A report on iUU fishing of Baltic Sea cod - Fisheries Secretariat

A <strong>report</strong> on IUUfishing of Baltic Sea codA <strong>report</strong> commissioned by FISH from ORCA-EU– –Tommy Svensson/Pressens Bild

A <strong>report</strong> on IUU fishing of Baltic SeaPublished byThe Fisheries Secretariat (FISH)Svartviksslingan 28167 39 BrommaSwedenISBN: 978-91-976859-0-0Author ORCA-EUEditor Niki Sporrong, FISHLayout by Tryckfaktorn AB, Hans MelchersonPrinted by OH-tryck, 2007– –

A <strong>report</strong> on IUUfishing of Baltic Sea codA <strong>report</strong> commissioned by FISH from ORCA-EU– –

Table of contentsA <strong>report</strong> on IUU fishing of Baltic Sea cod 1Preface 4Executive summary 5Published information 5IUU fishing activities 5The cause of IUU fishing 5How to reduce IUU fishing 5Can ENGOs help to reduce IUU fishing 6The policy and regulatory framework 6Creating a culture of control and compliance 6Part i 8Describing and quantifying IUU fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea 8Introduction 8Published information 8The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 8Comment and analysis 9Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) <strong>report</strong>0Comment and analysis 10Institute for Fisheries Management (IFM) studyComment and analysis 11“Gazeta Wyborcza” – Polish newspaperComment and analysis 12Personal perspectives and opinions on IUU fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea 12MethodologyDescribing the IUU fishing problem3Un<strong>report</strong>ed landings 13Mis-recorded landings 14Tampering with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 15Trans-shipping 15Late return of logsheets 15Fishing in closed areas 16Landing undersized cod 16Small mesh size or illegal rigging of gear 16“Targeted” bycatch 16Exceeding 48 hour soak time for gillnets 16Fishing without a special permit 17Possible future IUU fishing activities 17What can be done to improve compliance?7Reduce fleet capacity 17Improve deterrents 17More fisheries inspectors 18Monitoring the trade in cod 18Better use of technology 18Scientists and fishermen working together 19What can ENGOs contribute to improve compliance?9Conclusions 20– –

Part II 21Policy and regulatory frameworks 21Introduction 21The policy framework 21The reformed CFPThe development of a Baltic Sea cod recovery planComment 21Control and enforcementThe Action Plan for Cooperation in EnforcementWas the Action Plan effective in the Baltic Sea? 27The Compliance Work Plan8Support to national authorities and coordination between them 28Control and enforcement of the plan 28The Commission’s inspection priorities 29Administrative inquiries 29Redirecting EU inspectors 29Ensuring there is a deterrent 29Community Fisheries Control Agency9Comment 32Transparency 33Reporting catch data 33Overfishing 33Reports on fishing effort 33Behaviour seriously infringing the rules 33Infringement procedures 37EU Commission inspections 37Effectiveness of the Compliance Scoreboard 37Tri-annual Commission evaluation <strong>report</strong>s 37Ad hoc stakeholder meetings 38The regulatory framework 38The TAC and quota Regulation 39Technical and control measures 39Implementation of the technical and control measures 40The registration and accuracy of catches and catch information 40Mis<strong>report</strong>ed landings 41Technical and control measures for the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea in 2006 42Notes 46List of tables and figures 47References 48Annex I: Baltic Member States fishing and processing industries 49Annex II: Members of the Administrative Board of the CommunityFisheries Control Agency 58Annex III: Format for Serious Infringement <strong>report</strong>ing 59Annex IV: Summary of the European Commission’s Tri-annualEvaluation Report 2000-2002 60Annex V: European Regulations that apply to Baltic Sea cod 67– –

PrefaceIn 2005, the Fisheries Secretariat (FISH) commissioned a studyinto illegal, un<strong>report</strong>ed and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the BalticSea to inform its existing and future work. In particular, FISHwas interested in how NGOs might be best able to contribute toimproving compliance.As a result of this study, a <strong>report</strong> was produced that was intendedfor internal use.However, with the heightened interest in IUUfishing associated with the Baltic Se cod fishery, FISH has decidedto publish an amended version of the <strong>report</strong>. We hope that it willcontribute to a better understanding of some of the issues associatedwith the illegal fishing problem in the Baltic Sea cod fishery.The <strong>report</strong> is based on a review of the availableliterature on IUU fishing within the Baltic Sea region, informalmeetings/interviews with individuals with an active interest in theBaltic Sea cod fisheries, as well as a review and analysis of the EUfisheries policy and regulatory frameworks for control and enforcementthat apply within the Baltic Sea.– –

Executive summaryThe cod fisheries in the Baltic Sea have gainednotoriety for non-compliance with fisheriesregulations. This is commonly referred to as illegal,un<strong>report</strong>ed and unregulated fishing or IUUfishing. IUU fishing is seen as the major contributorto the unsustainable exploitation of the codstocks, particularly in the Eastern Baltic Sea, somuch so that this stock is now threatened withcollapse.This <strong>report</strong> is divided into two parts. The firstdescribes the results of the literature search andpresents the views expressed by participants ofthe informal meetings/interviews. The secondpart provides a summary of the policy and regulatoryframeworks that are in place and providethe basis for Member States to implement Europeanfisheries policy.Published informationLimited literature is available that describesor quantifies the IUU fishing within the Balticregion. The International Council for the Explorationof the Sea (ICES) has attempted to takeaccount of the quantities of un<strong>report</strong>ed landingswithin its fisheries assessment advice to the EuropeanCommission. Using a variety of sourcesthat includes fishermen, fisheries inspectors andfirst-hand observations by fisheries scientists, itis estimated that in the Eastern Baltic, 35-45%more cod is landed than <strong>report</strong>ed.Other recent <strong>report</strong>s and news articles suggestthat possibly even larger quantities are landed.However, owing to the clandestine nature ofthe activity it is not possible to confirm withoutdoubt what the quantities might be.IUU fishing activitiesIn discussions with a broad section of individualswith an active interest in the cod fishery tenforms of IUU activity were cited. There was aconsensus view that un<strong>report</strong>ed landings werethe most significant IUU fishing activity. Theseappear to be more prevalent at different timesof the year, from year to year and within certainfleet sectors, such as trawl and gillnet fisheries.For example, tighter quota restrictions wouldlikely lead to increases in unrecorded landings;area closures would coincide with apparentfailures in VMS; and, a strong year class enteringthe fishery could result in increased landings ofundersize cod.Poland was seen by many as the “bad boy” inthe Baltic, but those Member States that have thelion-share of the total allowable catch were alsoimplicated.The cause of IUU fishingIn simple terms, the cause of IUU fishing wasdescribed as a function of fleet overcapacity, decliningquotas, an inability to effectively monitorand control the fisheries, high consumer demandand high economic value. In part or as a whole,these create an added incentive to fish.Further detailed analysis offered by a Danishstudy concluded that the following are all factorsthat influence compliance:• the likely economic gains to be had fromcheating;• the risks of being detected and the severity ofthe sanction;• compatibility between the content of fishingregulations and fishing patterns/practices;• long-term non-compliant behaviour becomes‘normal’ behaviour such that moral standardsare affected.How to reduce IUU fishingReducing fleet capacity was seen as an importantfactor that would likely reduce IUU fishing. Somefishing industry representatives from the ‘older’Member States considered that their nationalfleet capacities are more in line with their quotasand that this balance needs to be quickly– –

control and enforcement system which, in summary:clarifies the responsibilities of the MemberStates and the European Commission; is designedto ensure that compliance with the rules of theCFP is achieved; and ensures that exploitation ofthe fish stocks is controlled throughout the wholefisheries chain.In order to take forward the new control andenforcement framework, the Commission hasundertaken a programme of work intended tobetter integrate and coordinate Member States.The Commission is of the view that there hasbeen improvement on each. However, some ofthe new Member States are still finding it hardto meet all the basic requirements, mainly as aresult of resource constraints. Some of the otherMember States are facing cutbacks or caps onresources and so this has meant that progress hasbeen slower than might have been hoped.As well as the inspection and monitoring workundertaken by the Commission, a CommunityFisheries Control Agency (CFCA or “The Agency”)has also been established and was due to beginits operational activities in 2007. The overallaim of the CFCA is to support Member States intheir control and enforcement efforts.According to the Agency’s work programme itwill concentrate on organising coordination ofcontrol and inspection by Member States on afishery-by-fishery basis, apparently covering allstages of control and inspection of fishing activitiesfrom fishing to the first sale of fish landedor entering the Community market. Fisheriessubject to recovery or multi-annual plans andhigh levels of IUU fishing are two criteria thatthe CFCA identify as priorities and so means thatthe Baltic Sea will likely be the subject of theirattention.In order to improve transparency with respectto control and enforcement, the Commissionpublishes a compliance scoreboard, a seriousinfringement <strong>report</strong> and tri-annual evaluations.All of these publications provide a means bywhich comparisons between Member States canbe made and inference drawn as to which are“good” and “not so good” at meeting their CFPobligations. However, from the publications todate it is difficult to draw any firm conclusionswith respect to the Baltic Sea. As a result, there islittle reassurance that, at both the Member Stateand the Commission level, effective systems arein place to improve or <strong>report</strong> on compliance.The regulatory framework for the cod fishery isless complex compared to the North Sea and hasan emphasis on improving the chances and accuracyof inspection. A suite of technical and controlmeasures are used. However, there is concernthat these are not being effectively implemented.In its role of ‘monitoring the monitors’, theCommission undertook an evaluation of howMember States have implemented technical andcontrol measures in the Baltic Sea in 2005/2006.Publication of the <strong>report</strong> has been delayed until2007. The <strong>report</strong> is expected to provide clearindicators as to how key control and monitoringmeasures are being implemented as well as an assessmentof their effectiveness. Initial indicationssuggest that fundamental flaws exist in some ofthe Member States.– –

Part IDescribing and quantifying IUUfishing for cod in the Baltic SeaIntroductionScientific advice from the International Councilof the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) has indicatedthat the two cod stocks in the Baltic Seaare suffering from unsustainable exploitationlevels. The Eastern stock has declined in size to apoint where it may not be able to replenish itselfand is considered to be threatened with collapse.The Western stock is in a better state but is alsosubject to high levels of fishing that mean thatthe yields from the fishery are lower than theirpotential level.Combined with less favourable environmentalconditions the ability of the two Baltic Sea codstocks to increase or, minimally, sustain themselvesis further compromised.The cod fisheries in the Baltic Sea have gainednotoriety for non-compliance with fisheriesregulations. This is commonly referred to as illegal,un<strong>report</strong>ed and unregulated fishing, or IUUfishing. IUU fishing, particularly in the EasternBaltic, is seen as the major contributor to theunsustainable exploitation of the cod stocks.In order to better understand IUU fishing in theBaltic and the measures that are in place to counterthe problem the study:• Undertook a review of the available literatureon IUU fishing within the Baltic region;• Conducted informal meetings/interviews withindividuals with an active interest in the BalticSea cod fisheries; and,• Reviewed and analysed European fisheriespolicy and regulatory frameworks for controland enforcement that apply within the BalticSea.The <strong>report</strong> is divided into two parts. The firstdescribes the results of the literature search andpresents the views expressed by participants ofthe informal meetings/interviews. The secondpart provides a summary of the policy and regulatoryframeworks that are in place and providethe basis for Member States to implement Europeanfisheries policy.Published informationAn Internet search revealed quite an extensiveand relatively recent source of literature on IUUfishing, the majority of which focuses on the highseas. In contrast, very limited peer reviewed and/or “grey” literature has been published that attemptsto describe and/or quantify IUU fishing inthe Baltic Sea. The following section summarisesthe most recent and readily available informationon IUU fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea, as wellas provides comment and analysis.The International Council for the Exploration ofthe Sea (ICES)The International Council for the Explorationof the Sea (ICES) officially recognises the seriouslevel of IUU fishing in the Baltic Sea cod fishery,particularly within the eastern Baltic. ICESdescribes the main IUU problem as, “...mis<strong>report</strong>edlandings, mostly in the form of un<strong>report</strong>edlandings”. It suggests that restrictive quotas, theabsence of fishing opportunities and inadequateinspection are the main causes, with the circumstancesbeing different in different Member States.Because the problem is considered to be sosignificant, the ICES Baltic Fisheries AssessmentWorking Group has included its own estimatesof un<strong>report</strong>ed landings in its annual <strong>report</strong>s since1993, referring to them as “unallocated quota”,and has highlighted that the scale of un<strong>report</strong>edlandings has severely compromised its assessments.– 10 –

The Working Group uses information fromfishermen, at-sea-sampling and fisheries inspectors,as well as comparisons between import andexport data to estimate the “unallocated quota”.In 2005 1 , the Working Group chose to presenttwo stock assessments to the ICES AdvisoryCommittee on Fishery Management (ACFM)based on the official <strong>report</strong>ed landing figures aswell as their own estimated landing figures, andleft it to the ACFM to decide on which to use (ifat all) in their advice to the European Commission.ACFM chose to provide both 2 .In the preamble to its 2005 assessment, theWorking Group emphasised that it would notdisclose the estimates or the sources of the problemthat particular Member States may provide.The reasons for its decision included not wantingto compromise the trust that has been establishedbetween fishermen and scientists or cause politicalproblems if estimates are seen to be differentfrom the official figures, as well as the possibilitythat Working Group members may lose theirjobs (presumably as a consequence of the formerreason).However, in order to provide some transparencyand repeatability in the assessments, the WorkingGroup has chosen to use, what it terms, a“raising factor” (RF) which provides an estimateof the un<strong>report</strong>ed landings year on year, withouthighlighting a particular Member State. Forexample, an RF of 1.40 implies that the WorkingGroup estimates that landings are 40% higherthan the official figures. Groupings of one ormore countries are given an RF value based onthe information they bring to the table, as follows:Group A, based on informal contacts with theindustry, is provided with a RF of 1.2.Group B, based on information from informalcontacts with industry and enforcement sourcesis given a RF = 1.5Group C is based on information available fromat sea-sampling, formal and informal contactswith the fishing industry, and inspection of import/exportrecords. Taken together these sourcesof information indicate total catches about100% greater than the <strong>report</strong>ed figures, resultingin a RF of 2.0.Group D, for which either no information isavailable, or information indicates no or negligiblemis<strong>report</strong>ing, is provided with a RF of 1.0.Table 1. The Baltic Fisheries Assessment Working Group overall RFfor cod landings from the eastern Baltic between 2000 and 2005Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005RF 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.45 1.41 1.38Source: The <strong>report</strong> of the ICES Baltic Fisheries Assessment Group(WGBFAS), 18-27 April 2006, RostockUsing these RF figures against the <strong>report</strong>ed landings,the estimated quantities of un<strong>report</strong>ed codlandings have remained relatively stable for thelast 6 years, averaging just over 20,000 tonnes.However, the 2005 Working Group <strong>report</strong>stresses that the estimates are “considered to besubstantial underestimates of the true catches(recent mis<strong>report</strong>ing estimates imply that truecatches have been at least 40% greater than<strong>report</strong>ed catches)”.For comparison, in Table 2 below, <strong>report</strong>ed landingsof cod from the Baltic Sea between 2000and 2005 3 are set out, along with ICES estimatesof total landings and unallocated quota.Table 2. A comparison of Member State <strong>report</strong>ed landings and ICESestimates of total landings and unallocated quota for the EasternBaltic.Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Reportedlandings 66,171 67,651, 49,456 49,239 49,015 40,041ICESestimateof totallandings 89,289 91,328 67,018 71,386 68,578 55,032ICESestimate ofun allocatedquota 23,118 23,677 17,562 22,147 19,563 14,991Source: Adapted from the <strong>report</strong> of the Baltic Fisheries AssessmentGroup (WGBFAS), 18-27 April 2006, RostockComment and analysisOwing to its clandestine nature, estimating thelevel of IUU is extremely difficult. For a pre-eminentadvisory body like ICES, which bases itsadvice on best available science, the willingnessto use empirical and anecdotal information onIUU fishing to inform its advice makes a pointedstatement about the scale and seriousness of theproblem and emphasises the significance with– 11 –

