HIIK, Conflict Barometer 2012

Global Conflict Panorama

Global Conflict PanoramaGlobal DevelopmentIn 2012, a total of 396 conflicts was counted, marking a rise bynine compared to 2011. Among these were eighteen wars and25 limited wars, amounting to 43 highly violent conflicts. Another165 conflicts were classified as violent crises. The numberof wars compared to last year’s all-time high of twenty decreasedby two. However, the number of limited wars rose bysix and the number of violent crises was extended by ten from155 to 165. Overall, 208 conflicts, more than half of thoseobserved, were conducted with the use of violence, therebybeing the highest number of violent conflicts ever observed.In contrast, 188 non-violent conflicts were counted, subdividedinto 105 disputes and 83 non-violent crises. The numberof non-violent conflicts remained stable, marking only a slightchange from 193 to 188. Of the eighteen wars observed, elevenremained on the same level of intensity compared to theprevious year, among them four in Sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. Somalia(Islamist groups), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Sudan (Darfur),and South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence).A further five wars remained at war level in the Middle Eastand Maghreb, namely Afghanistan (Taliban et al.), Iraq (Sunnimilitant groups), Turkey (PKK) , Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)and Syria (opposition groups). Similarly, one war continuedin both the Americas as well as Asia and Oceania. [1 Mexico(drug cartels), Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. Seven conflictsescalated to wars in 2012, among them three former limitedwars: Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State), Sudan (SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile) and Sudan - South Sudan,the last being the only highly violent interstate conflict. Mali(MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad) and Nigeria (farmers - pastoralists)accounted for the only two former violent crises to escalateby two levels to wars. Another two conflicts saw a steepescalation from a non-violent level to a war [1 India (ULFA etal. - Biharis, Bengalis), DR Congo (CNDP/M23)]. The most fatalof 2012’s wars was the opposition conflict in Syria with approx.55,000 fatalities, followed by the drug-related violencein Mexico, which caused the death of at least 12,000.Of last year’s wars, six saw a significant de-escalation byGlobal Conflict Intensities in2012 compared to 2011two levels to violent crises, and two slightly de-escalated tolimited wars. The war between the SPLM/A and the Sudanesegovernment had already ended in 2011 with the secessionof South Sudan. Of the 2011 wars associated with the ArabSpring, only the one in Syria continued on the same level ofintensity. Egypt (opposition groups) and Yemen (oppositiongroups) de-escalated to violent crises, and Libya (opposition)de-ecalated to a limited war. However, a new highly violentconflict closely connected to the Libyan opposition conflicterupted [1 Libya (inter-factional violence)]. Furthermore, theconflicts Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners) and Côte d’Ivoire(opposition), both having been closely related to nationalelections in 2011, de-escalated from wars to violent crises.Additionally, the war between different ethnic groups in theSindh Province, Pakistan, de-escalated by one level, while theconflicts Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State,Kaya State) and South Sudan (various militias) de-escalated bytwo.Of the 25 limited wars observed, two were wars in the previousyear, nine had already been on this level of intensity,and ten saw a significant escalation by two levels. Furthermore,four conflicts erupted in 2012 on the level of a limited war,i.e. Mali (Islamist groups - MNLA), Libya (inter-factional violence),Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakshan), and Myanmar (Buddhists- Rohingyas / Rakhine State).The total number of conflicts rose by nine, since sixteenconflicts erupted in 2012 and seven were considered to haveended in 2011. A further two conflicts ended in 2012, namelyMalawi (opposition) and Colombia - Venezuela (system). Sixnew conflicts erupted in the Americas, among them two betweenpolice personnel and the governments in Bolivia andBrazil, respectively. Honduras and El Salvador saw the eruptionof one new violent conflict each, both involving organizedcrime [1 Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organizedcrime), El Salvador (Maras)].In addition, a new violent conflict between militant groupsand the Nicaraguan government over the orientation of theGlobal conflicts of low, medium and highintensity 1945 to 201210610516515587 832012 :2011 :200150low Intensity :medium Intensity :high Intensity :10019 25 20 1850dispute non-violent crisis violent crisis limited war war194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102

Global Conflict Panoramapolitical system erupted, as well as one non-violent oppositionconflict in Paraguay [1 Nicaragua (militant groups), Paraguay(impeachment)].In Europe, in demonstrations by the Romanian opposition,hundreds were injured, thus establishing a new violent crisis[1 Romania (opposition movement)].Another violent crisis over resources erupted in Myanmar,adding to the aforementioned limited war [1 Myanmar (farmerset al. / Sagaing Region)].In addition to the inter-factional violence in Libya, theMiddle East and Maghreb accounted for three new conflictswith an autonomy conflict in Libya, an opposition conflict inKuwait and a conflict between Kurds and the anti-Assad coalitionin Syria [1 Libya (Federalists / Cyrenaica), Kuwait (oppositionmovement), Syria (NC - KSC)].Africa saw the eruption of two new conflicts in Mali. Thefirst was Mali (coup plotters), which was then followed by theescalation of several conflicts and the likewise eruption of theother new conflict Mali (Islamist groups - MNLA).In order to better analyze a long-term trend, the five intensitylevels were categorized into three groups: The twonon-violent levels were summarized as low intensity conflicts,while limited wars and wars as conflicts of high intensity. Violentcrises were labeled medium intensity conflicts.As the graph below shows, the number of conflicts observedrose more or less continuously from 83 in 1945 to 396in 2012. However, this increase must be partly attributed toimproved availability of information on current conflicts inrecent decades. With regard to high intensity conflicts, theirnumber increased almost constantly until 1992, when an alltimehigh was reached with 51 high intensity conflicts shortlyafter the decline of the Soviet Union and the breakup ofYugoslavia. Afterwards, its number dropped sharply, but thenrose again until it reached 45 in 2003. In the following eightyears, the number of highly-violent conflicts ranged between31 and 41. While 2011 saw the highest number of wars, 2012accounted for the highest number of highly violent conflictssince 2003 with a total of 43.Analysis intrastate – interstateThe amount of intrastate conflicts increased from 303 to 314,while the number of interstate conflicts decreased by twofrom 84 to 82. While five intrastate conflicts had ended in2011, sixteen new domestic conflicts erupted in 2012, therebymarking an increase by eleven. Thus, as in previous years,about 80 percent of all conflicts were domestic.The escalation between Sudan and South Sudan resultedin the first interstate war since the confrontation betweenRussia and Georgia in 2008. In the aftermath of the 2011secession of South Sudan, tensions over contested borderareas and the oil-rich Higlig region led to heavy bombingcampaigns and several ten thousands displaced, reaching apeak in April with intense fighting over Higlig [1 Sudan – SouthSudan]. The conflict between the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo and Rwanda over influence in the Kivu region constitutedthe second violent interstate confrontation in Sub-Saharan Africa.Number of Intra- and Interstate Conflicts in2012 by Intensity Levelintrastate :interstate :Seven other interstate conflicts were conducted with the useof violence, with Syria accounting for violent conflicts withneighboring Turkey and Israel. Several cross-border incidentstook place between the Syrian army and Israeli and Turkishtroops in the course of intensified fighting in the ongoingSyrian opposition conflict [1 Syria – Israel, Syria – Turkey]Pakistan also accounted for two violent interstate conflicts[1 Afghanistan – Pakistan, Pakistan – India]. In the Americas,violence occurred in two border conflicts [1 USA – Mexico(border security), Guatemala – Belize (territory)]. The crisisover the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia andAzerbaijan remained the sole violent interstate conflict in Europe.In spite of the cease-fire agreement, several clashes andsniper attacks killed at least eight people in the course of theyear. The conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, extendingto a limited war in 2011, decreased to a non-violent crisis[1 Thailand – Cambodia (border)].Intra- and Interstate Conflicts of high Intensity1945 to 2012intrastate :interstate :15750403046595620278025117dispute non-violent crisis violent crisis limited war war194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000201020053

Global Conflict PanoramaThe average intensity calculated for all domestic conflictsobserved (2.63) was approx. one intensity level higher thanthat of interstate conflicts (1.57). Apart from the higher meanintensity, intrastate conflicts also preserved a higher totalnumber of conflicts since the beginning of the long-term analysisof conflicts in 1945. The same long-term observation period,for which purpose both limited wars and wars were compiledin one group of high intensity conflicts, clearly showsthat the intrastate dominance among the highly violent conflictssustained.Regional DevelopmentSimilar to previous years, Asia and Oceania ranked highest with128 conflicts, accounting for about one third of all conflicts observed.These were followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 90, theMiddle East and Maghreb with 69, Europe with 58, and the Americaswith 51. In terms of highly-violent conflicts, Sub-SaharanAfrica brought forth nineteen conflicts of the corresponding intensity,while ten were counted in Asia and Oceania, and nine inthe Middle East and Maghreb. Accordingly, Sub-Saharan Africahad the most wars (nine). Europe and the Americas experiencedno changes in the number of highly violent conflicts comparedto 2011, counting one and three limited wars respectively, aswell as one war in the Americas [1 Mexico (drug cartels)]. Thesum of highly violent conflicts decreased in the Middle East andMaghreb (from thirteen to nine), marking the only decrease. Meanwhile,the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Asia andOceania saw a rise in high intensity conflicts, with an increaseby six and two, respectively. In Asia and Oceania, 55 violent criseswere observed, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 37 andthe Middle East and Maghreb with 36. Concerning non-violentconflicts, 63 have been listed in Asia and Oceania, pursued byEurope with the second largest occurrence of non-violent conflicts(45).Asia and Oceania accounted for 34 percent of all intrastateconflicts and 26 percent of all interstate conflicts observed. Regardingintrastate conflicts, the regions ranked as follows: Sub-Saharan Africa (24 percent), Middle East and Maghreb (18 percent),Europe, and the Americas (both 12 percent). Consideringinterstate conflicts, Europe came second with 23 percent, followedby the Americas with eighteen percent and Sub-SaharanAfrica as well as the Middle East and Maghreb (both 17 percent).Relating the number of conflicts to the number of countries in aregion, the Middle East and Maghreb has shown to be the mostconflict-ridden, with a general average value of 3.2, and specificallyfor highly violent conflicts with 0.4 per state. Asia and Oceaniaranked second regarding the overall average and third forhighly violent conflicts (2.8 and 0.2 respectively). Sub-SaharanAfrica was situated third with an overall average per state of 1.9,while sharing the first rank for highly violent conflicts with 0.4.This calculation underlines that the Americas and Europe werethe most peaceful regions this year, in ascending order.112Distribution of all Conflicts in 2012by Region and Intensity Type4519373442522low Intensity :medium Intensity :high Intensity :Europe sub-Saharan Africa the Americas Asia and Oceania the Middle East andMaghreb10635593624Dynamics within individual conflictsAs in the preceding years, the intensity of about two thirdsof all conflicts monitored, i.e. 261 out of 396, remained unchangedcompared to 2011.In total, 59 conflicts escalated, 42 of which by one, fifteenby two, and two by three levels.60 conflicts de-escalated, 42 of which by one level andeighteen by two levels, while there were no de-escalationsby more than two levels. More than half of the 59 conflictswhich escalated, namely 33, turned from a non-violent levelto either violent crises, or limited wars, or wars. Of the disputes,twelve escalated by two levels to violent crises. Amongthem were FYROM (Albanian minority), DR Congo - Rwanda,Tanzania (Uamsho), Mexico (opposition), Samoa (landownerprotests), Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government), Saudi Arabia(opposition movement), and Syria - Turkey. Seventeen nonviolentcrises escalated by one level to violent crises, Kenya(MRC), Ethiopia (opposition), Venezuela (opposition), Indonesia(Muslims - Christians / Sulawesi), Nepal (right-wing Hindugroups), and Syria (Kurdish groups) being among them. Furthertwo escalated by three levels to wars [1 DR Congo (CNDP/M23), India (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis)].Two violent crises, both in Sub-Saharan Africa, increased inintensity, escalating by two levels to wars. One was the secessionistconflict between the Tuareg group National Movementfor the Liberation of Azawad and the Islamist group Ansar al-Din, on the one hand, and the Mali government, on the other[1 Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)]. The other conflict wasthat over subnational predominance and resources betweenfarmers and pastoralists in Nigeria.Three limited wars escalated by one level to wars, i.e. Sudan(SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile), Sudan - SouthSudan, and Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State).Of the 60 conflicts which de-escalated, almost half, i.e. 29,turned non-violent.4

Global Conflict PanoramaOut of 28 violent crises, seventeen de-escalated by one levelto non-violent crises, including Belarus (opposition groups),Brazil (MST), Myanmar (Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA / RakhineState), Tajikistan (Islamist militant groups), Iraq (al-Sadrgroup, Shiite militant groups).Eleven violent crises de-escalated by two levels to disputes.Among them were Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabimilitants), Angola (FLEC / Cabinda), Niger (opposition), Mexico(APPO), Papua New-Guinea (Highlanders - Lowlanders), Iraq(KRG - Kurdish opposition movement), and Oman (oppositionmovement). One conflict de-escalated by two levels from alimited war to a non-violent crisis, i.e. the border conflict betweenThailand and Cambodia. The conflict remained tense althoughbilateral relations improved following the inaugurationof the new government under Yingluck Shinawatra.Six former wars de-escalated by two levels to violentcrises. Among them were the oppositional conflict in Côted‘Ivoire, Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners), Myanmar (KNU,KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State), Egypt (oppositiongroups), and Yemen (opposition groups). Sixteen newconflicts erupted, eleven of which were violent crises and fourlimited wars. Half of the new violent crises were in the Americas,among them Honduras (drug trafficking organizations,organized crime) as well as police riots in Bolivia and Brazil.One of the new limited wars was recorded in Sub-SaharanAfrica, i.e. Mali (Islamist groups - MNLA), and two in Asia andOceania, i.e. Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State)and Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan), as well as another in theMiddle East and Maghreb, i.e. Libya (inter-factional violence).Change of intensityEscalation by four levelsEscalation by three levelsEscalation by two levelsEscalation by one levelNo changeDeescalation by one levelDeescalation by two levelsDeescalation by three levelsDeescalation by four levelsNumber021542261421800Conflict ItemsAs in previous years, the most frequent conflict item in 2012was system/ideology, with 130 cases out of 396 conflicts.Conflicts with this item were conducted in order to change thepolitical or economic system, or concerned ideological differences,e.g. striving for a theocracy, religious differences, seekingdemocracy in an autocracy, or striving for a socialist economicorder. National power ranked second with 88, followedby resources with 81 cases. Since many conflicts centeredon more than one item, a single conflict might occur twice ormore times in this analysis. Frequent combinations of conflictitems were system/ideology and national power, subnationalpredominance and resources, as well as territory and resources.System/ideology was the most frequent item in violentconflicts (83 out of 130), 64 of them being violent crises.However, regarding highly violent conflicts, half of the 43high intensity conflicts were fought out over subnational predominance,alone or in combination with other items.Further frequent items in highly violent conflicts were system/ideologywith nineteen cases, resources with fourteencases, and national power with ten cases. Although rankingfourth in terms of frequency, the conflict item most prone toviolence proved to be subnational predominance. In 74 percentof those conflicts, the use of violence was observed. Subnationalpredominance indicates attaining de-facto controlover a territory or a population. In contrast, in only ten percentof cases demands for autonomy were pursued violently.The item autonomy indicates the aim of a group or region togain more political, socioeconomic or cultural rights within anexisting state. In 68 percent of all conflicts over national power,conflict parties employed violent means. System/ideologyand secession, the latter meaning the motivation to separatea territory from an existing state in order to create a new stateor to join another, closely followed with 64 and 63 percentviolent cases, respectively. In comparison, 13 and 12 percentof the conflicts over territory or international power, respec-tively, were carried out violently. Therefore, these conflictitems, which exclusively occur in interstate conflicts, were lessprone to violence than the other items.The world regions differed considerably with regard to thefrequency of conflict items, indicating different regional patternsof conflicts. System/ideology, the most frequent item intotal, was prevalent in Asia and Oceania (42 cases out of 130conflicts), in the Middle East and Maghreb (43 out of 68 conflicts),and in the Americas (21 out of 51 conflicts). In contrast,this item was of minor importance in Europe and Sub-SaharanAfrica with 10 out of 59 conflicts, and thirteen out of 90, respectively.It is nevertheless noteworthy that its proneness toviolence was visible in all regions, e.g. twelve out of the thirteensystem conflicts in Africa were carried out violently, withfive of them being highly violent. The second most frequentGlobal Frequency of Conflict Items in2012 by Intensity Groupsresourcesinternationalpowersubnationalpredominancenational powersystem / ideologyautonomydecolonisationsecessionterritory17465292419 18 190 0 03644710502822372040low Intensity :medium Intensity :high Intensity :29353214 154other225

Global Conflict Panoramaitem on a global scale, national power, was prevalent in Africa(30 cases), followed by Asia and Oceania (22 cases) and theMiddle East and Maghreb (22 cases). It was, however, comparativelyrare in the Americas (seven cases) and Europe (sevencases). Equally, the item ranking third globally, resources, wasprevalent in Africa (27 cases), and the Americas (21 cases), butrare in Europe (four cases), Asia and Oceania (eleven cases),and in the Middle East and Maghreb (seven cases). With regardto the item subnational predominance, regions also differedconsiderably. These conflicts were fought out primarily in Africa(23 cases) as well as Asia and Oceania (32 cases), whereasthis item was almost not observed in Europe (two cases) andvery rare in the Middle East and Maghreb (ten cases). In theAmericas, it was not very frequent (twelve cases), but neverthelessimportant, as it accounted for eleven of the violentconflicts in this region. Conflicts over autonomy or secession,were dominant in Europe, constituting 46 percent of all conflicts,and common in Asia and Oceania (26 percent), Africa (20percent), the Middle East and Maghreb (20 percent) but quiterare in the Americas (eight percent).Coups d’étatIn 2012, four cases of attempted coup d’états were reported,three of which were successful. Both Sub-Saharan Africa andAsia and Oceania encompassed two.In January , President Malam Bacai Sanha, then-president ofGuinea-Bissau, died of natural causes. Subsequently, RaimundoPereira, former Speaker of Parliament, became interim president.On April 12, shortly before the presidential run-off, militarycoup plotters under the leadership of Army Chief AntonioIndjai ousted Pereira, which was followed by shootings and grenadeexplosions [1 Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)]. In an allegedcounter-coup, on October 21, gunmen led by Captain PansauN’Tchama attacked army barracks near the capital’s airport.In Mali, soldiers under the command of Captain AmadouSanogo staged a coup against President Amadou Toumani Touréon March 21, six weeks before the presidential elections[1 Mali (coup plotters)]. They suspended the constitution andtook control of the capital Bamako. The coup was preceded bynumerous civil protests in February against the government’slack of action against the Tuareg attacks in the north and theinsufficient equipment of the army [1 Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din/ Azawad)]. After two days of fighting between the soldiers loyalto the government and the presidential guard, on the one hand,and the mutinying soldiers, on the other, the latter took controlof Bamako. Following the coup, MNLA quickly gained control ofall three northern regions.In early February, following increasingly violent protests inthe Maldives, parts of the police and the military turned againstPresident Nasheed. He resigned on February 7, claiming that itwas a coup d’état.In Papua New Guinea, mutinying soldiers loyal to former primeminister Michael Somare took hostage three officers loyal toPresident Peter O’Neil, demanding Somare’s reinstatement. O’Neil had been appointed prime minister during Somare’s hospitalstay in Singapore in 2011. The insurgency ended after severalhours and Colonel Yaura Sasa, leader of the coup, was arrested.6

Measures of Conflict Resolution

Measures of Conflict ResolutionNegotiations and TreatiesThroughout the year, numerous conflict actors negotiated andsigned treaties, affecting the course of the respective conflictsin different ways. For instance, in Myanmar, the government andthe National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K),an Indian nationalist group, signed a ceasefire agreement in Aprilwith the objective to grant autonomy to the NSCN-K in three Burmesedistricts [1 India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)]. After PresidentThein Sein’s call for dialog in mid-2011, ceasefire agreementswere reached with several rebel groups, among them the ChinNational Front in January and the National United Party of Arakanas well as the Arakan Liberation Party in April. While the November2011 ceasefire agreement with the United Wa State Armycontinued to hold ever since, ceasefire agreements with the KarenNational Union and the Karen National Liberation Army brokedown. The government held several rounds of talks with theKachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Kachin IndependenceOrganization (KIO), which remained without agreement [1 Myanmar(KIA, KIO / Kachin State)]. In response to the war between KIAand the government following the breakdown of a sixteen-yearold truce in June 2011, the United Nationalities Federal Council,a merger of different rebel groups, stated it would review thepeace process including ceasefire agreements reached with thegovernment if military offensives in Kachin State would not stop.In the Philippines, the government and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) continued to negotiate, which eventually ledto the signing of a framework agreement on the Bangsamoro inOctober [1 Philippines (MILF / Mindanao)]. Under the agreementa new autonomous political entity, the Bangsamoro, would beestablished and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao replaced.There were no reports of clashes between MILF militantsand soldiers. However, clashes between MILF and a breakawaygroup intensified [1 Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)].In Colombia, President Juan Manuel Santos confirmed exploratorypeace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC) [1 Colombia (FARC)]. The conflict parties heldpreparatory talks in Norway in October, and after talks in Cubain November, FARC declared a unilateral ceasefire. However, thegovernment continued military offensives against FARC militantsin December. In El Salvador, the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio18 announced to stop inter-gang violence following a trucemainly brokered by the Catholic Church [1 El Salvador (Maras)].Initially refusing to enter direct talks with the gangs, the governmentlater supported an informal peace deal, granting improvedconditions to detained gang leaders. Subsequently, the country’smurder rate dropped significantly. In December, the governmentand the gangs agreed on the creation of special zones free ofcrime.In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the government andthe rebel group M23 negotiated under the meditation of theUgandan government in Kampala in late November, followingM23’s seizing of the cities of Goma and Sake [1 DR Congo (CNDP/ M23)]. Following the talks, M23 pulled out of the two cities inDecember under the provision that further talks would be held.Negotiations were stopped in late December but re-scheduledfor January 2013. In South Sudan, the government signed peaceagreements with several militant groups, planning their reintegrationinto the army. For instance, the government reached a peacetreaty with the SSDM leader Peter Kuol Chol Awan on February27, leading to a significant decrease in rebel activities. Whileparts of the SSDM rejected this peace deal, choosing John Olonyas their new leader, approx. 1,800 SSDM fighters joined the demobilizationand reintegration process [1 South Sudan (variousmilitias)]. In Somalia, the National Constituent Assembly approveda new constitution in late July [1 Somalia (Islamist groups)].Accordingly, a new parliament, elected by elders, was installedin Mogadishu in August. On September 10, the new parliamentelected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the first President of the FederalGovernment of Somalia, ending the transitional period. Inthe course of the conflicts in northern Mali, ECOWAS mediatorBlaise Compraoré repeatedly met with representatives of Ansaral-Din and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawadon to find a political solution to the crisis. However, negotiationswere ineffective, since the military intervention remained scheduledfor the beginning of 2013.UN-backed negotiations between the Cypriot governmentand the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus under its leaderDervis Eroglu resumed in January [1 Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)].However, Eroglu declared an end to all negotiations whenCyprus assumed the EU presidency in July.In February, the UN and the Arab League appointed formerUN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as special envoy to mediatein the conflict between the opposition and the Syrian governmentof President Bashar al-Assad over national power and theorientation of the political system [1 Syria (opposition groups)].In early August, Annan resigned due to a lack of consensus inthe UN Security Council, the violation of a ceasefire, and ongoingmilitarization. That month, former Algerian minister of foreignaffairs, Lakhdar Brahimi, replaced Annan and established a fourdayceasefire in October, which, however, both sides violated.After Iran had expressed its willingness to talks, new rounds ofnegotiation between Iran and the five members of the UN SecurityCouncil and Germany took place between April and July[1 Iran - USA, EU (nuclear program)]. IAEA envoys also met withgovernment officials in Tehran, ultimately reaching no agreement.Additionally, Iran denied IAEA access to a military facility,which prompted the USA and the EU to impose new sanctions.In Afghanistan in early 2012, Taliban ruled out negotiations withthe government of President Hamid Karzai, but agreed to meetUS officials in Doha, Qatar [1 Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. However,these negotiations failed in March. In late December, severalleaders of militant groups, including Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami,and members of the Higher Peace Council of the Afghan governmentmet in Paris to hold talks.8

Measures of Conflict ResolutionAuthoritative Decisions by the ICJBy the end of 2012, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)had twelve disputes on its list of pending cases. Throughoutthe year, the Court closed four proceedings, one of whichwas announced to be appealed.On January 23, the ICJ fixed time limits for the filing ofthe initial pleadings in the dispute between Nicaragua andCosta Rica concerning Costa Rica’s construction of a highwayclose to the Río San Juan River [1 Nicaragua – Costa Rica (RíoSan Juan)]. On April 27, Guatemala and Belize agreed to holdsimultaneous referenda on whether they should take theirterritorial dispute to the ICJ on 10/06/13 [1 Guatemala – Belize(territory)].On November 19, the ICJ came to a ruling regarding themaritime border between Nicaragua and Colombia in theirdispute over the waters surrounding the Archipelagos ofSan Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina [1 Nicaragua -Colombia (sea border)]. The court granted Colombia sovereigntyover the uninhabited islands of Alburquerque, BajoNuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serranaand Serranilla. It fixed the parties’ maritime border, grantingan exclusive economic zone to Nicaragua that extended 200nautical miles from its coast. In reaction, Colombia withdrewfrom the pact of Bogotá, under which the countries of theAmericas agreed to settle boundary disputes in using the ICJ.On December 13, Colombia announced to appeal against theruling.Japan rejected China’s requests to allow the ICJ an examinationof their conflict on the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands[1 Japan - China (Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands)]. Japan proposedSouth Korea to refer their dispute over the Liancourt Rocksto the Court but South Korea declined the proposal [1 Japan- South Korea (Takeshima / Dokdo)].International OrganizationsThe United Nations administered twenty-nine missions in2012. Seventeen of these were peacekeeping operations, includingone special political mission in Afghanistan (UnitedNations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), led by the UN Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the other twelvebeing political missions led by the Department of PoliticalAffairs (UNDPA). In comparison, only three political missionswere conducted in 2008. One year later, they already amountedto ten. In total, by the end of December, 112,735 personnelserved in peacekeeping missions, among them 79,508troops, 12,359 police and 1,947 military observers. In the civilian-ledpolitical missions, including the mission in Afghanistan,4,283 personnel served by the end of November. Withrespect to financial and personnel resources, the missions inSudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) constitutedthe two biggest. The African Union-UN Hybrid Operationin Darfur (UNAMID) had a budget of 1.4 billion US dollarsand comprised 25,248 personnel. The budget of the UN StabilizationMission in the DRC (MONUSCO) amounted to 1.3 billionUS dollars and its personnel totalled 25,248. The main providersof military and police personnel to peacekeepingoperations by December 2012 were once again found in Asiaand Africa. Pakistan supplied 8,967 personnel, Bangladesh8,828, India 7,839, Ethiopia 5,857, and Nigeria 5,441. The totalbudget of peacekeeping operations was approx. 7.33 billionUS dollars. The top ten financial contributors were, as in theprevious years, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom,Germany, France, Italy, China, Canada, Spain and the Republicof Korea. The United States’ contribution amounted to 27 percentof the budget. The UN General Assembly assigned theexpenses based on a scale taking into account the memberstates’ relative economic wealth, with the permanent membersof the Security Council required to pay a larger share inline with their special responsibilities. The largest share ofpeacekeeping was conducted by the Global South, while theGlobal North mainly funded and controlled the operations.Regarding fatalities, 110 died in DPKO-led missions in2012. From 1948 to 2012, altogether 3,080 personnel died inDPKO-administered missions.One mission, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste(UNMIT) came to an end after six years in December2012. However, a new but only short-lived mission in Syriawas established. On April 21, the UN Security Council establishedthe Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) by resolution2043 in order to monitor the conflict and the implementationof the six-point plan of the former Joint Special Envoy KofiAnnan [1 Syria (opposition groups)]. Due to intensifying violence,the mission was suspended. On July 20, the SecurityCouncil extended the mission for 30 days under the conditionthat violence would end. As those conditions were not met,the mandate came to an end on August 19. On December 20,the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an African-ledInternational Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).As in the previous years, the region with the highest numberof missions was Sub-Saharan Africa. Seven peacekeepingoperations (see table below) and seven political missionswere in place, namely the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), UNRegional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), UN Integrated PeacebuildingOffice in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), theUN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOG-BIS), the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the UN IntegratedPeacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), and the UN PoliticalOffice for Somalia (UNPOS). In the Middle East and Maghreb,the four peacekeeping missions UNDOF, UNIFIL, MI-NURSO, and UNTSO continued, while the newly establishedUNSMIS in Syria came to an end after four months. UNDPAmaintained three political missions in the region: the UN AssistanceMission for Iraq (UNAMI), the Office of the UN SpecialCoordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), andthe Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UN-SCOL). Despite the high number of conflicts in Asia and Oceania,the region was left with only one military mission, UN-MOGIP in India and Pakistan, after the end of UNMIT in 2012.The political mission UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplo-9

Measures of Conflict Resolutionmacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA) remained in place. In Europe,DPKO maintained UNFICYP in Cyprus and UNMIK in Kosovo(Serbia). As in previous years, the UN Stabilization Mission inHaiti (MINUSTAH) was the only UN mission in the Americas. Nopolitical missions were administered in Europe or the Americas.The international community also applied non-militarymeasures, such as sanctions. By the end of 2012, UN maintainedthirteen sanction committees, one more than in 2011.The sanctions concerned seven states of Sub-Saharan Africa(Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Guinea-Bissau),another six of the Middle East and Maghreb (Iraq,Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, and Afghanistan), and an armsembargo against North Korea since 2006. A further sanctioncommittee targeted the transnational network of al-Qaeda aswell as associated individuals and entities. After the coupd‘état in Guinea-Bissau, the Security Council imposed a travelban on the perpetrators of the putsch on May 18.Aside from the UN, several regional organizations maintainedfield missions in 2012. The OSCE maintained missions inthe Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, employingabout 3,000 staff in a total of seventeen missions andfield operations. Among these were six field missions in theBalkans, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo,Skopje (FYROM), and the OSCE presence in Albania, onemission to Moldova, field offices in Minsk (Belarus), Baku(Azerbaijan), Yerevan (Armenia), and Tajikistan, project coordinatorsin Ukraine and Uzbekistan, OSCE Centers in Ashgabad(Turkmenistan), Astana (Kazakhstan), and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan),as well as a Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Officeon the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference[1 Armenia - Azerbaijan]. In Kosovo, UNMIK und OSCE workedtogether to secure and monitor the parliamentary elections.Kosovo’s supervised independence ended on September 10.The Council of the European Union, as part of its CommonDefense and Security Policy (CDSP), administered fourteenmissions. Three military operations were administered togetherwith eleven civilian missions. The latter were located inBosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia,DRC, the Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Furthermore,the military missions encompassed European UnionForce – Operation Althea (EUFOR Althea) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,the European Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta(EUNAVFOR Atalanta) off the coast of Somalia as well asin the Indian Ocean, and the European Training Mission Somalia(EUTM Somalia) in Uganda. Three civilian missions startedin 2012, namely EUCAP Nestor, which encompassed 29 personneland was intended to improve maritime security in Somalia,Kenya, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Tanzania. EUCAP SahelNiger, compromising 26 personnel, commenced in August2012 and aimed at strengthening Nigerien security forces.EUAVSEC’s aim was to enhance aviation security at SouthSudan’s Juba international airport, consisting of 13 personnel.In total, 2,514 troops and 3,421 civilian personnel worked inthe EU-administered missions.The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintainedthe International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,the Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in the MediterraneanSea, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), as well as the counter-piracyOperation Ocean Shield around the Horn of Africa and theGulf of Aden.Some 110,000 military personnel operated in NATO-ledmissions across three continents. With regard to the withdrawalof ISAF in 2014, the transfer of security responsibility toAfghan authorities continued in 2012. On November 21, Turkeyrequested NATO to deploy patriot missiles on its borderwith Syria. The member states Germany, the Netherlands, andthe US confirmed in December to station two missiles each inKahramanmaras, Adana, and Gaziantep, southern Turkey[1 Syria - Turkey].Furthermore, the African Union (AU) continued the AU Missionin Somalia (AMISOM) as well as the hybrid UN-AU missionin Darfur (UNAMID). Regional African organizations also maintainedmilitary missions. The Mission for the Consolidation ofPeace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) under theresponsibility of the Economic Community of Central AfricanStates (ECCAS) deployed additional troops to combat the Sélékarebellion in December, but was unable to stop their advance[1 Central African Republic (rebel groups)]. MICOPAXwas financed by the EU through the African Peace Facility(APF) within the framework of the Africa-EU partnership. Similarly,on November 11, the Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS) agreed to deploy 3,300 soldiers to endthe crisis in northern Mali.10

Measures of Conflict ResolutionCurrent UN Missions led or supported by DPKOMission AcronymName of Mission Start CountryEuropeUNFICYPUNMIKSub-Saharan AfricaUNMISSUNAMIDUNISFAMONUSCO—United Nations Peacekeeping Force in CyprusUnited Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo—United Nations Mission in the Republic of South SudanAfrican Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in DarfurUnited Nations Interim Security Force for AbyeiUnited Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo—19641999—2011200720012010—CyprusSerbia—South SudanSudanSudanCongo (Kinshasa)UNOCIUNMILThe AmericasMINUSTAHAsia and OceaniaUNAMAUNMITUNMOGIPThe Middle East and MaghrebMINURSOUNDOFUNIFILUNSMISUNTSOUnited Nations Operation in CÔte d’IvoireUnited Nations Mission in Liberia—United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti—United Nations Assistance Mission in AfghanistanUnited Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-LesteUNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan—United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western SaharaUnited Nations Disengagement Observer ForceUnited Nation Interim Forces in LebanonSupervision Mission in SyriaUnited Nations Truce Supervision Organization20042003—2004—200220061949—19911974197820121948CÔte d’IvoireLiberia—Haiti—AfghanistanTimor-LesteIndia, Pakistan—MoroccoSyria, IsraelLebanonSyriaMiddle East11

europe

EUROPE: No violent conflict: violent crisis: limited war: war14

EUROPEThe number of conflicts observed in Europe remained thesame, with a total of 58. The conflict between Norway andRussia (Barents Sea) ended in 2011, while a new violentopposition conflict erupted in Romania. It grew out of massdemonstrations against austerity measures, with protestersbeing violently dispersed by the authorities.As in the years before, Europe remained the region with thehighest share of non-violent conflicts, which accounted for 76percent of the region’s conflicts. Only thirteen conflicts wereconducted violently, with one of them being a limited war oversecession and system/ideology between Islamist militants andauthorities in the Russian Northern Caucasus Federal District(NCFD), embracing the republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Karbadino-Balkaria,Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia [1 Russia (Islamistmilitants / Northern Caucasus)]. The change in the numberof conflicts in Northern Caucasus compared to the Conflict Barometer2011 was a result of a methodological revision, mergingsix conflicts involving Islamist militants in NCFD. A largeshare of the Islamist militants strove with the same means forthe establishment of an independent Sharia-ruled CaucasusEmirate in NCFD. This necessitated a merger due to a high resemblanceof the conflict actors, items, and dynamics. In SouthCaucasus, the opposition conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgiaremained violent, whereas the conflict between the Armenianopposition and the government further de-escalated.Autonomy and secession were Europe's most frequentconflict items, accounting for fourteen conflicts each. All conflictsover autonomy remained on the lowest level of intensity,except for one that escalated to a violent crisis [1 FYROM (Albanianminority)]. In contrast, six conflicts concerning secessionwere carried out violently, two of them in Western Europeandemocracies [1 France (FLNC / Corsica), United Kingdom(Nationalists / Northern Ireland)]. The second most commonconflict item was international power, which was prevalent intwelve non-violent interstate conflicts, followed by territoryand system/ideology, each amounting to ten. The two crisesconcerning subnational predominance both decreased to thelowest level of intensity [1 Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabimilitants), Russia (Ingush minority / North Ossetia-Alania)].Europe’s sole violent interstate conflict was also the only violentone over territory [1 Armenia - Azerbaijan].Southeast Europe, including the Balkans, formerly Europe’smost violent area, featured 43 percent of the region’s conflicts.However, only four of them were judged as violent crises[1 Romania (opposition movement), Greece (social protests),FYROM (Albanian minority), Serbia (Kosovo)].Although non-violent, both conflicts concerning Cypruswitnessed lasting tensions due to its EU presidency and thehalt of UN-backed negotiations [1 Cyprus - Turkey, Cyprus(TRNC / Northern Cyprus)].In Middle and Eastern Europe, the system and power conflictin Belarus de-escalated to a non-violent crisis [1 Belarus(opposition)]. In the context of the Russian presidential elections,which resulted in the reinstatement of Vladimir Putin aspresident, the opposition conflict continued on a violent level[1 Russia (opposition groups)].In West and South Europe, two conflicts over secession remainedviolent [1 France (FLNC / Corsica), United Kingdom (Nationalists/ Northern Ireland)]. Europe’s largest demonstrationwas staged in the context of the Catalonian secession conflictwith up to 1.5 million protesters gathering in the Catalan capitalof Barcelona [1 Spain (Catalan nationalists / Catalonia)].The European Union obtained the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012for its work over six decades of promoting peace, reconciliation,democracy, and human rights. However, four out of the thirteenviolent conflicts in Europe were fought within EU member states.Among them were the conflicts concerning deterioratingsocio-economic conditions and austerity measures in Greeceand Romania in the context of the Euro debt crisis [1 Greece(social protests), Romania (opposition movement)].With 39 conflicts within states, twice as many intrastateconflicts as interstate conflicts were observed, with the lattercounting twenty conflicts. However Europe accounted for thehighest percent-share of interstate conflicts. In contrast toSub-Saharan Africa (sixteen percent), in Europe 33 percent ofall observed conflicts were between states.Conflict Intensities in Europe in2012 compared to 2011Frequency of Conflict Items in 2012 in Europe byIntensity Groups34342012 :2011 :13low Intensity :medium Intensity :high Intensity :129813 1211011554 443210 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 02 210 01010dispute non-violent crisis violent crisis limited war warterritoryinternationalpowersubnationalpredominanceresourcesothersystem / ideologyautonomydecolonisationsecessionnational power15

EUROPEConflicts in europe in 2012Name of conflict 1 16Armenia (opposition)Armenia – AzerbaijanAzerbaijan (Nagorno - Karabakh)*Azerbaijan (opposition groups)*Azerbaijan - IranBelarus (opposition groups)Belarus – Poland*Belgium (N-VA / Flanders)Bosnia and Herzegovina (BosnianSerbs / Republic of Srpska)Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croatparties / Herzegovina)*Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabimilitants)Croatia (Croatian Serbs / Krajina,West and East Slavonia)*Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)Cyprus - TurkeyDenmark - Canada (Hans Island)*Estonia (Russian-speaking minority)*France (FLNC/ Corsica)FYROM (Albanian minority)Georgia (Abkhazia)Georgia (Armenian minority)*Georgia (Azeri minority)*Georgia (opposition groups)Georgia (South Ossetia)*Greece (social protests)Greece - FYROM (official name ofFYROM)*Hungary – Romania (minority)*Hungary – Slovakia (minority)*Italy (Lega Nord / northern Italy)*Italy (Red Brigades)*Latvia (Russian-speaking minority)Moldova (AEI– PCRM)*Moldova (Transdniestria)*Romania (Hungarian minority /Transylvania)*Romania (opposition movement)Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4opposition vs. governmentArmenia vs. AzerbaijanNagorno Karabakh vs. governmentopposition groups vs. governmentAzerbaijan vs. Iranopposition groups vs.governmentBelarus vs. PolandN-VA vs. government, WalloonpartiesRepublic of Srpska vs. centralgovernment, Bosniak - CroatFederationnational powerterritorysecessionsystem / ideology, national powerinternational powersystem / ideology, national powerinternational powerautonomysecession200319871988200320111994199420071995656133322111Croat parties vs. centralgovernment, Bosniak-CroatFederation, Bosniak, partiesWahhabi militants vs. governmentCroatian Serbs vs. governmentopposition movement vs.governmentautonomysystem / ideology, subnationalpredominanceautonomyTRNC vs. governmentsecessionCyprus vs. Turkeyterritory, international power,resourcesDenmark vs. CanadaterritoryRussian-speaking minority vs. autonomygovernmentFLNC vs. governmentsecessionAlbanian minority vs. ethnic otherMacedoniansAbkhazian separatists vs.secessiongovernmentArmenian minority vs. government autonomyAzeri minority vs. government autonomyopposition groups vs. government system/ideology, national powerSouth Ossetian separatists vs. secessiongovernmentleftwing militants, other civic system / ideologyprotest groups vs. governmentGreece vs. Former Yugoslav otherRepublic of MacedoniaHungary vs. Romaniainternational powerHungary vs. Slovakiainternational powerLega Nord vs. government autonomyRed Brigades vs. government system / ideologyRussian-speaking minority vs. autonomygovernmentAEI vs. PCRMsystem / ideology, national powerTransdniestrian separatists vs. secessiongovernmentHungarian minority vs. government autonomynational power, other199220081991196320051973199119751991198920042004200719891973199119901993199119701991200919891989201243NEW1112211333113231111211213

EUROPEConflicts in europe in 2012Name of conflict 1 17Russia (Ingush minority / NorthOssetia-Alania)*Russia (IIslamist militant groups /Northern Caucasus)Russia (opposition groups)Russia – Estonia*Russia – Georgia*Russia – Kazakhstan et al. (CaspianSea)*Russia – Latvia*Russia – Norway et al. (Arctic)*Russia – Ukraine*Serbia (Albanian minority / PresevoValley)*Serbia (Bosniak minority / Sandzak)*Serbia (Kosovo)Serbia (Vojvodina)Serbia (Wahhabi militants /Sandzak)*Slovakia (Hungarian minority/southern Slovakia)*Slovenia – Croatia (border)Spain (Catalan nationalists /Catalonia)Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)Spain – United Kingdom (Gibraltar)*Turkey – Armenia*Turkey – Greece (border)*United Kingdom (Nationalists/Northern Ireland)United Kingdom (SNP / Scotland)*USA – Russia (missile system)*Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4Ingush minority vs. goverment,OssetiansIslamist militants vs. governmentsubnational predominancesecession, system / ideology19921989414government vs. opposition groupsRussia vs. EstoniaRussia vs. GeorgiaRussia vs. Kazakhstan vs.Azerbaijan vs. Turkmenistan vs. IranRussia vs. Latviainternational powerRussia vs. Norway vs. United States territory, resourcesvs. Canada vs. DenmarkRussia – Ukraineterritory, international power,resourcesAlbanian minority vs. government autonomyBosniak minority vs. governmentKosovar government vs. centralgovernmentregional parties vs. governmentWahhabi militants vs. governmentHungarian minority vs. governmentSlovenia vs. CroatiaCiU, ERC, Catalan government vs.central governmentETA, PNV vs. governmentSpain vs. United KingdomTurkey vs. ArmeniaTurkey vs. GreeceSinn Féin, RAAD, RIRA, The IRA vs.DUP, Alliance Party, SDLP, UUP,UDA, UVF, governmentSNP, Scottish regional governmentvs. central governmentUSA vs. Russiasystem/ideology, national powerterritory, international powerinternational powerterritory, international power,resourcesautonomysecessionautonomysecession, system / ideologyautonomyterritorysecessionsecessionterritoryinternational power, otherterritorysecessionsecessioninternational power20011994199219931994200120032000199119891989200719931991197919591954199119731968200720076531111112131111121123121Conflicts marked with * are without description2Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review3Change in intensity compared to the previous year: 3 or 5 escalation by one or more than onelevel of intensity; 4 or 6 deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; no change4Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

EUROPEArmenia (opposition)Intensity: 1 Change: 6Start:2003no-Karabakh in Brussels, Belgium. In the meetings, Nalbandiandemanded a referendum over the final status of the disputedterritory, while Mammadyarov stressed that Nagorno-Karabakhbelonged to Azerbaijan.mtoConflict parties:Conflict items:opposition vs. governmentnational powerAzerbaijan(opposition groups)The conflict over national power between the opposition andthe government of President Serge Sarkisian further de-escalated.Ahead of the parliamentary elections on May 6, theopposition was in conflict with the government over the electorallaw. On January 3, Sarkisian announced amendments tothe Electoral Code to guarantee free and fair elections. Theopposition doubted the sincerity of these pledges and calledfor more radical changes, including voting on a party-list basis.On April 16, the four major opposition parties agreed toform the Inter-Party Center for Public Oversight of Elections(ICPOE). The Republican Party (HHK) of Sarkisian won the absolutemajority in the May elections. The Armenian NationalCongress (HAK) of former president Levon Ter-Petrosian gained5.3 percent of the vote. OSCE called the elections competitiveand largely peaceful. ICPOE reported numerous proceduralviolations, such as the dismissal of voters’ complaintsby election commissions, vote-buying by HHK and its coalitionpartner Prosperous Armenia, which included for instance thedistribution of 500 tractors. Two days after the elections, approx.5,000 HAK supporters protested in the capital Yerevan,demanding judicial review of the ballot. On December 25, Ter-Petrosian announced that he would not run for president inFebruary 2013.lwArmenia - AzerbaijanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:opposition vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power2003The system and power conflict between oppositional groupsand the government went on. Throughout the year, most rallieswere held mainly in the capital Baku in spring. Police repeatedlyarrested and injured activists, oppositional journalists,and bloggers. Five non-parliamentary parties formed the ResistanceMovement for a Democratic Society on January 12.On March 1, approx. 1,000 people demanded the resignationof the local governor in Quba, Quba district. Some protesterstorched his house and damaged administrative buildings.Police dispersed the crowd by using rubber bullets and teargas. Three police officers and one journalist were injured. OnMarch 17, police beat up and detained three political activistsat a demonstration staged by youth organizations in Baku. Inthe forefront of this year’s Eurovision Song Contest in Baku,several rallies repeatedly gathered some thousand people inApril and May. On October 20 and November 17, police arrested60 attendants of oppositional rallies in the capital. Theopposition called for civil liberties, social and democratic reformsand the release of political prisoners, as well as earlyparliamentary elections and a new constitution, facing the upcomingpresidential elections in 2013.lw, ldIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Armenia vs. AzerbaijanterritoryStart:1987Azerbaijan - IranIntensity: 2 Change: 5Start:2011The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakhregion, internationally recognized as Azerbaijaniterritory but predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians,continued. Throughout the year, both parties frequently violatedthe 1994 ceasefire agreement. For instance, on January14, according to official Azerbaijani sources, Armenian securitypersonnel opened fire at Azerbaijani positions at the Lineof Contact (LoC) close to the villages of Chayli and Yarymdzha,Tartar district. Clashes at the LoC in early June left five Azerbaijaniand three Armenian soldiers dead and several woundedin the district of Qazakh. On June 11, a mine blast injured twoAzerbaijani officers at the LoC. Sniper attacks killed one Armenianand one Azerbaijani soldier in Tavush province, Armenia,in March. On January 23, Armenian President Serge Sarkisianand his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliev met for negotiationsin Sochi, Russia, mediated by Russian President DmitryMedvedev.On December 17, Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandianand his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarovheld separate meetings with EU representatives over Nagor-Conflict parties:Conflict items:Azerbaijan vs. Iraninternational powerThe conflict over international power between Azerbaijan andIran increased but remained non - violent. In mid-January,Azerbaijani authorities detained three men, suspected of carryingout Iran-backed plans to assassinate public figures inAzerbaijan, as well as illegally acquiring and transporting firearms,military supplies, and explosives. On January 16, a cyber-attackblocked about a dozen official Azerbaijani websites,including those of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party, the ConstitutionalCourt, and the Interior and Communications Ministries.A similar attack obstructed access to Iranian websitesone day later. Two groups calling themselves the AzerianCyberArmyand Pirates Crew claimed responsibility. A meetingbetween the countries’ foreign ministers and their Turkish colleaguescheduled the same day was canceled. After Israel hadsold drones, antiaircraft and missile defense systems to Azerbaijanon February 27, Iran repeatedly accused the country ofallowing Israeli intelligence activity on its territory [1 Armenia18

EUROPE– Azerbaijan]. In February, Azerbaijani police detained 22 personssuspected of planning attacks on the embassies of theUSA and Israel in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku and of having linksto Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Policeconfiscated AK-47 rifles, guns, and explosives. A courtsentenced the suspects to jail terms ranging from ten to fifteenyears on October 9. During a two-day meeting withIran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in order to soothetensions, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev statedon March 12 that Azerbaijani territory was not to be used fora military attack on Iran. However, Iran withdrew its ambassadoron May 21, following a visit of Israeli Foreign MinisterAvigdor Lieberman to Baku on April 23 and anti-Iran demonstrationson May 11 [1 Iran - Israel]. He was reassigned onemonth later. Likewise, Azerbaijan summoned its ambassadorfor consultations on May 30. Iranian authorities arrested twoalleged Azerbaijani spies in May, in the city of Tabriz, but releasedthem on September 4. Also in May, Azerbaijani authorcitiesarrested four Azerbaijani citizens suspected ofplotting attacks on the eve of the Eurovision Song Contest inBaku and of having ties to members of the IRGC. They weresentenced to prison terms varying between twelve and fourteenyears.ldBelarusIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition groups)2 Change: 6Start:opposition groups vs. governmentsystem/ideology, national power1994The system and national power conflict between oppositiongroups and the government de-escalated to a non-violentlevel. The government continued to repress the oppositionsystematically. Throughout the year, authorities arrestedabout 70 activists and journalists on charges of hooliganismand public indecency, evicted them from their homes, or expelledthem from university. Authorities impeded or prohibitedprotest rallies and public gatherings. However, on March25, which is Belarus’ Freedom Day, about 5,000 protesters inMinsk staged the first sanctioned rally since the crackdownon 12/19/10.Following cyber attacks on oppositional websites at theend of 2011, a law was passed on January 6, restricting accessto foreign and anti-government websites. Another law, passedon June 6, allowed the Committee for State Security (KGB) tobreak into people’s houses without a warrant. Furthermore,the government authorized KGB to ban Belarusians from travelingabroad on its own discretion on July 6.On January 19, the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD)was again denied registration as a political party. On February2, an alliance of four opposition parties threatened to withdrawtheir candidates from parliamentary elections unlessall political prisoners were liberated. Belarusian authoritiesannounced on June 25 to allow OSCE observers to monitorparliamentary elections. Several opposition groups boycottedparliamentary elections held on September 23. The votingprocess was denounced as fraudulent by the EU, OSCE, andthe Belarusian opposition.jdrBelgiumIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(N-VA / Flanders)1 Change: N-VA vs. governmentautonomyStart:2007The autonomy conflict between the nationalist party New FlemishAlliance (N-VA) and the government continued. On March11, N-VA accused Francophone Socialists’ (PS) Prime MinisterElio Di Rupo of not taking Flemish demands into accountin the 2012 budget. On September 10, N-VA leader Bart DeWever expressed optimism about his party’s prospects regardingthe 2014 federal elections and called on the Francophonesto prepare for confederalism. In mid-October, local electionswere held all over the country. N-VA won the municipalelections in Flanders’ important city of Antwerp, gaining 37.7percent of the votes. Following the victory, De Wever urged DiRupo to reshape the federal system. On October 19, Di Rupodemanded the European leaders to tackle the economic crisisin order to fight against the rise of separatist movements. OnOctober 27, unknown persons placed a chopped pig’s head infront of De Wever’s house in Antwerp. In his traditional Christmasaddress, King Albert II warned of populism, drawing ananalogy to the rise of fascism in the 1930s. In reaction, DeWever accused the King of having politicized his role and demandedhis resignation.fmbBosnia and Herzegovina (BosnianSerbs / Republic of Srpska)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:1 Change: Start:1995Republic of Srpska vs. central government,Bosniak-Croat FederationsecessionThe secession conflict between the Republic of Srpska (RS)and the central government continued. In the forefront of celebrationsmarking the 20th anniversary of the founding ofRS, a large amount of weapons and ammunition was foundat the designated venue in Banja Luka, RS, on January 8. RSboycotted Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) 20th anniversary ofindependence on March 1. RS President Milorad Dodik calledthe date an event only for Bosnians. On October 4, Dodik announcedan initiative for the abolition of the federal armedforces. During her visit to Sarajevo on October 30, US Secretaryof State Hillary Clinton criticized Bosnian Serb leaders forchallenging the territorial integrity of BiH and stressed theimportance of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement. Before theUN Security Council on November 13, High Representative forBosnia and Herzegovina Valentin Inzko warned about secessionistrhetoric used by RS leaders, in particular by Dodik. TheCouncil extended the mandate of the EUFOR Althea operationuntil November 2013.mmu19

EUROPEBosnia and Herzegovinamilitants)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:The conflict over ideology and subnational predominance betweenWahhabi militants and the government decreased. OnJanuary 21, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) Security MinisterSadik Ahmetovic announced measures to prevent Islamist attacks,in reaction to the one against the US embassy in the capitalof Sarajevo on 10/28/11. In an operation on January 30,police forces raided five Wahhabi-inhabited houses in Brcko.Authorities arrested Nusret Imamovic, leader of the largestWahhabi community in BiH, as well as two others and found asniper rifle, allegedly used in the US embassy attack. On April23, Bosnian prosecutors charged three assumed Wahhabi militantswith the attack. One of the suspects, Mevlid Jasarevic,said he was inspired by Imamovic. On December 6, the courtsentenced Jasarevic to nineteen years in prison while acquittingthe others.mmuCyprusIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:1 Change: 4(TRNC / Northern Cyprus)2 Change: TRNC vs. governmentsecessionStart:Start:(Wahhabi2008Wahhabi militants vs. governmentsystem/ideology, subnational predominance1963The secession conflict between the self-declared Turkish Republicof Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the government continuedon a non-violent level. The UN-backed negotiations,mainly concerning governance, individual property claims,and territorial issues between TRNC leader Dervis Eroglu andthe president of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitrios Christofias,were resumed on January 4. In the first half of the year, theparties held several meetings until Cyprus took over the EUpresidency on July 1. Eroglu declared that day the end of allnegotiations. Additionally, TRNC’s motherland Turkey ceasedall contact with Cyprus in the second half of the year [1 Cyprus– Turkey]. While the government blamed TRNC of not pursuinga solution on the agreed basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communalfederation, Eroglu perceived the first meetings as positive.Following a two-day meeting between the parties and UN Secretary-GeneralBan Ki-moon in Greentree, New York, havingstarted on January 22, Ban announced to call an internationalconference to end the conflict if main differences could beovercome. On January 25, the government criticized AlexanderDowner, Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General inCyprus, after he had called Cyprus’ approaching EU presidencythe "Presidency of the Greek Cypriots". A week later, theGreek Cypriot parliament adopted a resolution which rebukedDowner for perceived bias. Throughout February and Marchand under the auspices of UN officials, Eroglu and Christofiasrepeatedly discussed property issues at the UN residence,located in the buffer zone. On April 4, TRNC representativeKudret Ozersay suggested to re-open the uninhabited townof Varosha, allowing for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live underTurkish Cypriot rule. Christofias responded by referringto UN Resolution 550, which stated that Varosha should beunder UN administration before the inhabitants could return.On April 21, Ban called off his plans for an international summitand announced to no longer host the meetings of Cypriotleaders due to their failure to narrow lasting differences. OnJuly 19, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of theUnited Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until01/30/13.fmbCyprus – TurkeyIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: Start:2005Cyprus vs. Turkeyterritory, international power, resourcesThe conflict over international power, territory, and resourcesbetween Cyprus and Turkey continued. Cyprus repeatedly demandedTurkey to withdraw its troops from northern Cyprusand to abide by UN resolutions. On March 4, Turkey’s Ministerof European Affairs, Egemen Bagis, stated that he consideredannexing northern Cyprus in case reunification talksfailed [1 Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)]. As of July 1, Turkeyabstained from Cyprus-led meetings during the latter’sEU presidency, however, it continued collaboration with theEU. On October 15, Cyprus canceled this year’s Nikiforos militaryexercise. Similarly, Turkey called off its military exerciseToros on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus(TRNC) five days later. On December 10, Cyprus’ DefenseMinister Demetris Eliades urged to strengthen the country’sdefense forces as long as Turkish troops were deployed in thenorth of the island.Throughout the year, the countries were in conflict over oiland gas drillings in disputed waters off Cyprus. On February17, Cyprus rejected Turkish claims on its Exclusive EconomicZone (EEZ), demanding Ankara to stop provocative actions inregard to Cyprus’ exploratory drillings. Turkey’s state-run TurkishPetroleum Corporation launched oil and natural gas drillingsin the TRNC at the end of April. The Cypriot governmentcondemned the move as illegal. However, the drilling wasabandoned in October after the search had yielded no results.On May 18, Cyprus accused Turkey of pursuing an expansionistagenda in the region after Turkey had threatened withreprisals against companies that were bidding for Cypriot drillingprojects. Turkey conducted military exercises within theEEZ in mid-July, which were denounced by Eliades as an infringementof the freedom of navigation at sea. On July 31, Turkeywarned fifteen countries, among them Russia, China, France,UK, and Norway, against participating in a licensing round fordrilling blocks in the EEZ.fmb20

EUROPERomaniaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:A new conflict concerning national power and socio-economicconditions emerged between oppositional civic and politicalgroups, on the one hand, and the government of PresidentTraian Basescu, on the other. Throughout the year, protestsagainst the government’s austerity measures and decreasingliving standards had left several hundreds injured. On January10, Deputy Health Minister Raed Arafat resigned criticizingthe new healthcare reform bill. Two days later, demonstrationsin support of Arafat began taking place across the country.The largest demonstration took place in Targo Mures, MuresCounty, with about 3,000 participants. On January 14, morethan 1,000 protested against the government and Basescu inUniversity Square in the capital Bucharest. Some torched cars,looted shops, and threw stones, injuring one camera man andfour policemen. Police responded by using tear gas and watercannon injuring around a dozen protesters and detainingabout 30. Opposition parties joined the protests on January16, resulting in more than 20,000 people demonstrating inseveral cities across the country in the following three days.Police detained dozens.On February 6, Prime Minister Emil Boc, Democratic LiberalParty, announced the government’s resignation. One monthlater, the newly formed Social Liberal Union (USL) of formeropposition leader and new Prime Minister Victor Ponta wonthe parliament’s approval, which was eventually confirmed inparliamentary elections on December 9. On July 6, parliamentsuspended Basescu from office, paving the way for a referendumon his impeachment. On July 27, over 15,000 people attendeda rally in Bucharest, urging Basescu to resign. Although87 percent of the constituents voted against Basescu in thereferendum on July 29, it was declared invalid as the voterturnout fell short of the 50 percent required. On August 22,the Constitutional Court reinstated Basescu.mapRussia (Islamist militants /Northern Caucasus)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition movement)3 Change: NEW4 Change: Start:Start:Islamist militants vs. governmentsecession, system / ideology2012opposition movement vs. governmentnational power, other1989The system and secession conflict between Islamist militantsof the Caucasian Front (CF), led by self-proclaimed CaucasianEmir Dokka Umarov, on the one hand, and the central as wellas regional governments, on the other, continued on a highlyviolent level. The CF aimed at establishing a Caucasus Emirateruled by Sharia law and spanning over the North CaucasusFederal District (NCFD) comprising the Federal Republics ofChechnya (RoC), Dagestan (RoD), Ingushetia (RoI), Kabardino-Balkaria (RoKB), Karachay-Cherkessia (RoKC), and North Oss-etia-Alania (RoNOA), as well as the region Stavropol Krai (SK).Several local militant groups operating in the republics supportedthe CF, such as the Ingush Jamaat, the Yarmuk Jamaat in RoKC,Kataib al-Khoul aka the Ossetian Jamaat, and the Shariat Jamaat.Shootings, bombings, and ambushes against security forces,government authorities, and civilians occurred at times on a dailybasis. Responsibility for the attacks was uncertain in manycases but usually attributed to CF-aligned Islamist militants byofficials. Throughout the year, the conflict claimed approx. 600lives, among them at least 379 insurgents and 211 servicemen,including 149 police officers.The situation further escalated in RoD, where 232 insurgentsand 130 servicemen had been killed, therefore accounting fortwo thirds of the total number of deaths in NCFD. According to therepublic’s Interior Ministry, at least twelve groups made up of nearly300 militants operating in RoD. In the course of the year, governmentforces significantly increased their efforts against militantIslamist activities. Russian authorities started deploying InteriorMinistry personnel as military reinforcements. After relocating twodivisions from Chechnya consisting of more than 20,000 personnelin March, military forces in Dagestan exceeded 60,000. Additionally,more than 17,000 police officers were active in the region. On January13, security forces destroyed an insurgent’s base near the villageof Bolshaya Oreshevka, confiscating equipment and munitions. InFebruary, during a four-day operation close to the Chechen border,at least 20 rebels and seventeen security forces were killed. Amongthe casualties was Ibragim-Chalil Daudow, the suspected leader ofthe Islamist militants in Dagestan. Dokka Umarov announced AmirAbu Muchammad to be Daudow’s successor. On May 3, suspectedIslamist militants conducted a bomb attack on a police station in theDagestani capital Makhachkala, killing at least thirteen people andwounding more than 120. On May 15, during an operation in thesame city, Russian forces killed Gusein Mamaev, another suspectedleader of the Islamist insurgency. On November 20, Russian SpecialForces killed Taimas Taimasov, an alleged leader of an Islamist militantcell, in the eastern village of Gubden. Islamist militants also targetedseveral moderate Muslim leaders, among them Said Afandi,leader of a Sufi Muslim brotherhood on August 28.In Chechnya, frequent attacks and combat actions betweensecurity forces and militants caused at least 90 deaths and numerousinjuries. On August 6, the anniversary of the city’s stormingby Chechen militants in 1996, a suicide attack left four peopledead in the Chechen capital Grozny. Casualties included twoofficers, one soldier, and one civilian, while three others were injured.Unknown assailants attacked a police vehicle near the villageof Alkhan-Kala on August 18, killing four officers. On September 6,another police officer was killed in Grozny when a bomb detonatedunder his car. Until September, approx. 30 militants and 40 servicemenwere killed and more than 50 servicemen injured in specialoperations. Four Russian soldiers and four militants were killedin a shootout on January 8 in the Vedensky district, leaving sixteenother servicemen wounded. In a similar incident in the Gudermesdistrict, two insurgents and two police officers died on April 22.Two militants, allegedly ordered by Dokka Umarov to assassinateChechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, were killed in Grozny on June15, according to official sources. At least four militants and twopolice officers were killed in a special operation against an armedmilitant group led by Muslim Gakayev in the mountainous area ofVedensky district on September 20. After government forces hadcaptured rebel leader Emir Mukharbi Isaev on September 18 in23

EUROPEVedeno district, further operations were conducted in the area. Ina series of clashes beginning on September 20, four suspectedmilitants and four government forces were killed with the militaryusing helicopters, artillery, and heavy mortars to shell forest areas.In Ingushetia, gunfights, bomb attacks, and assassination attemptson local officials and security forces frequently took place.Two policemen died in a bomb explosion in Malgobek on April 28.In June and July, five security forces and one civilian were killed.On August 13, attackers shot dead two Russian servicemen intheir car near the border to North Ossetia-Alania. On August 19, asuicide bomber killed eight people and injured at least fifteen duringthe funeral of a killed police officer in Sagopshi. The attemptwas attributed to a militant group led by Artur Getagadzhev, aDokka Umarov lieutenant. A group of ten to twelve militants killedfour policemen in an armed clash near the village of Dattykh onOctober 3. A suicide bomber killed one policeman at a checkpointnear the border to North Ossetia on October 23. From Octoberonwards, Russian security forces were supported by Russian armytroops for the first time since 2006. On January 27, security forceskilled Dzhamaleyl Mutaliyev, alleged senior leader of the CaucasusEmirate and two other militants in Nazranovskiy district. In Augustand September, Kadyrov informed about the killing of eightmilitants in special operations near the Chechen border, whileIngushetian officials denied Chechen involvement.In Kabardino-Balkaria, the conflict remained violent. On February2, attackers shot and wounded an official of the Urvansky districtand killed his driver near Shitkhala. In Baksan, an officer of theRussian Federal Security Service (FSB) was killed in a car explosionon June 10. According to Interior Minister Kazbek Tatuyev, morethan 70 militants had been killed in Kabardino-Balkarian. For instance,security forces killed two militants in the Baksanskiy districton January 12. Another six insurgents were killed in the village ofMir on March 12. On March 27, Russian forces killed Alim Zankishiyev,aka Ubaida, in Nalchik, leader of a militant group operating inKabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. Two militants diedand four policemen were injured in a shootout in Baksan on June10. Later federal forces killed a suspected coordinator of assaultson June 26. Police forces killed eight militants on September 20 inNalchik. Among them were four leading figures of the insurgency,two of whom were identified as Ruslan Batyrbekov, aka Emir of Kabardino-Balkaria,and Shamil Ulbashev, so-called Emir of Nalchik.Around November 17, security forces killed five militants during asearch operation near the village of Baksanenok.In Karachay-Cherkessia, the number of violent incidentsdecreased. On June 12, security troops and local police killedseveral militants, including Umar Baichorov, who was suspectedfor masterminding and conducting attacks targeting local policelast year.dh, jd, ka, lwRussiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition groups)3 Change: Start:government vs. opposition groupssystem/ideology, national power2001The system and power conflict between various oppositiongroups and the government continued. Several oppositionaland pro-government demonstrations were staged throughoutthe year, some of them turned violent.On February 4, according to official sources, 35,000 antigovernmentprotesters of the For Honest Elections movementgathered in Moscow, while organizers estimated their numbersat 200,000. Simultaneously, up to 35,000 protesters assembledin Saint Petersburg, forming the third mass demonstrationsince the parliamentary elections on 12/04/11. Two weekslater, designated president Vladimir Putin gathered 130,000supporters in Moscow. On February 26, about 30,000 peoplestaged an anti-government protest, forming a 16 km long humanchain in Moscow and wearing white ribbons as a symbolfor peaceful protest.The presidential elections on March 4 sparked anotherwave of pro- and anti-Putin protests. Opposition activists andindependent observers reported widespread fraud after Putinhad won with a majority of around 64 percent. During protestsin Moscow and Saint Petersburg one day later, police detainedbetween 120 and 550 people including opposition leadersAlexey Navalny and Sergei Udaltsov. On May 6, violence betweenprotesters and police officers erupted, with police usingbatons. Twenty protesters were injured and more than 250 outof at least 20,000 detained. Putin’s inauguration on May 7 wasaccompanied by about 120 detentions as a result of the firstof several consecutive March of Millions demonstrations. InJune, the Upper House passed a law according to which protesterscould be charged with about USD 50,000 or up to 200hours of community service. After law enforcement officialsraided homes of opposition leaders on June 11, they detainedNavalny and Udaltsov one day later, an hour before they wereto speak on a demonstration.Shortly after pronouncing the sentence for the punk band PussyRiot for an anti-Putin performance at the Cathedral of Christ theSavior, Moscow, hundreds of activists demonstrated in front ofthe court on August 17. Some were detained. On September 14,the Duma unseated parliamentarian and Kreml-critic GennadyGudkov, a move criticized by the EU. On October 14, gubernatorialelections along with communal elections, in which Putin’sUnited Russia secured a majority, had to face accusations offorgery. After the Russian Investigative Committee (SK) hadaccused and questioned opposition activists Leonid Razvozzhayev,Konstantin Lebedev, and Sergei Udaltsov about plottinga mass disorder with foreign assistance, Razvozzhayev claimedon October 21 of being kidnapped from Kiev while seeking politicalasylum and later being tortured by SK. From October 20 to22, the opposition held its own Coordination Council elections.Almost 200,000 people had registered for the vote. fesSerbiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Kosovo)3 Change: Start:1989Kosovar government vs. central governmentsecessionThe secession conflict between the Kosovar government, supportedby the Albanian majority in Kosovo, on the one hand,and the central government of Serbia and parts of the Serbianminority in Kosovo, on the other, remained violent. Althoughboth sides held EU-mediated talks, tensions arose in24

EUROPEthe northern part of Kosovo, mainly inhabited by ethnic Serbs.On January 1, deputies of the three main Serb municipalitiesin northern Kosovo decided to hold a referendum in Februaryon whether they wanted to acknowledge legal bindings byKosovar institutions or not. On February 14 and 15, Serbs innorthern Kosovo rejected Kosovar rule. The referendum wasdenounced by both the Kosovar and Serbian governments andwas not legally binding. Serbian President Boris Tadic ruledout EU requirements regarding relations with Kosovo during avisit to a monastery in Pec, west Kosovo, on January 7. About200 protesters from the Kosovar opposition Self-Determinationmovement (Vetevendosje), mainly ethnic Albanians, demonstratedagainst his visit and threw stones at Tadic’s convoy.On January 14, hundreds of Vetevendosje members triedto block two border crossings near Merdare and Bela Zemljaand clashed with Kosovar police, who used tear gas and watercannon, arresting 146 protesters. 52 people, including 31 policeofficers, were injured.A new round of EU-sponsored dialog between Kosovo andSerbia started in Brussels on February 21, resulting in an agreementconcerning Kosovo’s participation in regional andEU-Balkan forums and the application of previous agreementslike the integrated border management. As a consequence,some border crossings were opened on February 23. On February27, more than 1,000 Kosovar Albanian hardliners protestedagainst the agreement. On March 1, Serbia was givenEU candidacy status. Unknown persons attacked a Serbiandelegation with stones in Pristina on April 4 when heading toa meeting with Kosovar officials. On April 8, tensions rose innorth Kosovo when a bomb exploded in Mitrovica, leaving oneethnic Albanian dead and five children injured. The same day,three unidentified assailants beat up a Serb and hundreds ofSerbs dismantled a mobile police post right after Kosovar officialshad set it up. On May 23, unknown attackers torchedtwo houses belonging to Serbian refugees in Drenovac.On June 1, two KFOR soldiers and three Serbs were woundedin a clash when a crowd tried to stop them from removingborder barricades. On June 19, unknown attackers threw twogrenades at KFOR barracks at the border. About twenty Serbsand 40 officials were injured during border clashes betweenSerbs and Kosovar police on June 28 - 70 Serbs had enteredKosovo, threwing stones at the authorities and firing automaticrifles. Later that day, unknown perpetrators attacked fivebuses, carrying Kosovar Serb students, with stones and Molotovcocktails in Pristina, injuring ten. On August 2, a groupof ethnic Albanians raided mainly Serb-populated Grabac anddamaged houses, injuring one person. On August 14, a groupof Serbs attacked two Albanians in Mitrovica, leaving one ofthem severely injured. On September 7, a policewoman wasinjured in northern Kosovo when unknown attackers openedfire at vehicles carrying EULEX forces and Kosovar police.On October 18, EU chief diplomat Catherine Ashton metthe prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia in a bid to re-launchtalks. Four days later, hundreds protested and threw stonesat police that used tear gas in response, leaving dozens injuredin Pristina. The protest was organized by Vetevendosje,which opposes all talks with Serbia. As a reaction, Kosovar PrimeMinister Hashim Thaci called on the movement to halt itsprotests. On November 7, the prime ministers of Serbia andKosovo held talks again.mapSerbiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Vojvodina)1 Change: Start:regional parties vs. governmentautonomy1989The secession conflict between the Catalan regional govern-The autonomy conflict between regional parties of Vojvodina,among them the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV), theUnion of Socialists of Vojvodina, the Vojvodinian Movement, andthe Alliance for Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) on the one hand, andthe central government, on the other, continued. On March 12, theVojvodina Assembly president and SVM member Sandor Egeresidemanded an own police force for Vojvodina. In regional parliamentaryelections on May 6 and 20, the Choice for a Better Vojvodina coalition,led by LSV Vice President and President of the Governmentof Vojvodina, Bojan Pajtic, gained the majority of votes, winning 58out of 120 seats. On July 11, the Constitutional Court declared partsof the Law on Establishing Jurisdiction of Vojvodina, implementedin January 2010, as unconstitutional. While the Democratic Party ofSerbia leader Vojislav Kostunica supported the court’s decision seeingit as an important step to stop further dissolution from Serbia,LSV urged the regional government to appeal to the European Courtof Human Rights. On October 13, Prime Minister Ivica Dacic andPajtic met in Belgrade to discuss the Constitutional Court’s decision,specifically the Law on Financing of Vojvodina.fphSlovenia – CroatiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:1 Change: Slovenia vs. Croatiaterritory(border)Start:1991The maritime and land border dispute between Slovenia and Croatiacontinued. After both countries submitted their arbitrationagreement to the UN on 05/25/11, Croatian Minister of ForeignAffairs Vesna Pusic and his Slovenian counterpart Samuel Zbogarmet in Brussels on January 10 to discuss a list of potential arbitratorjudges for the dispute resolution process. On January 18, Pusicand Zbogar announced the five candidates in Zagreb. Moreover,both sides agreed to accept any judgment of the panel, withoutthe possibility of appeal. At a meeting in The Hague, Netherlands,on April 14, Croatia and Slovenia agreed to submit their memorandaand reasoning on 02/11/13 and their counter-memoranda on11/11/13. The deciding debate will be held in spring 2015. sthSpain (Catalan nationalists /Catalonia)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:1 Change: Start:1979CiU, ERC, Catalan government vs. centralgovernmentsecession25

EUROPEment and the central government continued on a non-violentlevel. On March 14, some municipalities called for tax disobedienceagainst the central state. On July 18, the Catalonianpresident and Convergence and Union (CiU) leader, Artur Mas,exhorted other regions to object to a government’s austerityplan, according to which the regions had to reduce their publicdeficit to 1.5 percent of the economic output. Additionally,he blamed the central government to be responsible for thetense economic situation of Catalonia. On September 11, theCatalan national holiday, up to 1.5 million people demonstratedpeacefully in Barcelona against the government’s fiscalpolicy, for greater tax autonomy, and for independence. PrimeMinister Mariano Rajoy rejected the Catalan’s demands ina meeting with Mas on September 20. In response, Mas announcedsnap elections. On September 27, the Catalan regionalparliament adopted a resolution backing Mas’ demandsfor a referendum on independence during the next legislativeperiod in case CiU won the snap elections. The centralgovernment declared a referendum unconstitutional and onOctober 9, parliament voted against the Republican Left ofCatalonia (ERC) party’s motion that asked for the executivepermission to hold such a referendum. In snap elections onNovember 25, the pro-independence parties CiU and ERCemerged as the strongest parties. On December 12, CiU andERC agreed to hold a referendum on independence beforethe end of 2014.joeSpainIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(ETA, PNV / Basque provinces)2 Change: ETA, PNV vs. governmentsecessionStart:1959The conflict between Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA)and the central government concerning the secession of theBasque Country from Spain continued on a non-violent level.Since ETA declared a permanent ceasefire on 01/10/11, Presidentof the Government Mariano Rajoy entered into a dialogwith the President of the Basque regional government, PatxiLópez, agreeing on fundamentals to marginalize ETA. On February10, French police found a weapons cache in Capbreton,southwestern France, allegedly belonging to ETA. The politicalwing of ETA apologized for the first time on February 26 forthe group’s armed struggle. On March 8, ETA urged France andSpain to open direct talks on a definitive end to the conflictand on the situation of arrested ETA members. On May 3, theNational Court sentenced former head of ETA Félix Alberto Lópezde la Calle Gauna, alias Mobutu, to 81 years in prison. InAugust, about 700 ETA members in French and Spanish prisons,including former leader Arnaldo Otegi, went on hungerstrike to demand the release of terminally ill ETA member IosuUribetxebarria. A few days later, the government agreed to releasehim. In the regional elections on October 21, the proindependenceBasque Nationalist Party (PNV) and EH Bildu,a separatist coalition, became the strongest parties with 27and 21 seats, respectively. PNV leader Inigo Urkullu becameBasque Prime Minister. On October 28, police arrested ETAtop leader Izaskun Lesaka and another suspected ETA mem-ber in Macon, France. On November 12, about 15,000 peopledemonstrated in Bayonne, southwestern France, in support ofarrested Basque separatists. On November 24, ETA announceda possible disbanding under certain conditions, especially thetransfer of detained members to Basque prisons. A total of nineteenpeople suspected of having links to ETA were arrestedthis year, twelve of them in France.joeUnited Kingdom (Nationalists /Northern Ireland)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:1968Sinn Féin, RAAD, RIRA, The IRA vs. DUP,Alliance Party, SDLP, UUP, UDA, UVF,governmentsecessionThe conflict between the antagonistic communities over thesecession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom continued.On May 24, the Alliance Party withdrew from the fivepartyworking group aimed at promoting better communityrelations and greater integration in Northern Ireland. Allianceleader David Ford said there had not been enough progress onthe issues of integrated education, segregated housing, or illegalflags. On July 19, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,Owen Paterson, criticized the Stormont Executive over thedelay in the publication of the community relations strategy(CSI). On October 16, Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams declaredrepublican ambitions for Irish unity had been boosted bythe decision to hold a referendum on Scottish independencein 2014 [1 United Kingdom (SNP / Scotland)].On December 3, the Belfast City Council voted to fly theunion flag at city hall only on designated days, compromisingon the nationalists’ pledge to take down the flag altogether. Aloyalists’ protest outside the building erupted into violence,leaving fifteen police officers injured. On December 8, AssistantChief Constable Will Kerr said loyalist paramilitary groupswere actively involved in orchestrating the disorder. At least29 police officers were injured and 40 people arrested as aresult of protest-related violence.Throughout the year, paramilitary violence continued. TheRepublican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) claimed responsibilityfor the murder of a man in Buncrana, County Donegal, Republicof Ireland, on February 9. On September 3, Real Irish RepublicanArmy (RIRA) key figure Alan Ryan was shot dead in theClongriffin area of Dublin, Republic of Ireland. Three men weresubsequently charged over paramilitary displays at his funeral.On October 24, the Home Office declared the threat level inNorthern Ireland remained severe still regarding an attack bydissident republicans very likely. Again, on November 1, a prisonofficer was shot and killed in County Armagh. On November12, a new paramilitary group calling itself The IRA claimedresponsibility for the murder.jb26

Sub-Saharan Africa

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: No violent conflict: violent crisis: limited war: war28

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAAt a total 90 conflicts, the number of conflicts in Sub-SaharanAfrica decreased by two compared to 2011. The number ofhighly violent conflicts increased by five to eighteen. Thiswas the highest number of highly violent conflicts observedin Sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the observationperiod in 1945. All wars and limited wars were recordedin Western, Eastern and Central Africa, with Southern Africabeing only sporadically affected. Altogether, nine wars wereobserved: Four conflicts continued as a war [1 Somalia (Islamistgroups), Sudan (Darfur), Sudan (inter-ethnic violence),Nigeria (Boko Haram)], whereas five conflicts escalated tothe intensity level of a war. The conflict between the Islamistgroup al-Shabaab and the Somali government, supported bythe Ahlu Sunna wa-Jama’a, was fought as a war for the seventhyear running. The war between various ethnic groupsin South Sudan and the war in the Sudanese region of Darfurcontinued, the latter since its eruption in 2003. In addition,the conflict between the Islamist group Boko Haram, mainlyactive in northern Nigeria, and the government remained onthe intensity level of a war. In the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC), the conflict between former CNDP rebels andthe government escalated by three levels. The rebels starteddefecting from the army in Nord Kivu province in March,forming the new group M23 in May. The rebellion reachedthe level of a war in May, when government forces and therebels clashed near Virunga National Park. The conflict betweenthe National Movement for the Liberation of Azawadaiming at the secession of the regions Timbuktu, Gao, andKidal in northern Mali, and the Islamist group Ansar al-Din,on the one hand, and the government, on the other, turnedhighly violent at the beginning of 2012. Although having deescalatedto a violent crisis in 2011, the conflict over arableland between the predominantly Christian farmers of Beromand Tiv tribes on the one hand, and the mainly Muslim Fulaninomads on the other, escalated to a war for the first time.The former limited war over territory and resources betweenSudan and South Sudan escalated to a war, constituting theonly interstate war worldwide. Additionally, the conflict betweenthe SPLM/A-North, which formed the Sudanese RevolutionaryFront with two other armed groups, and the SudaneseConflict Intensities in sub-Saharan Africain 2012 compared to 2011government over the status of the provinces of Blue Nile andSouth Kordofan intensified to the level of a war.Three of the wars observed in 2011 de-escalated to violentcrises. A peace treaty was reached between several militiasand the government of South Sudan in February 2012,leading to a significant decrease in rebel activity throughoutthe year. After Laurent Gbagbo had surrendered in April 2011and Alassane Ouatarra became president of Côte d’Ivoire, theconflict between supporters of presidential candidates Ouattaraand Gbagbo de-escalated to a violent crisis in the secondhalf of 2011 and had become on this level in 2012. Similarly,the conflict between Northerners and Southerners in Nigeria,which had escalated in the course of the presidentialelections in 2011, eased by two levels. The war between theSPLM/A and the government in Khartoum, observed in 2011,ended the same year, following South Sudan’s independence.Apart from the nine wars, nine limited wars were observedin 2012. In addition to the two continuing limited wars,six conflicts escalated from a violent crisis to a limited warand one new conflict on this level of intensity erupted. Ofthe five limited wars observed in 2011, one de-escalatedto a violent crisis, two escalated to a war, and two remainedon the same level of intensity. While the conflict in Uganda(LRA) de-escalated to a violent crisis, the conflicts in the DRCbetween the FDLR and the government and the conflict betweenmilitant groups were fought out as limited wars for thesecond year running. The conflicts between ethnic groupsin Kenya, between Islamist groups and the Malian government,between rebel groups active in CAR and the Chadiangovernment, between the SSC regions and Somaliland,between Mayi-Mayi groups and the Congolese governmentand between Christian and Muslim groups in Nigeria escalatedto limited wars [1 Kenya (inter-ethnic violence), Mali(Islamist groups), Chad (rebel groups), Somalia (Somaliland- SSC), Nigeria (Christians - Muslims)]. In April, a new conflicton the level of a limited war erupted in northern Mali betweenIslamist groups and the MNLA.The number of non-violent conflicts decreased by five resultingin 34 non-violent conflicts. In addition, 38 conflicts ofmedium intensity were observed, slightly fewer than the 40 inFrequency of Conflict Items in 2012 insub-Saharan Africa by Intensity Groups40372012 :2011 :18low Intensity :medium Intensity :high Intensity :202319115108 91 192630 0 021576139118410 097112 26dispute non-violent crisis violent crisis limited war warterritorysecessionautonomysubnationalpredominanceinternationalpowerresourcesotherdecolonisationnational powersystem / ideology29

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA2011. Altogether, 62 percent of all conflicts included the useof violence and twenty percent were highly violent. In 2011,57 percent of all conflicts included the use of violent means,and approx. fourteen percent were highly violent.As in the previous year, the most frequent conflict items inSub-Saharan Africa were resources with 27 cases, often combinedwith national power (30 cases) or subnational predominance(23 cases).Two cases of successful coup d’états were observed inSub- saharan Africa [1 Mali (coup plotters), Guinea-Bissau(coup plotters)].In three out of eight wars, Islamist militants were directactors. The affected countries were Mali and Nigeria in WestAfrica and Somalia in East Africa. In at least twelve countriesof the African continent, Islamist groups were directly involvedin violent conflicts. Observations over the last several yearsshowed an increase in cooperation between different Islamistgroups all over the continent. Reportedly, scores of fightersfrom neighbouring countries joined the Islamist groups in Maliin their fight against the government. Most active groups inMali, namely Ansar al-Din and Movement for Unity and Jihadin West Africa were closely linked to al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM). AQIM also allegedly cooperated with BokoHaram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia.In Central Africa, several violent conflicts were related toa lack of state structures, e.g. CAR (rebel groups), DR Congo(CNDP/M23) and DR Congo (FDLR).In the DR Congo, the former CNDP rebels accused thegovernment in Kinshasa of neglecting the Kivu provinces andnot adhering to the 2009 peace agreement. Consequently, anew, well-equipped rebel group formed and quickly took overparts of Nord Kivu province, ultimately forcing the governmentto submit to negotiations. The conflict gained an internationaldimension due to M23 being allegedly supported by Rwandaand, to a lesser extent, by Uganda.A similar pattern could be observed in the Central AfricanRepublic. Different rebel groups formed the new coalition Sélékaand swiftly occupied more than half of the country, withthe government agreeing to talks by the end of the year. Severalconflicts were fought out between different ethnic groups,among these the wars Nigeria (Farmers - Pastoralists) and SouthSudan (inter-ethnic violence).30

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAConflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2012Angola (FLEC/ Cabinda)*Angola (UNITA)Angola – DR Congo*Botswana (Basarwa)*Burundi (FNL)Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4FLEC vs. governmentUNITA, CASA vs. governmentAngola vs. DR CongoBasarwa vs. governmentFNL led by Agathon Rwasa, FRD-Abanyagihugu, FNL-Ubugaboburihabwa, FPM-Abatabazi vs.governmentsecession, resourcesnational powerterritory, resourcessystem / ideology, resourcesnational power1975197520091997200545613113Burundi (Hutu – Tutsi)*Burundi (opposition groups)*Burundi – Rwanda (border)*Cameroon (militants / Bakassi)*Central African Republic (rebelgroups)Chad (opposition groups)*Chad (rebel groups)Comores (Anjouan, Mohéli)*Hutu vs. TutsiUPRONA, FRODEBU, CNDD, MSD,ADC-Ikibiri vs. governmentBurundi vs. RwandaBSDF vs. governmentAPRD, CPJP, CPSK, FDPC, UFDR vs.governmentUNDR, UDR, et al. vs. governmentFPR vs. governmentregional government of Moheli,regional government of Anjouanvs. regional government of GrandComore vs.national powersystem / ideology, national powerterritorysecessionnational powernational powernational power, resourcesnational power1962200619602006200519902005199765513124141CÔte d’Ivoire (opposition)*DR Congo (CNDP/M23)DR Congo (Enyele)*DR Congo (FDLR)DR Congo (FRF)*DR Congo (inter-militant violence)supporters of Gbagbo vs.governmentCNDP/M23 vs. governmentEnyele vs. governmentFDLR vs. governmentFRF vs. governmentFDLR, Nyatura vs. Mayi-Mayi Cheka,Raia Mutomboki, FDC vs. APCLS vs.Mayi-Mayi Shetani vs. M23national powersubnational predominance, resourcessubnational predominancesubnational predominance, resourcessubnational predominance, resourcessubnational predominance, resources1999200420101997199820114366351414Name of conflict 1 31DR Congo (Ituri militias)DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)DR Congo (opposition)*DR Congo – Rwanda*Equatorial Guinea - Gabon(Mbanié, Cocotier, Conga islands)*Eritrea – Djibouti (border)*Ethiopia (ARDUF)Ethiopia (OLF/ Oromiya)Ethiopia (ONLF/ Ogaden)*Ethiopia (opposition)*FRPI, FPJC, Cogai vs. governmentMayi-Mayi groups vs. governmentUPDS et al. vs. governmentDR Congo vs. RwandaEquatorial Guinea vs. GabonEritrea vs. DjiboutiARDUF vs. governmentOLF vs. governmentONLF vs. governmentCUD, Medrek, Ginbot 7, ENDP,UDJ, WPDP, EUFF, ARDUF vs.governmentsubnational predominance, resourcessubnational predominance, resourcesnational powerresources, otherterritory, resourcesterritoryautonomysecessionsecession, resourcesterritory, other1999199719972002197019941995197319842005536353433113333Ethiopia – Eritrea*Gabon (opposition)Guinea (opposition)*Guinea – Bissau (coup plotters)Guinea – Bissau (opposition)*Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)Ethiopia vs. EritreaUN, PDS, UPG, UFC vs. governmentUFDG et al. vs. governmentcoup plotters vs. governmentopposition vs. governmentBorana vs. Gabra vs. Pokot vs.Turkana vs. Meru vs. Merille vs.Degodia vs. Garre vs. Orma vs.Pokomo, Samburu,territory, othernational powernational powernational powernational powersubnational predominance, resources1998200920062009199819915233324Kenya (MRC)MRC vs. governmentsecession200853

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAConflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2012Kenya (Mungiki)*Kenya (SLDF)*Kenya (TNA - ODM)*Madagascar (TGV - TIM)*Malawi (opposition)*Mali (coup plotters)Mali (Islamist groups - MNLA)Mali (Islamist groups)Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)Mungiki vs. governmentsystem/ideology, subnationalpredominanceSLDF vs. governmentsubnational predominanceTNA vs. ODMnational powerTIM vs. TGVnational poweropposition vs. government national powerCNRDRE vs. governmentnational powerAnsar al-Din, MUJAQ, AQIM vs. system/ideology, subnationalMNLApredominanceAQIM, MUJAO, Ansar al-Din vs. secession, system/ideologygovernmentMNLA, Ansar al-Din vs. government secession, system/ideology200220021999200920112012201220091989ENDNEWNEW53322213445Niger (AQIM, MUJAO)Niger (opposition)*Niger (Tuareg / Agadez)*Nigeria (Boko Haram) 5Nigeria (Christians – Muslims)Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)*Nigeria (Ijaw groups / Niger Delta)*Nigeria (MASSOB, BZM / Biafra)*Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni / NigerDelta)*Nigeria (Northerners –Southerners)*Nigeria - Cameroon (Bakassi)*Rwanda (Hutu rebel groups)Rwanda (opposition)*Rwanda – France*Rwanda – Uganda*Senegal (June 23 Movement)*Senegal (MFDC / Casamance)Sierra Leone (APC– SLPP)*Somalia (Islamist groups)AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar al-Din vs.governmentopposition groups vs. governmentMNJ vs. governmentBoko Haram vs. governmentChristian groups vs. Muslim groupsfarmers vs. pastoralistsMEND, NDLF et al. vs. governmentMASSOB vs. governmentMOSOP, Ogoni vs. governmentNortherners vs. SouthernersNigeria vs. CameroonFDLR, Mayi-Mayi vs. governmentPS, DGPR, UDF, FDU-Inkingi vs.governmentRwanda vs. FranceRwanda vs. UgandaJune 23 Movement vs. governmentMFDC vs. governmentAPC vs. SLPPal-Shabaab vs. TFG, KDF, ENAsystem / ideology, subnationalpredominancenational powerautonomy, resourcessystem / ideologysystem / ideology, subnationalpredominancesubnational predominance, resourcessubnational predominance, resourcessecessionautonomy, resources, othersystem / ideology, national power,resourcesterritory, resources, othernational powernational powerinternational power, otherothernational powersecessionnational powersystem / ideology, national power20092009199920031960196019971967199019601961199020102004200020111982200720064535463125453323131113335Somalia (Puntland – Somaliland)*Somalia (Puntland)*Somalia (Somaliland – SSC)autonomous region of Puntland vs. territory, subnationalregional government of Somaliland predominanceTFG vs. autonomous region of autonomyPuntlandSomaliland vs. SSCsubnational predominance1998199820095314Somalia (Somaliland)*South Africa (KwaZulu – Natal)*South Africa (xenophobes–immigrants)*South Sudan (inter-ethnicviolence)South Sudan (LRA)*Name of conflict 1 32Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4TFG vs. regional government ofSomalilandIFP vs. ANC vs. NFPxenophobic gangs vs. immigrantsin South Africasecessionsubnational predominanceotherMurle vs. Lou Nuer vs. Misseriya vs. subnational predominance,Dinka Gok vs. Dinka Rek vs. Dinka resourcesBor vs. Bari vs. FartitLRA vs. governmentsubnational predominance19911990200820081994413351

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAConflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2012South Sudan (various militias)South Sudan - Uganda*Sudan (Darfur)Sudan (Eastern Front)*SSPLM/A, SSDM, SSDF, SSLA vs.governmentSouth Sudan vs. UgandaSRF, LJM vs. border guards vs. progovernmentmilitias vs.governmentEastern Front vs. governmentsystem/ideology, resourcesterritorysubnational predominance,resources, otherautonomy, resources201019942003200543251Sudan (SPLM/A-North / SouthernKordofan, Blue Nile)SPLM / A-North vs. governmentautonomy201155Sudan – Eritrea *Sudan – South SudanSwaziland (opposition)*Swaziland – South Africa*Tanzania (CUF/ Zanzibar)*Tanzania (Uamsho)Togo (opposition)Uganda (ADF, NALU)*Uganda (Baganda/ Buganda)*Uganda (LRA)Uganda (opposition)*Uganda – DR Congo (Lake Albert)*Zimbabwe (MDC-T, MDC-M –ZANU-PF)*Name of conflict 1 33Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4Eritrea vs. SudanSudan vs. South SudanPUDEMO, SNUS, SFTU, COSATU vs.governmentSwaziland vs. South AfricaCUF vs. CCMUamsho vs. governmentopposition vs. governmentADF, NALU vs. governmentKingdom of Buganda vs.governmentLRA vs. governmentgovernment vs. oppositionUganda vs. DR CongoMDC-T, MDC-M vs. governmentotherterritory, resourcessystem / ideology, national powerterritoryautonomysecession, system/ideologynational powersubnational predominance, resourcesautonomy, resourcessubnational predominancenational powerterritory, resourcesnational power1994201119981902199320102002198719951987200120072000533615313333233231Conflicts marked with * are without description2Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review3Change in intensity compared to the previous year: 3 or 5 escalation by one or more than onelevel of intensity; 4 or 6 deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; no change4Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute5HIIK wants to express their special thanks to the advanced course for Social Science at the Bunsen-GymnasiumHeidelberg and their teacher Bernhard Bildstein for their valuable research assistance in the course of HIIK’sschool project concerning terrorism.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAAngolaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(UNITA)3 Change: 5Start:UNITA, CASA vs. governmentnational power1975The conflict over national power between the oppositionparties and the government escalated. The governing partyPopular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) andthe main opposition party National Union for the Total Independenceof Angola (UNITA) had fought each other in thecivil war from 1975 to 2002. In March, former UNITA leaderAbel Chivukuvuku left the party to found the Broad Convergencefor the Salvation of Angola (CASA) party, which formedthe CASA-Coalition Electoral (CASA-CE) together with otherparties to run for the general elections on August 31. In therun-up to the elections, UNITA and other parties repeatedlyprotested in Angola’s main cities. Protesters condemned thereappointment of the head of the National Electoral Commission(CNE), claiming it undermined CNE's objectivity, as wellas fostering irregularities in the electoral process, in particularthe system to transmit and monitor election results. Thegovernment cracked down on the protests. For instance, onMarch 10, security forces dispersed demonstrations, injuringdozens of protesters. In May, the Supreme Court annulled theappointment of the former CNE chief and subsequently CNEelected a new chairman. Furthermore, the court approvednine of 27 parties to participate in the elections. Accordingto a report published by a civil society group in July, MPLAand UNITA members repeatedly clashed in the provinces ofHuambo and Benguela in June and July, leaving members ofboth parties injured. In Benguela, more than 100 MPLA activistsattacked an UNITA convoy on June 20, resulting in onefatality. On July 12, MPLA reportedly tried to prevent UNITArallies, causing two fatalities. In Huambo, MPLA militants attackedanother UNITA convoy on July 14. Two days later, MPLAattempted to prevent UNITA from reinstalling its office in theMbave commune. In the parliamentary elections on August31, MPLA won 72 percent of the votes, UNITA got nineteenpercent, and CASA-CE six percent, resulting in the reelectionof José Eduardo dos Santos as president. On September 19,Angola's Constitutional Court rejected an objection filed byUNITA along with other opposition parties.rabBurundiIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(FNL)3 Change: Start:FNL led by Agathon Rwasa,FRD-Abanyagihugu, FNL-Ubugaboburihabwa, FPM-Abatabazi vs.governmentnational power2005The power conflict between Agathon Rwasa's National LiberationFront (FNL) and the government continued. Rwasahad gone into hiding in the neighboring Democratic Republicof the Congo's (DRC) Sud Kivu province in 2010, and startedto reassemble his fighters there. On January 28, a courtsentenced sixteen suspects to jail for their alleged participationin the so-called Gatumba bar massacre of 2011. Thegovernment accused FNL to be responsible for the attack. InGihanga district, Bubanza province, gunmen supposedly comingfrom DRC raided a security checkpoint on March 7. Twopolice officers and one attacker were killed. While officialsblamed armed bandits for the attack, Gihanga district was aknown FNL stronghold. Three soldiers were reportedly killedin mid-April when FNL and the Congolese army, the ArmedForces of the DRC (FARDC), clashed in the Congolese part ofthe Rukoko Forest, near the Burundian border. While a FARDCofficer stated they had carried out a joint operation with theBurundian army in pursuit of the FNL, Burundi denied anyarmy presence in the DRC. Two weeks later, fighting betweenFARDC and FNL left dead FNL commander Claver Nduwayezuin the Uvira region, Sud Kivu. The government believed Nduwayezuto be behind the Gatumba bar massacre. In the sameskirmish, FARDC captured Jean-Petit Nduwimana, probableleader of the rebel group Forces for the Restoration of Democracy(FRD-Abanyagihugu) formed in 2011. Nduwimana wasa leading member of the then-rebel group National Councilfor the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense ofDemocracy (CNDD-FDD), Burundi's present ruling party. Later,he was chief of staff of the intelligence service until hewent into hiding in 2008. FARDC handed Nduwimana overto Burundi. Early in June, a local human rights group claimedhe had recently been executed by the army. In August,the commission set up to investigate alleged extra-judicialkillings targeted against suspected FNL members, amongothers, announced that no evidence of such killings couldbe found. Nevertheless, the Burundian human rights groupupheld their claims and stated that fifteen people had beenextra-judicially executed in 2012 as of October [1 Burundi(opposition groups)].On June 24, a gunfight between military forces and militantscoming from the DRC, allegedly led by Aloys Nzabampema,left 41 dead in Bubanza province. In early September,a group calling itself FNL-Ubugabo burihabwa claimed responsibilityfor a recent attack on an army position locatedbetween the capital and the Rukoko Forest. Its leader Nzabampemadeclared war on the government. Nevertheless, aRwasa's spokesman declared that FNL did not intend to takeup arms again and denied Nzabampema being a member ofFNL. In clashes with Burundian rebels near Uvira, DRC, at leastone Burundian army officer was killed on October 4. Burundianofficials declared that the officer had been on an officialintelligence mission. In the same region, several FNL fightersdied and others were captured in skirmishes with FARDC andlocal self-defense militias in late October. In retaliation, FNLset alight ten villages near Uvira. From October 22 to 24, theformerly unknown rebel group Murundi People's Front - theSaviours (FPM-Abatabazi) attacked several towns and communesin Cibitoke province, western Burundi. About 100fighters entered Burundi from the DRC and targeted securityforces, as well as members of the CNDD-FDD's militantyouth-wing Imbonerakure. While the army claimed that ninerebels had been killed, the rebels denied this number andstated they had killed nine soldiers.hlm34

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICACentral African Republicgroups)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: 5Start:(rebel2005APRD, CPJP, CPSK, FDPC, UFDR vs. governmentnational powerThe national power conflict between rebel groups and thegovernment escalated. On May 17, the Popular Army for theRestoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD) officiallydissolved. A hitherto unknown militia emerged in the middleof the year, the Convention of Patriots of Salut and Kodro(CPSK) allegedly encompassing dissident factions of Conventionsof Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and Union of DemocraticForces for Unity (UFDR). In late August, the leaders ofCPJP and of CPSK signed an agreement to merge their groupsunder one command. The coalition called itself Séléka and accusedthe government of blocking the peace process. Factionsof UFDR, under Michel Djotodia, and of the Democratic Frontof the Central African People (FDPC), under Abdoulaye Miskine,later joined the agreement.A dissident faction of the former CPJP, the FundamentalCPJP under Hassan al-Habib, attacked the cities of Sibut andDekoa, Kémo prefecture, and Damara, Ombella-M’Poko prefecture,on September 15, killing one policeman and two civilians.The militia later stated that they intended to overthrowPresident François Bozizé. On September 19, soldiers killedal-Habib near Dékoa. In late November, nine soldiers and atleast eight suspected Séléka members were killed in clashesin Kabo, Ouham prefecture.Séléka started an offensive in the north-west of the countryon December 10, moving south towards the capital Bangui. Inthe course of the offensive, Séléka attacked the north-westerntown of Ndélé, Bamingi-Bangoran prefecture the same day,causing thousands to flee. The following day, Séléka took thetowns of Sam Ouandja and Ouadda, Haute-Kotto prefecture.On December 12, the army claimed to have regained controlof the two towns. The same day, Séléka demanded the governmentto uphold the promises made in the peace deals. Threedays later, advancing further, the rebel coalition gained controlof Bamingui, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture on December 15,and of Bria, Haute-Kotto prefecture, a diamond-mining area.Fifteen soldiers were killed. Chadian soldiers crossed into theCentral African Republic (CAR) on December 18 to back thearmy. According to Séléka, they took the town of Kabo one daylater, advancing to Bambari, Ouaka prefecture on December23. As a result, the rebels controlled approx. two-thirds of thecountry. Despite an attack of the army on December 28, therebels stayed in control of Bambari. On December 29, Sélékatook the town of Sibut 150 km north from the capital, withoutfiring a shot.President Bozizé called on France to support the army onDecember 27. However, President François Hollande rejectedthe request. The Economic Community of Central African States(ECCAS) assured the deployment of additional troops tosecure Bangui. ECCAS diplomats negotiated with the governmentin Bangui and with Séléka in the rebel-held northerntown Ndélé. As a result of the negotiations, Bozizé offeredpeace talks and the formation of a unity government with Sélékaon December 30.fwChadIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(rebel groups)4 Change: 5FPR vs. governmentnational power, otherStart:2005The conflict between various rebel groups, mainly the PopularFront for Recovery (FPR), and the government over national powerand resources escalated to a limited war. FPR’s main areasof activity were the northern parts of the neighboring CentralAfrican Republic (CAR). Its main objective was the overthrow ofthe political regimes in N'Djamena and Bangui. The Union ofForces of the Resistance (UFR), the Rally of Forces for Change(RFC), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development(UFDD), the Union of Forces for Change and Democracy (UFCD),the Front for the Salvation of the Republic (FPSR) and the NationalAlliance for Change and Democracy (ANCD) had been disarmedin the last years. However, it remained unclear whetherremnants of these groups still existed in the tri-border areas ofCAR, South Sudan and Chad. From 2008 on, FPR rebels had assaultedthe population in the north-eastern provinces of CAR.On February 14, FPR claimed to prepare the deployment of itsforces to the N'Djamena area. Following a decision of the ECCASconference in N’Djamena on January 15, the Chadian armedforces (ANT) and the army of CAR (FACA) launched a joint offensiveagainst the FPR bases in the Nana-Grébizi region on January23. In the offensive, involving Chadian helicopters, the FPR’scommand center as well as seven villages were destroyed. Anunknown number of people died and 22,000 were displaced.After brief resistance, the FPR rebels fled and their leader, BabaLaddé, escaped. Nevertheless, FPR elements continued raidingand robbing, mainly in the prefectures Ouham, Nana-Grébizi,Ombella-Mpoko, and Ouaka. For instance, on March 1, nineteenheavily armed FPR rebels assaulted and seized the village ofNgoulinga, Ouaka, for 48 hours, killing two villagers and rapingseveral women. On June 1, Baba Laddé claimed to be located inSouth Sudan, which was later confirmed by CAR officials. OnJune 24, rebels attacked an uranium mining site at Bakouma,Mbomou. It remained unclear whether the attack was launchedby FPR or supporters of the Lord’s Resistance Army [1 Uganda(LRA)]. Following his return to the CAR on August 24, Laddé surrenderedto the Central African authorities in Ippy, Ouaka, onSeptember 2. Subsequently, he was transferred to Bangui bythe Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) on September3. Laddé arrived at N’Djamena two days later to resume peacenegotiations and the repatriation of the alleged 1,000 FPR affiliatesremaining in CAR. The Chadian and the CAR governmentconcluded an agreement with Laddé on September 8, whichprovided for the return of the FPR members to Chad within amonth. On October 8, a first group of an estimated 400 fighters,children, and women was transferred to the border village ofSido. Three days later, CAR's minister for territorial administrationdeclared that the FPR had left the CAR. Nevertheless, hundredsof FPR members returned to CAR in late October and November,some of them presumably joining local rebel groups35

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA[1 CAR (rebel groups)]. In November, several ambushes in Haut-Mbomou were tied to FPR fighters, such as an attack on a FACAvehicle on November 13 near Obo. One civilian died and severalsoldiers were wounded.jniDR Congo(CNDP/M23)Intensity: 5 Change: 3Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2004CNDP/M23 vs. governmentsubnational predominance, resourcesThe conflict concerning subnational predominance and resourcesin North Kivu and South Kivu, eastern DR Congo, betweenthe National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP),later M23, and the government escalated to a war. While thegovernment was supported by the UN mission MONUSCO,the rebels were backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Followingthe 2009 peace deal between the government and CNDP, therebels were integrated into the Armed Forces of the DR Congo(FARDC) while their former command structures remainedintact. The peace treaty had provided for CNDP's integrationinto the army under recognition of ranks, amnesty for CDNPmembers, release of prisoners, and administrative, territorialand economic reform in the Kivu region. In 2011, PresidentJoseph Kabila ordered a restructuring of military units in theKivus in order to break CNDP's predominance in the region.Subsequently, the majority of CNDP fighters deserted the armyin 2012, demanding the government to adhere to the 2009peace deal.The first to defect were three former CNDP officers with300 of their troops in Baraka and Uvira district, South Kivu, andin Pinga and Nyabiondo, North Kivu, in early April. Ensuing clashesbetween the army and the deserters left at least ten dead.The mutineers were allegedly led by their former commanderBosco Ntaganda, wanted for war crimes by the ICC. On April 29,heavy fighting broke out in Masisi, North Kivu, when the mutineersattacked the FARDC, which responded with heavy weapons.Six mutineers were killed and three soldiers injured. Thenext day, the defectors seized Karuba and Mushaki, two townsin North Kivu. On May 3, another 80 soldiers left their ranksin Goma, the capital of North Kivu. Among them was SultaniMakenga, Ntanganda’s second-in-command. On May 7, the desertersannounced the formation of the new rebel group M23,named after the failed peace deal of 03/23/09. On November20, the rebels took Goma without fighting after the army hadfled. The following day, the so far highest number of formerCNDP fighters defected from the army. 2,500 soldiers and policemenjoined the ranks of M23 in Goma. Apart from defections,the M23 recruited its personnel, including children, by force.M23 took position in the area of the Virunga National Parkclose to the border to Rwanda and Uganda, from where theystaged attacks on FARDC and MONUSCO. The rebels seized varioustowns and villages. Often they pulled out again severaldays later but continued controlling the conquered area fromtheir basis in the park. On July 8, M23 seized the town Rutshu-ru, North Kivu, and retreated one day later. On August 20, M23announced the formation of a regional government for therebel-held area, mainly the Rutshuru district and the VirungaNational Park. The rebels approached Goma again by seizingthe strategic towns Kibumba and Kibati, North Kivu, betweenNovember 17 and 19. Following heavy fighting with FARDC andMONUSCO, M23 was able to advance further till they reachedGoma airport on November 19. When M23 entered the city oneday later, FARDC troops fled to Sake, North Kivu. MONUSCOkept the airport under their control but refrained from fightingthe rebels in order to prevent the death of inhabitants. Afterthe seizing of Goma, M23 announced their next target was toconquer Bukavu, capital of South Kivu, and in the long run Kinshasa,capital of the DRC. M23 seized Sake on November 23.Shortly thereafter DRC and M23, represented by Makenga,started negotiations in Kampala under Ugandan mediation. Asa result, the rebels pulled out of Goma and Sake on December1, under the condition that further talks would be held. Negotiationsended on December 21 but were scheduled to resumeon 01/04/13. M23 denounced Kinshasa's unwillingnessto deal with certain armed groups in the Kivus [1 DR Congo(FDLR), Uganda (ADF, NALU)], alleged fraud in the 2011 presidentialelections, and continuing marginalization of the Kivuregion. From June on, the UN repeatedly accused Rwanda andUganda of supporting M23 with financial and military means,which was in turn denied by the respective states. Rwanda especiallywas accused of providing fighters and heavy weapons.Rwandan Defense Minister James Kabarebe allegedly commandedM23 in the fight for Goma. The UN and DRC accusedthe rebels of serious violations against civilians, among themrape, looting, and killing. The UN Security Council imposed amilitary embargo on M23, as well as a travel embargo and anassets freeze on Makenga and M23's president Jean-Marie Runiga.Between April and December, at least 700 people diedand 841,000 fled.jheDR CongoIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(FDLR)4 Change: Start:1997FDLR vs. governmentsubnational predominance, resourcesThe conflict between the Democratic Forces for the Liberationof Rwanda (FDLR) and the government over subnationalpredominance and resources remained highly violent. TheHutu rebel group FDLR originated from the Interahamwe,who were held responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,but also recruited Congolese Hutu [1 Rwanda (Hutu rebelgroups)]. Although FDLR fighting capacity decreased comparedto previous years, FDLR spokesman Laforge Fils Bazayeconfirmed their ultimate goal to take down the Rwandangovernment. Until the end of September, 867 combatantsdeserted from FDLR and returned to Rwanda. For instance,in March, FDLR Colonel Idrissa Muradadi, leading the secondbattalion in South Kivu, defected to MONUSCO with fifteenof his fighters. Between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters remained inthe Kivu region of eastern DRC. Throughout the year, at least100,000 fled due to FDLR activity. FDLR collaborated with36

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAthe newly formed armed group Nyatura, composed largelyof Congolese Hutu from Masisi, North Kivu. Armed Forces ofthe Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and FDLR repeatedlyclashed in North and South Kivu. FDLR frequentlyattacked FARDC and MONUSCO bases and killed at least 30soldiers. However, factions of FDLR tried to collaborate withthe army, following repeated attacks by other armed groups[1 DR Congo (inter-militant violence)].On February 15, FARDC and MONUSCO launched operationAmani Kamilifu, intended to track FDLR in Kabare district,South Kivu. FARDC claimed to have killed 60 and captured162 FDLR militants. The operations led to the displacementof at least 20,000 civilians. Following the M23 mutiny, PresidentJoseph Kabila announced the suspension of all militaryoperations in the east, including Amani Leo which was intendedto eradicate FDLR [1 DR Congo (CNDP / M23)]. AfterFDLR expanded their territory in 2011, it increasingly facedresistance by other armed groups. However, FDLR recapturedterritory and continued violating the population followingthe military void left by the M23 rebellion in April. For instance,FDLR killed at least 50 civilians in May during raids in Kalehe,South Kivu. The most fatal of which occurred in Kamanangaon May 14, leaving at least twenty people dead. Consequently,civilians demonstrated in front of the MONUSCO base inBunyakiri, South Kivu. The demonstration turned violent andeleven Pakistani blue helmets were injured. In October, FARDCand MONUSCO launched operation Taharazi against Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba, FDLR and National Front for Liberation (FNL)in Fizi, South Kivu [1 Burundi (FNL)], killing at least seven militantsand arresting several dozens. On October 16, FDLR killedfive civilians and injured six MONUSCO peacekeepers in anambush in Buganza, near Lake Edward, North Kivu.The trial against FDLR president Ignace Murwanashyakaand his deputy Straton Musoni continued in Stuttgart, Germany.On July 13, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for SylvestreMudacumura, the highest ranking military FDLR commander,on the count of war crimes. In December, three suspectedFDLR members were arrested in Bonn, Germany. They werealso accused of financially supporting Ignace Murwanashyakawho was under EU embargo. The UN Security Council renewedMONUSCO's mandate until 30/06/13. Also, on November 28,it adopted a resolution prolonging the arms embargo on M23,FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups.fbDR Congoviolence)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(inter-militant4 Change: Start:2011FDLR, Nyatura vs. Mayi-Mayi Cheka, RaiaMutomboki, FDC vs. APCLS vs. Mayi-MayiShetani vs. M23subnational predominance, resourcesThe conflict concerning subnational predominance and resourcesbetween different militant groups in the eastern DRCongo continued on a violent level. In North Kivu, the DemocraticForces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Nyaturamilitants, composed largely of Congolese Hutu, clashed withMayi-Mayi Cheka and the newly emerged group Forces for theDefense of the Congolese (FDC) in the Walikale and Masisiregions [1 DR Congo (FDLR), DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. FDC wascreated in late 2011 as a local defense group against FDLRas well as the DRC army, the Armed Forces of the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (FARDC). FDC was led by Butu Luanda,an ex-officer of the National Congress for the Defense ofthe People (CNDP) [1 DR Congo (CNDP/M23)]. In South Kivu,FDLR fought the Raia Mutomboki militia. Raia Mutomboki hadbeen mostly dormant for the past few years but resurfacedin 2011 after continued FDLR presence in South Kivu. RaiaMutomboki was composed of members of the ethnic groupsTembo and Hunde.In January, FDLR repeatedly clashed with FDC near thetowns of Walikale and Masisi, causing approx. 35,000 to flee.On January 11, a group of soldiers, allegedly Rwandan specialforces guided by the FDC, raided the FDLR headquartersin Walikale. They killed FDLR leader Brigadier General Mugaragu,prompting the defection of about 50 FDLR fighters.Skirmishes between FDLR and FDC continued throughout theyear. In the very first days of January, FDLR attacked civiliansin Bamuguba Sud, Shabunda, accusing them of collaborationwith Raia Mutomboki. About 45 people were killed andsome 4,400 fled. Facing repeated attacks by Raia Mutomboki,FDLR collaborated with the Nyatura militia. Both Raia Mutombokitogether with Mayi-Mayi Kifuafua, and FDLR togetherwith Nyatura abused the local population, accusing them ofsupporting the respective antagonist coalition. Torching andlooting villages in North Kivu, they caused the death of 264civilians between April and September. Throughout the year,FDLR and Raia Mutomboki repeatedly clashed in South Kivu,mainly in the Hauts Plateaux in Kalehe and eastern Kabare.The fighting between Raia Mutomboki, FDLR, and FARDC displacedat least 218,000 people in South Kivu until June.FDLR also fought over subnational predominance withdifferent Mayi-Mayi groups. Mayi-Mayi Cheka and FDLR repeatedlyclashed in Walikale over the control of mining sites,causing the population to flee. On September 1 and 2,Mayi-Mayi Cheka and FDC on the one side, and FDLR andNyatura on the other, clashed in Rutshuru, as well as in Masisi.Also, the Mayi-Mayi militia Alliance of Patriots for a Freeand Sovereign Congo (APCLS) clashed repeatedly with Mayi-Mayi Cheka in Walikale and Masisi territories. After FARDCconcentrated its North Kivu forces in order to fight M23 inJuly, both FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Shetani occupied the villagesaround Ishasha, Rutshuru. Fighting over control and taxation,they caused over 3,000 people to flee to Uganda. At the beginningof October, M23 took control over these villages withoutencountering resistance of FDLR or Mayi-Mayi Shetani[1 DR Congo (CNDP/M23)]. After FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Shetanihad retreated, they clashed over control of other regionsin Rutshuru on October 10, leaving thirteen militants dead.Subsequently, FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups also clashed withM23 towards the end of the year. On October 22, allegedM23 fighters clashed with APCLS near the latter’s headquartersin Lukweti, Masisi. Together with FARDC, APCLS foughtM23 elements in Sake, North Kivu, on November 22, eventuallydriving them off. All rebel groups engaged in raping andextorting the population as well as in the forced recruitmentof children.fb, fgi37

