsky (Pravda), and A. Taskaeyv, Candidate of BiologicalSciences and Director of the Komi Institute of Biology under the Scientific Center ofthe Ural Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, represented the Northern scientific414

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcommunity. Elected officials were represented by N. Plotnikov, the People’s Deputyfrom the Arkhangelsk Oblast Council, M. Danilov, an assistant to the RSFSR People’sDeputy and I. Shpektor, the People’s Deputy from the Autonomous Soviet SocialistRepublic of Komi. Their subsequent comments to the press were fully objective.• However, on October 29, 1990, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and RSFSRCouncil of Ministers made an unexpected statement about nuclear weapons testing at theNovaya Zemlya Test Range. Here is the “flustered” text:“On October 24 this year, in violation of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty ofthe Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, an underground nuclear explosion wasconducted near the islands of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago. This nuclear weaponstest was not approved by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, the Council of Ministers ofthe RSFSR, or the local authorities.The Supreme Soviet and the Government of the RSFSR consider this situationunacceptable, expresses its decisive protest and going forward demands total andunconditional compliance with the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the RSFSRin all of its aspects.The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the RSFSRare appealing to the President of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with arequest to immediately and urgently set out the conditions and procedures for preparingfor, carrying out and enforcing the decisions that are made with regard to nationaldefense and security.”In the end, a great fuss was made, as were demands that those who had arrangedthe test undergo a trial — from the head of the test range and right up to the top officialsof the Ministry of Defense and the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry. But the questionremained: who would the judge be? (The details of this escapade, reminiscent of the“strike your own so that the others will fear you” philosophy, was described in the books“Nuclear Archipelago” (1995) and “Nuclear Tests in the Arctic” (2006), which we areprepared to send to anyone interested in the subject.)As a side note: In 1990, the nuclear superpowers conducted 17 nuclear tests: 1 in theUSSR (October 24, 1990 at Novaya Zemlya, which turned out to be the last), 8 in the UnitedStates, 6 in France, and 1 each in Great Britain and China.• February 28, 1991, Moscow: On this date, a Soviet-Finnish meeting was held todiscuss the environmental safety of underground nuclear tests. This meeting was attendedby V. Mikhailov, the Deputy Minister for the Nuclear Energy Industry and experts A.Ivanov, E. Kozlov, V. Kulikov, A. Matushchenko and P. Ramzayev, who presented a reporton Novaya Zemlya and the environmental safety of underground nuclear tests. This wasthe proper beginning of the “disclosure” of the test range at an international level, andlater, this took place at a number of different international conferences, as well as underthe NATO SCOPE-RADTEST project.415

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• April 4¬6, 1991, in Kurgan: A report was presented by the USSR Ministry ofDefense (A. Matushchenko and V. Karimov), the USSR Ministry of Health (V.Logachyov) and the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry (N. Filonov and K. Kharitonov)on the Northern and Semipalatinsk test ranges: a diagnosis of the radiation, publichealth and environmental conditions of the test ranges and their surrounding territoriesand a comprehensive research program. This report was presented at the All-SovietConference of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which focusedon the medical and environmental consequences of manufacturing and testing nuclearweapons.Another side note: Oh, so much bile was spewed forth from Doctor Vladimir Lupandinat the conference with regard to the operations at the test range aimed at the creation ofour nuclear shield (by the way, he intentionally presented his report in “English,” butannounced beforehand in Russian that until Colonel Matushchenko was in the conferencehall, he would not give his presentation. That was the point at which the conferenceparticipants had a strongly negative reaction. And the very person who had started thisfilibustering later lobbied and tried to somehow apologize after having realized that weactually shared all of the principles of the international physicians’ movement, the heads ofwhich had invited us in person to attend the conference).• April 22–25, 1991: Ottawa was the host city for the International Symposiumat the Canadian Center for Arms Control & Disarmament. The theme of the event was“Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing: Potential Consequences on the Environmentand Their Restriction.” Experts from the USSR, including Nuclear Energy IndustryMinistry (V. Mikhailov and A. Chernyshev), the USSR Ministry of Defense (A.Matushchenko), the USSR Ministry of Health (P. Ramzayev) and the USSR Ministryof Nature (V. Ziberov) presented a targeted analysis of unexpected radiation situationsthat had taken place during underground nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya in tunnelsA-9 ( (October 14, 1969) and A-37A (August 2, 1987) and addressed issues regardingmonitoring these anomalies and their effects. This was an example of outstandingopenness before the representatives of Northern countries who unwaveringly stood forthe right to a nuclear-free North.• May 1991: From the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry’s NTS-2 WorkgroupReport, Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, the Chief of the 6th Department of the RussianNavy in charge of the Novaya Zemlya test range states:“Over the course of two years the topic of conducting tests at Novaya Zemlya hasbeen in the stage of being resolved and work is in progress. Over this time, we saw theviolation of procedures for centralized capital investments and shipments of suppliesand technical resources and, furthermore, the test ranges have been excluded fromfunding by the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry and the National Planning Committee(GosPlan) meaning that no centralized government capital investments are envisaged.The Ministry of Defense, as usual, allocated capital investments only for basic support.Moreover, the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry this year deprived the Russian Navyof practically all of its supply and technical resources, which were allocated for testpreparations in 1991. All of these factors have contributed to extremely tense conditions416

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYat the Novaya Zemlya test range. Nevertheless, the Russian Navy, in line with instructionsfrom the government, continues to work towards preparing facilities for tests in 1991 atthe Northern test field, although at a slower pace.”This was the “cry for help” of a man seeking to serve his country. Essentially, thetest range’s half-life had ended. Six months later, circumstances were aggravated byRSFSR President Yeltsin’s Order No. 67-rp dated October 26, 1991 (see below).• July 12–13, 1991. A new delegation of People’s Deputies arrived at the testrange from the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug, and led by Alexei Akhrameyev, Chairman of theCommission for the Environment and Natural Resource Management under the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug Soviet. But this delegation’s viewpoint on the test range was altogetherdifferent, i.e., more positive. The members included: A. Bondar, the Head of the Okrug’sCivil Defense headquarters (his objective, civil response to the actual state of radiationconditions at the test range was published in the newspaper Krasny Sever issue No.50, November 1991, under the title “Novaya Zemlya: A Test Range of Death?” Theanswer in the article was a resounding “no”), Y. Morozov, a correspondent from thepaper Rabochiy Nadyma (in September–October he published a series of reports underthe column “Novaya Zemlya — Rumors and Facts,” in which he provided a relativelycomplete and educated description of the situation that had developed with regard tothe test range and debunked various fabrications and outright lies about it), A. Kuzin,the Deputy Chairman of the Okrug Council, V. Obtsenko, the Head of the RadiologicalDivision of the Okrug’s Public Health Services, N. Pavlenko, a People’s Deputy fromthe village of Aksarka (and soon delighted us by unexpectedly sending a package withunbelievably delicious local fish to the 5 th Department of the Nuclear Energy IndustryMinistry with a note that the fish was totally free of radionuclides from the NovayaZemlya nuclear tests, which was not a surprise in the least. We ate it happily, having hada great deal of experience with expedition feasts near testing facilities). This delegationwas accompanied by Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, Major General V. Kosorukov, RearAdmiral and Head of the test range V. Gorev and experts from the USSR Ministry ofDefense (Captain 1st Class V. Dumik and Colonel Matushchenko), the Russian NuclearEnergy Industry Ministry (Y. Shipko) and the USSR Ministry of Heath (the Director ofLIRG and correspondent member of the Russian Academy of Mathematical Sciences P.Ramzayev), who all gave detailed explanations directly on test range premises, includingat the epicenter of the only surface nuclear explosion at Novaya Zemlya (September 7,1957), where radiation levels were below 1 mR/hr).As always, the delegation was welcomed heartily in Belushye, and the topic of“radiophobia” was discussed over a welcome luncheon and dinner with a sense of humorthat comes naturally to those who live at Novaya Zemlya, quoting the words of well-knownsongs in which “the stoker opened up our eyes” to the fact that “vodka is a good tonic againststrontium.”• October 7, 1991: The Soviet President Gorbachev made a statement regarding theUS President George Bush’s initiative: “My fellow countrymen, one week ago, GeorgeBush spoke about an important initiative on nuclear weapons. George Bush’s proposalis a solid continuation of what was started in Reykjavik. That is my fundamentalassessment. I do know that this opinion is supported by Boris Yeltsin and the heads of417

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYother republics. I would like to announce our intent to take similar measures. I announcethat as of today we are declaring a unilateral moratorium on conducting nuclear tests fora period of one year. This will leave the path open toward the speedy and total cessationof nuclear tests.”On October 26, 1991, totally unexpected Order No. 67-rp was issued by the RSFSRPresident on ceasing nuclear weapons testing at the Novaya Zemlya test range.“In support of the initiative of US President George Bush, USSR President MikhailGorbachev, based on our intent to strive toward the total cessation of nuclear testing andconsidering the many appeals of local authorities and Russian citizens, I hereby declare thefollowing:1. We declare a moratorium on conducting nuclear tests in Russia for a period of oneyear;2. We will halt nuclear testing operations at the Novaya Zemlya test range;3. We instruct the RSFSR Council of Ministers to submit a proposal on ways to optimizethe scientific and technical potential of the Novaya Zemlya test range and the expertsand citizens working there. Said proposal is to be submitted by December 1, 1991;4. We instruct the RSFSR Council of Ministers to ensure the social protection ofmilitary servicemen who are discharged due to the cessation of operations at the testrange.”These instructions were issued with the “not for print” seal, which of course wascompletely ignored by the democratic media, including the deputy-cum-journalistA. Emelyanenkov who addressed the public in one of V. Pozner’s television shows.He stated that, if there is no law on state secrets, then it was perfectly fine to revealthese secrets and expect no consequences. The populism of this statement was simplyshocking!In 1991 the nuclear superpowers conducted 14 nuclear tests: 7 in the United States,6 in France, and 1 in Great Britain. Neither the USSR nor China conducted any tests.• In February 1992, Russian President Yeltsin more or less revoked his previousOrder No. 67-rp (10/26/91) when he issued Decree No. 194 on the Novaya Zemlya TestRange:“Considering the insistent need to make qualitative improvements to nuclearweapons, increase their safety and conduct checks of nuclear munitions, I order thefollowing:Transform the Government’s Central Test Range under the USSR Ministry ofDefense into the Central Test Range of Russia and declare the test range the federalproperty of Russia. Temporarily, until the Government of Russia has issued instructionsin line with Clause 4 of this Decree, maintain the previous standards and legal documentswith regard to this test range and grant the right to use the land and the property of thetest range to the Senior Command of the Collective Armed Forces of the Commonwealthof Independent States (Navy).Instruct the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry and the Senior Command of theCollective Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Navy) tocontinue in 1992 the necessary work (shaft-sinking and tunneling, construction andassembly work) to prepare tunnels and cavities in order to support underground nucleartests at the Central Test Range (two to four per year) should the moratorium on nucleartesting come to an end.”418

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThis legal act, which served more as a set of instructions within the authorities of theRussian President, did not contradict any current legislation. It did envisage preparingproposals for negotiations — both bilateral or multi-lateral with regards to nucleartesting — and considered the participation of public movements and organizations.• On March 7, 1992, V. Mikhailov, the Russian Nuclear Energy Minister issuedDecree No. 271, announcing the decision to write the history of the nuclear industry ofthe former USSR and Russia. These materials were meant to reflect the USSR’s nuclearweapons tests at the Semipalatinsk (1949–1989) and Northern (1955–1990) test ranges,as well as peaceful nuclear explosions (1965–1988). This process began to take shape, aswe can see from the productive participation of International Physicians against NuclearWar, the Federation of Peace and Accord and a number of other organizations in theConference.On February 28, 1991, the decision was made to conduct a government inspectionof the radiation and environmental conditions at the Novaya Zemlya archipelago andthe surrounding territories (under orders from the Russian Ministry of the Environmenton February 28, 1992, Order No. 131 to create a commission chaired by Professor Y.Sivintsev).• In April 1992, V. Mikhailov again brought attention to the following (anInformation Bulletin published by TsNII-AtomInform, issue No. 4): “Considering theneed to support a sufficient level of defense in the country, it has been proposed that theNorthern test range be used to conduct up to 2–4 underground nuclear weapons tests inthe following years. As a result, what we are talking about is reducing the testing programfour times, from an average of 15 tests a year at two test ranges to 4 tests per year at one.The reduction of testing will account for heightened safety requirements, which willrequire developing new approaches to conducting the tests themselves and to improvingthe effectiveness of physical diagnostics processes stemming from underground tests.”A side note: two and a half years later, this provision turned out to be 100% justifiedby the tests conducted in December 1995 by VNIITF experts at a whole new level —“hydro-dynamic” tests (or in American terminology, subcritical) non-nuclear explosiveexperiments. This important achievement allowed Russia to sign the ComprehensiveNuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 24, 1996.• On May 25, 1992, P. Shcherbakov, Head of the Russian Defense Ministry’sScientific Research Institute No. 55, sent reference materials on conducting a governmentenvironmental inspection of Novaya Zemlya and surrounding territories to the Chairmen ofthe Committees of the Supreme Soviet of Russia (V. Varfolomeyev, Chair of the Committeefor Environmental Issues and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, and S. Stepashin,Chair of the Committee for Defense and Security Issues) as well as troop commanders G.Zolotukhin (No. 31100), S. Zelentsov (No. 31600-N) and G. Tsirkov, the Supervisor of the5 th Department of the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Energy. This material was distributedto these parties so that they would be used in preparations for parliamentary hearings onRussia’s Central Test Range. The documents were drawn up under the supervision of A.Matushchenko (Scientific Research Institute No. 55 under the Russian Defense Ministry)based on the results of the Region comprehensive scientific development by experts from419

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYthe Inter-Regional Expert Commission on evaluating the radiation and seismic safety ofunderground nuclear tests. This Commission included: K. Andrianov (from the Instituteof Biophysics under the Russian Health Ministry), V. Bazhenov (the 5 th Department ofthe Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry), V. Gorin, V. Yevseyev and A. Maltsev (also fromthe Russian Defense Ministry’s Scientific Research Institute No. 55), G. Krasilov (theInstitute of Global Climate and the Environment of Rosgidromet and the Russian Academyof Sciences), V. Safronov (The Central Test Range of the Russian Federation), and A.Chernyshev (VNIIEF).As the baseline data and the results of their analysis were complete, this informationbecame the basis for all other publications about nuclear test operations at NovayaZemlya, their radiation impact on the test range territory and surrounding areas. This was a“breakthrough” in terms of disclosing standard restrictions on this kind of information. Therewere no complaints made about the work that was conducted, and any attempts to re-checkthe data were inevitably approved. That is why all of the attempts of the “Greens” to plant aseed of doubt in our information have been futile, and — as this information is disclosed —it became uninteresting to them, once they could no longer use the secrecy “trump card,” andthis was made possible by the newly- established order, just as intended.This is where we experienced the diffusion of a good deal of the tension driven byindividual ambitions and often ratcheted up using purely populist means. The parliamentaryhearings to which A. Yablokov and others of his ilk had been called successfully tookplace on June 16, 1992. Only the teams of A. Bulatov and Deputy A. Emelyanenkov, E.Gaer and O. Suleymenov accompanied the topic of radiation with the slogan: “Say no tofunding for test ranges, say yes to funding for radioecologically damaged regions.” All ofthis bore a feeling of “radiation leprosy” among the residents of Kazakhstan, the Altai Krai,Yakutia, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and theArkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts and drew a connection with the “Chernobyl zone”and branded Russia as a “radioactive country.” Meanwhile, I. Belov’s article on “RadiationEcology: anthropogenic radiation in everyday life and at home” (Energiya, No. 7, July 1992)confirmed: “At present, the average dosage rate caused by the products of nuclear explosionsamounts to approximately 15 mSv/year, which is equivalent to approximately 1% of theamount of the dose from the natural radiation background.” Alas, over ten years have passedsince then, but still not everyone “gets” this objective position. Although by all accounts, theprocess is underway.• On July 10, 1992 in Geneva, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signedbetween the governments of Russia and the United States on research test ranges. Article onestated that “the test ranges of the Parties are: the Northern Test Range (Novaya Zemlya) inRussia, and the Nevada Research Test Range in the United States.”• On September 16–17, 1992 a commission began working in Novaya Zemlya headedby P. Grachev, the Russian Defense Minister, and V. Mikhailov, the Russian Nuclear EnergyMinister. The commission heard the opinions of representatives of the science communityin charge of the test range.“Over that time, we lost many qualified staff members and we let our scienceprograms take a hit,” said Captain 1 st Class V. Lepsky, the Head of the ScientificResearch Division of the test range. “It is difficult to make up for what was lost.” V.Kitayevsky noted: “Over the test range’s entire existence, there has not been one case420