which it has undermined their ability to providescientific advice.Also, the fact that national experts and advisorsare not willing to go public, because they mightloose their jobs, confirms the highly politicalnature of Baltic Sea fisheries management and,more specifically, IUU fishing.There is a danger that continuing to attempt toaccount for mis<strong>report</strong>ing will contribute to a declinein the quality of the data and, therefore, inthe quality of the resulting stock assessment. Inaddition, accounting for mis<strong>report</strong>ing in the assessmentcould also create incentives for furthermis<strong>report</strong>ing, as a higher estimated catch is likelyto lead to a higher estimate of stock size and thusincreased catching opportunities in the future.The Working Group has provided estimates ofunallocated quota since 1993. The continuedneed to do so and the apparent stability in itsestimates over the last 5 years suggests that BalticStates are unable, unwilling or not seriouslycommitted to effectively reducing the IUU fishingproblem.Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) <strong>report</strong>The WWF European Policy Office commissioneda <strong>report</strong> on IUU fishing in the Polish Baltic Seacod fishery in 2005. WWF chose not to publishthe <strong>report</strong> but allowed access to it for the purposeof this project. Poland was chosen as thefocus owing to common and consistent allegations,made by people within or associated withthe Baltic Sea cod fishing industry, of non-complianceby the Polish cod fleet.Having spoken with the authors, the <strong>report</strong> providedthem with a significant challenge, primarilydue to difficulties in gathering credible andsubstantiated evidence. Despite this, the <strong>report</strong>highlights two pieces of work, one of which isreferenced, which provide additional insight intothe potential IUU problem.The Marine Institute in Gydnia, Poland, producesa quarterly publication called “WiadomosciRybackie” (Fisheries News) which is aimedat the fishing industry and those with an interestin the fishing industry. In the March-April 2005edition 4 , an article compares import and exportfigures for cod and cod products with <strong>report</strong>edlanding and national consumption figures. Theresults show a discrepancy in export figuresequivalent to 49,000 tonnes of whole cod.The inference is that this discrepancy was causedby un<strong>report</strong>ed landings which, if it were true,would be over 3 times the <strong>report</strong>ed national annuallandings. Table 3 below shows the figuresthat appear in the article. The WWF <strong>report</strong> attemptedto analyse import and export data butfound that detailed information on whole cod orcod products was difficult to obtain. The <strong>report</strong>recommends that further information needs tobe gathered before a definite conclusion can bedrawn.The un-referenced work that was mentionedrefers to a study carried out by the Swedish fishingindustry in 2002. Using non-scientific comparisonbetween like-for-like fishing vessels andinformation on working practices provided byPolish crew working aboard Swedish and Danishfishing vessels, the study speculates that in 2003all the Baltic States and Russia could potentiallyhave exceeded their combined quota by as muchas 4 times, and that Poland could have exceededit by as much as 8 times. This would suggest anunbelievable and unrealistic figure in excess of350,000 tonnes.Table 3. Showing the <strong>report</strong>ed import, export, landing and nationalconsumption figures of cod for Poland in 2003Reported Figures for 2003Reported landings of codImported quantities of codPolish national consumption of codExported quantities of processed cod(Estimated live weight equivalent)DifferenceComment and analysis5,100 tonnes8,000 tonnes18,000 tonnes23,000 tonnes65,000 tonnes49,000 tonnesThe <strong>report</strong> provides a wide-ranging estimateof the levels of un<strong>report</strong>ed cod landings, whichserves to show the difficulties in accurately estimatingthe scale of the problem. The analysis ofofficial statistics is considered to be a good wayof highlighting discrepancies; indeed, this is usedto inform some of the ICES estimates. However,uncertainty as to which sources of informationare likely to be the most appropriate and calculating“whole cod equivalent” from the variety ofcod products (e.g., frozen filets, steaks, etc.) aretwo significant problems with this approach.– 12 –

For the purpose of this <strong>report</strong>, an analysis of thelatest trade statistics 5 and attempts to comparelanding and national consumption were undertakenfor all the Baltic Member States. The attemptonly proved to confirm the difficulties thatthe authors of the WWF <strong>report</strong> experienced andit was decided that this was a study in its ownright.Rather than concluding a likely figure and furthercontributing to the uncertainty of how muchcod is being caught and landed, a safer conclusionfrom the WWF <strong>report</strong> is that the Polish codfishery appears to be a significant contributor tothe overall IUU fishing problem in the Baltic Sea.Institute for Fisheries Management (IFM) studyIn 2003, two researchers – Jesper Raaker Nielsonand Christoph Mathiesen – from the Institute forFisheries Management and Coastal CommunityDevelopment (IFM) published a research paper 6 :“Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliancein Fisheries – Lessons from Danish Fisheries”.Their research focused on three Danish fisheries,one of which included the Baltic Sea cod fishery.They undertook a quantitative and qualitativesurvey asking fishers opinions and views on theiracceptance of imposed fisheries regulations andtheir respect for the management system. Ofthose questioned in the Baltic fishery:• 98% said that the profit from the allocatedquota has a major or medium impact on theircompliance behaviour, i.e., when profits fromlegitimate fishing are good the incentive forIUU fishing is reduced. However, there was anadded caveat that some fishers (2–5%) wouldcontinue to fish after catching their quota ifthe probability of detection was low;• 90% said that the risk of detection comparedto the economic gain from IUU fishing hasmajor or medium impact on their compliancebehaviour, giving a strong indication thateconomic incentive is the driving force behindnon-compliance in the Danish fishery;• 88% considered it morally wrong to discarddead fish even if they had exceeded theirquota;• 85% said it was morally wrong to violateminimum landing sizes;• 20% said it was wrong to land more thantheir allocated quota;• 77% completely or partially agreed with closedareas to protect fish from overfishing;• 57% completely or partially agreed thatdays-at-sea regulation is a better measure toregulate the fishery than closed areas; and• 90% said that practical difficulties to complywith regulations have a major or mediumimpact on their compliance behaviour.The <strong>report</strong> concludes that, in Danish fisheries,the following factors have a major impact oncompliance:• the economic gains to be obtained;• the risks of being detected and the severity ofthe sanction;• compatibility between the content of the regulationand fishing patterns/practices;• “norms” 7 , in particular, the behaviour ofother fishers and the moral of the individualfisher; and• co-management is important for rule compliance.Comment and analysisUnfortunately, this paper was not found andreviewed until the very late stages of the studyand so it was not possible to discuss the work indetail with the authors.While this research did not aim to describe orquantify the IUU problem within the Baltic codfishery, it did attempt to look at factors thatinfluence the behaviour of fishermen and highlightsome important attitudes and behaviouralreaction to rules and regulations.Only 56 fishers were interviewed in the courseof the study and there is no indication as to howmany of these represented fishers from the BalticSea cod fishery. With nine nationalities and theirdifferent economic, social and cultural differences,a similar study across the Baltic could providesome interesting comparisons and potentiallyinformative results that may contribute to betteror more informed management approaches anddecisions.“Gazeta Wyborcza” – Polish newspaperIn the May 4 th 2006 edition 8 of the Polish newspaper“Gazeta Wyborcza”, an article appearedunder the headline “Big Cod Fraud”. Representativesfrom the Polish Fishermen’s Association and– 13 –

the Association of Fish Processors were <strong>report</strong>edas confirming large scale catching and trading inillegal cod.The article <strong>report</strong>s that the lack of inspection,the large number of licensed fish buyers and thenumerous places where the first sale of fish ispossible make it easy for fishermen to land un<strong>report</strong>edcod and for illegal fish to enter the supplychain – as much as 80% of the cod that goes toprocessors is claimed to be illegal.Comparisons of the 2004 Polish cod quota andthe export of Polish cod products were used toshow apparent discrepancies: 16,000 tonnes codquota v 52,000 tonnes of exported cod products,which could equate to as much as 70,000–100,000 tonnes of whole cod.Apparently, attempts to establish larger stateowned auctions have had limited success andare not profitable as the supply of legal fish islimited. The Chairman of one of these auctions is<strong>report</strong>ed as saying that EU money has been madeavailable to support the building these large auctionsbut they are not profitable because of lowquotas and their inability to trade in illegal fish.While Poland and Sweden were given particularmention, according to a representative from theSea Fisheries Institute in Gdynia, all countriesexceed their national cod quotas. He also proposesthat a considerable increase in the quotabut with longer closed seasons is a solution tothe problem.The Chairman of the Fishermen’s Associationis <strong>report</strong>ed as blaming inadequate quotas as thereason for illegal fishing. He says that fishermenknow that there is more fish in the sea. He isalso <strong>report</strong>ed as saying that fishermen only catchmature fish and highlights that small mesh industrialfishing carried out mainly by the Danes andSwedes catches everything.Comment and analysisIf this newspaper article is accurate and theindividuals have not been mis-represented, thenit is a scathing self-analysis and admission of theillegal fishing problem in Poland.Comparing exports with the annual nationalquota to provide an estimate of un<strong>report</strong>edfishing may be misleading. It does not take intoaccount the significant quantities of cod that areimported into Poland (see table 3 above).The article seems to suggest that the state-ownedauctions restrict the sale of illegal fish. Whilethe consequence of this may be to compromisetheir ability to compete with other auctions, itdoes raise the question as to how they are able toachieve this.Personal perspectives and opinions on IUUfishing for cod in the Baltic SeaA series of informal meetings with individualswith an active interest in Baltic Sea fisheriestook place throughout the course of the project.Fishermen/fishermen’s representatives, fish processors,fisheries inspectors and fisheries scientistswere targeted as they were considered likely toknow most about the IUU fishing problem. Anumber of individuals within environmental nongovernmentalorganisations (ENGOs) with eitherexperience of working with IUU and/or BalticSea fisheries issues were also contacted, as were anumber of academics that had previously conductedresearch on Baltic Sea fisheries. Latterly, ameeting was held with investigative TV journalistswho had undertaken work on IUU fishing inthe Baltic Sea and, more recently, the Barents Sea.MethodologyIn preparation for these interviews, the literatureand Internet search described above enabled aprofile of each of the EU Member States’ andthe Russian Federation’s fishing industries tobe drafted and provided an important sourceof background information. These profiles arepresented in Annex I.A list of general and more specific questions, thelatter being tailored to particular target groups,was prepared and formed the basis of an informalinterview. Depending on the answers to thesequestions, supplementary questions were asked.It should noted that the questions were not partof any analytical framework that allowed forobjective analysis and conclusions to be drawn;rather, it was purely a subjective process but onethat was considered to provide better understandingof the IUU fishing problem.Face-to-face interviews, phone interviews andwritten responses through email correspondence– 14 –

were all used. Face-to-face interviews were thepreferred and most common option. The interviewslasted anywhere from 1–4½ hours, thelength of time largely determined by the participants’time constraints. The majority of meetingswere one-to-one, but as many as six people wereinvolved in any one interview.In total, 80 people were contacted, includingrepresentatives from all the Baltic Member Statesand the Russian Federation. Of these, 52 wereable or willing to provide a response to some orall of the questions. All participants were assuredthat any information or views that theyexpressed would be non-attributable.It should be noted that of the three key groupsthat were initially identified, fishermen and/orfishermen’s representatives were comparativelyunder-represented. This was mainly a result oflanguage barriers.Describing the IUU fishing problemFrom the responses received it was possible todraw up a list of IUU fishing activities for cod(see Table 4). Participants that were able to providemore detailed information on these activitiessuggested that they were likely to be moreprevalent at different times of the year, from yearto year and within certain fleet sectors, such astrawl and gillnet fisheries. For example, withthe uptake of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC),tighter quota restrictions would likely lead toincreases in unrecorded landings; area closureswould coincide with apparent failures in VMS;and, a strong year class entering the fishery couldresult in increased landings of undersized cod,particularly in trawl fisheries owing to the less effectivesize selectivity of this gear and/or deliberaterigging to reduce mesh size.Table 4. A list of the IUU fishing activities associated with the BalticSea cod fishery described in interviewsIUU fishing activity1. Un<strong>report</strong>ed landing2. Mis-recorded landing3. Tampering with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)4. Trans-shipment5. Late return of logsheet and landing declaration6. Fishing in closed areas7. Landing undersized cod8. Small mesh size or illegal rigging of gear9. “Targeted” bycatch10. Exceeding 48 hour soak time for gillnets11. Fishing without a special permitThe following section provides information oneach IUU activity and is based upon views andinformation that was provided by participants.Un<strong>report</strong>ed landingsWithout exception, un<strong>report</strong>ed landings wereconsidered to be the most serious IUU fishing activityowing to the scale and likely consequencesfor the long-term sustainability of the EasternBaltic cod stock. All Member States were implicatedbut responses suggest that the top threeoffenders are those with the “lion-share” of theTAC: Denmark, Sweden and Poland.In the course of interviews, the majority of participantswho were willing to estimate the likelyquantities of un<strong>report</strong>ed landings suggested that45–60% more cod was landed than <strong>report</strong>ed.Those that expressed a view said that the onlysure way of reducing this problem is to inspect asignificant proportion of all the cod landings.Measures designed to reduce the likelihood ofun<strong>report</strong>ed landings, such as designated ports,were considered to be limited - large ports canprovide for many landing sites and so make itdifficult for inspectors to cover all possible options.Specific points and times for landing wererecommended as possible improvements.In Denmark and Sweden (and quite likely inother countries too), avoiding inspection resultsin a “cat and mouse” game between skippers andinspectors. Some fishermen have their own countermeasures and tactics to ensure their landingsare less likely to be inspected. It is relatively easyto have “look-outs” in ports and harbours, outsideoffices and even the homes of inspectors toforewarn of any likely inspection activity. Mobilephone scanners may also be used to monitor conversationsbetween inspectors.In Poland, the likelihood of inspection has beenlow. As a result, fishermen have not needed tobe as organised or sophisticated in their avoidancetactics. The lack of manpower in the threeregional fisheries inspectorates, combined withlimited resources (e.g., mobile phones have onlybeen made available to them in the last year orso), has meant that effective and coordinatedinspection has been difficult.The reality of fisheries inspectors living within– 15 –