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICADR CongoIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Ituri militias)3 Change: Start:1999FRPI, FPJC, Cogai vs. governmentsubnational predominance, resourcesThe conflict between militia groups, mainly the Patriotic ResistanceFront in Ituri (FRPI), on the one hand, and the government,on the other, concerning subnational predominanceand resources in Ituri, Orientale province, remained violent.Throughout the year, FRPI repeatedly attacked villages in theregion of Bunia, looting goods as well as killing and abductingseveral people. On January 29, the Armed Forces of the DRCongo (FARDC) attacked four FRPI hideouts 90 km south ofBunia. FRPI leader Cobra Matata met with government representativesin Bukuringi, on February 23 and 26, to negotiateabout the integration of his militia into FARDC. They met againon May 10. On March 14, FRPI fighters seized Gety, near Bunia.The next day, they raided the village of Kanjoka, 100 kmsoutheast of Bunia, stole twenty cows and abducted two civilians.FRPI established a new alliance, the Coalition of ArmedGroups of Ituri (Cogai), together with three hitherto unknowngroups, the Popular Front for the Durable Development of Ituri,the Armed Forces for the Revolution, and the Armed Forcesfor the Integration of Ituri. Cogai demanded the reorganizationof the provinces, establishing Ituri as a province, as well as amilitary district. They further called for the integration of theirfighters into the army including recognition of their ranks aswell as the immediate removal of Col. Fal Sikabwe, the armycommander of Ituri, to be replaced by one of their ranks. OnJuly 8, FRPI and FARDC clashed in Koga, near Kasenyi. FRPI abductedfive farmers near Kanzo on July 15. In late July, theHema community of Kasenyi accused the Lendu-dominatedFRPI of having killed five Hema, which was denied by Cogai.Reportedly, several FARDC elements deserted and joined Cogairanks in August. From September on, FRPI started to gathernear Bunia under the survey of an army official, in order tobe integrated into FARDC. Matata demanded amnesty for themilitia in case of an integration. On December 7, FARDC attackedFRPI fighters to regain control over Boga, a village 100 kmsouth of Bunia, causing the population to flee. The next day,FARDC reconquered the village and dispersed the FRPI fighters.Former Ituri rebel leader, Thomas Lubanga, of the Unionof Congolese Patriots, was found guilty for war crimes by theICC on March 14. He was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment.On December 21, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a former FRPIcommander, was acquitted by the ICC. The prosecutor, however,appealed the verdict.hspDR CongoIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Mayi-Mayi)4 Change: 5Start:1997Mayi-Mayi groups vs. governmentsubnational predominance, resourcesThe conflict between various Mayi-Mayi groups and thegovernment over subnational predominance and resourcesescalated to a highly violent level. Mayi-Mayi was a generalterm used to describe various self-organized local defenseunits in the eastern DR Congo.Several Mayi-Mayi groups were active throughout Northand South Kivu, Katanga and Orientale provinces. They repeatedlyattacked bases of the Armed Forces of the DR Congo(FARDC), burned down villages, but occasionally cooperatedwith FARDC. At least 200 people died and at least 200,000people fled due to clashes between the various factions andFARDC. Mayi-Mayi Cheka and Raia Mutomboki allied with M23,whereas Alliance of Patriots for a free and sovereign Congo(APCLS) collaborated with the army to dislodge M23 fromRutshuru district, North Kivu [1 DR Congo (CNDP/M23), DRCongo (inter-militant violence)].Raia Mutomboki, originally a self-defense group againstthe Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)from Shabunda, South Kivu, emerged as one of the strongestgroups. Raia Mutomboki increased their influence in Masisiand Walikale districts, North Kivu, as well as in Kalehe and Kabaredistricts, South Kivu, clashing repeatedly with both FDLRand FARDC. According to a UN report, they were supported byM23 and strengthened M23’s rebellion by destabilizing largeparts of Masisi. FARDC and Raia Mutomboki signed a peaceagreement in Shabunda on April 12 which broke down shortlythereafter. Throughout the year, Raia Mutomboki repeatedlytook over Walikale and neighbouring territory rich in resources.They clashed with FARDC from July 17 to 19 over the controlof Walikale and Njingala, killing dozens of civilians. FARDCeventually expelled Raia Mutomboki after several days. BetweenNovember 6 and 13, military spokespersons held talkswith the militia, offering them to integrate into the army. OnDecember 22, FARDC drove off Raia Mutomboki from one oftheir strongholds in Shabunda, claiming to have killed ten militants.The fighting between Raia Mutomboki, FDLR and FARDCdisplaced at least 218,000 people in South Kivu until June.Mayi Mayi Cheka, also known as Nduma Defence for the Congo,led by Cheka Ntabo Ntaberi, operated in Masisi district,North Kivu, and allied with M23. After the M23 mutiny in April,over 100 deserters joined the ranks of Cheka, attacked villages,and killed several FARDC officers around Mpofi and Kibua,Walikale district.APCLS was active in its stronghold territory, Masisi. APCLS’sleader Janvier Karairi claimed to command 4,500 men.In the first half of the year, FARDC unsuccessfully tried totake over the APCLS headquarters in Lukweti. However, in August,FARDC approached APCLS to fight M23, as their sphere ofinfluence bordered the territory conquered by M23.In the northern mineral-rich Katanga province, Mayi-Mayiled by Gédéon Kyungu were active. On February 29, around26,000 fled after clashes between Mayi-Mayi Gédéon andFARDC in Shamwana, Katanga. On September 18, six militantsand one soldier died when Mayi-Mayi Gédéon attacked anFARDC base in Kiyambi, Katanga.Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba operated in South Kivu. After theyhad occupied several villages along Lake Tanganyika, Fizi, SouthKivu, FARDC pushed them out on May 30, killing five Mayi-Mayi. Clashes between FARDC and Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba continuedthroughout the year.38

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAIn the course of the year, the army tried to forge alliances withthe armed groups. In September, FARDC announced that AP-CLS had agreed to join the army. 35 militia leaders and combatantstook part in an army parade in North Kivu on November13, among them several Raia Mutomboki leaders, statingthat their members would join the army. In December, over80 Mayi-Mayi fighters surrendered to FARDC in South Kivu.On December 31, eleven Mayi-Mayi groups from South Kivu,among them Mayi-Mayi Kirikicho, based in Kalehe, demandedto be included in negotiations held by M23 and the government.fb, fgiEthiopiaIntensity:(ARDUF)3 Change: 3Start:1998several dozens more in Illubabor zone. They recovered AK-47rifles, hand grenades, and pistols.On June 4 and 5, OLF claimed to have killed seven soldiersin North Shewa zone and two more in Addis Ababa, respectively.Ten days later, OLA attacked a pickup truck transportingsoldiers in Addis Ababa, killing four and woundingfive. On June 20, OLA stated they had killed nine soldiers andwounded more than six others in North Shewa Zone. On thesame day, 21 soldiers surrendered to the OLA North Shewacommand, according to OLF. On July 14, OLA reported to havekilled seven soldiers and wounded six in East Hararge zone.Four days later, OLA in turn argued to have killed an officer inWest Hararge zone.On December 13, the Federal High Court convicted twoopposition politicians of having links with OLF and sentencedthem to jail [1 Ethiopia (opposition)].sgaConflict parties:Conflict items:ARDUF vs. governmentautonomyGabon(opposition)The autonomy conflict between the Ethiopian Afar RevolutionaryDemocratic Unity Front (ARDUF) and the governmentcontinued. ARDUF consisted of up to 200 fighters and foughtfor an autonomous and united Afar region, which was dividedby the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Ethiopia accused Eritrea oftraining and arming groups, among them ARDUF, attemptingto destabilize Ethiopia [1Ethiopia - Eritrea].On January 17, ARDUF attacked a group of tourists nearErta Ale Volcano in Afar Region, killing five, injuring three andkidnapping another four. In response, Ethiopia attacked threecamps in Ramid, Gelahbe, and Gimbi, located approx. ten milesinside southeastern Eritrea, on March 15, allegedly killing50 ARDUF rebels. This had been the first operation of Ethiopiantroops on Eritrean territory since the end of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in June 2000.mweEthiopiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(OLF / Oromiya)3 Change: OLF vs. governmentsecessionStart:1973The secession conflict between the Oromo Liberation Front(OLF) and its armed wing, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA),on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remainedviolent. In the course of the year, OLF stated to have conductedseveral attacks on security forces in Oromiya region, whichwere neither confirmed nor denied by the government.On January 1, a faction of OLF led by Kamal Galchu announcedthat OLF would stop fighting for secession.OLF rejected the statement on January 5, explaining it wasmade by a minority splinter group that had no right to act onbehalf of OLF. On January 29, OLA claimed to have killed agovernment agent in West Harerge. On February 3, OLA killeda police commander in Mieso. According to OLF, their fighterskilled at least 22 soldiers in Addis Ababa and North ShewaZone on March 19 and 20. In March and April, OLA fightersasserted to have killed at least seven soldiers and woundedIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:UN, PDS, UPG, UFC vs. governmentnational power2009The conflict over national power between opposition partiesand the government, led by Ali-Ben Bongo, remained on thelevel of a violent crisis. Following the elections to the NationalAssembly in December 2011, the opposition parties, Union ofthe Gabonese People (UPG) and the Party of Development andSocial Solidarity (PDS), claimed fraud. Furthermore, the constitutionalcourt obtained 45 challenges against the election results.The election results were verified in February, confirmingthe distinct majority of the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party(PDG). Throughout the year, the opposition experienced significantobstruction of the media. In January, the license of theprivately owned company TV+ and the newspaper Echo of theNorth were temporarily withdrawn, after they had covered aNew Year’s ceremony of Andre Mba Obame, leader of the outlawedopposition party, National Union (UN), and main oppositionfigure in Gabon. In August, the National CommunicationsCouncil suspended the two newspapers Ezombolo and La Unefor six months after they had published articles offending thepresident and the Gabonese diplomat Jean Ping. After fourteenmonths in exile, Obame returned to the capital Librevilleon August 11, and called for the formation of an independentnational conference to discuss democratic reforms. In thefollowing days, up to 2,000 opposition members protestedin Libreville, torching cars and throwing stones at the police.Security forces used tear gas to disperse the protesters. Accordingto the National Union, three people were killed, dozensinjured and 57 activists arrested, of whom 33 were sentencedto one year in prison. According to opposition sources, in Librevilleon August 15, about fifteen masked men armed withassault rifles and petrol bombs torched a TV+ broadcastingstation, owned by Obame. On September 5, assailants armedwith clubs attacked another TV+ station in Libreville, leavingone security guard injured. Four days later, twenty oppositionparties formed the alliance Union of Forces for Change (UFC),in Mouila, Ngounié Province, and repeated Obame’s call for a39

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAnational conference. President Ali-Ben Bongo rejected the requests.Following power struggles in October and November,nine parties of the UFC formed a new coalition called Union ofForces for Alternation on December 14.qguGuinea-BissauIntensity:3 Change: (coup plotters)Start:2009KenyaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(inter-ethnic violence)4 Change: 5Start:1991Borana vs. Gabra vs. Pokot vs. Turkana vs.Meru vs. Merille vs. Degodia vs. Garre vs.Orma vs. Pokomo, Samburusubnational predominance, resourcesConflict parties:Conflict items:coup plotters vs. governmentnational powerThe conflict over national power between military coup plottersand the government continued on a violent level. On January9, President Malam Bacai Sanha died of natural causesin a hospital in Paris. Subsequently, Raimundo Pereira, formerSpeaker of Parliament, became interim President. On March18, the first round of presidential elections led to a run-offballot between Prime Minister Carlos Domingos Gomes Jr. andformer President Kumba Yala. On April 12, seventeen days beforethe scheduled presidential run-off, military coup plottersunder the leadership of Army Chief Antonio Indjai took overpower, followed by shootings and grenade explosions, leavingone dead in the capital Bissau. Soldiers occupied offices ofthe African Party for the Independence of Guinea and CapeVerde (PAIGC), as well as TV and radio stations. The army detainedseveral politicians including Prime Minister Gomes andinterim president Pereira. Consequently, the army appointedan interim government. Subsequently, AU suspended GuineaBissau’s membership. On April 26, ECOWAS announced a militaryintervention to provide security for democratic electionsand the transition process. The next day, Gomes and Pereirawere released and went into exile in Côte d’Ivoire. On May 17,the first 70 troops of the ECOWAS military stabilization force,encompassing a planned total of 638 troops from Nigeria, Senegal,Togo, and Burkina Faso, arrived. According to an agreementbetween military leaders and 25 political parties on May19, former parliamentary speaker Manuel Serifo Nhamadjobecame interim president. Four days later, Nhamadjo appointeda transitional government and the military coup plottersdeclared their withdrawal. The new cabinet consisted of 27members, including one of the coup plotters. On October 21,gunmen, led by Captain Pansau N’Tchama, attacked army barracksnear the capital’s airport. The ensuing gun battle left sevenpeople dead. Six days later, governmental security forcesarrested N’Tchama, who had been the head of the commandounit that had killed then-president Vieira in 2009. On December14, the UN Security Council expressed its concern aboutthe political instability in Guinea Bissau and imposed travelbans on the coup leaders and their key supporters. sadThe conflict over resources and subnational predominancebetween various ethnic groups escalated to a limited war.Most incidents were related to cattle rustling and land ownership.The conflict between Borana and Gabra communities,which started in Ethiopia in November 2011, spilled over tonortheastern Kenya. On January 4, approx. six people werekilled and several injured after a peace meeting in the bordertown Moyale, Eastern Province. Suspected Pokot attackedTurkana people on January 9, killing three in Lokapel area, TurkanaSouth District. Violence in Moyale continued, as clashesbetween Borana and Gabra clans on January 26 left five peopledead and over 40,000 people displaced. Following the incidentsin Moyale, police arrested dozens of suspects, amongthem chiefs and civil leaders. In an attack on February 13, anda counterattack on February 14, three people were killed, respectively,in clashes between Meru and Turkana near Isiolo,Eastern Province, leading to hundreds of displaced Turkanamembers. Over 200 Pokot members raided Turkana villages,killing seven Turkana and stealing over 1,500 herds of cattleon March 23. In Todonyang, Rift Valley, clashes over cattle raidsbetween Turkana and over 300 Merille militias from Ethiopialeft two policemen dead on April 16. On August 20, during acattle raid, Garre clan shot dead five people from the Degodiaclan near Malkari, North Eastern Province. On August 21, thedispute over water and pasture between Orma and Pokomoin Tana River District, Coast Province, escalated, leaving 62dead. In a revenge attack on September 9, 500 armed Pokomokilled 38 people, including nine police officers, in Kilelengwanivillage, Coast Province, resulting in thousands of displacedpersons. Suspected Pokot stole cattle and killed two Ugandansoldiers in the districts of Nakapiriprit and Amudat, NorthernProvince, Uganda, on October 3. Subsequently, Ugandan militarywas deployed to the Kenyan border on October 12, andKenyan security officers were deployed on October 19. OnOctober 30, thirteen Samburu were killed in the attempt torecover cattle, stolen from them by the Turkana on October20, in Baragoi, Rift Valley. The government responded by sending107 police officers to pursue the armed Turkana rustlersand seize the stolen cattle. In Baragoi, November 10, Turkanaambushed them, killing 46. On November 13, the governmentordered the deployment of the army to search for the perpetrators,causing 1,500 Turkana to flee their homes. Rival clashesbetween Pokomo and Orma on December 21, resulted in over39 deaths in Tana River district. lke40

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAKenyaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(MRC)3 Change: 5MRC vs. governmentsecessionStart:2008The conflict between the secessionist group Mombasa RepublicanCouncil (MRC) and the government, concerning thesecession of Kenya’s coastal region, escalated. In additionto secessionist demands, the MRC threatened to disrupt the2013 general elections and encouraged the Coast provinceinhabitants to boycott the elections. On April 24, MRC protestedoutside a courthouse in Mombasa, Coast province, wherea hearing concerning its legitimacy was taking place, afterhaving been banned in 2010. Police tried to disperse them,leaving one MRC member dead. The MRC dismissed negotiationoffers by members of parliament on June 18, refusing anydialog until the ban imposed on it was lifted. The same month,the High Court declared the MRC’s banishment unconstitutional.Nevertheless, four months later, a court in Mombasa outlawedthe group again. In June and July, police repeatedly arrestedMRC members trying to recruit new followers. After MRCmembers had assassinated one resident of Tsangasini villagein Kilifi district, Coast province, on September 27, villagersand police killed at least ten MRC members. MRC memberskilled one villager and injured a policeman in the course ofthe clashes. In Silaloni in Samburu district, Rift Valley province,villagers killed four of the alleged attackers the following day.Five people were killed when suspected MRC members interrupteda meeting attended by the fisheries minister in Mtwapain Kilifi County, Coast province, on October 4. Five days later,police cracked down on MRC in Kombani, Coast province, arresting39 suspected MRC members, among them MRC leaderOmar Mwamnuadzi. In the raid, police allegedly killed two ofMwamnuadzi’s bodyguards. In the following weeks, sixteenfurther MRC members were arrested in Kwale, Coast province.On October 20, a group of 30 suspected MRC youths attackeda police camp in Kaloleni, Coast province, injuring a securityofficer. 60 suspected members of Nyuki Movement for Independence,supposedly linked to the MRC, raided a police postin Mombasa on December 12. Three of the attackers were shotdead by the police and four arrested.thgMaliIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(coup plotters)3 Change: NEWCNRDRE vs. governmentnational powerStart:2012A violent conflict over national power between mutinying soldiersand the government erupted. Soldiers under the commandof Captain Amadou Sanogo staged a coup against PresidentAmadou Toumani Touré on March 21, six weeks beforethe presidential elections. They suspended the constitutionand took control over the capital Bamako. The coup was precededby numerous civil protests in February at the government’slack of action against the Tuareg attacks in the north and theinsufficient equipment of the army [1 Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din/ Azawad)]. After two days of fighting between the soldiers loyalto the government and the presidential guard, on the onehand, and the mutinying soldiers, on the other, the latter tookcontrol of Bamako. Three people died in the fighting. Subsequently,the mutinying soldiers arrested fourteen members ofthe government, whereas Touré was able to flee to Senegal. Thecoup leaders established the National Committee for the Recoveryof Democracy and Restoration of the State (CNRDRE) andannounced to hand over power to an elected government assoon as the Tuareg rebellion would be put down. The AU, as wellas ECOWAS suspended the country’s membership on March 28.After having set an ultimatum of 72 hours to the military juntato hand over power to a civilian government, ECOWAS imposedsanctions on Mali on April 3. Four days later, CNRDRE agreed torelinquish power and to hold elections within 40 days. Subsequently,ECOWAS lifted the sanctions. After Touré had officiallyresigned on April 8, the former speaker of parliament, DioncoundaTraoré, was sworn in as interim president on April 12,appointing Cheick Modibo Diarra as transitional prime ministerfive days later. The same day, the army arrested six allies ofex-president Touré. On April 25, a new civilian government wasannounced by Traoré. Three military representatives were appointedministers of internal security, defense, and interior. OnApril 30, soldiers loyal to Touré tried to reclaim the state broadcastingbuilding, the airport, and army barracks in a countercoup,but junta forces remained in control and arrested 140 ofthe counter-coup plotters. Fourteen people died in the fighting.By granting a ten-day extension, ECOWAS ordered the interimauthorities to form a unity government by August 10. However,Traoré formed a national unity government on August 20. OnOctober 23, AU lifted the suspension of Mali’s membership. OnDecember 11, Diarra announced his and his government’s resignationafter having been arrested by the military. The sameday, interim President Traoré named Dango Cissoko prime minister.AU condemned the resignation, emphasizing that the militaryneeded to be subordinate to civil authorities.kseMaliIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Islamist groups – MNLA)4 Change: NEWStart:2012Ansar al-Din, MUJAO, AQIM vs. MNLAsystem/ideology, subnational predominanceA new highly violent conflict between Islamist groups and theNational Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) erupted.At the beginning of the year, Ansar al-Din and MNLA hadfought together against the government for the secession ofAzawad, consisting of the regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu,but had split several times over the year. On March 18, afterthe leader of Ansar al-Din, Iyad Ag Ghali, had called for the implementationof Sharia in Mali, tensions between MNLA andAnsar Dine arose and a violent conflict erupted. At the end ofMarch, MNLA took control of Gao, although the Islamist groupsin turn also strengthened their presence in Gao. In April, the twogroups cooperated again and seized Timbuktu [1 Mali (MNLA,Ansar al-Din / Azawad)]. Ultimately, Ansar al-Din kept control41

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAover the town, having ousted MNLA. On May 4, MNLA attemptedto convince Ansar al-Din to cease its cooperation with al-Qaedain the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) at a meeting in Adrar des Ifoghas,Kidal Region. After negotiations, MNLA and Ansar al-Din declaredAzawad to be an Islamic state on May 27. Two days later,the two rebel groups dissociated, resulting from a disagreementon the strictness of the Sharia law to be implemented. On June8, MNLA and Ansar al-Din clashed in the town of Kidal, afteranti-Sharia protests from 500 residents. At least two peopledied during the fighting. On June 13, MNLA and Ansar al-Dinclashed in Timbuktu, causing two deaths. On June 27, Islamistgroups and MNLA fought each other in Gao, leaving at least 35people dead. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa(MUJAO), another AQIM-linked group, took control over thetown. On June 29, Islamist groups forced MNLA to leave Timbuktuagain. On July 11, MUJAO ousted MNLA from their lastbase in Ansogo, Gao Region. Mid-October, MNLA and Ansar Dinemet in Kidal to negotiate. On November 16 and 17, MNLA andMUJAO fought one another near the town of Gao, leaving tenpeople dead. Two days later, MUJAO seized the town of Menaka,Gao Region, which had been under the control of MNLA. Severalcombatants died during the fighting. On November 29, Ansaral-Din ousted MNLA from the town of Léré, Timbuktu Region.At the end of 2012 most of northern Mali was under control ofIslamist groups.kseMaliIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Islamist groups)4 Change: 5Start:2009AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar al-Din vs. governmentsystem/ideology, secessionThe conflict between the Islamist groups al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa(MUJAO), and Ansar al-Din, on the one hand, and the government,on the other, escalated to a limited war.In a short-lived alliance with the Movement for the Liberationof Azawad (MNLA), Islamist groups brought the north of thecountry under their control after a military coup in March [1 Mali(MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad), Mali (coup plotters)]. Presumably,most of the members of these Islamist groups originatedfrom adjacent countries [1 Algeria (AQIM, MUJAO)].Throughout the year, the Islamist groups repeatedly kidnappedforeigners and engaged in fights with the government.In addition, they destroyed several mausoleums belonging toUNESCO cultural heritage register. For instance, AQIM fighterstook five European citizens hostage in Timbuktu in mid-February.In April, MUJAO took hostage seven Algerian diplomats and aSwiss citizen in Gao Region. Ansar al-Din destroyed several Sufishrines in Timbuktu in late June. In early September, MUJAOexpanded its area of influence to Douentza, Mopti Region. Thesame month, MUJAO declared the death of one of the Algeriandiplomats abducted in April. On November 21, MUJAO kidnappeda French citizen in south-western Mali outside the Islamistheldterritory. Additionally, in November, Ansar al-Din signaledits readiness for peace talks, distancing itself from AQIM andMUJAO. Nevertheless, Ansar al-Din and AQIM attacked furthermausoleums in Timbuktu in December.Human rights organizations repeatedly expressed concernsover the mistreatment of civilians by the groups. Tens ofthousands fled due to human rights violations by the Islamistgroups. In November, ECOWAS decided to send a 3,300 strongforce to Mali to recapture the north of the country which wasmostly held by Islamist groups by the end of the year. On December20, the UN Security Council authorized the African-ledInternational Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), led by ECOWAS,starting in January 2013.bkmMaliIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)5 Change: 3Start:MNLA, Ansar al-Din vs. governmentsecession, system/ideology1989The secession conflict between the Tuareg group National Movementfor the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the IslamistTuareg group Ansar al-Din, on the one hand, and the government,on the other, escalated to a war. Azawad was the areaclaimed by MNLA, consisting of the three regions Timbuktu,Gao, and Kidal. While the Tuareg strove for autonomy in previousyears, 2012 was marked by secessionist aims.On January 17, MNLA and Ansar al-Din clashed withgovernment troops in the town of Menaka, Kidal, in northernMali [1 Mali (Islamist groups)]. The army deployed at least onehelicopter; the Tuaregs used machinegun-mounted vehicles,and anti-tank and aircraft rockets. The following day, Tuaregrebels attacked two military camps in the towns of Aguelhokand Tessalit, Kidal Region, leaving 45 rebels and up to 40 soldiersdead. On January 24, the rebels captured and executedapprox. 82 soldiers and civilians in an offensive in Aguelhok.At the end of January, MNLA attacked the towns of Léré, TimbuktuRegion, and Andéramboukane and Menaka, Gao Region.UN reports estimated 30,000 internally displaced people (IDP)and 34,000 refugees at the beginning of February. The toll hadrisen to 60,000 IDPs and 60,000 refugees by the end of themonth. On February 2, hundreds of Malians protested in thestreets of Bamako over the government’s handling of the attacksby Tuareg rebels in the North [1 Mali (coup-plotters)]. Thesame day, Foreign Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga heldnegotiations with MNLA in Algiers, Algeria. MNLA rejected anyagreement. In fights around Timbuktu on February 4, the armykilled twenty rebels. On February 8, MNLA seized the strategicborder town of Tinzawatene, Kidal Region, and forced governmenttroops to withdraw into Algeria. On February 10, armyhelicopters attacked rebel positions near Kidal, killing dozens.In mid-February, MNLA and the army fought over the townsof Tessalit and Léré, leaving dozens of rebels dead. Finally, onMarch 11, the army retreated from a military base near Tessalit;subsequently, MNLA captured the town. In mid-March, MNLAand Ansar al-Din separated after the leader of Ansar al-Din,Iyad Ag Ghali, had called for the implementation of Sharia lawin Mali [1 Mali (Islamist groups vs. MNLA)]. After the militarycoup in the capital on March 22, MNLA announced its intention42

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAto profit from the situation’s instabilities by taking the cities ofKidal, Gao, and Timbuktu in order to control the area of Azawad[1 Mali (coup-plotters)]. By April 1, MNLA and Ansar al-Din hadseized the three cities without encountering resistance. After aceasefire announcement, MNLA declared the independence ofAzawad on April 6. The AU, EU, and US rejected this declarationof independence. On April 10, around 2,000 people protestedin Bamako for the liberation of the rebel-held north. Two dayslater, the transitional president Dioncounda Traoré threateneda total war against Tuareg rebels. On April 20, some 200 residentsprotested against the occupation of Timbuktu by rebels.On May 27, MNLA and Ansar al-Din resumed cooperation anddeclared Azawad an Islamic state. Two days later, the two rebelgroups separated again, resulting from a disagreement theover strictness of Sharia to be imposed [1 Mali (Islamist groupsvs. MNLA)]. On June 9, representatives of MNLA met ECOWASmediator Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso. As ofJuly, more than 350,000 people had fled the conflict areas,among them 155,000 IDPs. On October 12, the UN SecurityCouncil adopted a resolution paving the way for a military interventionto retake the north. At the end of October, envoysof the AU, ECOWAS, EU, as well as the UN Special Envoy for theSahel, Romano Prodi, met in Bamako to elaborate upon an operationplan for a military intervention. On November 6, Compaorémet with a delegation of Ansar al-Din, urging the groupto dissociate from al-Qaeda. At a summit on November 11 inNigeria, ECOWAS agreed to deploy 3,300 soldiers. The plan tosend troops to Mali covers a six-month period, including operationsin the north. On November 19, the EU Foreign AffairsCouncil decided to send military experts to train the army.On December 4, an official delegation of the government metrepresentatives of MNLA and Ansar al-Din for negotiations inOuagadougou, Burkina Faso. On December 20, the UN SecurityCouncil authorized the deployment of an African-led InternationalSupport Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The next day, MNLA andAnsar al-Din committed to suspending hostilities and holdingpeace talks with the government.kseNigerIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(AQIM, MUJAO)3 Change: Start:2009AQIM, MUJAO vs. governmentsystem/ideology, subnational predominanceThe ideology and subnational predominance conflict betweenthe al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) andthe government remained violent. On March 22, authorities inNiger arrested National Assembly adviser and former Tuaregleader Aghali Alambo. He was accused of being involved in thesmuggling of arms from Libya for AQIM in Niger in June 2011.On August 1, the EU sent an advisory team of 50 internationalofficers to the capital, Niamey, to train local security forcesto combat AQIM in Niger and Mali [1 Mali (Islamist groups)].It was part of the European Union's Capacity Building Mission,which was scheduled to last two years. In August, securityforces arrested several armed militants suspected to be membersof AQIM. On October 14, the Islamist group Movementfor Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which is linkedto AQIM and operates extensively in northern Mali, abductedsix aid workers from the town of Dakoro, Maradi. One of thehostages was wounded by a bullet during the kidnapping andlater died of his injuries. On November 5, the five remainingaid workers were freed.On October 18, the defense ministers of Niger and Nigeriasigned security and defense agreements aimed exchanginginformation in the fight against trans-border crime, especiallyin respect to the activities of AQIM and the Boko Haram fromNigeria [1 Nigeria (Boko Haram)].jasNigeria(Boko Haram)Intensity: 5 Change: Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:Boko Haram vs. governmentsystem / ideology2003The system and ideology conflict between the Islamist groupBoko Haram and the government continued on the level of war.The group was radically opposed to secular ideals and aimedat the implementation of Sharia law throughout Nigeria. Overthe course of the year, Boko Haram attacks killed at least 700people and displaced thousands. Violence also spread to thepreviously unaffected Ebo, Kogi, and Rivers States. PresidentGoodluck Jonathan admitted at the beginning of January thatBoko Haram members presumably held offices in government,parliament, and courts, and had infiltrated security forces andintelligence organizations. According to General Carter Ham,commander of the US Africa Command, the group presumablycollaborated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)and other Islamist groups in West Africa regarding training,provision of weapons, and financial assistance [1 Mali (Islamistgroups), Algeria (AQIM, MUJAO)]. In January, the UN expressedconcerns that the Libyan civil war gave Islamists in theSahel Region including Boko Haram access to heavy weapons[1 Libya (opposition)]. In October, the government signed anagreement with Niger on joint border patrols, aiming at thereduction of security risks caused by Boko Haram and AQIM[1 Niger (AQIM)].On January 2, Boko Haram issued an ultimatum, threateningall Christians who would not leave the mainly Musliminhabitednortheastern areas within three days with death.After the expiration of the period, Boko Haram launched attackson Christians, causing at least 250 fatalities and displacingthousands over the course of the month. In the most fatalattacks on January 20 and 21, coordinated bomb attacks, followedby gunfire, targeted four police stations in Kano State,leaving more than 190 people dead. In reaction, Jonathandismissed the chief of police in order to reorganize the policeforces and increase their effectiveness. The government announcedits intentions to intensify efforts to capture the militants,subsequently killing up to 49 in clashes and raids aswell as arresting approx. 200 suspected members. However,attacks continued in February, killing some 70 people. On February15, Boko Haram attacked Kogi Prison, Kogi State, freeing43

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA119. On February 20, attacks left about 30 dead in the BokoHaram stronghold of Maiduguri, Borno State, when severalbomb explosions were followed by gun fights between BokoHaram and security forces. In Kaduna, Kaduna State, a suicidecar bomber killed a further 38 near a church on April 8. Just asin many of such incidents, Boko Haram attacks were followedby severe clashes and reprisal attacks between Christians andMuslims [1 Nigeria (Christians-Muslims)]. In Okene, Kogi State,on March 31, security forces raided an alleged bomb manufacturer.Nine Boko Haram members and two soldiers died. Incoordinated attacks on April 26, three newspaper buildings inAbuja and Kaduna were hit by Boko Haram car bombs, leavingnine civilians dead. Up to 50 people died in an alleged BokoHaram attack at a market in Potiskum, Yobe State, on May 3.In June, a splinter group of Boko Haram called Jama’atu AnsarulMuslimina Fi Bidalis Sudan (Ansaru) emerged. On June 4,a Boko Haram suicide bombing hit a church in Bauchi State,leaving fifteen people dead and 40 injured. Two days later,sixteen Boko Haram members were killed in gunfights with themilitary Joint Task Force in Maiduguri. On June 18, clashes betweenmilitants and security forces in Damaturu, Yobe State,left 40 dead. On August 6, Boko Haram members opened fireupon the attendants of a church service in Kogi, killing twentypeople. On September 16, military forces killed Boko Haramleader Abu Qaqa in Kano. At the end of September, securityforces killed 35 suspected Boko Haram members and arrested156 in a three-day operation in Mubi, Adamawa State. OnOctober 1, at least 46 students died in Boko Haram gunfire atuniversities in Mubi. Military forces launched a two-day operationagainst suspected group members on October 31, killingat least 48 in Maiduguri, after a Boko Haram suicide bomberhad killed seven and wounded hundreds in Kaduna. In earlyNovember, Boko Haram declared its readiness for peace talkson the condition of all imprisoned group members being released,which was rejected by the government. On November25, Boko Haram carried out two car bomb attacks in Kaduna,killing eleven attendants of church services. In mid-November,Ansaru kidnapped a French citizen, citing the French involvementin Mali. Boko Haram gunmen raided a church in Peri,Yobe State, on Christmas Eve, killing six Christians and settingthe church ablaze.dig, sesNigeriaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Christians – Muslims)4 Change: 5Start:1960Christian groups vs. Muslim groupssystem/ideology, subnational predominanceThe conflict between Christians and Muslims over subnationalpredominance escalated to a limited war and was exacerbatedby Boko Haram attacks against Christians [1 Nigeria (Boko Haram)].Throughout the year, Muslim gunmen repeatedly raidedChristian church services, assemblies, and other events, openingfire upon crowds. Nearly all such assaults were followed by reprisalattacks from Christian youth groups. In the course of theyear, approx. 600 people died and thousands fled. During January,at least 50 people died in mutual attacks. For instance,on January 10, suspected Muslim youths torched the homesof Christian villagers near Jos, Plateau State and opened fireon those who fled, killing seven. Following a bomb attack ona church by Boko Haram, Christian youths raided Muslim communitiesin Jos, leaving ten people dead on May 11. BetweenJune 19 and 22, approx. 200 died in clashes between Christiansand Muslims in Kaduna State, 100 of which were in Kaduna City.Following multiple suicide bombings on churches on June 16by suspected Boko Haram members, Christian youths attackedseveral predominantly Muslim towns and villages on June 19using machetes and handguns. The following day, Muslim youthgroups attacked Christian villagers, leaving at least 36 dead. Theconflict spread southwards to Okene, Kogi State, when gunmenentered a church and opened fire at the visitors on August 6,leaving twenty people dead. One day later, gunmen attacked amosque in Okene, leading to the deaths of three. On October 14,a Christian youth gang shot dead 22 people in a mosque nearKaduna. After Christian youths had set up barricades on a roadleading into a Muslim neighborhood in Ibi, Taraba State, two-dayclashes between Christians and Muslims erupted on November18, leaving ten people dead. Another four people died on November22, when Muslim youths rioted in Bichi, Kano State, followingrumors of blasphemy against Islam.sesNigeria(farmers – pastoralists)Intensity: 5 Change: 3Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:1960pastoralists vs. farmerssubnational predominance, resourcesThe conflict between farmers and pastoralists over resourcesand subnational predominance escalated to a war. While themain item of the conflict was arable land, it was further fueledby differences concerning political, ethnic, and religiousissues between the predominantly Christian farmers of theBerom and Tiv tribes on the one hand, and the mainly MuslimFulani nomads on the other. As desertification in the SahelianZone narrowed fertile grounds, farmers insisted on theirtraditional right to cultivate the contested lands, while Fulaninomads claimed them as grazing areas for their cattle. Due toincreasing violence between farmers and pastoralists since2009, the government established a Special Task Force (STF)to observe the situation in Plateau State and intervene if necessary.At the beginning of March, feuding between Fulaniherdsmen and Tiv famers resulted in the deaths of 66 peoplein Benue State. Most of them were killed in raids by herdsmenin Western Benue on March 5. Several days later, Fulaniherdsmen assassinated fifteen people in central Plateau State.At least twelve Tiv villagers died and 48 were wounded ina two-day attack on several villages near Gombe, Gombe State,on May 12. Some 500 Fulani gunmen raided the villages,torched houses, and attacked villagers with guns and machetes.A week later, Fulani herdsmen again attacked several Tivvillages in Benue and Nasarawa States, burning down hutsand farmland and killing 75 people. In an alleged reprisalattack, farmers killed thirteen Fulani herdsmen on June 10.44

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAThe conflict further intensified in early July, when at least200 Fulani gunmen raided more than 25 villages near Jos,Plateau State. STF tried to control the situation. 100 peopledied in the incident, 21 of whom were killed by STF. The killingsagain were accompanied by the burning of houses andthe destruction of farmland. The next day, Fulani herdsmenattacked the mass burial of the victims. The assailants set fireto the church in which many mourners had sought shelter,resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people. The nextday, Berom youths launched revenge attacks, killing some100 Fulani. After these attacks, on July 16, STF demanded allFulani inhabitants of some crisis-prone villages to leave theirhomes within 48 hours, threatening to forcefully expel themotherwise. Many Fulani fled. On August 23, two farmers weremurdered by two herdsmen near Jos. Violence continued onOctober 13, when Fulani herdsmen killed 24 villagers in KadunaState. The following nights, Fulani herdsmen attacked aTiv community, torched houses and killed at least 30 people,causing 5,000 to flee. In a two-day attack by Fulani herdsmenin Nasarawa starting on October 19, twelve people died. Violencebetween farmers and pastoralists also spread to thestates of Ebonyi, Enugu, Ogun, Osun, and Oyo in the south ofNigeria. Over the course of the year, approx. 600 people diedand at least 15,000 were displaced.sesRwandaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Hutu rebel groups)3 Change: FDLR vs. governmentnational powerStart:1990The conflict over national power between Hutu-dominatedrebel groups and the Tutsi-dominated government of PresidentPaul Kagame remained violent. The conflict was closelylinked to the subnational predominance conflict betweenthe Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)and the government of DR Congo [1 DR Congo (FDLR)].FDLR allegedly launched a series of grenade attacks, beginningwith an incident on January 4 which killed two citizensin the capital Kigali. In another attack which took placein Muhanga, Sud Province, on January 24, ten people werewounded. On March 23, a grenade blast in Musanze, NordProvince, left one civilian dead. Due to a new outbreak ofviolence in the neighboring DR Congo, by mid-September25,000 had fled to Rwanda. On June 19, the governmentmet with Congolese representatives to discuss further cooperationconcerning the fight against FDLR and other rebelsin the border region. On June 21, parliament passed aresolution criticizing MONUSCO and demanding the UN toclarify possible connections between the mission and FDLR.On September 1, the government withdrew two companiesof the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) that had cooperatedwith the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC) in Nord Kivu. On November 26, FDLR attackedthe RDF in Rubavu District, Ouest Province. During the fighting,one civilian and up to ten rebels were killed. On December3, FDLR killed a park warden in Volcanoes NationalPark in Musanze District.nabSenegalIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(MFDC / Casamance)3 Change: MFDC vs. governmentsecessionStart:1982The secession conflict over the southern region of Casamancebetween the Movement for Democratic Forces of Casamance(MFDC) and the government continued on a violent level. BetweenJanuary 2 and March 23, at least seventeen people werekilled in clashes. For instance, suspected MFDC rebels attackedsecurity forces in the village of Affiniam, Ziguinchor Province,on January 2 and 4, leaving one officer dead and threeinjured. In an operation in southern Casamance on January 10,the military bombed rebel positions in the area. Searching forMFDC fighters in the region of Ziguinchor, government forcesclashed with rebels on February 14 and 15, leaving four soldiersdead and nine wounded. Also on February 14, 50 suspectedMFDC members raided a business area in Baghagha,Ziguinchor. Between February 24 and March 23, governmentforces conducted five combat operations in which seven soldiersdied and twelve were injured. On March 24, MFDC rebelstook seven civilians hostage, releasing them on May 11. OnJune 27, newly-elected President Macky Sall announced hisreadiness for negotiations with MFDC. In July, several rebelsagreed to enter peace talks. However, rebels clashed againwith military forces on July 29 after MFDC members had robbedcivilians. On October 13 and 14, preliminary talks betweenrepresentatives of both sides were held in Rome, Italy,in the presence of the mediators of the Christian Sant’Egidiocommunity. Following the community’s mediation, an MFDCdelegation handed over eight hostages captured in 2011 toGambian authorities on December 10.absSomalia5(Islamist groups)Intensity: Change: Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:The ideology and national power conflict between the Islamistinsurgent group al-Shabaab and the Transitional FederalGovernment (TFG) continued on the intensity level of awar for the seventh consecutive year. On 12/31/11, Ethiopiaofficially joined the struggle against al-Shabaab, taking overthe strategically relevant town of Beledweyne, Hiiran Region,which resulted in dozens of casualties. In May, the KenyanDefense Forces (KDF) were incorporated into AMISOM. Duringthe last week of July, the National Constituent Assembly approveda new constitution and accordingly a new parliamentelected by elders was sworn in on August 20, in Mogadishu,Banaadir Region. On September 10, the new Somali parliamentelected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the first Presidental-Shabaab vs. TFG, KDF, ENAsystem / ideology, national power200645

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAof the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), ending the transitionalperiod. On November 7, the UN Security Council extendedthe AMISOM mandate for another four months. OnDecember 1, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) officially joinedthe Somali government forces. ASWJ was a paramilitary group,which had supported TFG in their fight against al-Shabaab forseveral years. At the beginning of the year, Kenyan warplanesbombed several al-Shabaab positions in Gedo, Jubbada Hexe,and Jubbada Hoose, allegedly killing over 70 militants in January.The most devastating air strikes took place on January6, 15, and 21, as well as on February 3, the latter allegedlykilling 100 militants. On January 24, al-Shabaab carried outa suicide bomb attack on an Ethiopian military base in Beledweyne,allegedly killing ten soldiers. During February, KDF,supported by the TFG and Ras Kamboni militants, increasinglyconducted ground offensives against al-Shabaab, mostly inJubbada Hoose, leading to at least 45 deaths. During the firstthree weeks of February, violence between al-Shabaab andAMISOM-backed TFG increased in the capital of Mogadishu,leading to more than 100 deaths, approx. 8,000 displaced,and several houses being destroyed. On March 10, al-Shabaabmilitants raided an Ethiopian and TFG military base in Turkud,Gedo Region. Both sides claimed to have killed over 75of the other side. On July 1, suspected al-Shabaab membersattacked several churches in Garissa, capital of North-EasternProvince, Kenya, killing seventeen civilians. KDF restartedtheir air raid campaign against al-Shabaab positions in JubbadaHoose and Gedo Region, allegedly killing eleven militantson July 7, twenty on July 16 and 17, and 30 on the last threedays of the month, as well as eighteen on August 23. On August15, after clashes in Gedo Region between KDF and TFGforces on the one side and al-Shabaab militants on the other,both sides claimed to have inflicted over 50 casualties. OnSeptember 12, al-Shabaab launched a suicide bomb attack onthe newly elected president, killing more than eight people ata hotel in Mogadishu but failing to kill the president. Anotheral-Shabaab suicide bomber targeted a popular Mogadishu restaurant,leaving fourteen people dead on September 20. Inearly October, KDF captured the harbor city of Kismayo, JubbadaHoose, from al-Shabaab after a month of fighting, withat least 100 battle-related deaths and a minimum of 18,000displaced people. During those fights in Jubbada Hoose Region,FGS and Ras Kamboni fighters backed KDF. After retreatingfrom Kismayo, al-Shabaab launched numerous bombings andraids against Kenyan and FGS forces throughout October, killingat least twenty. In November, KDF and FGS forces crackeddown on al-Shabaab in Kismayo, arresting several hundreds.On November 19, alleged al-Shabaab militants threw a grenadeinto a minibus in a Somali populated suburb of Nairobi,Kenya, killing six civilians. UNHCR recorded that more than78,000 people fled the country in 2012. The total numberof IDPs has decreased by approx. 200,000 since 2011. tgSomaliaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Somaliland – SSC)4 Change: 5Somaliland vs. SSCsubnational predominanceStart:2009The conflict over subnational predominance in the regionsof Sool and Sanaag, as well as Togdheer’s Cayn Section, betweenthe self-declared independent state of Somalilandand the local resistance group from Sool, Sanaag and Cayn(SSC), escalated to a limited war. After clan meetings in Taleh,Sool Region, between January 6 and 11, Khatumo State,consisting of the SSC provinces, was officially foundedon January 11. The same day, Somaliland’s parliament andupper house condemned the newly-formed regional administration.On January 12, Somaliland forces injured twoprotesters during a demonstration for a united Somalia inLas’anod, Sool. Three days later, fighting started betweenSomaliland troops and SSC fighters in Buhodle, Cayn, lastingfor two days. According to local sources, Somaliland forcesentered the city with armed trucks and fired with mortarsat a Khatumo militia base, leaving ten people dead. Somalilandtroops using heavy artillery launched an attack onBuhodle from three different fronts on January 18, causingseven casualties. On January 25, Somaliland troops clashedwith Khatumo forces, causing 50 deaths in Buhodle. After afirefight between Somaliland forces and Khatumo in Buhodleinvolving artillery and machine guns on February 6, localsources reported ten casualties and 6,000 fleeing the area.On March 5, Somaliland announced its readiness for talkswith the Khatumo administration. On April 1, Somaliland’smilitary launched an offensive on Khatumo bases, nearthe town of Las'anod, leaving at least fifteen people dead.Khatumo assailants threw a hand grenade into a house ofSomaliland‘s regional intelligence in Las’anod, killing oneperson on July 8. Khatumo soldiers opened fire at Somalilandtroops in a village near Buhodle on July 26. Followingensuing firefights, which left seven people dead, Somalilanddeclared Buhodle region to be under its control. On August11, a delegation of Khatumo politicians and regional leadersof Buhodle met Somaliland’s president, Ahmad Silanyo, inSomaliland's capital Hargeysa, Woqooyi Galbeed, for peacetalks. One day later, local leaders of Buhodle and Silanyosigned an agreement aimed at defusing the conflict. Somalilandpulled back military forces from Buhodle, and released68 Khatumo fighters from prison. Silanyo named former SSCleader Saleban Isse Ahmed as Minister of Resettlement andAid in Somaliland, on October 14. On November 28, regionalcouncil elections held in Somaliland provinces werefollowed by violent protests. Khatumo fighters abductedmembers of Somaliland’s Xaqsoor political party in Sool regionon November 27. On the day of the election, six peoplewere killed and several injured in clashes between Khatumofighters and Somaliland forces in Huddun, Sanaag. OnDecember 8, four protesters died in post-election violencein Hargeysa. On December 24, Somaliland launched attacksagainst Khatumo fighters, who had reportedly attacked theirbase in Sool Region.rbr46

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICASouth Sudanviolence)(inter – ethnicIntensity: 5 Change: Start:2008South Sudan (various militias)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: 4Start:SSPLM/A, SSDM, SSDF, SSLA vs.governmentsystem / ideology, resources2010Conflict parties:Conflict items:Murle vs. Lou Nuer vs. Misseriya vs.Dinka Gok vs. Dinka Rek vs. Dinka Borvs. Bari vs. Fartitsubnational predominance, resourcesThe war over subnational predominance and resourcesbetween various ethnic groups continued. Violence usuallyrevolved around cattle raids, abduction, tribal controversies,and disputes over grazing land and water. At thevery beginning of the year, 6,000-8,000 armed Lou-Nuermembers, the so-called Nuer White Army, assembled inPibor County, Jonglei state, after having declared their intentionto wipe out the Murle Tribe. In a series of Lou-Nuerattacks on Murle villages, 20,000 to 60,000 people weredisplaced and 612 killed. The tribes had stood on differentsides in the secession conflict between Sudan and SouthSudan. On January 3, UNMIS deployed peacekeeping troopsto Pibor County and supported the government in deployingtroops and 2,000 policemen to Pibor, Jonglei. Thefollowing day, the government declared a state of emergencyin Jonglei. In multiple revenge attacks between January5 and 14, Murle members assaulted Lou-Nuer villagesin Duk, Akobo, Uror, and Nyirol Counties, all in Jonglei,killing 209. On January 16, Murle members attacked Dinkasin Duk. 300 houses were torched and 83 people killed.In another Nuer attack on Dinkas in late January, 78 peopledied in Warrap state. Eleven people died in early February,when Murle members attacked Lou-Nuer villages in Akobo.Another 22 people died in clashes between Dinka Bor andMurle in Pibor. On March 1, the government started a sixweekdisarmament program in Jonglei State. The followingday, Murle members attacked Lou-Nuer in Nyirol County,resulting in 30 fatalities. Clashes spread to Juba, the capitalof South Sudan, when fighting between Bari, Dinka, andLou-Nuer over land left ten people dead. Between March9 and 11, 223 people died when Murle attacked Lou-Nuermembers in Upper Nile. Five days later, three people werekilled when Murle attacked a bus in Jonglei. On May 5, PresidentSalva Kiir attended the signing of a peace deal betweenethnic group leaders in Bor, Jonglei. Four days later,Murle killed two people in Twic East County, Jonglei. OnOctober 1, Murle killed a Dinka Bor. Misseriya stole some100 cows in Abyei on October 24. On November 6, Dinkakilled 23 in Rumbek Central County, Lakes State. Clashesbetween Dinka Gok and Dinka Rek on November 30 left 31dead. In mid-December, some twenty people died in clashesbetween Dinka and Fertit in Western Bahr el-GhazalState. Four people died in a cattle raid in Twice East Countyon December 19. Murle killed seven people in Duk andan additional two Lou-Nuer in a cattle raid in Jonglei onDecember 28.jpuThe conflict between the government and various militiasover the orientation of the political system and resourcesde-escalated from a war to the level of a violent crisis. Thegovernment reached a peace treaty with the SSDM leader PeterKuol Chol Awan on February 27, leading to a significant decreasein rebel activities. While parts of the SSDM rejected thispeace deal, choosing John Olony as their new leader, approx.1,800 SSDM fighters joined the demobilization and reintegrationprocess. The South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), led byJames Gai Yoach, and factions of SSDM opposing the treatycontinued fighting throughout the year. In the course of rehabilitatingrebel leaders, the government reinstated Peter Gadet,former leader of the SSLA, allowing him to keep the rankhe had prior to his rebellion. Finally, the South Sudan PeopleLiberation Movement/ Army (SSPLM/A), a rebel group foundedby Tong Lual Ayat at the end of 2011, announced their reintegrationinto the armed forces on May 5. On March 27, SSLAforces attacked government positions in Lalop, Unity state, followedby an attack by SSDM forces on government positions inKuek, Upper Nile State on April 19. In addition, David Yau Yau,a militia leader who had concluded a peace agreement withthe government on 06/16/2010, resumed his armed strugglein April, becoming military commander of combined SSLAand South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) contingents in JongleiState. On April 19, SSLA forces attacked government positionsin Mayom County, Unity State, killing five soldiers. Fighting intensifiedon August 24, when joint SSLA/SSDF forces attackedgovernment troops in the Nanaam area of Jonglei, leavingbetween 25 and 100 government forces dead. Approx. 7,000people were displaced as a result of the fighting. Further clasheswere reported in Likuangole, Jonglei, between August 27and 30, as well as on September 22. On October 25 and 26,government troops and SSLA/SSDF forces clashed in the sameregion, leaving one person dead. In reaction, the governmentordered the armed forces to suspend disarmament measuresin Jonglei State that had been intended to ease tensionsbetween different ethnic groups and instead concentrate itscapacities on the fight against SSLA/SSDF rebels [1 South Sudan(inter-ethnic violence)]. On November 19, about nineteenSSLA/SSDF militias and one government soldier were killedduring clashes in Linkwangule, Jonglei.rs47

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICASudan(Darfur)Intensity: 5 Change: Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2003SRF, LJM vs. border guards vs.pro-government militias vs. governmentsubnational predominance, resources, otherThe war over subnational predominance and resources in theDarfur region between several rebel groups and the governmentcontinued, mainly affecting North Darfur. Beside regulartroops, the government also deployed a variety of policeand paramilitary forces such as the reserve police Abu Tira.During the year tenions among these various police and paramilitaryforces resulted in violent confrontations betweenthese groups. In 2011, the rebel groups Justice and EqualityMovement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – MinniMinnawi (SLM/A-MM), and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Abdul Wahid an-Nur (SLM/A-AW) formed the umbrellagroup Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).The conflict remained a key issue within the internationalcommunity. On February 28, the ICC issued an arrest warrantagainst the Sudanese Minister of Defense Abdelrahim MohamedHussein for crimes against humanity. On April 26, the UNSecurity Council decided to reduce the police and military personnelof the UNAMID by 3,000. About 16,000 troops remainedin Darfur. On February 8, the establishment of the DarfurRegional Authority (DRA), as agreed upon in the AU- and UNsupportedDarfur Peace Agreement of 2006, was completed.Led by Tijani Al-Sisi, DRA was to be responsible for post-warreconstruction and reconciliation. DRA implemented the newdivision of the Darfur region into South, North, Central, East,and West Darfur, as scheduled in the 2011 Doha Documentfor Peace in Darfur (DDPD).While most violent incidents concerned government aggressionagainst civilians, the highest death toll was reachedin the fighting between rebels and government. On June 2,the government army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),killed more than 45 JEM fighters in North Darfur. SAF and SRFclashed on September 19 in East Jebel Marra, North Darfur,causing more than 80 fatalities. On October 18, SRF killed 63soldiers in the region of Abu Delek, North Darfur. BetweenDecember 23 and 24, SLM/A-AW killed 90 soldiers in Golo,Central Darfur.While no fighting between different rebel factions was reported,government forces and militias clashed heavily on variousoccasions. For instance, between September 25 and 28,at least 70 civilians were killed and 25,000 displaced in fightingbetween Abu Tira, pro-government militias, and borderguards in Hashaba, North Darfur. After the militia had plunderedthe village, the air force bombed the area. Day-long fightingbetween government troops and pro-government militiasin Kutum, North Darfur, relocated to the nearby IDP campsof Kassab and Fatah Barno in early August. Some twenty IDPswere killed and 600 injured. The government forces alsorepeatedly attacked the civilian population as well as IDPcamps, employing their air force and heavy weapons. Amongother incidents, the SAF killed four civilians participating inviolent mass protests against the new governor of South Darfur,Hamad Ismail, in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, betweenJanuary 24 and 26. A pro-government militia burneddown five villages in North Darfur between March 27 and 29,displacing 7,000. On November 2, a militia attacked Sigili village,North Darfur, causing the death of thirteen civilians andleaving the village completely destroyed.Attacks upon the civilian population by rebel groups were reportedless often. As on April 25, SLM/A-MM supposedly killedeight people and detained 25 in Abu Gamra, North Darfur.Throughout the year, at least 1,000 people were killed, includingseveral hundred civilians and fourteen UNAMID peacekeepers.Some 800 died from September to December alone.The war was accompanied by rape and torture, especially inrefugee camps. More than 80 rape cases by pro-governmentmilitias were registered. For instance, on August 22, militiaforces raped more than twenty women in public at KassabCamp, North Darfur. At the end of the year, 2,850,000 peoplefrom the Darfur region lived in refugee camps. Although theDDPD foresaw the refugees’ return to Darfur, most of them refusedto do so due to the unstable security situation. apaSudan (SPLM/A-North / SouthernKordofan, Blue Nile)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:5Change:Start:SPLM / A-North vs. governmentautonomy2011The autonomy conflict between Sudan Revolutionary Front(SRF) and the government in the Sudanese provinces of SouthKordofan and Blue Nile escalated to a war. The SRF was analliance between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-North) and the three main rebel groups:Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan LiberationMovement/Army – Abul Wahed (SLM/A-AW), and the Sudan LiberationMovement/Army – Minni Minnawi (SLM/A-MM) basedin Darfur [1 Sudan (Darfur)]. The struggle between SRF and thegovernment was closely linked to the conflict between Sudanand South Sudan concerning the boundary line in SouthKordofan and Blue Nile [1 Sudan – South Sudan]. Between January2 and 9, government troops bombarded South KordofanProvince, killing nineteen civilians and injuring 34.On January 16, the government army, the Sudanese ArmedForces (SAF), and SPLM/A-North rebels clashed in the areas ofHajar Jawad and Elhijirat Mountains, South Kordofan. On January23, SAF conducted air strikes in Blue Nile State, resultingin several thousand refugees. The following day, the air forcebombed a transit center for refugees in Elfoi, South Kordofan,near the South Sudanese border. At least 1,100 civilians fledas a result. After SRF had seized ten villages in South Kordofanon January 28, 30,000 civilians fled. SRF rebels seized anarmy garrison near Lake Obyad, South Kordofan, on Februa-548

