The Partial Motion To Dismiss and the Defendant's ... - Lawyers

The Partial Motion ToDismiss and theDefendant’s ObligationTo Answer—continued from p. 36endnotes1. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(1)(a); ARIZ.R.CIV.P.12(a)(1)(a).2. See ARIZ.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(1)(a).3. See FED.R.CIV.P. 5(d); Katz v. Morgenthau,709 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’din part and rev’d in part, 892 F.2d 20 (2dCir. 1989); Madden v. Cleland, 105 F.R.D.520, 525 (N.D. Ga. 1985).4. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(4); ARIZ.R.CIV.P.12(a)(3); Goff v. Superior Courts, 409 P.2d60, 64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965).5. See Ju Shu Cheung v. Dulles, 16 F.R.D. 550,552 (D. Mass. 1954); State v. $5,500.00 inU.S. Currency, 817 P.2d 960, 962-63(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).6. See Milk Drivers, Local Union 387 v. RobertsDairy, 219 F.R.D. 151, 152 (S.D. Iowa2003); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (D. Minn. 2000);$5,500.00 in U.S. Currency, 817 P.2d at962 & n.6.7. See Ritts v. Dealers Alliance Credit Corp.,989 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (N.D. Ga.1997); Poe v. Cristina Copper Mines, Inc.,15 F.R.D. 85, 86 (D. Del. 1953).8. See Texas Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabanaof N.M., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907(W.D. Tex. 2003) (observing that “amotion to dismiss provides a valuable toolfor narrowing and clarifying the scope oflitigation”).9. See Drewett v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 405F. Supp. 877, 878 (W.D. La. 1975)(“Authorities indicate that [a Rule12(b)(6)] motion [directed to the failureto state a claim upon which relief can begranted] may be used to challenge the sufficiencyof part of a pleading such as a singlecount or claim for relief.”) (citationomitted); cf. Elliott v. State Farm Mut.Auto. Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 487, 489(E.D. Pa. 1992) (“A Rule 12(b)(6)motion may be granted as to portions of acomplaint.”).10. See, e.g., Capresecco v. Jenkintown Borough,261 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 2003)(“Defendants filed their Motion to Dismisspursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),although the Court notes that Defendants’Motion is in the nature of a Partial Motionto Dismiss, because they only attack portionsof Plaintiff’s claims.”); cf. Wade v.United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573, 1575(D. Haw. 1990) (observing that a motionto dismiss addressing only some of theplaintiff’s claims “is properly characterizedas one for partial dismissal”).11. Although the rule itself is silent on thematter, “No reported decision hasexpressed doubt over the propriety of apartial motion to dismiss.” Scott L. Cagan,A “Partial” Motion to Dismiss UnderFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12: Youwww.myazbar.org SEPTEMBER 2006 ARIZONA ATTORNEY 59

endnotes continuedHad Better Answer, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J.202, 202 (1992).12. See Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 448 F.Supp. 1168, 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1978)(“F.R.C.P. 12 does not explicitly address theissue of whether the filing of a motion underF.R.C.P. 12(b) … alters the time withinwhich the moving party must respond toclaims in the complaint not addressed in themotion.”).13. See Oil Express Nat’l, Inc. v. D’Alessandro,173 F.R.D. 219, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1997)(“Whether a party is required to answerunchallenged counts after a Rule 12(b)motion has been filed as to certain, but notall, of the counts is an issue that has notreceived significant judicial attention.”).14. Arizona is not the only state in which thisissue is unsettled. See, e.g., Nelson G. Apjohn& Patrick F. Brady, Dispositive Motions,MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CIVILPRACTICE MANUAL § 6.2.1(b) practice note(Supp. 2002) (“The rules do not addresswhether a defendant who has moved to dismissonly some claims of a multicount complaintmust file an answer with respect to theremaining counts within the 20-day periodof Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(a). … [N]oMassachusetts decision addresses thisissue.”).15. See Cagan, supra note 11, at 202 (observingthat “practitioners … risk a default judgmentif they do not answer the unchallengedcounts of the complaint in the event they filea partial motion to dismiss”).16. The prevailing view in both the federal andArizona state courts is that a default judgmentprecludes the defendant from subsequentlyasserting against the plaintiff a