or close to fishing communities was highlightedas a potential serious impediment to effectivemonitoring and application of EU rules andregulations. Furthermore, the civil service salarythat fishery officers are paid often belies therole, function and conditions within which theyare expected to operate. An individual able towork in intimidating circumstances, understandcomplex European legislation, and effectivelygather and present evidence needs to be of a highcalibre. To attract and retain such individualsrequires appropriate remuneration and is somethingthat a civil service salary does not necessarilyprovide.It was also noted that owing to the civil servicestatus of fisheries inspectors, their ability to fittheir working hours around an industry thatdoes not operate within normal working hourscreated an additional challenge. Limited fundsto cover unsocial working hours and over-time,combined with time-off-in-lieu, the necessity towork in pairs and/or teams, means that enforcementcoverage can be significantly reduced. Thefishing industry is fully aware of these constraintsand able to adapt quickly to counter any changesin inspection patterns or priorities.Also, physical inspection time is significantlyreduced owing to the administrative burden thatinspectors have to deal with. Up to 50% of theirtime can be spent cross-checking log sheet, landingdeclaration and sales note information, and inputtingdata onto the catch administration system.In Poland, there appeared to be a general acceptanceby those responsible for control andenforcement as well as the fishing industry thatthere is a significant under-<strong>report</strong>ing of landings.In contrast, the official and industry views inSweden and Denmark were much less acceptingof a potential problem.Un<strong>report</strong>ed landings in Poland were commonlyestimated to be two to three times more than the<strong>report</strong>ed landings. Given that members of fisheriesinspectorates were among those that providedthese estimates there may be some credence orvalidity in this figure. No estimate was offeredfor either Sweden or Denmark other than remarksthat suggested that, at times, the problemwas not insignificant.Opinion both from within and outside of Polandtalked of a culture of non-compliance withinthe Polish fishing industry. It was suggested thattogether the political history of Poland and thedetermined characteristics required to be a fishermenhave contributed to this culture. “Beatingthe system” has become habit, a way of life oreven a “badge of honour”.Furthermore, the economic benefit that waspromoted before joining the EU has not beenrealised by many in the fishing industry. This hashardened the resolve of many and created a militantelement that seek political influence. It was<strong>report</strong>ed that distinct groupings in the Polish codfishery are beginning to form. The more radicaland forceful groups appear to have become morepolitically influential, both at national and EUlevel, and appear to have seized the opportunityto try and influence their government and ensurethey protect and not negotiate down their fishinginterest.One of these groups was <strong>report</strong>ed to have metwith Commissioner Borg when he visited Polandin 2005. During their meeting, the fishermenapparently handed the Commissioner their “reallanding figures”. Their intention being, to ensurethat these were taken into account when settingthe proposed TAC for 2006. Whether this hadany effect is difficult to say. However, in discussionwith Commission officials it was clear thatthey wanted the starting point for their proposedmulti-annual cod plan (see page 21) to match thereality of the fishery, and the 2006 TAC was setat a level that some observers considered higherthan would have been reasonably expected.Mis-recorded landingsMis-recorded landings were described as beingdifferent to un<strong>report</strong>ed landings. It refers tothe practice of deliberately under-estimating thelanded weight of cod and, in some instances, therecording of cod as another species. This canonly happen when fishing vessels are not or areimproperly inspected.The reason for mis-<strong>report</strong>ing a landing as opposedto not <strong>report</strong>ing is not entirely clear. Itcould be a way of lessening the potential forattracting attention to a vessel’s activity; it couldalso be indicative of the guilt that some skippersundoubtedly feel when they break the rules.– 16 –

An overfilled box of cod can contain significantlymore than its apparent volume would suggest.The weighing of boxes on landing is required byEU regulations; however, ensuring that certifiedscales are available is not always a realisticoption for inspectors. Unless a landing inspectionis continued at the point of first sale, wherethere is a possibility of more accurate weighing,the skipper merely has to ensure that the salesnote or landing declaration that accompanies hislogsheet indicates that his landing was within8% of his estimated figure.Mis-recorded landings were considered to be amore common practice when multiple landingswere taking place and inspectors were only ableto count boxes being discharged from vessels,rather than undertake a full inspection and weighsample boxes.Tampering with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)Apparently, it is common practice to smotherthe VMS transmitter with a metal object, such asa bucket, so it is unable or its ability disruptedto transmit. One fisheries officer <strong>report</strong>ed thatsometimes there are tell-tale signs as the exhaustsoot that can settle on the VMS transmitter antennaecan show signs of having been disturbed.More subtle measures have also been employed,an example being the use of a syringe to injectfluid into the “tamper-proof” VMS equipmentrendering it inoperable.Tampering with the VMS should attract the attentionof the national inspectorate. However,the odds are in favour of the vessel making anun<strong>report</strong>ed landing before being inspected. Also,notification of vessels not transmitting does notalways get passed down to inspectors on thecoast or at sea in time to allow for preventativemeasures to be put in place. While a skippermight run the risk of a delay in returning to sea,owing to the authorities wanting to ensure thatthe system is functioning correctly before thenext fishing trip, the financial benefit from anun<strong>report</strong>ed landing is likely to be worth the attentionor the inconvenience.Trans-shippingTrans-shipping (i.e., the transfer of cargo betweenvessels at sea) of cod is not permittedunder EU fisheries regulations. However, twodifferent forms of trans-shipping were describedby a number of participants. The first involvestrans-shipping of cod from the catching vessel toa vessel that is unlikely to attract the attention offisheries inspectors. It was suggested that this wasan occasional but, at times, common practice ina number of Member States. To avoid attentionand suspicion, skippers would be sure to landand record some cod, but a significant part oftheir catch would be trans-shipped beforehand.The only way of effectively combating transshippingis to observe the activity and inspect thevessels while at sea.The second example involves a specific case,where fisheries inspectors suspected that codwas being transferred to Russian Federationvessels under the guise of licensed pelagic“klondyking” 9 . Pelagic vessels were suspected oftrans-shipping catches that had high levels of codbycatch. However, it was not possible to undertakean inspection as the coastguard vessels weredeployed on higher priority tasks.Late return of logsheetsIt seems likely that late return of logsheets andlanding declarations is the most common andwidespread breech of fisheries legislation. However,even though it is a key factor in determiningthe uptake of individual and/or national quota,it is also considered to be a relatively minor offence.It is unlikely that many inspectorates wouldsanction or take an offender to court for a latereturn of a logsheet, unless there is a consistentfailure to submit them within the required 48-hour-period after landing. Rather, the tendencyis for late returns to be taken into considerationalong with a more serious offence.It is easy to understand and even forgive afisherman for forgetting to return logsheets andlanding declarations within the required 48-hourperiod.However, <strong>report</strong>s suggest that late or noreturns increase when quota restrictions are moresevere. The likely reason for a deliberate late orno return is to allow an individual time to assessthe risks of not <strong>report</strong>ing or providing an inaccuratelanding of cod.– 17 –

Fishing in closed areasEU fisheries regulations provide for seasonal,temporary and permanently closed areas to allor specified forms of fishing. On occasion, somefishermen are known to deliberately breach theseregulations. Indeed, in 2005 Polish fishermenconducted a mass demonstration against theseasonal closure of the cod fishery by fishing duringa closed period. However, the extent to whichdeliberate fishing in closed areas takes place isuncertain.Unless a vessel is boarded in the act of fishingor without their nets appropriately stowed, itis extremely difficult to prove that they are orhave been fishing. While VMS will confirm thata vessel is in transit within a closed area it willnot confirm, without reasonable doubt, that it isfishing.Landing undersized codThe minimum landing size (MLS) for cod fromthe Baltic is 38 cm. This means that any cod underthis length should not be landed. The catching,retaining and landing of undersized cod washighlighted as an occasional widespread problemand often associated with a strong year classentering the fishery at, or close to, the MLS.As a result of the comparatively strong 2003 yearclass, more small cod are presently recruitingto the fishery and this has apparently coincidedwith an increase in landings of undersized fish.ICES estimate, that in 2004, 47% of the codcaught in the eastern Baltic Sea were 3 years oldor younger and 34% were 4 years old.Individuals involved in discard sampling in Sweden<strong>report</strong>ed that landing of undersized cod wasmore prevalent in some inshore areas where codstocks have declined or become less common.Apparently some fishermen have the attitude thatthey cannot afford to wait for the cod to growany bigger and/or be left for others to catch.In Poland, there appears to be a market forundersized cod – or “bolek” – and it was suggestedthat this was one of the reasons that someapparently good year classes had not resulted inthe predicted increase in stocks.The MLS increased from 33 cm to 35 cm in2002, with a further increase in 2003 to thepresent 38 cm. It was suggested that these changesmay be a contributing factor in the apparentcontinued landing of small cod, with some fishermenunable to get out of the habit or mindset ofcatching and keeping, what are now, undersizedfish. Limited or ineffective enforcement plus amarket for small cod will likely mean that thelanding of undersized cod will continue.Small mesh size or illegal rigging of gearThe increase in MLS has also been coupled withthe required use of more size-selective fishinggear such as the BACOMA trawl. However, withthe apparent market and the potential mindset offishermen to catch and retain undersize cod, instancesof rigging fishing gear so that mesh sizeswere restricted have been <strong>report</strong>ed.The gillnet fishery tends to target larger fish andso it was suggested that the landing of undersizedfish and the illegal rigging of gear were morelikely and characteristic of the trawl fishery.“Targeted” bycatchPelagic vessels are allowed a maximum 3%bycatch of cod. Some vessels are known to occasionallyand deliberately exceed this limit. Iflanding inspection is avoided, then the bycatchwill go undetected.When inspectors monitor the landing from apelagic vessel, visual inspection and sampling areused to indicate the percentage bycatch. It takesan experienced inspector to be able to estimatethe percentage of cod bycatch, particularly as theprocess of landing pelagic species does not necessarilyeasily lend itself to inspection. Pelagic speciesare often rapidly pumped from the fish holdsashore in large quantities. This is in contrast tocod and other demersal species that are commonlyboxed and winched ashore. It was suggestedthat the bycatch would need to be significantlyabove the 3% before some inspectors have theconfidence to suspend a landing and take appropriateaction.Exceeding 48 hour soak time for gillnetsExceeding the 48 hour soak time for gillnets washighlighted as a common complaint by trawlerfishermen. It was unclear as to whether this is a– 18 –

genuine concern for spoiling and wasting of codleft in nets for too long a period, or whether itis more to do with a territorial dispute betweenmobile and static fishermen.Fishing without a “special permit”In order to legitimately fish for cod in the BalticSea, Member States are required to issue “specialpermits” to fishermen. The number of permitsis capped in order to ensure that the cod fisheryis not subject to any increase in fishing capacity.While it was suggested that in some MemberStates anybody that had initially applied for thespecial permit got it, there were still fishermenwithout them who deliberately targeted codunder the guise of fishing for flatfish, such asflounder, turbot and dab. A 10% bycatch of codis allowed in these fisheries, but it was suggestedthat this is exceeded in some regions at certaintimes of the year. There was a suggestion thatsmaller vessels are often the culprits as they areless prone to inspections or are not inspected asthoroughly as larger vessels.Possible future IUU fishing activitiesDuring the interviews, some participants highlightedan additional EU fisheries regulation thatmay result in further IUU fishing activities: theestablishment of two separate TACs in the Baltic(for the western and eastern stock).The change in the TAC system does provide anopportunity to mis<strong>report</strong> area of capture. As fishermenstart to work within the new system, mis<strong>report</strong>ingmay well be used as a way of optimisingquota. Depending on in which area they planto record their catch, vessels with a functioningVMS will have to ensure that they actually enterthe western or eastern Baltic. As long as they arenot closely monitored, they will be able to logtheir catch to whichever sea area they like.What can be done to improve compliance?In response to this question, the majority ofpeople concluded that there was a need for a reductionin fleet capacity, more forceful deterrents,adequate numbers of well-trained enforcementofficers, a greater focus on the first point of sale,better use of existing and new technologies, andan improvement in the understanding and participationof fishers in the scientific assessmentprocess.The following briefly describes the main pointsthat were highlighted:Reduce fleet capacityFleet overcapacity is considered to be the underlyingdriving force of IUU fishing for Baltic Seacod. With limited stocks and increasing fishingcosts, fishermen and vessel owners feel forced tobreak the rules to ensure continued payments ontheir vessels and a decent living for themselvesand their crews.Capacity will decrease in the Baltic Sea overthe next few years. The Accession countries arereceiving decommissioning funds that will likelysee a significant reduction in their cod fleets. Forexample, Poland is aiming to reduce its capacityby approximately 40%. In the older MemberStates, fishing capacity has been “capped” andreduction will likely be left to economics and“natural wastage”, though funding for decommissioningis still available. Whether decommissioningmoney will find its way back intothe fishing industry (i.e. decommissioning fundscould help fund the buying of licences and newvessels) is uncertain. However, those that expressedan opinion suggested that fishing was notan attractive option for younger people and thatEU funds were anticipated to help countries likePoland to develop its economy and create jobsoutside of the fishing industry.Some fishing industry representatives from the‘older’ Member States considered that their fleetcapacities were more in-line with their quotasand that this balance needed to be quicklyachieved by the new Member States.Improve deterrentsDeterrents to IUU fishing was recognised as asignificant shortfall in the present managementregime (see page 30). The sanctions imposed foroffences are considered to be woefully poor andinadequate to act as deterrents. The time betweendetecting an offence and bringing it to court wasalso seen as reducing the deterrent effect.Of those that expressed a preference, administrativesanctioning rather than a judicial system wasfavoured. The benefits of an administrative sanctioningsystem were considered to include administrationby people who knew and understood– 19 –

the fishing industry and, therefore, were morelikely to administer an appropriate and proportionatesanction. However, it should be notedthat in Poland, where an administrative system isin place, it appears that the majority of sanctionsare appealed and, as a result, reduced.More fisheries inspectorsThe number of well-trained fisheries inspectorsand the ability to work in a way that respondsto the working practices of the fishing industrywere considered to be important requirements,particularly with respect to tackling the majorproblem of un<strong>report</strong>ed landings. There was afirm view that a high likelihood of effective inspection(combined with an adequate deterrent)would significantly reduce the level of un<strong>report</strong>edcatches. It was highlighted that it requires highlevelpolitical commitment and will to ensurethat fisheries inspectorates are well resourcedand able to effectively combat the IUU fishingproblem. Without it, inspectors become disillusionedand their effectiveness and commitment issignificantly affected.Monitoring the trade in codA large number of respondents considered thatfinding out where the IUU cod goes is the keyto reducing the problem. There was a strongbut unsubstantiated view that un<strong>report</strong>ed cod islanded and transported overland to China whereit is processed before returning to the EU market– its origin being lost along the way.More than half of those that expressed an opinionsuggested that, rather than spending largesums of money chasing fishing boats around thesea (particularly with the technological capabilitiesat hand), resources should be directedtoward the traceability of cod and cod products.Under EU regulations, all buyers and sellers of fishhave to be registered, however, there appears to beonly limited enforcement activity directed towardthem. In Poland, there are an estimated 400registered buyers of fish, who move between portsbuying fish directly from vessels, but the numberof inspections directed at them is significantlylower than the number of at sea inspections.There was some concern raised as to the transparencywith which large fish processing companiesoperated in the Baltic Sea. This concernhas not gone unnoticed by the largest buyer andprocessor of Baltic Sea cod, Espersen Ltd 10 .Information readily supplied by Espersen madeit clear that it is very aware that dealing in largequantities of cod will mean that, knowingly orunknowingly, there is a likelihood of dealingwith fish that originates from an IUU source.For this reason, as well as European food regulations(e.g. Reg. (EC) 178/2002) 11 , Espersenhas in-place a paper traceability system, which itis satisfied provides traceability of cod before itenters the processing chain.Espersen buys in the region of 25% of the codthat is caught in the Baltic Sea. This is purchasedfrom approximately 23 companies that buy froman estimated 80–100 vessels operating in Poland,Denmark, Lithuania and Sweden. It is then transportedover-land to their filleting and breadingplants in Poland and Lithuania. None of the fishis exported to China for processing. Frozen codis also purchased from the Barents Sea but isnot mixed with the fresh Baltic Sea cod duringproduction.Espersen has contractual agreements with itsbuyers regarding their supply of fish. For example,cod must be landed in designated ports;have been caught within the quota regime; and,must have been <strong>report</strong>ed in accordance with theappropriate regulations. The agreement explicitlyabsolves Espersen from receiving illegally caughtfish by ensuring that it is the supplier’s responsibilityto ensure it operates correct business proceduresto avoid this happening.Espersen has recently decided to contract an authorisedthird party to undertake regular auditsof its Supplier Agreement. Also, through its associationwith the fast-food chain McDonald’s, (towhom it supplies all the fish for their Europeanoutlets) Espersen has worked with ConservationInternational 12 on sourcing sustainable fisheriesresources.Better use of technologyWith respect to using existing or new technologies,the European Commission highlighted itsconcern that VMS was not being used to its fullestextent as a monitoring and an enforcement toolby the Member States. Among the problems are:– 20 –