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAry 26, killing 130 government troops and capturing machineguns, heavy artillery, and vehicles. Due to SAF bombardmentsbetween February 27 and March 4, more than 24 soldiers diedand 2,000 civilians fled from Blue Nile State to South Sudan.The same day, SPLM/A-North rebels launched an attack in al-Dalang, South Kordofan. Fifteen SAF soldiers died, an armycamp was destroyed, and a large number of arms seized in theassault, while the rebels suffered one death and six injuries.Between March 26 and April 18, SRF rebels claimed to havekilled more than 190 government soldiers. In late April, sixteencivilians were killed and 34 injured in SAF bombings. On June27, the government allowed the UN to deliver humanitarianassistance to civilians in areas held by SPLM/A-North. In Juneand July, bombardments and clashes continued. At least 77rebel fighters were killed in clashes between SRF and governmentforces near the village of Hagar al-Dom, South Kordofan,on August 6. Fighting between SAF and SRF in South Kordofanleft 82 soldiers and 29 rebels dead on August 24 and 25. Morethan 5,000 civilians fled the area. On September 2, 70 governmenttroops and seven rebels died in a major battle northeastof Kadugli, South Kordofan’s capital. On September 6 and 7,government forces killed at least 77 in South Kordofan. OnSeptember 10, SAF soldiers killed eighteen SRF forces nearKadugli. On September 20, fighting in South Kordofan resultedin the death of twelve SAF soldiers and 30 rebels. SPLM/A-North shot down an SAF airplane near Jau, South Kordofan, onSeptember 7, following a bombardment of rebel positions. Thesame day, rebels ambushed a military patrol between Hajarjawasand Angarko, South Kordofan, killing ten soldiers. OnOctober 8, SPLM/A-North shelled Kadugli, killing at least 27,including seven civilians and five SAF members. During rebelattacks on November 8 and 14 in South Kordofan, more thannineteen people were killed and 31 injured. On December 5,SAF soldiers arrested 70 people for collaborating with SPLM/A-North. On December 13, SPLM/A-North repelled a governmentattack, killing 27 government forces in a South Kordofan village.The majority of statements on casualties originated fromlocal sources in favor of either one of the parties or the other.According to UNHCR, 181,000 people had fled from Blue Nileand South Kordofan by December. Throughout the year, SRFwas repeatedly accused of recruiting children and sendingthem to training camps in South Sudan.lmpSudan – South SudanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:5Change:Start:SPLM/A-North vs. governmentterritory, resources, other2011The conflict between Sudan and South Sudan over contestedborder areas in general and the oil rich Higlig Region inparticular, the status of the Abyei area, border security, citizenship,transit fees for oil exports, and the alleged supportof rebel movements, escalated to a war. Against the backdropof intensified international pressure, including ultimatums5by the UN, AU, and its AU High Level Implementation Panel(AUHIP), the conflict parties reached several agreements inAddis Ababa on September 27. A consensus was reached onvarious conflict issues, but not on the future status of contestedborder areas, including Abyei. Though the treaties wereratified by both Sudanese parliaments, they were yet to beimplemented. In early 2012, the parties’ dispute over transitfees for South Sudan’s oil exports through Sudanese territoryresulted in a complete shut-down of oil production in SouthSudan on January 22.Relations further deteriorated when South Sudan accusedSudan of conducting air raids on South Sudanese territory. Inlate January, the UN confirmed that air raids had been conductedon a refugee registration site and on Panakuac Region,both in Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Although the conflictparties had reached a Memorandum of Understanding(MoU) on non-aggression and cooperation on February 10,followed by a MoU on the repatriation process on February14, fighting continued. On February 14, Sudan bombed theborder town of Jau, killing four people. Though the two Sudansreached an agreement on border demarcation on March13, aerial bombardments by the Sudanese air force on theSouth Sudanese states of Upper Nile, Unity State, and Bahrel Ghazal continued throughout March and April. Additionalheavy fighting on the ground was reported at Teshwin, UnityState, on March 23. Two days of fighting erupted around Heglig,an oil-rich border area claimed by both conflict parties,when South Sudanese troops briefly occupied the nearby oilinstallations on March 26. In addition, fighting intensified inthe South Sudanese Bahr el Ghazal State between March andApril, displacing approx. 10,000 people. Heavy fighting overthe oil installations of Heglig erupted on April 10. The conflictparties deployed more than 1,000 soldiers, tanks, antiaircraftrockets, mortars, and rocket launchers, SAF bombingstrategic infrastructure. The fighting severely damaged theoil installations and halted oil production. Between 400 and1,200 people were killed and a further 5,000 displaced in thebattle which resulted in South Sudan controlling the oil field.After severe international criticism, South Sudanese forcesretreated on April 20. Notwithstanding, air raids as well asground fighting continued on various occasions, e.g. in northernUnity State on May 4, and the War Guit area in northernBahr el Ghazal State on May 25. The negotiations betweenthe two Sudans came to a temporary halt after a Sudaneseair raid upon the locality of Rumaker in Bahr el Ghazal Stateleft several people injured on July 20. Even after the conclusionof the September agreements, which encompassedthe restart of oil exports from South Sudan, a demilitarizedzone along the border, and principles of border demarcation,clashes continued. From November 20 to 22, seven peoplewere killed and 200 displaced when Sudan conducted airraids into Bahr el Ghazal. Sudanese ground attacks on thearea of Kirr Adem in the same state left three people dead onDecember 9. Moreover, border clashes continued at the endof the year. For example on December 26, up to 28 peoplewere killed in the area of Warguet in Northern Bahr el Ghazelin fighting between the two armed forces. On the Sudaneseside, these attacks were justified as part of their fightagainst rebel forces which they claimed were supported bySouth Sudan [1 Sudan (SPLM/A-North/Southern Kordofan,49

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICABlue Nile)]. South Sudan denied the allegations, and in turnaccused Sudan of supporting rebel groups as well as stirringup ethnic tensions in South Sudan’s territory [1 South Sudan(various militias), South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)].While the conflict parties in turn clashed in the contestedarea of Abyei on May 2, tensions over Abyei conflict slightlydecreased when both Sudans withdrew most of their policeforces from the region. Additionally, in the framework of theAbyei Joint Oversight Committee, the conflict parties agreedupon a frame of reference for the Joint Military ObserverCommittee. However, the main joint institutions for Abyei,as foreseen in the Abyei agreement of 06/20/11, remainednon-operational throughout the year. Despite massive diplomaticpressure, the conflict parties also failed to agree uponthe persons eligible to vote in the referendum determiningthe future status of the Abyei area. South Sudan’s presidentSalva Kirr reiterated the South’s claim on the territories ofHiglig, Magenes-Jida, Kafia Kingi, Hafra Nahas, Taka Tijariya,and Wheatly Monroe Strip on June 11. Approx. 20 percentof the common border remained contested. With respectto border security, the conflict parties also failed to implementthe Abyei agreement of 06/20/11. The question ofthe boundary line of the envisaged Safe Demilitarized BorderZone (SDBZ) remained especially highly contested. On11/21/11, the AU had proposed a map displaying a temporaryadministrative line. While South Sudan agreed to themap, it was rejected by Sudan, on the grounds of allocatingWheatly Monroe Strip to South Sudan. As the AU had donebefore, the UN Security Council demanded the resumptionof negotiations within two weeks and the resolution of allconflict issues in the following three months on May 2. OnAugust 3, the AU extended the deadline to September 22,simultaneously mandating the AUHIP to draft detailed proposalsfor binding settlements on all outstanding issues. Incase of the conflict parties’ failure to agree, AUHIP’s proposalswere to be implemented by the AU in consultation withthe UN. Subsequently, on September 27 in Addis Ababa, theconflict parties reached various agreements dealing with theissues of citizenship, transit fees for oil exports, cross bordertrade, and border security respectively. Concerning citizenship,the agreement foresaw for all citizens of Sudan andSouth Sudan the right to live, work, travel, and own propertyin the respective neighboring country. With respect to bordersecurity, the immediate implementation of the SDBZ onthe basis of the AU-proposed temporary administrative linewas envisaged. The treaties were ratified by both Sudaneseparliaments on October 17 and 18. The conflict parties alsoplanned the resumption of oil exports from South Sudan toSudan that had stopped in January. However, on November28, the UN Security Council condemned the lack of progressin implementing the September agreements. As the conflictparties were also unable to make any progress concerningcontested border areas as well as of the future status of Abyei,both of which having not been dealt with in the Septemberagreements, the AU issued a new ultimatum on October24: The conflict parties were to agree on the border areaswithin two weeks and on the future status of Abyei withinsix weeks, or face final and binding proposals set by the AU.Both deadlines lapsed without any solution to the respectiveconflict issues.rsTanzaniaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3(Uamsho)Change:Uamsho vs. governmentsecession, system/ideologyStart:2010The conflict between the secessionist movement Associationfor Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation (Uamsho) and thegovernment turned violent. Uamsho demanded semi-autonomousZanzibar‘s independence from mainland Tanganyika,claiming that Zanzibar was being politically and economicallymarginalized. Uamsho gained support after the largest oppositionparty, the Civic United Front (CUF), formed a governmentof national unity with Tanzania's ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi(CCM), in 2010. On May 26 and 27, alleged Uamshomembers violently clashed with police forces in Zanzibar’scapital, Stone Town. Around 200 Uamsho members protestingagainst the arrest of one of their leaders burned down twochurches and attacked several bars, clubs, and shops. Policecracked down on the rioters with tear gas and water cannons,arresting 30 alleged Uamsho members. Several people werealso injured. The following day, Uamsho leaders, police andgovernment met for negotiations without any results. After thegovernment had banned any gatherings concerning Zanzibar’sstatus as part of Tanzania, police dispersed Uamsho meetingsin Zanzibar Urban/West on June 17 and 20, using teargas andwatercannons, arresting 43 alleged Uamsho supporters. AfterUamsho leader and Muslim cleric Sheikh Farid Hadi Ahmeddisappeared, Uamsho members and police clashed violentlyin central Stone Town between October 16 and 18. The rioterskilled one police officer and torched two offices of the rulingparty CCM. Uamsho threatened to kill Christians and burnchurches if its leader did not resurface. On October 19, Ahmedclaimed to have been abducted by government agents, but policedenied the accusations. Three days later, seven Uamsholeaders were charged with inciting the riots.jliTogoIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3(opposition)Change:The conflict between the government of President Faure Gnassingbéand the National Progress Alliance (ANC) under Jean-Pierre Fabre as well as other opposition groups continued. ThePermanent Committee for Dialog and Consultation (CPDC),which had been set up in 2009 to facilitate dialog betweenthe ruling party Rally for Togolese People (RPT), oppositionparties, and civil society representatives, was boycotted byopposition members in mid-February. In April, President Gnassingbédissolved RPT to create the new Union for the Republic(UNIR), uniting different political groups and civil society organizationswith links to the RPT. The opposition regularly stagedprotests, many of them being dispersed by police forces usingteargas and rubber bullets. In May, opposition leader Fabre3opposition vs. governmentnational powerStart:200250

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAthreatened to boycott parliamentary elections scheduled forOctober 2012. On July 11, Prime Minister Gilbert Houngbo announcedhis and his government’s resignation. Eight days later,President Gnassingbé appointed opposition member KwesiAhoomey-Zunu as prime minister. In early August, six oppositiongroups formed the Rainbow Coalition for the upcomingpresidential elections and announced their cooperation withthe Save Togo Collective (CST), a newly founded human rightsorganization. On August 25, thousands protested peacefullyagainst the government and Fabre demanded Gnassingbé tostep down as President. The same day in a protest initiated byCST, women started a one-week sex strike, withholding sexualintercourse from their partners, in order to mobilize themagainst Gnassingbé. However, parliamentary elections werepostponed to 2013.dtplant near Bakouma, Mbomou Prefecture, in eastern CAR, lootinggoods, abducting fourteen and leaving two civilians dead.Between September and December, violent LRA activity significantlydecreased in the DRC and CAR.cke, mweUganda(LRA)Intensity:3Change:6Start:1987Conflict parties:Conflict items:LRA vs. governmentsubnational predominanceThe conflict over subnational predominance in central Africabetween the Lord´s Resistance Army (LRA) and the governmentde-escalated but remained violent. After being pushed out ofnorthern Uganda by the Uganda People's Defense Force (UDPF)in 2006, the LRA operations concentrated in the boarder triangleof the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the CentralAfrican Republic (CAR), and South Sudan. As of 2012, all documentedconflict activity was solely based in the territoriesof DRC and CAR. CAR remained the suspected location of theLRA’s top command, including LRA leaders Dominic Ongwenand Okot Odhiambo commanding 100 fighters. The LRA’s leader,Joseph Kony, was suspected to be in the Darfur region ofSudan with an estimated 100 to 150 rebels at the beginningof the year. Though there was an initial increase in LRA attacksin CAR, the highest concentration remained in Orientale Province,DRC. Some 443,000 people remained displaced due toLRA activity, including an additional 2,000 newly displacedpersons since the beginning of the year. The highest number ofdisplaced continued to be in northern DRC, with 347,000 IDPs.Attacks most commonly consisted of lootings and abductionscarried out by small formations.Around 100 CAR soldiers were deployed in the eastern regionof CAR with another estimated 600 to 800 UDPF troops.In March, the AU officially launched the Regional CooperationInitiative (RCI) to strengthen efforts to combat the LRA. The initiativeincluded the establishment of a 5,000 member RegionalTask Force (RTF) composed of soldiers from Uganda, DRC, CAR,and South Sudan.From January to September, 180 presumed LRA attacks occurred,resulting in 39 deaths and 311 abductions. For instance,on January 20, LRA burnt down two schools in Faradje, OrientaleProvince, DRC. In a CAR hunting reserve, LRA allegedly killedthirteen artisanal gold miners on March 20 and 21. On May 12,Ugandan military forces seized LRA senior commander CaesarAchellam at the CAR-Congo border. From June 21 to 25, LRAcombatants carried out a series of attacks on a French uranium51

The Americas

THE AMERICAS: No violent conflict: violent crisis: limited war: war54

THE AMERICASIn the Americas, the total number of conflicts increased from45 to 51. While one interstate conflict ended in 2012 [1 Colombia– Venezuela (system)], six intrastate conflicts erupted;one over national power [1 Paraguay (impeachment)], twoover wages [1 Bolivia (police riots), Brazil (police riots)], twoover subnational predominance [1 El Salvador (Maras), Honduras(drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)], andone over the orientation of the political system [1 Nicaragua(militant groups)]. Five of the six newly emerged conflictsstarted on a violent level, while the national power struggle inParaguay resulting from the impeachment of President FernandoLugo constituted a dispute.The number of highly violent conflicts remained at four,with the conflict between drug cartels and the government inMexico constituting the sole war [1 Mexico (drug cartels)].While one limited war in Colombia decreased to a violent crisis[1 Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)], anotherconflict increased to a limited war [1 Brazil (drug traffickingorganizations)]. The limited war between the FARC and thegovernment of Colombia persisted despite peace negotiations,as did the limited war between several armed groups inMexico [1 Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)].Two interstate conflicts were conducted violently, leavingGuatemalan and Mexican civilians dead in the respective borderareas [1 Guatemala - Belize (territory), USA - Mexico (bordersecurity)]. Nicaragua’s conflict with neighboring CostaRica over the border river San Juan de-escalated to a dispute,while the maritime conflict with Colombia escalated to a nonviolentcrisis after Colombian warships had remained in contestedwaters despite the ruling of the ICJ [1 Nicaragua - CostaRica (Río San Juan), Nicaragua - Colombia (sea border)]. Theconflict between Argentina and the UK over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands also escalated to a non-violent crisis due to awarship deployment by the UK and heightened diplomatictensions [1 Argentina - United Kingdom (Malvinas/FalklandIslands)].In the course of presidential elections in Venezuela aswell as in Mexico, the two respective opposition conflicts turnedviolent again [1 Venezuela (opposition), Mexico (opposition)].Conflict Intensities in the Americas in2012 compared to 2011Three conflicts saw changes by two levels. The oppositionconflict in Ecuador escalated from a dispute to a violent crisis,while two conflicts involving indigenous people de-escalatedfrom a violent crisis to a dispute [1 Ecuador (oppositiongroups), Mexico (APPO), Chile (Rapa Nui / Easter Island)].The predominant conflict items in the Americas were resourcesand system/ideology, with 21 cases each. Furthermore,struggles over subnational predominance accounted forten old and two new conflicts, and the dispute between supportersof former President Fernando Lugo and new PresidentFranco in Paraguay added to the six existing national powerconflicts.The various conflicts over illicit drugs were again accompaniedby the deployment of military forces in the region, inseveral cases supported by US agencies. Military personnelwas deployed against organized crime (OC) as well as drugtrafficking organizations (DTOs). In Mexico, military deploymentshifted to the central states after a surge in drug-relatedviolence in the first six months. The newly-elected PresidentEnrique Peña Nieto announced to create a nationwide gendarmerieof several ten thousand personnel. In Jamaica, militaryforces were deployed in areas dominated by drug gangs,and a joint police-military operation was conducted in St. Catherinein March. El Salvador deployed military forces and aSpecial Counter-Terrorism Command to ensure the safety ofpublic transport, which was compromised by Mara gangsthroughout the country. In Brazil, in the course of OperationsÁgata IV-VI, more than 25,000 soldiers were deployed to securethe borders and to halt cross-border trafficking. Moreover,military forces joined with civilian law enforcement agenciesto re-establish security in urban areas under the influenceof DTO/OC.The US supplied Latin American countries with military infrastructureas well as military personnel and troops. Underthe Merída Initiative, a US-Mexican program aimed at fightingDTO/OC in Mexico, the US supported Mexican law enforcementagencies and the military with aircraft. Multinationalanti-drug operations in Central America, aimed at hinderingland and airborne drug trafficking from South America andthe Caribbean, led to increased military presence and actionFrequency of Conflict Items in 2012 inthe Americas by Intensity Groups252012 :2011 :12low Intensity :medium Intensity :high Intensity :111414178877108343433 3 33311010 0 00 0 001 1010 00dispute non-violent crisis violent crisis limited war warterritoryautonomydecolonisationsecessionothersystem / ideologyresourcesinternationalpowersubnationalpredominancenational power55

THE AMERICASthroughout the isthmus. In Guatemala, US Marines were deployedto cooperate with Guatemalan troops as part of »OperationHammer.« The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)launched the corresponding »Operation Anvil« in the northerndepartments of Honduras, maixnly to intercept planesand fight traffickers on the ground. Additionally, apart fromthe aforementioned operation, 20,000 Honduran soldiers remaineddeployed against DTO/OC with the aim to improvesecurity.The DEA supported Honduras with radar intelligence, severalhelicopters as well as at least one Foreign-deployed AdvisorySupport Team (FAST), a force initially created for rapiddeployment and combat in drug-producing regions in Afghanistan.56

THE AMERICASConflicts in the Americas in 2012Name of conflict 1 57Argentina – Iran (AMIA)*Argentina – United Kingdom(Malvinas/Falkland Islands)Bolivia (opposition)*Bolivia (police riots)Bolivia – Chile (access to sea)*Brazil (drug traffickingorganizations)Brazil (MST)*Brazil (police riots)Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía)Chile (Rapa Nui / Easter Island)*Chile (social movements)Colombia (ELN)*Colombia (FARC – ELN)*Colombia (FARC)Colombia (indigenous groups)Colombia (paramilitary groups,drug cartels)*Colombia – Venezuela (system)*Dominican Republic – Haiti*Ecuador (opposition groups)*El Salvador (Maras)Guatemala (drug cartels)Guatemala (opposition groups)Guatemala – Belize (territory)Haiti (opposition groups)*Honduras (drug traffickingorganizations, organized crime)Honduras (MUCA, MARCA, farmersof Bajo Aguán valley - landowners)Honduras (opposition)Jamaica (drug gangs)Mexico (APPO) *Mexico (drug cartels)Mexico (EPR/ Guerrero)*Mexico (EZLN/ Chiapas)*Mexico (inter-cartel violence,paramilitary groups)Mexico (opposition)Nicaragua (militant groups)Nicaragua (opposition groups)Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4Argentina vs. IranArgentina vs. United Kingdomopposition vs. governmentmilitant groups vs. governmentopposition groups vs. governmentotherterritory, resourcesopposition vs. government system / ideology, national powerBolivian National Police vs. othergovernmentBolivia vs. Chileterritory, resourcesdrug trafficking organizations, subnational predominancemilitias vs. governmentMST vs. governmentresourcesPolice forces in Bahía vs.othergovernmentMapuche, ATM, CAM vs.autonomy, resourcesgovernmentRapa Nui vs. governmentautonomyConfech, Fech, CUT vs. government system / ideologyELN vs. governmentsystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance, resourcesFARC vs. ELNsystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance, resourcesFARC vs. governmentsystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance, resourcesvarious indigenous groups vs. resourcesgovernmentparamilitary groups, drug cartels subnational predominance,vs. governmentresourcesColombia vs. Venezuelasystem / ideology, internationalpowerDominican Republic vs. Haiti otheropposition groups vs. government system / ideologyMara Salvatrucha, Barrio 18 vs. subnational predominancegovernmentdrug cartels vs. government subnational predominance, resourcesopposition groups vs. government system / ideologyGuatemala vs. Belizeterritoryopposition groups vs. government national powerdrug trafficking organizations, subnational predominance,organized crime vs. government resourcesbig landowners vs. peasant farmers resourcesof Bajo Aguán, MUCA, MARCAFNRP, LIBRE, anti-government system / ideology, national poweractivists vs. governmentdrug gangs vs. government subnational predominanceAPPO vs. governmentsystem / ideologydrug cartels vs. government subnational predominance, resourcesEPR vs. governmentautonomy, system / ideologyEZLN vs. governmentautonomy, system / ideology,resources, otherSinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. subnational predominance,La Familia et al. vs. CJNG et al. vs. resourcesLCT et al.national powersystem/ideologysystem / ideology, national power1994183319832012188320101996201220082010200619642006196420051983200420091980201220091985198119862012200920092010200620061995199420052006201220085NEW56NEW4656END3NEW536NEW543NEW121314233133143311333332333315224333

THE AMERICASConflicts in the Americas in 2012Name of conflict 1 58Nicaragua – Colombia (sea border)Nicaragua – Costa Rica (RÍo SanJuan)*Panama (opposition)Paraguay (EPP, agrarianmovements)Paraguay (impeachment)Peru (opposition movements)Peru (Shining Path)Peru – Chile (border)*United Kingdom – Chile(Antarctica)*USA – Cuba (Guantanamo)*USA – Cuba (system)*USA – Mexico (border security)USA – Venezuela*Venezuela (opposition)Venezuela – Colombia (MonjesIslands)*Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4Nicaragua vs. ColombiaNIcaragua vs. Costa Ricaopposition vs. governmentEPP, agrarian movements vs.governmentFranco supporters vs. Lugosupportersopposition movements vs.governmentSL vs. governmentPeru vs. ChileUnited Kingdom vs. ChileUSA vs. CubaUSA vs. CubaUSA vs. MexicoUSA vs. Venezuelaopposition vs. governmentColombia vs. Venezuelaterritory, resourcesterritorysystem / ideology, resourcessystem / ideology, resourcesnational powersystem / ideology, resourcessystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance, resourcesterritoryterritoryterritorysystem / ideology, internationalpowerothersystem / ideology, internationalpowersystem / ideology, national powerterritory, resources18251858200819892012200819801883200719591960200520011992187156NEW52133133111232311Conflicts marked with * are without description2Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review3Change in intensity compared to the previous year: 3 or 5 escalation by one or more than onelevel of intensity; 4 or 6 deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; no change4Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

THE AMERICASArgentina – United Kingdom(Malvinas / Falkland Islands)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: 5Start:Argentina vs. United Kingdomterritory, resources1833The conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK)over the territory of the Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands escalated,but remained non-violent. On January 31, the UK sentthe destroyer HMS Dauntless to a naval exercise near the disputedislands, with Prince William participating. The Argentinegovernment of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner accusedthe UK of militarizing the South Atlantic, whereas theBritish government of Prime Minister David Cameron statedthat the dispatch of the warship was a routine naval exercise.Moreover, Argentina accused the UK on February 10 of havingdeployed a nuclear submarine near the disputed islands. TheArgentine foreign minister Héctor Timerman filed a formalprotest at the UN the same day. On March 27, the UK rejectedthe accusations. On June 4, Argentina declared the oil drillingin the disputed waters by UK-listed companies illegal, whereasthe UK said the activity was part of the islands’ right of selfdetermination.On October 5, Argentina sent a letter of complaintto the UN Security Council regarding the planned Britishmilitary exercises, including missile launches, on the disputedterritory. Argentina perceived these exercises as a provocation,whereas the UK stated that they were part of their militarydefense presence. On November 19, Argentine nationalistsransacked a shipping agency in Buenos Aires that offers cruisetrips to the islands. The UK condemned the Argentine policenot trying to prevent the incident and thus responded withseeking actions through the European Union, the World TradeOrganization and the International Maritime Organization. Inaddition, the UK summoned the Argentine ambassador andcalled the incident a »violent act of intimidation.« swaBoliviaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(police riots)3 Change: NEWStart:2012Bolivian National Police vs. governmentotherThe conflict over wages and labor conditions between policeforces and the government lasted for a week. In the citiesof La Paz, Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Potosí, several hundred lowrankingpolice officers expelled their commanders on June 21.Three people were injured in clashes with anti-riot police. Thestrikers demanded their payments and pensions to be adjustedto those of the armed forces and urged the government toannul a law restricting their right to strike. Furthermore, theyrefused to accept the authority of the new police chief, ColonelVíctor Santos Maldonado, and called for his resignation.One day later, some 200 police forces successively attackedthe National Intelligence Directorate (Digipi), an office of thepolice disciplinary board (Segip), and the departmental policeheadquarters in La Paz, burned documents and demolishedoffice furniture and equipment. Similar actions took place inOruro, while an estimated 4,000 rank and file police officersall over the country joined the protests by occupying theirbarracks. On June 24, low-ranking police officers on strike rejectedan agreement signed by the government and the policeunion Anssclapol. While officers in Santa Cruz decided to suspendtheir protest, police forces in the other main cities burnedcopies of the agreement. The government accused its politicalopponents of using the mutiny to prepare a coup d’etat[1 Bolivia (opposition)]. The opposition, as well as the police,denied any such plans. On June 25, about 1,000 protesting officersand 500 government supporters clashed in front of thepresidential palace. They attacked each other with batons andtear gas. No injuries were reported. Two days later, the governmentand the police on strike reached a deal which ended theprotests across the country.hefBrazil (drug traffickingorganizations)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: 5Start:drug trafficking organizations vs.governmentsubnational predominance2010The conflict over subnational predominance between themain drug trafficking organizations, as well as militias, on theone hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a limitedwar. It remained the main goal of the government to permanentlyre-establish control over areas being currently underthe rule of drug trafficking organizations and militia groups.Starting in May, the government conducted operationsÁgata IV-VI in order to reduce criminal activities along the border.Approx. 25,000 military and civilian officials, backed byarmored vehicles, helicopters, and jets, were involved. Dozensof suspects were arrested, more than six tons of drugs andeleven tons of explosives seized. Gang activities also affectedneighboring Bolivia and Paraguay. On July 18, Comando Vermelho(CV) leader, Osmar Jesus "Bola de Fogo" Chavez, waskilled by two gunmen near the border town of Salto del Guairáin Paraguay’s Canindeyú department.Throughout the year, police and military forces carriedout anti-drug operations in favelas all over the state of Rio deJaneiro resulting in the arrests of several suspects, deaths oneither side, and the seizure of drugs and weapons. In Marchand April, alleged drug traffickers killed nine people includinga security officer in the favela Rocinha. In a joint operation ofmilitary forces as well as civil and federal police in the VilaAliança favela on May 13, Márcio José »Matemático« SabinoPereira, leader of the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP), was fatallywounded. On May 17, 1,600 police officers arrested fifteen suspectsand seized arms and drugs in sixteen favelas all overthe state. As part of operation "Purificação" at least 59 allegedlycorrupt police officers and eleven members of CV werearrested in Duque de Caxias on December 4.On January 27, police in São Paulo captured a leader ofCV, Fabiano »FB« Atanázio da Silva, along with three other CV59

THE AMERICASmembers. On May 28, officers of the special unit Rondas OstensivasTobias Aguiar killed six Primeiro Comando da Capital(PCC) members. In a series of revenge killings between membersof PCC and the police approx. 380 people were killed ofwhich at least 100 were police officers. PCC leader FranciscoAntônio »Piauí« Cesário da Silva was arrested on August 26, inSanta Catarina state. On October 29, 500 agents of military policeand its special unit Tropa de Choque conducted the operation»Saturação« in the PCC stronghold community Paraisópolis.The right hand of »Piauí,« Edson »Nenê« Fereira dos Santos,was arrested together with 107 suspects during the operation.Police also discovered a death list containing the names of 40policemen and seized weapons and drugs.jva, hefBrazilIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(police riots)3 Change: NEWStart:Police forces in Bahía vs. governmentotherThe conflict over wages and working conditions between policeforces in Bahía and the government lasted for twelve days.On January 31, at least 10,000 of the 32,000 members of theMilitary Police of Bahía went on strike demanding a 30 percentpay increase and better working conditions. Under the leadershipof former police officer Marco Prisco, 245 strikers alongwith their families occupied the legislative assembly in thestate capital Salvador da Bahía. Businesses, as well as publicvenues, closed down temporarily as strikers seized police cars,torched vehicles, looted stores, and blocked roads to Salvador.During the strike, the number of homicides in Salvador’smetropolitan area rose significantly, most of the killings wereattributed to militia groups [1 Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)].The government and Bahía state governor, JacquesWagner, repeatedly called the strike illegal, which later wasapproved by a court in Bahía on February 2. The governmentdeployed 3,500 soldiers, 650 federal police officers and 40officers of an army elite force to provide security. More than1,000 soldiers surrounded the occupied state assembly whilestrike leader Prisco vowed to resist. On February 6, army forcesand occupiers clashed using tear gas and rubber bullets, leavingsix injured. Three days later, the military police being onstrike left the building peacefully, but stressed that the strikewas not over. Prisco was arrested along with eleven otherstrike leaders. On February 11, striking officers accepted anagreement over salary increases as well as additional benefitsand called off the strike.jvaChile (Mapuche / Araucanía )Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:Mapuche, ATM, CAM vs. governmentautonomy, resources20122008The conflict over autonomy and resources in the region ofLa Araucanía between members of the indigenous Mapu-che people, among them Wente Winkul Mapu, CoordinadoraArauco Malleco (CAM) as well as Mapuche Territorial Alliance(ATM), and the government remained violent. Police operationsand occupation actions caused casualties on bothsides. For instance, on April 2, police raided the Mapuchecommunity Wente Winkul Mapu, Araucanía, using armoredvehicles to block roads, searching houses, applying teargasand arresting three Mapuche. Shots fired by an unidentifiedshooter in a nearby forest killed one police officer. Duringan arrest on June 7, police injured seven Mapuche, includingchildren, with pellet shots. Mapuche attacked at least onepoliceman with axes and rods. In the aftermath, the Courtof Appeals approved, on July 6, a constitutional complaintagainst the disproportional use of force by the police. On thesame day, one of the leaders of CAM was arrested during theoccupation of the agricultural estate El Natre. The latter usedteargas and rubber pellets. Between July 7 and 19, Mapucheset fire to several buildings in Ercilla. On July 22, CAM, amongothers, officially declared being responsible for the incendiaryof machines and trucks of the company Forestal Cautín.At a security summit on July 24, President Sebastián Piñeraannounced to increase the police’s resources and staff inthe region. Two days later, ATM occupied the UNICEF office inthe capital Santiago de Chile. On September 2, an agreementwith UNICEF was reached and the occupation ended. Underthe agreement, UNICEF was to ask the Ministry of the Interiorto withdraw police forces from the Mapuche communities.Throughout the year, Mapuche repeatedly went on hungerstrike. In Angol prison, Araucanía, Mapuche started a hungerstrike on July 27. They demanded freedom for all politicalMapuche prisoners and the mitigation of their own sentences.The hunger strike ended after three months followingthe easing of their sentences by the Supreme Court. FiveMapuche detained in the prison of Temuco, Araucanía, wenton hunger strike on October 1. They demanded to be transferredto Angol prison, where their families were imprisoned.After 22 days, the authorities granted them their demands.During the hunger strikes, protests were held by other Mapuche.The largest of which occurred on October 15, with 5,000to 10,000 thousand participants in Santiago de Chile. Onceit turned violent, it was ended by the police using teargas.On November 14, two imprisoned leaders of CAM started ahunger strike demanding the liberation of all political Mapucheprisoners and the abatement of action concerning theircondemnation.lef, hkaChileIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(social movements)3 Change: Start:CONFECH, ACES vs. governmentsystem / ideology2006The system conflict between various social movements ledby the Confederation of Chilean Students (CONFECH) and thegovernment remained violent. On January 27, President SebastiánPiñera issued the Solidarity Loan Fund Law, granting110,000 student loans, and called upon students not to stageprotests in 2012. Nevertheless, beginning in March, mostly vi-60

THE AMERICASolent protests for educational reform regularly took place allover the country. The protesters usually hurled stones, sticks,paint-filled bottles and lit barricades, while police used teargasand water cannons.On March 15, the Coordinating Assembly of High SchoolStudents (ACES) called for the first protests this year. About5,000 students took to the streets in the capital Santiago deChile demanding free quality-education and protesting againstthe expulsion of about 200 students who participated in lastyear’s protests. At least three officers were injured and 50 protestersdetained. After ongoing protests, the government announceda new financing system for students on April 23. Twodays later, protests organized by CONFECH took place all overthe country. In Santiago, 48,000 to 80,000 people demonstratedlargely peacefully, nevertheless, 69 were arrested. Thesame day, Piñera announced further investments regardingeducation. On May 16, CONFECH staged nationwide mass protests,with about 100,000 participants only in Santiago. Threepeople were injured and 70 arrested. In his annual State ofthe Nation speech on May 21, Piñera said that he wanted toadvocate an education reform, but dismissed the demands fora free education system. The speech coincided with mass demonstrationsof various civil groups, including CONFECH, in 27cities. On August 8, demonstrators and police forces clashedin Santiago. At least 49 officers were injured, about 75 studentsarrested, and three public buses burned. Pressured bythe continued mass demonstrations, the congress approved atax reform, raising funds exclusively for education spending,on September 4. However, the student movement rejected theinitiative as insufficient and resumed their protests. lef, hefColombiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(FARC)4 Change: Start:1964FARC vs. governmentsystem / ideology, subnational predominance,resourcesThe system conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) and the government remained highly violent.The Marxist-Leninist FARC financed its activities mainlythrough extortion, drug trafficking, and illegal mining. Countingapprox. 8,000 members, FARC exerted considerable influenceespecially in the departments of Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca,Chocó, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca.On January 9, a communiqué signed by FARC top commanderRodrigo Londoño Echeverry, alias Timochenko, was releasedsignalizing willingness to re-establish peace talks. In reaction,President Juan Manuel Santos reiterated his demand to releaseall FARC-held hostages and ruled out the establishment of ademilitarized zone.In another communiqué released on February 26, FARC announcedto abandon the practice of kidnapping civilians forextortion and to release the last ten members of the securityforces held captive. The six policemen and four soldiers werefinally released at the beginning of April. However, on April 28,a French journalist was kidnapped by FARC in Caqueta. He wasreleased on May 30.On August 27, Santos publicly confirmed exploratory peacetalks. Representatives of both parties conducted preparatorytalks in Oslo, Norway, on October 18. Norway and Cuba actedas guarantors, while Chile and Venezuela as witnesses. At thefirst round of talks held in Havana, Cuba, between November19 and 29, FARC declared a unilateral ceasefire until January20, 2013. The preliminary results were kept secret.Meanwhile, violent actions continued. On January 13, FARCset off a car bomb in Tibú, Norte de Santander, causing thedeath of four civilians. Until the end of January, FARC increasedits actions in the department, allegedly in collaborationwith other guerrilla groups [1 Colombia (ELN)]. On February 11,FARC assaulted a military base in Valle del Cauca, killing foursoldiers. Two days later, the Minister of Defense announcedthe deployment of 1,100 police officers to protect the region’smain cities Cali and Palmira. On February 20, clashes with securityforces left three soldiers dead and caused 250 civiliansto flee.On March 17, eleven soldiers were killed in an ambush inArauca, near the Venezuelan border. Four days later, an air strikeon a FARC camp in the same region resulted in the death of 33guerillas. In another air-ground operation in Meta, 36 militants,including seven front commanders, were killed on March 26.In early April, FARC forced a stoppage of transportation inseveral municipalities of Chocó and a nighttime curfew in theprovincial capital Quibdó. An attack on a military patrol causedthe death of six soldiers and two militants on April 7 in thesame department. In another attack on a military squad, FARCmembers killed twelve soldiers in the department of La Guajiraon May 21 and fled to Venezuela. In support of the Colombiangovernment, Venezuela announced the deployment of troopsto the area and declared not to allow incursions by any armedgroups. Beginning in late June, FARC launched attacks on theurban areas of Toribío and Caldonó, Cauca. Dozens of houseswere destroyed by mortar fire. In the aftermath, at least 2,800people were displaced from the area. Local indigenous groupslaunched efforts to expel all armed actors from their territories,mostly by non-violent means [1 Colombia (various indigenousgroups)]. In spite of FARC’s unilateral ceasefire declaration, thegovernment continued offensive operations in December. Atleast 30 militants were killed in air strikes on FARC camps inNariño and Antioquia.Throughout the year, FARC attacks against the electric infrastructureand the oil sector increased. On July 5, they killedfive employees of the national oil company. Five days later, thegovernment announced the deployment of 5,000 soldiers toprotect petroleum facilities. On August 15, three people werekilled by a landmine in Chocó while trying to re-establish powersupply interrupted by FARC.fblColombiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(indigenous groups)3 Change: 5Start:2005various indigenous groups vs. governmentresourcesThe conflict between various indigenous groups and thegovernment over resources turned violent. The indigenous61

THE AMERICASand the Salvadorian presidents proposed the legalization ofdrugs such as marijuana and cocaine as a measure to fight thedrug cartels more effectively. Despite their reiterated effortsthroughout the year, both the US and the majority of the otherCentral American countries disapproved of this proposal. cmeGuatemalaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition groups)3 Change: 5Start:opposition groups vs. governmentsystem/ideology, resources1985The conflict over the system and resources between variousoppositional movements and the government under PresidentPérez Molina escalated to a violent level. Throughout the year,conflicts over land ownership, educational and constitutionalreforms, and the President’s frequent employment of the militaryto guarantee security mobilized unionized teachers, studentgroups and indigenous groups. On March 19, thousandsof mainly indigenous protesters started a nine-day march fromCobán, Alta Verapaz, to the capital Guatemala City, demandinga solution to the land conflict as well as a moratorium on miningand hydroelectric projects adjacent to their communities.On March 27, Molina promised to attend to their demands withpriority, leading to a peaceful ending of the protests. In April,however, protests continued when the president announcedto establish two military bases in Petén and in San Juan Sacatepéquez.On May 1, the conflict between local communities inSanta Cruz Barillas, Huehuetenango, and the electricity companyHidro Santa Cruz over the construction of a hydroelectricdam on their territory turned violent. 200 local residents tookcontrol of a nearby military base, when attackers, allegedlylinked to the electricity company, left one activist dead andtwo others severely injured. In response, the government decreeda state of siege in Santa Cruz Barillas, deploying at least500 soldiers and 150 police officers on May 2. In reaction, 25families fled into the nearby mountains. The government endedthe state of siege on May 19. On July 3, student protestersclashed with police in Guatemala City. The protesters, studyingto become teachers, opposed an education reform that wouldincrease the duration of their university education from threeto five years. Reportedly, at least 43 people were injured, includingthe ministers for education and the interior, who gotcaught in the demonstration. On October 4, police officers andsoldiers killed at least four protesters and injured as many as30 who had complained about the rise in electricity prices, theeducation reform, and had proposed a constitutional reform ata road blockade of the Pan-American highway in Totonicapán.After initially denying the involvement of soldiers in the shooting,Molina acknowledged on October 5, that soldiers wereresponsible for the deaths. Five days later, he added that themilitary would not be used to dissolve demonstrations in thefuture. On October 11, the Public Ministry arrested eight rankand file soldiers and a colonel over the killings.cmeGuatemala-BelizeIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: 3Guatemala vs. Belizeterritory(territory)Start:1981The conflict between Guatemala and Belize over territory turnedviolent. Incidents in the border area claimed three lives intotal. On January 28, the Belize Defense Force (BDF) shot deada Guatemalan farmer close to the border in Chiquibul, Belize.On July 18, BDF killed one Guatemalan farmer who lumberedillegally near the Adjacency Zone and arrested two.On October 4, another Guatemalan, presumably panninggold illegally, was shot dead by BDF soldiers on Belizean territory.The fatal incident of January 28 was the main topic ofa meeting between the Belizean and Guatemalan foreign ministerson February 2. Throughout the year, representativesof both countries had met on several occasions. On April 27,delegations of the two countries met at the headquarters ofthe OAS in Washington, D.C., USA. They agreed on a date forsimultaneous referendums to be held in the two countries onwhether they should take their territorial dispute to the ICJ.The referendums are to take place on 10/06/13. On June 1,another meeting of Guatemalan and Belizean representativestook place at the office of the OAS, located in the AdjacencyZone. In order to mediate in the affair concerning the fatalityof July 18, and in order to find a long-term solution for theenduring conflict, the OAS convoked a conference at theirheadquarters for July 31. On October 22, the Belizean presidentand his Guatemalan counterpart held another meeting.Three days later, the Belizean Minister of National Security,John Saldivar, announced the preferred use of non-lethal weaponsand the deployment of supplementary BDF troops in theborder zone. In order to financially support the settlement, theEU and the OAS signed a treaty at the OAS headquarters onDecember 17.hkaHonduras (drug traffickingorganizations, organized crime)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: NEWStart:2012drug trafficking organizations, organizedcrime vs. governmentsubnational predominance, resourcesA violent crisis erupted between drug trafficking organizationsas well as organized crime syndicates and the government,supported by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Up to20,000 soldiers were deployed nationwide in 2011 after thehomicide rate had gone up to twenty per day and more than79 percent of all drug flights from South America had passedthrough Honduras. In 2012, more than 400 people were killedin massacres by organized crime. Measures against drug traffickersprimarily affected the northern departments of Atlántida,Colón, Gracias a Dios, Olancho, and Yoro. Counter-drugoperations, supported by the DEA, included the destruction of63

THE AMERICASclandestine airfields and the interception of planes carryingillicit drugs. In »Operation Armadillo,» the military destroyedmore than 60 clandestine landing sites in Gracias a Dios andother northern departments only in the first three months.Military forces were deployed in operations Xatruch I-III toform a joint police-military force in Colón [1 Honduras (MUCA,MARCA, farmers of Bajo Aguán valley - landowners)]. In thecourse of the multi-national anti-drug operation »Anvil« to cutdown the flow of illicit drugs through Central America [1 Guatemala(drug cartels)], the government received helicoptersand technical assistance from the US, including at least oneForeign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST). On March 26,in the course of »Operation Xatruch II,« about 30 criminalsambushed a military convoy near Tascosa, Colón, injuring fivesoldiers. On May 11, in a combined US-Honduran anti-drugoperation in Ahuas, Gracias a Dios, security forces killed fourcivilians from inside a helicopter. On June 13, helicopters anda Super Tucano warplane shot down an aircraft in Olancho. Thetwo pilots were killed. On June 23, a DEA agent killed a traffickernear Brus Laguna, Gracias a Dios, in a raid on traffickersnear a hidden landing site. On July 3, a plane with two Braziliantraffickers aboard was downed south of Catacamas, Olancho.Police officers and DEA agents killed a trafficker at the scene.About 900 kilograms of cocaine were found aboard the plane.From August 18 to November 19, the US suspended the sharingof radar intelligence with the Honduran military becauseof the violation of a bilateral agreement on the downing ofairplanes in late July. Intelligence sharing was later reinitiated.On November 29, authorities seized an estimated fifteen tonsof illegal drugs in the course of «Operation Julián ArístidesGonzález« in Pata de Gallina, Yoro.rmaHonduras (MUCA, MARCA, farmersof Bajo Aguán valley - landowners)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:2009big landowners vs. peasant farmers of BajoAguán, MUCA, MARCAresourcesThe conflict over farmland between peasant farmers of theBajo Aguán Valley, located in the northern department of Colón,and regional big landowners supported by the governmentbecame separated from the opposition conflict in 2009,when then-President José Manuel Zelaya initiated negotiationsover land distribution before being ousted in a coupd’état [1 Honduras (opposition)]. Farm worker groups, namelythe Unified Peasant Movement of Aguán (MUCA) and theAuthentic Peasant Reclamation Movement of Aguán (MARCA),repeatedly declared the 1990s purchases by big landownersillegal and demanded the redistribution of farmland. In Decemberthat year, farm workers staged coordinated land invasionswhile big landowners hired private security personnelto protect ranches. Since 2009, the conflict claimed 80 lives,mostly peasant activists. Peasant organizations and humanrights activists repeatedly blamed security guards for thosemurders, which were rarely solved. In the course of the operationsXatruch I-III, military forces were deployed. They dissol-ved land occupations, sometimes violently. On March 28, fourfarm workers were killed near Trujillo, allegedly by security guardsof big landowners. On June 5, President Porfirio Lobo andMUCA signed a deal intended to end the conflict, which impliedselling 2,400 hectares to MUCA. The government granteda long-term loan for this purpose. On June 29, a court declaredthe 1990s land acquisitions illegal. In July, private security guardsaltogether killed three peasant farmers. On July 25, Lobodeclared the land conflict a matter of national security andannounced to resolve it before leaving office in January 2014.On August 1, Lobo opted against a formerly announced stateof siege in the region and instead decreed a general disarmamentwith an exemption for private security guards. On August9, security guards killed three peasant farmers. A month later,near Tocoa, Colón, an occupier died of teargas during the evictionof a farm. On September 12, security guards attacked agroup of farmers, killing two. On September 23, a human rightslawyer concerned with the issue was assassinated in the capitalTegucigalpa. Throughout November, six farmers were killedin assaults, most of whom were members of peasant organizations.On December 6, landowner Miguel Facussé declaredto suspend significant investments in Bajo Aguán and to havesold his plantations to the government.rmaHondurasIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition)3 Change: 5Start:2009FNRP, LIBRE, anti-government activists vs.governmentsystem/ideology, national powerThe system and national power conflict between the main oppositionumbrella group National Front of People’s Resistance(FNRP) and the government turned violent. FNRP consistedmainly of supporters of former President Manuel Zelaya, whowas ousted in a coup in 2009, and was headed by Zelaya’swife, Xiomara Castro. On October 28, FNRP presented 81,000signatures to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to request inscriptionas a political party called Freedom and RefoundationParty (LIBRE). In the course of the year, several oppositionactivists and supporters of FNRP and LIBRE had been killed.These incidents mostly remained unresolved. Oppositionalpoliticians and human rights organizations repeatedly statedthe murders to be politically motivated. For instance, on May7, human rights and anti-coup activist Erick Martínez Ávila wasfound strangled in Guasculile in the Federal District. A monthlater, Miguel Ángel Ramos Díaz, member of FNRP and LIBRE,was gunned down in San Pedro Sula, Cortés department. OnJune 24, another LIBRE activist was killed in an ambush in thecapital Tegucigalpa.peh64

THE AMERICASJamaicaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(drug gangs)3 Change: Start:drug gangs vs. governmentsubnational predominance2010The conflict between drug gangs and the government oversubnational predominance remained violent. After the DudusCoke affair in 2010, military forces remained deployed ingang-dominated areas throughout the country in 2012. Clansmanand their rival One Order remained the leading criminalgangs, still dominating different regions. On March 3, a jointmilitary-police operation in St. Catherine resulted in the seizureof several firearms and the detention of approx. 180 individuals.Just a few days later, on March 6, six people, amongthem two civilians, were killed during a police operation in thecapital Kingston. The police assumed that three of the five maleswho were killed were part of different gangs and wantedfor various crimes including homicide. In the operation, severalweapons were seized and 58 people detained. On October 29,the police detained 100 men in St. Catherine, Spanish Town, inan operation aimed at preventing an internal One Order gangfeud from escalating. Police shot and killed Delroy Scott, leaderof the Banton Gang in August Town, St. Andrew, on November18. Despite the death threats towards police personnel fromboth Clansman and One Order gang, the government plannedto lower crime significantly in the next five years.alsMexico(drug cartels)Intensity: 5 Change: Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2006drug cartels vs. governmentsubnational predominance, resourcesThe war between various drug cartels and the governmentover subnational predominance and resources continued. Themost active groups were the cartels of Sinaloa, Los Zetas, theGulf Cartel, and Los Caballeros Templarios.Violent clashes with government forces took place almostdaily. The regions most affected were the northern states ofNuevo León, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas, but also Sinaloaand Guerrero. Additionally, cartel infighting intensifiedin those states [1 Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitarygroups)].In Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, eight police officers werekilled off duty in January. To prevent such attacks, authoritiesaccommodated more than 2,000 policemen in hotels aftertheir shifts. On March 28, gunmen conducted an attack onpolicemen, killing five. Despite these attacks, the city’s rateof drug-related homicides dropped by 75 percent. Variousfirefights took place in Coahuila. In heavy clashes betweenauthorities and gunmen in Saltillo, five gunmen were killedon March 13, another eight on June 21. On November 8, gun-men attacked a hotel hosting officers of the Federal Police (PF)in Piedras Negras. Consecutive gunbattles left four criminalsdead and two policemen injured, while one of the border crossingsto the US was closed. In Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, jointarmy and navy personnel killed fifteen gunmen in a three hourshoot-out in the city’s main streets on March 13. Until March21, more than 9,500 federal forces were deployed to the state.Despite focused military deployment, violence escalated inthe second half of the year in Tamaulipas. On July 3, two policemenwere killed by gunmen attacking with grenades andlater detonating a car bomb in Ciudad Victoria.A five-day combat between the army and cartel memberstook place in the mountainous region of Choix, Sinaloa, startingon April 28. As the military deployed several helicopters,one of them was targeted and an air force officer killed. In thecombats, 28 gunmen, three soldiers, and one municipal policemanwere killed. 2,300 families in the hills of Sinaloa fledfrom violence. Consequently, army and Sinaloa state policestrengthened their presence in Choix, deploying 600 troops.On July 9, gunmen ambushed state police forces heading toChoix. Seven police officers and four gunmen were killed inthe highway-shootout near El Fuerte. In Canute A. Neri, Guerrero,an ambush on police forces on March 18 claimed thelives of twelve policemen. Police had been searching for suspectsresponsible for a massacre where ten human heads hadbeen left in town.Whereas violence in some border regions slightly declined,it surged in the central states corridor of Michoacán-Guanajuato-SanLuis Potosí-Zacatecas in the second semester.On July 21, 80 gunmen attacked the mayor’s office and policestation of Vista Hermosa, Michoacán. Four municipal policeofficers and one civilian were killed. Heavy clashes betweenPF and gunmen took place on August 10 in Apatzingán,Michoacán. Authorities deployed Black Hawk helicopters tofight gang members armed with grenades and assault rifles.At least eight gunmen and eleven police officers were killed.Gang members killed another seven policemen in Jalisco andfive in Michoacán in separate incidents on December 23. OnOctober 23, a firefight between alleged Los Zetas membersand marines took place in Guadalupe, Zacatecas, leavingseven gunmen and three soldiers dead. Grenades and highcaliberweapons were used. The central states were also afocus of intensified troop deployment. On August 13, incumbentPresident Felipe Calderón announced the deploymentof 15,735 additional security forces to Michoacán, Guanajuato,Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, andNuevo León.In a skirmish on June 25, PF officers assumed to be involvedin cocaine smuggling killed three of their colleagues atthe capital’s international airport. In the aftermath, all of theairport’s 348 PF officers were replaced. On August 24, a USembassy truck was targeted in a shootout on a road in TresMarías, Morelos, by men in four unmarked PF police cars. TwoCIA agents were injured. Afterwards, nineteen PF officers werecharged.In Panuca, Veracruz, soldiers taking part in »Operation VeracruzSeguro« clashed with gunmen on October 13, killing ten.About 14,000 delinquents were detained in the operation, sofar. Between December 27 and 29, another nine members ofLos Zetas had been killed in Córdoba, four of them while trying65