claimthat would have constituted a compulsorycounterclaim in the case in which the defaultjudgment was entered. See Lindquist v.Quinones, 79 F.R.D. 158, 161 (D.V.I.1978); Rich v. Tudor, 599 P.2d 846, 848(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). As the ArizonaSupreme Court has explained:A default judgment has the same res judicataeffect as a judgment on the meritswhere the issues were litigated. We wouldcircumvent the purpose of Rule 13(a) ifwe were to rule that a claim which wasthe subject of a compulsory counterclaimis not barred in a subsequent suit merelybecause judgment was taken by defaultrather than on the merits.Technical Air Prods., Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray,Inc., 445 P.2d 426, 428 (Ariz. 1968).17. Rule 55(a) of the Arizona Rules of CivilProcedure “requires that notice of the applicationfor entry of default shall be given tothe party claimed to be in default.” State exrel. Corbin v. Marshall, 778 P.2d 1325, 1327(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (discussingARIZ.R.CIV.P. 55(a)). The rule then permitsthe party in default to file an answer within a10-day “grace period,” in which event “theclerk’s entry of default never takes effect.”Corbet v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 383, 385(Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). The rule thus “essentiallyextends the time to answer under Rule12(a)” by enabling a defendant to berelieved of its default “simply by filing ananswer within the 10-day grace period.”Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Osterkamp, 836P.2d 398, 402 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).18. If the defendant in a federal case “fails to filean answer in response to a complaint, andthe plaintiff notifies the Court, then theClerk must enter default against that defendant.”Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Niles,150 F. Supp. 2d 188, 190 (D. Me. 2001)(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 55(a)). Once thatoccurs, “no responsive pleading may bemade … unless the Defendant formallymoves to set aside the entry of default.”Maryland Nat’l Bank v. M/V Tanicorp I, 796F. Supp. 188, 190 (D. Md. 1992); see alsoKingvision Pay-Per-View, 150 F. Supp. 2d at189 (“[O]nce default has been entered, theonly appropriate response for a defendant tomake is a motion to set aside default.”). It isalso “hornbook law that once default hasbeen entered by the Clerk, only the Court isempowered to set it aside,” LoperenaHernandez v. Hernandez, 107 F.R.D. 102,104 (D.P.R. 1985), and it may do so “only… upon a showing of ‘good cause.’”Kingvision Pay-Per-View, 150 F. Supp. 2d at190 (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 55(c)).19. 448 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1978).20. See id. at 1174 (“[T]here appears to be nocase law which addresses this issue.”); see alsoBull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. American ExpressBank Ltd., 1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,555, at 23,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(describing Gerlach as “the only case onpoint”).21. See Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1170. In federalcases, obtaining a default judgment is “atwo-step process.” New York v. Green, 420F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). First, “[t]heClerk of Court is authorized to enter defaultwhen ‘a party against whom a judgment foraffirmative relief is sought has failed to pleador otherwise defend.’” Ritts, 989 F. Supp. at1479 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 55(a)). In thesecond step of the process, “a default judgmentmay be obtained only by application tothe court.” Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52F.3d 1139, 1152 n.11 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’SFEDERAL PRACTICE 55.03[2], at 55-21 (2ded. 1994)).22. Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174.23. Id.; cf. Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542,551 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing the use of aRule 12(b) motion “to narrow the claims atthe onset of the case, rather than engagingin extensive discovery”).24. See Finnegan v. University of Rochester Med.Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 249-50 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (“Gerlach … appears to be in theminority among the courts that haveaddressed this issue.”).25. Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174.26. 