• Ineffective sharing of VMS informationbetween Member States• Limited cross-checking of VMS data withlogsheets and landing declarations.• Some Member States are not using VMSdata as supportive evidence in prosecutioncases• Closed areas are not being effectivelymonitored by VMS• Failure to take action when VMS is notfunctioning• Excessive equipment “failure”Some Member State inspectorates also indicatedthat electronic logbooks would help to ensuregreater compliance, as real-time catch recordingwould assist shore and sea-based inspections inconfirming quantities of fish. However, such ameasure would only be effective if supported byadequate inspections.Scientists and fishermen working togetherFinally, a number of participants suggested thatfor a number of reasons, fishermen were accidentallyor deliberately detached from the scientificassessment process. Reasons included: no, limitedor misunderstanding of the part which their informationplays in the stock assessment process;a lack of cooperation with scientists owing to theassociation of fisheries science with government;the perceived or real arrogance of some scientiststo fishermen; and, the fear that scientists willonly provide advice that causes a reduction intheir fishing opportunities.It was suggested that the relationship betweenscientists and fishers could and should be improved,and that it could indirectly contribute toimproved compliance. Examples of how this hadbeen achieved in the North Sea 13 were highlightedas being positive experiences for both fishersand scientists, although there was no evidenceor feeling that this had yet contributed towardimproved compliance.What can ENGOs contribute to improvecompliance?The majority of respondents considered thatENGOs had a legitimate right to engage in theIUU fishing issue. There was a general consensusthat IUU fishing could be significantly reduced ifthere was the political will to achieve it. Publicopinion was seen as the best way of creating orinfluencing this political will, and ENGOs wereseen as being particularly good or well equippedto undertake this role. There was a clear emphasisthat if ENGOs were to engage in this subject,they needed to be very clear and up-to-date withthe issues. In particular, respondents involved inenforcement highlighted that ENGOs needed tounderstand the practical difficulties that are associatedwith control and enforcement.The development of the Baltic Sea Regional AdvisoryCouncil (BS RAC) was seen as particularlyimportant for ENGOs to use to highlight and attemptto influence the Commission and others inimproving compliance. Although, it was emphasisedthat this was not a platform or stage fromwhich to launch or present campaigns, rather anappropriate forum to discuss policy and practicalmeasures in reducing IUU fishing.Direct action that had recently been undertakenby some NGOs on Mediterranean and High Seasfisheries was not endorsed by anyone exceptENGO respondents. Those involved with enforcementconsidered this sort of action to bemisguided and very unlikely to lead to successfulprosecution of offenders. ENGOs confirmedthat their intention was not necessarily to gatherevidence for prosecutions but to raise awarenessof abuse or weaknesses in the system. They alsoconcluded that if such action was to be takenin the Baltic, then communication with andpotential support from national authorities wasimportant.Toward the end of the interview phase of theproject a two-part, investigative TV documentaryon IUU fishing for cod in the Barents Seawas televised in Sweden (“Kalla Fakta” – ColdFacts on TV4) . The programme generatedenough public and political interest for there tobe follow-up TV coverage, including interviewswith the Swedish Fisheries Minister, prominentfisheries representatives and ENGO representatives.Greenpeace and WWF were both involvedwith the making of the documentary; Greenpeaceproviding information through “undercover”work and WWF providing more of a policy angleto the issue.As a result of the documentary, and questionsasked by the Swedish Government and others,the European Commission was forced to become– 21 –

very active on the issue and, at the request ofthe Swedish Government, it was made a specificagenda item at the next Fisheries Council meeting(20/02/06). The Council concluded to workwith Russia and Norway in combating IUU fishingin the Barents Sea and ensuring that IUU coddoes not enter the EU market 14 .The opportunity to meet with one of the investigativejournalists confirmed that within asustained and intense six month period, withthe support of key individuals and organisationssuch as the Norwegian Coastguard and ENGOs,they were able to obtain enough informationon which to base a television programme whichshowed that cod has become an expensive commodityand, as a result, has attracted sophisticatedbusiness networks and operations that adopttactics reminiscent in style and approach to theMafia in their attempts to conceal fishing vesselownership/activity and trade in cod.ConclusionsOwing to its clandestine nature, IUU fishingis extremely difficult to confidently estimate.Rather than attempt to estimate the quantitiesof fish that are caught and landed and furthercontribute to the uncertain situation, it is reasonableto conclude that there is a high level of IUUfishing, particularly in the form of un<strong>report</strong>edlandings from the Eastern Baltic. The Polish codfishery appears to be a significant contributor tothis aspect of the IUU fishing problem, however,the cumulative effect of IUU activities in otherMember States could also be significant.Other forms of IUU fishing exist and these arelikely to vary throughout the year in response tothe availability of fish and the technical conservationmeasures in place.In some instances, there is chronic non-compliancecaused by no or ineffective enforcementaction and deterrent. This was described at alocal, regional and national scale. Such long termnon-compliant behaviour may mean that thishas become “normal behaviour” with little or nofeeling of moral obligation to comply.Reducing overcapacity is seen as an importantway to reduce IUU fishing. Current decommissioningprogrammes in the new Member Stateswill mean significant reductions in their nationalfleets. However, in the absence of any clear understandingof what a balance between capacityand resource may look like it is uncertain whetherthis will contribute to reducing IUU fishing.Improving the quality of control and enforcementis seen as an important factor in contributingto a reduction in IUU fishing. However,detecting and successfully compiling a case willonly help reduce IUU fishing if the sanction thatis imposed acts as a deterrent. If the cost of sanctionsare only viewed as a cost of doing businessthen they will have limited effect.It seems likely that anyone trading in largeamounts of cod runs a high risk of dealing withfish that has come from an IUU source. In someinstances, traceability appears to be operationalfrom the point of first sale. However, there is anonus on buyers of first sale fish to ensure that itdoes not come from IUU sources. Without independentmonitoring to confirm that these buyersare making necessary checks to ensure that this isthe case, the system is flawed and open to abuse.VMS appears to be under- or ineffectively utilisedby the Member States. Until these short-fallsare resolved the monitoring, control and enforcementregime will not be as effective as it couldor should be. Further, new technology may beof value, e.g. electronic logbooks, although withthe likely need to integrate these systems thereis concern that the potential benefit and addedvalue they bring might not be fulfilled.The political will to improve compliance withfisheries regulations needs to be created and theENGOs are seen as being well placed to contributeto this. It appears that high profile and factuallybased media events, in particular throughtelevision, provide a very effective way of creatingpublic awareness and help to stimulate politicalwill to tackle IUU fishing.– 22 –

Part IIPolicy and regulatory frameworksIntroductionEuropean fisheries policy and regulatory frameworksfor control and enforcement apply withinthe Baltic Sea. The following sections describeand analyse these frameworks.The policy frameworkThe reformed CFPA reformed EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)was adopted in December 2002. Given theconsiderable time and effort that went into thewhole reform process, the final outcome is a surprisinglyshort, 21-page document 15 that providesthe new “framework regulation” for the CFP.All other regulations related to the conservation,management and exploitation of living aquaticresources and aquaculture must be in accordancewith this regulation. Seven chapters and two annexesprovide the basis for measures concerning:• conservation, management and exploitationof living aquatic resources;• limitation of the environmental impact offishing;• conditions of access to waters and resource;• structural policy and the management of thefleet capacity;• control and enforcement;• aquaculture;• common organisation of the markets; and• international relationsChapters II, V and VI of the reformed CFPprovide for three important additions within thepolicy areas associated with conservation andsustainability, control and enforcement, and decision-makingand consultation. They also haveparticular relevance with respect to the Baltic Seaand the cod fishery in that they provide for:• The development and implementation ofrecovery plans for fisheries that exploit stockswhich are outside of safe biological limits;• A new legal framework for a Communitycontrol and enforcement system; and• The establishment of Regional AdvisoryCouncils (RACs) to help meet the objectivesof the CFP and to advise the Commissionand the Member States on matters of fisheriesmanagement in respect of certain sea areas orfishing zones.The advent of a reformed CFP did not mean thateverything changed overnight; further policydevelopment was required to ensure that the newobligations were met. The Commission was giventhe major task of developing and presenting proposalsthat would lead to the implementation ofthe new CFP. This is an ongoing process which isbeing undertaken in incremental steps.The development of a Baltic Sea codrecovery planThe International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission(IBSFC) adopted a long term management plan forcod in 1999. Despite the plan, however, the stateof the stocks continued to worsen and a recoveryplan was agreed and adopted in 2001 and furtherrevised in 2003. With the accession of Poland,Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the EuropeanCommunity in 2004, only two parties – the EUand Russia – remained in the IBSFC. In 2005,the Community withdrew from the IBSFC andthe organisation ceased to exist at the end of thatyear. Bilateral agreements between the EU andRussia have been adopted and EU regulations andmanagement measures are replacing those agreedwithin the IBSFC, including the long term managementand recovery plans for cod in the Baltic Sea.Following two consultations on versions of a“non-paper on long term management for codstocks in the Baltic Sea” in 2005 the EuropeanCommission published its proposal for a multiannualcod management plan in July 2006 16 . Itexpects that it will be adopted in June 2007. Inthe meantime, technical conservation measuresare in place that reflects the recommendations– 23 –

that were adopted within the IBSFC’s recoveryplan.The following provides a brief summary of thekey points in the plan:Based on scientific advice, target fishing mortalityrates are set for both stocks. In order to reachthese targets an annual 10% reduction in fishingeffort and fishing mortality is proposed. AnnualTACs would be set so that they correspond withthe effort limits. In order to avoid large annualchanges in the TAC a maximum 15% variation,up or down, would be allowed.Fishing effort would be limited by annual closuresin both the western and eastern Baltic Sea,initially; these would correspond to approximately2 months in the spring and summer, respectively.Thereafter, if the fishing mortality rateis at least 10% higher that the target rate, thetotal number of days allowed for fishing wouldbe reduced by 10%. A further three seasonal areaclosures are proposed that correspond to spawningareas.Monitoring, inspection and surveillance measuresare highlighted with the intention of betterensuring Member States improve the accuracy oflanding data and enable improved coordinationand cooperation between each other.The plan would be evaluated after the first threeyears and, thereafter, annually to review the rateof progress toward the targets. If there is an indicationthat targets are not likely to be achieved,the Council would decide on a proposal from theCommission on additional or alternative measures.CommentThe main difference between the existing managementapproach and that which is described inthe multi-annual plan is the proposed adoptionand use of target fishing mortality rates againstwhich to assess the recovery of stocks. Also, byclearly linking TACs and fishing effort to thesetargets and introducing annual maximum variationsin them, the Commission has attemptedto strike a balance between bringing the stockswithin safe biological limits and the likely economicand social consequences of doing so.In theory, this approach is an improvement onthe existing regime. However, the outcome ofthe TAC negotiations for 2006 left some peoplefeeling that the European Commission and theCouncil of Ministers took a backward step and,indeed, created a worse situation from whichtheir own recovery plan will start if adopted in2007. A cynical view may suggest it confirmsthe lip service that the European institutions payto the management of fish stocks; a pragmaticview may suggest it more accurately reflects thepresent reality of the fishery by taking accountof the un<strong>report</strong>ed landings and will thereforeprovide a more realistic basis for a new recoveryplan.Furthermore, some have raised concern that theproposed plan does not meet the requirementsof the CFP in that stocks outside safe biologicallimits must have a “recovery plan”. However,because the plan aims to manage two stocks, oneof which is at or slightly above the safe biologicallimit, the Commission has proposed a compromiseand called it a “multi-annual plan”. Thestated intention being to conform with the overallobjectives of the CFP, aid recovery and, at thesame time, allow fishing in a less restrictive waythan would be required with a recovery plan.Control and enforcementThe reformed CFP provides a new frameworkfor a Community control and enforcement systemwhich, in summary: clarifies the responsibilitiesof the Member States and the Commission; isdesigned to ensure that compliance with the rulesof the CFP is achieved; and ensures that exploitationof the fish stocks is controlled throughoutthe whole fisheries chain. The following representa summary of some of the key points afforded bythe new framework:• The Member States are primarily responsiblefor the control and enforcement of the CFP,while the Commission is responsible for monitoringand enforcing correct application ofCommunity law by the Member States.• Member States shall ensure:– enforcement measures are taken to ensurecompliance with the rules of the CFP;– effective control, inspection and enforcement,and provide adequate financialand human resources to achieve this;– 24 –

– measures that provide sufficient deterrentto discourage infringements;– cooperation with each other to ensurecompliance with the rules of the CFP;– that fisheries products are subject to anaudit and that anybody commerciallytrading in fishery products must be registered.• The Commission will:– evaluate and control the application of theCFP by Member States, and facilitate coordinationand cooperation between them;– take preventative measures where there isa risk of a serious threat to the conservationof living aquatic resources;– evaluate and <strong>report</strong> every three years onMember States’ application of the CFPrules.In order to take forward the new control andenforcement framework, the Commission producedtwo Communications 17, 18 in 2003 whichdescribed a step-wise approach with the applicationof an “Action Plan for Cooperation inEnforcement” followed by a “Compliance WorkPlan” which the Commission would implementin coordination with the Member States. Bybetter integrating national control strategies, theCommission aimed to promote a “European cultureof control and enforcement” 3 . The ActionPlan was viewed as a short-term initiative, i.e.2003-2005, providing the platform from whichthe long-term Compliance Work Plan would belaunched.To implement the Action Plan, the Commissioncalled upon two of its advisory bodies– the Management Committee for Fisheries andAquaculture and the Expert Group on FisheriesControl – to provide advice, feedback andsupport. The Management Committee is madeup of senior representatives from Member Statesadministrations responsible for the whole gambitof fisheries management issues. In this instance,individuals from Member State policy, scientificand inspectorate divisions are all potential participants.Similarly, the Expert Group on FisheriesControl is made up of senior representativesfrom Member States but, more obviously, fromthose parts of national administrations that areresponsible for monitoring, control and surveillanceof fisheries.The Action Plan was meant to establish the basisfor the Compliance Work Plan and 2006 marksthe transition between the two. It is thereforetimely to consider and review how the ActionPlan has been applied in the Baltic Sea. Table 5describes each of the Action Plan’s eleven actionpoints and, drawing upon discussions with representativesfrom the Commission’s DirectorateD and from some Member State inspectorates,provides an analysis of each. Figure 1 provides apictorial explanation of how the Action Plan andWork Plan relate and the intended outcomes.Figure 1. The relationship and planned outcomes of the Action Planfor Cooperation in Enforcement and Compliance Work PlanThe Action Plan for Cooperation in EnforcementThe aim and objectives of the Action Plan wereto achieve more effective use of national meansof inspection and surveillance through:• better using the means available in selectedfisheries or stocks;• adopting Specific Monitoring Programmes(SMPs); and• periodically evaluating the effectiveness of theSMPs.Support to nationalauthorities & promotionofcoordinationbetween themAction Plan forCooperation inEnforcementCommissionComplianceWork PlanTransparency2002–20052006 & beyondControl andenforcement withthe support of theCFCA– 25 –