THE AMERICASto recover the body of local Zetas leader from a morgue.The government arrested and killed several cartel leaders.On September 12, Gulf Cartel leader Jorge Eduardo alias »ElCoss» Costilla Sanchez was captured by marines in Tampico,Tamaulipas. Marines killed Los Zetas leader Heriberto »Z-3«Lazcano Lazcano, in a shootout in Progreso, Coahuila, on October7. Several heavy weapons, such as rocket launchers, werefound in Veracruz, Coahuila, Jalisco, and Michoacán. Most seizureswere made in Coahuila, where gang members attackedpolice with a rocket launcher on March 8.Drug cartels showed a strong presence in illegal businessesapart from drug-trafficking. Criminal syndicatesstole more than 1.8 million barrels of oil from the nationaloil company Pemex in the first semester, marking an 18percent rise. Cartels were also involved in illegal mining,human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, contraband, andproduct piracy.Concerning security issues, the new President Peña Nieto plannedto increase the size of the PF and to build an independentparamilitary police of several ten thousands. tmiMEXICO (inter-cartel violence,paramilitary groups)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: Start:2005Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. LaFamilia et al. vs. CJNG et al. vs. LCT et al.subnational predominance, resourcesThe subnational predominance and resources conflict betweenvarious drug cartels and armed groups remained highlyviolent. Despite arrests and deaths of several gang leaders[1 Mexico (drug cartels)], violence increased while old cartelssplit and new groups ascended.Especially turf wars between the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetascaused hundreds of deaths throughout the country, wherebycriminal organizations often resorted to mass killings tointimidate rival organizations or civilians. The victims of thosekillings mostly remained unidentified. On April 17, fourteendecapitated bodies were placed outside the city hall of NuevoLaredo, Tamaulipas, with a message by the Sinaloa Cartel threateningLos Zetas. On May 4, nine bodies were hung from abridge in the same city. A message stated that the dead wereZetas. In the outskirts of Guadalajara, Jalisco, eighteen dismemberedbodies were left in vans on May 10. At the site, amessage from Los Zetas was found. On September 17, seventeenbodies were abandoned in the same way nearby. However,most of the violent incidents occurred in the northernborder state of Nuevo León, reportedly as a result of infightingbetween factions of Los Zetas and their feud with the GulfCartel. On May 14, gang members abandoned 49 mutilatedbodies in the outskirts of the state capital Monterrey. Later on,a video showing the body dump appeared, and a banner wasfound signed by Los Zetas leaders threatening members of theGulf and Sinaloa cartels as well as marines and soldiers.A series of violent events took place in Monterrey. On January25, gunmen killed eleven individuals. With the bodies, aprinted banner addressed to a rival gang was left. Ten allegedThe conflict over national power between the leftist opposition,led by Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador’s RevolutionaryDemocratic Party (PRD), and the government escalated in thecontext of this year’s presidential election. When, in 2006, theopposition lost by less than a percentage point, Obrador hadencouraged numerous demonstrations in Mexico City, callinghimself the legitimate president.Prior to and on election day, a series of unresolved killings,kidnappings, and threats against politicians were registered.Among the victims were three PRD and two representatives ofthe National Action Party (PAN) of then President Felipe Calderón.On July 1, Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Re-members of Los Zetas were later arrested and held responsiblefor the killings.On February 20, in a clash between more than 3,000 membersof Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel in Apodaca prison nearMonterrey, 44 gang members were killed. In January, a prisonfight between gang members in neighboring Tamaulipas hadleft 31 inmates dead. On November 3, a total of fourteen gangmembers were killed in a series of shootouts between rivaldrug gangs on the Reynosa-Monterrey highway.An alleged split within Los Zetas and resulting disputes alsogenerated violent confrontations. For instance, on June 7, fourteendismembered bodies were discovered in a truck in CiudadMante, Tamaulipas. A printed banner, accusing two top LosZetas leaders of betraying former prominent members of theirown organization, was also found at the scene. Two Zetas factions,that of Ivan »El Talibán« Velazquez Caballero and a groupcalled Los Legionarios, separated in the following months.In the Pacific state of Michoacán, the groups La Familia, Cártelde Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), and Los Caballeros Templarios(LCT), fought for control. On April 10, sixteen individualswere found dead in Zinapecuaro, Tancítaro, and Lázaro Cárdenas,together with banners attributing the killings to CJNG. Acouple of weeks before, in a video masked men claimed to bepart of CJNG and threatened LCT in Guerrero and Michoacán.In March and April, nine dead bodies were found in the portof Acapulco, Guerrero, five of them beheaded. Similar killingscontinued in the city during the next months. Also in Guerrero,on August 26, eleven bodies were found on a highway withsigns of torture, bullet wounds, and messages signed by LCT.On July 2, a shootout between LCT and La Familia left ten deadin Zacazonapan in the neighboring Estado de México. On December24, 30 gunmen raided the community of Concordia,Sinaloa, and executed nine people with supposed ties to a localcartel.Additionally, the year saw enhanced propaganda by cartelsagainst each other, culminating when the leader of LCT, Servando"La Tuta" Gómez Martínez published a video in Augustin which he called upon other criminal groups and the militaryto make a common front against Los Zetas.rgoMexicoIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition)3 Change: 3opposition vs. governmentnational powerStart:200666

THE AMERICASvolutionary Party (PRI) won the presidential election. The UNregistered 233 denouncements concerning vote-buying, intimidationof voters, and physical violence during the electionprocess. PRD members in San Juan Chamula, Chiapas, stated alocal candidate of theirs had received death threats by PRI. Ashootout in Rincón Chamula, Chiapas that caused two deathswas also attributed to PRI by PRD officials. On July 7, PRD supportersinitiated demonstrations in more than 28 cities againstthe imposition of Peña Nieto. On July 12, Obrador mounted alegal challenge in order to cause the election’s invalidation.The Electoral Tribunal verified the elections by verdict on August31. As a reaction of disapproval, the student organization#YoSoy132 congregated around 2,000 protesters in a peacefuldemonstration in front of the tribunal. On September 9, Obradorannounced the creation of a youth organization calledNational Regeneration Movement (MORENA). On December 1,in the context of Peña Nieto’s inauguration, police forces andprotesters clashed in a riot in the capital, leaving at least fourprotesters and twenty policemen injured. Police used tear gasand rubber bullets against protesters who were armed withclubs and Molotov cocktails. Vandalism inflicted damage onpublic facilities of around USD 1.5 - 1.9 million.jokNicaraguaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(militant groups)3 Change: NEWStart:militant groups vs. governmentsystem / ideology2012A new conflict over the political system erupted between variousarmed groups and the government. After various appearancesand threats in earlier years, several groups, in traditionof the 1980s Contras, declared war on the government ofPresident Daniel Ortega. Two groups, the Democratic Front ofCommando 3-80 (FDC 3-80) and the Commando of NationalJustice (CJN), created an umbrella organization named CoordinatedNicaraguan Guerrillera (CGN) on May 5. Police statedthat the militants had their retreat area on the Honduran sideof the border. On January 13, the body of alleged FDC 3-80leader Santos »Pablo Negro« Guadalupe Borges was found inthe Honduran El Paraíso department. »Comandante Byron,« anally of former militant leader »Yahob,« was killed on February29. In response, FDC 3-80 announced to attack the governmentand military forces. On May 3, six militants with AK-47 attackeda group of police officers in the northern Jinotega department,injuring two. The same day, eight people were killed in an ambushin the municipality of La Cruz de Río Grande. On May 6, agroup leader known as »Sheriff« declared in an interview thatFDC 3-80 would continue to fight the Ortega government to»reinstall democracy.« On July 21, according to a CGN statement,FDC 3-80 killed three policemen and two soldiers in LasBreñas in the Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic(RAAN). Furthermore, CGN accused police and the military ofassassinating farmers suspected to cooperate with the groups.On August 22, leaders of FDC 3-80 appealed for abstentionfrom the November 4 municipal elections. On September 3,a soldier and two civilians died in a gunfight with a FDC 3-80brigade near Siuna, RAAN. On September 27, FDC 3-80 atta-cked a police post in El Tortuguero, and on October 15, killeda police officer in Río Grande, both in the Autonomous Regionof the Southern Atlantic. The government repeatedly deniedthe existence of any armed groups but nonetheless increasedpolice and army patrols in the northern regions.jneNicaraguaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition groups)3 Change: Start:opposition groups vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power2008The system and national power conflict between various oppositiongroups and the government of President Daniel Ortega’sSandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) continued on a violentlevel. While Ortega began his second presidential term onJanuary 10, the government received strong international andinternal criticism for last year’s election process. Former presidentialcandidate Fabio Gadea Mantilla of the IndependentLiberal Party (PLI) protested with 200 of his supporters, claimingthat last year’s election had been manipulated. On February6, several groups demanded new elections. Reports fromthe OAS, the US State Department, and the EU condemned thegeneral lack of transparency, especially criticizing the role ofthe Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). In the context of theseaccusations, several countries such as Germany and Finlandcut their development aid for the country. On July 19, allegedFSLN members intercepted an oppositional gathering in frontof the CSE, injuring eighteen people.After FSLN had won the municipal elections on November4, violent demonstrations took place. In Sebaco, Matagalpa, PLImembers clashed with FSLN sympathizers, leaving five peopleinjured. On November 6, two PLI members were killed during apost-electoral street protest in Ciudad Darío, Matagalpa, whilea Sandinista Youth member was fatally wounded in El Jícaro,Nueva Segovia. In Paz Centro, León, 27 people were arrestedwhen PLI sympathizers torched municipal government vehicles,the historical train station, the market, and the fire station.On November 14, the National Police set roadblocks in orderto impede a march of several thousand protesters led by theConstitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) candidate, Miguel ObandoBravo, in Nueva Guinea, Autonomous Region of the SouthernAtlantic. The next day, clashes between PLC supportersand militant Sandinistas in the same municipality resulted inseveral injuries and about 60 arrests. The Nicaraguan Centrefor Human Rights claimed that anti-riot police had acted withpartiality on behalf of the Sandinistas.jneNicaragua – ColombiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: 5Nicaragua vs. Colombiaterritory, resources(sea border)Start:1825The dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia over the maritimeborders surrounding the archipelagos of San Andres,67

THE AMERICASProvidencia, and Santa Catalina escalated, but remained nonviolent.In a previous decision in 2007, the ICJ had ruled thatthe archipelagos were Colombian territory but left the maritimeborder dispute unresolved. In this context, Nicaragua accusedColombia of using its claim on the islands to encroachon Nicaragua’s maritime boundaries. On April 23, a group ofmore than 600 residents of San Andres protested for theirright to self-determination accompanied by Colombian politicians.On May 5, the Colombian congress requested assistanceof UNESCO, fearing future Nicaraguan oil explorationin the area, which was declared a UN Marine Biosphere Reservein 2001. On its Independence Day, July 20, Colombiaheld a military parade on San Andres, which was criticized byNicaragua as being disrespectful towards the ICJ. On October11, two Colombian warships and an aircraft intercepteda Nicaraguan-flagged vessel, forcing it to leave the disputedwaters near the 82nd meridian. In response, Nicaragua accusedColombia of hostilities and of violating Nicaraguan nationalsovereignty. On November 19, the final ICJ ruling gaveColombia sovereignty over seven disputed islands within theSan Andres archipelago while granting Nicaragua politicaland economic control of a large amount of the surroundingwaters. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega appreciatedthe decision while his Colombian counterpart Manuel Santosannounced a week later the country’s withdrawal fromthe Pact of Bogotá that recognizes the authority of the ICJ.On December 1, the two presidents met for first talks afterthe ruling, committing themselves to a peaceful resolutionof the conflict. On December 3, the Nicaraguan Chamber ofFishing stated that hundreds of fishermen had complainedof being harassed by Colombian warships and helicopters inthe disputed territory. On December 13, Colombian ForeignMinister María Angela Holguín announced the country’s appealagainst the ICJ ruling. By presidential order, Colombianwarships remained in the disputed area while Nicaragua declaredto enforce its sovereignty.jnePanamaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition)3 Change: Start:opposition vs. governmentsystem / ideology, resources2008The system conflict between the oppositional umbrella groupFrenadeso, supported by the recently founded party BroadFront for Democracy (FAD) and the worker union SUNTRACS, onthe one hand, and the government of President Ricardo Martinelli,on the other, remained violent. At the end of January, Frenadesoand SUNTRACS declared solidarity with the indigenousNgöbe-Buglé, who protested against the construction of minesand hydro-electric power plants in their territory.About 5,000 Ngöbe-Buglé blocked the Pan-American Highwayin the Chiriquí department near the Costa-Rican border. Thegovernment and the Catholic Church asked for a dialog in orderto intervene. At least one protester was killed and several injuredwhen police violently dissolved the blockades on February5. The next day, 500 protesters torched the police station, thefire station, and the city hall in the municipality of Volcán. Onepolice officer was injured. At the same time, demonstrations ofsolidary organizations took place in Panama City.After promulgating Law 72 on October 19, which would haveoverseen the selling of land in the Colón Free Trade Zone, protestsin the city center of Colón turned violent. Protesters builtup barricades and lit stores and gas stations. Local authorityforces used teargas and rubber bullets, later imposing a curfew.One protester was killed, while at least nine others werewounded. Protests spread across the country in the followingdays. The Colón section of FAD announced a 48-hour generalstrike on October 22, supported by SUNTRACS, oppositionparties, and other associations. In the lasting protests in Colón,security forces shot and killed three demonstrators. Local mediareported twenty people injured and 275 arrested duringthe riots. On October 30, parliament withdrew the law and protestsseized.jsParaguay (EPP, agrarianmovements)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:1989EPP, agrarian movements vs. governmentsystem / ideology, resourcesThe conflict over land reform between the left-leaningPeople’s Army of Paraguay (EPP), several farmers’ organizations,indigenous groups, and landless people, on the onehand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violentlevel. These groups continued to express their demandsfor integral agrarian, social and political reform. Violent clashesbetween landless farmers and mainly Brazilian-bornfarm owners took place in Iruña and Ñacunday in Alto Paranádepartment in mid-January and lasted for several weeks. Atleast two people had been injured and significant materialdamage been caused. In March, around 10,000 farmers invadedthe territory of Paraguay’s biggest soy producer TranquiloFavero. Violent clashes between farmers and securityforces occurred on June 15 in the province of Curuguaty,Canindeyú department. Between 100 and 300 police forcestried to evict protesters from the occupied farm of businessman and politician Blas N. Riquelme. The protesters claimedthat Riquelme obtained the land illegally during the Stroessnerdictatorship. When security forces moved in, a firefightensued in which seven policemen and ten farmers died andmore than 80 people were injured. President Fernando Lugodeployed the army to take control of the situation. The incidentcontributed to the impeachment of Lugo on June 22[1 Paraguay (impeachment)].After the impeachment of Lugo, offensive measures by EPPfurther increased, mainly in the Concepción department. InAugust, suspected EPP members attacked a farm and carriedout a series of bomb attacks. The first occurred on October4, when two bombs caused significant material damage toa local radio station in Horqueta. Another device was foundby police before detonating. Suspected EPP member ÉdgarMancuello was arrested in connection with the incident. OnOctober 5, a bomb was found on a farm located near the municipalityof Kurusú de Hierro.ank68

THE AMERICASParaguayIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(impeachment)1 Change: NEWStart:2012Franco supporters vs. Lugo supportersnational powerA national power conflict emerged between supporters of theelected President Fernando Lugo and those of the new PresidentFederico Franco. On June 21, the lower house of Parliamentdecided with 73 to 1 votes to start impeachment proceduresagainst Lugo. The opposition brought five charges againstthe president, including his alleged failure to tackle a politicalcrisis ignited by the conflict with the People’s Army of Paraguay(EPP) [1 Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)]. On June 22, theSenate voted 39 to 4 for the impeachment of Lugo.After Lugo’s impeachment was announced, his supporters assembledoutside the parliamentary building. Police dispersedthem with tear gas and rubber bullets. Lugo’s lawyers arguedthat the impeachment process was unconstitutional as he hadnot been given time to either prepare his defense or to outlinehis case in front of the Senate. The complaint was rejected bythe Supreme Court on June 25. In response to Lugo’s impeachment,several Latin American countries withdrew their ambassadors.In addition, Venezuela stopped all energy supplies tothe country. OAS sent a special commission to investigate theincident and decided on July 10 not to impose any sanctions.However, on June 28, Unasur and Mercosur excluded Paraguayand called for the re-establishment of the democratic orderthrough fair and open elections. The Franco government regardedthese measures illegal and withdrew its ambassadorsfrom several countries. However, in October, the country announcedits will to rejoin Mercosur and Unasur.ankPeruIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Shining Path)3Change:Start:The system conflict, also concerning subnational predominanceand resources, between two factions of the left-wingMaoist rebel group Shining Path (SL), on the one hand, and thegovernment, on the other, remained violent. The first faction,the Center Regional Committee (CRC), was active in southernPeru, especially in Apurímac and Ene River Valley (VRAE). Thesecond faction, the Huallaga Regional Committee (CRH), operatedin the Huallaga Valley region north of the capital Lima.The government accused both factions of being involved indrug trafficking and providing gunmen for drug cartels.Security forces clashed with CRH on February 9, woundingtheir leader, Florindo Eleuterio Flores, alias "Comrade Artemio."Three days later, a military patrol detained Flores in Tocacheprovince, San Martín. On March 4, his presumed successor,Walter Díaz Vega, alias "Comrade Freddy," was captured bynational police in Leoncio Prado province, Huánuco. On April1980SL vs. governmentsystem / ideology, subnational predominance,resources3, security forces arrested the newly-appointed CRH leaderFreddy Jaime Arenas Cavides, alias "Comrade Braulio," in theSanta Rosa de Yanajanca Valley, Huánuco region. Two days later,President Ollanta Humala claimed the total defeat of CRH.Throughout the year, CRC fighters and security forces repeatedlyclashed, altogether leaving at least thirteen officialsdead. On April 9, 40 SL members kidnapped about three dozenworkers from the Camisea gas field in the Cuzco region.They demanded a ransom of USD 10 million, explosives, anda yearly payment of USD 1.2 million. The government declareda 60-day state of emergency for the region and deployed1,500 police and military troops to free the hostages. CRCmembers attacked a helicopter searching for the hostageson April 12, killing one police officer and wounding two. Twodays later, security forces encircled the captors. In the ensuingskirmish, three members of the security forces and presumablytwo CRC fighters were killed. All abducted gas workerswere freed.mgmUSA – MexicoIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: (border security)USA vs. MexicootherStart:2005The conflict between the USA and Mexico over border securitycontinued. Subject to disagreement were drug, weapon, andunauthorized immigration enforcement policies as well as theuse of lethal force by the US Border Patrol. While withdrawing900 National Guard troops from the Mexican border, the USincreasingly relied on surveillance infrastructure like drones,gunboats, military helicopters, and aerostats to monitor theborder. On June 25, the US Supreme Court partially upheldthe Arizona immigration law SB 1070 which aimed at reducingundocumented immigration to Arizona. Mexican President FelipeCalderón repeatedly condemned the legislation. Throughoutthe year, Calderón criticized weapon trafficking into Mexicoand called for an assault weapon ban in the US. On April14, US President Barack Obama rejected any proposals on thelegalization of drugs at the Summit of the Americas in Colombia.However, on November 6, the US states Washington andColorado legalized the recreational use of marijuana. In reaction,the Mexican President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto said hisgovernment would have to review its anti-drug policy due tothe changes in the US. Tensions between the US and Mexicoincreased over the killings of three Mexicans shot by BorderPatrol agents after the Mexicans had thrown stones at them. Inthe incidents, US Border Patrol fired across the border on July7, September 3, and October 10. The Mexican governmentcondemned each of the shootings and demanded investigations.On October 18, the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights criticized the disproportional use of lethal force by USBorder Patrol agents. Despite these problems, cooperationcontinued with the Merída Initiative as well as on a politicallevel. Shortly before taking office, Peña Nieto met with Obamaon November 27 in Washington, D.C. and affirmed that theMexican government would continue working with the US inthe future.las69

THE AMERICASVenezuela(opposition)Intensity:3Change:5Start:1992Conflict parties:Conflict items:opposition vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national powerThe system and national power conflict between the opposition,composed of student organizations, a coalition of alarge number of political parties, and interest groups, on theone hand, and the government, on the other, turned violent.With regard to the presidential elections on October 7, theopposition´s coalition Table for Democratic Unity (MUD) heldprimaries on February 12. Henrique Capriles Radonski fromthe party Justice First (PJ) was elected to run against PresidentHugo Chávez Frías. After nine months of campaigning, Chávezwon the presidential elections with 54.42 percent on October7, while Capriles gained 44.97 percent. On March 4, during avisit of Capriles in Cotiza, Caracas, Chávez’ supporters shot atCapriles’ campaigners, leaving six persons injured. On April 13,in order to express their disagreement with the government,members of the opposition broke into the Venezuelan Embassyin London and damaged property. On July 7, the nationalpolice hindered a rally of Capriles and his supporters in Caracas.One day later, supporters of Capriles attacked ten membersof the pro-Chávez movement Comando Carabobo withknifes and bottles in San Vicente de Maturín, Monagas state.Ten people were injured. On August 18, Chávez’ adherents attackedsupporters of Capriles during his visit in the state ofMiranda throwing bottles and shooting at the campaigners. Nocasualties or injured persons were reported. On September 13,Chávez supporters blocked a main road in Puerto Cabello, Carabobostate, where opposition supporters had assembled fora visit of Capriles. Both sides attacked each other with rocks,leaving fourteen persons injured and an opposition campaigntruck torched. On September 30, a supporter of Chávez’ UnitedSocialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) killed at least threemen during a march of Capriles in the state of Barinas. Thevictims were two politicians and one adherent of PJ. jca70

Asia and Oceania

Asia and oceania: No violent conflict: violent crisis: limited war: war72

Asia and oceaniaWith a total of 127 conflicts, the region of Asia and Oceaniaaccounted for nearly a third of the world’s conflicts, as in theprevious year. Compared to 2011, the total number of violentconflicts increased by three to 65. Violent crises increased byone to 55, limited wars by two to seven. The number of warsremained unchanged with three.One limited war escalated to a war in Myanmar [1 Myanmar(KIA, KIO / Kachin State)], while the war concerning the secessionof Karen State and Kayah State de-escalated [1 Myanmar(KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State)].A non-violent crisis in India escalated by three levels toa war [1 India (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis)]. The war betweenIslamist groups and the government in Pakistan continued[1 Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. The 2011 war inPakistan’s Sindh province de-escalated to a limited war [1 Pakistan(Mohajirs - Balochs, Pakhtuns, Sindhis)]. One violent crisisescalated to a limited war [1 Pakistan (TTP et al. - religiousgroups)]. Two conflicts erupted as limited wars, one each inMyanmar and Tajikistan [1 Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas /Rakhine State), Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)].Most conflicts in the region concerned system/ideology(42), followed by 32 conflicts concerning subnational predominanceand 22 over national power, and resources, respectively.Violence occurred across all conflict items. Most of thehighly violent conflicts were fought over system/ideology andsubnational predominance.South Asia saw the biggest number of highly violent conflicts.As in preceding years, Pakistan was affected by several such conflicts.The government’s war against Islamist militant groups continuedand claimed the lives of more than 4,000 people. Whilethe conflict mainly took place in the Federally AdministeredTribal Areas and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province along theAfghan border, Islamists attacked government institutions andcivilians all over the country. Moreover, the conflict Pakistan (TTPet al. - religious groups) caused the death of 500 people andspread to Gilgit-Baltistan for the first time. Karachi, the country’slargest city and economic hub, was the scene of a limited warbetween Mohajirs on the one hand and Balochs, Pakhtuns, andSindhis, on the other, which left approx. 700 dead.In India, thirteen conflicts were carried out in the country’sConflict Intensities in Asia and Oceania in2012 compared to 2011northeast, nine of those by violent means. In the state of Assam,the conflict between ethnic Bodos and Muslims of Bengaliorigin escalated to a war. In July and August, more than 100people were killed and 400,000 fled their homes. Throughoutthe year, several members of different militant groups laiddown their weapons, partly due to the government grantingamnesty [1 India (HPC-D, HNA / Mizoram, Manipur, Assam), India(PULF), India (MPLF et al. / Manipur)]. As in the previousyear, the conflict between left-wing militants and the governmentin the east remained on the level of a limited war [1 India(Naxalites)].In Central Asia, a limited war over subnational predominanceerupted between the Tajik government and the militiagroup of Tolib Ayumbekov [1 Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)].The conflict between the Kazakh government and Islamist militantgroups remained a violent crisis [1 Kazakhstan (Islamistmilitant groups)].In East Asia, leadership changes occurred in Japan, thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC), and South Korea. Six interstateconflicts persisted on a non-violent level.The USA increased their military presence in the South ChinaSea [1 China - Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly andParacel Islands)]. Under its new leader Kim Jong-un, North Koreaaccelerated its nuclear program and sent its first satellitesuccessfully into orbit [1 North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan].Ongoing territorial disputes remained tense and strainedSino-Japanese [1 Japan - China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)],Japanese - South Korean (Takeshima/Dokdo)] and Sino-Vietnameserelations [1 China-Vietnam et al. (South China Sea,Spratly and Paracel Islands)]. Domestic conflicts with ethnicminorities continued on a violent level [1 China (Tibet), China(Inner Mongolia), China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang), China (Hui - Han- Tibetans)], although violence in Inner Mongolia decreasedsignificantly. In Papua New Guinea, a conflict over claims tothe prime-ministership erupted with an attempted coup in thewake of the country’s general elections [1 Papua New Guinea(opposition)]. The elections were also accompanied by increasedtribal violence [1 Papua New Guinea (tribal violence)].Additionally, in several countries people took to the streets,demanding improved working conditions, return of previouslyFrequency of Conflict Items in 2012 inAsia and Oceania by Intensity Groups57552012 :2011 :20low Intensity :medium Intensity :high Intensity :184042161322211071071110610711101157331010 0 014110114dispute non-violent crisis violent crisis limited war warterritoryautonomydecolonisationsecessionothersystem / ideologyresourcesinternationalpowersubnationalpredominancenational power73

Asia and oceaniataken land or compensation therefore and environmental protection[1 China (socioeconomic protests), Papua New Guinea(socioeconomic protests), Samoa (landowner protests)].In South East Asia, in Myanmar, the Union Election Commissionformally accepted the re-registration of the oppositionalNational League for Democracy (NLD) in January. In byelectionsin April, the NLD secured almost all seats of thosecontested [1 Myanmar (opposition movement)]. Additionally,the government released hundreds of political prisoners.However, Myanmar remained the most conflict-ridden countryin South East Asia, accounting for twelve intrastate conflictswith one limited war and one war. After President Thein Sein’scall for negotiations in mid-2011, ceasefire agreements werereached with almost all ethnic rebel groups, among them theChin National Front in January and the National United Partyof Arakan and the Arakan Liberation Party in April. While theNovember 2011 ceasefire agreement with the United Wa StateArmy lasted, ceasefire agreements with the Karen NationalUnion (KNU) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)broke off. The government held several talks with the KachinIndependence Army (KIA) and the Kachin Independence Organization(KIO), which brought forth no agreement. The limitedwar in Kachin State escalated to a war, leaving hundreds ofcivilians dead and approx. 100,000 displaced. A highly violentconflict erupted between parts of the majority Buddhistpopulation and the minority Rohingya Muslims in RakhineState [1 Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State)].Around 180 people died, approx. 110,000 were displacedand thousands of houses as well as religious buildings weredestroyed. A new violent conflict over land rights broke outbetween farmers, land rights activists, and monks, on the onehand, and the government, on the other [1 Myanmar (farmerset al. / Sagaing Region)].In the Philippines, the government and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) continued negotiations, which led to thesigning of a framework agreement on the status of Bangsamoroin October [1 Philippines (MILF / Mindanao]. Under the agreement,a new autonomous political entity, the Bangsamoro,would be established and the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao replaced. There were no reports of clashes betweenMILF militants and the government; however, clashes betweenMILF and a breakaway group intensified [1 Philippines (BIFM,BIFF - MILF, government)].The border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia deescalatedby two levels from a limited war to a non-violentconflict following the July 2011 ICJ ruling [1 Thailand - Cambodia(border)]. In the south of Thailand, Islamists continuedto launch bomb attacks in the provinces of Yala and Songkhla.Throughout the year, approx. 600 people were killed [1 Thailand(Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)].74

Asia and oceaniaConflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2012Bangladesh (AL, BCL - BNP, BJC)Bangladesh (ICS, JeI - AL, BCL)Bangladesch (JMB, HuJI-B)*Bangladesh (PCJSS – UPDF)*Bangladesh (PCJSS, UPDF / ChittagongHill Tracts)*Bangladesh – Myanmar*Cambodia (opposition movement)Cambodia – Vietnam*China (Falun Gong)*China (Hong Kong pro-democracyparties)*China (house churches)*China (Hui – Han – Tibetans)*China (Inner Mongolia)*China (opposition movement)*China (socioeconomic protests)*China (Taiwan)China (Tibet)China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)China – India*China – USA*China-Vietnam et al. (South ChinaSea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)Fiji (Indo-Fijians – indigenous Fijianethnonationalists)*Fiji (opposition groups)*Fiji – Tonga (Minerva Reefs)*India (GJM et al. / northern WestBengal, eastern Assam)Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4AL, BCL vs. BNP, BJCJeI, ICS vs. AL, BCLJMB, HuJI-B vs. governmentPCJSS vs. UPDFUPDF, PCJSS vs. governmentnational powersystem/ideology, national powersystem / ideologysubnational predominanceautonomy1991200020041997197133232Bangladesh vs. MyanmarCPP vs. SRP, HRP, civil societygroupsCambodia vs. VietnamFalun Gong vs. governmentHong Kong pro-democracy partiesvs. government vs.House Church vs. governmentHui ethnic minority vs. Han Chinesevs. Tibetan ethnic minorityMongolian ethnic minorities vs.Han Chinese, governmentopposition movement vs.governmentlandowners, peasants, workers vs.governmentPRC vs. ROC vs. pro-Taiwanindependence groupsTibetan government-in-exile,Tibetan separatists vs. governmentTIP, ETIM, Uyghurs, WUC vs.government, Han ChineseChina vs. IndiaChina vs. USABrunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Malaysiavs. Philippines vs. VietnamIndo-Fijians vs. indigenous Fijianopposition vs. governmentFiji, TongaGNLF, GNLF-C, GJM, IGPP, GLO,UGRF vs. ABGL, ABAVP,Janachetana, Amra Bengali,AIADC vs. governmentterritory, resources, othersystem / ideology, national power,resourcesterritorysystem / ideologyautonomy, system / ideologysystem / ideologysubnational predominanceautonomy, subnationalpredominance, resourcessystem / ideologysystem/ideology, resources, othersecessionsecession, system / ideology,resourcessecession, system / ideology,subnational predominanceterritory, international power,resourcesinternational powerterritory, international power,resourcesnational power, subnationalpredominancesystem/ideology, national powerterritoryautonomy19781997196919991997194919491981197819781949195019491954194919491970198720051947556613122India (GNLA et al. / Meghalaya)India (GNLA, HNLC – ANVC, UANF)*India (Hindus – Christians)*India (Hindus – Muslims)India (HPC-D, HNA / Mizoram, Manipur,Assam)*India (Islamist militant groups)*India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)India (MPLF et al./Manipur)*Name of conflict 1 75233132332121213HNLC, PLF-M, ANVC, ANVC-B, UANF,LAEF, GNLA vs. governmentGNLA vs. HNLC, ANVC, UANFBajrang Dal, VHP, Hindus vs.ChristiansHindus vs. MuslimsHPC-D, HNA vs. governmentJeM, HuJI, LeT, IM, SIMI, HM vs.governmentJeM, HM, LeT, HuM vs. governmentMPLF, KCP, ZRA, KYKL, PREPAK(Progressive), UPPK vs. governmentautonomysubnational predominancesubnational predominancesubnational predominancesecessionsystem/ideologysecessionsecession198819921999194719862000194719645533232333

Asia and oceaniaConflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2012India (Nagas – Kukis)*India (Naxalites)India (NDFB– ACF, BCF)*India (NLFT, ATTF, BNCT / Tripura)*India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)*India (NSCN-K– NSCN-KK – NSCN-IM)India (PULF)*India (Sikhs– DSS)*India (Sikhs/ Punjab)India (TJAC / Telangana)*India (ULFA et al. – Biharis,Bengalis)India (ULFA et al. / Assam)Indonesia (Ahmadiyya)Indonesia (Bugis – Dayaks /Kalimantan)*Indonesia (Islamist militant groups)Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh -Irwandi camp / Aceh)*Indonesia (KPA, PartaiAceh / Aceh)*Indonesia (Muslims–Christians / Moluccas)*Indonesia (Muslims–Christians / Sulawesi)*Indonesia (OPM/ Papua)Indonesia – Timor Leste*Indonesia (RMS, FKM /Moluccas)Japan – China (Senkaku/DiaoyuIslands)Japan – Russia (Southern KurilIslands)*Japan – South Korea (Takeshima/Dokdo Islands)Kazakhstan (Islamistmilitant groups)Kazakhstan (oil worker protests)*Kazakhstan (opposition groups)*Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz – Uzbeks)*Laos (Christians)*Laos (Hmong, royalists)*Malaysia (Malay– Chinese, Indian,and Indigenous Malaysians)*KNF, KNA, KLA vs. NSCN, UNPCCPI-M vs. governmentBodos, NDFB vs. Santhals, ACF, BCFNLFT, ATTF, BNCT vs. governmentNSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-IM,NSCN-U, ANSAM, UNC, NNC vs.governmentNSCN-K vs. NSCN-KK vs. NSCN-IMPULF vs. governmentSikhs vs. DSSShiromani Akali Dal, KLF, KZF, BKI,KTF vs. governmentTJAC vs. governmentULFA, ATTF, NDFB, NLFT, AABYSF,AASU, Bodos vs. Bengalis, BiharisULFA, NDFB, DHD, Black Widow vs.governmentAhmadiyya vs. government, radicalSunni MuslimsBugis vs. DayaksTanzim al-Qaeda in Aceh, JI, JAT,Sunni Movement for IndonesianSociety vs. governmentKPA, Partai Aceh vs. Irwandi campKPA, Partai Aceh vs. governmentMuslims, Laskar Jihad vs. ChristiansMuslims vs. ChristiansOPM vs. governmentTimor Leste vs. IndonesiaRMS, FKM vs. governmentPRC vs. ROC vs. JapanJapan vs. RussiaJapan vs. South KoreaDjund al-Khalifat, Islamist militantgroups vs. governmentoil industry workers, oppositionparties vs. governmentopposition vs. governmentethnic Kyrgyz vs. ethnic UzbeksChristians vs. governmentHmong, royalists vs. governmentMalay Malaysians vs. ChineseMalaysians, Indian Malaysians,Indigenous Malaysianssubnational predominancesystem / ideologysubnational predominancesecessionsecessionsubnational predominanceautonomy, system / ideologysubnational predominanceautonomyautonomysubnational predominancesecessionsystem / ideologysubnational predominancesystem/ideology, national powersubnational predominance,resourcesautonomy, resourcessubnational predominancesystem/ideology, subnationalpredominancesecession, resourcesterritory, otherSezessionterritory, resourcesterritoryterritorysystem / ideology, national powerresourcessystem/ideology, national powersubnational predominance, resourcessystem / ideologysystem / ideology, national powersystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance1947199719941978194719881993200719471969198119791980199919812006195319981998196120021950197119451951201120112004199019751975194665535666624233323335331331333212123222232Malaysia (opposition movement)Name of conflict 1 76Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4Pakatan Rakyat, Bersih vs. governmentsystem/ideology, national power19693

Asia and oceaniaConflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2012Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4Malaysia – Indonesia, Philippines(immigrants)*Malaysia vs. Indonesia, Philippinesother19982Maldives (opposition)*Myanmar (Arakan Liberation Army,NUFA / Rakhine State)*opposition vs. governmentArakan Liberation Army, NUFA vs.governmentnational powersecession20111948632Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas /Rakhine State)Buddhists vs. Rohingya Muslimssubnational predominance, other2012NEW4Myanmar (CNA, CNF / Chin State)*Myanmar (farmers et al. / SagaingRegion)*CNA, CNF vs. governmentfarmers et al. vs. governmentsecessionresources198820126NEW23Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)Myanmar (KNPP, KnA, KNLP / KayahState)*KIA, KIO vs. governmentKNPP, KnA, KNLP vs. governmentautonomy, resourcesautonomy19611948553Name of conflict 1 77Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBABrigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State)*Myanmar (MNLA, NMSP / MonState, Karen State)*Myanmar (opposition movement)Myanmar (Rohingyas, ARNO /Rakhine State)*Myanmar (SSA-S, SSA-N / ShanState)Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / ShanState)*Nepal (former PLA members)*Nepal (Kiratis/Kosi, Mechi,Sagarmatha)*KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 vs.DKBA, Karen BGF, governmentMNLA, NMSP vs. governmentopposition vs. governmentRohingyas, ARNO vs. governmentSSA-S, SSA-N vs. GovernmentUWSA, NDAA vs. governmentformer PLA members vs.governmentKhambuwan National Front, LNLF,Kirant National Front, FLSC, KJWP,KLF-U vs. governmentautonomysecessionsystem / ideology, national powerotherautonomyautonomyotherautonomy194819481962194819521988200819924665632223132Nepal (Madheshis / Terai)JTMM-G, JTMM-J, JTMM-R, JTMM-S,JTMM, ATMM, TJP-M, MMT, SJTMM,MJF, TMPD vs. governmentautonomy20043Nepal (opposition II)*Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups)*opposition vs. governmentNDA, Ranabir Sena, BhishwoHindu Youth Federation, RPPNvs. governmentsystem/ideology, national powersystem / ideology200820065533Nepal (UCPN-M Bhattarai – Dahalfactions)*Nepal – Bhutan*North Korea - South Korea*North Korea – USA, South Korea,JapanUCPN-M Bhattarai faction vs.UCPN-M Dahal factionBhutan vs. NepalNorth Korea vs. South KoreaNorth Korea vs. USA, South Korea,Japansubnational predominanceotherterritory, system / ideology,international powersystem / ideology, internationalpower, other20111985194819903122Pakistan (BLA et al. / Balochistan)Baloch and Brahui tribes, BLA, BRA,BLF, BLT, BNP, NP, BRP, UBA, BLUF,BSO vs. governmentsecession, resources19483Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)Islamist militant groups vs.governmentsystem/ideology, national power20015Pakistan (Mohajirs – Balochis,Pakhtuns, Sindhis)Mohajirs, MQM vs. Pakhtuns, ANP,Balochs, PPP, Sindhis, AwamiTehreeksubnational predominance194761Pakistan (opposition)*Pakistan (Taliban – tribes)opposition vs. governmentTTP, LI vs. various tribes, TI, AmanLashkanational powersystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance19982001613

Asia and oceaniaConflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2012Name of conflict 1 78Pakistan (TTP – LI)*Pakistan (TTP et al. - religiousgroups)Pakistan – IndiaPapua New Guinea (opposition)Papua New Guinea (socioeconomicprotests)Papua New Guinea (tribal violence)Papua New Guinea(Highlanders – Lowlanders)*Philippines(Abu Sayyaf / Mindanao)Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF,government)Philippines (CPP, NPA)*Philippines (MILF– MNLF)*Philippines (MILF/ Mindanao)*Philippines (MNLF / Mindanao)Samoa (landowner protests)*Singapore – Malaysia*Sri Lanka (Muslims)*Sri Lanka (Sinhalese Buddhists,JHU, JVP - Hindus, Eelam Tamils,Muslims, SLMC, Christians)Sri Lanka (Tamils– Muslims)*Sri Lanka (Upcountry Tamils)*Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)Tajikistan (Islamist militantgroups)*Tajikistan (opposition)*Thailand (Islamist separatists /southern border provinces)Thailand (UDD, PTP – PAD)*Thailand – Cambodia (border)*Thailand – Myanmar*Timor-Leste (FRETILIN - CNRT)*Timor-Leste (veterans)*Timor-Leste – Australia*USA – PakistanUzbekistan (Islamist militantgroups)*Uzbekistan (opposition)Uzbekistan – Tajikistan*Vietnam (Montagnards)*Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4TTP vs. LITTP, LeJ, SSP, Jandullah, FazalSaeed Haqqani group vs. variousreligious groupsPakistan vs. IndiaPapua New Guinea vs. Oppositionlandowners vs. employees vs.governmentVarious Highland Tribes vs. VariousHighland TribesHighlanders vs. LowlandersAbu Sayyaf vs. governmentBIFM, BIFF vs. MILF, governmentEelam Tamils vs. MuslimsUpcountry Tamils, CWC vs.governmentTolib Ayombekov’s Militia vs.governmentUTO, HuT, al-Qaeda, IMU vs.governmentopposition vs. governmentvarious Islamist separatists vs.governmentUDD, PTP vs. PAD, Pitak SiamThailand vs. CambodiaThailand vs. MyanmarFRETILIN vs. CNRTVeterans vs. governmentTimor Leste vs. AustraliaUSA vs. PakistanIMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir vs. various Islamistmilitant groups vs. governmentopposition vs. governmentUzbekistan vs. TajikistanMontagnards vs. governmentsystem / ideology, subnationalpredominancesystem/ideology, subnationalpredominanceterritory, international powernational powerresources, othersubnational predominance,resourcessubnational predominancesecession, system/ideologysubnational predominanceCPP, NPA vs. governmentsystem / ideology,MILF vs. MNLFsubnational predominanceMILF vs. governmentsecession, system/ideology,resourcesMNLF vs. governmentautonomy, system/ideology,resourcestraditional landowners vs. government otherSingapore vs. MalaysiaterritoryMuslims, SLMC vs. government otherSinhalese Buddhists, JHU, JVP vs. system/ideology, subnationalTamil Hindus, Eelam Tamils vs. predominanceSLMC, Muslims vs. Christianssubnational predominanceothersubnational predominancesystem/ideology, national powersystem / ideology, national powersecession, system/ideologynational powerterritory, international powerterritory, othernational powerotherresourcesothersystem/ideology, national powersystem/ideology, national powerinternational power, resourcesautonomy, system/ideology201019851947201120021975197519912011196820091977196919461963194819481948194820121997199719022006195419482006200620022003199119912010195854566365NEW6463655343233134332123122114224321311212231Conflicts marked with * are without description2Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review3Change in intensity compared to the previous year: 3 or 5 escalation by one or more than onelevel of intensity; 4 or 6 deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; no change4Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

Asia and oceaniaBangladeshIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: (AL, BCL – BNP, BJC)AL, BCL vs. BNP, BJCnational powerStart:1991The national power conflict between the governing AwamiLeague (AL) and its student wing, the Bangladesh ChhatraLeague, on the one hand, and the oppositional BangladeshNational Party (BNP) and its student wing, the BangladeshJatiyotabadi Chhatradal, on the other, continued on a violentlevel. Over the year, large numbers of activists wereinjured and several people killed in clashes between supportersof both parties. Numerous opposition leaders andactivists were in turn arrested for alleged involvement inviolent activities. When police clashed with opposition activistsin Chandpur and Laxmipur, Chittagong division, onJanuary 29, four people were killed and at least 450 peopleinjured. Among them were 100 policemen. The protestersdemanded the restoration of the institution of caretakergovernments tasked with overseeing parliamentary elections.The respective constitutional provision had beenamended in June 2011. On April 17, BNP’s Organizing SecretaryMohammad Ilias Ali of Sylhet District and his driverwent missing. In reaction, BNP held marches in different districts,which led to violent clashes between police and BNPsupporters. On April 23, BNP called a three-day countrywidehartal, a general strike and shutdown, to protest against thedisappearance of Ilias Ali. At least 60 people and five policemenwere injured during the hartal and numerous vehiclesvandalized. On May 13, BNP and its allies clashed with policein Chittagong over the obstruction of a march in responseto the disappearance of Ilias Ali. The clashes left at least100 people injured, including 50 police officials. On December9, BNP called a countrywide road blockade to press forthe restoration of the caretaker government. At least threepeople died and over 380 were injured during clashes withpolice personnel and AL supporters. On December 10, BNPSecretary-General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir was arrestedfor his alleged involvement in violence during the road blockade.In response, BNP called countrywide hartals on December11 and 13.kblBangladeshIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: (ICS, JeI – AL, BCL)Start:JeI, ICS vs. AL, BCLsystem / ideology, national power2000The national power and ideology conflict between the Islamicparty Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and its student organization,the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), on the one hand, and thegoverning Awami League (AL) and its student organization,the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), on the other, continuedon a violent level. Throughout the year, numerous JeI andICS leaders and activists were arrested for their suspectedinvolvement in riots and anti-government activities. ICS andJeI held rallies across the country demanding their release,resulting in violent clashes with the police. During clashesin Rajshahi District, on January 30, one JeI activist was shotdead by the police and 80 people, including 19 policemen,were injured.In the course of the year, numerous clashes at campusesacross the country between ICS and BCL left several hundredsinjured. On February 5, two ICS activists died and numerousactivists were injured in an incident which occurredbetween the parties at Chittagong University, ChittagongDistrict. On July 9, clashes between ICS and BCL students lefttwenty injured and at least 42 dormatory rooms were set afirein Sylhet, Sylhet District.The pending war crimes trials before the InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal also caused violent confrontations. SeveralJeI leaders were arrested for alleged involvement in warcrimes during the 1971 Liberation War. The final verdict isexpected in 2013. On November 4, JeI announced a nine-dayprotest against the tribunal. During the protest, nationwideclashes between JeI and ICS supporters, on the one hand,and the police and AL and BCL activists, on the other, leftover 300 civilians and 200 policemen injured. On November15, Home Minister Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir announced thearrest of 2,400 JeI and ICS activists during the previous days.On December 17, the JeI Central Publicity Secretary andother JeI activists were arrested for the possession of antigovernmentpublications. Local JeI units called an eight-hourhartal, a general strike and shutdown, in Sylhet and Rajshahifor December 19.kblCambodiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition movement)3 Change: Start:1997CPP vs. SRP, civil society groupssystem / ideology, national power, resourcesThe conflict between the ruling Cambodian People’s Party(CPP) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, on the one hand, andthe opposition movement comprising various political parties,in particular the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), and civil societygroups, on the other, remained violent. Throughout the year,thousands of union members, garment workers, and victimsof forced eviction demonstrated and blocked major nationalroads, demanding higher wages and an end to land seizure.Civil society groups repeatedly clashed with security forces.Several government critics and activists faced arbitrary arrestsand court suits. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy, facing criminalcharges at home, remained in self-imposed exile in France. InJuly, SRP formed an alliance with the second-largest oppositionparty, the Human Rights Party, forming a new entity calledthe Cambodia National Rescue Party. On April 26, environmentalactivist Chut Wutty was shot dead in Koh Kong Province bya military police officer, according to witnesses. Chut Wuttywas investigating illegal deforestation and the timber trade.Official investigations into the killing were abandoned in September.On May 16, hundreds of soldiers, military police andpolice personnel raided the village of Broma, Kratie Province,79

Asia and oceaniain order to confiscate farmland which had been subject to along-running land dispute. During clashes between securityforces and the villagers, security forces killed one person. OnOctober 2, oppositional activists Mom Sonando and Bun Rathawere charged with insurrection and incitement and convictedto 20 and 30 years in jail respectively. On May 24, against thebackdrop of land disputes, thirteen women from Boeung Kak,Phnom Penh, were sentenced to jail but released in early June.Protests accompanied court hearings; these were dispersed byriot police using electric shields and batons. Six people wereinjured as a result.somChinaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Taiwan)2 Change: Start:1949PRC vs. ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independencegroupssecessionThe conflict between the government of the Republic of Chinain Taipei (ROC) and the government of the People’s Republicof China in Beijing (PRC) regarding the political status of Taiwancontinued. Throughout the presidential elections in theROC in January and leadership transition in the PRC in November,both governments promoted stable cross-Strait relationsand economic cooperation.On January 14, Ma Ying-jeou, chairman of the KuomintangParty, was reelected as president. The pro-independenceDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP), which rejected the 1992Consensus between the ROC and PRC which acknowledgedthe existence of a single Chinese state, lost the election. OnJuly 25, DPP announced a restructuring of its organization reflectingits renewed recognition of ROC’s relations to the PRCas distinct from international relations. The US welcomed thisdevelopment.On August 9, the two governments signed agreementsconsolidating their investment relations by mutually guaranteeingthe protection of the rights and interests of investorsfrom both sides and by simplifying customs regulations.The ROC continued to build up its military and urged theUS to sell it defensive arms. The US continued to deny thelong-debated sale of 60 F-16C/D jet fighters to the ROC. InAugust, the US delivered two coastal minesweepers to theROC. According to the ROC’s annual China Military Power Report,the PRC raised the number of its ballistic and cruise missilesdirected at the island of Taiwan from 1,400 to more than1,600. Furthermore, the PRC completed a new air force basein Shuimen, Fujian Province, situated not only close to Taiwanbut also to the Diaoyu Islands, which are claimed by both ofthe Chinese governments and Japan respectively [1 China-Japan (Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands)]. On August 21, Ma restatedthat the ROC would not side with the PRC in the territorialdispute.On November 1, the US included ROC nationals in its VisaWaiver Program. On November 22, the PRC released newpassports featuring a map depicting Taiwan as a part of itsterritory. The ROC protested, stating that the issue might harmthe stability of the improved cross-Strait relations. yreChinaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Tibet)3 Change: Start:1950Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetanseparatists vs. governmentsecession, system / ideology, resourcesThe conflict concerning secession, system, and resources betweenTibetan separatists and the Tibetan government-in-exile,on the one hand, and the central government, on the other,remained violent. Police forces killed at least ten Tibetans,wounding many more. Furthermore, 83 Tibetans resorted toself-immolation in protest of Chinese rule over Tibet. On January8, police shot dead one Tibetan who had allegedly triedto sabotage the construction of an airfield in Labrang/XiaheCounty, Gansu Province. The site was located at a place consideredsacred by Tibetans. The incident triggered demonstrationsby villagers which security forces dispersed, using teargas and injuring many Tibetans. Between January 23 and 26,several thousands protested for a free Tibet and the return ofthe Dalai Lama in three counties of Sichuan. Security forceskilled at least four demonstrators and many more were injured.On February 25, a Tibetan detonated a bomb at a governmentbuilding in Derge/Dege County, Sichuan. On March 6, policeshot dead one Tibetan and injured two others linked to ananti-government rally, in Golog/Guoluo Prefecture, QinghaiProvince. Two self-immolations in Ngaba/Aba on August 13led to clashes with police in which one Tibetan was killed. Twodays later, about a thousand Tibetans protested against Chinesemining operations in Markham/Mangkang County, TibetanAutonomous Region (TAR). One Tibetan was shot dead in aclash with the security forces. Self-immolations occurred in allprovinces inhabited by Tibetans and often sparked protests.Officials reacted with an increased security presence and detentions.The month of November recorded the highest numberof self-immolation incidents. On September 28, a TibetanSpecial General Meeting was held by the government-in-exilein Dharamsala calling for an end to self-immolation incidents.On November 2, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,Navi Pillay, urged China to address the allegations of rights violationsin Tibet, especially the excessive use of force againstpeaceful demonstrators and the curbing of Tibetans’ culturalrights. Additionally, she advocated independent monitors forthe region and called on the government to respect the right topeaceful assembly and expression.axtChinaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Uighurs / Xinjiang)3 Change: Start:1990ETIM, TIP, Uyghurs, WUC vs. Han Chinese,governmentsecession, system / ideology, subnationalpredominanceThe secession conflict between the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslimminority mainly living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-80

Asia and oceaniagion, and the government remained violent. Throughout theyear, several dozen Uyghurs and Han Chinese died.According to the government, a group of nine Uyghurskilled thirteen people, mostly Han Chinese, in Kargilik/YechengCounty, Xinjiang, on February 28. Police shot dead sevenattackers and detained the other two. On March 9, policeshot dead four Uyghurs in Korla/Ku’erle County, Xinjiang. Thevictims had allegedly constructed bombs. Six Uyghurs triedto hijack a plane on its route from Hotan/Hetian to Urumqi/Wulumuqi, Xinjiang, on June 29. They were overwhelmed bypassengers and sky marshals. Some of the hijackers and atleast seven passengers and two marshals were injured. Twoof the hijackers died a few days later under custody due totheir injuries. On September 6, the World Uyghur Congress, anexile organization fighting for Uyghur rights and an independentEast Turkestan, blamed the government for cyber-attacksupon ten Uyghur organizations. On October 1, the Chinese nationalholiday, an Uyghur reportedly drove a motorcycle into apolice facility in Kargilik/Yecheng County. The motorcycle triggeredan explosion, killing up to twenty policemen as well asthe driver. On October 23, three Uyghurs reportedly attackeda police station in Korla/Ku’erle. One attacker was killed whileanother one and two policemen were injured. After a Han Chineseperson lifted the veil of a Uyghur girl, Uyghurs took tothe streets in Zhenping County, Henan Province, on November28. 50 of the protesters were injured in the ensuing clasheswith police.axtChina - Vietnam et al. (South ChinaSea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: Start:1949Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs.Philippines vs. Vietnamterritory, international power, resourcesThe conflict over territory, resources, and international powerin the South China Sea (SCS), also known as East VietnameseSea or West Philippine Sea, between the governments of thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC),Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia respectivelycontinued. The Chinese governments and Vietnam reiteratedextensive but ill-defined claims for most parts of the SCS, includingall of the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The Philippinesrestated its claims for Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal,and eight of the Spratly Islands. The USA heightened its militarypresence in the area and strengthened its defense cooperationwith the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Efforts to establisha mitigating regional code of conduct continued to fail.The Cambodian ASEAN chair kept the SCS issue off the agendaof the summits in April and November. Mineral and fishing resourcesremained serious issues. ROC, the Philippines, and thestate-owned oil firms China National Offshore Oil Corporationand PetroVietnam accelerated their gas and oil explorationplans in disputed territory, exacerbating the situation.After the detention of fishermen in the disputed area, tensionsincreased. On April 10, a Philippine Navy frigate interceptedeight PRC fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal. Two unar-med vessels of PRC’s Chinese Marine Surveillance intervenedshortly after. This led to tensions during which PRC reinforcedits presence with armed ships of the Fishery Law EnforcementCommand, while the Philippines replaced its warship with aCoast Guard cutter. About 26 PRC boats remained in the shoal.On May 22, the US reaffirmed its bilateral defense treaty withthe Philippines. Both countries’ forces conducted joint militaryexercises from April 16 to 27 near Palawan Island, Philippines.On June 21, Vietnam passed a law claiming sovereignty overboth the Paracel and Spratly Islands, strongly opposed by thePhilippines and PRC. On the same day, PRC established theSCS as a prefecture in Hainan Province, with Sansha on theisland chain of Paracel’s Woody Island as administrative center.The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began aerial andnaval patrols around the Spratly Islands. On August 3, the USvoiced serious concerns over these actions. PRC officials reactedwith strong rhetoric. One month later, PRC announced itsintention to establish a PLA garrison in Sansha. On November22, PRC released new passports displaying a map claiming sovereigntyover the entire SCS and the island of Taiwan [1 China(Taiwan)]. The Philippines, ROC and Vietnam voiced strongcriticism. Several anti-PRC protests occurred in Hanoi and HoChi Minh City, Vietnam, between June and December. On November27, Hainan Province passed a law allowing maritimeauthorities to seize foreign ships entering the claimed territory.The law was to become effective on 01/01/13.yreIndia (GJM et al. / northern WestBengal, eastern Assam)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:1947GNLF, GNLF-C, GJM, IGPP, GLO, UGRF vs.ABGL, ABAVP, Janachetana, AmraBengali, AIADC vs. governmentautonomyThe conflict over autonomy between different ethnic Gorkhagroups, among them the Gorkha National Liberation Front(GNLF), the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM), the United GorkhaRevolutionary Front (UGRF), and the Gorkha Liberation Organization(GLO), on one side, different non-Gorkha minority organizationslike Amra Bangali, Janachetana, the All India AdivasiDevelopment Council (AIADC), on another, and the government,on a third side, over the creation of a federal state ofGorkhaland in the Dooars Region, encompassing areas in northernWest Bengal State and eastern Assam State, remainedviolent.In January and February, GJM repeatedly threatened topush for a separate federal state if an autonomous GorkhalandTerritorial Administration (GTA) was not implemented by endof March. On March 7, President Pratibha Patil signed the GTABill which paved the way for the first GTA elections in July. Ina clash between GNLF and GJM, six GNLF cadres were injuredin Darjeeling District, West Bengal, on April 5. One week later,several non-Gorkha minority groups, including AIADC, organizeda general strike in the Dooars and Terai areas of WestBengal in protest against GJM’s demand to include 398 localadministrative units from this region into the GTA. On April 21,81