397 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).27. Id. at 64.28. See Cagan, supra note 11, at 203 (notingthat the Business Incentives court reached itsconclusion “without explanation”).29. See, e.g., Oil Express Nat’l, 173 F.R.D. at221 (relying on Business Incentives in holdingthat “a partial motion to dismiss allowsfor altering the [time] limits of FED.R.CIV.P.12(a) with respect to answering those claimsnot addressed in [the] motion”).30. See Tingley Sys., Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc.,152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 122 (D. Mass. 2001)(“Since the issuance of the Gerlach decision,no court has relied on its reasoning or followedits ruling.”).31. See, e.g., Godlewski v. Affiliated ComputerServs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 571, 572 (E.D. Va.2002) (“The Gerlach court’s resolution ofthe issue under the minority approach is, inthis Court’s opinion, unnecessarily formalisticat the expense of sound policy and judicialeconomy.”).32. See Bull HN Info. Sys., 1990 Copyright L.Dec. (CCH) 26,555, at 23,280 (relyingon Gerlach in suggesting that Rule 12(a)requires a defendant “to move or answer asto each count” of the complaint).33. See Oil Express Nat’l, 173 F.R.D. at 221;Brocksopp Eng’g, Inc. v. Bach-Simpson Ltd.,136 F.R.D. 485, 486-87 (E.D. Wis. 1991).34. See Oil Express Nat’l, 173 F.R.D. at 221;Brocksopp Eng’g, 136 F.R.D. at 487.35. See Ritts, 989 F. Supp. at 1480:[I]f a Rule 12(b) motion is granted, it willlead to dismissal of the action and theparty who filed it will never have to file aresponse. In such an instance, therefore, …it makes sense not to make the party file ananswer until the Rule 12 motion isresolved.36. See Rawson v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co.,No. 93 C 6866, 1994 WL 9638, at *1(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1994) (“The difficulty isthat, [even] if the motion is granted, it willstill be necessary for the defendant to servean answer to the remaining claims of thecomplaint.”).37. See Cagan, supra note 11, at 204 (“[T]hepotential for piecemeal pleadings[] can bealleviated by the simple filing of an amendedanswer upon the disposition of the motion.With today’s computer technology, amendingan answer is hardly a cumbersometask.”) (emphasis omitted).38. See, e.g., Katt v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 95Civ. 8283 (LMM), 1997 WL 394593, at *2n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1997) (noting thatthe plaintiff’s assertion of multiple claims“caused substantial disagreement among theparties about the scope of discovery withrespect to the various claims,” which resultedin “time-consuming motion practicerelating to the proper scope of discovery”).39. Compare Weiss v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,729 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1990)(“[T]he Court stayed discovery pending aruling on defendants’ partial motion to dismiss.”)with Powell v. City of Chicago, 94 F.Supp. 2d 942, 946 (N.D. Ill. 2000):The court’s decision to allow plaintiff togo forward rests in part on the fact that60 ARIZONA ATTORNEY SEPTEMBER 2006www.myazbar.org

the instant partial motion to dismisswould not dispose of the entire case.Because the parties will have to conductdiscovery regardless of the outcome ofthe instant motion, it would be prematureto bar plaintiff at this early stagefrom [proceeding].40. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Facialchallenges to the legal sufficiency of a claimor defense, such as a motion to dismissbased on failure to state a claim for relief,should … be resolved before discoverybegins.”) (footnote omitted).41. Id. at 1368.42. In most jurisdictions, the filing of a motionto dismiss under Rule 12(b) does not automaticallystay discovery pending resolutionof the motion. See In re Sulfuric Acid,Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 331, 336 &n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Nevertheless, “suchstays are granted with substantial frequency,”id. at 336, and are clearly appropriate“where the likelihood that such motionmay result in a narrowing … of discoveryoutweighs the likely harm to be producedby the delay.” 