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYof radiation illness here. There are nearly 9,000 people living here and every year wecelebrate weddings and children are born. In 1991, 29 babies were born in NovayaZemlya, 60 students graduated from high school, and most of them got into institutes,military schools or vocational schools…” P. Grachev also states: “Unfortunately, no onebesides the French have joined us in the moratorium. When I was in the United States, Iasked Mr. Cheney, the Defense Secretary a question. The Russians and the French haveannounced a moratorium, but you are still detonating bombs. For what purposes? Areyou perfecting nuclear weapons? “No,” he replied, “The explosions are continuing inorder to ensure that the staff do not lose their skills and in order to test the reliability ofthe storage of nuclear munitions.” (O. Falichev, “The Novaya Zemlya Test Range: TwoYears of Silence. What About Nevada?” [Novozemelsky poligon: dva goda tishiny. A vNevade?] Krasnaya Zvezda, 09/22/1992). A statement from V. Mikhailov: “Why are theAmericans so stubbornly fixed on nuclear tests? There are a number of reasons. First,the Americans are carrying out a multiyear program of nuclear tests that will accomplishboth military and economic tasks in the interests of all of society. Second, they are lessvulnerable to the influence of public opinion when the issue at hand is drawn back tonational interests.” (Inspections at Novaya Zemlya [Inspektsiya na Novuyu Zemlyu].Izvestiye, 09/24/1992).Both ministers resolved a lot of the test range’s problems on the spot, in particularstaffing issues, and supplied motor vehicle and aircraft equipment.• September 1992: The Public Outreach Center for Nuclear Energy’s Bulletin No.9 published an article on “Underground Nuclear Tests: The Conditions under whichThey Were Conducted under the Criteria of the Moscow Agreement of 1963” (authors:A. Matushchenko, G. Krasilov, A. Maltsev, V. Bazhenov, and V. Dumik). This articleprovided the following significant information about the Novaya Zemlya test range: “Inthe period from 1964 through 1990, a total of 42 underground nuclear explosions wereconducted at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range. In terms of radiation conditions, they arecategorized as follows:• 15 (36%): explosions with total internal action, i.e., no radioactive inert gasesleaked into the atmosphere;• 26 (60%): explosions that were not completely contained, and inert radioactivegases did escape into the atmosphere, although they did not cause any residualpollution;• 2 (4%): explosions with pressurized release of gaseous and steam products intothe atmosphere, which are characterized by those who were directly involvedas non-standard radiation situations (October 14, 1969 and August 2, 1987).”Furthermore, there was no radioactive fallout beyond the territory of the test rangeafter any of these tests.This publication took place on the eve of the international conference on theenvironmental problems of the Arctic and the outlook for nuclear disarmament, whichwas planned under the initiative of the environmental movement “To Novaya Zemlya”on October 14–18, 1992 in the City of Arkhangelsk. This was one of the components ofthe information that was presented in the first collection (Issue 1), which was alreadysigned for publication (July 24, 1992).421

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• On September 18–26, 1992, the government environmental inspection began atNovaya Zemlya under the supervision of Professor Y. Sivintsev, PhD (see February28, 1992). The results of the inspection commission’s work were reviewed on October7 at a plenary meeting of the expert commission under the Chief Department of theState Environmental Inspection under the Russian Ministry of the Environment. Duringthe 9:00 PM broadcast of the news show Vesti, the first-ever report was made that theradiation level near Novaya Zemlya was within natural background levels (8–12 mSv/hour) and that the inspection confirmed the previously published information. Thecomplete report from the environmental inspection of the Novaya Zemlya archipelagofrom October 13, 1992 was published in the weekly Evraziya on January 17, 1993.This was an important next step toward disclosing information about the test rangefor the greater public, which had become very worried by our radiation legacy. But othersteps were also taken.• October 14–18, 1992: Work began in Arkhangelsk for the international conferenceon environmental problems in the Arctic and the outlook for nuclear disarmament. Therepresentatives of the environmental movement Toward Terra Nova advocating theclosure of the Novaya Zemlya test range and voicing their discontent with PresidentialDecree No. 194 (February 27, 1992) were clearly planning to take revenge and play offof the government’s ignorance of their position as anti-nuclear “doves.” However, the“nuclear hawks” were equally alert. Retired Lieutenant General Gavriil Kudryavtsev,former Chief of the Novaya Zemlya test range (from April 1959 through June 1963) andsomeone who had been involved in 56 atmospheric nuclear tests before the ban cameinto force, including the 50 megaton “Tsar Bomb” (of October 31, 1961), expressedhis stance as follows: “I never saw myself as a ‘nuclear hawk,’ a proponent of nuclearweapons or the intensive testing thereof like, for example, the American General Groveswas. But I honestly, like all military testers, viewed my responsibilities and my debt andmy oath to my loyalty to the Motherland. I am in favor of the announced moratorium,but I am against one-sided disarmament.”He pointed to the fact that our information was made public, not only throughparticipation in the conference, but by receiving representatives of various countries at theNovaya Zemlya test range (see below). For many “Greens” in the hall, this informationcame as a surprise, as did the subsequent frank reports presented by a group of expertsunder L. Ryabev from the Russian Ministry of Defense, including some who had comedirectly from the test range, the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, the Ministry of Health,the Ministry of Nature, and Goskomgidromet. The reports included: “The NovayaZemlya Test Range: Its Contribution to Nuclear Testing” [Novozemelsky poligon: vkladv yaderniye ispytaniya] (A. Matushchenko, G. Zolotukhin, V. Dumik, and others); “IBelieve – Russia Will Rise Again” [Ya veryu – Rossiya obyazatelno vozroditsa] (E.Negin, S. Voronin, S Brezgun); “The Contribution to Testing at the Northern Test Rangeto Radioactive Pollution of the Environment” [Vklad ispytanii na Severnom poligonev radioaktivnoye zagryazneniye okruzhayuschey sredy] (A. Miroshnichenko, P. Popov,V. Safronov, O. Frolov); “The Underground Nuclear Explosion: Recording RadioactiveProducts in Molten Mountain Rock” [Podzemny yaderny vzryv: fiksatiya radioaktivnikhproduktov v rasplavakh gornykh porod] (Y. Dubasov, A. Krivokhatsky, and others);“Some Questions Concerning Radiation Monitoring in Regions Near the Northern TestRange” [Nekotoriye voprosy radiatsionnogo kontrolya v rayonakh, prilegayuschikh k422

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYSevernomy poligonu] (G. Kaurov, G. Krasilov, and others); “Some Aspects of CreatingNuclear Explosion Technologies for Destroying Toxic and Hazardous Materials andWastes” [O nekotorykh aspektakh sozdaniya yaderno-vzrysnikh tekhnologii dlyaunichtozheniya toksichnykh i opasnykh materialov i otkhodov] (I. Andryushin, Y. Trutnev,A. Chernyshev); “Experience in Assessing External Gamma-Beta Radiation Among theParticipants of the Nuclear Test in Tunnel A-9 on October 14, 1969 in the Absenceof Data on Individual Dosage Rate Monitoring” [Opyt otsenki vneshnego gammabeta-oblucheniyauchastnikov yadernogo ispytaniya v shtolne A-9 15 oktyabrya 1969g. v otsustviye dannykh individualnogo dozimetricheskogo kontrolya] (N. Nadezhina,A. Guskova); “Retrospective Assessment of Radiation Doses among Participants ofNuclear Weapons Testing at the Northern Test Range” [O retrospektivnoy otsenke dozoblucheniya uchastnikov ispytaniy yadernogo oruzhiya na Severnom poligone] (V.Logachyov); “The Fauna of Novaya Zemlya Today” [Fauna Novoi Zemli segodnya](S. Uspensky, G. Khakhin); “Our Service is Rigorous and Difficult: About the Union ofNovaya Zemlya Residents” [Nasha sluzhba i surova i trudna: o soyuze novozemeltsev](V. Tsaubulin) and a number of others.There was also a presentation of the already-mentioned “The Northern Test Range:Nuclear Explosions, Radiology, and Radiation Safety. Reference Information. Issue 1,”as well as a showing of the uncensored documentary “Testing a 50 Megaton NuclearBomb (October 31, 1961).”• October 14–15, 1992: Media representatives visited the test range. Therepresentatives were accredited journalists from Moscow, the United States, GreatBritain, France and a number of non-nuclear countries. This was essentially anunprecedented event, yet their first visit to the nuclear test range was neverthelessorganized to coincide with the conference. Their names for posterity: Carroll Bogert (theVice President of Newsweek Association, United States), David Leuvggren (ReutersInternational), John Kampfner (the Daily Telegraph, Great Britain), Malcolm Dixeliusand Berko Jonssen (TV-1, Sweden), Stephen Gram (TV, Denmark), Ishikawa Ichiye(TV INK, Japan), Michel Chevalier and Yvan Scopan (TV-1, France), Bruce Conover(CNN Producer, United States), Jan Kruse (Teleradio, Norway), Sheppard Scherbel(Der Spiegel, Germany), Frederick Hyatt (Washington Post, United States), OdorisGonzalez and Sylvia Elena (EFE News Network, Italy). In addition to these foreigncorrespondents, the test range also welcomed representatives of Russian media outlets:Colonel V. Beketov and Captain 3rd Class Biketov from the Russian Ministry of DefensePress Service, V. Gondusov (military observer for ITAR-TASS), L. Zolotenko (Soyuz-Telefilm), N. Malyshev (photo journalist, ITAR-TASS), S. Naberukhin (Correspondentfor the television program “Military Review”), V. Tarasenko (film director, Soyuz-Telefilm), and N. Tereschenko (correspondent with the weekly Zelyoniy mir). Theydid not give negative reports about their visit to the Central test range of the nuclearsuperpower known as the Russian Federation. Only John Kampfner grumbled slightlyin Nezavisimaya Gazeta about what seemed to him to be “showing off” things that weremuch more impressive than in reality (November 3, 1992, “The Soviet Union Lives Onat Novaya Zemlya” [Na Novoi Zemlye prodolzhayet zhit Sovietsky Soyuz]).G. Kaurov, Head of PR for the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry, oversaw theorganization and convention of this complex event. He was also a former resident of NovayaZemlya, as he had formerly served as the head of the department for radiation studies (May423

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY10, 1935 – May 6, 2007, may his memory be honored).Side note: In 1992 the nuclear superpowers conducted eight nuclear tests: 6 inthe United States and 2 in China. No tests were conducted in Russia, Great Britain orFrance.• July 5, 1993 marked the announcement of Presidential Decree No. 1008 on themoratorium on nuclear testing:“Based on the Russian Federation’s goal toward total cessation of nuclear testingby all countries and the wish to facilitate favorable conditions for the commencement ofmultilateral negotiations in the near future toward developing a comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty, I hereby decree:1. The Russian Federation will extend its moratorium on nuclear testing firstannounced by the President of the Russian Federation on October 26, 1991in Decree No. 67-rp and extended by the instructions of the President of theRussian Federation from November 19, 1992 in Decree No. 1267, until sucha moratorium is de jure or de facto honored by other countries possessingnuclear weapons.2. I instruct the Russian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conductconsultations with the representatives of other countries possessing nuclearweapons in order to commence multilateral negotiations to develop acomprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”• October 11–14, 1993: Antwerp (Belgium) hosted a symposium on radioecologyunder the aegis of the European Commission, which preceded the start of the SCOPE-RADTEST project. Russian scientists Y. Izrael, Professor Matushchenko and Y. Tsaturovagreed on the extent to which Russian experts would participate in this project, with afocus on mutual exchanges of adequate information about tests conducted at the testranges of the five nuclear states among the nuclear superpowers.Books, Books, and More Books!• On November 1, 1993: Russian Nuclear Energy Minister V. Mikhailov publishedhis book “I am a Nuclear Hawk” [Ya – Yastreb]. Proud and kind words were expressedfor the Novaya Zemlya test range. But the book also includes details about his hard workand the hazards of nuclear tests, even if they are conducted underground. For the firsttime, a photograph of a radioactive cloud – explosion products escaping as steam into theatmosphere during an underground nuclear test with that did not go as planned (August2, 1987). Five thousand copies of this book were printed, and the book quickly becamea rarity. Interest was shown among foreign publishers as well; in 1995 it was publishedin China, and in 1996 it was published in England, in addition to a second printing inRussia. This work includes the strong words: “Russia’s history is great, and it is not aneasy feat to contribute to its further greatness, but I am confident that each generationmust strive to do so in the name of our future. Today Russia is experiencing what may bethe most difficult period in the history of our generation. So let us remember that all ofus and each of us carry the burden of responsibility. And we will help those who cannotcarry that burden. Peace is a beautiful thing, and each person is capable of recognizinghappiness simply by living and taking a peaceful step on his own native ground.”424

