Muguerza, Javier - The Tanner Lectures on Human Values

[MUGUERZA] <strong>The</strong> Alternative of Dissent 85does not always imply that “Y has the (moral) right to receivesuch and such from X.” For example, I am absolutely convincedthat we humans have “moral duties” regarding animals and wouldwelcome their having “legal rights” that were recognized in asociety that considers itself civilized. But I would not allow thatfrom the fact that we humans have moral duties regarding animalsit follows that the latter have moral rights. An animal may wellbe a right-holder in the legal sense when humans bestow this conditionon it, but no animal will ever be a moral subject. Moralityis the prerogative of men and, of course, women - that is, ofhuman beings - and I do not believe the partisans of moral rightswould be willing to consider animals holders of such rights, asthey would have to be, however, if those partisans wished topursue the questionable thesis of the correlativity of duties andrights to its final consequences. But one never knows: in a heateddiscussion I once heard an American friend, who was a member ofthe Animal Liberation Front, speak of “animals’ human rights”(derechos humanos de los animales).But, in concluding our excursus into ordinary language, Iwould only like to mention an expression that on the contraryseems to me extremely revealing of certain aspects of the moralphenomenology involved here, an expression that is furthermorean integral, and colloquial, turn of phrase. I refer, of course, tothe expression “You’ve no right,” which we so often use independentlyof any legal context: the expression “You’ve no right(for example, to treat someone in a manner we judge reprehensible)”is usually accompanied by a feeling of moral indignationwhich in our example might be a translation of the convictionthat “it is denigrating to treat anyone that way” or that“such treatment violates his dignity.” But I already warned amoment ago that we would do well to separate the treatment ofhuman dignity from that of the supposed natural rights, and I feelthe same about supposed moral rights, which counsels that wepostpone that subject until the proper time comes.