19th Street Baptist Church v.St. Peters Episcopal Church, 190 F.R.D.345, 349 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (internal quotationmarks and citation omitted).43. See Godlewski, 210 F.R.D. at 572 (“[T]heminority approach has the advantage ofpreventing a party from using a partialRule 12(b) motion to delay adjudication ofthe remaining portion of the action.”);Cagan, supra note 11, at 204 (“[R]equiringa defendant to answer the unchallengedcounts discourages the filing of a partialmotion to dismiss solely as a dilatory tactic,and encourages expedient discovery.”).44. See Cagan, supra note 11, at 204 (“A partialmotion to dismiss often has the practicaleffect of impeding, often paralyzing, theprogress of discovery, and the Rules contemplatea steady—if not swift—discoverypace.”); cf. Washington v. City of Evanston,535 F. Supp. 638, 639 n.2 (N.D. Ill.1982) (“Like the large majority of [Rule]12(b)(6) motions, in principal part this onehas accomplished little except to delay thereal commencement of litigation.”).45. Indeed, the filing of a motion to dismisssuspends the time for answering only if aspecific time for doing so is not otherwise“fixed by court order.” FED.R.CIV.P.12(a)(4). Thus, a court clearly could avoidany prejudicial delay simply by requiringthe defendant to file an answer despite itssubmission of a partial motion to dismiss.See, e.g., In re Longhorn Secs. Litig., 573 F.Supp. 255, 263 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (“Toexpedite this litigation, … the Court hasrequired the defendants to answer thecomplaints even though their pre-answermotions were still under consideration.”).46. See, e.g., Godlewski, 210 F.R.D. at 572-73([“[A]ny potential abuses or dilatory tacticswhich the minority approach seeks to preventcan … be guarded against under thewww.myazbar.org SEPTEMBER 2006 ARIZONA ATTORNEY 61

endnotes continuedmajority approach through the use of Rule11 sanctions to deter abuse.”).47. See generally Finnegan, 180 F.R.D. at 249(“[T]he language of Rule 12 itself does notsupport [the minority] position.”); BullHN Info. Sys., 1990 Copyright L. Dec.(CCH) 26,555, at 23,280 (observing thatrequiring the defendant to answer claimsnot addressed in a partial motion to dismiss“is not required by the plain language” ofRule 12(a)).48. See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No.90, Civ. 2823 (CSH), 1991 WL 221110, at*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1991) (“Any motion,particularly when the motion addresses asignificant portion of the complaint …, willsuspend the time to answer any claim.”);Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Safrabank(California), No. 90-4194-R, 1991 WL173784, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug 28, 1991)(“Ordinarily, a defendant need not file ananswer until ten days after the court hasruled on any motions permitted by Rule12.”).49. See Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1101(7 th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 12(a)(4) allows aparty that files a motion to strike a pleadingto delay filing his responsive pleading untilten days after the motion is denied . . ..”); Fredrick v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 789,791 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (observing that themotions that enlarge the time for answeringunder Rule 12(a) “are, of course, listed inRule 12(b) through (f)”). But see 5BCHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 1346, at 46-47 (3d ed. 2004) (observingthat the “extension of time provision inRule 12(a) does not apply to the grant of amotion to strike under Rule 12(f),”although the rule’s “failure to deal with thissituation probably is simply an unintendedomission”) (emphasis added).50. See, e.g., Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc.v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1332n.92 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing thedefendants’ “Rule 12(f) motion to strikesome of the general allegations from thecomplaint”); Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996)(“Under Rule 12(f), Defendants seek tostrike several items from the Complaint.”);cf. Battle v. Nat’l City Bank of Cleveland,364 F. Supp. 416, 419 (N.D. Ohio 1973)(“Ordinarily an entire pleading should notbe stricken, but only those portions, if any,which are objectionable.”).51. See, e.g., Rawson, 1994 WL 9638, at *1(noting that the rule “does not require thatthe motion go to all of the claims in a complaint”);United States v. Union Corp., 194F.R.D. 223, 233-34 (E.D. Pa. 2000):A party moving under Rule 12(b)(6)may challenge the sufficiency of one,some, or all of the claims for relief containedin a pleading; the overall action isnot directly at issue. . . . Nothing in thelanguage of [the] rule suggests that itseffect and application should turn onwhether only one or some claims … orthe entire action is at issue.52. See Wray v. Edward Blank Assocs., Inc., 924F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(“Technically, motions to strike are notproper methods of disposing of part or allof a complaint. However, to avoid beingrestricted by the technical form of commonlawpractice, which the federal rules haveabandoned, courts may treat motions tostrike as motions to dismiss.”) (citationomitted).53. Indeed, because “the essential functions of amotion to strike