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY• In December 1993: A team of enthusiasts began working on a project to create a seriesof important books that became collectively known as “Nuclear Tests in the USSR.” Theproject was planned in six volumes:Volume 1: Goals. General Features. Organizing Nuclear Tests in the USSR. TheFirst Nuclear Tests (published in 1997). This same volume was released as a book in ared binding (IzdAT Publishing, 1997), which was a symbol of the extinction of nucleartests, i.e., they were entered into the “Red Book.”Volume 2: The Technology of Nuclear Tests in the USSR. The Impact on theEnvironment. Safety Measures. Nuclear Test Ranges and Fields. (published in 1998).Volume 3: Nuclear Weapons. Military and Political Aspects (2000).Volume 4: The Technology of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (2000).Volumes 5: (Nuclear Tests and the Environment) and 6 (The People of the NuclearEra) are still being prepared for publication and their delay was caused by objectivereasons (as explained below).This work is supervised by V. Mikhailov, member of the Russian Academy ofSciences. A great deal of the work contributed to this series was conducted by an editorialgroup led by A. Chernyshev. PhD of Physics and Mathematics (RFYTs-VNIIEF) andmembers of the MVEK-NE.A side note: Issue 3 of the Reference information about tests at the Semipalatinsk testrange is still waiting its turn. This test range, with its rich nuclear legacy, has been left ina non-nuclear country. It is not open to “unauthorized” visits, which hinders access toany additional information requested in the name of “openness” or the “environment.”Basically, the key here is to “hurry along slowly,” which our Kazakh friends understand,as they are also concerned about problems such as nonproliferation and terrorism. Butthis collection, which has “been lost” in the manuscript archives of A. Matushchenkoand Y. Dubasov, will naturally grow if given the opportunity to do so.• On October 5, 1993, a nuclear test was conducted only in China (with a forceranging from 20 to 150 kilotons).• In 1994, again China was the only country that conducted nuclear tests – three tobe exact (June 10 and 16, and October 7).A side note: At this point there are just two years left before the Nuclear Test-BanTreaty is signed, but China insisted on its own “moral right” to continue its nuclear testsin order to ‘catch up’ to the United States and Russia.• On April 16, 1994: Finally the first manuscript of the book “The Peaceful Useof Nuclear Explosions. A Reference. Issue 4.” was completed (it was published in Julyunder editors and Professors O. Kedrovsky and A. Krivokhatsky.• In 1995 China continued to conduct nuclear tests (two – on May 15 and 17)and France also resumed its testing with five tests (September 5, October 1 and 27,November 21 and December 27).425

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAs a result, the number of tests amounted to 36 since the start of the moratorium atRussia’s Novaya Zemlya test range. Russia adhered to its moratorium.However, in December 1995 right before the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was signed,two non-nuclear gas dynamic experiments were conducted at Russia’s Central TestRange as planned by RFYaTs VNIITF in order to develop methods for assessing thesafety of nuclear munitions.• On April 9, 1996: Russian President Yeltsin presented US President Bill Clintonwith a book, the cover of which depicted a polar bear against a landscape of snowcoveredmountains: “There are but two copies of this book,” the Russian Presidentexplained. “I have one, and now you have the other. I would like for the informationin this book to remain confidential for now. Only you and I will know about it.” Thisconversation took place on the eve of the Group of Seven in Moscow.The book was called “Nuclear Weapons Testing and Peaceful Nuclear Explosionsin the USSR, 1949–1990.” (RFYaTs-VNIIEF, Sarov, 1996. 66p. ISBN 5-85165-062.Professor V. Mikhailov, ed. Authors: I. Andryushin, V. Bogdan, S. Vashchinkin, S.Zelentsov, G. Zolotukhin, V. Karimov, V. Kirichenko, A. Matushchenko, Y. Silkin, V.Strukov, K. Kharitonov, A. Chernyshev, G. Tsyrkov and P. Shumayev.)An excerpt from Vladimir Gubarev’s message (“A Portrait of a Nuclear Devil. TheRussian Ministry of Nuclear Energy Discloses Yet Another Secret,” published in thepaper Vek, No. 391, 10/04/1996, p. 10): “The American President held true to his word:the book that he received from Yeltsin was not leaked to the media or to physicists (withsome minor exceptions). But the interest in the book shown by all of the US secretservices is perfectly understandable — for many years, these agencies gave themselvesheadaches trying to figure out the secrets of different tests. But frankly, the US spies didnot believe that we had reported the truth! But careful examination of “Yeltsin’s present”(as the book was codenamed) confirmed the integrity of the Russian government…”The foreword to the book was written by Russian Nuclear Energy Minister V.Mikhailov: “This book contains official facts about the general features of all of thenuclear explosions and all peaceful nuclear explosions conducted in the USSR. Thisbook is the fruit of long-term work conducted by experts at the Russian Ministries ofNuclear Energy and Defense, which analyzed baseline data contained in many classifieddocuments.A similar (non-classified) book was published by the US Department of Energy:“United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,” DOE/NV. 209.(Rev/14) December 1994. The existence of these two symmetrical materials helps usmake specific, qualitative comparisons of the nuclear test programs carried out by theUSSR and the USA.During the time when the USSR was conducting underground nuclear weaponstests, technology had been developed for grouped nuclear explosions, which were usedfor both military and peaceful purposes. This technology is significantly more complexcompared to the explosion of single nuclear devices, although its use has helpedconsiderably reduce economic expenses, and intensify the process of nuclear testing.The total number of nuclear tests and peaceful explosions conducted in the USSRamounts to 715, while the number of detonated nuclear charges and nuclear explosivedevices amounted to 969.426

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYIn comparing the nuclear testing programs of the USSR and the United States, wefind the following:• The USSR conducted less tests than the United States (715 in the USSR, 1,032in the United States, and 24 tests conducted jointly by the United States andGreat Britain);• The number of explosive nuclear charges and devices are: 969 in the USSR,1,127 in the United States, and 24 joint explosions by the United States andGreat Britain;• The number of peaceful nuclear explosions in the USSR amounts to 124, whichis much more than the number of peaceful nuclear explosions conducted in theUnited States (27).I would like to stress that, in conducting its nuclear testing program, the USSRalmost always had to ‘play catch-up’ with the United States. Thanks to effectivescientific and technological solutions and the heroic contribution of its experts, theUSSR managed to close the gap to a large degree in conducting its nuclear weaponsdevelopment and testing program, despite its more restricted financial situation and evenstricter limitations due to the features of the test ranges themselves. At the same time, theannouncement of moratoriums and the introduction of newly negotiated restrictions onnuclear testing generally had a serious effect on the USSR’s testing capabilities and theSoviet Union was left to once again undertake extraordinary efforts under the conditionsset out by said restrictions.Nuclear weapons tests were at the foundation of the USSR’s nuclear shield and itis difficult to downplay their significance, as they often compensated for our restrictedabilities when it came to other elements of the technology of creating nuclear weapons.The importance of the nuclear tests that were conducted for Russia’s defense capabilitieswill remain for many years, and the results of the tests are part of the military andtechnical foundation of our national security.”V. Gubarev states: “You cannot disagree with the conclusion of the book’s authors.In the two agencies — the Nuclear Energy Ministry and the Defense Ministry — thesame people who work today worked then to build the country’s nuclear competenceunder unbelievably difficult conditions. It was their fate to take on America’s challenge,and they honorably undertook all of the trials that fell into their lot. And believe me, theyhad a lot fewer holidays than tough workdays!”• In October 1996, in line with the established procedures, Russian scientistssubmitted an analytical report to the US Department of Defense on the history of Sovietnuclear weapons tests, information about which appeared in The Washington Post withan explanation from A. Chernyshev stating that the report was no more than a history ofthe tests, and did not reflect Russia’s modern nuclear arsenal. He also noted that before itssubmission to the Pentagon, the text was thoroughly reviewed by Russia’s Nuclear Energyand Defense Ministries. Minister V. Mikhailov, who was also the scientific supervisor atVNIIEF, approved the document for submission.But what was the reaction of our critics at home?Printed in the newspaper Izvestiya No. 205, 10/30/1996: “Alexander Baldin fromthe United Institute of Nuclear Studies in Dubna believes that there are no secrets inRussia. They’ve gone crazy in Arzamas. All of the information is leaking out, and notonly from there.” The reaction from one authoritative member of Russia’s nuclear427

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYcommunity, Evgeniy Velikhov, the Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences,was also interesting: “Chernyshev? I know him — that’s the guy who in all seriousnessproposed making small nuclear weapons in case NATO began moving into the East.He was talking about a neutron bomb. And weapons-grade plutonium was somethingelse that he proposed be retained despite international agreements to destroy it. Crazyideas. I won’t be surprised if he came up with something weird as an overview for thePentagon.”Well, there is always the option to respond in true American style: “No comment.”Although all subsequent information, can be considered to be a specific response to thiscriticism. In particular, Izvestiya published another piece to balance out the opinions: “TheFirst Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute, N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, was sure thatMinister Mikhailov, based on his nature and his view on his work, would never have allowedany classified information to lead to the West. Basically, the scientist believes that workingtogether with the Americans on the history of the creation of nuclear weapons could beuseful for both sides.”In 1996, nuclear tests continued in France (one on January 27) and China (1 on July29). Russia conducted another two subcritical tests (on January 15 and July 7). Russia thenconfidently moved toward signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty after having conducted foursubcritical tests.• September 24, 1996, New York: All five nuclear superpowers had signed theComprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Later, over 140 countries became signatories.But not many people are aware that one of the fundamental conditions that Russiaset before signing the Treaty was the achievement of positive results from the foursubcritical tests conducted at the Central Test Range in 1995–1996. Information fromthe United States has revealed that similar tests were conducted there. But the purposeis one and the same: the absence of any nuclear energy release. This was announced onSeptember 24, 1996 at the Moscow Carnegie Fund by First Deputy Minister of NuclearEnergy, Mr. Ryabev.• In 1997, no nuclear tests were conducted. But the media published hints aboutpreparations for tests in India and Pakistan. There is always someone willing to fill thevoid. And another thing: whatever a politician dreams up will come true every time.• In 1998, it happened. India and Pakistan conducted underground nuclear tests (2at India’s Pokhran Test Range on May 11 and 13, and 2 at Pakistan’s Chagai Test Rangeon May 28 and 30). Had the “nuclear club” just expanded to eight members? Who wouldbe next? North Korea?• The years 1999–2005 passed without any nuclear tests. But the non-nuclear subcriticaltests continued at both Russia’s Central Test Range and the Nevada test range, within theterms of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.• On October 9, 2006 North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion!And here it was: the ninth member, despite Suleymenov’s anti-test range formula of 5– 1, the number of nuclear test ranges became “4 + 2 + 1”: the United States, Russia, France428

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYand China + India and Pakistan + North Korea.Now that there was more information available about radioecology, the followingoriginal scientific and journalistic monographs came before the publication of the 5thessential volume of “Nuclear Tests and the Environment” (in addition to volumes 1–4from RFYaTs-VNIIEF):1. The Semipalatinsk Test Range: Ensuring General and Radiation Safety of NuclearTests. Professor V. Logachev, ed. (Moscow: Medbioekstrem, 1997. 319: ill. 3,000 copies).This work includes a foreword from Russian Healthcare Ministry Professor T. Dmitrieva,who noted: “…In conclusion, I would like to say that I hope that the Healthcare Ministersof Russia and other countries never have to take part in nuclear tests or oversee measures toreduce the impact of radioactive pollution.”2. Nuclear Tests in the USSR: Hydronuclear Tests: An Inventory of Used Plutonium.V. Mikhailov, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, ed. (Sarov, RFYaTs-VNIIEF,1998. 22.). This work includes additional data about the altitudes at which nuclear chargeswere detonated for the overwhelming majority of the nuclear tests conducted in 1949–1962. It includes a Catalog of 89 hydro-nuclear tests conducted by the USSR, 4 of whichwere conducted at Novaya Zemlya, including 2 atmospheric tests at the Semipalatinsktest range detonated by dropping an explosive device from aircraft, and 15 undergroundtests at the Semipalatinsk test range conducted in tunnels in the Degelen Mountains, inaddition to 72 surface tests. Furthermore, one of the hydro-nuclear tests resulted in thedispersion of uranium, while several others caused the dispersion of plutonium. For thefirst time, data was published on the inventories of weapons-grade plutonium for use innuclear weapons tests and hydro-nuclear tests in 1949–1963: tests using nuclear charges(1949–1962) used 520 kg of plutonium and hydro-nuclear tests (1958–1963) used 11 kg;of these, 290 kg were detonated at the Semipalatinsk test range (97 kg for surface tests)and Novaya Zemlya accounted for 206 kg (4 kg for a surface test on September 7, 1957),while another 35 kg was used on non-test range premises (1 kg for a surface test). Thetotal is 531 kg.3. The Novaya Zemlya Test Range: Ensuring General and Radiation Safety ofNuclear Tests. Facts, Evidence and Recollections. Professor V. Logachev, ed. (Moscow,IzdAT, 2000. 487: ill. 1,500 copies). This work included a foreword from V. Mikhailov, theDirector of the Institute for Strategic Stability, the scientific supervisor of RFYaTs-VNIIEFand member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He noted: “In conclusion, I would liketo express my wish that this book, a little piece of the lives of the professionals who havewritten it, finds acknowledgment among readers, as it is about nuclear weapons testing andabout those who took the first steps toward understanding this energy of colossal force,allowing no one any privileges save for one: to be on the forefront of something that was asof yet unknown, and to selflessly and professionally fulfill one’s duty. I also truly hope thatthe authors’ intent to release a third book dedicated to the problems of ensuring generaland radiation safety during peaceful nuclear explosions becomes a reality. May you besuccessful in your endeavors!”4. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions: Ensuring General and Radiation Safety: Facts,Evidence, and Recollections. Professor V. Logachev, ed. (Moscow: IzdAT, 2001. 519: ill.1,500 copies printed). This book includes a foreword from Deputy Healthcare MinisterProfessor G. Petrov, who notes: “… When conducting underground nuclear explosionsfor industrial purposes, we had every reason to believe that the safety level needed to429

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYprotect people was sufficient for protecting other living beings and plants, as well asthe environment, against radioactive pollution. This monograph proves that it is time toacknowledge that over the last several years, the health of the Russian population hasbeen affected by a number of different negative factors, including poor socio-economicconditions and the state of the environment, increased daily stress, and many others.That is why it is important to understand that each person must be attentive when itcomes to his own health and attempt to avoid illnesses from the onset, which requiresprompt doctor visits in order to ensure qualified aid or recommendations.” Also in theforeword is a message from Professor V. Lebedev, the Deputy Nuclear Energy Minister,who emphasized the following: “It can be said that there is a high demand for peacefulnuclear explosions, but there are also countless problems involved with them. That iswhy the global community is so cautious and correctly included a number of provisionsin the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. For example, in line with Article VIII, every ten yearsconferences are to be held to review the Treaty and actions taken within it, and anyparticipant may request that recommendations be considered to amend the Treaty in orderto permit peaceful nuclear explosions, provided that there would be no military benefits tothese explosions. According to Article VII, amendments to the Treaty must be passed bya consensus. So what it really comes down to is appropriate proposals from the Treaty’ssignatories at these conferences. In conclusion, I would like to express my wish that thisbook about peaceful nuclear explosions be recognized by its readers, and not just thosewho share the opinions about their usefulness, but also among those who have differentopinions for a variety of reasons. This is why, if we return to the words of one of the fathersof Russia’s nuclear program, Yulii Khariton, I would like to agree with his optimism andthe competent authors of this book, particularly in the belief that the powerful energy ofnuclear explosions, which is fully manageable by intelligent people, will be in demand anduseful to all as an element of high technology. Let us see the atom as a worker, and not asoldier. I am also pleased to note that Chagan Lake, created in Kazakhstan by a nuclearexplosion, made its own mark in history as a showpiece in the field of nuclear explosivetechnology when it was included in the register of monuments of nuclear science andtechnology (see: “The Monuments of Science and Technology of the Domestic NuclearIndustry. Moscow: the Memorial Humanitarian Fund. Znaniye. 1999).5. Radiological Conditions at Test Ranges Today (Semipalatinsk, Novaya Zemlya,Totskoye, and Kapustin Yar): Facts, Evidence, and Recollections: Professor V. Logachev,ed. (Moscow: IzdAT, 2002, 639: ill. 1,500 copies printed). This book includes a forewordfrom Deputy Healthcare Ministry Professor and distinguished doctor V. Korbut, whonoted: “…This monograph, the fourth book in the series on ensuring radiation safetyduring the use of nuclear explosive technologies, answers practically all of the questionsrelated to the assessment of the consequences of nuclear tests and the extent of theirimpact on the health of the country’s citizens.”6. The Semipalatinsk Test Range: Creation, Operation and Conversion. Editors:Professor V. Shkolinka, M. Akhmetov, S. Berezin, R. Ibrayev, V. Logachev, L. Logacheva,A. Matushchenko, L. Ptitskaya, S. Ryskulova, S. Tukhvatulin, O. Tyupkina, and Y.Cherepnin (Almaty, ISBN 9965-00-614-8, 2003. 344: ill.). This book was also publishedin English. This volume includes a foreword from V. Shkolnik, who states: “...It isimpossible to provide an objective evaluation of the results of the operations at theSemipalatinsk test range without shedding light on the history of how it was created, howthe nuclear tests were conducted, and how it has since been converted. This monograph430