Asia and oceaniaa high-ranking UGRF cadre surrendered to the authorities inDarjeeling District.On April 23, GJM and an AIADC faction called a two-daygeneral strike in the Dooars and Terai areas after they did notget the permission from the state government to hold a publicrally. The strike turned violent, houses and vehicles were seton fire, and pro-GTA and anti-GTA groups clashed. The policeused batons and tear gas to disperse the rival groups. The authoritiesdeployed paramilitary forces to the region. Severalpeople, including three police officers, were injured. On June9, the Justice Shyamal Sen Committee, formed by the governmentto decide on the inclusion of the contested administrativeunits, recommended to include only five of them in theGTA. On July 29, GJM won all current constituencies in the GTAelections. From September onwards, the West Bengal governmentstarted to transfer departments, powers, and functionsto the GTA.lstIndiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(GNLA et al. / Meghalaya)3 Change: Start:1988HNLC, PLF-M, ANVC, ANVC-B, UANF, LAEF,GNLA vs. governmentautonomyThe autonomy conflict between various militant groups in thestate of Meghalaya, among them the Achik National VolunteerCouncil (ANVC), the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), theHynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), the Liberationof Achik Elite Force (LAEF) and the People’s Liberation Frontof Meghalaya (PLF-M), on the one hand, and the government,on the other, remained violent. Militants of all outfits were arrestedthroughout the year and several laid down their armsvoluntarily.On January 31, the government declared GNLA a terroristorganization. On March 30, around 300 ANVC militants joinedthe group’s breakaway faction (ANVC-B) to protest against theunfulfilled tripartite ceasefire agreement of 2004 from thestate and central governments, as well as to oppose the GNLA[1 India (GNLA, HNLC - ANVC, UANF)]. ANVC-B herewith attractedpublic attention for the first time. The faction, togetherwith GNLA, engaged in the assault, abduction, and killing ofcivilians for allegedly being police informants and in order tocollect ransom. On April 5, security forces clashed with GNLAmilitants in East Garo Hills District, killing four of them. On April19, police shot dead one GNLA combatant in an encounterin South Garo Hills District. Security forces killed a GNLA commander,injured one rebel, and recovered light weapons fromtheir hideout in East Garo Hills on September 14. On October8, three GNLA rebels died in clashes with security forces inGoalpara District, Assam State, and in North Garo Hills District.On November 10, suspected ANVC-B militants ambushed apolice vehicle in South Garo Hills; two civilians died and sixothers were injured. The next day, police shot dead one GNLAmember and arrested another during an encounter in WestGaro Hills. Four days later, security forces killed one GNLAmember in Goalpara District and recovered light arms and ammunition.The government rejected the peace talk offer by HNLCon August 28, as the outfit refused to lay down arms unanimously.veIndiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Hindus – Muslims)3 Change: 5Hindus vs. Muslimssubnational predominanceStart:1947The conflict over subnational predominance between Hindusand Muslims escalated to a violent level. Throughout the year,at least twelve people were killed. On February 23, Hindusand Muslims clashed in Anand District, Gujarat, attacking eachother with stones, petrol-filled bottles, and acid bulbs. Theyclashed over the construction of shops on land owned by theIslamic waqf board, a religious endowment. Large numbers ofsecurity personnel, including one State Reserve Police Forcecompany, fired tear gas at protesters. Approx. 40 people wereinjured, among them up to nine policemen. After a week oftensions between Hindus and Muslims, police forces interrupteda procession of a Hindu community on March 15 inthe town of Rajouri, Jammu and Kashmir, in order to preventfurther clashes. Over twelve people, including six policemen,were injured. On April 8, Hindus and Muslims clashed in Hyderabad,Andhra Pradesh, after cow meat had been found ina Hindu temple. At least twelve people were injured, at leasttwo vehicles torched, and about 57 people arrested. On July23, violence erupted in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, over Hinduchanting. One person was shot dead and twenty were injured.On August 7, two days ahead of Hindu festivities, nearly1,500 Hindus and Muslims, took to the streets in BanaskanthaDistrict, Gujarat. They were armed with clubs and swords. Fivepeople were injured, including a police constable. On October24, policemen used tear gas to disperse Muslims and Hindusin Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh, following a Hindu procession. Theclash left two people dead and at least nine injured, includingone policeman. Over 70 people were arrested.cscIndiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(JeM et al. / Kashmir)3 Change: Start:JeM, HM, LeT, HuM vs. governmentsecession1947The secession conflict in the Indian-administered state of Jammuand Kashmir (J&K) between Kashmiri and Pakistani insurgencygroups, namely Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen(HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harkat-ul-Mujahhideen(HuM), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continuedon a violent level. LeT and HM remained the predominantmilitant groups. Militant activities claimed 117 lives, amongthem insurgents, security forces, and civilians. Throughout theyear, police forces neutralized several militant hideouts in thedistricts of Poonch, Bandipora, and Ramban, seizing cashes ofarms and ammunition. On January 7, a grenade attack at Sopore82

Asia and oceaniapolice station, Baramulla District, killed one militant and injuredfive people including two policemen. On March 28, securityforces killed five LeT militants in two separate clashes in KupwaraDistrict. On August 2 and 3, civilians on the behest of HMlaunched four grenade attacks in Sopore and Srinagar, injuringthree people and damaging several vehicles. On October 1, 24the counterinsurgent Rashtriya Rifles and state police killed fiveHM militants equipped with automatic weapons in Badgam Districtwhile conducting a joint search operation. Security forcesseized five AK-47 rifles, two grenade launchers, and ammunition.On October 19, four heavily-armed LeT militants ambushedan army convoy with grenades in Srinagar. Subsequently, themilitants stormed a nearby hotel, killing one civilian and injuringtwo others. While security forces were conducting search operationsin Sopore on December 18, LeT militants attacked themwith automatic weapons; the security forces shot dead five militants.On December 24, two LeT militants who were allegedlyinvolved in the hotel incident and one policeman were killed ina clash in Dodhipora Village, Kulgam District.lju, isypatnam District, Andhra Pradesh. Security forces recoveredaround 100 kilograms of explosives and other material duringa raid against a Maoist camp in Bijapur District, Chhattisgarh,on September 20. On November 14, an encounter betweensecurity forces and Maoist militants in Odisha left five militantsdead and at least two security personnel wounded. In response,Maoists called a statewide shutdown six days later. OnDecember 14, 26 Maoists surrendered before the additionaldirector general of police in Bihar. Rifles, revolvers, pipe guns,pistols, and ammunition were seized. A former CPI-M areacommander assured the public that more than 100 Maoistswere considering laying down their arms. On December 25,Maoist militants set ablaze two earthmovers in Garhwa District,Jharkhand. Between 30 and 40 armed Maoists stormeda road construction site, assaulting between ten and fifteenworkers.mwu, mstIndia(NSCN - K – NSCN - KK – NSCN - IM)IndiaIntensity:(Naxalites)4 Change: Start:1997Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:1988NSCN-K vs. NSCN-KK, ZUF vs. NSCN-IMsubnational predominanceConflict parties:Conflict items:CPI-M vs. governmentsystem / ideologyThe ideological conflict between the Communist Party of India- Maoist (CPI-M), also called Naxalites, and the governmentcontinued on a highly violent level. The Naxalites operated inthe states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and WestBengal, also known as the "Red Belt". With more than 100fatalities, Chhattisgarh remained the primary battleground,while Jharkhand and Odisha were also heavily affected withover 90 and 60 casualties respectively. Encounters betweensecurity forces and CPI-M militants, abductions, bomb attacks,and strikes inflicted a total of over 360 casualties, amongthem over 100 security personnel, approx. 120 militants, andmore than 140 civilians. Throughout the year, Maoists repeatedlytargeted civilians, accusing them of collaborating withgovernment authorities.On January 2, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), theCombat Battalion for Resolute Action, and district police personnelclashed with Maoist militants near the forest of Matiama,Rohtas District, Bihar. Three top Maoist cadres were killedand one other was seriously injured. In reaction, CPI-M calleda bandh, a general strike, and blew up two mobile towers inAurangabad District, Maharashtra, on January 17. Four days laterin Garhwa District, Jharkhand, 50 to 60 Maoists triggereda landmine blast killing thirteen policemen and injuring twoothers. On March 4, 23 Maoists surrendered in Bihar. BetweenJune 28 and 29, CRPF and Chhattisgarh police killed twentypeople in two separate incidents in Sukma and Bijapur Districts.Six CRPF troopers were injured and at least seven suspectedMaoists arrested. While CRPF claimed that those killedwere CPI-M militants, other sources stated many of them werecivilians. Two days later, CRPF and state police forces arrested36 Maoists, among them six senior leaders, in Vishakha-The conflict over subnational predominance between thedifferent factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland,i.e. Isak-Muivah-faction (NSCN-IM), the Khaplangfaction(NSCN-K), the Khole-Kitovi-faction (NSCN-KK) andits splinter group, Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), remainedviolent. Though all the groups share the common goal of establishinga Greater Nagaland in India’s North East [1 India(NSCN et al. / Nagaland)], different ideological orientationsand tribal affiliations caused various internal disputes. Violencemainly occurred in Nagaland state in northeast India.In total, 54 people were killed in the conflict.Over the year, 37 militants and three civilians died inclashes between the NSCN-K and NSCN-KK. On January 15,NSCN-K raided an NSCN-KK camp and killed one insurgentin Peren District. Four days later, ten NSCN-KK militants armedwith AK-47 rifles killed an NSCN-K chief secretary inZunheboto District. In February and March, similar clashesbetween the two factions claimed sixteen lives in the districtsof Dimapur, Peren, and Kohima. From May 30 to July1, eight militants and one civilian died in five clashes inZunheboto District. On September 6, NSCN-KK fighters attackedthe house of an NSCN-K member in Dimapur usinggrenades and firearms, injuring two militants. Two NSCN-IM members were killed in separate clashes with NSCN-Kin Manipur State on October 25 and in Arunachal PradeshState on November 1. Clashes between NSCN-IM and ZUF inManipur on May 30, September 26, and October 2 claimedthe lives of eight militants and one civilian.The Forum for Reconciliation, initiated in 2008 by independentNaga people with the aim of finding a solutionto the political differences and ending the violence betweenthe factions, organized two meetings this year. AsNSCN-K did not participate in the meeting on February 29and NSCN-IM abstained on May 26, no major progress wasmade.fwo83

Asia and oceaniaIndiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Sikhs / Punjab)3 Change: 5Start:1947Shiromani Akali Dal, KLF, KZF, BKI, KTF vs.governmentautonomyThe autonomy conflict between various Sikh organizations inthe state of Punjab and the government turned violent. OnMarch 24, various Sikh organizations, among them the ShiromaniAkali Dal (Panch Pardhani and Amritsar), held a marchin Jalandhar, protesting against the hanging of Babbar KhalsaInternational member Balwant Singh Rajoana scheduled forMarch 31. Rajoana was convicted for the assassination of formerprovincial Chief Minister Beant Singh in 1995. In responseto the protests, fifteen companies of paramilitary forces and60,000 policemen were deployed all over the state. On March28, Sikh organizations called for a bandh, a general strike.Thousands took to the streets, demanding Rajoana’s amnesty.Three people were injured, among them a head constable, aspolice forces dispersed 1,500 protesters who were blockingthe Jalandhar-Amritsar railway track. On the same day, policearrested more than 100 Sikhs. As a result, the Home Ministryannounced the postponement of Rajoana’s execution. lgrIndia (ULFA et al. – Biharis,Bengalis)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:5 Change: 3Start:ULFA, ATTF, NDFB, NLFT, AASU,Bodos vs. Bengalis, Biharis, AABYSFsubnational predominance1981The conflict over subnational predominance between ethnicBodos and different militant groups like the United DemocraticFront of Bodoland (NDFB) and the United Liberation Frontof Assam (ULFA), on the one hand, and ethnic Bengalis andBiharis, on the other, escalated to a war. While also affectingother Indian states, the conflict mainly took place in the Assameseparts of the semi-autonomous Bodo Territorial AutonomousDistrict (BTAD), where many Bodos perceived Muslimsand Bengali-speakers to be illegal immigrants. Over the year,more than 100 people were killed, thousands of houses destroyed,and more than 400,000 people forced to flee theirhomes.The violence started in the village of Magbari, Assam, onJuly 19, when a gunman attacked two Muslim student leaders.The day after, four former Bodo activists were killed. On July21, the government deployed paramilitary forces to the BTAD,imposed a curfew in the region, extending it to other districtsof Assam two days later, when Bodo and Bengali mobs killedat least nine people in Barpeta and Kokrajhar Districts. FromJuly 21 to 29, mobs of both sides burned down several villa-ges, clashed with police and killed at least 56 people in Assam.On August 4, a NDFB faction announced that they wouldnot allow Muslim migrants to live in tribal areas. Three dayslater, violence erupted anew when a group of ten armed withAK-47 rifles, killed three Muslims in Ranighuli, Kokrajhar.The day afterwards, the conflict spread to places outsideAssam when five students from northeast India were attackedin Pune, Maharashtra state. On August 11, Muslim protester inMumbai, Maharashtra, clashed with police, leaving two peopledead. Two days later, NDFB killed a Muslim and injured twoothers at the Bhutanese border. After threats of violence, tensof thousands of people northeastern Indian origin fled fromBangalore, Karnataka State, and Chennai, Tamil Nadu State, aswell as other major cities from August 15 onwards. However,most of them returned by the end of the month. In Assam, isolatedoutbreaks of violence occurred throughout August andraised the total death toll to 95 by the end of the month. Forexample, six Bengali speakers were killed in Chirang Districtand two more in Dhemaji District on August 25. One day later,ULFA announced actions against immigrants in Assam if theviolence against people from the northeast in other stateswould not stop. From November 10 to 16, violence eruptedonce again and at least five Muslims and one ethnic Bodowere killed in separate incidents in Kokrajhar.mwIndiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(ULFA et al. / Assam)3 Change: Start:ULFA, NDFB, DHD, Black Widow vs.governmentsecession1979The secession conflict over the state of Assam between theUnited Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National DemocraticFront of Bodoland (NDFB), and the Dima Halim Daogah(DHD), as well as its breakaway faction, the Black Widow, onthe one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.Despite peace accords between the government and ULFA aswell as NDFB, factions of both militant groups perpetrated violentactions.The peace process between the government and ULFA’spro-talk faction (ULFA-PTF) proceeded in talks on April 9 andJune 29, while violence perpetrated by ULFA’s anti-talk faction(ULFA-ATF) continued. Throughout the year, thirteen ULFA-ATFcadres, three security personnel, and two civilians were killed,and 25 people were injured in at least eight ambushes and fivebomb attacks. Authorities arrested 109 ULFA-ATF militants andrecovered approx. fifteen small arms and four improvised explosivedevices. The government extended the ceasefire agreementwith the Dilip Nunisa faction of DHD (DHD-N) and NDFBpro-talk faction for another six months on January 18. AlthoughNDFB’s anti-talk faction (NDFB-ATF) had declared unilateralceasefire beginning on 08/01/11, clashes with security forcescontinued. On May 31, security forces killed one NDFB-ATF militantin Kamrup District. Over the course of the year, the governmentarrested approx. 70 NDFB-ATF militants. On October 8,DHD and the central and state governments signed a Memorandumof Settlement after nine years of peace talks.dsc84

Asia and oceaniaIndonesiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Ahmadiyya)3 Change: Start:1980Ahmadiyya vs. government, radical SunniMuslimssystem / ideologyThe ideology conflict between the Indonesian branch of theAhmadiyya religious community, on the one hand, and thegovernment as well as radical Sunni Muslims, on the other,remained violent. Throughout the year, radical Sunni Muslimsattacked Ahmadis and their facilities. Around 1,000 conservativeMuslims took to the streets in Jakarta on March 9, demandinga government ban on the Ahmadiyya religion. On April20, about 150 people attacked an Ahmadiyya mosque withMolotov cocktails and stones in Singaparna, West Java, destroyingthe whole interior as well as parts of the building. Oneweek later, the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) disrupted the Fridayprayers of an Ahmadiyya group in Batam, Riau Islands, anddestroyed parts of the building’s interior. FPI dragged threegroup members to a local police station, where they forced theleader of the group to stop all religious activities in the area.On July 13, a mob threw stones at Ahmadiyya houses in thevillage of Cisalada, West Java, resulting in a fight between thetwo communities. The clash damaged six houses and injuredfour people, among them three Ahmadis. After the mob hadabandoned the site, it returned with knives and machetes. Accordingto the police, security personnel brought the situationunder control. On July 25, police and military forces preventeddozens of FPI members from breaking into a mosque in Cianjur,West Java. On November 8, approx. 200 FPI members protestedin favor of the implementation of a ban on all activitiesof Ahmadis in West Java.erIndonesiagroups)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Islamist militant3 Change: Start:1981al-Qaeda in Aceh, JI, SunniMovement for Indonesian Society vs.governmentsystem / ideology, national powerThe conflict between Islamist militant groups fighting for anIslamic state in Indonesia and the government continued on aviolent level. On February 2, a top leader of Jemaah Islamiah(JI), Zulfiki bin Hir was killed in an airstrike by the Philippinemilitary on Jolo Island, the Philippines [1 Philippines (AbuSayyaf / Mindanao)]. On March 18, in Denpasar, Bali, policeforces killed five suspected JI militants. Twelve days later, twosuspected militants were shot dead in a firefight with police inJakarta. On May 16, in West Jakarta, high-profile Islamist militantAbu Umar of the Abu Umar group was sentenced to tenyears in prison for smuggling firearms. The last remaining militantinvolved in the 2002 Bali bombings, Umar Patek, was sentencedto twenty years in prison on June 21 in West Jakarta.The Densus 88 anti-terrorism squad killed two suspectedmilitants and arrested one other in Solo, Java, on September1. The militants in turn shot dead one police officer. On September22 and 23, Densus 88 arrested ten Islamic militants inSolo, Java, and West Kalimantan, Borneo. On October 27, policearrested eleven members of the new Islamist group SunniMovement for Indonesian Society in Java. The group had beenplanning attacks on American diplomatic missions. skaIndonesiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(OPM / Papua)3 Change: OPM vs. governmentsecession, resourcesStart:1961The conflict between the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and thegovernment over the independence of the Papua region remainedviolent.In the course of the year, shootings claimed the lives of atleast eighteen people. On January 28, OPM attacked twelveparamilitary policemen during their patrol and killed one policeofficer in the highlands of Puncak Jaya, Central Papua. OnApril 8, OPM shot at a commercial airplane at Mulia Airport,Puncak Jaya, using machine guns. One man died and four civilianswere wounded. On July 1, up to 30 OPM members attackedand killed a village chief. On August 18, OPM shot deada government official near the border of Indonesia and PapuaNew Guinea. Three days later, OPM shot dead a police officerin Paniai, West Papua. While Papua activists claimed that thepolice torched houses while searching for militants, the policedenied such allegations. On November 15, OPM membersraided a police station and stole firearms and ammunition inPapua. On November 27, around 50 OPM members attackeda police station, killing three police officers, and set the officeablaze in the city of Wamena, West Papua.Over the year, police arrested at least 27 OPM membersin raids. In a raid on OPM´s headquarters, two OPM memberswere arrested by police in Yapen on May 29. On September 2and 3, the police arrested 25 OPM members in several raids,including OPM leader Daniel Kogoya in Jayapura and Abepura.Throughout the year, people demonstrated peacefullyin many cities in West Papua. For instance, on February 20,thousands of people took to the streets and demanded a referendumin West Papua. On July 4, OPM commander LambertPekikir announced that OPM would declare a ceasefire if thegovernment held an international conference including theUN.ascJapan – ChinaIslands)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: (Senkaku / DiaoyuROC vs. PRC vs. Japanterritory, resourcesStart:1971The territory and resources conflict between the People’s Re-85

Asia and oceaniapublic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and Japanover the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands continued. All parties reiteratedtheir sovereignty claims, supported by nationalist activistgroups, most noteworthy among them Ganbare Nippon fromJapan and PRC’s China Federation for Defending the DiaoyuIslands (CFDD). In April, the CFDD officially associated withtwo activist groups from Hong Kong and ROC under the bannerof the World Chinese Alliance in Defense of the DiaoyuIslands (WCADD). In mid-April, Shintaro Ishihara, the governorof Tokyo, Japan, urged the city’s government to buy the islandsfrom their private Japanese owners. In July, the Japanese CoastGuard (JCG) stopped ROC activists sailing to the islands. OnJuly 20, CFDD chairman and president of China Fortune Investment,Tong Zeng, requested the PRC’s permission to invest inthe Diaoyu Islands. On August 15, PRC and Hong Kong WCADDactivists, among them leading members of radical Hong Kongpro-democracy parties [1 China (Hong Kong pro-democracyparties)], procured a vessel and reached the islands. They werethere arrested by the JCG and sent back on August 17. As aresponse to the campaign, Ganbare Nippon activists landedon the islands shortly after. Both incidents fueled a wave ofriots in several major cities in PRC, erupting on August 18. OnSeptember 10, PRC formally declared the territorial baselinefor the disputed area. Despite strong protests, the Japanesegovernment purchased the islands on September 11. Subsequently,ROC recalled its envoy from Japan while PRC sent sixmore Chinese Marine Surveillance patrols to the islands. A secondwave of protests intensified around September 18. Protesterslooted Japanese shops and factories and threw objectsat the Japanese embassy in Beijing. Beijing prohibited protestsin front of the embassy, but condoned a boycott for Japaneseproducts and suspended the 40th anniversary of Sino-Japaneserelations. On September 23, between 800 and 1,400Ganbare Nippon activists demonstrated in Tokyo against PRC’ssovereignty claims. Two days later, the JCG fired water cannonsat ROC fishing and coast guard ships. On September 26, Japan’sPrime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, addressed the UN General Assembly,reiterating Japan’s claims and also its willingness toresolve the conflict peacefully. On October 1, ROC returnedits envoy to Japan and resumed dialog on fishing rights. Japanrejected ROC requests for allowing the ICJ to examine the conflict.Japan began joint maritime military drills with the US nearthe disputed islands on November 5. On December 13, a PRCplane patrolled above the disputed islands causing the JapaneseDefense Minister Satoshi Morimoto to file an objectionwith PRC and to heighten Japan’s level of alert.kolJapan – South Korea (Takeshima /Dokdo)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: Japan vs. South KoreaterritoryStart:1951The territorial conflict over the Liancourt Rocks between Japan,referring to them as Takeshima, and South Korea, referring tothem as Dokdo, continued. The conflict remained strongly interwovenwith Korean resentment over Japanese revisionism.On January 24, Minister of Foreign Affairs Koichiro Genba emphasizedJapanese claims over Takeshima, leading to protestfrom South Korea. On June 29, due to protests among the public,South Korea postponed the General Security of MilitaryInformation Agreement with Japan. On July 9, a South Koreannational attacked the Japanese embassy in Seoul, South Korea,with his truck, displaying a banner stating that the Dokdo isletswere Korean territory. The event was the first in a series of anti-Japanese protests. On August 29, the Japanese embassy issueda safety warning for its citizens in South Korea. On August 10,South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited the islets. Fourdays later, he urged the Japanese emperor to officially apologizefor the Japanese occupation of Korea. Japan’s Prime MinisterYoshihiko Noda responded by temporarily recalling hiscountry’s ambassador. On August 22, the ambassador returned.Noda proposed referring the conflict to the ICJ, which SouthKorea rejected.tspKazakhstangroups)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: (Islamist militantStart:2011al-Khalifat, Islamist militant groups vs.governmentsystem / ideology, national powerThe system and power conflict between Islamist militantgroups, among others the Jund al-Khalifa, and the governmentremained violent. On February 21, a court in Aqtobe, AqtobeProvince, sentenced five suspects of the July 2011 attacks toterms ranging from five to thirteen years. On April 18, a courtin Atyrau, Atyrau Province, convicted 42 out of 47 suspects involvedin organizing the bombings of 10/31/2011. Police allegedthat the suspects were linked to Jund al-Khalifa, which hadtaken responsibility for the attacks. Police forces conducted aseries of raids against suspected Islamist militants in August.On July 11, alleged Islamist militants detonated a bomb inTausamal, Almaty Province. Eight people died. On August 17,security forces stormed a hideout in the outskirts of Almaty,killing nine suspects. Five alleged militants were killed and oneseverely injured in a special operation in Atyrau on September12. Three days later, two unknown persons attacked a policestation in Atyrau, injuring two policemen. In response, specialforces stormed a militants’ hideout in Atyrau on September 21,killing four suspects in a firefight. In October, courts in Atyrauand Aqtobe sentenced several suspects apprehended duringthe raids to long prison terms for militant activities. ayuMalaysiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition movement)3 Change: Start:1969Pakatan Rakyat, Bersih vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national powerThe system and power conflict between the pro-democracyopposition, led by Pakatan Rakyat and the Coalition for Clean86

Asia and oceaniaand Fair Elections (Bersih), on the one hand, and the government,on the other, continued on a violent level. Bersih is analliance of several non-governmental organizations and PakatanRakyat encompasses the three largest opposition partiesParti Islam Se-Malaysia, Parti Keadilan Rakyat, and Parti TindakanDemokratik.In early April, the Parliamentary Select Committee onElectoral Reforms, formed in the aftermath of the Bersih 2.0rally in 2011, released a report with 22 recommendations toimprove the electoral system. While the House of Representativespassed the report without debate on April 3, the oppositionparties and Bersih opposed the paper. Supported byPakatan Rakyat, Bersih organized the Bersih 3.0 rally in thecapital Kuala Lumpur on April 28, demanding further reformsof the electoral system. They called for the resignation ofthe Election Commission and the monitoring of the generalelections to be held in early 2013 by international observers.Prime Minister Najib Razak warned against participation inthe rally and police forces set up roadblocks. Up to 300,000people protested in Kuala Lumpur and clashed with riot police.The latter fired tear gas and chemical-laced water, injuringat least 113 people. In addition, police attacked several journalistsand arrested 512 demonstrators, most of whom werereleased the same day. International observers described therally as peaceful. On January 9, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahimwas acquitted by the Kuala Lumpur High Court of violatinglaws against homosexuality. However, the Attorney-General’s Chambers filed an appeal against the Kuala LumpurHigh Court decision on January 20. Ten months later, the Courtof Appeal set 02/15/13 for case management of the appealagainst Ibrahim’s acquittal.sgemergency throughout Rakhine State and authorities imposeda curfew in Sittwe, among other places. Authorities alsoarrested at least ten local UN aid workers. Throughout June,clashes between Rohingyas and Buddhists continued in Sittwe,Kyauktaw, Rathidaung, Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Mrauk-U,Rambree, Pauktaw, and Taung Goat. Between August 4 and 6,clashes erupted after Rohingyas set a highway bus terminalon fire. During the clashes, which left seven people dead anddestroyed five villages, Rohingyas and Buddhists perpetratedmutual arson attacks. According to Human Rights Watch,Rohingyas fell victim to human rights abuses, including arbitrarymass arrests, rapes, and killings conducted by local securityforces, Na Sa Ka personnel, a paramilitary border force,and soldiers. On August 17, Thein Sein announced the formationof an investigatory commission. Rohingyas were excludedfrom the commission. On October 21, violence startedanew when a Buddhist merchant in Mrauk-U was killed. BetweenOctober 21 and 26, dozens of people were killed andhundreds of houses burned down. Riots spread from Min Byaand Mrauk-U to several other towns, culminating in Kyaukpyuwhere Buddhists destroyed a predominantly Muslim quarterbetween October 23 and 24. On October 26, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called upon the government to put anend to the violence.fpeMyanmarIntensity:(KIA, KIO / Kachin State)5 Change: 5Start:1948Myanmar (Buddhists – Rohingyas /Rakhine State)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: NEWStart:Buddhists vs. Rohingya Muslimssubnational predominance, other2012A highly violent conflict erupted between the majority Buddhistpopulation and the minority Rohingya Muslims in RakhineState.Clashes between Muslims and Buddhists occurred mainlyin June and October and claimed the lives of around 180people as well as the displacement of an estimated 110,000people. The October violence alone led to 89 fatalities, atleast 136 people injured, and the destruction of over 5,300houses and religious buildings. About 2,000 Rohingyas fledto Bangladesh but were sent back. The rape and murder of aBuddhist woman on May 28 in Rambree Township, allegedlyby three Rohingyas, sparked the ensuing violence. On June 3,around 300 Buddhists in the town of Toungop attacked a busand beat to death ten Muslims on board. Five days later, in thetown of Maungdaw, Rohingyas killed an unknown number ofBuddhists and destroyed property of Buddhists. Subsequently,violence escalated in Sittwe, the state capital. Buddhistsand Rohingyas attacked each other with torches, knives, andswords. On June 10, President Thein Sein declared a state ofConflict parties:Conflict items:KIA, KIO vs. governmentautonomy, resourcesThe autonomy and resource conflict between the KachinIndependence Organization (KIO) and its military wing, theKachin Independence Army (KIA), on the one hand, and thegovernment, on the other, escalated to a war.The conflict flared up anew after a seventeen-year ceasefirecollapsed in June 2011. KIA and government forcesclashed repeatedly over the year in Kachin State and thenorthern area of Shan State, where 25 percent of the Burmesearmy were deployed. The army used heavy artillery,helicopter gunships, and fighter jets. The number of combatantskilled on both sides in the course of the year remainedconflicting, with estimates ranging in the thousands. In September,KIA reported the loss of over 700 fighters since theceasefire’s collapse. The conflict caused the death of hundredsof civilians and the displacement of approx. 100,000.An estimated 7,000 to 10,000 Kachins fled to Yunnan Province,China, from whence Chinese authorities repatriated5,000 back to Kachin in August. The government repeatedlyblocked aid deliveries. Human Rights Watch reported armyattacks against civilians, extrajudicial killings, and the confiscationand destruction of property. Over the year, the conflictparties held several peace talks in Myanmar and China withoutresults. While violence also occurred in Shan State, allmajor incidents took place in Kachin State, where the army87

Asia and oceaniahad a strong interest in controlling natural resources andeconomic projects.On March 1, President Thein Sein stated that he had orderedthe army to only act in self-defense and not to launchoffensive actions. On April 6, two government light infantrydivisions shelled KIA bases around the town of Laiza, wherethe KIA headquarters are located, with heavy artillery.Between April 8 and 9, government troops attacked a KIAoutpost with over 100 mortar shells near Waingmaw Township.On April 25, KIA rebels captured Pangwa, a strategicallyimportant town at the Sino-Burmese border. In response,army helicopters airlifted about 200 troops near Pangwa torecapture the town. According to state media, the numberof casualties peaked in May, with over 100 that month. Inaddition, about 2,000 soldiers were deployed to Laiza. OnMay 6 and 7, KIA forces detonated several bombs in Bhamoand Momauk Townships, resulting in the deaths of up to 70soldiers. On May 12 and 13, two soldiers were killed and fourothers injured in clashes with KIA combatants near the Myitsonedam project, constructed by government contractorsand the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation.On May 14, Mi-24 helicopters attacked the KIA-controlledvillages of Jik Loi and Rit Pan, destroying civilian property.Over the month, KIA combatants destroyed bridges, railroadsand energy supply towers. During November, the governmentheightened its military presence in Kachin State with40 trucks carrying weapons, soldiers, and supplies. Accordingto KIA, 1,000 government troops arrived in the vicinityof KIA’s stronghold in Laiza. Four KIA rebels died and fifteenwere injured between December 1 and 11 while reclaimingfrontline posts. On December 14, the government attackedKIA outposts around Layang with three Mi-24 helicoptersand mortars. In response, KIA forces killed and injured morethan 60 soldiers. On December 28, five fighter jets and twohelicopters launched rocket attacks near Layang, hitting strategicallyimportant KIA outposts. The number of casualtiesremained unknown.phuMyanmarIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition movement)2 Change: Start:opposition vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power1962The system and national power conflict continued betweenvarious opposition groups and the government de-escalatedto a non-violent level.On January 5, the Union Election Commission formally acceptedthe re-registration of the oppositional National Leaguefor Democracy (NLD). In by-elections on April 1, the NLD won43 out of 44 parliamentary seats it contested. On January 13,the government released 650 political prisoners, among themleaders of student groups, Buddhist monks, generals, and theformer prime minister U Khin Nyunt, after an amnesty orderendorsed by President Thein Sein. On August 20, the governmentlifted its censorship of the press; the Press Scrutiny andRegistration Department announced media outlets were nolonger obliged to submit their works to state censors prior topublication. These developments were welcomed by severalWestern nations as well as the EU. In September, Thein Seinreshuffled the cabinet. On September 6, all nine judges of theConstitution Tribunal resigned after the lower house Parliamentvoted to impeach them, a move that followed a weeklongpower struggle between the two bodies. Eight days later,the exiled oppositional National Coalition Government of theUnion of Burma announced its dissolution to contribute tothe achievement of national reconciliation. Opposition leaderAung San Suu Kyi urged the government on November 29 toapologize for a violent crackdown of protestors at a coppermine project site but also stated the country had to continueto pursue its commitment to complete the project [1 Myanmar(farmers et al. / Sagaing Region)].lrMyanmarIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(SSA-S, SSA-N / Shan State)3 Change: Start:SSA-S, SSA-N vs. governmentautonomy1952The autonomy conflict between the northern and southernwings of the Shan State Army (SSA-N and SSA-S), on the onehand, and the government, on the other hand, remained violent.Despite peace deals, tensions between the conflict partiesremained as soldiers continued to force Shan rebels towithdraw from economically strategic bases. SSA-N signed aninitial peace agreement with both the state-level and centralgovernment on January 28. However, clashes between SSA-Nand government forces in Shan State persisted throughout theremainder of the year. On April 6, for instance, SSA-N reportedthat as many as seven soldiers were killed during fighting inHsenwi Township. According to local sources, ten governmentinfantry battalions attacked an SSA-N base in Monghsu Townshipfor four days at the beginning of July. At least seven SSA-Nmilitants were arrested following a clash in Mong Ton Townshipon October 26.Following the signing of an initial peace agreement on12/02/11, SSA-S and government officials continued to negotiatein January. On January 16, SSA-S signed a peace agreementwith the government. However, SSA-S reported clasheswith government forces beginning on February 7. In subsequentviolent confrontations between February and May, bothSSA-S and the government suffered casualties. On May 19, theRestoration Council of Shan State, the political wing of SSA-S,signed another peace agreement with the government in thetown of Kengtung. However, fights between SSA-S and governmentforces continued throughout June and July. Violenceabated until the advent of a skirmish between governmentand Shan State Army forces on November 24 in which one soldierreportedly died.jre88

Asia and oceaniaNepalIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Madheshis / Terai)3 Change: Start:2004JTMM-G, JTMM-J, JTMM-R, JTMM-S, JTMM,ATMM, TJP-M, MMT, SJTMM, MJF, TMPD vs.governmentautonomyThe autonomy conflict between various Madheshi politicalparties, among them the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF)and the Terai Madhesh Democratic Party (TMPD), and assortedmilitant groups such as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha(JTMM), the Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha (ATMM), the MadhesiMukti Tigers (MMT), and the Samyukta Janatantrik Terai MuktiMorcha (SJTMM) and their various factions, on the one hand,and the government, on the other, continued.Throughout the year, diplomatic efforts increased. On January22, JTMM-G, led by Jaikrishna Goit, signed an agreementwith the government and renounced violence. On February25, JTMM-B met with government officials in Rupandehi andsimilarly foreswore violence. On August 27, SJTMM in turn signeda deal with the government and also renounced violence.On March 8, Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai resumed theintegration of Madheshi youth into the army for the first timesince December 2011.On January 1, police arrested a member of Bhagat SinghledJTMM-B in Banke District. On March 12, the army defusedan MMT-planted improvised explosive device (IED) inside theItahari District Education Office. Ten days later, JTMM-J, led byJwala Singh, installed an IED in a bus, injuring two passengersin Dang District. On March 31, an alliance of five Madheshipolitical parties, the United Democratic Madhesi Front, held arally in Kathmandu to reiterate their claim for identity-basedfederalism within the pending constitution. On April 30, aJTMMM-planted bomb killed five people and injured at least24 in Janakpur. On August 10, ATMM set off an IED in a hotelin Siraha District. No casualties were reported. Two days later,police shot dead a JTMM member in Mahottari District. OnSeptember 1, JTMM-B handed over its weapons to the police.In a similar move, SJTMM started to hand over its weapons andexplosives to the authorities by December 24. On November30, police arrested an SJTMM member in Kapilvastu District.On December 26, police arrested another six militants fromthis organization in Kathmandu.lstnew supreme leader by the Political Bureau of the Workers'Party of Korea on 12/29/2011. Seven months later, he becamea marshal in the Korean People’s Army (KPA), after then-Chief of the General Staff of the KPA, Ri Yong-ho, had beendismissed. Kim continued his father’s Military First policyand advanced NK’s nuclear and satellite capabilities. Allegedly,NK prepared the Punggye-ri test facility in Kilju County,North Hamgyong Province, for a third nuclear test after 2006and 2009. On May 30, NK proclaimed its status as a nucleararmedstate by amending its constitution. This change wascriticized by the US and SK.Trilateral cooperation between the US, SK, and Japancontinued, despite conflicts between Japan and SK [1 Japan– South Korea (Takeshima / Dokdo)]. The three countries conductedtheir first official joint naval exercise from June 21to 22, followed by a large US-SK single-day drill. In spite ofstrong protest from NK, the US and SK conducted two of theirregular annual large-scale exercises in spring and autumn, respectively.On October 7, the US and SK revised their treatyon technological aid, permitting an extension of the range ofSK’s ballistic missiles to 800 km and of the missiles’ payloadto over a ton. Two days later, NK claimed its missiles couldreach the US mainland.On January 11, NK test-fired three short-range ballisticmissiles. During January and February, the US offered NK foodaid in return for talks on denuclearization. As announced onemonth earlier, NK launched a satellite aboard an Unha-3 carrierrocket on April 13. The rocket launch failed shortly afterlift-off. The international community condemned the test. TheUS withdrew its food aid offer from earlier on in the year andinstead proposed economic sanctions against NK. The UnitedNations Security Council approved sanctions against three NKcompanies allegedly involved in NK’s ballistic missile industry.NK revoked its previous permission for IAEA inspections totake place on April 16.After stating the intention to reconsider its stance on thenuclear issue on July 20, four days later NK deployed twentyto 50 helicopters to airbases close to Baengnyeong Island,the sovereignty over which was disputed between NK and SK[1 North Korea – South Korea]. On November 31, a governmentdelegation from PR China voiced its concerns over NK’splans to launch a satellite. In early December, the US deployedwarships equipped with sophisticated ballistic-missiledefense systems to monitor a potential NK rocket launch. OnDecember 12, NK successfully launched a long-range Unha-3rocket, bringing a satellite into orbit for the first time. lbsNorth Korea – USA, South Korea,JapanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: Start:1990North Korea vs. USA, South Korea, Japansystem / ideology, international power, otherThe system and international power conflict between NorthKorea (NK), on the one hand, and the USA, South Korea (SK),and Japan, on the other, continued. After Kim Jong-il’s deathon 12/17/2011, his son Kim Jong-un was proclaimed NK’sPakistanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(BLA et al. / Balochistan)3 Change: Start:1948Baloch and Brahui tribes, BSO, BPLF, JWP, BLA,BRA, BLUF, BNP, LeB, BMDT vs. governmentsecession, resourcesThe conflict over resources and secession between variousmilitant groups and Baloch political parties in Balochistanprovince, on the one hand, and the government, on the other,remained violent.89

Asia and oceaniaThe war over national power and the orientation of the poli-Over the course of the year, at least 330 people were killedin encounters between security forces and militant groups aswell as in attacks on civilians who were perceived to be aliento Balochistan. Moreover, nineteen attacks on railroad infrastructureand more than 30 attacks on gas pipelines, underminingthe country’s energy supply, were reported. On January11, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) attacked a convoyof the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) in the Turbat area andkilled fourteen soldiers. The Baloch Republican Army (BRA)destroyed a checkpoint and killed ten paramilitary securitypersonnel in the Sui area on January 26. On February 1, theBaloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed at least eleven FC personnelin a fraught encounter in the Margut area. Two peopledied and twelve were injured in a BRA attack on a police vanin Dera Murad Jamali, Nasirabad District, on February 13. Twodays later in Turbat, BLA killed seven road workers from Sindhand the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. BRA injured fourpeople in a bomb attack in Dera Murad Jamali on May 16.The Baloch Liberation Tigers (BLT) killed eighteen civiliansfrom Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces in Turbat onJuly 6. One day later, BLA kidnapped and killed seven workersfrom the Sorange coal mining fields. About 50 BLF militantsarmed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades destroyeda coast guard post and killed six security personnelin Gwardar on July 21. The United Baloch Army (UBA) killedten road workers in the Mastung District on September 13.Five people died in a BRA bomb attack on an army vehicle inQuetta on November 21.In the first two weeks of February, BRA, the BalochistanRepublican Party (BRP), Balochistan National Party, NationalParty, and other Baloch groups organized two province-widestrikes, lasting two and three days respectively, to protestagainst the murders of Sangat Sana Baloch, former vice-chairmanof the Baloch Student Organization, and two relatives ofa BRP leader. BRP accused the paramilitary Frontier Constabularyfor the murders. On August 13, another province-widestrike against security forces in the region was organized byvarious Baloch nationalist groups. Two weeks later, BRP openedfire on two buses from Sindh and Punjab which operateddespite the call for a strike. Five people died in the assault.The US Congress introduced a non-binding resolution demandingthe right of self-determination for Balochistan on February17. Despite protests against the resolution, the governmentannounced amnesties for exiled Baloch leaders six dayslater.cbrPakistanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Islamist militant groups)5 Change: Start:various Islamist militant groups vs.governmentsubnational predominance2001tical system between various Islamist militant groups, suchas the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda, Haqqani network,and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islam (HuJI) on the one hand,and the government, supported by the USA, on the other,continued for the sixth year running. The conflict claimed thelives of over 4,000 people over the course of the year. Theheaviest clashes between security forces and militants occurredin the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), especiallyin the agencies of Orakzai, Khyber, North Waziristan,Kurram, and Bajaur.For instance, on January 2, fighter jets bombed militant hideoutsin Orakzai, killing at least twenty TTP militants. In Khyber,fighting throughout the year claimed the lives of at least360 people and forced more than 181,000 to flee. On March11, for instance, security forces killed 39 militants during anoperation in the Alam Godhar area and further 30 militants inthe course of several clashes on June 2 in Tirah Valley.In North Waziristan between May 7 and 8, security forcesclashed with militants, leaving 39 people dead in the Miranshaharea. In the TTP-dominated Kurram Agency, securityforces attacked militant hideouts with artillery and helicoptergunships, killing at least twelve on May 14. A major battle,leaving 200 people dead, erupted in Bajaur on August 23and lasted until September 19, when around 400 TTP militantsattacked security forces supported by pro-governmenttribal militias from their bases in Afghanistan, temporarily takingcontrol of six small villages near the border [ 1 Pakistan(Taliban – tribes)].In Upper Dir, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province, securityforces killed at least 34 TTP militants, including their spokesmanMullah Mansoor, during fights between June 29 and July1. After an interruption of almost two months, the US resumeddrone operations in FATA to support the government onJanuary 10 by killing four suspected militants in the outskirtsof Miranshah, North Waziristan. In the course of the most fataldrone attack, 24 people died in Gorwaik Village in NorthWaziristan, on July 6. One attack targeted at the Haqqani networkkilled at least eighteen militants in a madrasa in BalandKhel, Orakzai, on October 11. Over the year, US drone attacksleft a total of 312 people dead, including the two al-Qaedacommanders: Badr Mansoor on February 9 and Abu Yahya al-Libi on June 4.Despite resumed peace negotiations between the governmentand TTP, Islamists carried out suicide attacks and ambushestargeting both security personnel and civilians, especiallyin warrant agencies of FATA, but also in all four provinces. Inresponse to the army’s assassination of TTP commander QariKamran on January 1,TTP militants killed fifteen previouslykidnapped Frontier Constabulary personnel, in North Waziristanfour days later.On April 15, around 150 TTP militants stormed a prison inthe town of Bannu, KP, and freed nearly 400 inmates. On June24, TTP militants attacked a military convoy in Upper Dir district,KP, resulting in the death of at least eleven militants andten soldiers. On July 9, the Punjabi wing of the TTP attacked anarmy camp near Wazirabad in Gujranwala district, killing eightsoldiers. In a similar attack on an air force base in Kamra wherenuclear warheads were allegedly being stored, two securityforces and nine militants died on August 16. On December 15,ten TTP militants attacked the airport at Peshawar, KP, using a90

Asia and oceaniasuicide car bomb, three rockets, and several other explosives.The explosions and the ensuing gun battle left all the assailants,several civilians, and one police officer dead, and 35 peopleinjured. One week later, TTP killed KP’s Senior Minister forLocal Government and Rural Development, Bashir Bilour, andseven other people in a suicide attack in Peshawar. mfuPakistan (Mohajirs – Balochs,Pakhtuns, Sindhis)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: 6Start:1947Mohajirs, MQM vs. Pakhtuns, ANP, Balochs,PPP, Sindhis, Awami Tehreeksubnational predominanceThe conflict in the province of Sindh over subnational predominancebetween the Urdu-speaking Mohajir people andtheir political organization, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement(MQM), on the one hand, and Pakhtuns, backed by the AwamiNational Party (ANP), Balochs, supported by the PakistanPeople’s Party (PPP), Awami Tehreek, and Sindhis, on theother, de-escalated to a limited war. PPP was the ruling partyon both provincial and federal levels. Most of the violenceobserved occurred in Karachi, Sindh’s capital and Pakistan’slargest city and economic hub, where Mohajirs make up themajority. According to official sources, approx. 700 peopledied in targeted killings over the year, among them 170 PPP,150 MQM, and 97 ANP supporters.In January, at least 30 people died in targeted killings inKarachi. Subsequent police and paramilitary search operationsin the area of Teen Hati, Orangi Town, and Liaqatabad onJanuary 30 and 31 sparked heavy protests involving hundredschanting anti-government slogans and blocking roads withburning tires. In response, the police fired tear gas and arrestedat least 50 people. On March 27, the killing of a MQM partyworker and his brother sparked riots. Educational institutions,public transport, and business came to a halt; at least elevenpeople died, more than twenty were injured, and at least 35vehicles were torched in clashes between armed groups. Theday afterwards, the killing of an ANP member intensified unrestand at least fifteen more people had been killed by theend of March. After a police raid on April 1 in the town of Lyari,Karachi, and a visit from President Asif Ali Zardari, local gangsattacked police and PPP activists with rockets and automaticweapons. Seven people, including one PPP member, died. Inlate April, hundreds of families fled their homes when clashesbetween police and militants intensified and 22 people diedwithin four days. Militants used rocket-propelled grenadesand AK-47s. On May 22, a gunman attacked a Awami Tehreekrally, killing at least ten people and injuring 35. Beginning onJuly 17, 38 people fell victim to targeted killings within oneweek. The killing of one MQM provincial assembly member onJuly 30 caused violent uprisings in the following week, leavingapprox. 90 people dead. On November 2, the Tehrik-i-TalibanPakistan [1 Pakistan (Islamist militants)] announced that itwould combat the MQM dominance in the city after the partyhad taken a more pronounced anti-Taliban stance. Over theyear, paramilitary and police forces detained several hundredsuspects and recovered AK-47 assault rifles, pistols, and handgrenades in joint search operations.mpa, hruPakistanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Taliban – tribes)3 Change: 6Start:2001TTP, LI vs. various tribes, TI, Aman Lashkasystem / ideology, subnational predominanceThe conflict over subnational predominance and ideology betweenthe Islamist militant groups Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan(TTP) and the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), on the one hand, and variouspro-government tribal militias, among them Aman Lashkarand Tawheedul Islam (TI), on the other, in the Federally AdministeredTribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province(KP) de-escalated, but remained violent. More than 240 peoplewere killed throughout the year, among them at least twelvetribal elders and pro-government militia leaders. Tribal militias,among them TI, fought alongside the Pakistani army in thewar against the Taliban [1 Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)].On January 20, a tribal elder from the agency of Mohmand,FATA, was shot dead in Peshawar, KP. On May 4, a TTPsuicide bomber killed 24 and injured more than 60 in KharBazaar, Bajaur Agency, FATA, among them two commandersof the local tribal police. After surviving a suicide attack onJune 12 which killed three of his guards, Faheem Khan, chiefof an anti-Taliban militia, and three other people, were foundshot dead in Peshawar, KP, on June 27. TTP claimed responsibility.On November 3, a suicide bomber killed five people inBuner, KP, including Aman Lashkar’s district head Fateh Khan.Pro-government tribal elders were killed in FATA on June 20,July 8, and 15. Clashes between TI and LI continued frequentlyin Tirah Valley, Khyber Agency, FATA. On February 20, a bombkilled at least nine TI fighters. In the subsequent fighting, atleast two LI militants were killed. In late March, TI killed sixLI militants in two separate incidents. Another two LI fighterswere killed in a gunfight between TI and LI on April 6. Over theyear, militants destroyed several schools in FATA and KP. Forexample, militants blew up one girls’ school in Khyber agencyon March 4. On October 9, TTP attempted to kill Malala Yousafzai,a teenage activist from Swat Valley, KP.lrPakistangroups)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(TTP et al. – religious4 Change: 5Start:1985TTP, LeJ, SSP, Jandullah, Fazal SaeedHaqqani group vs. various religious groupssystem / ideology, subnational predominanceThe system and predominance conflict between militant Sunnigroups, among them Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and Jandullah,on the one hand, and various religious minorities, onthe other, escalated. Islamist militants launched attacks andsuicide bombings nationwide. According to a report from the91

Asia and oceaniaPakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 537 people were killed in202 sectarian attacks over the course of the year. Most of thevictims were Shiites but at least four Hindus and four Ahmadiswere also killed.On January 15, alleged LeJ militants detonated an improvisedexplosive device in the midst of a Shiite procession inKhanpur, Punjab province, killing at least eighteen and injuring30 people. On February 17, a suicide bomber killed at least26 people in front of a Shiite mosque in the agency of Kurram,Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). A TTP breakawayfaction led by Fazal Saeed Haqqani claimed responsibility. OnFebruary 27, Jandullah militants stopped a bus in Kohistan,Khyber Pakhtunkha (KP) Province, and killed eighteen Shiiteswhile sparing non-Shiite passengers. Over the following days,police clashed with protestors in Gilgit-Baltistan, the predominantlyShiite region to which the bus was headed. On April3, clashes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims erupted in theregion. Violence started in the city of Gilgit when Sunnis protestingagainst the arrest of one of their leaders who had beencharged with an alleged attack on Shiites, clashed with the police.A hand grenade was thrown into the crowd, killing two andinjuring approx. 30 protestors. In Chilas, protestors killed fourpeople and torched four vehicles. At least ten people werekilled and more than 45 injured in the clashes. In a separateincident on the same day, ten people were killed in an attackon a bus in Chilas. Later that day, police imposed a curfew andthe army was deployed.In the first half of April, at least 27 Shiites were killed inQuetta, Balochistan’s provincial capital. At the same time, Shiiteorganizations staged protests in the major cities of the countryagainst the killings and the government’s lack of protection. OnJune 18, at least four Shiites were killed in a bus in Quetta whena 40 kg car bomb exploded nearby. LeJ claimed responsibility.On August 16, TTP militants forced the passengers of three busesto step out and killed at least twenty Shiites in MansheraDistrict, KP. On September 10, twelve people died in a car bombexplosion at a market dominated by the Shiite Turi tribe in Paranchinar,FATA. TTP was allegedly responsible. On September18, a twin blast killed seven and injured 22 people in Karachi,Sindh’s provincial capital. The victims were from the Shiite DawoodiBohra community. On November 22 in Rawalpindi, Punjab,a TTP suicide bomber killed at least 23 Shiites and injuredmore than 60 other in a Muharram procession, a ceremony especiallysacred to the Shiite community. The same day, seven peoplewere wounded in a TTP attack on a Shiite mosque in Karachi.On November 24, eight people died and at least 30 were injuredwhen TTP detonated ten kilograms of explosives at a Muharramprocession in Dera Ismail Khan District, KP. On December 30, atleast eighteen Shiite pilgrims traveling by bus were killed in aremotely triggered explosion south of Quetta.mpaPakistan – IndiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:Pakistan vs. Indiaterritory, international power1947The conflict between Pakistan and India over internationalpower and the status of the Kashmir region remained violent.Over the course of the year, the contested Line of Control (LoC)served as the battlefield for at least 31 skirmishes betweenthe Indian and Pakistani armies.Between June 11 and 19, two Indian soldiers died andanother five were injured in at least five encounters betweenIndian and Pakistani troops armed with automatic weaponsand mortars. On June 18, the Indian army deployed artillerynear the LoC for the first time in a decade. In several light-armsfirefights between August 6 and 20, two Indian soldiers diedand another three were wounded. Pakistani mortar fire on anIndian outpost wounded one Indian soldier on December 6. Inthe period under review, eighteen additional fire exchangesbetween the conflict parties occurred without inflicting damageon life or property. In the course of the year, the Indian armykilled at least nineteen Pakistani militants who tried to crossthe LoC illegally [1 India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)]. On October 22,India’s Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde accused Pakistan ofassisting the militants.After an avalanche in the Siachen Glacier area near the LoChad destroyed a battalion headquarters and claimed the livesof 140 Pakistani soldiers on April 7, in an informal meetingIndia’s Prime Minister Manhoman Singh offered Pakistan’s PresidentAsif Ali Zardari assistance in rescuing the buried soldiers.On April 18, high-ranking Pakistani military officials proposeda demilitarization of the Siachen area. The day after, India forthe first time successfully test-fired an intercontinental ballisticmissile with an estimated range of 5,000 km. Six dayslater, Pakistan conducted a test of a nuclear-capable missilewith an estimated range of 3,000 km. Bilateral negotiations onthe demilitarization of the Siachen area on June 11 bore noresults. On September 8 in Islamabad, the foreign ministers ofboth countries agreed upon new confidence-building measuressuch as facilitating business visas and expanding cross-LoCtravel for the purpose of tourism and pilgrimage.jmiPapua New GuineaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: (opposition)Start:Papua New Guinea vs. Oppositionnational power2011The national power conflict between the government headedby Prime Minister Peter O’Neill, on the one hand, and theopposition of former Prime Minister Michael Somare and hissupporters, on the other, continued. The conflict emerged followingthe parliament’s appointment of O’Neill as new primeminister during Somare’s hospital stay in Singapore in mid-2011. Although the Supreme Court had declared the appointmentunconstitutional and ordered Somare’s reinstatement on12/12/11, O’Neill continued to be supported by the majorityof the parliament, army, and civil service. In order to bring Somareback to power, retired colonel Yaura Sasa mutinied withtwenty soldiers in the capital Port Moresby on January 26.They took three officers loyal to O’Neill hostage, among themarmy commander General Francis Agwi. The mutiny ended thesame day with the hostages freed and Sasa arrested. On March22, the parliament passed a law empowering the government92

Asia and oceaniato suspend judges of the Supreme Court. The next day, 2,500students marched to the government district, demanding thelaw’s abrogation. Students in Lae, Morobe Province, joinedthem shortly thereafter. On April 5, parliament voted to postponethe upcoming national elections. Five days later, massprotests from several thousand students, in association withworkers and churchmen, forced parliament to revoke the decision.On May 21, three members of the Supreme Court again demandedSomare’s reinstatement as prime minister. Three dayslater, Deputy Prime Minister Belden Namah led a contingentof police officers into the court to arrest Supreme Court ChiefJustice Salamo Injia under charge of sedition. The next day,about 30 police officers loyal to Somare tried to prevent parliamentfrom declaring a state of emergency for Port Moresby.Policemen loyal to O’Neill, however, ended the blockade. OnMay 28, police arrested Supreme Court Justice Nicholas Kirriwom.Two days later, parliament elected O’Neill as prime ministerfor a second time. Finally, after troubled parliamentaryelections from June 23 to July 17 [1 Papua New Guinea (tribalviolence)], O’Neill was chosen and sworn into office as primeminister on August 3.cbrPapua New Guineaprotests)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: (socioeconomicStart:2002landowners vs. employees vs. governmentresources, otherThe resource and labor security conflict between landowners,employees, and the government continued on a violent level.The government continued to grant Special Agricultural andBusiness Leases that so far have transferred over five millionhectares of customary-owned land to foreign companies,whose large-scale logging, gas, oil, and mining projects oftencaused severe environmental damage. The biggest project wasthe Exxon Mobil-led PNG LNG joint venture in the provincesof Southern Highlands and Hela. Local landowners protestedagainst the government and companies, demanding compensationfor land-grabbing and environmental damage. Companyemployees launched strikes and protests over labor andsecurity conditions.On March 6, landowners protested over outstanding PNGLNG payments in the capital’s government district. Fully armedRoyal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) officersused tear gas and fired in the air to disperse the protest. Afew weeks later, landowners’ road blockades and employeestrikes forced PNG LNG to cease work for two weeks. Allegedly,RPNGC squads arrived, burning down houses of landownersand opening fire on workers, killing one and injuring another.Shortly afterwards, the government deployed soldiers to protectPNG LNG and Barrick Gold’s Porgera mine in Enga Province.On May 26, parliament declared a state of emergency inthe capital, Port Moresby, and in Hela and Southern Highlands.To gain compensation, landowners threatened to stop energysupply or close down public facilities. On June 18, landownersstormed a hydroelectric power station in the village of Rouna,Central Province, and cut off power to Port Moresby. On August28, local employees of the Porgera mine protested against securityshortcomings after locals killed two miners. Three dayslater, police ended the protests. In December, Prime MinisterPeter O’Neill declared that state ownership of land would remainunchanged.cbrPapua New GuineaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Various Highland Tribes(tribal violence)Start:1975subnational predominance, resourcesThe conflict over subnational predominance and resourcesbetween various tribes in the highlands of Papua New Guineacontinued on a violent level. Compared to the electionsof 2002 and 2007, violence rose significantly during the 2012parliamentary elections as members of tribes violently supportedtheir favored candidates. During the elections takingplace from June 23 to July 17, the government deployed over2,000 security personnel to the highlands supported by 240troops, six helicopters, and two planes from Australia and NewZealand respectively.At least eighteen people were killed during the pre-electionperiod in the provinces of Chimbu, Enga, Jiwaka, and Easternand Southern Highlands. The violence began on May 23when clashes between candidates’ supporters resulted in twodeaths. A first climax was reached between June 2 and 8, whenmembers of the Kuruka Nega and Hira tribes attacked eachother with assault rifles in Lufa District, Eastern Highlands Province,leaving ten people dead and 50 injured.Violence intensified after polling had commenced on June23, claiming approx. twenty lives. The same day, three to sixpeople were hacked to death near the Murusapa polling stationin the coastal province of Madang. In Hela Province, riotingfrom candidates’ supporters occurred in the villages of Tari,Kelabo, and Kereneba. Houses and cars were looted and ballotboxes destroyed or hijacked. Using warning shots and teargas to disperse mobs, security forces shot a man in Mt. Hagen,Western Highlands, on July 15, and a boy in Womai, Chimbu,the next day. Post-election violence broke out after the declarationof the results. At the end of the month, members of theDagle tribe in Kerowagi, Chimbu, fought against the Kamanekutribe for not having supported their candidate, resulting in injuriesand massive destruction of property.On September 15, unrelated to the elections, fighting overland compensation money broke out between factions of theBazanofi clan in Henganofi District, Eastern Highlands [1 PapuaNew Guinea (socioeconomic protests)]. One man wasshot dead and several injured. Police arrested 40 men. Tribalviolence broke out again on December 7, leaving fifteen deadand several injured from gunshot and bush knives. cbr93