and a motion to dismiss arepractically identical,” Ham v. Aetna Life Ins.Co., 283 F. Supp. 153, 154 (N.D. Okla.1968), a court could elect to treat a partialmotion to dismiss “as a motion to strike ordismiss certain paragraphs of [the] plaintiff’scomplaint.” Stoutt v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.Co., 598 F. Supp. 1000, 1001 (S.D. Fla.1984) (emphasis omitted); cf. Belton v. AirAtlanta, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 28, 28-29 n.2(N.D. Ga. 1986) (observing that a “motionto strike portions of [a] plaintiff’s complaint”is “similar in effect to a motion todismiss”).54. See Godlewski, 210 F.R.D. at 572; Finnegan,180 F.R.D. at 249; Oil Express Nat’l, 173F.R.D. at 220.55. See Finnegan, 180 F.R.D. at 249; OilExpress Nat’l, 173 F.R.D. at 220.56. See Godlewski, 210 F.R.D. at 572 (“Case law… fails to conclusively decide the issue.”).57. See Josh Belinfante, To Answer or Not toAnswer: The Partial Motion to Dismiss, 52FED. LAW. 20, 20-21 (Nov./Dec. 2005)(contrasting the minority view representedby Gerlach with the majority view embracedby courts in nine states other than Arizona).58. The Gerlach court itself concluded thatdefault was too “harsh” a penalty for thedefendant’s failure to submit an answer, andgave the defendant 10 days from the date ofits ruling on the defendant’s partial motionto dismiss within which to submit ananswer. Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1174; seealso Bull HN Info. Sys., 1990 Copyright L.Dec. (CCH) 26,555, at 23,280 (observingthat the entry of a default judgmentwould be a “very harsh remedy” for adefendant’s failure to answer claims thatwere not addressed in its motion to dismiss).59. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Berry Coll., Inc., 74Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 999, 1000(N.D. Ga. 1997):Significant case law and one of the mostauthoritative treatises on Federal Practiceand Procedure supports Defendants’position that, when a defendant files aRule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,addressing only some of the claims containedin the plaintiff’s complaint, thedefendant is not required to file ananswer until the court rules on themotion to dismiss. . . . Given this, thecourt has no trouble concluding that,even if Defendants’ view of the FederalRules is mistaken, Defendants had goodcause … for their alleged default.Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’sMotion for Entry of Default Judgmentand grants Defendants’ Motion toVacate Entry of Default.60. See, e.g., Alex. Brown & Sons Inc. v. MarineMidland Banks, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.(CCH) 99,440, at 96,893 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Alex. Brown has moved for adefault judgment with respect to the claimsMarine has not moved to dismiss, based onMarine’s refusal to answer those claimsprior to a decision on the instant motion todismiss.”).61. See Cagan, supra note 11, at 204(“Although a court is likely to vacate aclerk’s entry of default or a default judgmenteven if it agrees with the Gerlachinterpretation of Rule 12(a), it is possiblethat a court may refuse to vacate them.”).62. See id. at 204:[I]t is the clerk, and not the court,which enters a default as a matter ofcourse if less than all of the counts areattacked. Hence, even if the court agreesthat Rule 12(a) enlarges a defendant’stime to answer all of the counts untilresolution of the motion, the attorneywill be forced to file a motion to vacatethe clerk’s entry of default.(footnote omitted.)63. See Does I Through III v. District ofColumbia, 238 F. Supp. 2d 212, 221 n.9(D.D.C. 2002) (“[I]t is well establishedthat ‘a motion for partial judgment on thepleadings is appropriate[.]’”) (quoting VNAPlus, Inc. v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc.,29 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1258 (D. Kan.1998)); Moran v. Peralta Cmty. Coll. Dist.,825 F. Supp. 891, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1993)(“Although Rule 12(c) does not expresslyauthorize ‘partial’ judgments, neither doesit bar them, and it is common practice toapply Rule 12(c) to individual causes ofaction.”). But cf. Picker Int’l, Inc. v. MayoFound., 6 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (“[I]t is not clear whether aRule 12(c) motion should be granted whenit would not dispose of the entire case.”).64. See Belinfante, supra note 57, at 21 (“[A]defendant could file an answer, then file amotion for judgment on the pleadings pursuantto Rule 12(c), and then move to staydiscovery pending the resolution of theRule 12(c) motion.”); cf. Alexander v. Cityof Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir.1993) (“A defendant may use a rule 12(c)motion after the close of the pleadings toraise various rule 12(b) defenses regardingprocedural defects, in which case courtsapply the same standard applicable to thecorresponding 12(b) motion.”).65. See Straker v. Metro. Transit Auth., 333 F.Supp. 2d 91, 94 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); N.Y.State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F.Supp. 677, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).66. See, e.g., Gordon-Maizel Constr. Co. v. LeRoyProds., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 528, 531 (D.D.C.62 ARIZONA ATTORNEY SEPTEMBER 2006www.myazbar.org