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYaddresses the most important aspects that have had an influence on operations at the testrange, as well as the consequences of those operations. Often, the lack of expertise ofthe authors with regard to issues such as nuclear hazards and nuclear safety, as well astheir biased positions, are surprising, and not just to professionals. One of the participantsin the nuclear epic wrote in his memoirs that the scientific supervisor of the nuclearprogram — Igor Kurchatov — whose name has been bestowed upon an administrativeand scientific center at the Semipalatinsk test range, during the last five years of his lifeoften said: “We must start to write. The time has come to tell others about what we aredoing. We must write about everything and what everything was like, without leavinganything out and without making anything up. If we do not do this now, we will only seelies, confusion and fabrication later on — we will not recognize ourselves.”7. Radioactive Pollution of the Environment and Public Health. Supervised by I.Vasilenko (Russian Academy of Natural Sciences) and L. Buldakova (Russian Academyof Medical Sciences). Radiation Consequences of Nuclear Tests at the Test Ranges of theFormer USSR. Authors: V. Logachev, L. Logacheva, A. Matushchenko, Y. Stepanov Y.Dubasov, L. Belovodsky, B. Shagin, G. Khodalev, and V. Gayevoi (Moscow: Meditsina,2004. 15–33. 1,500 copies printed). The book’s introduction reads: “...This multidimensionalstudy was conducted under the International Science and Technology Center’s projectNo. 519 on the radioactive pollution of the environment and the health of the population.Leading scientists and engineers were recruited for the project, including those who hadtaken part in preparations for the nuclear weapons tests at the Semipalatinsk and NovayaZemlya test ranges, studies of radioactive pollution in the regions from radionuclide fallout,studies of the destructive effects of nuclear fission products and biologically significantradionuclides at test ranges and under laboratory-created conditions, and finally radiation,health and epidemiological studies in areas affected by radioactive pollution. The peoplewho carried out this project were directly involved in cleaning up the consequences ofthe accident at the Chernobyl NPP. This executive team is of fundamental importance inresearching such a complex and multifaceted problem.”8. Radioecological Conditions at the Sites of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in theRussian Federation Today: Facts, Evidence, and Recollections. Authors: V. Logachev,L. Logacheva, A. Matushchenko, V. Uyba, and O. Shamov (Moscow: IzdAT, 2005. 256.500 copies printed).The publication of this monograph was timed to coincide with the 40 th anniversaryof the first peaceful nuclear explosion in the Former Soviet Union, which was conductedon the eastern border of the Semipalatinsk test range in the Soviet Socialist Republic ofKazakhstan on January 15, 1965 in order to create a research and industrial water reservoirfor the steppe area often affected by droughts. The book’s foreword was written by G.Onishchenko, the Chief National Medical Officer of Russia, the Head of the FederalServices for Supervision of the Protection of Consumer Rights and Human Well-Being,member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and laureate of the National USSRAward, and A. Vasiliev, Director of the International Center for Environmental Safetyunder the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry. These contributors stated: “This monographis the result of many years of work performed by a team of qualified members of leadingscientific and research organizations: the State Science Center and Institute of Biophysics,VNIPI-PromTekhnologiya under RosAtom, and other specialized institutions. The authorslabored over the collection, analysis and review of extensive materials that were submittedby the regional Centers of State Public Health and Epidemiological Monitoring, as well431

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYas data from a variety of literary sources…” It is noted that the overwhelming majority offacilities created with the use of nuclear explosive technologies have radiation conditionsthat are within natural background radiation levels. Rehabilitation efforts and measures toprotect staff members are currently underway at the territories of facilities where radiationconditions exceed background levels.“It is important to note that in the future, such seemingly harmless actions aspumping water out of deep aquifers or pumping water into a cavity formed by a peacefulnuclear explosion as part of an oil extraction process, could pose an environmentalthreat. It is equally important to have a solution for the status of the facilities wherepeaceful nuclear explosions were conducted with developed title documentation, and itis important to define who the owners of these wells and facilities are. All of these issuesare the prerogative of the Government of the Russian Federation.”9. Nuclear Tests in the Arctic: A Scientific and Journalistic Monograph. Under thegeneral editorship of RFYaTs VNIIEF, V. Mikhailov, member of the Russian Academyof Sciences (Book 1 in 2 volumes: vol. 1: “The Arctic Nuclear Test Range,” in two partsby E. Shitikov, Part 1, “History of the Nuclear Weapons Fleet,” and part 2 “Memoirs ofthe Residents of Novaya Zemlya.” Volume 2: “The Arctic Nuclear Test Range,” also intwo parts. Part 1 written by V. Logachev, “Radioecological Conditions at the Central TestRange of the Russian Federation and the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago,” and Part 2 by Y.Smirnov, V. Adamsky and Y. Trutnev “Nuclear Tests in the United States and the USSRas the Emergence of Government Policy”). Book 2, by S. Zelentsov “Nuclear Tests. TheTotskoye Military Exercises.” Moscow: Moscow Textbooks, 2006. Book 1, Vol. 1: 463:ill., Vol. 2: 455: ill., Book 2 197: ill.This edition of the books was dedicated to the 50 th anniversary of the creation ofthe Novaya Zemlya test range and the 50 th anniversary of the military exercises at theTotskoye test range in the Orenburg Oblast (September 14 and 17, 1954).Andrei Efremov made a comment regarding these books in Literaturnaya Gazeta(No. 5, February 7–13, 2007). “If we were to ask our contemporaries and our citizenswhich events in 1961 were the most historically significant, more or less educatedpeople would recall Yuri Gagarin and his legendary cry of “And we’re off!” Othersmay point to Khrushchev’s monetary reform. And only a handful, the most erudite ofthem all — the nuclear experts — would answer the following: “In autumn of 1961 abomb was detonated over Novaya Zemlya that had no equal on the planet in terms ofits colossal force.” Then on October 31, we saw the successful test of a thermonuclearweapon, which made the USSR at least the geopolitical equal of the United States inthe military and strategic sense, and clearly put the USSR amongst the world’s leadersin terms of scientific potential in the defense industry. The closure of the Semipalatinsktest range in August 1991 left the test range on the Novaya Zemlya the only operatingtest range across the vast post-Soviet territory. Nearly 15 years later, nuclear tests are nolonger conducted here due to the introduction of moratoriums starting with Gorbachevand continued by Yeltsin.”In turn, V. Mikhailov made a statement at the end of the book, summing up everythingoptimistically: “Right now we can only admire how the country’s nuclear industry hasmanaged to survive and retain its key intellectual and scientific staff members, a feelingof loyalty for serving the state. Today this is a factor of national security and a badge ofhonor.”10. The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range: Creation, Establishment, and Operations.432

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYI. Akchurin, Professor S. Pertsev, ed. Moscow: Golden Bee, 2007. 258: ill.The introduction of the book includes a note from V. Verkhovtsev, the Head ofthe 12 th Government Department of the Russian Defense Ministry: “At the price of theincredible efforts of the test range staff, military construction workers and designers,the test range was built and ready to conduct tests in an extremely short period of time.Later, a one-of-a-kind research testing base was created here, allowing us to conductfull-scale nuclear tests and model the destructive effects of a nuclear explosion and itsconsequences on military equipment and both military and civil facilities.Everything that was done at the Semipalatinsk test range to create the country’snuclear shield was done for the first time ever. This is where the first Russian-madenuclear device was tested, where the model of a real nuclear air-delivered bomb wasfirst dropped, where thermonuclear charges were first tested, where the prototype forthe thermonuclear munitions that comprised the foundation of the Armed Forces nucleararsenal was first tested, and where underground nuclear explosions were first carried out[Note from the author: and, we should add, the first peaceful nuclear explosion used tocreate a massive water reservoir].In 1994, the Second State Central Test Range under the Russian Defense Ministrywas complete. This achievement remains an honored memory not only for test rangeveterans, but for new generations as well.”The works listed above are also complemented by:- Underground Burial of Industrial Waste via Enlarged Cavities Made UsingUnderground Nuclear Explosions. Authors: N. Prikhodko, A. Vasiliev. A. Agapova, ed.Moscow: IzdAT, 2007. 104.This book is about the development and introduction of the technology used for theunderground burial of toxic industrial waste water using peaceful nuclear explosions,such as the Kama-2 facilities (10/26/1983, 10 kilotons, a depth of 2,206 m, put into usein 1967), and Kama-1 (07/08/1974, 10 kilotons at a depth of 2,123, put into use in 1983)in Bashkortostan. Over 29 years of operation, the Kama-2 cavity (as of 01/01/07) storednearly 34.5 m 3 of highly-mineralized industrial waste water from the SterlitamakskSoda Industrial Association. Over 23 years of use, Kama-1 has stored 3.42 million m 3of particularly toxic industrial waste water from Salavatnefteorgsintez. Overall, thesesystems have made it possible to prevent dumping industrial waste into surface waterreservoirs and thus prevent RUB 6.5 million in damage to the environment.- The Nuclear Shield, by A. Greshilov, N. Egupov, and M. Matushchenko. Moscow:Logos, 2008. 424: ill. Based on a number of sources, including newly declassifiedsources, this book presents the true history of nuclear weapons development and the birthof nuclear industry in the Soviet Union. The scientific and technological requirementsfor carrying out the first nuclear project are revealed, and the work also reflects thepolitical climate of the time that developed under the influence of the Cold War andthe growing threat that a thermonuclear attack could be unleashed against Russia. Thisbook also addresses the development of the H-bomb and second- and third-generationthermonuclear devices. It includes information about the USSR’s test ranges, the maintypes of nuclear weapons, the tests conducted with them, and the nuclear explosionsconducted for peaceful purposes. A detailed bibliography on the book’s subject is alsoincluded (335 sources, and all from the ever-growing personal “nuclear library” of coauthorProfessor A. Matushchenko as of July 25, 2007).433

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY- Trust, But Check You Must! N. Voloshin. Snezhinsk: RFYaTs-VNIITF Publishing,2008. 216: ill. This work is a striking memoir of one of the most active participants in theevents involved with the preparation for, the conducting of, the receipt and the assessmentof results from a unique joint Soviet-US experiment in monitoring the Nuclear Test-BanTreaty on underground nuclear weapons testing, which was signed on June 3, 1974 inMoscow between the USSR and the United States. This experiment was carried out 20years ago and involved detonating two underground nuclear explosions: one on August17, 1988 (“Kearsarge” at the Nevada test range) and another on September 14, 1988(“Shagan,” at the Semipalatinsk test range). This experiment was referred to as “the Signalof Hope” in reference to the future comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. During thefollowing four years, the USSR / Russia conducted observation and monitoring at fourtests (Hoya – 1991, Junction – 1991–1992, and in part Greenwater – 1992) at the Nevadatest range in the United States. However, during this period, Russia was already enforcinga moratorium on nuclear tests, which is still in effect today. That is why the United Statesdid not have the opportunity to monitor or observe any Russian nuclear tests. However,experts were able to take part in scheduling observation and monitoring activities forthree planned tests and attend and tour the Central Russian Test Range on the NovayaZemlya archipelago (Russia’s only test range after the fall of the USSR) on June 14–18,1993. This was done in line with an agreement reached at the Fourth Session of theBilateral Consultative Commission on enforcing the provisions of the Treaty between theUSSR and the United States on restricting underground nuclear weapons testing.A little background: the US delegation was led by Robert Cockerham, and includedEugene McKenzie, William Menold, Michael Chiders, Roger Hill, and others (total of14 people). Our American guests were shown what support the US staff would receivefor its monitoring activities in line with the 1974 Treaty and related protocols. They wereshown certain test range facilities (based on prior agreements), examples of equipmentand technology and they were provided with information about how accommodations,meals, transportation and collaboration were dealt with at the test range. The US guestswere met by the Head of the 6 th Department of the Russian Navy, Vice Admiral G.Zolotukhin, and representatives from the Russian Nuclear Energy and Defense MinistriesB. Andrusenko, N. Voloshin, V. Frolov, A. Kolesnikov, V. Gorev, V. Shevchenko, V.Yarygin, D. Rusin, V. Smirnov, and Y. Naglis, in addition to others, including expertsworking at the test range.And We Are Still Writing…Our efforts in disseminating nuclear information are continuing: preparations for thepublication of a manuscript of another work are nearing completion: “Peaceful NuclearExplosions: Past and Present (edited by the International Center for EnvironmentalSafety under the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry, A. Vasiliev) which will containextensive information about all 124 of the peaceful nuclear explosions conducted in theUSSR from 01/15/1965 through 09/06/1988.On January 30, 2007 at a meeting of experts from the Interagency Commission(MVEK-NE), the following was noted: “The finished manuscript is a highly qualifiedand well-developed book project that summarizes modern views on the results of theUSSR’s peaceful nuclear explosion program and the radiological consequences of theseexplosions on the surface of the Earth as well as the depths of the explosion zone, which434

