Proceedings - Academy of International Business - Michigan State ...

Session 2.3.8 - Track 2 - WORKSHOPMONDAY PROGRAMGlobalizations as the Slow Transformation of Institutions: The Making of Global Norms, Institutions andSector Governance MechanismsRoom: Windjammer 3-4Time: 8:30-10:00 a.m.Chair: Steven M. McGuire, University of Bath, S.M.McGuire@bath.ac.ukMultinational Enterprises and Corrupt Practices: Sorting Out the Operating EnvironmentPaul Steidlmeier, State University of New York at Binghamton, psteidl@binghamton.eduGlenn A. Pitman, State University of New York at Binghamton, gpitman@binghamton.eduThis paper focuses on the specific challenges MNEs face as they deal with corrupt practices. It begins with an overview andcritique of corrupt practices within today’s global operating environments. This is followed by an assessment of the currentrules, regulatory environments, and sanctions that target corrupt practices. The final section assesses MNE strategic optionsin shaping and negotiating the global operating environment and examines their roles, responsibilities and creative options.Beyond the Bargaining Power Model: Explaining the behavior of Nation States, Firms, and NGOs inEstablishing Internet GovernanceJames Nebus, University of South Carolina, jnebus@sc.rr.comA nation state has little or no direct bargaining power over internet firms, located in other countries, whose transactionsinvolve the digital transfer of goods and services to customers located in its country. However, this lack of bargainingpower has not stopped nation states from passing internet laws, including those that spill over its territorial boundaries.This begs the research question addressed by this paper: what are the determinants that affect the interaction of nationstates, internet firms, and NGOs in developing internet governance? The purpose of this paper is to develop theory thatexplains the process by which pertinent actors establish governance affecting internet transactions or transfers. First, amodel is presented which frames the problem. The model depicts actors involved in establishing governance, and thestructure of relationships among them. Second, given that bargaining power theory is of limited applicability, regimetheory, private authority, and agency theory are leveraged to contribute explanations in this new situation and context. Themodel and these theories are examined in light of two internet governance issue areas: internet user data privacy, and thecollection of consumption tax in e-commerce transactions.Convergence of EU and US Merger Control Policies - Strategic ImplicationsYusaf Akbar, Southern New Hampshire University, yusafakbar2003@yahoo.co.ukGabriele Suder, CERAM Graduate School of Management and Technology, gabriele.suder@ceram.frThis paper seeks to shed light on DG Competition’s decisions regarding international mergers with a view to examiningwhether there is a discernable pattern in their decision making and what the implications are for international mergerstrategies. In particular, we are interested in establishing whether there is a bias towards “market dominance”methodologies as is claimed by observers. We examine ten years of merger decisions by DG Competition’s MergerTaskforce (MTF) (and its predecessors). We analyze only those cases that are transnational in nature or who have atransnational dimension. Thus we do not consider intra-EU mergers not having a direct and discernable transnationaldimension. It is certainly the case that the prevalence of contestability methodologies in recent times in the USgovernment’s merger guidelines has created a contrast with a number of decisions taken by DG Competition. This paperdoes not seek to argue for the relative correctness of either the market dominance or the contestability approach tocompetition policy. In some senses, this is a normative, ideological and political debate. However, if DG Competition isapplying a “market dominance” approach to its merger analyses, then there are clear implications for international mergerstrategy. Should companies be more aware of the impact of EU regulatory oversight? What is the best approach thatcompanies should take in their merger proposals? Should companies re-consider merger as a strategic option in the face ofEU merger scrutiny? How would convergence of merger analysis by competition authorities affect company mergerstrategies?AIB 2003 - Monterey, California, USA July 5-8, 2003 49