ordered for any other reason thanto simply ‘keep busy’. A raid wasfrequently made at dusk or in the darkand, usually, turned out to be a bloodyand swift hand-to-hand combat in aforward trench line. This, <strong>of</strong> course, is agreat simplification <strong>of</strong> the grand conceptbehind trench raiding which had manylocal motives. Even their frequencyvaried greatly from sector to sector andfrom commander to commander. Withthe British in particular, some battalioncommanders believed the trench raid tobe an important method <strong>of</strong> keeping theirmen out <strong>of</strong> mischief and ‘battle-keen’;although it is certainly believed that withthe latter it had the reverse effect. Havingsaid this, raids frequently had a directmilitary purpose. The aim was usually tocapture prisoners and assess the quality<strong>of</strong> the enemy’s front line troops, whilstalso testing their capability to mount anadequate defence. Such raids could beundertaken by any number <strong>of</strong> men froma dozen to a battalion (although this wasrare) and platoon or company raids weremore commonplace. During larger, moreorganised and co-ordinated, raids theattackers had access to support artillery.Whilst raids could be complicatedcombined operations, by far the mostnormal local <strong>of</strong>fensive tactic was thepatrol. The objective <strong>of</strong> patrols wasmore limited than raids but, as theyrequired a higher level <strong>of</strong> fieldcraftskills, the numbers involved were<strong>of</strong>ten smaller. Indeed, the maximumnumber <strong>of</strong> a patrol could be as high as30 but this was almost unheard <strong>of</strong>, thestandard number being a ten man squador below. Unlike raids, patrols were aregular trench routine and could be sentout on an almost nightly basis, <strong>of</strong>ten toobserve the enemy’s working parties andto determine the nature <strong>of</strong> suspiciousfeatures (likely to be observation posts)in No Man’s Land. However, a BritishArmy Order demanded that no <strong>of</strong>ficerabove the rank <strong>of</strong> Company Commandershould lead a patrol - due to the danger<strong>of</strong> wastage on an already stretchedresource - and, consequently, junior<strong>of</strong>ficers and senior NCOs normallycommanded these groups. Despitethis, many senior field <strong>of</strong>ficers did leadpatrols out personally even though theywere threatened with court-martial ifthey did so. On these occasions it wasgenerally as a result <strong>of</strong> their experiencebeing needed to rectify a failed raid orthat their specific military expertisewas required.In particular, observation patrolmissions sent out into No Man’s Landwere especially dangerous as, naturally,the best conditions for observing anenemy position was in daylight. Thedrawback, <strong>of</strong> course, was the greaterchance <strong>of</strong> being seen by an enemy.Although all manner <strong>of</strong> cunning andingenious devices were constructed forthis purpose, the best solution was toemploy trained No Man’s Land scoutswho could traverse the dangerousterrain. Two such scouts came fromthe 4th Royal Berkshire Regimentwho volunteered to reconnoitre Hill63 at Messines Ridge shortly beforethe planned assault <strong>of</strong> June 1917. One,a very ‘Biggles-like’ character calledCaptain Gaythorne-Hardy, had beena Big-Game hunter prior to the warand was skilled in camouflage andconcealed movement. Both he and hiscorporal crawled up to the Germanwire, in broad daylight, and successfullyrecorded a full plan <strong>of</strong> the ground andentanglements. All the time, they wereunder the watch <strong>of</strong> the entire Germanline but, amazingly, both soldiersreturned to British trenches unscathedand - more importantly - unseen. Forthis valuable work, Gaythorne-Hardywas awarded the Military Cross, whilsthis corporal was promoted to sergeantand awarded the Distinguished ConductMedal. Another example can be shownby Major R.T. Rees <strong>of</strong> the LoyalNorth Lancashire Regiment, who feltcompelled to undertake an observationpatrol himself. It had followed a failed(but not costly) raid, which the Majorhad ordered and planned but, not beingallowed to lead it, had lost direction andended in confusion. Consequently, thenext day, Major Rees crept out into NoMan’s Land (in daylight) to make notes<strong>of</strong> the enemy’s position, accompaniedby Sgt-Major Pasquill. Whilst crouchingin a shell-hole, he turned around to findSgt-Major Pasquill gone - only to seehim crawling back from the Germanposition moments later. The Sgt-Majorhad discovered a German dugout closeby and tried to enthusiastically motivatethe Major that, between the two <strong>of</strong>them, they could capture it. The Major’sresponse was apparently to remind theSgt-Major that “...he was too old andtoo valuable to be such a fire-eater, Irecommended a speedy and carefulreturn to our own lines.” [Major R.T.Rees, in A. Simpson, Hot Blood & ColdSteel, pp65-66 BCA 1993]World <strong>War</strong> I1914-1918
Although patrols were normallyinformation gathering missions, theywere sometimes sent out to disruptenemy working parties that were outto repair wire or rebuild their parapetsunder the cover <strong>of</strong> darkness. In this case,a subaltern and senior NCO would bebriefed on the overall objective <strong>of</strong> themission and be sent ‘over thetop’ to strike at the enemy quicklyand decisively.For example, by winter 1915, thevolunteer battalion <strong>of</strong> the 8th (Service)East Lancashire Regiment was holdingthe front line trenches along theFoncquevillers-Monchy au Bois Line.This area <strong>of</strong> line, defended by the 37thDivision, was near to Gommecourt andthe trenches here were in an abysmalcondition. In fact, by December thetrenches were so waterlogged by thewintry rain and sleet that movementalong them was severely limited. It got sobad by the last few weeks <strong>of</strong> the monththat platoon reliefs <strong>of</strong> the front line wererotated every twenty-four hours. <strong>War</strong>faretoo was hampered by the weather andmost British <strong>of</strong>fensive engagementswere restricted to disruptive bombingraids, regular nightly patrols and wirecuttingmissions.On the night <strong>of</strong> 21st December, apatrol party <strong>of</strong> the 8th Lancs, advancedcautiously towards positions at ‘Little Z’(east <strong>of</strong> Foncquevillers) and came underaccurate German gunfire. There followedan exchange <strong>of</strong> fire, where patrol SergeantAllan was wounded in the thigh and, inthe murk and mud, left for dead in NoMan’s Land. The next morning, PrivateWilliam Young (a Scot living in Preston)saw his Sergeant lying out in front <strong>of</strong> thewire and resolved to bring him back tothe British lines. Under enemy fire, heclimbed over the parapet and, despitebeing urged to go back by Sgt. Allan, Pvt.Young was hit twice by machine-gun fireas he assisted the NCO. By now anothercomrade, Private Green, had followedYoung and, helping him, they draggedAllan back to safety. Having been hitin the chest by one bullet and withhis jaw shattered by another, WilliamYoung then walked back to the village <strong>of</strong>Foncquevillers for medical treatment.As domination <strong>of</strong> No Man’s Landbecame a particular priority in theyears <strong>of</strong> 1915-1917, patrols <strong>of</strong> eitherside went out at night to establish theirauthority over an area. As Germantactical practices advanced (with thecreation <strong>of</strong> stormtrooper units) the Alliedresponse had to be equally forceful.The Canadians, for example, developeda counter raiding tactic known as the‘Silent Death’, which became as much <strong>of</strong>a psychological weapon as anything else.Canadian raiders would stealthily work