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYare being addressed for the first time. There are recommendations to improve the integralpeaceful nuclear explosion database (the MTsEB-ICES international peaceful nuclearexplosion database) by including a geologic time scale model showing the characteristicsof the rock formations found in the explosion zone and the work area in order to build anextensive database for the Russian agencies involved…”In turn, on January 9, 2008 the group of authors led by Professor V. Logachevsubmitted a manuscript for publication of an important new work on the effects ofradiation on the public resulting from nuclear tests conducted at the test ranges of allnuclear superpowers.We also intend to work on collections such as “Nuclear Radiance” [Yadernoe siyaniye]and “The Mountain Station” [Gornaya stantsiya] in continuation of the Novaya Zemlya andSemipalatinsk veterans’ memoirs, as well as books such as “The Nuclear Shield” and “TheNuclear Umbrella,” which will continue where “The Nuclear Sword” left off (under thegovernment program for the Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation in2006–2010, by Decree No. 422 of the Russian Government, 07/11/2005).ConclusionThere is a reason that today, we have dedicated so much time to sharing informationabout nuclear weapons, nuclear testing, and the consequences thereof. Without a doubt,society must know about this from the horse’s mouth, and not from a dilettante’s pointof view or that of opportunists or populists.I would also like to give answers to a number of questions that are especiallyrelevant in our time, which is particularly complicated by geopolitical relations. Thesequestions (by Natalia Vershinina) and the answers (by Nikolai Voloshin)—former Headof the 5th Chief Department of the predecessor to the Nuclear Energy Ministry in 1996–2004, the Nuclear Munitions Research and Development Department of the RussianNuclear Ministry, to be precise, known since March 2004 as RosAtom—from the book“For You, My Colleagues – 2” (2003) and in the pages of the magazine EkonomicheskiyeStrategii “The Fifth Department...” (2003, No. 01).– Correspondent: How would you compare our scientists with foreign scientists?– N. Voloshin: Before the end of the 1980s, we spoke with US experts via theCommittee for Nuclear Energy Use. The weapons issue was “behind the curtain” — ourspecialists were invited only for consultations, but no one ever had any direct contactwith foreigners.The first time I met with American scientists was in 1988 when they visited theSemipalatinsk Test Range. Later, when I had the opportunity to work at the test rangein Nevada, I noted one detail: all of the workers there had very narrow specializations.Each person had in-depth knowledge of their topic, and no one needed to know anythingbeyond the realm of their own field of specialization. We have a different kind of system.Our experts possess extensive knowledge from one field to another. My career took mefrom being your typical engineer to becoming a Doctor of Sciences and I later masteredthe entire range of processes and interconnections. Another difference is our unfalteringsense of responsibility. Even when he retires, a Russian nuclear expert lives his work, hewill still be consulted for advice. Our men will watch over their “children” like a fatherhis entire life.– Correspondent: Was it difficult to take this step – to open up to the Americans435

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYand start to work together on something that had always been this great secret?– N. Voloshin: Yes, it was difficult. But our proactive stance was the result ofpolitical decisions made at the very top. Many perceived contact with foreigners as aclear violation of everything we stood for. I remember how the supervisor of one ofthe laboratories in my department responded to the suggestion that he go abroad on abusiness trip. His answer was a terse “I’m not going anywhere! You go, I won’t have anypart of it.” And he was not the only one who felt that way.– Correspondent: How would you evaluate your collaboration with the G5 and thestrategic partnership with the world’s nuclear superpowers?– N. Voloshin: In 1996, after signing the new CTBT, we were confident that wewere working for the good of mankind, and that the nuclear powers had managed toachieve mutual understanding and an agreement on their positions. However, in 2000,England, France and Russia ratified the Treaty, while the United States opted not to;the Republicans had taken majority over the Democrats, and they decided that ratifyingthe Treaty would contradict national interests. Now China is wavering, waiting to seewhat the United States will do next. At present, talks about the fate of the Treaty are stillunderway, but three of the five nuclear states ended up, generally speaking, in a state ofsurprise and confusion.- Correspondent: Perhaps it was simple provocation? “At the count of three, everyonejump! One, two, three!” But not everyone jumps.- N. Voloshin: It’s a possibility. We know that, as far as that issue is concerned, theUnited States is dealing with some internal struggles. The US National Academy of Scienceshas released a report that states outright: no matter what, the United States would benefit fromratifying the Treaty. After all, the nuclear superpowers already know how to do everything.If you need to create a new nuclear arsenal with old tested devices, it can be done withouttesting. And if CTBT comes into force, not one country — either nuclear or non-nuclear —will make a new nuclear device without testing. That is why the Treaty is beneficial for theentire global community.- Correspondent: What priorities has the government set for the Nuclear MunitionsResearch and Development Department?- N. Voloshin: The main thing is to ensure national security in today’s changinggeopolitical situation. The Americans have withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, and nowwe are thinking about how to respond to that withdrawal. The United States is buildinga national missile defense system that will have global capabilities. The layout of theradiolocation station has already been published — they are aiming to surround theentire Northern hemisphere. Not only will they be able to protect the United States fromindividual missiles, but they will also be able to quickly expand the system’s capabilitiesfor more dangerous threats. We are modernizing our old arsenal and reaching a newlevel with new delivery vehicles and control systems. We are carrying out non-nuclearexplosive experiments at Novaya Zemlya, which are not restricted by the CTBT. Thisaffirms the safety of our old arsenal. The Americans know about this and they conductthe same experiments. Based on what has been published, the United States has carriedout about 20 similar experiments over the past few years. We have carried out 30.– Correspondent: Are any large-scale experiments being conducted?– N. Voloshin: Not at this time.– Correspondent: What 20 th century discovery in nuclear physics do you think wasoutstanding?436

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY– N. Voloshin: Well, my specialization is weapons, so that affects my answer. At first,in the first half of the 1940s, the Americans figured out how to release nuclear energy anduse it, and we followed the same path. Later we learned to use released nuclear energyfor peaceful purposes — I mean first and foremost nuclear explosive technology, whichpresumes the existence of devices that result in fewer fission fragments and less residualtritium. The weapons experts were the ones to develop these devices. I believe that these twodiscoveries — nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive technology — are genius.We have conducted 124 peaceful nuclear explosions at various locations. Six of thesehad unsatisfactory results, which damaged our reputation somewhat. The remaining 95% ofpeaceful explosions were a success and were very useful.I, for example, have participated in putting out gas fires in Uzbekistan (Ura-Bulak,09/30/1966). There was a gas well fire burning for over a year, and it was impossible to putout. Underneath that gas well, we created a new one with an incline and planted a nucleardevice there (30 kilotons of TNT equivalent), the explosion of which compressed the fire. Agreat deal of explosions have been conducted for seismic exploration of mineral resources.The explosions have extracted ore at apatite deposits in the Kirov Oblast. The Americanshave carried out 27 peaceful explosions. They folded that program in 1973 under pressurefrom environmentalist protests. We stopped conducting peaceful explosions in 1988.– Correspondent: What is your favorite saying?– N. Voloshin: From Abutalib: “Don’t fire a gun into the past, or the future will fireat you from a cannon.”One final side note: In 2001 and 2003, N. Voloshin published two books: “For You, MyColleagues – 1” and “For You, My Colleagues – 2” with the fabulous motto: “Dedicatedto the deeds of those who have passed, and the moxie of those still with us.” The pages ofthese books are filled with his warmth and kindness in portraying many interesting events andpeople involved in the past and present of Russia’s nuclear weapons industry. He ended thebook with this bit of verse:“Everyone needs peace, a belief we revere,Yet the gunpowder must always stay dry.We are entrusted with the Fatherland’s nuclear shield,We protect it and we hold it dear.”And on this note we end our narrative of the creation of our nuclear shield, the sixtyyears of which will be celebrated in August 2009 under the Government Program for thePatriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation in 2006–2010 (by Decree No.422 of the Russian Government, 07/11/2005).May these words also serve this purpose well!437

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTHE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION WAS NOT DELIVEREDAT THE EVENTWhy We Need the History of Science: Understanding andResolving Radiation ProblemsMarina KhvostovaSenior Scientific Collaborator, Environmental Center, Institutefor the History of Natural Sciences and Technics, RussianAcademy of SciencesAt first glance, the topic of my speech may seem completely removed from modernradiation problems and not at all practical. But believe me when I tell you this is not thecase. On the contrary, a historical scientific analysis can help us see and understand theroots and origins of any number of radiation issues that are very relevant today, or thatmay arise in the future.The great scientists who understood the role of science history in global scientificand technological progress hold this field of scientific work in very high regard. VladimirVernadsky noted that science history is “one of the ways to determine scientific truth”(1). Sergey Vavilov wrote that “to correctly judge the current state of any science andits prospects, it is always useful to look back to its past, sometimes even its distant past”(2).What is the goal of science history? Its main goal is to reveal patterns in thedevelopment of science, conditions, and factors that favor development. A researcherbrings to light the development of ideas and problems in a given field of science. Allscience history is strictly documented and is based exclusively on official, verifiedsources. Conversely, science history is important for the substantiation of facts and helpsdetermine whether or not a given event took place. What, then, is considered a sourcedocument? These are various archived documents, such as letters, notebooks, expeditionlogs, accounts of works conducted, maps, etc., as well as tested research results laid outin studies and articles, materials for scientific conferences, and many others.Science historians note that in recent years, environmental problems have led togreater attention toward the latest history of natural science. Consequently, the argumentcan be made that turning to the history of a given field of science may be an indicator ofthe importance of this scientific direction for modern society.So how does this theory relate to radiation? Let us try a kind of historical scientificdigression, placing an emphasis on and showing the priorities of radioecologicalresearch.A little over 110 years has passed since Antoine Henri Becquerel discovered thephenomenon of radioactivity in 1896. While 110 years is not a very long time in sciencehistory, in this short period of time, the practical use of the discovery’s findings hassignified a new era in the history of mankind: the nuclear era. Even during the first yearsof studying radioactivity, many scientists understood the importance of this discovery.In 1911, Vladimir Vernadsky, who foresaw the immense significance of nuclear energy,438

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYsaid: “before us, through the phenomenon of radioactivity, are revealed sources ofnuclear energy, which are a million times greater than all the sources of power thatman had ever imagined” (3). Even earlier, in 1905, Pierre Curie ended his Nobel Prizeacceptance speech at the Swedish Academy of Science with the following words: “Incriminal hands, radium may become dangerous…Will humanity benefit from learningnature’s secrets, has it matured enough to use them constructively, or will this knowledgebe a source of harm?” (4). Thus, even at the dawn of radiation research (nearly 30 yearsbefore the discovery of artificial radioactivity by Irene and Frederic Joliot-Curie), PierreCurie foresaw great possibilities of using nuclear energy, but at the same time, warnedmankind of the enormous responsibility resulting from this discovery.A science historian must also consider the society’s response to a new discovery. Forexample, the discovery of the emanation of radium in mineral sources and the study ofits physiological effect on the human body elicited an unusual burst of interest in medicaltreatment with radioactive mineral waters. Interest in physiotherapy became more orless mainstream nature; the well-known doctor Lev Bertenson wrote in 1914 that thisinterest was entirely legal, but fueled artificially “by modern advertising — widespread,brazen, deftly supported by a scientific ballast…” (5). In one vivid illustration, hedescribed the following incident: “It is amazing how shamelessly inventive some ofthe modern creators of the reputation of water can be, as illustrated by the followingexample. La Gazette des Eaux recently published a letter from an anonymous entitydoing business with some French water. The letter was addressed to a well-known andrespected chemist, suggesting, for a hefty honorarium of course, “to find strong levels ofradioactivity in the designated medicinal water area in order to launch an advertisementcampaign based on a scientific analysis that cannot be verified!” (5). This is one exampleof how society reacted to a new field of knowledge with relatively little research, but thatwas nonetheless becoming the new, fashionable trend in both science and society.The founder of Russia’s very first specialized radiological laboratory in 1909,Evgeny Burkser, made the following comparison: “Similarly to how the discovery ofbacteria launched the study of infectious diseases to a new level, currently, radium iscausing an overturn in physiochemical theories” (6).Even in the early stages of studying radioactivity, it was clear to many scientiststhat this field of knowledge would become one of the dominant areas in the upcomingyears, and indeed, this is what happened later in the history of its development.I am purposefully bringing up the names of scientists in my presentation, because,in science history, it is particularly important to follow the development of ideas and thepeople behind the research. In the foreground, there is always the persona of the scientist,his or her way of thinking, motivations, working conditions, and even aspects of hisor her personality. Researchers who devoted their lives to studying the phenomenonof radioactivity were, in many ways, portraying their finest qualities — selflessness,dedication, the desire for knowledge, and the drive to help people. We can gather thisfrom their biographical data, both from early researchers and from our contemporaries.At the same time, each individual scientist belongs to his or her era, works within theframework of that era’s traditions, and cannot exist outside it.Historical scientific analysis allows us to judge the contribution of a specificscientist to a particular area of science, and to rediscover the names of the researcherswho were misunderstood or unappreciated in their time. Today we are familiar with theroles of the first researchers of radioactive properties in the environment. Starting in439

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY1904, scientists such as A. Sokolov, P. Orlov, E. Burkser, V. Spitsyn, and E. Karstensindependently organized research in different parts of Russia and began paving the roadfor the search for radioactive ores and minerals.Archives give us the opportunity to incorporate new layers of knowledge into ourscientific knowledge, and discover entirely unexpected information. Another interestingfact proven by science historians is that Antoine Henri Becquerel was not the first toobserve radioactive properties in uranium salt. The French officer Niepce de Saint Victordetermined in 1858 (i.e., nearly 40 years before Becquerel’s experiments) that uranylnitrate releases a form of energy that affects photographic plates (7). Unlike Becquerel,the officer immediately came to the conclusion that this phenomenon is not in anyway related to fluorescence. But, after nine years of attempting to solve this mysteryand conducting his experiments in a laboratory that he single-handedly organized inan unused hall in the police station (Niepce de Saint Victor was a lieutenant in themunicipal guard), he was unable to explain the phenomenon he was observing. Scientistsexplain this by pointing out that, at the time when the Frenchman was conducting hisexperiments, physics and chemistry had not developed sufficiently to understand thenature of radioactivity. The works of Niepce de Saint Victor were not recognized by hiscontemporaries and were not continued.It is important to note that one common feature of historical and scientific studiesof radiological issues is a kind of “material resistance.” All of the vast work conductedby an enormous number of scientific institutions, scientists, governmental organizationsin the USSR, beginning in the mid-1930s, became increasingly secretive, until thevery end of the Soviet Union, and much of it is still inaccessible to science historianstoday. Therefore, researchers seek their own approaches to studying radioecology. L.Rikhvanov notes that most of his attention is focused on radioecology in the 1950s and60s, as he is convinced that “it was in those years that the true, un-retouched state ofaffairs was portrayed, which, in later times, was significantly contorted and excludedfrom wider discussions” (8).Many scientists unanimously state that the secrecy of materials, as well as theabsence of consistency and a unified work program, led to the fact that even afterthe unfortunate experience of the Kyshtym disaster, the government turned out to becompletely unprepared for Chernobyl. Only in the 1990s did the public and the scientificcommunity learn about the information that had been kept secret, or not studied at all(for example, dumping radioactive waste into Siberian rivers). In any field of science,it is extremely important that no scientific experiment ever be aborted and that it istransferred from generation to generation and developed, adding to new knowledge.We are clearly approaching the concept of a “field of research.” Once again, ahistorical scientific analysis allows us to observe the establishment and developmentof a given field of research — radiobiological, radioecological, radiogeoecological,etc. In terms of accumulation of knowledge in radioactivity, and depending on what isbeing studied and the different tasks involved, the material becomes differentiated, andscientific fields such as radiobiology, radiation biogeocenology (later, “radioecology”),agricultural radioecology, continental and sea radioecology, radiological hygiene, etc.,begin to take shape.We can trace the evolution of ideas, understand what was important at a particulartime, and identify the questions that faded into the background, while others came to the440