Table 5. An analysis of the 11 Point Action Plan for Cooperation in Enforcement with respect to the Baltic Sea cod fishery5.2.2 Action Was Point the and its Action Aim Plan effective in the Baltic Sea?A description and analysis of how the actions have been applied in the Baltic Sea region1. Select relevant fisheries orstocks:• Demersal fisheries in regions2 and 3;• Highly migratory species inthe Mediterranean;• Cod, herring and sprat fisheriesin ICES divisions III b, cand d, (i.e. The Baltic Sea);• Industrial and pelagic fisheriesin regions 1, 2 and 3;and• Landings of IUU vessels inCommunity ports (this refersspecifically to vessels engagingin high seas fisheries).Aim: The prioritisation ofthe use of existing means ofinspection and surveillance inselected fisheries or stocks.The Baltic Sea cod fishery has been selected as a key fishery on which to focus inspection and surveillanceeffort.The Commission has chosen to use the Working Group on Control and Enforcement, which wasoriginally established by the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC), as the main focalpoint for improving integration and cooperation of national control strategies. The Working Group ischaired by the Commission and brings together representatives from all the Baltic Sea Member Statesfisheries inspectorates.Unlike the IBSFC, the Commission does not publish <strong>report</strong>s of these meetings. It appears that owingto sensitivities that some Member States have with respect to having their “shortfalls” being made publiclyavailable and, given the role of facilitator, coordinator and encourager, the Commission is keento establish meetings where Member State representatives can talk openly and not feel too guarded inwhat they say.Feedback received in the course of this study suggests that the Commission is of the opinion that theeffectiveness of inspection and surveillance at sea would be greatly enhanced by better coordinationand more frequent inspections of landings. In particular, the Commission believes:• VMS data is under-utilised by and between Member States with limited use or capacity to usereal time information to direct inspections. Given that Community funds have contributed to thedevelopment and implementation of VMS, the Commission is keen to see better use of the system.• Coordinated at-sea inspections appear to happen more on an ad-hoc basis owing to poor coordinationbetween the relevant Member State departments as well as difficulties in ensuring that vessels,which are often tasked with multiple roles, are available. The Community Fisheries ControlAgency (CFCA) (see page 30) and any vessels it may charter may be able to provide a solution tothis situation.• There is a need for an increase in the frequency of landing inspections: concerted actions needto be taken targeting those fleets or ports where landings of cod are most likely; more inspectorsneed to be employed by the Member States; and/or more specific designated places and times(i.e. than the existing designated ports) need to be set for landings to improve the chance ofinspection.2. The Commission will adoptregulations laying down specificmonitoring programmes forthe relevant fisheries or stocksand establish:• Common inspection andsurveillance priorities;• Benchmarks for inspectionand surveillance of fishingactivities; and• Checks to be made byinspectors.Member States should ensurethat their competent authoritieswill achieve the commoninspection priorities andbenchmarks.Aim: Enhanced effectivenessof inspection and surveillanceactivities.Annex III to Council Regulation 52/2006 19 (also page 42) provides the basis of a specific monitoringprogramme (SMP) for the Baltic Sea cod fishery. Its origin is the IBSFC’s cod recovery plan, which wasagreed in 2002 and has been annually rolled forward and adapted since. An EU cod recovery plan isanticipated in 2007 (see page 21) and will provide a new framework for the SMP.Member States are required to take the necessary measures to facilitate implementation of theseprogrammes, particularly as regards the human and material resources required and the periodsand zones where these are to be deployed. Baltic Sea Member States are required to publish thisinformation on their authorities’ websites. In the same vane, benchmarks for inspection are requiredto be publicised on official websites. While all Member States have published this information somedeficiencies are noted, for example, the Polish website does not give information on how they implementeffort management.The Commission is keen to ensure that uniform inspections are being conducted and that criteria areestablished for what constitutes a “full inspection”. Common rules for national control programmeshave been set but a standardised inspection protocol or criteria have yet to be established for theBaltic Sea.In 2005, the Commission undertook an evaluation of how Member States had implemented measuresset out in Annex III (see page 40). In its interim assessment, the Commission presented broad conclusionsfor four unnamed Member States (subsequently found out to be Poland, Latvia, Lithuania,Estonia). They concluded that:• The interim and additional conditions for monitoring, inspection and surveillance in the contextof recovery of cod stocks in the Baltic Sea were mostly being implemented. However, some measures(undisclosed) were not achieving the intended outcome or were not considered to be useful.• Extra enforcement effort had been deployed in most cases but there were unlikely to be any moreadditional resources for at-sea or onshore enforcement in the near future.• Comprehensive and efficient catch registration systems are in place.• There was scope for better cooperation between Member States.– 26 –

Action Point and its AimA description and analysis of how the actions have been applied in the Baltic Sea regionA more detailed analysis for all the Baltic EU Member States was expected to be published in June2006, however, this was delayed and has yet to be formally released (as of early 2007). The delay isapparently due to the Commission discussing the results and encouraging Member States to makeimprovements in their ability to carry out fundamental control, monitoring and surveillance (CMS).3. The Commission will periodicallyreview the effectivenessof inspection and surveillanceactivities in cooperation withnational control experts.Aim: Enhanced transparencyof inspection and surveillanceactivities.Measuring the effectiveness of inspection and surveillance is difficult. Rather than try to measure thisspecifically, the Commission believes that consistent and equitable application of the rules will resultin more effective inspection and surveillance. In this regard, it has chosen a number of ways that, incombination, provide an on-going review of effectiveness and greater transparency:• The Commission convenes regular meetings of the Baltic Sea Working Group on Control andEnforcement to discuss effectiveness of National Action Plans and Joint Inspection Programs.• The Commission undertakes its own evaluation of the effectiveness of control and inspectionactivities.• Inspection <strong>report</strong>s are produced for every inspection and the Member States provide an analysis ofthis to the Commission and other Member States.• The Commission annually publish a Compliance Scoreboard (see page 33 and table 6) which,among other things, is meant to provide an indication of how Member States comply with theirobligations associated with control and enforcement.The lack of transparency of the meetings of the Working Group, as already highlighted above inreference to Action Point 1, makes it difficult to comment on how this group contributes to improvedeffectiveness of inspection and surveillance.Since 2003, the Commission has undertaken three separate evaluation/verification programmes:• BACOMA verification programme;• VMS verification; and• Interim evaluation of technical conservation measures.The compilation of Member State inspection information and the Compliance Scoreboard are linked;the analysis of the inspection information provides the basis for assessment by the Commissionthrough the Scoreboard. However, in the analysis that the Commission has provided with each of theScoreboards that have been published so far, it highlights the difficulties in making meaningful comparisonbetween Member State control and surveillance programmes. The reason appears to be thelack of a standardised way of compiling and <strong>report</strong>ing inspections, despite the Commission providinga template within which to submit information. As a result, the way in which the Commission haschosen to assess effectiveness and enhance transparency is significantly compromised to the point oflimited use and meaning.4. Working in cooperationwith the Commission and thirdcountries, Member States willadopt legislation requiring thesetting up of pilot projects todevelop and test electronic<strong>report</strong>ing devices and logbooks.Aim: Rationalised data recordingand <strong>report</strong>ing to authorities.Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) have been developed and supported by the Commission and arenow in place for all vessels over 15 metres. The Commission has funded research into electroniclogbooks – Secure and Harmonised European Electronic Logbook (SHEEL) – and is confident that suchinnovations will be part of the control regulations in the not too distant future; indeed, Denmark isalready operating an electronic logbook system. Ensuring that new technologies to improve controland enforcement are used to best effect and in a way that allows Member States to better coordinatetheir inspection effort will be a challenge; one that has not been met with total success with VMS, asindicated under Action Point 1 above.5. Member States will appointcoordinators capable ofresponding at short notice torequests for information on thecharacteristics of vessels flyingtheir flag.Aim: Increased effectiveness ofinspection, surveillance and follow-upaction on infringementsthrough accessibility of relevantinformation.An obvious pre-requisite for improved coordination between Member States is knowing who, whereand how to contact officers within different administrations in order to gain access to relevant andspecific vessel information. According to the Commission, all Baltic States have appointed coordinatorsand the intention is that remote access to information by electronic means will be available in thefuture.In conversation with some members of fisheries inspectorates it still seems there are problems gettinginformation in a timely and useful fashion. Not only does this apply to statutory information such aslogsheets, sales notes and landing declarations but also with respect to VMS or vessel sighting data.– 27 –

Action Point and its Aim6. Working in cooperationwith national authorities, theCommission will review nationalprocedures and requirementsconcerning accessibilityof individual data and, whereappropriate, introduce harmonisedminimum requirements byadopting new legislation.Aim: Guaranteed confidentialityof information concerningindividual vessels or individualoperators.A description and analysis of how the actions have been applied in the Baltic Sea regionWhen vessels operate either within, from or between different Member States, secure and quickaccess to vessel data provides for improved control, surveillance and enforcement. The Commissionconfirmed that through the Working Group on Control and Enforcement it has reviewed the nationalprocedures in place. It concludes that, in some instances, procedures are still inadequate or infrequent.Member States where this was a problem made a commitment to remedy the situation in 2006;to what extent this was achieved is not yet certain.Again, without access to <strong>report</strong>s or minutes of the Working Group, it is not clear to which MemberStates it refers and whether improvements were achieved. Neither is it clear what action the Commissionwill take if the situation is not improved.7. Working in cooperationwith national authorities,the Commission will reviewoperational communicationprocedures and, where needed,will introduce uniform communicationroutines.An important issue with respect to improved cooperation between national authorities is their practicalability to securely communicate between surveillance vessels and aircraft. Some Member Statesuse military technology and procedures, while others use civilian means of inspection and are notequipped with installations that allow them to communicate in this way. It is not clear how much ofan impediment this really is. While the Commission has a commitment to improve the situation, it hasopenly given this a low priority and admits to limited progress on this action.Aim: Harmonisation of operationalcommunication routinesbetween inspection platforms.8. Member States should adoptmeasures to facilitate exchangeof inspectors, notably as regardsinspection and surveillance oftrans-boundary fishing activities.Aim: Enhanced uniformity ofinspection and surveillance.The Commission is helping to facilitate this approach by providing resources to improve exchangeand liaison. Some Member States have established good links resulting in a regular (annual) exchangeof inspectors.Those inspectorates that expressed an opinion agreed that these exchanges were valuable. However,losing inspectors from already under-staffed administrations posed its own problems.9. The Commission will reviewinformation on irregularitiesand non-compliance which itreceives from third parties, onan annual basis, together withrepresentatives of the fishingindustry.The Commission is of the opinion that the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) provide a forumthrough which irregularities on non-compliance could be brought to its attention.While this action point specifically mentions reviewing information on an annual basis, when asked,the Commission confirmed that if the irregularities were considered to be of a serious enough nature itwould deal with them in a more expeditious fashion.Aim: Enhanced uniformity ofinspection and surveillance.10. The Commission will composea draft code of conductfor inspection to be discussedwith national inspectors and thefishing industry by mid-2003.The code has been given a low priority and not been progressed. Some Member States already operatetheir own codes of conduct.Such codes are important to show that the administrations have established clear and transparentmethods for conducting their duties.Aim: Fair, professional and safeinspection and surveillance.11. The Commission willprovide regular feedback of inspectioninformation to nationalcontrol experts.The findings of Commission inspectors are made available to the competent national authorities forcomment. This is part of a formal process.The Commission has said that it will review the information on irregularities on conduct.Aim: Enhanced cooperation betweenthe Commission and thecompetent national authorities.– 28 –

Was the Action Plan effective in the Baltic Sea?Within the Baltic Sea region, the European Commissionhas achieved the majority of the actionpoints set out in the Action Plan:• The Baltic Sea cod fishery has been identifiedas a key fishery on which to focus inspectionand surveillance effort;• A working group, formerly under the auspiciousof the IBSFC, has been used to coordinatecooperation;• Common priorities and benchmarks for inspectionand surveillance for all the Baltic SeaMember States have been adopted;• The Commission has undertaken evaluationof a variety of control and inspection activities;• The Commission provides regular feedbackof inspection information to national controlexperts;• A compliance scoreboard has been publishedannually since 2003;• Pilot projects have been funded and areexpected to result in new applications in thenear future;• Review of third party complaints through thedevelopment of the Baltic Sea RAC;• Member State coordinators have been appointedto ensure improvement in requests forinformation from other Member States; and• Member States are increasingly exchanginginspectors and the Commission is helpingprovide funds for this process.The Commission has made limited or no progresson:• Achieving common inspection protocol orcriteria;• Reviewing operational communication procedures;and• Drafting a code of conduct for inspection.The Commission should be given credit forachieving so much within a relatively short spaceof time and with the limited resources it has atits disposal. In discussion with Commission staff,the “fall out” from the CFP reform has providedthem with a significant task and was furtheradded to by unrealistic political gestures andcommitments made by some senior staff whowere buoyed up by the fact that they were leavingafter the CFP reform – and so would not bearound to deal with the consequences.Furthermore, within the post-CFP reform phase,the accession of four new Member States withinthe Baltic has provided the Commission withanother significant increase in workload. If it hadnot been for the fact that the IBSFC provided afocal point and structure which the Commissioncould adopt and mould into a form that suited it,then it seems likely that the Commission wouldhave had serious difficulties in achieving what ithas. In some instances, the accession process mayhave benefited the speed with which the ActionPlan has been implemented owing to the requirementof new Member States to meet the AcquisCommunautaire, i.e. the body of legislationcandidate countries must adopt before joiningthe EU. The near coincidence of their joining andthe implementation of the reformed CFP mayhave provided for a more rapid adoption by newMember States of some new working practices.While the Commission may have been able toput in place the majority of the actions it had intended,the real “litmus test” is to assess whetherthey have been effective or not, and also to considerthe consequences of those actions that werenot fully implemented.There has been no official assessment of the ActionPlan. During the course of the study, however,representatives from the Commission wereasked their opinion on how effective the ActionPlan had been in achieving its aims.There was a general feeling that cooperationhad improved and overall there was much bettercoordination. However, some of the newMember States were still finding it hard to meetall the basic requirements, mainly as a result ofresource constraints. Some of the other MemberStates were facing cutbacks or caps on resourcesand so, as with any system that was being askedto do something different but with the same orless resources, progress was slower than mighthave been hoped. It was also pointed out thatthe outcome of the Commission’s 2005 evaluationof how Member States implemented thetechnical and control measures set out in AnnexIII of Council Regulation 52/2006 will provideclear indicators as to a number of the key aspectsof the Action Plan (see page 40). The ComplianceScoreboard was also considered to providesome indication of how Member States werecomplying with requirements of the Action Plan,although it was recognised that there were some– 29 –

