atsb final report released 16 may 2013 - Ambulance Service of NSW

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15° cable angle limit. This limit was published in the relevant winch supplement tothe AW139 Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM).The winch was equipped with an electrical cable cutter system that was able to beactivated by the pilot via a guarded, collective-mounted switch (Figure 9), or by theACM via a second guarded switch on the winch control panel in the rear cabin(Figure 10). Additionally, manual cable cutters in the rear cabin provided the ACMwith a second means to sever the winch cable (Figure 11).Figure 9: Searchlight controlsCollectivePendantCable cutter switchMulti-position switchesSource: ATSBFigure 10: Winch operator control panelSource: ATSB- 16 -
Figure 11: Manual winch cable cuttersSource: ATSBThe helicopter was also equipped with an emergency Quick Splice Plate (QSP)assembly that was designed to restore winching capability in the event that thenormal hook was cut away or damaged. The maximum allowable weight using theQSP remained at 272 kg.Lighting systemThe helicopter had a number of fixed and movable external lights, including amovable SX-16 Nightsun searchlight located on the left side of the fuselage and asecond movable searchlight underneath the cockpit (Figure 12). The helicopter wasalso equipped with winch-mounted lighting (Figure 13), and a handheld searchlightfor use by the ACM (Figure 14).Figure 12: AW139 external lighting 16Rescue winchMovable SX-16Nightsun searchlightFixed landinglightMovable secondarysearchlightSource: Helicopter operator16A fixed landing light was mounted in each of the sponsons. The left landing light is obscured inthis image by the Nightsun mount.- 17 -
Page 1: Helicopter winching accidentInsert
Page 4 and 5: Published by: Australian Transport
Page 6 and 7: CONTENTSSAFETY SUMMARY ............
Page 8 and 9: DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL INFORMATIONRepor
Page 10 and 11: TERMINOLOGY USED IN THIS REPORTOccu
Page 12 and 13: front right seat; an air crewman (A
Page 14 and 15: patient and himself directly undern
Page 16 and 17: paramedics, so the pilot elected to
Page 18 and 19: eported that he did not advise the
Page 20 and 21: advised the ACM to communicate usin
Page 22 and 23: The pilot contacted the ASNSW Medic
Page 24 and 25: and lighting systems. The ACM’s t
Page 28 and 29: Figure 13: Winch-mounted lighting (
Page 30 and 31: communications were controlled by t
Page 32 and 33: The ATSB did not examine the accide
Page 34 and 35: Figure 17: Duty paramedic’s ropes
Page 36 and 37: The section of severed cable that h
Page 38 and 39: was night vision goggle (NVG)-capab
Page 40 and 41: ASNSW management and individual ARC
Page 42 and 43: winch training at increased height
Page 44 and 45: tag line was connected to the stret
Page 47 and 48: ANALYSISIntroductionThe ATSB identi
Page 49 and 50: It was also considered unlikely tha
Page 51 and 52: CommunicationDuring the course of t
Page 53: manual, increased the risk that ARC
Page 56 and 57: Other key findings• There was no
Page 58 and 59: Role of the special casualty access
Page 60 and 61: Risk assessmentAction taken by the
Page 63: Australian Transport Safety Bureau2

atsb final report released 16 may 2013 - Ambulance Service of NSW

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