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYforeground. For example, the beginning of nuclear weapons testing marked the beginningof global radioactive pollution. The study of anthropogenic radionuclide migrationgained more attention, while studies of natural radionuclide biogeochemistry decreasedsomewhat. However, as early as the 1970s, interest grew in the natural radioactivebackground as it affects the environment and radiological health. Moreover, in the 1980s,the view that the natural radioactive background had an important role became popular,and the concept of an “anthropogenic radioactive background” emerged, although theissue of radiological pollution from anthropogenic radionuclides was still important incertain regions of the country.Historical scientific analysis helps us understand and evaluate the significance of anidea or study. For example, today we can judge to what extent the biogeochemical fielddeveloped by Vladimir Vernadsky was productive. All further studies on the migrationof natural radionuclides, and later, anthropogenic radionuclides, are based on the lawsof biogeochemistry.Today, there is not one single plant or animal on the planet whose compositiondoes not include anthropogenic radionuclides. An organism’s ability to accumulateradioactive substances was noted by Vladimir Vernadsky back in 1929, after establishingthat swamp algae is capable of accumulating radium in significantly greater quantitiesthan the surrounding water. Even then, in the early stages of researching naturalradioactivity in natural objects, nature was giving a “warning” about the threat ofradionuclides accumulated by living organisms in concentrations far greater than thoseseen the environment. Here, developing on Vladimir Vernadsky’s thesis, one can goso far as to call mankind a geological force that changes the chemistry of the Earth,bringing unnatural, anthropogenic radionuclides into the biosphere. In this case, humansare acting on par with nature’s own natural forces.As I have already stated, interest in the most recent history of natural science hasincreased in the last few years. There are many questions. Can a science historian studythe present day? How does one make the distinction between historical events andcurrent events? When addressing topics related to science history, Vladimir Vernadskywould say that a historical period consists of 25 years, i.e., one generation. As a result,arguments often occur: should the Chernobyl catastrophe be regarded as an event thatcan be analyzed in a historically scientific manner? After all, 25 years have not yetpassed, and the radioecological effects of Chernobyl will continue to be studied forseveral more decades, if not centuries. It would follow that one cannot analyze thepresent day from a historical scientific perspective. However, modern sociologists,philosophers, and even science historians note that the 20 th and 19 th centuries broughtabout an increase in the speed with which science and technology develop. Mankind hasentered the information era, where the speed of exchanging information is rapid and isa part of daily life. Therefore, it can be said that the historical 25-year period describedby Vladmir Vernadsky has been significantly reduced. Even as the 20 th anniversaryof the Chernobyl disaster approached, one could identify the primary patterns in thenegative impact on humans and ecosystems based on studies by Russian radioecologists,radiobiologists, doctors, and other scientists.In concluding my presentation, I would like to say the following: science historyforces us, again and again, to turn to issues that seem to have been addressed long ago,that should not have any influence on the course of today’s events. Nonetheless, practiceshows that many modern problems were put aside long before they became relevant.441

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAnother important element in historical scientific research on radiology is the attemptto obtain credible, objective, and to the extent that it is possible, complete information.By studying our scientific radiological legacy, we can gradually put together a mosaicof many years of studies, reflecting the different fields of development, the scientistsbehind the ideas, different schools of thought, cultural traditions and, importantly, themistakes that have been made. Step by step, we strive to reach the top, trying to graspwith our minds everything that mankind has already achieved in this field of science, inorder to take all of the best and use it to help mankind.References1. Vernadsky, V. I. Academic K. M. von Ber: In Memoriam [Pamyati akademika K.M. fon Ber]. Works by the Commission on the History of Knowledge [Trudy komissii poistorii znanii]. Leningrad: 1927, 2 nd edition, 3.2. Vavilov, S. I. Collection of essays [Sobranie sochinenii]. Volume 3. Works ofPhilosophy and History in Natural Science [Raboty po filosofii i istorii estestvoznaniya].Moscow: 1956. 870.3. Vernadsky, V. I. Top Priorities in the Study of Radium [Zadacha dnya v oblastiradiya]. Russian Academy of Science News. 1911. Volume 5. No. 1. 61–72.4. Staroselskaya-Nikitina, O. A. The History of Radioactivity in Nuclear Physics[Istoriya radioaktivnosti i vozniknoveniya yadernoi fiziki]. Published by the Academy ofScience of the USSR. Moscow: 1963. 428.5. Bertenson, L. B. Radioactivity in Medicinal Waters and Mud [Radioaktivnost vlechebnykh vodakh i gryazyakh]. Saint-Petersburg: 1914, 204.6. Burkser, E. S. Studies on Radioactive Phenomena [Ocherki yavleniiradioaktivnosti]. Public Lectures, Read in Odessa, Nikolaev, and other cities 1908–1909 and Presentations at the Student Chemistry Club at the Imperial NovorossiyskUniversity. Nikolaev: 1909. 99.7. Zaytseva, L. L., Figurovsky, N. A. Radioactivity Research in Pre-RevolutionaryRussia [Issledovaniya yavlenii radioaktivnosti v dorevolyutsionnoi Rossii]. Moscow:1961. 223.8. Rikhvanov, L. P. General and Regional Problems in Radioecology [Obshchie iregionalnye problemy radioekologii]. Tomsk: 1997. 384.442

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRussian ParticipantsALEKSAKHINALIMOVARTEMOVAASHIKHMINABABANINBARANOVSKYBASKAKOVBODROVBRYZGALOVABULATOVRudolf MikhailovichRashidTatianaTamara YakovlevnaIgor ValentinovichSergei IgorevichVladimirAlexandrovichOleg, ViktorovichNatalya VladimirovnaValeriy IvanovichDirector, All-RussianInstitute for AgriculturalRadiology and Agro-Ecology; Member,RosAtom’s PublicCouncilEditor-in-Chief, Bellona-RU Internet Publication,St. PetersburgReporter, PosevMagazineDirector, Laboratory forBio-Monitoring, VyatkaState HumanitarianUniversity; President,Green Cross RussiaKirov AffiliateCoordinator, Project onResource Efficiency,Greenpeace Russia, St.Petersburg OfficePresident, Green CrossRussia, and Member ofthe Board of Directors,Green Cross InternationalPresident, Green CrossRussia, OrenburgAffiliateChairman, Green WorldCouncil, Sosnovy Bor, St.PetersburgDirector, RussianEnvironmental Congress,MoscowProfessor, Yugorsk StateUniversity, Khanti-Mansiisk443

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYBURLAKOVABURTSEVCHEREPNINCHUMAKOVEPERINEVSTRATOVFROLOVFROLOVFYODOROVGAVRILOVGORINElena BorisovnaAndrei AleksandrovichYuri SemyonovichAleksandr NikolaevichAnatoliy PavlovichEvgeniyVyacheslavovichA.N.AndreiAleksandrVyacheslavovichSergey DmitrievichValeriy VladimirovichChairwoman, ScientificCouncil on Radio-Biology, RussianAcademy of Sciences;Assistant ScienceDirector, the EmmanuelInstitute of Bio-ChemicalPhysics under the RussianAcademy of SciencesAdvisor to the GeneralDirector, AvangardDirector of Research andDevelopment, DollezhalResearch and DesignInstitute for PowerEngineeringCorresponding Member,Russian Academy ofNatural Sciences; andVice President, GreenCross RussiaScientific Director / FirstDeputy Director, Institutefor Nuclear Energy,Saint Petersburg StatePolytechnic University,Sosnovy Bor, LeningradOblast; Doctor ofSciences and ProfessorDeputy Head, RosAtomReporter, Dom PrirodyNewspaperUnion of PublicEnvironmentalOrganizations, MoscowDirector, PublicRelations, Green CrossRussiaDekom Technologies,MoscowGeneral Director,EcoGeoTekh444

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYGRACHEVVladimirAlexandrovichAdvisor to the GeneralDirector of RosAtom;Member of RosAtom’sPublic Council; andCorresponding Memberof the Russian Academyof SciencesGUSKOVATatyana SergeevnaMember, RosAtom’sPublic CouncilKABIROVATecha EnvironmentalMilyaOrganization,NurmukhametovnaChelyabinskKALININRemos IvanovichDoctor of Sciences,Professor. Nuclear SafetyInstitute, MoscowKASATKINVladimir ViktorovichDepartment Head,PromTechnologiaScientific InstituteKATKOVA Ekaterina Reporter, ITAR-TASSKHATUNTSEVKHVOSTOVAKIRILINKIRSANOVKNUTSENVyacheslavViktorovichMarina SergeevnaVladimir IvanovichGennadiy AntonovichKai AsbernSenior Lecturer,Northwest Academyof Public Service,SeverodvinskSenior ScientificCollaborator,Environmental Center,Institute for the Historyof Natural Sciencesand Technics, RussianAcademy of SciencesDirector, EcoService,KrasnoyarskKonstantin Institute forNuclear Physics, RussianAcademy of Sciences, St.PetersburgReporter, NorwegianSociety for theConservation of Nature445

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYKONYSHEVKOSTINAKRASNOSLOBODTSEVAKUZNETSOVLABYNTSEVALAVKOVSKYLAGUTOVLEONOVIgor ValerievichSvetlana YurievnaSvetlanaVyacheslavovnaVladimir MikhailovichMarina AnatolievnaStanislavAleksandrovichVladimir ViktorovichVladimirAlexandrovichDirector, Departmentof Public Relations,Public Organizations andRegions Liaison Branch,RosAtom; and Secretaryof RosAtom’s PublicCouncilDeputy Minister,Ministry of Radiation andEnvironmental Safety,Chelyabinsk OblastJunior ScientificCollaborator, Centerof History of theChelyabinsk State andMunicipal Government,Urals Academy of PublicServiceDirector, NuclearRadiation SafetyProgram, Green CrossRussia; Member of theRussian Academy ofNatural Sciences andAcademy of IndustrialEcology; and Memberof RosAtom’s PublicCouncilHead, Public RelationsDepartment, AtomProfInstitute of ContinuedProfessional Education,St. PetersburgChief Constructor,LazuritChairman, GreenDon EnvironmentalMovement,Novocherkassk, RostovOblastProgram Director, GreenCross Russia446

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYLESIKHINANina AndreevnaCoordinator for EnergyProjects, Bellona,Murmansk OfficeLISOVSKII Sergey Ekologiia SocietyLOGACHEVVadim AfanasievichCo-Chairman, Inter-Departmental ExpertCommission for theAssessment of Radio-Ecological Safety ofFull-Scale Experiments,Institute for Bio-Physics,MoscowMALYSHENKOStanislav PetrovichLaboratory Head,Institute of HighTemperatures, RussianAcademy of ScienceMANILOIvan IvanovichDirector, Kurgan PublicOutreach and InformationOffice, Green CrossRussia; and Member,Russian EnvironmentalAcademyMATUSHCHENKO Anatoliy MikhailovichCo-Chairman of theInteragency ExpertCommission under theScientific ResearchInstitute for PulseEngineering, Advisor tothe Department Head,RosAtom, MoscowMENSHCHIKOVValeriy FyodorovichCo-Manager, Program forRadiation and NuclearSafety, Russia’s Centerfor Environmental Policyand the InternationalSocio-Economic Union;Board Member, Center ofRussian EnvironmentalPolitics; Member,RosAtom’s PublicCouncil447

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMIRONOVMITROPOLSKIYMUNINMURATOVNAZAROVNASIBOVNECHAEVSergeyIvan AndreevichPavel IvanovichOleg EnverovichAnatolii GeorgievichAshot AlexandrovichAleksandr FyodorovichChairman of the RussianFederation Council of theFederal Assembly; andChairman of Fair Russia:Motherland, Pensioners,LifeScientific Secretary,Laboratory for NuclearSpectroscopy, KonstantinInstitute for NuclearPhysics, St. PetersburgDepartment Head,Moscow Academy ofBusiness Administration,Eurasian Center ofSustainable DevelopmentExecutive Secretary,Northwest Branch ofthe Nuclear Society ofRussia, St. PetersburgDirector, EnvironmentalCenter of the VavilovInstitute for NaturalHistory and Technology,Russian Academyof Sciences; DeputyChairman, RosAtom’sPublic Council; Member,Presidium of the RussianAcademy of NaturalSciencesDirector, Public RelationsCenter, RosEnergoAtomHead, Departmentof Engineering andRadiation Ecology andRadiological-ChemicalTechnologies, St.Petersburg Institute ofTechnology448

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNIKITINNIKITINNOVOSYOLOVOZHAROVSKIYPETUKHOVPIMENOVPIMENOVPISKUNOVPONOMARENKORASSOMAKHINRYBALCHENKORYLOVSARKISOVAlexanderKonstantinovichVadimir SemyonovichVladimir NikolaevichAndreyVyacheslavovichViktor VasilievichAlexander OlegovichValeriy IvanovichMikhail AndreevichAndrey AnatolievichAndrey YurievichIgor LeonidovichMikhail IvanovichAshot ArakelovichDirector, BellonaPublic Organization, St.PetersburgGeneral Director,Zvezdochka Shipyard,SeverodvinskProfessor, Centerof History of theChelyabinsk State andMunicipal Government,Urals Academy of PublicServiceProject Coordinator,EcoZashchita PublicOrganizationSenior ScientificCollaborator, ScientificInstitute for ShipbuildingTechnologiesDeputy Senior Engineer,Research and DesignInstitute for PowerEngineeringGeneral Director, GreenCross RussiaCenter of Assistanceto Civil Initiatives,DimitrovgradCoordinator, Nuclear andRadiation Safety Projects,Bellona-MurmanskDirector, Far Eastern StarShipyardPower EngineeringTechnology, SosnovyBor, Leningrad OblastDirector, Center forNuclear and RadiologicalSafety, St. Petersburg;Vice President of GreenCross RussiaMember, RussianAcademy of Sciences449

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYSHCHERBININSIVINTSEVSHKREBETSSMAGULOVSOROKINTALEVLINTOROPOVVAKULOVSKYVASILYEVNikolai GennadievichYuri VasilievichAlexanderSamat GabdrasilovichVladimirAndrei AlexandrovichAlexei VladimirovichSergey MstislavovichAlbert PetrovichDirector, Green CrossPublic Outreach Office,SeverodvinskSenior ScientificCollaborator andProfessor, KurchatovInstituteTransborder EcologicalInformation Agency,Saint PetersburgSenior ScientificCollaborator, StateInstitute for AppliedEcology, SaratovProfessor, United Instituteof Energetics and NuclearInvestigations, Minsk(Sosny), BelarusChairman of the Board,For Nature Charity Fund;and Senior Instructor,Department for Civil,Land and EnvironmentalLaw under the LegalDivision at ChelyabinskState University,ChelyabinskExecutive Director,Green Cross RussiaTomsk Affiliate; andSiberian EnvironmentalAgencyDeputy Director,Typhoon Company,Obninsk, KaluzhskayaOblastDirector, InternationalCenter for EnvironmentalSafety, Russian Ministryof Nuclear Energy450

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYVINOGRADOVAZHAVORONKINZERNOVAZUBKOVAnna MikhailovnaSergei NikolayevichLina SergeevnaArtyom NikolayevichHead, Balakova Affiliateof the All-RussianSociety for NatureConservation, SaratovOblastSecretary, MurmanskOblast Public Councilon Nuclear EnergySafety and Expert,Nuclear and RadiationSafety Program, GreenCross Russia MurmanskAffiliatePublic Advisory Council,Sosnovy Bor, LeningradOblast; and Chairmanof the Leningrad OblastGreen Russia Fraction,Yabloko Russian UnitedDemocratic PartyGeneral Director,Avangard451