failings in the process (see page 33).With respect to actions for which there werelimited or no progress, the Commission hadgiven a low priority to all but the developmentof common inspection protocol/criteria fromthe outset. Results from its interim evaluationof the implementation of Annex III confirm thatinspections are still not being conducted in astandardised way. It was not entirely clear fromthe discussions with the Commission why standardisinginspections was such a difficult thing todo. It seems likely that, for some Member Stateauthorities, a significant factor is the practicalreality of undertaking inspections with limitedresources, often in less than ideal conditions orcircumstances. In such cases, inspectors may findthey have to prioritise aspects of an inspection atthe expense of others.If standardised, inspections may consistently failto be fully applied, even though key aspects ofan inspection were undertaken. The authoritiescould either fail to meet minimum requirementsor chose to <strong>report</strong> a complete inspection, withoutactually doing so, making a mockery of thesystem.It would be unfair to use the feedback receivedin the course of the study as a clear indication ofeffectiveness of the Action Plan. However, it wasobvious that some of the actions were consideredeasier to assess than others as they had tangibleresults or indicators. In other instances, thereappears only to be a presumption that becausecertain frameworks or procedures are in placethe actions are effective.The Compliance Work PlanThe Commission’s Compliance Work Plan aimsto compliment and take forward the Action Plan.It focuses on three main areas:• Support to national authorities and promotionof co-ordination between them• Control and enforcement• TransparencyIn discussion with members of DirectorateD: Control and Enforcement and with referenceto the Commission’s Communication(COM(2003)344) 20 , the following provides asummary of what the Commission has alreadyachieved and what it envisages for the Work Planunder these three areas. Where possible, it alsohighlights aspects of particular relevance to theBaltic region.Support to national authorities and coordinationbetween themThe Commission will continue to work withthe Member States within the framework ofthe Management Committee for Fisheries andAquaculture and the Expert Group on FisheriesControl. Their focus will be:• the adjustment of fleet capacity;• the current weaknesses in inspection andsurveillance, including follow-up of infringements;and• assessment of joint inspection programmes(in so doing, the Commission will undertakeperiodic evaluation <strong>report</strong>s).The Commission will also continue to consultstakeholders through the Advisory Committeeon Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) and useRegional Advisory Councils (RACs) to consultinterested parties. With respect to the Baltic, theWorking Group on Control and Enforcementwill continue to provide important input and theCommission specifically expressed its high expectationsof the Baltic Sea RAC.Control and enforcement of the planThe Commission has broadly set out withinthe Work Plan how it will monitor and enforcethe correct application of Community law bythe Member States. The Commission intends tofocus its efforts in four ways:1. By identifying inspection priorities;2. The establishment of “administrative inquiries”into cod and hake catch data;3. The freeing up and re-directing of EU inspectortime away from RFO (Regional FisheriesOrganisations such as NAFO, NEAFC) duties;and4. Ensuring Member States are applying appropriatedeterrents.As well as the inspection and monitoring workundertaken by the Commission, a CommunityFisheries Control Agency (CFCA or “The Agency”)will also be established to support MemberStates in their control and enforcement efforts.– 30 –

Using the above points as headings, the followingprovides a summary of what the Commission envisagesfor the control and enforcement aspectsof the Work Plan and also describes the role andfunction of the Control Agency.The Commission’s inspection prioritiesThe European Commission has a team of approximately30 inspectors and, following an advertisingfor 29 more, will be recruiting throughout2007. Through “Missions” to the MemberStates and through the analysis of informationgathered from different sources, the inspectorsobserve and verify how the national authoritieshave organised their control and inspection activities,and how the rules of the CFP are applied inpractice. The Commission has set four inspectionpriorities:The first priority for Commission inspectors isthe effective application of conservation, controland enforcement measures by Member Stateson stocks that are outside safe biological limitsand for which recovery plans have been tabled– and so includes the Baltic Sea cod fishery. Theadoption of specific monitoring programmes willprovide a focus on inspection and surveillanceat sea, inspections of landings, including the firstsale of the quantities landed, as well as transportand marketing. The monitoring programmes willalso set out benchmarks for inspection, commonpriorities and list the checks to be carried out bynational inspectors, with the intention of providinga clearer basis upon which Commissioninspectors can undertake their evaluations.The second priority is the verification of theimplementation and effectiveness of particularrequirements in specified areas, such as effortlimitations in the North Sea and North WesternWaters, control measures for the Baltic Sea codfishery, control measures for highly migratoryspecies, checking of logbook requirements in theMediterranean and checking on how MemberStates control engine power. In so doing, theCommission inspectors will provide evaluation<strong>report</strong>s on how Member States are performing.The third priority relates to cooperation withthird countries, notably under bilateral fisheryagreements, regional fisheries organisations’control and enforcement schemes, and the FAOInternational Plan of Action to Prevent, Deterand Eliminate Illegal, Un<strong>report</strong>ed and Unregulatedfishing – this is a high seas initiative ratherthan within the EU EEZ.Finally, the fourth priority that the Commissionhas set will facilitate the implementation of newtechnological requirements adopted by the newCFP, such as the inclusion of VMS requirementsfor smaller vessels, pilot projects on remote sensingand electronic logbooks.The Commission’s priority areas appear to be appropriateand well founded. However, the abilityof the Commission inspectors to effectively undertaketheir role as “monitors of the monitors”has been diluted and constrained in a numberof ways by Article 27(1) of the CFP frameworkregulation (EC 2371/2002):• They have no additional powers beyond thoseof national inspectors and have no enforcementpowers;• If a Commission inspection takes placewithout assistance of national inspectors, thethird party is within their right to decline aninspection;• Commission inspections can only take placeon fishing vessels, places of first landing orfirst points of sale, unless accompanied bynational inspectors;• Commission inspections of business premisesor vehicles transporting fish can only takeplace when accompanied by national inspectors;and• Member States are not obliged to act againstindividuals on the basis of the findings of aCommission inspection <strong>report</strong>.How much these limitations undermine theCommission inspectors effectiveness was notclarified during the course of this study, althoughit was intimated by the Commission that theinability for Commission inspectors to operatewhile ashore, in some circumstances, inhibitedtheir effectiveness and that it was down to MemberStates to be more willing than they presentlywere to allow this to change.Administrative inquiriesOwing to the apparent EU-wide problem ofunrecorded landings of cod and hake, the Commissionwill request all Member States concernedto undertake administrative inquiries into thereliability of cod and hake catch data and toinvestigate any potential cases of illegal landings– 31 –

of cod and hake. The Commission will be ableto ask that particular sources of information areused including commercial, trade and tax dataand Commission inspectors will be able to participatein the inquiries.This is a key initiative and something that is tobe anticipated within the Baltic. At the time ofwriting it had apparently not been decided whensuch a request will be made. It was not possibleto gauge the level of detail or the extent to whichthe Commission anticipates being involved inthese inquiries. However, it would seem prudentto ensure limited warning is given to those thatmight be involved in the trade of un<strong>report</strong>edlandings; that the level of participation by theCommission is high; and, that appropriatelyqualified and skilled investigators are used toundertake a task that is, potentially, beyond thenormal capabilities and expectations of fisheriesinspectors who are more accustomed to dealingwith fishermen, fishing vessels and other fisheriesinspectors than trade and tax data.Redirecting EU inspectorsTo ensure that the Commission is able to bestdirect its limited inspection resources to this newway of working, Commission inspector time inRFO fisheries will be freed up and the shortfallwill be made up by inspectors from the MemberStates benefiting from these fisheries. This hasalready happened within the NAFO region. Also,as indicated above, in order to ensure that it ismore able to effectively carry out these areasof work, the Commission is in the process ofappointing a further 29 Commission inspectors.These will be based in Brussels and will be taskedwith developing, undertaking and evaluatingmonitoring programmes in all the coastal MemberStates.Ensuring there is a deterrentMember States are required to have systemsthat will deprive offenders of any financial gainfrom their actions and also act as an appropriatedeterrent. When Member States fail to complywith these requirements, the Commission is ableto improve the level of compliance by suspendingfinancial assistance, invoking preventive measuresand reducing future fishing opportunities.As regards preventive measures, as a first stage,the Commission envisages using this instrumentprimarily in relation to “black fish” concerningvulnerable stocks such as cod and hake.These appear to be appropriate and effectivemeasures. However, the time and human resourcesneeded to undertake such action areconsidered likely to act as more of a deterrent forthe Commission than the Member States. It wasonly after 15 years of political and legal wranglingthat France was finally penalised last yearfor overfishing. It is not clear how or why theprocess for penalising Member State judicial oradministrative systems for inappropriate deterrentswill be any easier or quicker.In addition to what the Commission may havein their “deterrent armoury”, Article 25(4) of thereformed CFP (EC Reg. No. 2371/2002) saysthat the Council will establish, “…a catalogue ofmeasures to be applied by Member States relatingto serious infringements…”. The Commissionand others have regularly highlighted thatappropriate deterrents are either not used or arenot consistently applied, and so this was seen bymany as a positive move toward establishing away by which Member State judicial and administrativesystems could accordingly set penalties.However, during the course of the discussionswith the Commission staff they said that theywould delay the development of such a catalogueand first focus on making the existing transparencyelements of their Work Plan (i.e. the SeriousInfringement Report and the Compliance Scoreboard)more meaningful and effective (see page37). This would not likely happen until 2007.Community Fisheries Control AgencyThe following is based on a summary from CommissionCOM(2003)130 21 , Commission staffworking paper SEC(2004)448 22 and the CouncilRegulation 23 that confirmed the establishmentof the Community Fisheries Control Agency(CFCA) – ’’the Agency’’.The setting up of the Agency was agreed by theCouncil of Ministers in April 2005 and preempteda feasibility study that the Commissionhad already put out to tender with the intentionof informing the Agency’s establishment.The Regulation confirms the objective of theAgency is “…to organise operational coordinationof fisheries control and inspection activitiesby the Member States and to assist them tocooperate so as to comply with the rules of theCFP in order to ensure its effective and uniformapplication”.– 32 –

It also confirms that there will be a correspondingobligation on Member States to make availablethe resources needed, and to deploy these“…in accordance with the joint deploymentplan”. Figure 2 includes the joint deploymentplan and also shows how the Agency will potentiallywork with, coordinate and assist MemberStates on specific monitoring, control and surveillanceoperations.Its Administrative Board was constituted at itsfirst meeting held in February 2006 (see AnnexII). At its second meeting held in Vigo, Spain, inJune 2006, the Administrative Board appointedthe Executive Director of the Agency. The Agencyis in the process of setting up its basic administrativeand financial structures and recruitingstaff so as to be ready to commence its operationalactivities from January 2007. It is basingitself in Brussels until its new headquarters arebuilt in Vigo.According to the Agency’s work programme itwill concentrate on organising operational coordinationof control and inspection by MemberStates on a fishery-by-fishery basis, apparentlycovering all stages of control and inspection offishing activities from fishing to the first sale offish landed or entering the Community market.Three operational priorities are highlighted:(i) Recovery and multi-annual plans for stocksand the fishing activities exploiting thosestocks;(ii) The Community Action Plan to combatillegal, un<strong>report</strong>ed and unregulated fishing;and,(iii) The need to reduce the impact of destructivefishing practices and discards.Preparation of operational “Joint DeploymentPlans” (JDP) will be undertaken and they will beFigure 2. Showing the potential structure for a joint inspection framework within which the Agency might operateBench marks &prioritiesSupportCOMMUNITYFISHERIES CONTROL AGENCY(CFCA)Reports & adviceEuropean CommissionReal timeInformationAgreement supervisonJoint Deployment Plan (JDP)Developed by the CFCAMember State1CONTROL GROUPCoordinated deploymentat target fisheryMember State2Joint Deployment Plan– 33 –

adopted in the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and forthe eastern stock of blue fin tuna.What constitutes a JDP is elaborated upon in theAgency’s work programme. In summary, it willbuild on the existing operational cooperation betweenthe Member States in the region concernedand it will be tailored to the characteristics ofthe region. The Agency will first make a studycovering information on fishing and control andinspection activities, non-compliance records andlevels, and reasons for such behaviour.Moreover, it will examine ways to promote aculture of compliance on the level of the regiontogether with the relevant RAC. Subsequently,the Agency will analyse on the basis of the meansof control and inspection pooled by the MemberStates concerned how the objectives, prioritiesand bench marks set out in the specific controland inspection plan can be achieved.Within its competence and for this purpose, theAgency may assist in or hold meetings, symposia,conferences, working groups with the MemberStates concerned and the stakeholders throughthe relevant RAC and invite third persons toattend or to make presentations or other writtendocuments so as to contribute to the objectivespursued by the Agency.Within Community waters, priority is given tofishing activities affecting stocks with recoveryplans and within which non-<strong>report</strong>ing of landingsis considered a significant problem.In international waters, the Agency may takeon tasks that are already assigned to the Commissionwithin the North East Atlantic FisheriesCommission (NEAFC) and the North AtlanticFisheries Organisation (NAFO). It may also undertakework with Norway on discarding in themackerel fishery.According to the work programme, the Agencywill have to concentrate its operational activitiesin 2007 and 2008 on a limited number offisheries since it will take some time to be fullyequipped and staffed (estimates of 49 staff havebeen made by the Commission – based on similarCommunity inspection agencies).The Agency will use its experience from 2007 toagree future needs with Member States and theCommission. By 2010 the Agency is anticipatedto become the independent and objective contactpoint in the Community for matters relating tocontrol and inspectionThe estimated budget of the Agency is in theregion of €5 million, which it envisages wouldbe met mainly by a contribution from the Communitybut also through other sources of incomeincluding charges to Member States for specificservices provided to them on a contractual basis(e.g. training), as well as fees for publications.CommentDiscussions with the Commission confirm thatit and some Member State administrations havesome uncertainty as to the benefits the agencywill provide. Some are of the opinion that theAgency was a result of politics as opposed topractical solutions. The basing of it in Vigo, thefishing heartland of a Member State with a notoriousreputation for non-compliance, only servedto confirm these opinions. Some of the southernMember States appear to be more positive asthey see that there is the potential for a CommunityAgency to improve their IUU problems andremove potentially difficult political situationsthat might be created if their own administrationswere more effective. Whereas in the northernMember States they are keen to show thattheir agencies and systems are able to deal withthe problem; in the UK, for example, anythingthat undermines or shows a failing in the RoyalNavy to undertake enforcement will be seen tobe very negative.The challenge appears to be whether the Agencywill add value to the existing system. ManyMember State administrations are under regularscrutiny as to the cost of enforcement and thisis becoming more of an issue. The success, orotherwise, of the Agency is likely to be highlydependent on the ability of the Chief Executiveto establish the organisation and win over theopinion that the Agency is more than a politicalsop to tackling IUU fishing.Figure 2 has been adapted from the CommissionCommunications and staff working papersto show how the Commission envisages that theAgency will fit into helping coordinate and engagewith Member States on specific monitoring,control and surveillance operations.– 34 –