Asia and oceaniaPhilippinesIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Abu Sayyaf / Mindanao)3 Change: Start:Abu Sayyaf vs. governmentsecession, system / ideology1991The secession and ideology conflict between the Islamist AbuSayyaf Group (ASG) and the government remained violent. Violencelinked to ASG militants occurred mainly in the town ofSumisip, Basilan Province, Mindanao, and consisted of attacksand bombings. In addition, ASG resorted to kidnappings forransom, targeting mainly foreigners. The abduction of two Europeanson February 1 raised the number of foreigners heldhostage to ten since the beginning of 2011.On February 2, a USA-backed airstrike killed fifteen membersof ASG and Jemaah Islamiah on Jolo Island, Sulu Province.Soldiers arrested an Abu Sayyaf leader in Zamboanga City, Basilan,thirteen days later. On March 3, two civilians died andthirteen were injured from an improvised explosive devicein a commercial area in the town of Jolo, Sulu. Police linkedthe incident to ASG. On March 15, security forces launchedan operation, supported by helicopters and artillery, againstASG militants in Sumisip. At least four militants and one armyranger died, and three more soldiers were wounded. On April10, one soldier was killed and 26 others wounded when theytriggered ASG landmines in Sumisip. On July 26, army forcesclashed with ASG militants in Basilan, leaving up to nineteenpeople dead and up to 23 wounded. On August 15, soldiersclashed with around 35 suspected ASG militants when theyconducted an area-clearing operation in Basilan. One soldierwas killed and a further three wounded. In another clash inBasilan on September 4, three ASG militants were killed andfour army rangers wounded. The government used artilleryand airstrikes. Three days later, Abu Sayyaf members killedone plantation worker and wounded 36 others in an extortionattempt in Basilan. On September 21, police and militaryforces killed three suspected ASG militants in Zamboanga Citywhile rescuing a Chinese man kidnapped by ASG in 2011. OnOctober 28, soldiers and ASG militants clashed in the villageof Bakong, Sulu. Three soldiers and two militants died and tenother soldiers were injured.aasPhilippines (BIFM, BIFF – MILF,government)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: 5Start:BIFM, BIFF vs. MILF, governmentsubnational predominance2011The conflict between the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement(BIFM) and its military wing the Bangsamoro IslamicFreedom Fighters (BIFF), a breakaway faction of the Moro IslamicLiberation Front (MILF), on the one hand, and the governmentsupported by MILF, on the other, over subnational predominancein the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM) and SOCCSKSARGEN region escalated to a limited war.Throughout the year, BIFM attempted to enforce a Shariabasedjustice system in areas under its control. On June 23,BIFF accused the military of killing one of its members in thecourse of an operation in the province of Maguindanao. In response,over 200 BIFF militants launched attacks on severalarmy outposts and towns in Maguindanao between August 5and 11 using grenade launchers, high-powered firearms, andexplosives. In the course of these attacks, they killed ten soldiers,a police officer, and at least two villagers, set on fire over50 houses, and forced 25,000 to 47,000 residents to flee thearea. In a subsequent counteroffensive approved by MILF, themilitary deployed MG-520 helicopters which fired rockets atthe rebels, killing 80 members of BIFF forces. In two separateattacks on August 12 and 13, BIFF shot dead two security guardsand an army intelligence agent, injuring five others. Afterthe army had captured two enclaves of BIFM on August 14, thelatter injured three soldiers in a retaliatory attack in the townof Guindulungan, Maguindanao, two days later. The next day,soldiers killed six BIFF members in a gun battle and subsequentlycaptured two further camps. In the SOCCSKSARGENRegion, BIFF attacked an army checkpoint in Pikit, North CotabatoProvince, on August 22, killing one civilian and woundingtwo soldiers. The next day, fifteen BIFF militants fired grenadesupon an army detachment near Pikit and shot dead one villager.An ensuing gun battle involving another 100 militantsleft two combatants and one civilian injured. On September 7,BIFM announced after a corresponding agreement with MILFthat it would stop its attacks against the military. In order tomonitor BIFM´s compliance with the agreement, MILF deployeda large number of forces in Maguindanao two days later.However, on September 10, clashes erupted between MILFand BIFM, forcing 40 families to flee the area. On October 18,fighting resumed between dozens of MILF and BIFM members,leaving four combatants dead.prüPhilippinesIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(MILF / Mindanao)2 Change: 6Start:1977MILF vs. governmentsecession, system / ideology, resourcesThe conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),consisting of members of the Bangsamoro ethnic group, andthe government de-escalated to a non-violent level. FromDecember 2011 to November 2012, twelve rounds of peacetalks took place between the government and MILF with majorachievements reached since April. In a meeting in Kuala Lumpuron April 23 and 24, the parties signed an agreement inwhich they identified preliminary principles that would serveas a framework for the eventual signing of a peace agreement.After exploratory talks from October 2 to 7, President BenignoAquino III announced that the government and MILF had successfullydrafted a framework agreement. They decided on thecreation of a new autonomous political entity for MindanaoMuslims, called Bangsamoro, in place of the Autonomous Regionin Muslim Mindanao already in existence. Furthermore,the agreement included wealth-sharing, power-sharing, anda normalization of the relations and was officially signed on94

Asia and oceaniaOctober 15 in Manila. On June 2, government troops arresteda MILF fighter in the town of Malita, Davao del Sur Province,and recovered three firearms. In reaction to the frameworkagreement, clashes between MILF and a breakaway group intensified[1 Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)]. Additionally,the Moro National Liberation Front strongly criticizedMILF for having signed the agreement [1 Philippines (MNLF /Mindanao)].prüSri Lanka (Sinhalese Buddhists,JHU, JVP – Hindus, Eelam Tamils,Muslims, SLMC, Christians)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:TajikistanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: 5The system and subnational predominance conflict betweenthe Sinhalese Buddhist side, along with the monk-led JathikaHel Urumaya (JHU) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),on the one hand, and the Hindu side, consisting of Eelam Tamilsand Tamil Hindus, along with Muslims, supported by theSri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), and Christians, on the other,continued. On April 20, around 2,000 Buddhists, includingmonks, demanded the demolition of a mosque in Dambulla,Central Province, as well as the removal of a Tamil Hindu templein the same area, which was considered by Buddhists to besacred ground. Their claims were backed by JHU, arguing thatthe building of the mosque was unauthorized. Some reportsindicated the fruitless use of incendiary devices and the stormingof the mosque. People were evacuated from the site andnobody was injured. Two days later, the government orderedthe mosque’s relocation, thereby reacting to Buddhists’ threatsto otherwise destroy the building. On April 26, Muslims tookto the streets in Ampara and Batticaloa Districts, Eastern Province,causing the shutdown of many public services. Demonstrationswere halted by the military. On May 30, around 200demonstrators led by several dozen Buddhist monks threwstones at a mosque near the capital Colombo.lsc(Gorno – Badakhshan)4 Change: NEWStart:Start:1977Sinhalese Buddhists, JHU, JVP vs. TamilHindus, Eelam Tamils vs. SLMC, Muslimsvs. Christianssystem / ideology, subnational predominance2012Tolib Ayombekov’s Militia vs. governmentsubnational predominanceA limited war over subnational predominance between themilitia of Tolib Ayombekov and the government erupted in theGorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province. Ayombekov wasconsidered to be involved in human and drug trafficking.On July 21, the government accused Ayombekov and threeothers of killing the regional head of the State Committee onNational Security, Major-General Abdullo Nazarov, in the pro-vincial capital Khorog. On the same day, the government orderedthat Khorog be cut off from communication and set upstreet blockades. Ayombekov, however, denied involvement inNazarov’s killing and refused to surrender to the police. OnJuly 23, aiming at restoring order and establishing full governmentauthority in the semi-autonomous region, a massive militaryoperation involving 3,000 soldiers and ten helicoptersbegan in the region. The following day, Ayombekov’s militiaand soldiers clashed, leaving dead between 47 and 200 onboth sides, including an unknown number of civilians. On July25, the government ordered its troops to cease fire in orderto enable talks on the immediate laying down of all weaponsby Ayombekov’s militia in exchange for amnesty. Since a growingnumber of insurgents had agreed to lay down their arms,on August 1 government forces started to withdraw from theprovince, with the exception of 500 troops scheduled to remainin Khorog. On August 12, Ayombekov and a group ofsupporters reportedly ended their resistance. Ten days later,the ceasefire was broken when special forces allegedly shotone of the militants after he had surrendered. This triggeredmassive protests from inhabitants of Khorog, who demandedthe immediate withdrawal of all soldiers. President EmomaliRakhmon visited the region on September 18. He announcedthat his government will enforce law and order in the futureand curb extremism. On September 29, the government announcedthe allocation of special development funds to stabilizesecurity in the province.sciThailand (Islamist separatists /southern border provinces)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: Start:Islamist separatists vs. governmentsecession, system / ideology1902The secession and ideology conflict in the southern borderprovinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Songkhla remainedhighly violent. Islamist separatists staged near-daily attackson representatives of the central government, including stateofficials, public school teachers, and defense volunteers, aswell as Buddhist monks and civilians, regardless of religiousaffiliation. Over the course of the year, at least 600 peoplewere killed.On February 9, for instance, the detonation of a 30 kg explosivehidden in a vehicle outside a public health office inMuang District, Pattani, left at least one person dead and atleast eleven others wounded. In March, 73 attacks carried outby alleged insurgents left 56 people dead and 547 peoplewounded. In a major incident on March 31, for example, atleast fourteen people were killed and over 500 wounded in aseries of four coordinated bomb blasts in Yala and Songkhla.The army blamed the independence movement Barisan RevolusiNasional. On November 18, in Rueso District, Narathiwat,militants attacked a train, detonating 90 kilograms of explosives.At least three defense volunteers were killed and at leastanother fourteen passengers wounded.In addition to bomb attacks, Islamist separatists repeatedlyclashed with security forces. On January 6, 30 heavily armed95

Asia and oceaniaalleged separatists attacked a defense volunteer base in Rueso,Narathiwat. Two defense volunteers were killed and threeothers seriously wounded. On February 21, seven presumedmilitants ambushed a military checkpoint in Kampung Naprau,Pattani. Three Islamists were killed while at least two paramilitaryrangers were wounded. On April 19, five insurgents of theIslamist militant group Runda Kumpulan Kecil, among them apresumed senior leader, were killed in a shootout with a 100-man squad in Krongpinang District, Yala. On September 5, inRueso, Narathiwat, military forces besieged a suspected militanthideout. After a gunfight which killed one militant, militaryforces detained at least three others.On April 7, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centreadmitted it had held talks with leaders of separatist groups.Nevertheless, it stated that no negotiations were carried out.On April 13, the National Security Council affirmed the continuationof talks with Islamist groups. On September 11, thegovernment extended the emergency decree in Yala, Narathiwat,and Pattani by another three months until December 19.On the same day, over 100 separatists surrendered to authorities.On November 30, the government extended the InternalSecurity Act for Songkhla’s four border districts by anotheryear.halUzbekistanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition)2 Change: 5Start:opposition vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power1991The system and power conflict between the opposition partyThe People’s Movement of Uzbekistan (PMU), formed in2011 by the parties Erk and Berlik as well as other oppositiongroups, and the government continued on a non-violent level.On March 23, the senate approved terms for new presidentialand parliamentary elections which would allow the incumbentPresident Islam Karimov to be re-elected for a fourth time.PMU leader Muhammad Salih and his associates mainly actedfrom exile in Germany and Turkey. On June 30 and July 1, PMUafterwards held its second congress in Berlin, Germany, its firstbeing in 2011 in Prague, Czech Republic. The Youth MovementChulpan, the People’s Political Union For Free Elections, andthe human rights organization Salvation joined PMU. Duringa press conference following the congressional meeting, Salihstated he did not rule out the use of force against the government.astUSA – PakistanIntensity:2 Change: 6Start:2003Conflict parties:Conflict items:USA vs. PakistanotherThe conflict between Pakistan and the USA over violation ofPakistan’s sovereignty by the US de-escalated to a non-violentcrisis. On May 23, Pakistan sentenced Shakil Afridi, a physicianwho conducted a fake vaccination campaign to provide informationleading to the killing of Osama bin Laden on 05/02/11,to 33 years of imprisonment for treason. One day later, a USSenate committee cut the annual aid budget for Pakistan byUSD 33 million. After a cross-border attack on the Pakistaniarmy check post in Salala, Federally Administered Tribal Areas,by NATO troops on 11/26/11, Pakistan closed the supply routesfor NATO forces in Afghanistan [1 Afghanistan (Taliban etal.)]. On May 22, a US Senate panel approved aid cuts to Pakistanby 58 percent if the routes remained closed. After US Secretaryof State Hillary Clinton condemned the losses sufferedby the Pakistani military in the Salala attack on July 3, Pakistanreopened NATO supply routes to Afghanistan. On November29, Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar stated thatmilitary and intelligence ties with the US were fully restored.Throughout the year, Pakistan reiterated that it considered anyunsanctioned US-led drone attack on its territory a violation ofits sovereignty [1 Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. mfu96

The Middle East and Maghreb

the middle east and maghreb: No violent conflict: violent crisis: limited war: war98

the middle east and maghrebThe total number of conflicts in the region of the Middle Eastand Maghreb increased from 65 to 69 in 2012. As in 2011,about two-thirds of the conflicts in the region concerned,among other items, ideology or the orientation of the politicalsystem, while one-third concerned inter alia national power.Also like in 2011, system/ideology was the conflict itemmost violently fought over with seven highly violent conflicts.The conflicts regarding territory and international power werefought at a lower intensity. The overall number of highly violentconflicts decreased from thirteen to nine. In contrast to eightwars in the region in 2011, the toll declined to five in 2012.A new violent opposition conflict emerged in Kuwait, whilethe violent crisis between Bedouns and the government continued.The opposition conflict in Saudi Arabia turned violentwhen police forces broke up a university protest of femalestudents in March. The opposition conflicts in Algeria, Bahrain,Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Morocco continued on the level of a violentcrisis. In Oman, the violent crisis between the governmentand the opposition de-escalated to a dispute. Three of the fivehigh intensity conflicts, which erupted in the course of theArab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, de-escalated to violentcrises [1 Egypt (opposition groups), Tunisia (oppositiongroups), Yemen (opposition groups)]. Following the overthrowof Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, the war over national powerde-escalated, yet remained on the level of a limited war [1 Libya(opposition)]. Simultaneously, a new highly violent conflictover subnational predominance, the orientation of the politicalsystem, and resources erupted between numerous tribes,militias, religious groups, and the government [1 Libya (interfactionalviolence)]. The opposition conflict in Syria continuedon the level of war. Government forces and the Free SyrianArmy (FSA) tried to gain power over strategic cities and mainroutes, employing a significantly higher number of airstrikesand bombings. Since the beginning of the civil war, approx.60,000 people were killed and more than 500,000 refugeeswere registered in neighboring countries.Moreover, violence frequently spilled over into Syria’s regionalneighborhood. In reaction to cross-border incidents, Turkeyincreased its military presence at the border and requestedNATO to deploy patriot missiles. Furthermore, Syrian troopsConflict Intensities in the Middle East andMaghreb in 2012 compared to 2011entered the Demilitarized Zone between Syria and Israel whilepursuing fighters of opposition groups. Following the explosionof mortar shells near an Israeli army post, Israel responded withartillery fire. In North Lebanon, violence erupted as groups supportingthe Syrian government repeatedly clashed with its opponents.The army tried to halt the fights [1 Lebanon (March 14 Alliance- March 8 Alliance)]. In Syria’s northeastern provinces, theKurdish minority protested for more autonomy and took controlover several towns, thus at times clashing with FSA fighters.On the other side of the border, the autonomy conflict inTurkey’s Kurdish areas remained on the level of a war. As in2011, the government launched large-scale military operations,including airstrikes, against the Kurdistan Workers' Party(PKK) in the southeastern provinces and northern Iraq. In Iran,the conflict with the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) deescalatedbut remained violent.In Afghanistan, the war between the Taliban, the Haqqaninetwork, and other militant groups, on the one hand, and thegovernment, supported by foreign troops, on the other, continued.Militants were responsible for the majority of the approx.2,300 civilian casualties in 2012. The number of foreigntroop fatalities decreased to slightly over 400.In Iraq, the war between Sunni militants and the governmentcontinued. The number of fatalities caused by al-Qaedain Iraq (AQI), the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) as well as other militantgroups further increased to 4,500. Areas populated byShiite Muslims and their common festivities remained in thefocus of militant attacks and bombings, which also targetedthe Sunni civilian population and government institutions, publicfigures, officials, and security personnel.Al-Qaeda and several of its militant Islamist affiliates continuedto operate against governments in the Maghreb regionand on the Arabian Peninsula. In Algeria, the conflict betweenthe government and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)remained highly violent. Especially in the Sahara and Sahelzone, the AQIM-affiliated group Movement for Unity and Jihadin West Africa (MUJAO) clashed with security forces closeto the border of Mali [1 Mali (Islamist groups)]. In Tunisia andMauritania, security forces clashed with AQIM and seized weaponsand explosives. In Morocco, the government arrestedFrequency of Conflict Items in 2012 in the MiddleEast and Maghreb by Intensity Groups362012 :2011 :23low Intensity :medium Intensity :high Intensity :281313161381154850371310 0 015176 6313036142140dispute non-violent crisis violent crisis limited war warterritoryautonomydecolonisationsecessionothersystem / ideologyresourcesinternationalpowersubnationalpredominancenational power99

the middle east and maghrebseveral suspected AQIM members. Also, the conflict in Yemenbetween al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Ansaral-Sharia, on the one hand, and the government, on theother, remained on the level of a war, leaving approx. 1,800people dead and causing thousands of refugees. However, thegovernment, supported by tribal fighters as well as the USA,was able to regain control of several large cities held by AQAP.The conflict between Israel and various militant Palestiniangroups operating in the Gaza strip remained on the level of alimited war [1 Israel (Hamas et al./ Palestinian Territory)]. Forthe first time since 1991, rockets reached the areas of Jerusalemand Tel Aviv.100

The Middle East and MaghrebConflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2012Afghanistan (Kuchi nomads –Hazara)Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)Afghanistan - Pakistan*Algeria (AQIM, MUJAO)Algeria (Berbers / Kabylia)*Algeria (opposition groups)*Bahrain (opposition groups)Egypt (Bedouin activists)*Egypt (Islamist groups / SinaiPeninsula)Egypt (Muslims– Christians)Egypt (opposition groups)Egypt – Sudan*Iran (Jundallah/ Sistan-Balochistan)*Iran (opposition groups)*Iran (People’s Mujahideen)*Iran (PJAK / Kurdish areas)Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4Kuchi nomads vs. Hazarasubnational predominance,resources2007 3Taliban, Haqqani network, HIG,various militant groups vs.governmentsystem / ideology, national power 1994 5Pakistan vs. AfghanistanAQIM, MUJAO vs. governmentBerbers vs. governmentopposition groups vs. governmentopposition groups vs. governmentBedouin activists vs. governmentTakfir wal-Hijra, militant groups vs.governmentMuslims vs. Christiansopposition groups vs. governmentEgypt vs. SudanJundallah vs. governmentopposition groups vs. governmentPeople’s Mujahideen vs. governmentPJAK vs. governmentterritory, international power, othersystem / ideology, national powerautonomy, system / ideologysystem / ideology, national powersystem / ideology, national powerothersecession, system / ideologysubnational predominancesystem / ideology, national powerterritoryautonomy, system / ideologysystem / ideology, national powersystem / ideology, national powerautonomy1947198919632011197520041992Iran – Israel*Iran – UAEIran – USA, EU (nuclear program)Iraq (al-Sadr group, Shiite militantgroups)*Name of conflict 1 10119521954195819791993196519794634133333313313Iran vs. IsraelIran vs. UAEIran vs. USA, EUal-Sadr group, Kata’ib Hezbollah,Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Promised DayBrigades vs. governmentsystem / ideology, internationalpowerterritoryinternational powersystem / ideology, national power197919701979200462122Iraq (KRG – Kurdish oppositionmovement)*KRG vs. Kurdish oppositionmovementsystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance201141Iraq (Kurdish RegionalGovernment)*KRG vs. governmentautonomy, resources200533Iraq (opposition movement)*opposition movement vs.governmentsystem / ideology20113Iraq (Sunni militant groups)AQI, ISI, Ansar al-Islam, 1920Revolution Brigades, Sunni militantgroups vs. government, Al-Sahwamilitiasystem / ideology, national power20035Iraq – Iran*Iraq – Kuwait*Israel (al-Fatah – Hamas)Iran vs. IraqIraq vs. Kuwaital-Fatah vs. Hamasterritory, international powerterritory, resourcessystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance196919611994111Israel (Hamas – various Salafistgroups)*various Salafist groups vs. Hamassystem / ideology20072Israel (Hamas et al. / PalestinianTerritories)Hamas, PRC, PIJ vs. governmentsecession, system / ideology19884Israel (Hezbollah)*Israel (PNA/ Palestinian Territories)Hezbollah vs. IsraelPalestinian National Authority vs.governmentsystem / ideologysecession, system / ideology,resources1982194823Israel – Lebanon*Israel vs. Lebanonterritory, international power,resources194862Jordan (Hamas)*Hamas vs. governmentsystem / ideology19941

The Middle East and MaghrebConflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2012Conflict parties 2 Conflict items Start Change 3 Intensity 4Jordan (opposition groups)Kuwait (Bedouns)Kuwait (opposition movement)Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam)*Lebanon (March 14 Alliance –March 8 Alliance)opposition groups vs. governmentBedouns vs. governmentopposition movement vs. governmentFatah al-Islam vs. governmentMarch 14 Alliance vs. March 8Alliancesystem / ideologyothersystem/ideology, national powersystem / ideologysystem / ideology, national power20111960201220061975NEW33313Libya (Federalists / Cyrenaica)government vs. Congress of the Peopleof Cyrenaica and other federalistsautonomy, system/ideology2012NEW3Libya (inter-factional violence)Libya (opposition)Libya (Salafist groups)*Mauritania (AQIM)*Morocco (AQIM)*Morocco (opposition)*Warffallah tribe vs. Zwai vs. Tibutribe vs. Berber ethnic groupsvs. Ethnic Arab settlements vs.El-Mashasha tribe vs. al-Fawatratribe et al.opposition vs. governmentSalafist groups vs. governmentAQIM vs. governmentAQIM vs. government20 February Movement vs.governmentsubnational predominance,resources, othersystem / ideology, national powersystem/ideologysystem / ideology, national powersystem / ideology, national powersystem/ideology, national power201220112011200720032011NEW656443323Morocco (POLISARIO / WesternSahara)POLISARIO, indigenous Sahrawisvs. governmentsecession197562Morocco – Spain (Ceuta and Melilla)*Morocco – Spain (Parsley Island)*Oman (opposition movement)*Morocco vs. SpainMorocco vs. Spainopposition movement vs.governmentterritoryterritorysystem / ideology1956200220114111Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)*Saudi Arabia (AQAP)*Saudi Arabia (oppositionmovement)*al-Houthi rebels vs. governmentAQAP vs. governmentopposition movement vs.governmentsubnational predominancesystem / ideology, national powersystem / ideology20091990199053233Saudi Arabia (Shiites)Syria (Kurdish groups)Syria (NC - KSC)*Syria (opposition groups)Syria – IsraelShiites vs. governmentKDPS, PYD vs. governmentNC vs. KSCopposition groups vs. governmentSyria vs. Israelsystem / ideology, national powerautonomy, subnational predominancesubnational predominance, othersystem / ideology, national powerterritory, international power,resources197919622012201119485NEW33353Syria TurkeySyria – USA*Syria vs. TurkeySyria vs. USAterritory, international powersystem / ideology, internationalpower19462003332Tunisia (AQIM)*Tunisia (opposition groups)AQIM vs. governmentopposition groups vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national powersystem / ideology, national power20112010633Turkey (PKK/ Kurdish areas)Turkey – Iraq*Yemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunnitribal forces)Name of conflict 1 102PKK vs. governmentTurkey vs. Iraqal-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribalforcesautonomyinternational powersubnational predominance1974197920115523Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)*al-Houthi rebels vs. governmentsystem / ideology, subnationalpredominance20043Yemen (AQAP– al-Houthi rebels)*Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)AQAP vs. al-Houthi rebelsAQAP, Ansar al-Sharia vs.governmentsystem / ideologysystem / ideology, national power2010199235Yemen (opposition groups)Yemen (SMM / South Yemen)*opposition groups vs. governmentSMM vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national powersecession201120094331Conflicts marked with * are without description2Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review3Change in intensity compared to the previous year: 3 or 5 escalation by one or more than onelevel of intensity; 4 or 6 deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; no change4Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

the middle east and maghrebAfghanistan (Kuchi nomads –Hazara)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:2007Kuchi nomads vs. Hazarasubnational predominance, resourcesThe conflict between Kuchi nomads and Shiite Hazara over resourcesand subnational predominance in eastern Afghanistancontinued. Kuchi nomads and Hazara disputed over grazingland. The government and the UN intervened diplomatically. OnMay 26, Kuchi nomads allegedly attacked the Hazara-populatedBehsud District, Nangarhar Province, torching schools and houses.On June 3, up to 2,000 Kuchi nomads armed with rocketlaunchers and machine guns launched an attack on the mainlyHazara-inhabited Kajab Valley, Wardak Province. A gun battleraged between the Kuchi nomads and Hazara with Afghan soldiersintervening in order to end the fighting. Casualty numbersranged from three to eleven. A local police chief stated that amosque, four shops, and nineteen houses were destroyed duringthe clashes. Most of the village’s Hazara population fled. Inorder to de-escalate the conflict, President Hamid Karzai andthe UN held talks with representatives of both conflict parties.In May, Karzai met Hazara representatives to discuss their conflictwith Kuchi nomads. In mid-June, UN Deputy Special EnvoyNicholas Haysom met the governor of Wardak, government officials,and Hazara and Kuchi representatives to hold peace talksin the city of Maidan Shar, Wardak.mkuAfghanistan(Taliban et al.)Intensity: 5 Change: Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:1994Taliban, Haqqani network, IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan, HIG, militantgroups vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national powerThe war over national power and the orientation of the politicalsystem between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, theHezb-e Islami, and various other militant groups, on the onehand, and the government, supported by the International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF) and the US-led Operation EnduringFreedom, on the other hand, continued. At the beginningof the year, the Taliban ruled out negotiations with the governmentof President Hamid Karzai, but agreed to meet US delegatesfor peace talks in Doha, Qatar. In March, these negotiationsbetween the US and Taliban failed. The UN imposed sanctionson the Haqqani network and put it on a blacklist in November.A spokesman of Karzai approved that move and stated thatthe Haqqani network did not meet the preconditions requiredto engage in negotiations. By the end of December, militantgroups, including Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami, and members ofthe Higher Peace Council met in Paris to hold peace talks.According to UN figures, from January to October, more than2,300 civilians were killed, mostly by militants. For example, onJune 6, suicide bombers killed some twenty people in Kandaharprovince. On August 14, similar attacks in the provinces of Nimrozand Kunduz left 48 people dead and some 130 wounded.A suicide bomber killed 41 people and injured a further 56 infront of a mosque in the city of Maimana, Faryab Province, onOctober 26. In the capital of Wardak Province, a Taliban suicideattack killed two and injured some 90 on November 23.Militants launched two major attacks in Kabul. In theirfirst major attack upon Kabul, Taliban, allegedly backed bythe Haqqani network, assaulted the parliament building, ISAFheadquarters, and the German and British embassies on April15. The militants were armed with rifles, suicide vests, androcket propelled grenades (RPG). Subsequently, an eighteenhourfight erupted between militants and security personnelsupported by NATO helicopters. Simultaneously, Talibanlaunched assaults in Logar, Paktia, and Nangarhar provinces.According to Karzai, 36 militants, eleven members of securityforces, and four civilians were killed in these interrelatedattacks, constituting the beginning of the Taliban’s spring offensive.On June 21, Taliban fighters armed with machine gunsand RPGs attacked a hotel in Kabul, taking dozens of hostages.Security forces and ISAF troops engaged the militants in atwelve-hour firefight in which at least 22 people died.The number of fatalities among foreign troops throughoutthe year decreased to slightly over 400. Nevertheless, ISAF remaineda focus of militant attacks, which also caused significantlosses among government forces and civilians. In an attackon an ISAF convoy in Khost City on June 20, a suicide bomberkilled 25 people, including three ISAF troops, and injured 30.On September 14, some fifteen militants armed with RPGs, explosives,and automatic rifles attacked the NATO-led Camp Bastionin Helmand Province, killing two US marines and destroyingsix jet fighters. In a further suicide attack on a NATO convoy inKhost province on October 1, fifteen people, among them threeISAF soldiers, were killed and another 53 wounded.In contrast to the large-scale operations prior to 2011, NATOand government forces continued to concentrate on less timeandpersonnel-intensive operations, making more use of precisionairstrikes. For instance, security forces targeted 300 Taliban inFarah province in mid-May, leaving twenty militants and six troopsdead. On June 2, government and ISAF troops conducted anoperation in Helmand province, killing 26 Taliban. Some ten dayslater, Taliban fighters and security forces clashed in Helmand’sSangin District. NATO forces intervened with an airstrike. In thecourse of the incident, twenty Taliban and two members of securityforces died. Beginning on September 28, dozens of policeand security forces backed by ISAF soldiers conducted a six-dayoperationin Wardak Province, thereby killing 30 militants, includingfive Taliban commanders. On October 15, an ISAF airstrike inGhazni Province killed seventeen militants, among them allegedlyfifteen Pakistani nationals. In Logar Province, security forceslaunched an operation involving more than 1,000 troops in lateDecember, killing numerous militants and arresting dozens more.Provinces bordering on Pakistan, especially Kunar and Nurestan,faced major militant attacks, cross-border assaults, andfrequent ISAF airstrikes [1 Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)].Hundreds of militants assaulted two villages in Kamdish District,Nurestan, on June 28, resulting in a gun battle between103

the middle east and maghrebsecurity personnel and militants. In the course of events, anentire village was torched, six policemen, 25 militants, someof Pakistani nationality, and eight civilians were killed. In August,ISAF frequently carried out airstrikes in the eastern provinceof Kunar. In one such incident, an air raid killed eighteenmilitants in Watapur District on August 3. Four days later,twelve militants, half of them Pakistani, died in an airstrike inMarwara District. The most fatal airstrike delivered killed 52militants in Chapa Dara District on August 18.nho, etAlgeria(AQIM, MUJAO)ANP troops killed seven members of AQIM in Bouira and BejaiaProvinces. In December, several small clashes took place inBouira and Boumerdes, leaving six people dead.Throughout the year, security forces disbanded severalsmuggling networks and seized arms in the Sahara-Saheldesert zone. Several high level meetings and security summitsincluding the Member States of the Arab Maghreb Unionwere held in Algiers in order to combine efforts againstAQIM and MUJAO. Moreover, concerns arose that AQIM wascooperating with the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram[1 Nigeria (Boko Haram)].kniIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: Start:AQIM, MUJAO vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power1989Bahrain (opposition groups)Intensity: 3 Change: Start:1975The conflict over national power and the orientation of thepolitical system between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM) and its splinter group Unity Movement for Jihad inWest Africa (MUJAO), on the one hand, and the government,on the other, remained highly violent. In the course of theyear, militants abducted at least seven civilians and one communalguard. For example, AQIM kidnapped the governor ofIllizi Province on January 16. Hours later, Libyan forces freedhim within their own territory.Two bombings in January injured three soldiers and destroyeda railway track. Incidents increased at the border withMali, especially in the course of AQIM incursions into TamanrassetProvince from Mali [1 Mali (Islamist groups)]. For example,security forces clashed twice with AQIM in February, leavingone soldier and ten fighters dead. On January 2, security forceskilled Mohand Ouramdane, al-Qaeda’s key figure in Tizi Ouzou,together with his deputy. In Boumerdes Province, a roadsidebomb detonated on February 19, killing four civilians andwounding at least nine others. Subsequently, security forceslaunched a large-scale operation in the area lasting until theend of the month, killing eleven AQIM fighters. On March 3, aMUJAO suicide bomber attacked police headquarters in theprovincial capital Tamanrasset, injuring 24. In a helicopter-backedoperation near the Malian border, the Algerian NationalArmy (ANP) killed twenty MUJAO members on April 30. Fromlate April to June, roadside-bombings and small-scale attacksby militant groups claimed the lives of at least fourteen securityforces in Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou Provinces. On June 6,security forces killed six AQIM members in Tizi Ouzou. On June15, some 50 fighters attacked police barracks in Ouacifs withmortars and rocket-propelled grenades, killing two officers. InJune, ANP conducted operations in the Kabilya region and closeto the Tunisian border in Tebessa and El Oued Provinces, as aresult of which at least twenty militants and two soldiers werekilled. On July 23, some hundred soldiers backed by helicoptersattacked a MUJAO convoy near Tinzouatine, Tamanrasset, andkilled twelve militants. On August 28, air strikes killed anothersix MUJAO members near the Malian border. In August and October,security forces killed at least 23 AQIM members in nineseparate operations in the provinces of Boumerdes, Jijel, andTizi Ouzou. On October 18, AQIM militants forced two soldiersto leave a civilian bus and executed them. In mid-November,Conflict parties:Conflict items:opposition groups vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national powerThe conflict concerning the orientation of the political systemand national power between opposition groups and thegovernment continued. Whereas the majority of the populationas well as the protesters were comprised of Shiite Muslims,the government was mainly Sunni.Protesters took to the streets nationwide every month, demandinga more democratic constitution, the improvement ofliving and working conditions, and the release of prisoners. Securityforces employed tear gas, water cannons, birdshot, andsound bombs in clashes with the protesters. Fifteen protesterswere killed, around 650 injured and up to 250 detained,among them leading opposition figures. One police officerdied and up to fifty others were injured as protesters hurledstones, Molotov cocktails, and homemade bombs. Leading upto the anniversary of last year’s February uprisings, severalthousand protesters violently collided with security forces inseveral cities. For instance, on January 12, around 3,000 protestersclashed in Manama, riot police injuring several by firingtear gas, rubber bullets, and stun grenades. On February 4,King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa promised strengthened commitmentto reforms as well as the installation of a compensationfund for victims of the unrest. He further announced the implementationof the recommendations made by the BahrainIndependent Commission of Inquiry, set up to investigate theprotest-related violence of 2011. From February 13 to 17,thousands of protesters clashed with increased numbers ofsecurity forces. Five protesters died and up to 250 were injured.In April, tensions further intensified due to the upcomingFormula One Grand Prix to be held in Bahrain that month. Followingclashes with security forces against the backdrop of therace, a protester was found dead on April 21 in a village nearManama. As another example, on April 9, protesters using petrolbombs wounded seven police officers. After Hamad hadapproved amendments to enhance parliament’s competenceson May 3, some thousand protesters demanded further constitutionalreforms the following day. In the following months,clashes between protesters and security forces continued. Thegovernment, on October 30, banned all protest gatherings.Two days later, dozens of protesters demonstrating against the104

the middle east and maghrebban clashed with police in Sanabis and Jidhafs. On November7, authorities withdrew the citizenship of 31 government criticscharged with undermining state security.eluEgypt (Islamist groups / SinaiPeninsula)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:The secession conflict, also concerning the creation of an Islamicstate in the Sinai Peninsula, between Takfir wal-Hijra andother Islamist groups, on the one hand, and the government, onthe other, continued in the North Sinai Governorate. Throughoutthe year, militants launched several attacks on security personnel.On August 5, for example, fighters stormed a checkpointat the border with Israel near Rafah. The militants seized twoarmored vehicles and crossed into Israel. In an ensuing attack,the Israeli Air Force destroyed one of the vehicles. In the courseof events, eight gunmen and sixteen Egyptian soldiers died. Respondingto the incident, the government deployed hundredsof troops and dozens of military vehicles to the Sinai Peninsulafor the first time since 1973. In subsequent operations, militaryforces launched airstrikes and missile strikes against suspectedmilitants in the village of Touma on August 8, killing twentypeople. Four days later, security forces killed five militants andinjured six gunmen in the town of al-Ghora. In a further campaignon September 8, the army attacked militants with tanks,leaving 32 dead and destroying 31 tunnels into the Gaza Strip[1 Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory)]. On September16, Takfir wal-Hijra attacked the security headquarters in thecity of al-Arish with mortar bombs and machine guns in order tofree ten previously detained militants. The same day, militantsclashed with government troops, backed by helicopters and 30armored vehicles, in the town of Sheikh Zuweid, killing one soldier.On November 3, militants killed three police officers andwounded another in al-Arish. The following day, dozens of policemenwent on strike, demanding a stronger military campaignagainst militants.asmEgyptIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: (Muslims – Christians)3 Change: Muslims vs. Christianssubnational predominanceStart:Takfir wal-Hijra, militant groups vs.governmentsecession, system / ideologyStart:19921952The conflict over subnational predominance between Muslimsand Coptic Christians continued on a violent level. As in previousyears, Coptic Christians, the largest non-Muslim minority,faced discriminatory government policies, political and economicmarginalization, as well as sporadic violence, also at thehands of security forces. Following rumors about a love affairbetween a Copt and a Muslim woman, approx. 3,000 Muslimsattacked Coptic homes and shops in Kobry-el-Sharbat, Alex-andria, on January 27. Subsequently, traditional village eldersand the local police reportedly expelled eight Coptic families.As a result of a similar scenario, a Coptic family was orderedby tribal elders, local lawmakers, and security officials to leavethe town of Amriya, Kafr el-Sheikh, on March 21. On June 14,a Muslim was injured by a group of Copts in the capital of LuxorGovernorate, Luxor. As a response, Muslim residents threwrocks at Copts and damaged several of their shops. On July 27,a two-day clash erupted between at least 1,000 Muslims andCopts using firebombs in the village of Dahshur, Giza, leaving aMuslim fatally wounded and forcing dozens of Coptic familiesto flee the village. In the course of the clashes, police forcesprevented a thousand Muslims from storming the village’schurch. Three days later, on August 1, violent clashes betweenhundreds of Muslims and security forces armed with tear gasbroke out again, while Muslim residents torched several Coptichomes and shops. Six people were injured. In response, thegovernment set up a reconciliation committee and compensatedaffected Copts financially. On October 5, President MohamedMursi traveled to the Sinai Peninsula and ordered securitymeasures tightened in Rafah, North Sinai, after an estimatedfifteen Coptic families had fled in response to death threats byIslamists. On October 9, several thousand Copts, accompaniedby Muslim clerics, activists, and liberal lawmakers, marchedthrough Cairo in remembrance of the 09/10/11 military crackdownon a Coptic protest, demanding retribution against thearmy leaders responsible. The country's three Christian Churcheswithdrew from the constitutional assembly on November16, claiming that the draft, published by the Islamist-dominatedpanel, would impose an Islamic state without protectingkey rights of minority groups [1 Egypt (opposition groups)].The new Coptic pope Tawadros II was elected on November4. The absence of President Mursi during the enthronement ofPope Tawadros on November 18 led to disappointment amongCopts. However, the Prime Minister Hisham Qandil attendedthe ceremony and President Mursi congratulated Tawadros onhis installation.skbEgypt(opposition groups)Intensity: 3 Change: 4Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:opposition groups vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power1954The war over national power and the orientation of the politicalsystem between several opposition groups and the governmentde-escalated to a violent crisis.In the parliamentary elections on January 21, the Freedomand Justice Party (FJP), affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood,won 47.2 percent of the vote. On April 10, however, Cairo'sAdministrative Court suspended the assembly. In the wake ofpresidential elections, tens of thousands protested in TahrirSquare, Cairo, on April 13 and 15 against candidates with tiesto the former government as well as the disqualification of oppositioncandidates by the Egyptian Electoral Commission. Allegedgovernment supporters attacked protesters using rocks,clubs, Molotov cocktails, and shotguns, killing at least elevenand injuring hundreds. On May 31, the government lifted the105

the middle east and maghrebstate of emergency after 31 years. On June 19, the governmentdissolved the parliament and amended the constitutionaldeclaration of March 2011, triggering mass protests at TahrirSquare. FJP candidate Muhammad Mursi won the presidentialelection run-offs held June 16 to 18 with 51.73 percent of thevote. On June 30, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces(SCAF) handed over government control to newly elected PresidentMuhammad Mursi.On October 12 and 13, the government’s opponents andsupporters pelted each other with stones, bottles, and petrolbombs in Cairo, leaving over 120 people wounded. On November22, Mursi issued a decree granting himself extensive powers.In response, thousands gathered in Cairo and clashed withpolice forces. In the governorate capital Alexandria, protestersstormed and torched FJP headquarters the following day. Morethan a hundred people were injured in protests across thecountry. Government supporters and opponents clashed onNovember 25 in Cairo and Damanhour, Beheira Governorate,with police forces intervening, leaving two dead and at least 60people injured. In similar clashes throughout December, eightprotesters were killed and hundreds wounded. In response,Mursi annulled the decree on December 8. After a constitutionalreferendum had been scheduled for December 15, violenceerupted between rival factions from December 11 until14 in Cairo, Alexandria, and Asyut, Asyut Governorate, whichleft at least 25 people injured by petrol bombs, shooting, clubs,and stones. In the course of clashes in Alexandria after the firstround of the referendum, 32 people were injured on December21. The next day, the second round concluded with 63.8 percentin favor of the government’s proposal.sepIranIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(PJAK / Kurdish areas)3 Change: 6PJAK vs. governmentautonomyStart:1979The conflict in the Kurdish areas of north-western Iran betweenthe Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) and the government deescalated,but remained violent. The PJAK was considered to belinked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party [1 Turkey (PKK)]. On April25, PJAK forces killed four members of the Islamic RevolutionGuard Corps and wounded another four near the town of Paveh,Kermanshah Province. Reports stated that PJAK fighters also sufferedcasualties in the clash. According to an article published ona pro-Kurdish website on May 6, three prisoners were sentencedto death by a court in the city of Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province,for membership in a Kurdish political party.et, ltoIran – UAEIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:1 Change: Iran vs. UAEterritoryStart:1970The conflict between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)over three islands in the Persian Gulf named Abu Musa, Greaterand Lesser Tunb continued on a non-violent level. Duringthe period of observation, several Iranian politicians visitedthe Gulf Islands, an act which the UAE regarded as deliberateprovocation. On April 11, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejadvisited Abu Musa. It was the first time that an Iranianhead of state had ever visited the island. The next day, the UAErecalled their ambassador from Iran's capital Tehran. In Apriland May, Iranian members of parliament and the commanderof Iran´s Revolutionary Guard also visited the three islands.The UAE cancelled a soccer match with Iran in April and threemonth later called upon UAE soccer clubs to no longer signIranian players. In September, at the UN General Assembly, theUAE Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the international communityto urge for the settlement of the island dispute andclaimed full sovereignty over the islands. On October 9, Iranianmedia reported that Iran considered ending diplomatic tieswith the UAE if they did not abstain from their claim of sovereigntyover the three islands. The same day, the state-ownedmedia denied that Iran took such steps into consideration. InNovember, in order to underline its authority over the disputedislands, Iran announced its intention to heighten its navalpresence in the Gulf.jbaIran – USA, EUIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2 Change: (nuclear program)Iran vs. USA, EUinternational powerStart:1979The non-violent crisis over Iran’s nuclear program betweenIran, on the one hand, and the USA and the EU, on the other,continued. Whereas Iran underlined that the program servedcivil purposes, the US, EU, and Israel suspected Iran of developingatomic weapons. The IAEA repeatedly reported on Iran’sincreasing capacities and progress in uranium enrichment. TheUS and EU imposed sanctions and the US and Israel threatenedwith the possibility of military strikes [1 Iran - Israel]. Iran threatenedin turn to close the Strait of Hormuz, an important oilshipping route. On January 23, three days after an IAEA report,US imposed sanctions on several banks, while EU member statesbanned all Iranian oil imports as of July 1. On February 16,Iran expressed its willingness to resume negotiations with thefive members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1),led by EU chief diplomat Catherine Ashton. However, Iran continuedwith its uranium enrichment. Iran and the P5+1 met severaltimes between April and July. In June, Iran offered to halturanium enrichment in exchange for nuclear fuel with whichto run its reactors, but negotiations failed. Iran subsequentlyannounced plans to build a nuclear-powered submarine. OnJuly 1, the US imposed new sanctions. Two days later, the Iranianparliament passed a draft bill closing the Strait of Hormuz.On November 16, the IAEA reported again that Iran had advancedits uranium enrichment pace and capacities.In the course of the year, Iran conducted various militaryexercises in the Persian Gulf. As a result, The US and EU deployedwarships, aircraft carriers, and mine-countermeasureships to the Persian Gulf. Several Cyber-attacks against Iranian106

the middle east and maghrebindustrial and nuclear enrichment facilities also occurred. Iranrepeatedly accused the US, Israel, France, and Germany of sabotage,espionage, and the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists.In July, Iran stated that it could hit every US base in the region.On November 1, Iranian jets opened fire on a US drone, accusingthe US of violating its airspace.florIraq(Sunni militant groups)Intensity: 5 Change: Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2003AQI, ISI, Ansar al-Islam, 1920 RevolutionBrigades, Sunni militant groups vs.government, Al-Sahwa militiasystem / ideology, national powerThe war over national power and the orientation of the politicalsystem between al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni militantgroups on the one hand, and the government supportedby the Sahwa militia, on the other, continued. Militant Sunnisperceived their political and economic interests as well as theirreligious views to be underrepresented in the political systemand the predominantly Shiite government. In the course of theyear, the number of fatalities caused by militants slightly increasedto over 4,500. Authorities frequently blamed AQI andaffiliated Sunni militant groups. Many attacks took place in thepredominantly Sunni provinces of Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, andSalah ad-Din, as well as in Baghdad. Additionally, frequent attackswere carried out in the mainly Shiite provinces of Babil,Basra, and Dhi Qar, targeting religious festivities in particular.Besides Shiites, militants focused on Christian, Kurdish, andShabak minorities.On January 5, for instance, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) detonatedfive bombs in predominantly Shiite districts of Baghdad,leaving at least 24 dead and 66 wounded. The same day,a suicide bomber attacked Shiite pilgrims, killing at least 46and injuring at least 80 in the area of al-Badha, Dhi Qar. Thegovernment had previously deployed more than 30,000 securityforces to the area in order to protect pilgrims. In a furtherattack near Basra on January 14, militants killed 63 pilgrimsand injured 130. On February 23, militant assaults in morethan fifteen cities left at least 55 dead and hundreds injured.Four bombings targeted Shiites celebrating the anniversary ofthe death of a Shia Imam in Baghdad, killing 25 and woundingmore than 70 on June 4. On the deadliest day since the USwithdrawal in December 2011, militants killed a total of 93and wounded 260 in car bomb, mortar, and suicide attacks inall provinces affected by the conflict on June 13. Both civiliansand security forces were among the fatalities. One bomb hitthe headquarters of the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, MassoudBarzani. Three days later, ISI claimed responsibility for the attacks.The same day, two car bombs targeting Shiite pilgrimsin Baghdad killed 32 and wounded 68. On July 3, militants setoff a huge truck bomb in a popular market in Diwaniya, Qasidiyahprovince, leaving 40 people dead and 75 wounded. AfterAQI had announced an offensive, militants killed at least 107people and wounded 268 others in some 40 bomb and gunattacks in Baghdad, among other places, as well as in the predominantlyKurdish cities of Mosul and Kirkuk on July 23. BetweenAugust and December, militants orchestrated numerouslarge-scale coordinated attacks mainly on Shiites in severalprovinces on a monthly basis. Each assault left dozens deadand wounded.Militants also frequently targeted security forces, politicians,and other public figures. On January 15, at least six gunmenstormed a police station in Ramadi, Anbar, and detonatedthree explosive belts. The explosions and the subsequentfight with police officers left ten dead and eighteen wounded.On March 5, AQI gunmen, posing as special forces, detainedand killed two senior officers and attacked several securitycheckpoints in Haditha, Anbar. In the course of events, 27 policemenand three assailants died. One June 13, a twin bombblast in the city of Hilla, Babil, targeted a restaurant frequentedby policemen, killing 21 people. In a prison break in Tikriton September 27, militants set off a car bomb in front of themain gate and took temporarily control of the prison. At leasttwelve security forces were killed and 65 wounded, while 47suspected AQI members and 43 other inmates escaped. OnNovember 6, militants targeted recruits waiting outside anarmy base in Taji, Baghdad, with a car bomb, killing at least 27and injuring 40.valIsraelIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(al-Fatah – Hamas)1 Change: Start:1994al-Fatah vs. Hamassystem / ideology, subnational predominanceThe dispute between the secular Palestinian National LiberationMovement (al-Fatah) and the Islamic Resistance Movement(Hamas) over system and subnational predominance in thePalestinian Territories continued. The conflict revolved aroundthe reconciliation process and the formation of a unity government.On February 6, al-Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas and Hamasleader Khaled Meshaal signed an accord in Doha, Qatar,over the creation of an interim government run by Abbas whichwould oversee the formation of a unity government. Consequently,the parties issued a statement to the effect that aninterim government line-up would be announced by February18. In the following weeks, both parties repeatedly met, butdid not bring the agreement into effect. Furthermore, Hamasnamed several terms that should be fulfilled before fully consentingto the agreement. Amidst paused talks, supporters ofboth parties gathered at a demonstration in Nablus on March22, emphasizing their longing for unification. On March 30, securityservices in Gaza reportedly arrested some 80 al-Fatahmembers. On May 20, a further agreement was signed in Cairo,Egypt, as part of the broader reconciliation pact intended tobring both parties closer to joint elections. On May 28, Hamasallowed the Central Elections Committee to start updating thevoters’ lists. One week later, senior leaders from both sidesmet to discuss nominations for prime minister of the interimgovernment. On July 2, however, Hamas stopped voter-registrationin Gaza in protest against anti-Hamas security measures107

the middle east and maghrebby al-Fatah in the West Bank. Hamas also boycotted the municipalelections in the West Bank on October 20, which markeda victory for al-Fatah despite a low turnout. Hamas and al-Fatahannounced mutual solidarity as well as efforts to stage reconciliation-meetingsin the course of the war in Gaza commencingNovember 14 [1 Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory)]. OnNovember 25, Hamas consequently announced its intention torelease all al-Fatah prisoners.emaIsrael (Hamas et al. / PalestinianTerritories)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:4 Change: Start:Hamas, PRC, PIJ, Army of Islam vs.governmentsecession, system / ideology1988The conflict over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian statebetween the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and otherIslamist militant groups operating in Gaza, on the one hand,and the government, on the other, continued at the level of alimited war. Hamas and other militants repeatedly launchedQassam rocket attacks on the Southern District throughout theyear, with a peak in launches in November, prompting a massiveIsraeli air offense. In mid-February, militants fired five rocketsinto Israel without causing injury or damage, after whichIsrael retaliated by striking several targets in Gaza. On February18, Israeli helicopters attacked members of the al-Qassam Brigades,the military wing of the Hamas movement, woundingseven Palestinians. In March, the fighting intensified as militantsfired hundreds of rockets at Israel. The Israeli Air Force(IAF) conducted some twenty airstrikes against rocket launchingcells and militants, killing 24 Palestinians and wounding68. Among the dead was the Popular Resistance Committee’s(PRC) leader, Zuhair Qaisi. On March 12, both sides agreed to aceasefire mediated by Egypt.In June, hostilities erupted again when militants fired atleast 300 rockets into southern Israel over the course of severaldays in response to Israeli air attacks on militant targets. Atleast fifteen Palestinians and militants linked to a Salafi groupsympathetic to al-Qaeda died in various air attacks, while fiveIsraelis were wounded. On June 18, militants killed one Israeliworker with a roadside bomb along the border to Egypt. A fewhours later, Israeli forces shot two militants allegedly involvedin the attack. Later on, a truce mediated by Egypt was unofficiallydeclared, however this was broken by repeated rocketfire and retaliatory strikes. On September 5, militants fired severalrockets into Israel, prompting an air strike that killed threeof the militants. A day later, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) attackedmilitants attempting to place a bomb on the Gaza border,leaving three dead. During October rocket fire intensified oncemore. On October 8, militants fired over 50 rockets into Israel,while the IDF responded with air strikes and tank fire, woundingfive Palestinians. On October 24, 80 rockets and mortarshells fired by militants hit the western Negev, severely woundingtwo Israeli workers. The same day, an Israeli airstrike onthe Gaza Strip killed four Palestinians and injured ten others. Atruce was agreed upon a day later.In November, the heaviest fighting broke out since “OperationCast Lead” in 2008. On November 10, four soldiers wereinjured in their jeep by an anti-tank missile fired from the GazaStrip. The IDF retaliated with tank fire and helicopter strikes,killing four Palestinians and injuring at least 25 others. A daylater, militants fired a barrage of approx. one hundred rocketsinto Israel, wounding three people.On November 14, the IAF killed Hamas Military Chief Ahmedal-Jabari. Consequently, Palestinian militant groups firedmore than 1,500 rockets at Israel within seven days, damaginghomes, schools, and other civilian areas, killing five Israelis andwounding another 240. Some rockets reached the Tel Aviv andJerusalem areas for the first time since the Gulf War of 1991. Inresponse, IDF launched “Operation Pillar of Defense” with themain goal of disempowering militants and their infrastructurein the Gaza Strip. In the course of the operation, IDF attackedmore than 1,500 targets, including command centers, weaponmanufacturingand storage facilities and approx. one thousandunderground rocket launchers. At least 160 Palestinians werekilled, with another 1,235 people wounded. On November 21,Egypt announced that a cease-fire had been reached. The trucelargely held, despite an attack on a central Tel Aviv bus on thesame day that resulted in 28 people being injured. It was thefirst such attack in the city since 2006. Two days later, policearrested a man allegedly connected to the Hamas and IslamicJihad militant groups.hlIsrael (PNA / PalestinianTerritories)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:1948Palestinian National Authority vs.governmentsecession, system / ideology, resourcesThe conflict between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)and the government centering on the creation of a sovereignPalestinian state continued. There were no serious attempts toresume peace talks and return to negotiations and the governmentcontinued to expand settlements in the West Bank. OnJune 6, for instance, the government announced the buildingof 851 new homes, which PNA condemned as prejudicing thefinal status issue. In reaction to massive Palestinian protest,PNA President Mahmoud Abbas canceled a planned meetingwith Vice Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz regarding means of resumingpeace talks on June 29. On November 29, the UN GeneralAssembly recognized Palestine with a majority vote as a nonmemberstate. Consequently, the government announced thebuilding of 3,000 new housing units across the West Bank anddecided to seize PNA tax revenues.Throughout the year, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conductedarrests across the West Bank on a regular basis. The numberof arrests increased while the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure,houses, and villages in areas under governmentalcontrol continued unabated. On February 21, Palestinian prisonerKhader Adnan ended a 66-day hunger strike against hisviolent arrest and conditions of detention. His release on April17 triggered a mass hunger strike of up to 2,500 other Pales-108