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYInternational ParticipantsALBERTINRaphaelleAssistant to the Nuclear Advisoron Nuclear Issues, Embassy ofFrance, MoscowBORTISHans-RuediMinister and Deputy Headof Mission, Embassy ofSwitzerland, MoscowBYSTROVATatyanaNuclear Issues Officer, theGlobal Threat ReductionProgram, British Embassy,MoscowDUCHEMINAnne-MarieCouncil of Development of thePays du Cotentin, FranceFLORYDenisNuclear Advisor, Embassy ofFrance, MoscowGOZALAlbertSenior Program Manager,Partnering & SustainabilityDepartment, CommercializationSupport Program (PCS), theInternational Science andTechnology CenterHAAVISTO Pekka Member of Parliament, FinlandIONCristianSenior Associate, LegacyProgram, Global Green USAJARDINELeslieL J Jardine Services Director,Dublin, CA, USAJURKITervaSecond Secretary for theEconomic Sector, Embassy ofFinland, MoscowKHODJAMBERDIEV Igor BakhabovichCoordinator of the Toxic ActionNetwork for Central Asia; andCo-Chairman of the InternationalSocial-Ecological Union, KyrgyzRepublicKIRCHNERMarieMember, Council ofDevelopment of the Pays duCotentin, FranceKOCHReinhardManaging Director, theEuropean Center for RenewableEnergy, Güssing, Austria452

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYKOLDELEWISMARTINMATHIOTPOMPERRANDALLROBINSONSCHATZKINESOROKINTESSLERWALKERWESTSTRATEDorotheaJeffreyMattAlainMilesThomas DavidStephanJulieVladimir NikolaevichVeronicaPaulErikDeputy Head, SwissCooperation Office, Embassy ofSwitzerland, MoscowDirector, Nuclear Strategy andNonproliferation Initiative, NewAmerican Foundation, USAProgram Manager, The StanleyFoundation, Muscatine, Iowa,USADirector, G8 Global PartnershipProgram of FranceEditor, Arms Control Today,USASenior Manager, Global ThreatReduction Program, Departmentfor Business Enterprise &Regulatory Reform (BERR), UKInternational Coordinator,Legacy Program, Green CrossSwitzerlandAssistant to the Nuclear Advisor,Embassy of France in RussiaChief Researcher, UnitedInstitute of Energetics andNuclear Investigations, Minsk(Sosny), BelarusProgram Associate, The StanleyFoundation, Muscatine, Iowa,USALegacy Program Director,Global Green USA, andChairman, International LegacyProgram Steering Committee,Green Cross InternationalFirst Secretary, RoyalNetherlands Embassy, Moscow453

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYAbbreviationsABWRADEALTAMECAmAMBANCLIAtomenergopromAtomFlotBAM RailwayBioSNGBNBNPPBtLBTGRBWRCANDUCDPCfCISCoCOWAMCNPPCRESPCsAdvanced Boiling Water ReactorPlutonium Production ReactorsAlanine TransaminaseArctic Military Environmental CooperationAmericiumA type of (slow neutron) nuclear reactorNational Association of Local Information CommitteesState-owned holding company that unites Russian civilnuclear industryA type of Russian nuclear icebreaker; also, refers toMurmansk Shipping Company that operates the thistype of icebreakersBaikal-Amur Mainline Railway in Eastern Siberia andFar EastA synthetic fuel in gas formA type of reactor that can operate as burner or breederby replacing the (U) uranium blanket with a stainlesssteel blanket.Balakovskaya Nuclear Power PlantA synthetic fuel in liquid formBase Tariff General RatesBoiling Water ReactorCANada Deuterium Uranium; a pressurized heavywater reactorComprehensive Dismantlement ProgramCaliforniumCommonwealth of Independent StatesCobaltCommunity of Practices Concerning Radioactive WasteManagementChernobyl Nuclear Power PlantCoordinated Research and Environmental SurveillanceProgramCesium454

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYCTBTCTBTOCTRCWDDLRDNADOEEBRDEEEEECEGPEIAEIA – USEKOMET-SEnergoSetProektEPRERECEUEuEUREURTEUROCLIFBRFGUFGUPFNPPFSBFSIComprehensive Test Ban TreatyComprehensive Test Ban Treaty OrganizationCooperative Threat Reduction ProgramChemical Weapons DestructionGerman Aerospace CenterDeoxyribonucleic AcidUnited States Department of EnergyEuropean Bank of Reconstruction and DevelopmentEuropean Centre of Renewable Energies in GüssingEuropean Energy CommunityA model of a graphite-moderated boiling-water nuclearreactor for combined heat and powerEnvironmental Impact AssessmentUnited States Energy Information AdministrationRussia’s only specialized metal radwaste treatment anddisposal plantAn Armenian institute working to construct a nuclearpower plantEuropean Pressurized ReactorEuropean Renewable Energy CouncilEuropean UnionEuropiumEuroEastern Urals Radioactive TraceEuropean Commission of Local InformationCommitteesFast Breeder ReactorFederal State InstitutionA federal state-owned franchiseFloating Nuclear Power PlantRussian Federal Security ServiceFederal State Institution455

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYFTBFTPFZGBWRGCCHGCIGCRGDPGFRGGUSAGMOGNTsGO ChSGosSanEpidNadzorGosAtomNazdorGosKomGidrometGosSanNadzorGosStroyGKhKGRTsASHDMAHEUHLWHPPFloating Technical BaseFederal Target ProgramRussian federal lawGraphite-Moderated Boiling Water ReactorGreen Cross SwitzerlandGreen Cross InternationalGreen Cross RussiaGross Domestic ProductGas-Cooled Fast ReactorGlobal Green USAGenetically Modified OrganismA state scientific centerRussian Civil Defense and Emergencies ServiceState Sanitary-and-Epidemiologic InspectorateFederal Nuclear and Radiation Safety authority ofthe Russian Federation (It was known before 1991 asGosAtomEnergoNadzor)State Committee on Hydro- and Meteorology of theUSSRSanitary Centers for Hygiene and Epidemiology underthe Ministry of HealthSee RosStroiMining and Chemical CombineRussian State Center for Nuclear ShipbuildingHealthcare Distribution Management AssociationHighly Enriched UraniumHigh-Level WasteHydroelectric Power Plant456

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYHPZIAEAIASAPIBRAEIMBINESINFORSEINPROIRGISOJSCKKChKhKKhMAOKoAESKSCKWLBRLEULFRLLWLNPPLRWLWRHealth Protection ZoneInternational Atomic Energy AgencyInternational Arctic Seas Assessment ProjectInstitute of the Safe Development of Nuclear Energyunder the Russian Academy of SciencesInternational Maritime BureauInternational Nuclear Event ScaleInternational Network for Sustainable EnergyInnovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel CyclesInert Radioactive GasesInternational Organization for StandardizationJoint-Stock Company (can be open (OJSC) or closed(CJSC))PotassiumThe Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical CombineThe Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous OkrugThe Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous OkrugKola Science CenterKilowattLamin B Receptor, an integral protein of the innernuclear membraneLow-Enriched UraniumLead-Cooled Fast ReactorLow-Level WasteLeningrad Nuclear Power PlantLiquid Radioactive WasteLight Water Reactor457

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYMACMChSMinAtomMKERMLWMNEPRMNTTsMOUMOXMSMMSRMVEKMWNATONDEPNDMANFCNGONIINIKIETNNEENMNPPMaximum Allowable ConcentrationEmergency Situations MinistryMinistry of Atomic Energy of the Russian FederationThe next advanced reactor after the RBMK indevelopment of pressure-tube reactor facilities inRussiaMid-Level WasteMultilateral Nuclear and Environmental Program inRussiaInternational Science and Technology Center (ISTC)Memorandum of UnderstandingMixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide FuelMethylsulfonylmethaneMolten-Salt ReactorInter-agency Commission for Assessing Radiation andSeismic Safety of Underground Nuclear ExplosionsMegawattNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNorthern Dimension Environmental PartnershipNitrosodimethylamineNuclear Fuel CycleNon-Governmental OrganizationScientific research instituteDollezhal Research and Development Institute ofPower EngineeringNon-Nuclear Explosive Experiments (aka. Sub-CriticalExperiments)Nuclear MaterialsNuclear Power Plant458

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNPTNRBNRCNRESNRPANSSNTsNWRNZKhKOECDOJSCOSKOSPAROSPORBOYaRBPICASSOPNEPOPOIOPUPWRRAEPKRANRAO UESRBMKNuclear Nonproliferation TreatyRadiation Safety StandardsUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNon-traditional Renewable Energy SourceNorwegian Radiation Protection AuthorityNuclear Service ShipA science centerNorthwest Region of RussiaNovosibirsk Chemical Concentrate PlantOrganization of Economic Cooperation andDevelopmentOpen Joint Stock CompanyUnited Shipbuilding CorporationConvention for the Protection of the MarineEnvironment of the North-East AtlanticBasic Sanitation Regulations for Ensuring RadiationSafetyNuclear and Radiation Safety DepartmentA system for radiological monitoringPeaceful nuclear explosionAn industrial associationPublic Outreach and Information OfficePlutoniumPressurized Water ReactorRoadmap for Developing the Nuclear Energy IndustryRussian Academy of ScienceUnified Energy System of Russia; a Russian electricitytrading and holding companyHigh Power Channel Type Reactor459

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYRBPRFREARESRFYaTsRITEGRNTsROIRosAtomRosGidrometRosPromRosEnergoAtomRosPotrebNadzorRosStroiRosSudoStroyeniyeRosTekhNadzorRSRSFRRTGRUBRUSALRW, radwasteSCEARSCWRRussian Biofuel ProgramRussian FederationRussian Environmental AcademyRenewable Energy SourceRussian Federal Nuclear CenterRadioisotope Thermoelectric GeneratorA Russian science centerReturn on InvestmentRosatom Nuclear Energy State CorporationRussian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology andEnvironmental MonitoringFederal Agency on IndustryRussian nuclear power stations operator under theAtomenergoprom.Federal Service for Oversight of Consumer ProtectionRights and WelfareFederal Agency of Construction, Housing and HousingServices of the Russian Federation (aka. GosStroy)Russian Shipbuilding AgencyRussian Federal Service for Ecological, Technical andAtomic SupervisionRadioactive SubstancesRussian Soviet Federated RepublicRadioisotope Thermoelectric GeneratorRuble (Russian currency)Russian Aluminum CompanyRadioactive WasteScientific Committee on the Effects of AtomicRadiationSuper Critical Water Reactor460

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYSevMorGeoSFDSFRSIEPSNFSMPSKhKSPOROSrSRMSSRWTEKTNTTPPTPUTsPBTWUUNUNEPUSUSDUSSRVAVHTRFederal State Unitarian Research and ProductionCompany for Geological Sea SurveySouthern Federal DistrictSodium-Cooled Fast ReactorSevernoye Izmereniye Environmental PartnershipSpent Nuclear FuelStrategic Master PlanNorthern (Siberian or Seversk) Chemical CombineHealth standards and regulations for radioactive wastemanagementStrontiumShip Radiation Monitoring SystemSolid Radioactive WasteHeat and Energy ComplexTrinitrotolueneTidal Power PlantTomsk Polytechnic UniversityBusiness Support CenterTerawattUraniumUnited NationsUnited Nations Environment ProgramUnited States of AmericaUnited States dollarsUnion of Soviet Socialist RepublicsVolumetric ActivityVery Hot Temperature Reactor461

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYVNIIEFVNIITFVNIPI-PromTechnologyVOOPWHOWMDAll-Russian Scientific Research Institute of TechnicalPhysics, a federal nuclear center in the city ofSnezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70)All-Russian Scientific Research Center forExperimental PhysicsInstitute that researches and develops uranium miningand processing technologyNational Russian Nature Conservation SocietyWorld Health OrganizationWeapons of Mass Destruction462

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYTable of ContentsForward .......................................................................................................... 3Welcoming AddressSergei Baranovsky, President, Green CrossRussia and Member of the Board of Directors,Green Cross International ................................................................................. 4Opening RemarksHans Reudi Bortis, Minister and DeputyHead of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland in Russia...............................................6Opening RemarksSergey Mironov , Chairman of the RussianFederation Council of the Federal AssemblyChairman of Fair Russia: Motherland, Pensioners, Life.........................................7The Most Important Aspect of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia:A Legislative Solution for the Safe Management of Radioactive WasteEvgeniy Evstratov, Deputy Director, RosAtom.................................................... 8Resolving Global Environmental Problemsthrough the Acceleration of Nuclear Energy DevelopmentVladimir Grachev, Advisor to the Director of RosAtom,Member of the RosAtom Public Council and CorrespondingMember, Russian Academy of Sciences............................................................ 17RosAtom’s Social and Environmental ProgramIgor Konyshev, Director, Department of Public Relations,Public Organizations and Regions Liaison Branch, Rosatom;and Secretary, Public Council of RosAtom .............................................................28Civil Society and Nuclear Activities: From Risks Perceptionto a Strategy of Developing our TerritoryCivil Society and Nuclear Activities: From Risks Perceptionto a Strategy of Developing our TerritoryMarie Kirchner and Anne-Marie Duchemin, Members of theCouncil of Development of the Pays du Cotentin, France.................................. 35Developments at RosEnergoAtom and Its Public ImageAshot Nasibov, Director, Public Relations Center, RosEnergoAtom .................. 40Innovative Nuclear Reactor ProjectsVyacheslav Kuznetsov, Kurchatov Institute Russian Science CenterYuriy Cherepnin, Director of Research and Development,Dollezhal Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering....................... 42Efficient and Safe Use of Nuclear Technologies in Russia’s NorthwestAnatoliy Eperin, Scientific Director and First Deputy Director,Institute for Nuclear Energy, Saint Petersburg State PolytechnicUniversity, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast ...................................................... 52463

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYConditions for Building a New Nuclear Power Plant in the Tomsk OblastAlexei Toropov, Executive Director, Green Cross Russia Tomsk Affiliate ........... 55A Local’s Perspective on Peaceful Nuclear Energy: A Heavy HandLina Zernova, Public Advisory Council, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Region,and Chairman of the Leningrad Oblast Green Russia Fraction,Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party....................................................... 58Question and Answer SessionPaths for the Development of the Nuclear Energy Sector................................61The Untapped Potential of Alternative Energy in RussiaAleksandr Chumakov, Corresponding Member, Russian Academyof Natural Sciences; and Vice President, Green Cross Russia ........................... 64Alternative Energy in Russia: Meeting Energy NeedsWhile Decreasing Threats to the EnvironmentIgor Babanin, Coordinator, Project on ResourceEfficienc, Greenpeace Russia, Saint Petersburg Office...................................... 70Development of Renewable Energy in EuropeReinhard Koch, Managing Director, European Center forRenewable Energy, Güssing, Austria................................................................ 75Prospects for Developing Non-Traditional, RenewableEnergy Sources on the Kola PeninsulaNina Lesikhina , Coordinator for Energy Projects, Bellona,Murmansk Office ........................................................................................... 79The Russian Biofuel ProgramVladimir Kirilin, Director, EcoServiceNikolai Zubov, Chairman, Krasnoyarsk Krai Environmental Union.................. 86Questions and AnswersSession on Alternative Energy Organized by theInternational Science and Technology Center (ISTC) ......................................91What is the Meaning and Danger of Radioactive Disaster?Anatolii Nazarov, Director, Environmental Center of theVavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, RussianAcademy of Sciences; Deputy Chairman, Public Council of RosAtom;Member of the Russian Academy of Natural SciencesViktor Letov, Institution for Continuing Professional Education;The Russian Medical Academy for Post-Graduate Education;Russian Ministry of Health and Social DevelopmentElena Burlakova, Chairwoman of the Scientific Council onRadio-Biology, Russian Academy of Sciences................................................... 93The Impact of Low Doses of Radiation: Why is it Controversial?Vladimir N. Sorokin, Professor, United Institute of Energetics andNuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus ............................................. 102464