TransparencyDuring the CFP reform process, the Commissionpublished a “Roadmap” 24 that set out howit would implement its programme of reform. Inthis, the Commission committed itself to improvingtransparency of information on compliance offisheries regulations by collating Member State informationand publishing an annual ComplianceScoreboard. To date, three editions of the scoreboardhave been published 25 and take the form ofwritten analysis and data presented in tables.The Scoreboard is intended to show MemberStates’ compliance with their obligations regardingfish stock conservation, fleet management,structural policy, and control and enforcement.This is achieved by using indicators, intendedto provide an easy way of viewing comparativeinformation between Member States. The Scoreboardalso indicates the inspections carried outby Member States and shows the infringementprocedures initiated by the Commission againstMember States who have failed to comply withCFP rules.Table 6 summarises the indicators used in theCommission’s Compliance Scoreboard andevaluates how the EU Baltic Sea Member Statesperformed in 2004.Of particular relevance to this study is the effectivenessof the Scoreboard’s indicators underthe policy themes associated with “managementof fisheries” and “verification of national monitoring/controlarrangements and infringementprocedures”. The following considers each withrespect to the EU Baltic Member States.Reporting catch dataThis is used as a basis to indicate whetherMember States are implementing adequate datamonitoring procedures. The analysis in Table 6shows that six of the Member States had problemsmeeting the requirements of submitting dataon time. From the available information, it canbe concluded that these Members States did nothave adequate monitoring procedures. However,there is no explanation as to the significance orwhy there was this apparent failing, nor is thereany indication of how the Commission intendedto follow up and improve the situation.OverfishingNone of the Member States <strong>report</strong>ed overshootingquotas. However, the Commission is notnaïve enough to think that this is an accuratereflection of the situation and mentions in itsassessment that scientific <strong>report</strong>s and its ownobservations have supported the suspicion thatmis<strong>report</strong>ing and un<strong>report</strong>ed landings take placethroughout the EU. With this in mind, it begs thequestion as to the validity or worth of this as anindicator of compliance.Reports on fishing effortThree Member States were late in submittingtheir fishing effort <strong>report</strong>s. The Commissionindicates that it could take infringement actionagainst those that do not fully meet the requirementsof <strong>report</strong>ing fishing effort. In this instance,however, it gave no indication as to whetheraction would be taken. Without explanation asto the follow up action that the Commissionintends to take, there is no validation in the valueof this as an indicator.Behaviour seriously infringing the rulesFour serious infringement <strong>report</strong>s have beenpublished 27, 28, 29, 30 . Owing to the late submissionof information (see required information formatin Annex III) from Member States, the Commissionwas unable to publish a <strong>report</strong> in 2004. Inits 2005 <strong>report</strong>, the Commission was unable todraw many clear conclusions because of the poorquality of the Member States’ data and the toneof some of the <strong>report</strong>s final remarks suggest adegree of frustration, for example, “Given a certainunreadiness to comply with the obligation oftimely and accurate <strong>report</strong>ing of information on‘serious infringements’, the Commission shall notrule out at this stage taking action against someMember States”.However, and despite this, one clear conclusionthe Commission was able to make is that the levelof fines is insufficient to act as a deterrent andshould be generally increased. It is of the opinionthat an administrative sanction that penalisesfishing time rather than the pocket of fishermen,such as the suspension of a licence or authorisationto fish, would be quicker to administer anda more effective deterrent. It highlights its regretthat Member States do not more readily use thisapproach.– 35 –

Table 6 Showing the indicators used in the Commission’s 2004 Compliance Scoreboard and how Baltic Sea Member States performed.Policy areas Policy theme Indicator How Baltic Member Statesperformed in 2004Management Reporting of To ensure that the Member States are implementing adequate The following tabulation shows whichof fisheries catch data data monitoring procedures, the Commission requires them to Member States complied with submittingprovide data at regular intervals throughout the fishing year. their <strong>report</strong>s in 2004. Where an “0” isThis information is divided between six types of <strong>report</strong>s, used it signifies either a late or nil return.known as Reports A to F.<strong>report</strong>s that must be presented monthly:A <strong>report</strong>: quantities of each stock covered by a TAC and/orquota landed in the territory of a Member State by vesselsflying its flag.B <strong>report</strong>: quantities of each stock covered by a TAC and/orquota landed in the territory of a Member State by vesselsflying the flag of another Member State.<strong>report</strong>s that must be presented quarterly:C <strong>report</strong>: quantities of each stock not covered by a TAC and/orquota landed in the territory of a Member State by vessels flyingits flag.D <strong>report</strong>: quantities of each stock not covered by a TAC and/orquota landed in the territory of a Member State by vessels flyingthe flag of another Member State.E <strong>report</strong>: quantities of each species taken in third-country watersor on the high seas landed in the territory of a Member State byvessels flying its flag.F <strong>report</strong>: quantities of each species taken in third-countrywaters or on the high seas landed in the territory of a MemberState by vessels flying the flag of another Member State.Swe Den Pol Ger Fin Lith Lat EaA x x x x x 0 0 0B x x x x x 0 0 0C x x 0 0 x 0 0 0D x x 0 0 0 0 0 0E x x 0 0 0 0 0 0F x x 0 0 0 0 0 0overfishing The data forwarded by Member States to the Commission is No Baltic Member State <strong>report</strong>edbased on the declarations of catches and landings made by exceeding their annual quota.vessel owners or agents.The TAC for cod in 2004 was 75,000When a Member State assesses that its annual quota allocations tonnes. 69,858 tonnes was <strong>report</strong>ed tofor any particular stock or group of stocks are almost used up it have been landed. The ICES Balticis obliged, under Community law, to take a number of measures Fisheries Assessment Working Groupto avoid these quotas from being overfished. These measures Report (2005) estimates total landingsinclude not only enforcing a ban on fishing for the stocks or of 88,609 tonnes.group of stocks concerned, but also setting a date after whichthese stocks cannot be retained on board a vessel, trans-shippedor landed.<strong>report</strong>s on “Fishing effort” is defined as the product of the fishing capacity Sweden was the only Member State tofishing effort of a vessel (usually assessed in terms of engine capacity) and its submit all their <strong>report</strong>s on time. On atfishing activity (days spent at sea). Limits on fishing effort have least one occasion Denmark, Germanybeen imposed in some fishing areas, such as the Baltic Sea. and Finland all submitted late <strong>report</strong>s.member States are required to provide the Commission with The accession countries were exemptinformation on the fishing effort exerted by their vessels in these from this <strong>report</strong>ing requirement for 2004.areas in quarterly and yearly <strong>report</strong>s, the latter showing fishingeffort on a monthly basis.Fleet Community’s Member States have to register their fishing vessels in the All Member States provided thismanagement register of Community Fleet Register; therefore, the Register should reflect information on time.fishing vessels the current situation of their fleets. The Member States have tosend a copy of their complete national fleet register database,which includes a minimum set of characteristics per vessel tothe Commission four times a year.Compliance Before 1st May each year, Member States have to submit a <strong>report</strong> All States remained withinwith the entry- on their efforts during the previous year to achieve a sustainable the reference levels.exit regime balance between fleet capacity and available fishingand the re- opportunities.ference levelsfor the fleet at Since 1 January 2003 Member States have had to apply anthe end of entry-exit regime to the capacity of their fleets, measured in003. terms of both tonnage and power. Any entry of capacity into the– 36 –

Policy areas Policy theme Indicator How Baltic Member Statesperformed in 2004Fleetmanagementfleet of a Member State has to be compensated by the prior exitof at least the same amount of capacity (ratio 1:1, “at any time”),unless the entry corresponds to works to improve safety,hygiene or living and working conditions on board.reference levels for fleet capacity were set at the end of the MultiAnnual Guidance Program (MAGP IV). Since the reference levelsare a legacy of MAGP IV (period 1997–2002), they do not applyto the Member States that joined the EU on 1st May 2004.rather, they have to ensure that the capacity of their fleets(in terms of gross tonnage and kilowatt power) must be equal orless than it was at 1st May 2004.re-measuring Owing to differences in how Member States’ measured fleet All States had re-measured their fleets,fishing vessel capacity in 1995 the Commission put in place rules to except for Poland, which still had tocapacity standardise the measurement of Community vessels in Gross measure 1% of its 0–15 m fleet.Tonnes (GT). Measuring capacity is particularly pertinent in theattempts to better achieve a balance between fishing capacityand fish stocks. By 2003, all vessel length categories (0–15 m,5–24 m, >24 m) were to have been re-measured.information Member States are required to communicate the vessel agent’s All States were fully compliant.required on name and address, the owner’s name and address, and the placefishing of construction for all vessels.licencesStructural Progress Each year, Member States are required to submit progress <strong>report</strong>s All States were fully compliant.Policy <strong>report</strong>s on on every programme being carried out under the terms of theprogrammes FIFG before 30 April. The <strong>report</strong>s should also cover informationunder the on financial aspects of implementation, and on the steps beingFinancial taken to ensure the quality and effectiveness of the applicationinstrument of of the funding.FisheriesGuidance These <strong>report</strong>s allow the Commission to keep a close watch on(FIFG) how the FIFG is operating, and to check that aid granted underthe scheme by the Member States meets the requirements of thestructural funds (e.g. eligibility criteria). Since 1 January003, FIFG aid to a Member State can be suspended if <strong>report</strong>ingobligations are not met.member States’ Member States are legally obliged to implement effective All States were fully compliant.management management and control systems and must assist the Commissionand control by carrying out checks on how European funds are being used.systems for Member States must inform the Commission by 30 June eachassistance year of the checks they have carried out.granted underthe StructuralFundsEnvironmental Annual <strong>report</strong> Since 2003 there has been a general prohibition on ”shark Sweden was the only Member State toIssues on shark finning” – although there are certain exceptions. By 1st May submit their <strong>report</strong> on time; all the otherfinning Member States are required to send a comprehensive annual Member States provided late submissions.<strong>report</strong> on the implementation of the Regulation during theprevious year. This <strong>report</strong> must include a description ofmonitoring systems in place to ensure compliance with therequirements set out in the Regulation and the outcome ofcontrol procedures.– 37 –

Policy areas Policy theme Indicator How Baltic Member Statesperformed in 2004Environmental List of vessels By 30th April each year, Member States are required to send the Germany and Sweden provided theirIssues authorised to Commission the list of vessels authorised to carry out fishing information to the Commission on time.use driftnets in activities using driftnets in the Baltic Sea. There will be a totalthe Baltic Sea prohibition of this gear in the Baltic Sea from 1st January 2008. Poland did not make any submission.This total ban is preceded by a progressive phasing out. In 2005,the maximum number of vessels, which may be authorised by a All the other Member States providedmember State to use driftnets, shall not exceed 60% of the late submissions.number of fishing vessels that used driftnets during the referenceperiod 2001 to 2003. In 2006 and 2007, this maximum numberof vessels shall not exceed 40% and 20% respectively of thereference number.Verification of Behaviour In 1999 a system was devised “…to increase transparency in the The following shows the number ofnational seriously enforcement of CFP rules and to encourage the adoption of serious infringements and the percentagemonitoring/ infringing the adequate and dissuasive sanctions when serious infringements for which penalties were imposed incontrol arrange- rules of the are detected” 26 . Council Regulation (EC) No.1447/1999 described 2003: Denmark 485 (59%); Germany 128ments and CFP types of behaviour (see table 7) that were considered likely to (100%), Finland 18 (50%); Swedeninfringement cause “serious infringement” of rules relating to important 97 (24%).procedurescomponents of the CFP: fish stock conservation, monitoring offishing activity and marketing of fisheries products.drawing any meaningful conclusionsfrom these figures is not possible for amember States are required to provide annual returns to the number of important reasons, amongCommission on the number of serious infringements, the them: each Member State has its ownproceedings that were initiated (i.e. administrative or criminal) judicial or administrative system forand a description of the outcome. The Commission then uses the dealing with and sanctioning offences;data to present statistical information (i.e. the number of cases, there are no Community standards forthe number of cases where Member State authorities have inspection, so direct comparison is notdetected infringement by nationals and non-nationals, the possible; and, the levels of fishing andnumber of penalties/sanctions, the number of seizures, the enforcement effort are not taken intoaverage fine and the amount paid by the fishing industry in each account.member State as a consequence of serious infringement) thatallows for comparison between Member States.infringement Infringement procedure means any procedure adopted by the The following Member States hadprocedures Commission and formally initiated against a Member State for procedures against them in 2004:failure to comply with basic or secondary Community law (i.e.provisions in the Treaties, Regulations and other legislative For exceeding Member State quota:instruments). If the Commission considers a Member State has Finland (2), Denmark (10), Sweden (6)breached Community law, it asks the State concerned to presentits observations within a specified period of time by sending it a For failure to provide catch/fishing effortletter of formal notice. data: Sweden (1), Finland (1)if the State continues to fail to meet its obligations, and if the For failure to implement VMS:Commission does not change its views as a result of the Member Estonia (1)State’s observations in response to the letter of formal notice, theCommission then delivers a reasoned opinion with which themember State must comply within a given period. If the MemberState fails to do so, the Commission may then refer the matter tothe Court of Justice (this procedure is called a referral). The Courtof Justice delivers judgements on any matter referred to it, andthese judgements are then binding on the Member States. In004, 69 procedures were underway.– 38 –

