The Partial Motion To Dismiss and the Defendant's ... - Lawyers

More documents

Recommendations

Info

The Partial Motion ToDismiss and theDefendant’s ObligationTo Answer—continued from p. 36endnotes1. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(1)(a); ARIZ.R.CIV.P.12(a)(1)(a).2. See ARIZ.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(1)(a).3. See FED.R.CIV.P. 5(d); Katz v. Morgenthau,709 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’din part and rev’d in part, 892 F.2d 20 (2dCir. 1989); Madden v. Cleland, 105 F.R.D.520, 525 (N.D. Ga. 1985).4. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(4); ARIZ.R.CIV.P.12(a)(3); Goff v. Superior Courts, 409 P.2d60, 64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965).5. See Ju Shu Cheung v. Dulles, 16 F.R.D. 550,552 (D. Mass. 1954); State v. $5,500.00 inU.S. Currency, 817 P.2d 960, 962-63(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).6. See Milk Drivers, Local Union 387 v. RobertsDairy, 219 F.R.D. 151, 152 (S.D. Iowa2003); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (D. Minn. 2000);$5,500.00 in U.S. Currency, 817 P.2d at962 & n.6.7. See Ritts v. Dealers Alliance Credit Corp.,989 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (N.D. Ga.1997); Poe v. Cristina Copper Mines, Inc.,15 F.R.D. 85, 86 (D. Del. 1953).8. See Texas Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabanaof N.M., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907(W.D. Tex. 2003) (observing that “amotion to dismiss provides a valuable toolfor narrowing and clarifying the scope oflitigation”).9. See Drewett v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 405F. Supp. 877, 878 (W.D. La. 1975)(“Authorities indicate that [a Rule12(b)(6)] motion [directed to the failureto state a claim upon which relief can begranted] may be used to challenge the sufficiencyof part of a pleading such as a singlecount or claim for relief.”) (citationomitted); cf. Elliott v. State Farm Mut.Auto. Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 487, 489(E.D. Pa. 1992) (“A Rule 12(b)(6)motion may be granted as to portions of acomplaint.”).10. See, e.g., Capresecco v. Jenkintown Borough,261 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 2003)(“Defendants filed their Motion to Dismisspursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),although the Court notes that Defendants’Motion is in the nature of a Partial Motionto Dismiss, because they only attack portionsof Plaintiff’s claims.”); cf. Wade v.United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573, 1575(D. Haw. 1990) (observing that a motionto dismiss addressing only some of theplaintiff’s claims “is properly characterizedas one for partial dismissal”).11. Although the rule itself is silent on thematter, “No reported decision hasexpressed doubt over the propriety of apartial motion to dismiss.” Scott L. Cagan,A “Partial” Motion to Dismiss UnderFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12: Youwww.myazbar.org SEPTEMBER 2006 ARIZONA ATTORNEY 59
endnotes continuedHad Better Answer, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J.202, 202 (1992).12. See Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 448 F.Supp. 1168, 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1978)(“F.R.C.P. 12 does not explicitly address theissue of whether the filing of a motion underF.R.C.P. 12(b) … alters the time withinwhich the moving party must respond toclaims in the complaint not addressed in themotion.”).13. See Oil Express Nat’l, Inc. v. D’Alessandro,173 F.R.D. 219, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1997)(“Whether a party is required to answerunchallenged counts after a Rule 12(b)motion has been filed as to certain, but notall, of the counts is an issue that has notreceived significant judicial attention.”).14. Arizona is not the only state in which thisissue is unsettled. See, e.g., Nelson G. Apjohn& Patrick F. Brady, Dispositive Motions,MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CIVILPRACTICE MANUAL § 6.2.1(b) practice note(Supp. 2002) (“The rules do not addresswhether a defendant who has moved to dismissonly some claims of a multicount complaintmust file an answer with respect to theremaining counts within the 20-day periodof Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(a). … [N]oMassachusetts decision addresses thisissue.”).15. See Cagan, supra note 11, at 202 (observingthat “practitioners … risk a default judgmentif they do not answer the unchallengedcounts of the complaint in the event they filea partial motion to dismiss”).16. The prevailing view in both the federal andArizona state courts is that a default judgmentprecludes the defendant from subsequentlyasserting against the plaintiff a claimthat would have constituted a compulsorycounterclaim in the case in which the defaultjudgment was entered. See Lindquist v.Quinones, 79 F.R.D. 158, 161 (D.V.I.1978); Rich v. Tudor, 599 P.2d 846, 848(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). As the ArizonaSupreme Court has explained:A default judgment has the same res judicataeffect as a judgment on the meritswhere the issues were litigated. We wouldcircumvent the purpose of Rule 13(a) ifwe were to rule that a claim which wasthe subject of a compulsory counterclaimis not barred in a subsequent suit merelybecause judgment was taken by defaultrather than on the merits.Technical Air Prods., Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray,Inc., 445 P.2d 426, 428 (Ariz. 1968).17. Rule 55(a) of the Arizona Rules of CivilProcedure “requires that notice of the applicationfor entry of default shall be given tothe party claimed to be in default.” State exrel. Corbin v. Marshall, 778 P.2d 1325, 1327(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (discussingARIZ.R.CIV.P. 55(a)). The rule then permitsthe party in default to file an answer within a10-day “grace period,” in which event “theclerk’s entry of default never takes effect.”Corbet v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 383, 385(Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). The rule thus “essentiallyextends the time to answer under Rule12(a)” by enabling a defendant to berelieved of its default “simply by filing ananswer within the 10-day grace period.”Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Osterkamp, 836P.2d 398, 402 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).18. If the defendant in a federal case “fails to filean answer in response to a complaint, andthe plaintiff notifies the Court, then theClerk must enter default against that defendant.”Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Niles,150 F. Supp. 2d 188, 190 (D. Me. 2001)(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 55(a)). Once thatoccurs, “no responsive pleading may bemade … unless the Defendant formallymoves to set aside the entry of default.”Maryland Nat’l Bank v. M/V Tanicorp I, 796F. Supp. 188, 190 (D. Md. 1992); see alsoKingvision Pay-Per-View, 150 F. Supp. 2d at189 (“[O]nce default has been entered, theonly appropriate response for a defendant tomake is a motion to set aside default.”). It isalso “hornbook law that once default hasbeen entered by the Clerk, only the Court isempowered to set it aside,” LoperenaHernandez v. Hernandez, 107 F.R.D. 102,104 (D.P.R. 1985), and it may do so “only… upon a showing of ‘good cause.’”Kingvision Pay-Per-View, 150 F. Supp. 2d at190 (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 55(c)).19. 448 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1978).20. See id. at 1174 (“[T]here appears to be nocase law which addresses this issue.”); see alsoBull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. American ExpressBank Ltd., 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,555, at 23,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(describing Gerlach as “the only case onpoint”).21. See Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1170. In federalcases, obtaining a default judgment is “atwo-step process.” New York v. Green, 420F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). First, “[t]heClerk of Court is authorized to enter defaultwhen ‘a party against whom a judgment foraffirmative relief is sought has failed to pleador otherwise defend.’” Ritts, 989 F. Supp. at1479 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 55(a)). In thesecond step of the process, “a default judgmentmay be obtained only by application tothe court.” Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52F.3d 1139, 1152 n.11 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’SFEDERAL PRACTICE 55.03[2], at 55-21 (2ded. 1994)).22. Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174.23. Id.; cf. Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542,551 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing the use of aRule 12(b) motion “to narrow the claims atthe onset of the case, rather than engagingin extensive discovery”).24. See Finnegan v. University of Rochester Med.Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 249-50 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (“Gerlach … appears to be in theminority among the courts that haveaddressed this issue.”).25. Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174.26. 397 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).27. Id. at 64.28. See Cagan, supra note 11, at 203 (notingthat the Business Incentives court reached itsconclusion “without explanation”).29. See, e.g., Oil Express Nat’l, 173 F.R.D. at221 (relying on Business Incentives in holdingthat “a partial motion to dismiss allowsfor altering the [time] limits of FED.R.CIV.P.12(a) with respect to answering those claimsnot addressed in [the] motion”).30. See Tingley Sys., Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc.,152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 122 (D. Mass. 2001)(“Since the issuance of the Gerlach decision,no court has relied on its reasoning or followedits ruling.”).31. See, e.g., Godlewski v. Affiliated ComputerServs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 571, 572 (E.D. Va.2002) (“The Gerlach court’s resolution ofthe issue under the minority approach is, inthis Court’s opinion, unnecessarily formalisticat the expense of sound policy and judicialeconomy.”).32. See Bull HN Info. Sys., 1990 Copyright L.Dec. (CCH) 26,555, at 23,280 (relyingon Gerlach in suggesting that Rule 12(a)requires a defendant “to move or answer asto each count” of the complaint).33. See Oil Express Nat’l, 173 F.R.D. at 221;Brocksopp Eng’g, Inc. v. Bach-Simpson Ltd.,136 F.R.D. 485, 486-87 (E.D. Wis. 1991).34. See Oil Express Nat’l, 173 F.R.D. at 221;Brocksopp Eng’g, 136 F.R.D. at 487.35. See Ritts, 989 F. Supp. at 1480:[I]f a Rule 12(b) motion is granted, it willlead to dismissal of the action and theparty who filed it will never have to file aresponse. In such an instance, therefore, …it makes sense not to make the party file ananswer until the Rule 12 motion isresolved.36. See Rawson v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co.,No. 93 C 6866, 1994 WL 9638, at *1(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1994) (“The difficulty isthat, [even] if the motion is granted, it willstill be necessary for the defendant to servean answer to the remaining claims of thecomplaint.”).37. See Cagan, supra note 11, at 204 (“[T]hepotential for piecemeal pleadings[] can bealleviated by the simple filing of an amendedanswer upon the disposition of the motion.With today’s computer technology, amendingan answer is hardly a cumbersometask.”) (emphasis omitted).38. See, e.g., Katt v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 95Civ. 8283 (LMM), 1997 WL 394593, at *2n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1997) (noting thatthe plaintiff’s assertion of multiple claims“caused substantial disagreement among theparties about the scope of discovery withrespect to the various claims,” which resultedin “time-consuming motion practicerelating to the proper scope of discovery”).39. Compare Weiss v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,729 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1990)(“[T]he Court stayed discovery pending aruling on defendants’ partial motion to dismiss.”)with Powell v. City of Chicago, 94 F.Supp. 2d 942, 946 (N.D. Ill. 2000):The court’s decision to allow plaintiff togo forward rests in part on the fact that60 ARIZONA ATTORNEY SEPTEMBER 2006www.myazbar.org
Page 6 and 7: the instant partial motion to dismi
Page 8: 1987) (noting that the defendants

The Partial Motion To Dismiss and the Defendant's ... - Lawyers

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?