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYReport on the Joint Agreement onTecha River Floodplain Rehabilitation betweenRosAtom and the Chelyabinsk Oblast GovernmentSvetlana Kostina, Deputy Minister, Ministry for Radiation andEnvironmental Safety, Chelyabinsk OblastTatyana Meshkova, Department Head, Ministry for Radiation andEnvironmental Safety, Chelyabinsk Oblast......................................................110Environmental Surveys and Inspections of Plots ofLand for the Construction of Single-Family Housingat the New Muslyumovo and Old Muslyumovo Resettlement ZonesVladimir Kuznetzov, Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, GreenCross Russia; Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Academyof Industrial Ecology; and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council ....................116Remediation of Polluted Areas in the Ob-Irtysh BasinValery Bulatov, Professor, Yugra State University, Khanti-Mansiisk .................119Proximity to a Nuclear Power Plant and the Occurrence ofLeukemia in Children under Five Years Old 1Andrey Ozharovskiy, Project Coordinator, EcoZashchitaPublic Organization, Moscow........................................................................ 136Question and Answer SessionRadiobiological Concerns, Rehabilitation of Affected Territories ...................140Improving Public Outreach Using the Radiation Monitoringand Emergency Response System Being Created in the Arkhangelsk OblastVladimir Nikitin, General Director, Zvezdochka Shipyard, SeverodvinskAnatoly Shepurev, Deputy Chief Engineer, Zvezdochka ShipyardNikolai Shcherbinin, Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk .142Terrorist Threats to Nuclear FacilitiesAnd the Role of the Public in Countering ThemIgor Khripunov, , Associate Director, Center forInternational Trade and Security, University of Georgia................................. 149Overcoming Contention between the Authoritiesand NGOs in Regional Radioecology Public OutreachSvetlana Krasnoslobodtseva, Junior Scientific Collaborator Center of Historyof the Chelyabinsk State and Municipal Governments, Urals Academy of PublicService..................................................................................................... 153465

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNegotiation Power: The Significance of the Public as Demonstratedby Public Hearings on the Creation of Floating Nuclear Power Plantsand the Management of Unsafe VesselsSergey Gavrilov, Dekom Technologies, MoscowMikhail Rylov, Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety,St. Petersburg, and Vice President, Green Cross RussiaVyacheslav Khatuntsev, Senior Lecturer, Northwest Academy ofPublic Service, SeverodvinskNikolai Scherbinin, Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk...156A Strategy for Eliminating Threats Stemming fromDecommissioned Facilities of the Russia’s Northern Nuclear FleetAshot Sarkisov, Member, Russian Academy of SciencesLeonid Bolshov, Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of SciencesSergei Antipov, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear EnergyValentin Vysotsky, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear EnergyProf. Remos Kalinin, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear EnergyPavel Shvedov, Engineer, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear EnergyVladimir Shishkin, Dollezhal Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering .167Radiation Safety in the Region Affected by RadioactiveContamination from Operations at the Mayak ComplexVladimir Novosyolov, Professor, Center of History of the ChelyabinskState and Municipal Government, Urals Academy of Public Service....................179Russia and the United States: Renewing the Strategic DialogueMatt Martin, Program Manager, The Stanley Foundation..................................181The New US Nuclear Posture Review: A US PerspectiveJeffrey Lewis, Director, Nuclear Strategy Initiative, New America Foundation....186Plenary Discussion on the Topic ofInternational Cooperation and Global Partnership in Disarmamentand Non-Proliferation of WMDs ................................................................. 189Tracking and Monitoring Radioactive Substancesand Nuclear Materials: Achievements, Challenges, and SolutionsViktor Petukhov, Senior Scientific Collaborator, Scientific Institute for ShipbuildingTechnologies, Saint PetersburgMikhail Rylov, Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety, Saint Petersburg196Russian Federation Regulations Governing theManagement of Radioactive WasteAndrei Talevlin, Chairman of the Board, For Nature Charity Fund,Chelyabinsk; and Senior Instructor, Civil, Land, and EnvironmentalLaw Dept., Law School, Chelyabinsk State University ........................................206466

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYDismantlement of Nuclear Service Ships in Northwest Russia:Environmental Problems and SolutionsSergei Zhavoronkin, Secretary, Murmansk Oblast Public Councilon Nuclear Energy Safety and Expert, Nuclear and Radiation SafetyProgram, Green Cross Russia Murmansk Affiliate .............................................209Submersion of Materials that Constitute Nuclear andRadioactive Hazards: Past, Present and FutureYuri Sivintsev, Senior Scientific Collaborator and Professor, Kurchatov Institute .219A Unified Federal System for Radioactive Waste Management:A Prerequisite for the Development of Nuclear EnergyOleg Muratov, Executive Secretary, Northwest Branch of the NuclearSociety of Russia, St. Petersburg.................................................................... 238Proposal for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management in RussiaAlexander Nikitin, Director, Bellona Public Organization, St. Petersburg........ 251Results of the Sample-Based Radiation Inspection of theZvezdochka Health Protection and Observation Zones.Measurement of External Gamma Radiation Dose Equivalentand Beta Particles Flux Density on Yagry Island, SeverodvinskVladimir Kuznetsov, Director, Nuclear and Radiation SafetyProgram, Green Cross Russia, and Member of the RussianAcademy of Natural Sciences and Academy of IndustrialEcology, and Member of RosAtom’s Public CouncilVladimir Nikitin, General Director, Zvezdochka Shipyard, SeverodvinskNikolai Shcherbinin, Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk .255Plenary Session on Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive WasteAnatolii Nazarov, Director, Environmental Center of the VavilovInstitute for Natural History and Technology, Member of RussianAcademy of Sciences; and Deputy Chairman, RosAtom’s PublicCouncil; and Member, Presidium of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.257The Nuclear and Radiation Legacy of Northwest Russia:Problems, Solutions, and the Role of the PublicMikhail Rylov, Director, Center for Nuclear and RadiologicalSafety; and Vice President, Green Cross Russia, St. Petersburg....................... 258The Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines and the EnvironmentalRehabilitation of Facilities Constituting Nuclear and RadiationHazards: Experience, Today’s Problems, and the FutureViktor Kovalenko, Associate Manager, RosAtom’s Departmentfor SNF and RW Management and Decommissioning HazardousNuclear and Radiation FacilitiesAlexander Pimenov, Deputy Senior Engineer, DollezhalInstitute (NIKIET), MoscowVladimir Shishkin , Senior Engineer, Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET), Moscow... 265467

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYThe 1954 Nuclear Exercise at the Totskoye Test Range:How is this “Radiation Legacy” Dangerous?Sergei Zelentsov, The Government Institute for StrategicStability, RosAtom, MoscowVadim Logachev, Co-Chairman, Inter-DepartmentalExpert Commission for the Assessment of Radio-EcologicalSafety of Full-Scale Experiments, Institute for Bio-Physics, MoscowAnatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman, InteragencyExpert Commission under the Scientific Research Institutefor Pulse Engineering, Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom,Professor, Moscow........................................................................................ 277Resolving Radiation Safety Problems in the Kurgan OblastIvan Manilo, Director, Kurgan Public Outreach and InformationOffice, Green Cross Russia, and Member, Russian EnvironmentalAcademy Lyudmila Ponomareva and Aleksandr Revyakin ShadrinskState Pedagogical Institute............................................................................ 288Comprehensive Radioecological Examination of theTerritories and Surrounding Waters near NuclearSubmarine Stationing and Dismantlement PointsSergey Vakulovskiy, Deputy Director, Typhoon Company,Obninsk, Kaluzhskaya OblastV. Kim, M. Propisnova, A. Nikitin, I. Katrich, V. Chumichyov,A. Volokitin Typhoon Company, Obninsk, Kaluzhskaya Oblast........................ 292The Global Consequences of Nuclear TestingPavel Munin, Head of Department, Moscow Academy of BusinessAdministration, Eurasian Center of Continuous Development......................... 302Nuclear Tests on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and theNuclear Cultural LegacyAnatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the InteragencyExpert Commission under the Scientific Research Institutefor Pulse Engineering, and Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtomA. Volkov, The BTS Scientific Research Center under the RussianDefense Ministry, St. PetersburgVladimir Safronov, Radon Federal Scientific and IndustrialAssociation, MoscowNadezhda Shusharina, The Global Climate andEnvironment Institute under RosGidromet and theRussian Academy of Sciences, MoscowPetr Boyarsky, The Likhachev Russian Cultural andNatural Legacy Scientific Research Institute, Moscow.................................... 308468

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYPeaceful Nuclear Explosions in the USSR: Hopes and RealitiesAlbert Vasilyev, Director, International Center for EnvironmentalSafety under the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, MoscowVladimir Kasatkin, Department Head, PromTechnologiaScientific Institute, Moscow........................................................................... 318The Semipalatinsk Test Site, Exploring the Nuclear Underworld:A Beginner’s Guide to Radiation Levels in Cavities Created byUnderground Nuclear ExplosionsSamat Smagulov, Senior Scientific Collaborator, State Institute forApplied Ecology, SaratovAnatoliy Matushchenko, Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom;Co-chairman, Interagency Expert Commission on Assessing RadiationSafety of Underground Nuclear Tests; Professor, Scientific ResearchInstitute for Pulse Technology, MoscowAleksandr Kiryukhin, RosAtom Situation Crisis Center.................................. 342The Nuclear Explosion in the Aral DesertAlexander Aidin , State Science Center Institute of Biophysics at the FederalMedical and Biological Agency of Russia, MoscowSergei Zelentsov, The Federal Institute of StrategicStability, RosAtom, MoscowAnatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the InteragencyExpert Commission under the Scientific Research Institutefor Pulse Engineering; Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom.................. 354Evaluating the Consequences of the Totskoye Nuclear Tests in 1954Vladimir Baskakov, President, Green Cross Russia Orenburg Affiliate ..............361Post-Plenary Discussion on the Consequencesof Nuclear Device Testing ................................................................................... 364A Nuclear Aluminum Investment Project for BalakovoAnna Vinogradova, Head, Balakovo Affiliate of the All-RussianSociety for Nature Conservation, Saratov Oblast............................................. 366The Uranium Tailing Pit in Tien Shan and EnvironmentalConsequences for the Local PopulationIgor Khodjamberdiev, Coordinator of the Toxic Action Networkfor Central Asia and Co-Chairman of the InternationalSocial-Ecological Union, Kyrgyz Republic .............................................................. 370Muslyumovo: Yesterday, Today and TomorrowMilya Kabirova, Techa Environmental Organization, Chelyabinsk.................... 375Environmental Aspects of Radiation Safety near theKirovo-Chepetsk Chemical CombineTamara Ashikhmina, Director, Laboratory for Bio-Monitoring,Vyatka State Humanitarian University; President, GreenCross Russia Kirov Affiliate................................................................................... 380469

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITYNuclear “Red Herrings” Along the Eurasian CanalVladimir Lagutov , Chairman, Green Don Environmental Movement,Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast............................................................................... 386Nuclear Energy, Society and SecurityAndrei Frolov , Union of Public Environmental Organizations, Moscow ......... 393Dialogue Closing Discussion...................................................................... 395Closing StatementSergei Baranovsky, President, Green Cross Russia;Member of Green Cross International’s Board of Directors;Professor and Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences ................ 398The Widespread Effects of “Peaceful” and “Non-Peaceful”Uses of Nuclear Energy in the Orenburg Oblast on Humans and NatureValentin Dombrovsky, Chairman of Green Committee, Orenburg...................... 400Nuclear Tests in the USSR: The Red Book(From Nuclear History: Fear, Horror and Nuclear Blackmail)Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the InteragencyExpert Commission under the Scientific Research Institutefor Pulse Engineering, and Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtomSamat Smagulov, Senior Scientific Collaborator, StateInstitute for Applied Ecology, SaratovVadim Logachev, Co-Chairman, Inter-DepartmentalExpert Commission for the Assessment of Radio-EcologicalSafety of Full-Scale Experiments, Institute for Bio-Physics, Moscow ................ 405Why We Need the History of Science:Understanding and Resolving Radiation ProblemsMarina Khvostova, Senior Scientific Collaborator,Environmental Center, Institute for the History ofNatural Sciences and Technics, Russian Academy of Sciences .......................... 438Russian Participants................................................................................... 443International Participants............................................................................ 452Abbreviations.............................................................................................. 454470

Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY21-22 April 2008Saint Petersburg, Russia472

The Legacy ProgramOperating on the principle of “cooperation, not confrontation,” the Legacy of the Cold WarProgram (otherwise known as “The Legacy Program”) engages in neutral, third-party facilitationof issues related to arms control and disarmament, demilitarization, technology developmentfor safe weapons destruction, nonproliferation, military base cleanup and conversion, and socioeconomicdevelopment of communities impacted by weapons stockpiles.More specifically, the Legacy Program works to:• Support the safe and environmentally-sound demilitarization of weapons of massdestruction – nuclear, chemical, and biological – as integral to the implementation ofarms control treaties;• Provide access to information for communities near weapons destruction facilities andstockpiles and ensure open channels for dialogue between citizens and authorities;• Promote stakeholder input and involvement in demilitarization-related decisionmakingprocesses through citizens’ advisory commissions, public hearings, and nationaldialogues;• Address the weapons-related health, environment, and welfare concerns of affectedcommunities by working through schools, hospitals, local government, and the mediato promote understanding of weapons destruction processes, encourage emergencypreparedness, and support sustainable economies and democratic policies;• Educate legislatures and policy-makers in Russia, Europe, and the U.S. on the importanceof international support for demilitarization and organize international gatherings ofofficials to encourage dialogue, collaboration, and consensus;• Collaborate with like-minded groups to advocate for continued funding ofdemilitarization and nonproliferation efforts, in particular the U.S. Cooperative ThreatReduction (CTR) Program and the G-8 Global Partnership Initiative; and• Mediate and facilitate globally to make progress in arms control, disarmament, andnonproliferation.The Legacy Program spearheads a range of public outreach and education initiatives. In Russia,for example, the Legacy Program maintains 13 public outreach and information centers toeducate and support communities near chemical weapons stockpiles and nuclear submarinedismantlement sites. The centers are an important resource for residents seeking access to specificinformation and a channel to communicate with authorities. The Legacy Program also organizesforums promoting frank exchange on weapons and security issues. Two of the most importantare the “National Dialogues” on Russian chemical weapons destruction, and on nuclear energy,society, and security held annually in Russia. A similar “Legacy Forum” is also held annually in theU.S. on global weapons demilitarization and nonproliferation.The Legacy Program is a international effort of Green Cross International managed primarily byGlobal Green USA (Washington DC), Green Cross Switzerland (Basel and Zurich), and Green CrossRussia (Moscow). More information is available at www.globalgreen.org, www.greencross.ch,www.green-cross.ru, and www.gci.ch.Global Green USA1717 Massachusetts Ave, NWSuite 600Washington, DC 20036, USATel: +1-202-222-0700Green Cross Russia3 Krasina St.Moscow, Russia 123056Tel: +7-495-925-6997Green Cross SwitzerlandFabrikstrasse 178005 Zürich, SwitzerlandTel: +41-43-499-1313