1987) (noting that the defendants“answered the complaint, rather than risk adefault judgment”); see also Landman v.Borough of Bristol, 896 F. Supp. 406, 409(E.D. Pa. 1995) (“When filing an answer, aparty may simply be seeking to avoid therisks of default.”); Prod. Stamping Corp. v.Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F. Supp. 1074,1077 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (“[T]he filing of ananswer may be no more than a carefullawyer’s decision to avoid the risk ofdefault.”).67. See, e.g., Jamaica Lodge 2188 of Bhd. of Ry.Employees v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 200 F.Supp. 253, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (“[A]fterfiling a timely answer, the defendant in thisaction moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) … for judgment on the pleadings.”). Seegenerally Cetenich v. Alden, 177 F.R.D. 94,95 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (“A defendant avoidsdefault by filing either an answer or a Rule12 motion within twenty days of service ofthe complaint.”) (emphasis added).68. See Signature Combs, Inc. v. United States,253 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Tenn.2003); Little v. FBI, 793 F. Supp. 652, 653(D. Md. 1992), aff’d, 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir.1993).69. See Blessing v. Norman, 646 F. Supp. 82, 83(N.D. Ga. 1986) (noting that “pre-answermotions … toll [the] defendant’s time foranswering” under Rule 12(a)) (emphasisadded); 6 B. E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIAPROCEDURE Proceedings Without Trial §164, at 577 (4th ed. 1997) (“A motion forjudgment on the pleadings does not extendthe time to plead so as to avoid a default,and thus should not be filed in lieu of aresponsive pleading.”) (citation omitted).70. See Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, 298 F.Supp. 1099, 1103 (W.D. Mo. 1969)(observing that Rule 12(a) “temporarilyrelieves [the] defendant of the duty toanswer”); cf. Carter v. Am. Bus Lines, Inc.,22 F.R.D. 323, 326 (D. Neb. 1958) (“Thereason one would raise [its] defenses bymotion [under Rule 12(b)] rather thananswer lies in the hope to have the defensesustained without resorting to the troubleof pleading an answer.”).71. See Apjohn & Brady, supra note 14, at §6.2.1(b):One option for a defendant filing a partialmotion to dismiss is to file, simultaneously,a partial answer to the complaint—answeringonly those claims notaddressed in the partial motion to dismiss.Then, following notice of thecourt’s action on the motion to dismiss,the defendant has 10 days to answer theremaining counts of the complaint, tothe extent necessary under the court’sruling.72. See, e.g., Eberts v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,581 F.2d 357, 359 (3d Cir. 1978);Chisholm v. T.J.X. Cos., 286 F. Supp. 2d736, 738 (E.D. Va. 2003); U.S. Fid. &Guar. Co. v. Bank of Bentonville, 29 F. Supp.2d 553, 555 (W.D. Ark. 1998).73. Indeed, a court is likely to treat a partialmotion to dismiss pending when an answeris filed as if the motion were actually onefor partial judgment on the pleadingsunder Rule 12(c). See, e.g., Stanley v. St.Croix Basic Serv., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d379, 381 n.1 (D.V.I. 2003) (“[B]ecausethe Partial Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of anAnswer was filed at the same time as theAnswer, it should have been framed as aMotion for Judgment on the Pleadingspursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rulesof Civil Procedure.”); see also Colin v.Marconi Commerce Sys. Employees’ Ret.Plan, 335 F. Supp. 2d 590, 607 n.20(M.D.N.C. 2004).74. Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, 709 F. Supp.1146, 1147-48 (S.D. Fla. 1989). But seeBeary v. West Publ’g Co., 763 F.2d 66, 68(2d Cir. 1985) (“Although Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b) encourages the responsive pleader tofile a motion to dismiss before pleading,nothing in the rule prohibits the filing of amotion to dismiss with an answer.”).75. No. 93 C 6866, 1994 WL 9638 (N.D. Ill.Jan. 11, 1994).76. See id., 1994 WL 9638, at *2.77. Id. (citations omitted); cf. Becker v.Fitzgerald, No. 94 C 7646, 1995 WL215143, at * 2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1995):[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedurecontemplate that a defendant shall file asingle answer. If a motion for a moredefinite statement has been served andmade, the defendant’s single answer isto be made after the ruling on themotion within the time limits set byRule 12(a)(4)(A). The procedure defendant… used—interposing an answer topart of a complaint and making a Rule12 motion directed to another part ofthe complaint—is nowhere to be foundin the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.(citation omitted.)78. See Cagan, supra, note 11, at 204 (“[A]nattorney who files a partial motion to dismisswould be prudent to either seek permissionfrom opposing counsel to extendits time to answer the unchallenged counts,or move the court for an extension of timeto answer the unchallenged counts.”).79. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig.,190 F.R.D. 331, 333 (D.N.J. 1999); GatesEnergy Prods., Inc. v. Yuasa Battery Co.,599 F. Supp. 368, 370 (D. Colo. 1983);Gines v. Bailey, Civ. A. No. 92-4170, 1992WL 394512, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29,1992).80. See Belinfante, supra note 57, at 21 (“Manypractitioners wisely file a motion to extendthe time to answer pending the court’s resolutionof the motion to dismiss. Such amotion tells the court why no answer willbe forthcoming, and it provides strongammunition if the opposing party movesfor a default judgment.”).81. Because “Rule 13(a) only requires a compulsorycounterclaim if the party whodesires to assert [the] claim has served apleading,” United States v. Snider, 779 F.2d1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1985), the filing of aRule 12(b) motion ordinarily extends notonly the time within which the defendant isrequired to answer, but also the time withinwhich it must assert any compulsory counterclaims(although the filing of a motion todismiss does not toll the substantive statutesof limitation applicable to any counterclaims).See Full Draw Prods. v. EastonSports, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1009 (D.Colo. 2000). However, because a defendantordinarily waives any compulsory counterclaims“not asserted in [its] first responsivepleading,” id., its submission of a “partialanswer” with its motion to dismiss mightpreclude it from pursuing any compulsorycounterclaims not also asserted at that time.Cf. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp.,175 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1376 (S.D. Fla.2001) (suggesting that the defendant’s obligationto assert counterclaims arises when itserves “an answer (or partial answer)”),vacated and remanded, 276 F.3d 1368(Fed. Cir. 2002).82. See Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 306 F.Supp. 743, 751 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1969):[D]efendants move additionally for anorder pursuant to Rule 6(b), F.R.Civ.P.,extending the time within which theymust answer to “ten days after the decisionof [their] motions.” Having movedpursuant to Rule 12(b), F.R.Civ.P., fordismissal …, the time provisions of Rule12(a), F.R.Civ.P., automatically alter andextend defendants’ time to answer as perdefendants’ request and without the needof a court order since these motions todismiss were not fully granted.83. See, e.g., Oil Express Nat’l, 173 F.R.D. at 221(holding that a “partial motion to dismissallows for altering the [time] limits ofFED.R.CIV.P. 12(a) with respect to answeringthose claims not addressed in [the]motion”).84. See Belinfante, supra note 57, at 21 (notingthat “[c]itations to the [relevant] casesshould be included” in any motion toenlarge the time for answering).85. 915 F. Supp. 378, reconsideration denied,916 F. Supp. 1557 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d,87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996).86. See id. at 379-80, 381 (noting that thedefendants moved to dismiss “CountsThree, Four, Seven and, Nine of the [plaintiffs’]amended complaint” and, on separategrounds, “Count Eight of the amendedcomplaint”).87. See id. at 384. Rule 6(b) permits the court,upon timely motion, to enlarge the timewithin which a required act must be done“for cause shown.” FED.R.CIV.P. 6(b). Therule thus enables the court to extend thetime within which a responsive pleadingmust be served under Rule 12(a). See SonyCorp. v. Elm State Elecs., Inc., 800 F.2d 317,319 (2d Cir. 1986).88. See Preserve Endangered Species, 915 F. Supp.at 384.www.myazbar.org SEPTEMBER 2006 ARIZONA ATTORNEY 63