the middle east and maghrebtinians in Israeli prisons, which only ended on May 15 afterboth parties had reached a deal. On March 27, IDF conducteda raid in Rammun. According to government sources, they shotand injured three Palestinians, one of them fatally, after beingattacked with knives. Three days later, Palestinians protestingagainst the expropriation of land in the occupied territoriesclashed with IDF during demonstrations across the West Bank.In the course of further widespread Palestinian demonstrationsdemanding the right to return for refugees, IDF injured over 80protesters in clashes on May 15.Between November 15 and 21, the war in Gaza sparked solidaritydemonstrations across the West Bank [1 Israel (Hamaset al. / Palestinian Territory), Israel (al-Fatah - Hamas)]. In orderto disperse these protests, IDF fired live ammunition, killingthree protesters and injuring 65 more, detaining 120 othersin turn. On December 6, some 250 Palestinian residents of Hebronattacked IDF forces with stones after the attempted arrestof a PNA policeman, injuring one soldier. In turn, IDF fired rubberbullets and threw stun grenades and tear gas, woundingtwenty Palestinians. On December 12, IDF shot dead a Palestinianat a checkpoint near Hebron. His death under such controversialcircumstances led to mass protests with thousandsof participants. Demonstrators threw stones and bottles at thelocally deployed soldiers, who responded with tear gas andrubber bullets, leaving five Palestinians injured.eolJordanIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition groups)3 Change: Start:IAF, Salafists, opposition groups vs.governmentsystem / ideology2011The conflict between various opposition groups, including theMuslim Brotherhood as well as the newly established NationalFront for Reform, and the government over the political systemcontinued. Throughout the year, large demonstrations protestingagainst socioeconomic shortcomings and demanding democraticreforms took place in the capital Amman and other cities. Thelargest protests occurred on March 31 in Amman where policereportedly beat protesters, on October 5, with up to 15,000 participants,and on November 30, attracting some 7,000 demonstrators,respectively. On October 4, King Abdullah II dissolvedparliament and later scheduled new elections for 2013, the firstto be held under a newly amended election law. While the lawincluded several concessions such as parliamentary election ofthe prime minister and the casting of an additional ballot for aparty list, the opposition declared the reforms to be insufficient.On November 13, the government announced the lifting offuel subsidies. The measure sparked mass protests targetingthe king himself on an unprecedented level during the followingweek. Several thousands took to the streets in all twelvegovernorates, police temporarily detaining some 150 protesters.Hours after the announcement, some 500 demonstratorshurled stones at riot police aiming to prevent a sit-in near theinterior ministry in central Amman, also setting tires and garbagecontainers ablaze. Police fired tear gas in response. In Salt,Balqa Governorate, dozens of protesters demanding the primeminister’s resignation tried to storm his residence. However, riotpolice using tear gas and water cannons broke up the rally. Inthe governorate capital of Maan, demonstrators shot in the airduring a confrontation with riot police, wounding one officer.Gatherings remained violent the next day when protesters armedwith automatic weapons stormed police stations in Irbidand Amman’s Shafa Badran suburb, injuring thirteen policemen,one of them fatally. One of the assailants also died in an ensuingfirefight with security forces and another four demonstratorswere wounded. Protesters smashed shop windows and torchedbuildings in the governorate capitals of Karak and Tafila, and acivil affairs office in Salt. Several protesters burned pictures ofAbdullah II and called for the government's resignation. Afterthe rioting had subsided, the conflict de-escalated and therewere no violent outbreaks until the end of the year. asuKuwaitIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Bedouns)3 Change: Bedouns vs. governmentotherStart:1960The conflict between Bedouns, stateless Arabs, demanding civilrights and citizenship and the government continued. Meaning“without”, the Arabic word “bedoun” is used to designatethose without nationality within Kuwait. Although the governmentwarned Bedouns that participants of demonstrationswould forfeit their chances of naturalization, Bedouns protestedin al-Jahra Governorate, mainly in the cities of Taima' andSulaibiya, over the course of the year. Security forces repeatedlydispersed demonstrations using batons, tear gas, watercannons, sound, and smoke bombs. For instance, on January6, at least 4,000 Bedouns demonstrated, holding Kuwaiti flagsand pictures of Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabahaloft. One week later, security forces dispersed a demonstrationof approx. 2,000 Bedouns, wounding several and arrestingmore than 50. Bedouns in turn threw stones, wounding up to21 policemen. On October 2, hundreds of Bedouns protestedin Taima'. Police forces broke up the demonstration, injuring atleast two protesters and arresting 23. In the course of the year,some 230 Bedouns were charged with staging illegal demonstrations.The government made some concessions and announcedthe possible naturalization of thousands of Bedouns,though this did not satisfy the protesters.sulKuwaitIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition movement)3 Change: NEWStart:2012opposition movement vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national powerA violent crisis between the opposition movement and thegovernment erupted. The opposition demanded democraticreforms, especially an elected prime minister and the legalizationof political parties, as well as an end to corruption. EmirSheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah’s decrees of Decem-109

the middle east and maghrebber 2011, which dissolved parliament and announced newelections respectively, were declared unconstitutional by theconstitutional court on June 20. Therefore, the parliamentaryelections held on February 2, in which the opposition had gaineda majority, were also rendered invalid. The court dissolvedthe new parliament and reinstated its predecessor. Until mid-October, thousands of protesters staged demonstrationsagainst the ruling and the government's plans to change theelectoral law.Violence erupted for the first time on October 15. Whenabout 5,000 citizens started marching near the National Assemblyin Kuwait City, security forces beat demonstrators with batons,injuring at least four and arresting just as many others.Protesters threw stones and bottles, wounding several policemen.Four days later, the emir announced new elections on December1 and altered the election law by decree. Claiming thatthe reform put them at a disadvantage, the opposition called fora boycott of the forthcoming poll. On October 21, more than20,000 protested in Kuwait City. Security forces using rubberbullets, tear gas, stun grenades, and batons clashed with thedemonstrators. Eleven policemen and scores of protesters werewounded, and more than fifteen arrested. Subsequently, thegovernment forbade gatherings of more than twenty people. OnOctober 31, security forces attacked some 2,000 protesters demonstratingagainst the detention of leading opposition figureMussallam al-Barrak next to Central Prison in Sulaibiya, al-JahraGovernorate. According to the government, the rioters blockedstreets and assaulted police forces with stones and bottles. Furthermore,drivers tried to run over members of the specialforces, injuring five. On November 3, the government announcedits intention to make use of all necessary means to prevent theopposition from staging unauthorized protests. The next day,however, several thousand citizens protested in Mischref, HawallyGovernorate. Intervening security forces arrested up to 70people and injured around eighteen demonstrators. Protestscontinued both before and after the December 1 elections,which were boycotted by the opposition.sulLebanon (March 14 Alliance -March 8 Alliance)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:1975March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliancesystem / ideology, national powerThe conflict over national power and the orientation of the politicalsystem between the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance, ledby the Future Movement and the Christian Lebanese Forces, onthe one hand, and the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance, mainly consistingof Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the AmalMovement, on the other, continued. In the course of the conflict,groups of Salafis also engaged in fights against Hezbollah.On February 2, the UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanonannounced that the trial investigating the murder of formerprime minister Rafik al-Hariri would be held in absenceof the accused Hezbollah members. In July, the starting datefor the trial was set for March 2013. Clashes between governmentsupporters, mostly Alawites, and opponents, mainlySunni Muslims, intensified especially in Tripoli in the courseof increasing spillover effects of the civil war in neighboringSyria [1 Syria (opposition groups)]. On February 10, hundredsdemonstrated against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli,North Lebanon, and clashed with Assad supporters. Inensuing fights between Sunnis and Alawites, two were killedand at least eight injured, including several soldiers. In the aftermathof an assassination attempt on Lebanese Forces Partyleader Samir Geagea on April 4, the coalition accused March 8of the attack. Throughout May, Alawites and Sunnis repeatedlyclashed in Tripoli, using guns and rocket-propelled grenades.Between May 12 and 14, fighting erupted after the arrest of aprominent Sunni cleric, leaving five people dead and twentyinjured. Appeals from the army and politicians, as well as religiousleaders, to bring an end to the fighting failed.On May 20, soldiers killed an anti-Assad cleric at a Lebanesearmy checkpoint in Akkar, North Governorate. Subsequently,protestors blocked roads in Akkar. Ensuing clashes betweenthe Future Movement and the pro-Syrian Arab Movement Partyin Beirut left three dead and eighteen injured. After a two-daystruggle between Sunnis and Alawites involving assault rifles,grenades, machine guns, and mortar bombs which left fourteendead and 52 wounded, the government reinforced its troopsin Tripoli on June 3. Nevertheless, clashes between Sunnisand Alawites from August 20 to 24 involving gun and grenadefire claimed the lives of at least fifteen people and woundeda further 120, among these eleven soldiers. On October19, Wissam al-Hassan, a March 14-affiliated head of a branchof the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, and eight other individualswere killed in a car bomb attack in Beirut. March 14accused the March 8 Alliance and the Syrian government of responsibility.The same day, Prime Minister Najib Mikati offeredto resign from office as March 14 had repeatedly demanded.President Michel Suleiman, however, rejected the proposal. Inthe following days, March 14 supporters held demonstrationscondemning the bombing, but were dispersed by army gunfire,wounding two demonstrators. Further fighting between thegroups in Tripoli left three more people dead on October 20. Asa result of the fatal clashes in Beirut and Tripoli, the army increasedits presence. By the end of October, March 14 announcedits intent to use all necessary legal means to bring down thegovernment. On November 12, four people were killed andseven wounded in fighting between Hezbollah membersand supporters of Salafi leader Ahmad al-Assir in Sidon, SouthGovernorate. The killing of 21 Lebanese Sunni fighters inHoms, Syria, in late November sparked new clashes betweenSunni and Alawite gunmen in Tripoli. The confrontations lastedfor two days and left at least six people dead as well as dozensinjured by December 6.rl, yalLibyaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Federalists / Cyrenaica)3 Change: NEWStart:2012government vs. Congress of the People ofCyrenaica and other federalistsautonomy, system / ideologyA violent conflict over autonomy and the orientation of the110

the middle east and maghrebpolitical system erupted between pro-federalist forces in theeastern region of Cyrenaica and the central government. Afterpast year’s downfall of Muammar al-Qaddafi, Cyrenaicansdemanded the National Transitional Council (NTC) to reintroducethe constitution of 1951 that had granted autonomy tothe three regions of Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania. OnMarch 6, about 3,000 delegates gathered for the Congress ofthe People of Cyrenaica in Benghazi. They declared the creationof a semi-autonomous region of Cyrenaica and formed aSupreme Transitional Council under Sheikh Ahmed al-Zubairal-Senussi. The leader of the NTC, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, announcedafterwards that the interim government would defendthe unity of Libya, even with force. However, Jalil calledon Cyrenaican leaders to join a dialog about preserving nationalunity on March 7 and clarified that he did not intendto use military force against pro-federalists. On March 16, aweek after demonstrations against federalism in Tripoli andBenghazi, federalists and anti-federalists clashed in Benghazi,leaving five people injured. On May 3, the Supreme TransitionalCouncil called for a boycott of the following month'sconstituent assembly elections, rejecting the transition planset out by the interim authorities. Pro-federalists blocked themain highway between Tripoli and Benghazi before the nationalpoll, demanding an even number of seats for all threeregions. About 300 pro-federalists stormed election offices inBenghazi as well as in Tobruk, burned election material anddestroyed computers. The next day, pro-federalists blockedseveral oil ports to protest against the election, cutting approx.half of the country’s oil exporting capacity. On July 5,the NTC passed a law granting equal representation for allTripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica regions in the constituentauthority. During the elections for the General National Congress,approx. a thousand people demonstrated in Benghazi,demanding more autonomy.ajeLibya(inter - factional violence)Intensity: 4 Change: NEWStart:Conflict parties:Conflict items:2012Warffallah tribe vs. Zwai vs. Tibu tribe vs.Berber ethnic groups vs. Ethnic Arabsettlements vs. El-Mashasha tribe vs.al-Fawatra tribe et al.subnational predominance, resources, otherFollowing the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi, a highly violentconflict over subnational predominance, the orientation ofthe political system and resources erupted both between tribesand militias as well as within the respective factions. On oneside, tensions arose due to old rivalries, on the other side theywere closely connected to the fact that the conflict parties hadstood on opposing sides in the 2011 civil war [1 Libya (opposition)].During 2011, the availability of weaponry for militantgroups increased significantly. Several militant groups repeatedlyused heavy weapons in the course of the year.On February 13, clashes over control of territory betweengunmen from the Zwai tribe and members of the Tibu ethnicgroup began in the city of Al Kufrah. In response to the ongoingclashes, the government sent the national army on February18 to stop the fighting, but they met with limited success. Ultimately,negotiations between tribal elders temporarily endedmajor fighting. More than 130 people were killed and half of thecity´s population was displaced. On March 26, clashes eruptedin Sabha between former rebel fighters from Sabha and gunmenfrom the Tibu tribe. The government sent approx. 3,000soldiers to the area. Two days later, the fighters negotiated atemporary ceasefire but fighting broke out again. Subsequently,tribe representatives and government officials, among themPrime Minister Abdurraheem al-Keib, brokered a new ceasefire.Within one week of fighting, some 150 people had reportedlydied and approx. 400 people were injured.From April 2 to 6 in the Western town of Zuwarah, al-Nuqatal-Khams, members of the Berber ethnic minority, who had opposedQaddafi in 2011, clashed with members of the Arab settlementsof al-Jumail and Regdalin, some of whom had backedthe former leader. Fighting included large caliber weapons andleft at least eighteen people dead and hundreds injured.On June 12, members of the El-Mashasha tribe, a militiaformerly loyal to Qaddafi, and rebel fighters of Zintan clashedsouthwest of Tripoli for three days, using heavy weapons, suchas Grad rockets, and caused at least fourteen fatalities. A fewdays later, the army sent troops to intervene. Breaking a previouslynegotiated ceasefire, the incessant violence caused over100 casualties. Subsequently, the area was declared a militaryzone. On August 23, heavy clashes between the rival tribes al-Haly and al-Fawatra occurred near Zlitan, leaving three peopledead and eight injured. On December 17, the governmentannounced emergency law in the southern regions Ghadames,Ghat, Obari, Al-Shati, Sebha, Murzuq, and Kufra.Besides tribal violence, rival militias clashed several timesthroughout the year. For instance, on June 4, hundreds of al-Awfea Brigade members drove on approx. 60 armed pickuptrucks onto the tarmac of Tripoli's International Airport, bringingair traffic to a halt. Subsequently, clashes broke out when militiagroups from Tripoli and Zintan arrived at the site, allegedly tryingto convince them to lay down their weapons.selLibya(opposition)Intensity: 4 Change: 6Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:opposition vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power2011The conflict over national power and the orientation of the politicalsystem between opposition groups and the National TransitionalCouncil (NTC) de-escalated to a limited war. On the onehand, supporters of former ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi, killed on10/20/2011, tried to regain national power. On the other hand,protesters repeatedly demanded democratic reforms and moretransparency concerning the government's work. In July, theNTC transferred power to the General National Congress (GNC).Former Qaddafi supporters frequently targeted governmentalbuildings and officials, while the government conducted severalmilitary operations in return. The areas most affected werethe districts of Benghazi, Tripoli, al-Jabal al-Gharbi, as well BaniWalid, a former stronghold of al-Qaddafi in Misrata district.On May 13, an armed group killed Khaled Abu Saleh in Ob-111

the middle east and maghrebari, the capital of Wadi al-Hayaa district, after he had registeredas candidate for the national assembly elections. On August 19,three car bombs exploded near governmental buildings in Tripoli,killing at least two people and injuring several others. Subsequently,authorities arrested 32 Qaddafi loyalists. On September25, the government issued a ten-day ultimatum, whichrequested Qaddafi loyalists to hand over the murderers of OmranShaban who had given away Qaddafi´s hideout in October2011. After the ultimatum had expired, pro-government militiasand Qaddafi loyalists clashed on October 8. Three combatantswere killed and seven injured.Throughout the year, pro-Qaddafi militias repeatedly announcedthat Bani Walid was under their control. In response,on October 18, the government sent several thousand troops tolay siege to the city in order to oust Qaddafi loyalists from thecity with the help of pro-government militias and tribal fighters.Both rocket-propelled grenades and anti-aircraft weapons wereused during the fighting. The clashes killed at least 26 people,injured hundreds and forced tens of thousands to flee. By October24, the army had seized control of the city.Throughout the year, protesters demanded further democraticreforms, safer living conditions, and the dismissal ofthe representatives of the former government [1 Libya (interfactionalviolence)]. Additionally, they protested against continuousviolent clashes.On January 21, for instance, hundreds of protesters demandedmore transparency from the NTC and the discharge of formerQaddafi officials in Benghazi. A crowd of protesters threwstones and metal bars at NTC headquarters, prompting securityforces to fire teargas.kaeMoroccoSahara)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(POLISARIO / Western2 Change: 6POLISARIO vs. governmentsecessionStart:1975The conflict over the secession of Western Sahara betweenthe Popular Front of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra andRio de Oro (POLISARIO) and the government de-escalated.The ninth round of unofficial UN-brokered negotiations betweenPOLISARIO and the government was held in Manhasset,USA, between March 11 and 13. Delegations from Algeria andMauritania were also present. The talks ended at an impasse,both sides continuing to reject the other’s respective proposalsconcerning future negotiations. In contrast to the governmentoffering Western Sahara autonomy, POLISARIO insistedon a referendum in the region, including the option of independence.However, both parties reiterated their willingnessto collaborate with the UN and initiated talks over de-mining,natural resources, and the environment. On April 30, the UNSecurity Council extended the MINURSO mandate for anotheryear. While the government had blamed UN Western SaharaEnvoy Christopher Ross of being partial, the latter met withthe foreign minister in Rabat, on October 27. Subsequently,Ross conferred with POLISARIO representatives. POLISARIOactivist Aminatou Haidar accused police of beating and threa-tening her on November 1. Authorities, however, denied theseassertions. On November 28, Ross declared the UN-brokeredunofficial negotiations to have terminated, as they had notyielded any results. Instead, he would consult the conflict partiesseparately, as well as neighboring states. In its resolutionof December 19, the UN Security Council expressed its supportfor the negotiation process.shrSaudi ArabiaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Shiites)3 Change: Start:Shiites vs. governmentsystem/ideology, national power1979The conflict over national power and the orientation of the politicalsystem between Shiites and the Sunni government continued.Violent protests and attacks on security forces took placein the Shiite-dominated Eastern Province. Main subjects of Shiiteprotest remained the call for political reforms, the end ofsectarian discrimination, and the release of political detainees.Over the year, security forces killed up to thirteen protesters,wounded up to 29, and detained at least twenty. On January 12,Shiites demonstrated in the town of Awamiya, Qatif region. Policeforces opened fire, killing one demonstrator and woundinganother three, while protesters threw stones and petrol bombs.During demonstrations in the towns of Qatif and Awamiya onFebruary 9 and 10, police forces killed one protester in eachcase. On July 8, security forces detained the Shiite cleric SheikhNimr al-Nimr, causing a protest which left two demonstratorsdead. While activists claimed the protesters had been shot bypolice, the interior ministry denied any confrontation. Up to300 Shiites protested in Qatif on July 27, demanding the releaseof the detained cleric. Protesters blocked roads and threwMolotov cocktails. In turn, police forces arrested several Shiites.According to protesters, security forces opened fire and woundedfourteen demonstrators, which was denied by officials. OnJuly 13, four Shiites attacked a police station in Awamiya withMolotov cocktails and small arms. Police fired back and claimedto have killed one attacker, who Shia sources stated was a nonparticipant.On August 3, four Shiites opened fire on a policepatrol in Qatif, killing one soldier and wounding another. Securityforces fired back, killing one attacker, wounding anotherand arresting the survivors. Seven days later in the same town,a bystander was killed when a police patrol came under fire,allegedly from Shiites. Security forces conducted a raid in Awamiya,killing three Shiites on September 26. Another demonstrationtook place in Qatif region on December 27. Police firedupon demonstrators, killing one and wounding six. cwiSyriaIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(Kurdish groups)3 Change: 5Start:1962KDPS, PYD vs. governmentautonomy, subnational predominanceThe crisis between the Kurdish Democratic Party Syria (KDPS),112

the middle east and maghrebthe Democratic Union Party (PYD), and their militia PopularProtection Unit (YPG), on the one hand, and the government,on the other, over cultural and political autonomy turned violent.Since September 2011, anti-government protesters in predominantlyKurdish regions called to a greater extent for culturaland political rights [1 Syria (opposition groups)]. On March12, tens of thousands commemorated the 2004 Qamishli revoltsin numerous towns in the governorates of Aleppo andal-Hasakah. Security forces dispersed demonstrators using batonsand tear gas, while those demostrating responded by throwingstones. On March 30, police attacked Kurdish demonstratorscalling for autonomy rights in al-Ashrafiyah, Aleppo.Protests took place in Qamishli and later in Amouda, both inal-Hasakah, on April 26 over the arrest of a YPG member by securityforces the previous day. The rallies were dispersed withbatons and tear gas and resulted in the arrest of two demonstrators.In response, PYD took three members of security forceshostage, who were later exchanged for all three detainees. OnMay 11, in the course of nationwide anti-government demonstrations,Kurdish activists marched in support of the Kurds ofAleppo while explicitly rejecting the strong Islamic context ofprotests in other areas [1 Syria (opposition groups); Syria (NC-KSC)]. Security forces violently dispersed Kurdish protests inQudurbak, al-Hasakah. On June 8, Kurdish protesters in al-Hasakahand Aleppo called for an autonomous administration. InRuknuddin, Rif Dimashq Governorate, security forces attackeddemonstrators erecting roadblocks.In June and July, YPG erected numerous armed checkpointsin al-Hasakah. Between July 19 and 21, PYD and YPG forcestook control over cities in Aleppo and al-Hasakah, such as Ainal-Arab, Amouda, Afrin, and al-Malikiyah. Since governmentforces withdrew from the area, no major clashes have occurred.In Qamishli, however, government forces attacked YPG membersand Kurdish protesters on July 21, killing one and leavingtwo injured. YPG responded by firing gunshots at the securityforces, injuring one. The same day, security forces fired into acrowd of demonstrators in al-Malikiyah and killed one activist.In the course of the city’s occupation, PYD and security forcesexchanged fire and the latter regained control over all intelligenceservice headquarters, leaving one YPG fighter dead.On November 13, YPG forces and thousands of al-Malikiyahresidents stormed the local intelligence headquarters and thecity directorate. Security forces and officials reportedly fledthe city after the exchange of fire at army checkpoints capturedby YPG.mkiSyria(opposition groups)Intensity: 5 Change: Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:opposition groups vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power2011The war between the opposition and the government of PresidentBashar al-Assad over national power and the orienta-tion of the political system continued. The opposition wasled by the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Free SyrianArmy (FSA), the latter mainly consisting of defected soldiers.In November, various opposition groups including SNC andFSA united behind the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionaryand Opposition Forces (NC), which was recognized bymost Arab League countries, Western states, and the EU asthe sole representative of the Syrian people. According toUN reports, approx. 60,000 people have been killed sincethe beginning of the uprising in March 2011, including over13,000 members of security forces. This marked a substantialincrease in the overall number of fatalities. By the endof the year, more than 500,000 refugees were registered inEgypt and all other neighboring countries with the exceptionof Israel. Approx. 2.3 million were left internally displacedthis year. Throughout the year, mass anti-government protestscontinued to take place across the country, often violentlydispersed by government forces.In January, heavy fighting occurred in the governorates ofAleppo, Hama, Homs, Dara'a, Dimasqh, and Idlib. On January22, for instance, Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) attacked opposition-heldareas in the capital Damascus with tanks. Ensuingclashes left up to 60 people dead. Between January 24 and27, at least 130 people were killed when SAF shelled districtsof Homs, which remained at the center of fighting forseveral weeks. Security forces launched an offensive, killingat least 100 people on February 4 alone and bombarding theBaba Amr district for 27 consecutive days until March 1. Meanwhile,military assaults on Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib killedscores throughout February. SAF attacks on Homs continuedin March, leaving at least 250 people dead. Security forcesintensified their attacks in Idlib on March 7, eventually forcingFSA to retreat from the area. Skirmishing, however, continued.On March 14, SAF resumed its attack on Dara'a, killingseven defectors and thirteen civilians. Air strikes hit Hama forseventeen consecutive days. Prolonged clashes between FSAand security forces also occurred in Aleppo and Damascus.Heavy shelling in Hama, Homs, and Idlib killed some 660 FSAfighters throughout April. In an increasing number of bombattacks upon urban centers, more than 100 civilians died inMay. Twenty SAF soldiers were killed in ambushes in Aleppoand Damascus on May 2. In Rastan, Homs, FSA clashed withsecurity forces on May 14, leaving at least 23 soldiers dead.SAF in turn assaulted Souran, Hama, killing 34 people on May20. Some ten days later, SAF launched an offensive backedby tanks and helicopters to recapture the Atareb area, Aleppo.In the course of fighting, twenty soldiers, six oppositionfighters, and six civilians were killed. The execution of 108residents of al-Houla, Homs, on May 25, sparked internationaloutrage and caused the expulsion of diplomats from severalWestern countries. According to UN reports, the killingswere conducted by the pro-government al-Shabbiha militia.On June 4 and 5, FSA fighters attacked military vehicles withautomatic weapons and grenades in Idlib and Damascus,killing up to 100 soldiers. Throughout the month, dozens ofcombatants died in heavy fighting, mainly in the governoratesof Homs, Idlib, Aleppo, Dara'a, and Rif Dimashq. On June21, SAF conducted simultaneous operations including bombingof opposition-held areas in Homs, Hama, Deir al-Zor, Idlib,and Dara’a, killing up to 114 civilians. Between July 15113

the middle east and maghreband 17, clashes involving thousands of combatants and heavyweaponry left at least 75 dead in Damascus. On July 18,a bomb attack targeting the national security headquarterskilled four high-ranking officials, including Defense MinisterDawoud Rajiha. FSA and the Islamist group Liwa al-Islam claimedresponsibility. The next day, FSA fighters seized for thefirst time border crossings into Iraq and Turkey. Meanwhile,SAF repeatedly bombarded Damascus, killing dozens. By theend of the month, thousands of troops and FSA fighters wereinvolved in clashes in the city of Aleppo involving helicoptersand rocket-propelled grenades. With approx. 5,000 casualties,August was the month with the highest death tollsince March 2011. Government forces increasingly reliedupon airstrikes, thereby concentrating on Damascus, Aleppo,Idlib, Hama, and Deir al-Zor. Some 3,500 refugees crossedinto Turkey in mid-August. Clashes in Aleppo continued, leavingat least 70 people dead on August 7. An airstrike on nearbyAzaz nine days later killed 40. From August 20 to 22, SAFattacked opposition-held areas in Damascus with helicoptergunships and tanks, killing 128 people. In ensuing clashesinvolving hundreds of soldiers, tanks, and warplanes, at least157 people had died by August 29. In a siege on Daraya,Rif Dimashq, security forces allegedly killed up to 400 residentsin mass executions and tank shelling. Over 250,000fled their homes. In September, clashes in Aleppo left at least200 dead and destroyed the UNESCO-protected ancient city.On September 27, some 6,000 opposition forces launched athree-day assault on government positions. Ensuing clashesand bombardment killed at least 60 people. In al-Raqqah,an airstrike killed up to 54 civilians on September 20. SAFrepeatedly shelled suburbs of Damascus, killing hundreds.In early October, 30,000 additional soldiers were deployedto Aleppo. On October 15, FSA shot down a MIG fighter jetusing an anti-aircraft gun. In Damascus, a FSA ambush killed21 soldiers on October 4. Heavy fighting for the strategicallyimportant Maarat al-Numaan, Idlib, had left up to 200 combatantsand civilians dead by October 12. At least 500 peopledied in clashes across the country between October 26and 29. In November, FSA launched an offensive in regionsbordering upon Turkey and Iraq. On November 1, assaultson army checkpoints in Idlib left 28 soldiers and five rebelsdead. Two days later, FSA attacked the Taftanaz airbase, usedto conduct airstrikes on Idlib. On November 8, FSA seized Rasal-Ain, al-Hasakah, killing eighteen soldiers. A SAF counterattack,backed by helicopters, forced some 9,000 residents toflee and sparked tensions between FSA and Kurdish militias[1 Syria (NC – KSC)]. FSA captured a military airport and anarmy base in Deir al-Zor in late November. Airstrikes continued,killing dozens of opposition fighters in Damascus onNovember 21 alone. SAF attacked opposition-held suburbsof Damascus with fighter jets and heavy rocket fire on December2, killing at least ten. Heavy fighting continued acrossthe country and caused hundreds of civilian casualties. OnDecember 23, an air strike in Halfaya, Hama, killed up to 200civilians.International efforts to mediate failed due to discord inthe UN Security Council. On February 23, former UN Secretary-GeneralKofi Annan was appointed UN-Arab League specialenvoy to Syria. He resigned on August 2, arguing thatthe lack of unity in the UN Security Council, the violation ofa ceasefire, and ongoing militarization in Syria had underminedhis role. On August 17, the former Algerian minister offoreign affairs, Lakhdar Brahimi, had been appointed Annan’ssuccessor. A four-day truce negotiated by Brahimi started onOctober 26 was violated by both parties on the same day.A UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) established onApril 21 ended on August 19.Violence repeatedly affected neighboring countries,causing dozens of foreign casualties. Lebanese supporters ofboth the government of al-Assad and NC frequently clashedthroughout the year [1 Lebanon (March 8 – March 14)]. OnJuly 7, security forces in pursuit of opposition fighters firedmortar shells into northern Lebanon, leaving five residentsdead. In a similar attack on October 3, SAF artillery fire hitAkcakale, Turkey, killing five civilians. Turkey responded withcross-border shelling [1 Syria – Turkey]. In November, straybullets repeatedly struck the Golan Heights, provoking Israeliartillery fire [1 Syria – Israel].yal, ghe, mkiSyriA – IsraelIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:1948Syria vs. Israelterritory, international power, resourcesThe conflict between Syria and Israel over international powerand the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights continued.On May 2, the Israeli parliament approved a requestfrom the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to summon sixteenadditional reserve battalions in case of unrest at the borderas a result of the war in Syria [1 Syria (opposition groups)].In early May, Israeli Minister for Energy and Water UziLandau decided to renew oil drilling permits on the GolanHeights. On May 13, the Syrian state media condemned thedecision as a violation of international law. On June 5, theJordanian media claimed that Syria was moving hundredsof long-range Scud missile launchers towards its borderswith Israel and Turkey [1 Syria - Turkey]. Israeli officialsexpressed their concerns about increased Syrian armstransfers and the proliferation of chemical weapons to theLebanese Hezbollah, calling the latter a red line for Israel[1 Israel (Hezbollah)].On July 19, Syrian armed forces in pursuit of oppositionfighters entered the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the GolanHeights near the village of Jubata al-Khashab, QuneitraGovernorate, with 500 soldiers and 50 vehicles [1 Syria(opposition groups)]. In response, Israel filed a formalcomplaint with the UN Security Council on July 22. Syrianmortar shells aimed at rebel forces hit the DMZ on September25 and November 8. On November 3, three Syrian tanksentered the DMZ. In all cases, Israel complained to UNDOF.In response to mortar shells fired in the course of Syrianintrastate fighting which hit the ground near an IDF postin the DMZ on November 11, Israel fired a guided missileinto Syria. The next day, IDF fired tank shells at the assumedsource of firing, claiming direct hits. Again on November 17,Syrian gunfire spilled over into the DMZ. Israel respondedwith artillery fire the following day.mki114

the middle east and maghrebSyriA – TurkeyIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: 3Start:Syria vs. Turkeyterritory, international power1946The latent conflict between Syria and Turkey over internationalpower escalated due to spillover effects from the war inSyria [1 Syria (opposition groups)]. As a result, both partieswere unable to reach a formal agreement regarding the statusof Turkey’s Hatay province, which is officially claimed by Syria.On April 9, Turkey protested and summoned Syria's envoyafter Syrian forces opened fire at refugees across the borderin Kilis province and stray bullets struck Turkish territory. OnJune 22, Syrian Armed Forces downed a Turkish F-14 Phantomjet over the Mediterranean Sea, killing the two pilots. Shortlythereafter, Syrian ground-to-air defense system reportedlyshot at a Turkish search and rescue plane searching for the jet.On June 26, NATO condemned the shooting as unacceptable.In the following days, Turkey deployed 30 military vehiclesand six additional warplanes to the border, while Syria alsoreinforced its troops there with some 170 tanks and other armoredvehicles.The conflict peaked on October 3 and 4 when Turkishforces shot artillery into the Syrian border provinces of Idliband al-Raqqah, killing up to twelve soldiers. The artillery barrageswere fired in response to Syrian mortar shells directedat fleeing Syrian opposition forces which had left five Turkishcivilians dead in Akcakale, Sanliurfa. The next five days, bothparties exchanged cross-border artillery fire and the Turkishparliament authorized troops to conduct operations in Syria ifnecessary. Responding to the events, Turkey increased its militarypresence in its southeastern land and maritime regionswith additional troops, warships, and submarines. On October10, the Turkish Air Force intercepted a Syrian passenger planecoming from Russia and forced it to temporarily land in Ankara,suspecting it of carrying weapons. Afterwards, Syria and Turkeymutually closed their airspaces in respect to civil flights.Throughout the following weeks, Syrian shells repeatedly hitTurkish territory, to which Turkey responded with artillery fireand the strengthening of its military presence. On November16, in response to a bombardment by the Syrian Air Force inthe border region, Turkey deployed two additional warplanesto the area. On November 21, Turkey requested NATO to deployPatriot missiles on the border. The US, Germany, and theNetherlands confirmed in December the stationing of missilesin southern Turkey.ajement de-escalated, but remained violent. The oppositionconsisted of various groups, including labor unions, students,lawyers, and diverse Salafist groups. Throughout theyear, the opposition groups repeatedly protested againsteconomic shortcomings, poor living conditions, and the lackof improvement regarding civil rights. Following a generalstrike which started in Makhtar, Siliana Governorate, on January13, protests spread to neighboring towns. The protestersdemanded jobs and better living conditions, barricadingaccess roads to several towns. On October 17, media employeeswent on strike over the government’s interference inthe media. Subsequently, the government announced theimplementation of two decrees to protect freedom of themedia which had already been passed the previous year. OnNovember 27, after the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT)had called for demonstrations, thousands of demonstratorsprotested in Siliana, demanding financial aid for economicdevelopment and the governor’s dismissal. Protestersthrew stones, while riot police used birdshot, teargas, andbatons to disperse the demonstrators. The protests lastedfive days, leaving approx. 300 injured. The clashes endedon December 1, when the central government and laborunions reached an agreement including the replacement ofthe governor and a regional development plan. The sameday, further clashes erupted between the police and protestersin Bargou, Siliana Governorate. Over the course ofthe year, Salafists held at least ten demonstrations againstthe secularization of the state, calling for the introductionof Sharia law. The protests repeatedly escalated into violentconfrontations with the police. On August 16, Salafistsarmed with swords and rods attacked the Bizerte music andtheater festival, injuring five. The police dispersed the Salafistsand arrested four. Following the arrest of a Salafist accusedof attacking a policeman, hundreds of Salafists reportedlyattacked a police station in the town of Dawar Hicher,Manouba Governorate, on October 30. The police openedfire on the assailants, leaving two dead. In response to theenduring protests, on May 4, the interim president MoncefMarzouki prolonged the state of emergency until the endof July, and then in September extended it once more toJanuary 2013.sag, shrTurkey(PKK)Intensity: 5 Change: Start:1974Tunisia(opposition groups)Conflict parties:Conflict items:PKK vs. governmentautonomyIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: 6Start:opposition groups vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power2010The conflict over national power and the orientation of thepolitical system between opposition groups and the govern-The war between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and thegovernment over autonomy continued. The government repeatedlyaccused various Kurdish political organizations, suchas the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the bannedKurdish Communities Union (KCK), of supporting the PKK,arresting many of their members. Over the course of the year,at least 500 security forces and militants died in numerous115

the middle east and maghrebroadside bombings and PKK attacks, as well as in the minimumof 974 military operations carried out by the Turkish ArmedForces (TAF), among them 55 cross-border attacks into northernIraq.Violence between PKK and the military in the first half ofthe year affected the southeastern provinces of Agri, Amasya,Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Hatay, Siirt, Sirnak,and Tunceli and claimed the lives of at least 126 PKK militantsand 40 security personnel. Clashes escalated from June onwards,primarily in Hakkari, spilling over into the neighboringErbil region of northern Iraq. On June 19, for instance, at leasthundred PKK fighters attacked three military outposts in Hakkariwith rocket launchers, rifles, and hand grenades, leavingeight soldiers and ten to twenty militants dead. In subsequentoperations, both in the region bordering Iraq and Iran, and inErbil involving some 5,000 soldiers, combat helicopters, howitzers,and F-16 warplanes, more than 30 PKK militants died.According to PKK sources, militants shot down four helicoptersand killed over a hundred soldiers.Several incidents affected the province of Hakkari betweenJuly and September. In response to a PKK attempt to seize controlof the town of Semdinli, Hakkari province, starting on July23, the government sent in up to 2,000 troops and bombardedthe area with helicopters and warplanes, killing 22 militantsand forcing hundreds of residents to flee the area. Accordingto PKK media outlets, some 30 soldiers died in the course ofthe clashes, whereas official media reported only two casualtiesand ten injured. On August 4, a PKK attack on a militaryoutpost in Gecimli and subsequent clashes left fourteen militants,six soldiers, and two village guards dead. In responseto a roadside bomb attack by PKK which killed five soldiers onAugust 22, the government sent troop reinforcements and helicoptergunships into the region. Operations and subsequentclashes for the next two days left 21 militants dead. BetweenSeptember 6 and 17, TAF launched a large-scale ground operation,including some 5,000 troops backed by fighter jets andhelicopters. During the fighting, TAF killed 155 militants andlost four soldiers.In simultaneous attacks on government institutions inBeytussebap, Sirnak province, on September 2, PKK killed tensoldiers. Subsequent TAF operations in the Kato Mountainsinvolved over 2,000 troops as well as F-16 fighter jets, includedcross border attacks into northern Iraq, and left at least 25militants and one soldier dead. Twelve F-16 fighter jets bombedPKK targets in Iraq starting on October 7. Four days later,parliament extended a one-year mandate allowing militaryoperations in northern Iraq despite objections from Baghdad[1 Turkey - Iraq]. In the course of a PKK attack in Hakkari inmid-October, and in subsequent TAF operations involving theuse of fighter jets and helicopters, 40 militants, three soldiers,and two village guards died. After PKK had attacked governmentinstitutions in Sirnak with automatic rifles and rocketpropelledgrenades on October 28, TAF conducted large-scaleoperations in both Hakkari and Sirnak between October 30and November 7, killing at least 31 militants in Sirnak alone.On November 6, six F-16 warplanes bombarded PKK targetsin northern Iraq, simultaneous to a ground operation ofMaroon Beret soldiers. Between November 7 and 9, TAF struckseveral PKK targets with warplanes and performed a groundoperation in Hakkari, killing 42 militants. During the clashesone soldier died. On November 18, PKK clashed with TAF inSemdinli, leaving five soldiers dead. In a subsequent, two-day,large-scale operation, TAF killed fourteen militants. In earlyDecember, warplanes bombarded PKK camps and installationsin the Iraqi Kandil Mountains for two days in a row.On September 12, some 1,700 Kurdish prisoners began ahunger strike, demanding an end to the solitary confinementof imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and freedom to usethe Kurdish language in the judicial system and education. Thestrike ended on November 18 after signals of governmentalconcessions and an appeal from Ocalan himself. vs, mkiYemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunnitribal forces)Intensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:3 Change: Start:2011al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forcessubnational predominanceThe conflict over subnational predominance between theShiite al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces including Salafistmilitants continued on a violent level. In the course of theyear, al-Houthi rebels repeatedly clashed with tribesmen affiliatedto the Sunni al-Islah party and Salafist militants in thenorthern provinces of Saada, Hajjah, and Amran. The USA andthe government accused Iran of supporting and financing al-Houthi rebels [1 Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. Throughout theyear, clashes claimed the lives of more than 400 people onboth sides, including unarmed civilians. Fighting took place,especially in January and February, between al-Houthi rebelsand Sunni tribesmen in Hajjah and Saada. On January 26, ongoingfighting in Hajjah displaced more than 300 families.On February 5 and 6, clashes in the area led to 55 casualtiesbefore a ceasefire was established on February 10. However,two days later, al-Houthis resumed fighting. At least 44more casualties were reported before the end of February.In March, several landmine blasts killed a total of eighteenpeople, mostly civilians. Al-Houthis were accused of havingplanted around 3,000 landmines in the area. In April, conflictrenewed in Saada, yielding around 35 casualties from bothsides. Further clashes on May 29 left dozens more dead onboth sides. During the fighting, tribesmen were able to seizea village held by al-Houthi fighters. On June 3, clashesresulted in at least 24 casualties in Saada. Two days later, al-Houthi fighters raided three houses and took captive at leasttwenty men. In the same area, al-Houthi fighters killed twoBritish Muslims on June 26. Further clashes claiming at leastfour casualties were sparked after al-Houthi rebels killed twowomen in Hajjah on August 21. A renewed ceasefire was establishedon August 27. However, on September 6, al-Houthifighters destroyed houses and wells in Amran and clashedwith Sunni tribesmen, causing at least 30 casualties. In thesame area, thirteen people were killed when Islah Party militiasand al-Houthi supporters clashed from September 21to 23.Al-Houthis skirmished with Sunni tribal forces again on November3 in Sanaa province. On December 16, al-Houthi rebelsstormed the Islah Party headquarters in Saada.jri116

the middle east and maghrebYemen(AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)Intensity: 5 Change: Start:Conflict parties:Conflict items:1992AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national powerThe conflict over national power and the orientation of thepolitical system between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula(AQAP) and the linked Islamist militants of Ansar al-Sharia, onthe one hand, and the government, supported by the USA, onthe other, remained at war level. The militants were mainly activein the southern province of Abyan, where they had seizedseveral towns the previous year. Since Ali Abdullah Saleh handedover power to the new president, Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, in February [1 Yemen (opposition groups)], the governmentintensified its cooperation and US-backed efforts to fightAQAP. In total, the conflict claimed the lives of at least 1,800people in 2012, including civilian casualties. According to UNreports, the fighting also resulted in the displacement of severaltens of thousands of civilians.Several clashes between soldiers and militants took placein Zinjibar, Abyan province, and Radda, Bayda province, in February.On February 25, the day the newly elected presidentwas inaugurated in the capital Sanaa, a suicide attack in frontof a presidential palace in Mukalla, Hadramout province, left26 people dead, including twenty soldiers. On March 4, atleast 85 soldiers and 20 militants died in two suicide attacksand subsequent clashes in Zinjibar. On April 9, militants attackedan army camp in the city of Lawdar, Abyan, claiming thelives of 57 from both sides. In response, the army launched anoffensive, including air strikes, against Ansar al-Sharia in thearea. Within a week, more than 200 people had been killed.On April 24, militants clashed with pro-government tribal fightersin Abyan, as a result of which 21 militants and two tribesmendied.Starting mid-May, troops launched a US-backed offensiveto regain control over southern cities held by AQAP fighters,involving around 20,000 soldiers as well as numerous fightersfrom army-allied tribes. Altogether, air strikes, ground offensiveswith heavy weapons, and counter-attacks from AQAP inthe Abyan cities of Jaar, Zinjibar, and Shaqra, left more than500 people dead in May. On May 21, an Islamist suicide bomberkilled about 100 soldiers at a military parade in Sanaa. OnJune 4, hundreds of troops retook the coastal town of Shaqra.On June 12, the Defense Ministry stated that it had completelyretaken the cities of Zinjibar and Jaar. Twenty militants andfour soldiers died in heavy fighting in Jaar, as well as ten militantsin Zinjibar, while 200 to 300 Islamist fighters fled thetowns. However, clashes in both cities continued. On June 13,the army launched two air strikes on the town of Azzan, Shabwahprovince, killing at least 27 militants. In the same area,another 76 militants died in clashes with the army in the followingtwo days.Having lost their strongholds in the south, AQAP then focusedon targeted assassinations, such as a suicide attack thatkilled an army chief and two soldiers in Aden on June 18. AnAnsar al-Sharia suicide bomber killed 45 tribesmen at a funeralin an Abyan village on August 4. On September 11, DefenseMinister Mohammed Nasser Ahmad survived an assassinationattempt in Sanaa. Furthermore, Islamist militants claimed responsibilityfor repeatedly destroying various oil and gas pipelines.Several drone strikes, reportedly conducted by the US,killed at least 114 suspected AQAP members throughout theyear, particularly in Yemen's south.cfYemenIntensity:Conflict parties:Conflict items:(opposition groups)3 Change: 4Start:opposition groups vs. governmentsystem / ideology, national power2011The conflict over national power and the orientation of thepolitical system between the opposition and the governmentde-escalated to a violent crisis. The opposition consisted ofthe Joint Meeting Parties, the Yemeni Youth Movement, tribalforces, and previously defected troops.President Ali Abdullah Saleh had signed a deal in November2011 to hand over power, also granting him immunity.Throughout the year, up to several hundred thousand demonstrators,rejecting the agreement, called for Saleh’s prosecutionand the removal of his allies from government positions. Supportersand opponents of Saleh clashed repeatedly, leaving36 people dead in total.On January 13, security forces shot dead up to four protestersand injured over a dozen others in Aden. On February21, former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi wasconfirmed in a single-candidate election as Saleh’s successor.In the following months, Hadi consecutively dismissed severalsenior government members and military officers, including anephew and a half-brother of Saleh. On July 29, some 100tribesmen loyal to Saleh temporarily seized control of the interiorministry in the capital, Sanaa. As they tried to storm thebuilding again two days later, clashes with security forces ensued,leaving fifteen people dead and 43 wounded. On August1, security forces retook control of the ministry. On August 6,Hadi deprived Saleh’s son Ahmed, the head of the RepublicanGuard (RG), of some of his units and put them under his ownauthority. In protest, hundreds of RG members clashed withgovernment troops as they surrounded the defense ministryon August 14. Three people were killed and nine wounded. OnDecember 15, a military tribunal sentenced 93 RG members toprison terms for the attack. Four days later, Hadi decreed a restructuringof the military, including the dissolution of the RGand the First Armored Division of General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar,who had defected during last year’s protests. A National Dialogueset to begin on November 5 had not started until theend of the year.ba117

Methodology

MethodologyConflictActorsPolitical ConflictConflictMeasuresThe concept of political conflict and its attributesConflictItemstional organization or a non-state actor. Collective conflict actorsare distinguished from one another through their internalcohesion and internally shared goals. An actor is regarded asdecisive if his existence, actions, and communications considerablyalter the practices of at least one other conflict actorpertaining to the conflict item.Conflict measures are actions and communications carriedout by a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict. Theyare constitutive for an identifiable conflict if they lie outsideestablished procedures of conflict regulations and – possiblyin conjunction with other conflict measures – if they threatenthe international order or a core function of the state. Establishedregulatory procedures are defined as those mechanismsof conflict management that are accepted by the conflict ac-Since 1991, quantitative conflict research at the HIIK hasanalyzed political conflicts by focusing on conflict processesrather than e.g. purely quantitative thresholds of casualties ofwar. Thus, the HIIK is particularly concerned with the concreteactions and communications between conflict parties. Such aprocess-oriented approach gives the analysis of political conflicts,especially regarding intensities, a broader and more detailedempirical foundation.Beginning in 2011, the HIIK in cooperation with the ConflictInformation System (CONIS) research group – establishedin 2005 and likewise located at Heidelberg University– has taken steps to further elaborate its methodologicalapproach. In particular, the institute has revised its definitionof political conflicts and restructured its conflict intensityassessment. The latter now not only takes into account theintensity for a given conflict area in a given year, but determinesthe intensity of the conflict processes for subnationalpolitical units and months as well. As such, it allows for amuch more detailed measurement of conflict dynamics. Furthermore,the conflict actions and communications, on whichthe intensity assessment is based, are now evaluated bycombining qualitative and quantitative indicators measuringthe means and consequences of a conflict. This is intendedto further enhance exactitude, reliability, and reproducibilityof the conflict information provided.According to the revised definition, a political conflict is apositional difference, regarding values relevant to a society(the conflict items), between at least two decisive and directlyinvolved actors, which is being carried out using observableand interrelated conflict measures that lie outside establishedregulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, theinternational order or hold out the prospect to do so.A conflict actor is either an individual, a state, an internators.Examples may include elections and court proceedings.The use of physical violence, however, is never considered tobe an established regulatory procedure. Core state functionsencompass providing security of a population, integrity of aterritory and of a specific political, socioeconomic or culturalorder. A state function or the international order is threatenedif its fulfillment and persistence, respectively, becomes unlikelyin a conflict actor’s point of view.Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued byconflict actors via conflict measures. Due to the character ofconflict measures, conflict items attain relevance for the societyas a whole - either for coexistence within a given state orbetween states. This aspect constitutes the genuinely politicaldimension of political conflicts. The catalog of conflict items inuse up to the present Conflict Barometer covers ten differentitems. Ideology/system is encoded if a conflict actor aspiresa change of the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicialorientation of the political system or changing the regimetype itself. National power means the power to govern a state.Whereas autonomy refers to attaining or extending politicalself-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territorywithout striving for independence, secession refers to theaspired separation of a part of a territory of a state aiming toestablish a new state or to merge with another state. Furthermore,decolonization aims at the independence of a dependentterritory. Subnational predominance focuses on the attainmentof the de-facto control by a government, a non-stateorganization or a population over a territory or a population.The item resources is encoded if the possession of natural resourcesor raw materials, or the profits gained thereof, is pursued.Territory means a change of the course of an internationalborder, while international power as an item describes thechange aspired in the power constellation in the internationalsystem or a regional system therein, especially by changingmilitary capabilities or the political or economic influence of astate. The item other is used as residual category.In addition to the three constituting elements – conflictactors, measures, and items –conflict intensity is an essentialfeature of political conflicts. A conflict intensity is an attributeof the sum of conflict measures in a specific political conflictin a geographical area and a given space of time. Since 2003,the HIIK has been using a five-level model of conflict intensity.Under its revised methodology, the intensity levels are nowknown as dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war,and war. The last three constitute the category of violent conflicts,in contrast to the non-violent conflicts (dispute and nonviolentcrisis). Whereas a dispute is a political conflict carriedout completely without resorting to violence, in a non-violentcrisis one of the actors is threatened with violence.In measuring the three levels of violent conflict, five proxiesare used indicating the conflict means and consequences. Thedimension of means encompasses the use of weapons andpersonnel, the dimension of consequences the number ofcasualties, destruction, and refugees. For every region-monthobserved – i.e. for every calendar month in every first-levelsubnational political unit – each of these indicators is assessedand given a score. In order to determine the respective regionmonthintensity, the five values are aggregated.Combining qualitative and quantitative research strategies,the following concrete steps are taken when assessing120

Methodologythe conflict intensities: First, the institute’s conflict observerevaluates the type of weapon and the manner in which it wasused. A catalog of keywords helps to distinguish light fromheavy weapons and to evaluate the severity of the weapon’semployment. Second, the observer identifies the conflict measureof an analyzed region-month in which the highest numberof personnel was employed. He or she then distinguishesbetween low, medium, and high numbers of personnel, basedon two thresholds: 50 and 400 persons.Third, the observer evaluates the overall number of casualtiesin the conflict in a region-month. The thresholds employedhere are 20 and 60 persons killed. Fourth, the amount ofdestruction resulting from the conflict is determined in fourdimensions considered essential for civil populations: infrastructure,accommodation, economy, and culture. Last, theconflict observer evaluates the overall number of cross-borderrefugees and internally displaced persons in a region-month.The thresholds employed here are 1,000 and 20,000 refugees.The region-month intensities can be aggregated to informabout the conflict intensity in a given calendar year in a specificconflict area. A conflict area is the sum of all subnationalunits affected by the violent conflict in question. The area-yearintensity is basically equal to the maximum region-month intensityin a given area-year. In addition, the exact area-yearintensity is fine-tuned by looking at the annual and area-widenumbers of casualties and refugees as the two core indicatorsof conflict assessment. A violent crisis can thereby beupgraded to limited war level if there were more than 360casualties or more than 18,000 refugees in the whole year inthe conflict area. A limited war can be upgraded to war levelif there were more than 1,080 fatalities or more than 360,000refugees. In contrast, a limited war can be downgraded to a violentcrisis if there were less than 120 casualties and less than6,000 refugees. Likewise, a war can be downgraded to limitedwar level if there were less than 360 casualties and less than120,000 refugees.The revised methodology of the HIIK and CONIS enables adetailed analysis of conflict dynamics. In contrast to other conflictmethodologies, the Heidelberg approach rests on a broadempirical basis. The number of conflict-related deaths is notexcluded from the analysis, but is just one indicator among several.This aims at increasing the validity of the data obtained.The specified set of indicators guides the institute’s conflictobservers through the research process, improving reliabilityand reproducibility of the data. The theoretical disaggregationof the concepts of political conflict and conflict intensity, themultitude of indicators included, as well as the differentiatedevaluation at the subnational and monthly levels, allow for adetailed observation, collection, and analysis of non-violentand violent political conflicts worldwide.Intensity Level12345Previous Terminologylatent conflictmanifest conflictcrisisserious crisiswarTerminology since 2011Level of ViolenceIntensity Classdisputenon-violent crisisviolent crisislimited warwarnon-violent conflictsviolent conflictslow intensitymedium intensityhigh intensityThe terminology of intensity levels121

MethodologyDatabase CONISThe data on which the Conflict Barometer is based has beencollected and processed in cooperation between the HIIK andthe CONIS Group, using news archives and other open sources.The CONIS database comprises information on all formsof inter- and intrastate political conflicts from 1945 until today.With more than 15,000 conflict-year data, it aims at understandingthe dynamics of violent and non-violent conflictsworldwide. CONIS (Conflict Information System) was developedon the basis of the Conflict Simulation Model (COSIMO)database in the course of two research projects at HeidelbergUniversity, co-financed by the European Union and in collaborationwith the HIIK. More information on CONIS, containingdata on affected countries, conflict parties, conflict items, andannual intensities, can be accessed at www.conis.org122

LIMITED WARsEditors :Fiona Byrne, Lars Dittrich, Peter Hachemer, Elza Martinez , Imran SyedChief Editor :Simon EllerbrockAdvisory Board :Dr. André Bank, Dr. Marco Bünte, Marvin Cuschieri, Prof. Dr. Jörn Dosch,Dr. Asiem El Difraoui, Dr. Malte Pehl, Prof. Dr. Siegmar Schmidt, Arik Segal,Dr. Clemens Spiess, Prof. Dr. Christoph Stefes, Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf,Dr. Jonas WolffEnglish Proofreader :Nelson Butschbacher, Alexander Edmonds, Blaise MullenixDatabase and Statistical Analysis :Julian-G. Albert, Lars Kumbier, Nicolas Schwank, Dominik HattrupLayout :Friedemann Albert | TheThisThere.comMAPS :Thomas WenckerConceptualization :Pamela Jawad, Nicolas SchwankEffective:April 02, 2013The AmericasBrazil (drug trafficking organizations)Colombia (FARC)Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)Asia and OceaniaIndia (Naxalites)Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State)Pakistan (Mohajirs - Balochs, Pakhtuns, Sindhis)Pakistan (TTP et al. - religious groups)Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)Thailand (various Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)EuropeRussia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)The Middle East and MaghrebAlgeria (AQIM, MUJAO)Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory)Libya (opposition)Libya (inter-factional violence)Sub-Saharan AfricaCentral African Republic (rebel groups)Chad (rebel groups)DR Congo (FDLR)DR Congo (inter-militant violence)DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)Mali (Islamist groups – MNLA)Mali (Islamist groups)Nigeria (Christians – Muslims)Somalia (Somaliland – SSC)The AmericasMexico (drug cartels)WARsAsia AND OceaniaIndia (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis)Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)Partner :Supported By :Middle East and MaghrebAfghanistan (Taliban et al.)Iraq (Sunni militant groups)Syria (opposition groups)Turkey (PKK)Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)Sub-Saharan AfricaDR Congo (CNDP/M23)Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)Nigeria (Boko Haram)Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)Somalia (Islamist groups)Sudan (Darfur)Sudan (SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile)Sudan – South SudanSouth Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)

: No violent conflict: violent crisis: limited war: warviolent conflicts in 2012 on subnational level

Heidelberg Institute forInternational Conflict Research e. V.at the Department of Political Science,University of HeidelbergCampus BergheimBergheimer Str. 5869115 HeidelbergGermanyeMail: info@hiik.dePhone: +49 (6221) 54 31 98Fax: +49 (6221) 54 28 96www.hiik.deISSN 1616-931X 10€