Policy areas Policy theme Indicator How Baltic Member Statesperformed in 2004Verification of European The European Commission has a team of approximately 30 The BACOMA evaluation programmenational Commission Commission inspectors. Through “Missions” to the Member showed that all the relevant Membermonitoring/ inspections States and through the analysis of information gathered from States had implemented the BACOMAcontrol arrange- different sources, the inspectors observe and verify how the measures.ments andnational authorities have organised their control and inspectioninfringement activities, and how the rules of the CFP are practically applied. The VMS verification programproceduresE evaluation <strong>report</strong>s are produced summarising the findings, mes showed that not all legislation wasproviding data on the level of compliance of the Member States in place and the lack of a mandate oftenconcerned and drawing general conclusions. For example, in hindered the effective enforcement of the004 a BACOMA and VMS verification programme was CFP; not all vessels required to be fittedcarried out.with a VMS terminal had been; the VMSsystems of most of the Member States didin 2004, the following number of EU Commission inspection not demonstrate the potential to monitorvisits were made to the Baltic Member States: Denmark 6, and control fishing vessel activity; andestonia 2, Lithuania 2, Poland 2, Germany 6, Latvia 2, Finland 1 the technical aspects of most systemsand Sweden 5.were limited.The average financial penalty imposed by eachof the EU Baltic Sea Member States in 2003was: Denmark € 455, Germany € 379, Finland €282, Sweden € 742. These represent some of thelowest financial penalties for all the EU MemberStates in 2003, with Finland being the lowest ofall. The average between the Baltic States was €464.50 compared to an overall EU average of €4,664 – which was still considered to be whollyinadequate as a deterrent by the Commission.With respect to its effectiveness it can only beconcluded that the serious infringement <strong>report</strong>does not effectively achieve its aim of increasingtransparency, nor does it appear to have encouragedthe adoption of adequate and dissuasivesanctions.Infringement proceduresIn discussion with Commission representativesthey were of the opinion that, until recently,the long drawn-out process of infringementprocedures has not been an effective incentivein ensuring that Member States meet their CFPobligations. However, since July 2005 when theEuropean Court imposed considerable fines onFrance for failing to meet inspection requirements,there had been a sudden improvement inthe way in which Member States were <strong>report</strong>ingon many aspects of the CFP. Up until this pointit appears that Member States administrationshad not taken the Scoreboard seriously, consideringit a burden rather than a way of promotingimproved compliance.EU Commission inspectionsWith limited resources the Commission hasundertaken a considerable number of inspectionsthroughout the EU and, more specifically, theBaltic Sea. In some instances, for example VMSverification, significant failings were highlightedbut no indication on what follow up action theCommission intended to take was given. Withoutthis, anybody who is interested in equitable andtransparent application of the rules is left withmore questions than answers.Effectiveness of the Compliance ScoreboardThe Compliance Scoreboard has provided ameans by which comparisons between MemberStates can be made and inference drawn as towhich are “good” and “not so good” at meetingtheir CFP obligations. However, because someof the indicators are, at best, limited in theirmeaning, accurate comparison is not possible.Also, in some instances, the Scoreboard fails toshow what follow-up action the Commission istaking to ensure that a failing in compliance isimproved. As a result, there is little reassurancethat, at both the Member State and the Commissionlevel, effective systems are in place toimprove or <strong>report</strong> on compliance.Tri-annual Commission evaluation <strong>report</strong>sThe Commission has also chosen to use anexisting requirement, afforded by Article 35 ofthe Control Regulation (EEC No. 2847/93) 31 ,along with a more recent obligation, afforded by– 39 –

Table 7. The list of types of behaviour which are considered to be serious infringements of the CFP rules• Obstructing the work of fisheries inspectors• Falsifying, concealing, destroying or tampering with evidence• Obstructing the work of observers• Fishing without holding a fishing licence/permit or any other authorisation required for fishing• Fishing under cover of a falsified document• Falsifying, deleting or concealing the identification marks of the fishing vessel• Using or keeping on board prohibited fishing gear• Using prohibited fishing methods• Not lashing or stowing prohibited fishing gear• Directed fishing for, or keeping on board of, a species subject to a fishing prohibition• Unauthorised fishing• Failure to comply with minimum landing sizes• Failure to comply with the rules and procedures relating to transhipments• Falsifying or failing to record data in logbooks• Tampering with the satellite-based vessel monitoring system• Deliberate failure to comply with rules on remote transmission of movements of fishing vessels• Failure of a third country vessel to comply with the rules when operating in Community waters• Landing of fishery products not complying with the community rules on control and enforcement• Storing, processing, placing on sale, and/or transporting fish products not meeting marketing standardsArticle 27(4) of the reformed CFP FrameworkRegulation (EC No. 2371/2002), as a means ofimproving transparency. Under both of these,it is required to publish a tri-annual evaluation<strong>report</strong> on control and enforcement of the rules ofthe CFP by Member States. The <strong>report</strong>s are basedon annual control <strong>report</strong>s submitted by MemberStates and observations made by the Commission.The latest <strong>report</strong> was published in 2005 32 andcovers the pre-accession period 2000-2002. The<strong>report</strong> is supported by a 230-page annex thatprovides an evaluation of each Member State,including a description of the prominent featuresof the fisheries; the fisheries-related activities thatneed to be controlled; the legal and administrativesystem in place; a description of the existingmeans of control and their use in monitoring, inspectionand surveillance activities; a descriptionof the cooperation exercised both at national andinternational level; and, finally, the Commission’sassessment of the state of fisheries control in theMember State for the period in question.A summary of the findings of the <strong>report</strong> for Denmark,Sweden, Finland and Germany is providedin Annex IV.These <strong>report</strong>s are potentially very useful for comparingand contrasting the different approachesand issues in each Member State. However,because of the significant task in collating andputting this information together and becausethe Commission undertakes to provide MemberStates with an opportunity to comment as well asto suggest any additional topics to be included,by the time they enter the public domain, theyare minimally 3 years out of date. Also, the valueof the <strong>report</strong>s is diluted because the Commissiondoes not include how it has or intends to dealwith any shortfalls that may be described in theevaluations.Ad hoc stakeholder meetingsFinally, under the theme of transparency, theCommission has also committed to provide additionalinformation to stakeholders by conveningad hoc meetings specifically tailored to the exploitationof the stocks concerned in the relevantregions. With the emphasis on stock recoveryplans it seems likely that it will be within theseregions most of these meetings will take place.The regulatory frameworkAll of the EU Regulations that apply to the BalticSea cod fishery are listed in Annex V and, wherepossible, links provided. All Regulations that– 40 –

are applicable to the CFP can be found on theEuropean Commission’s Fisheries and MaritimeAffairs website at the following address:http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/doc_et_publ/factsheets/legal_texts/regl_en.htm#generalThis section focuses on the process and the consequenceof those regulations that allocate thecod quotas to each EU Baltic Member State andprovide technical conservation measures for theBaltic Sea cod fishery.The TAC and quota Regulation2005 marked the transition from the IBSFC tobi-lateral, annual agreement on TACs and quotasbetween the EU and the Russian Federation italso marked a change in the process and timetablefor their establishment.In June 2005, the Commission received ICES scientificadvice on fishing opportunities in the BalticSea for 2006. ICES advised the setting of twoseparate TACs: 28,400 tonnes and 14,900 tonnesfor the Western and Eastern Baltic, respectively.The Commission then called upon its ownadvisory committee the Scientific, Technical andEconomic Committee on Fisheries (STECF) 33 toassess the information and take into account economicconsequences of the ICES advice. This wasthe first time the STECF had been used in theBaltic Sea process as, up until then, this functionwas handled within the framework of the IBSFC.After receiving advice from the STECF the Commission,on behalf of the Community, attendedthe final meeting of the IBSFC in September anddiscussed the TAC, quotas as well as fishing conditionswith the Russian Federation. A proposedTAC of 28,400 and 45,339 tonnes for the westernand eastern stocks, respectively, was agreed.In an attempt to reduce the burden of work forthe Council at the end of year, the Commissionpresented its proposals to the Council in November34 for consideration; however, it was not untilthe December meeting that final negotiations andagreement took place.Traditionally the IBSFC had agreed one TAC forthe whole of the Baltic Sea, however, the Councilchose to accept ICES and Commission adviceand set two separate TACs. They set the Westerncod TAC at 28,400 tonnes and Eastern at 45,339tonnes.The Commission and the Council explained thatthey increased the Eastern TAC because of acombination of fishing effort reductions, seasonalclosures as well as strengthened control andmonitoring of fishing activities.In 2006, the Baltic Sea TACs for 2007 wereagreed at the October Fisheries Council meeting.ICES recommended a TAC of 24,500 tonnes forthe Western stock and a zero TAC for the Easternstock. ICES also stated that a recovery planshould be developed and implemented before afishery was re-opened. The Council set TACs of26,696 tonnes and 40,805 tonnes, respectively.These agreed TACs were conditional on the settingup of the cod multi-annual plan by 30 June2007. If an agreement is not reached by thatdate, the reductions will automatically increaseto 15% for the two stocks concerned.Furthermore, the number of fishing days wasreduced by 10%.Table 8. Shows a summary of the Baltic Sea cod TAC for 2006 and2007 and compares it with the ICES advice.ICES Advice for 2006cod TACs (tonnes)Agreed TACs cod(tonnes)Western Eastern Western Eastern8,400 14,900 8,400 45,339ICES Advice for 2007cod TACs (tonnes)Agreed TACs cod(tonnes),500 0 6,696 40,805Source: Data taken from Council Regulation (EC) No. 52/2006 &Commission Press release, October 2006Technical and control measuresCouncil Regulations EC No. 2187/2005 35 andEC No. 52/2006 provide the technical conservationmeasures and the conditions that presentlyapply for EU Baltic Member States and the codfishery. Both of them reflect the legacy of IBSFCregulations and newer EU measures.Council Regulation (EC) No. 2187/2005 - “forthe conservation of fishery resources throughtechnical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts andthe sound” provides new and up to date rules onall the fisheries in the Baltic Sea. The intention– 41 –

of this Regulation is to streamline and simplifysome of the regulations that resulted from theEUs participation in the IBSFC. Within the Regulation,specifications for fishing gears targetingcod are laid down and conditions for bycatch ofcod in other fisheries is also specified.Annex III, to Regulation 52/2006 provides “transitionaltechnical and control measures” whichare specifically designed for the cod fishery andare intended to enhance measures that were inplace within the IBSFCs cod recovery plan andalso act as interim measures during the periodprior to the implementation of the EU’s own codrecovery plan. As the name suggests technicalmeasures with respect to area closures are dealtwith as well as control measures setting out howor what Member States are required to have inplace to effectively manage the cod fishery.With the accession of the new Member Statesand, in anticipation of a future recovery plan, theCommission undertook an evaluation in 2005of how all the EU Baltic Member States wereimplementing Annex III. Having completed halfof its visits to Member States the Commissionpresented the interim results of its assessment atthe final IBSFC meeting, in September 2005. TheCommission chose not to name the four MemberStates, preferring to wait until it had completedits fieldwork and shared the findings with all theMember States before publishing a <strong>report</strong> in June2006. However, through the course of this study,it was clear that the four Member States werePoland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.In the presentation “key indicators” were usedto assess the level of compliance by the MemberStates for the implementation of the technicaland control measures as well as the registrationand accuracy of catches and catch information.Implementation of the technical and controlmeasuresIn its limited summary of findings, the Commissionconsidered there had been successful administrativeimplementation of the technical andcontrol measures and unspecified measures hadresulted in improved control and enforcement.On the less positive side, not all measures wereeffective or properly implemented and some ofthe Member State Inspectorates had expressedconcern over the complexity of the regulations.From an observers point of view the assessmentdoes not look particularly promising. The twoareas where the four Member States receiveda particularly poor assessment, i.e., inspectionbenchmarks and exchange of informationbetween Member States, likely mean that at thetime, little or no progress had been made onthese aspects. Without further details it is difficultto draw any strong conclusions other thanto say that, apart from the ability to issue specialfishing permits and logbooks to vessels over 8 m,the system appears to be far from satisfactory.Table 9. Shows the key indicators and the level of compliance forthe implementation of technical and control measures for fourBaltic Sea Member States in 2005.Key IndicatorSpecial fishing permitDesignated portsLogbooks for vessels > 8mNational control action programmePrior notificationInspection benchmarksClosed areas and summer banExchange of inspectors and joint surveillanceExchange of information between Member StatesInspections and follow-up action in case of non-complianceFull complianceProgress being madeLittle or no progressComplianceThe registration and accuracy of catches andcatch informationThe second part of the Commission’s assessmentfocused on the ability of Member States to effectivelymonitor landings.Logsheets, landing declarations and sales notesprovide the landing data from which the uptakeof quota is measured against the vessel and theMember State. Discrepancies in these sourcesdirectly translate into discrepancies in quotamanagement; therefore, the accuracy of thisinformation is very important.In its presentation, the Commission confirmedthat the use of logsheets, landing declarationsand sales notes was in place. However, there– 42 –

were some serious failings in the accuracy andsubmission of the data:• 35% of the logsheets they examined were outsidethe permitted level of tolerance. Similarly,comparisons between landing declarationsand sales notes resulted in 19% of the landingdeclarations being outside of the allowedtolerance.• For an undisclosed number of landings observedby the Commission Inspectors, approximately21% failed to submit a sales note,23% failed to submit landing declarationsand 5% failed to submit a logsheet within therequired timescales.It is the role of Member State Fisheries Inspectoratesto reduce these discrepancies by educatingfishermen and fishermen’s representatives and,where appropriate, take action to penalise thosewho do not comply.Table 10. Shows the indicators used to assess the four MemberStates ability to apply important requirements with respect to registeringlanding information and their ability or willingness to followup on administrative inaccuracies.Key IndicatorImplementation of logbooks, landing declaration, etc.Computerised catch registration systems in placeSystem to record catches by < 8m vesselsQuality and return of statutory documentsPrior submission of logsheetsLogbook tolerance of 8%Delay in getting catch data onto the systemCross-checking of logbooks with statutory returnsCross-checking of logbooks with VMSLogbook registration system in placeComplianceInspections and follow-up action in case of non-complianceFull complianceProgress being madeLittle or no progressAgain, without the full details of the <strong>report</strong> itis difficult to draw any strong conclusions. Itappears that the ability to register catch dataonto a national data system has been achieved.However, the practical aspects associated withthe, all important, inspection of logsheets, theircross-referencing with VMS data and the followupof any apparent inaccuracies seem to havesignificant shortfalls.Mis<strong>report</strong>ing landingsThe level of mis<strong>report</strong>ing of cod catches and theapparent effect landing inspections had on subsequentcatch and landing information formed thefinal part of the Commission’s presentation. Themethodology was described:• Landings for a number of vessels were observed.• Comparisons were made between actual andestimated landings submitted by fishermen ontheir statutory returns.• Landing Per Unit Effort (LPUE) was calculatedfor the sampled landing, i.e. the weightof landed cod divided by the <strong>report</strong>ed fishingeffort.• The LPUE from inspected landings were comparedwith the LPUE from <strong>report</strong>ed landingsbefore and after the inspection. 27 landingsby < 10m vessels and 94 landings by > 10mvessels were observed and a total of 607 landingrecords were analysed.Without exception, in all the Member States thatwere assessed the average LPUE of the inspectedlanding was higher than the average LPUE forlandings before and after the inspected landings.Also of note, the LPUE for the landings that followedthe inspected landings were all higher thanthose prior to the inspection. A possible explanationor inference is that, as a result of the inspection,the behaviour of the skipper may have beeninfluenced such that a more accurate return wasmade.The average difference between LPUE of inspectedand non-inspected landings for each of theMember States was calculated at 21.6%, withdifferences ranging from 3.0% to 54.1%.In its summary and presentation of key findings,the Commission confirmed that it would continueto conduct further analysis of the informationgathered on its mission and would also applysimilar methods when visiting the remaining 4Baltic Sea Member States.It concluded that:• The Commission’s sampling programme– 43 –

appeared to bear out that significant underdeclarationof catches was taking place;• The interim and additional conditions formonitoring, inspection and surveillance in thecontext of recovery of cod stocks in the BalticSea were mostly being implemented, however,some measures (undisclosed) were notachieving their intended outcome or were notconsidered to be useful;• Extra enforcement effort had been deployedin most cases but additional resources for atsea or onshore enforcement were unlikely inthe near future.• Comprehensive and efficient catch registrationsystems are in place;• There is scope for better cooperation betweenMember States;• Cross-checking of statutory returns with inspectionand VMS data needed to be improved;and,• The interim findings will be used to informmanagement arrangements for 2006 and beyond.Technical and control measures for the codfishery in the Baltic Sea in 2006Between them, Council Regulations EC No.2187/2005 and EC No. 52/2006 provide quitean impressive package of technical and controlmeasures that, if they were correctly applied andadhered to, should enable the effective managementof the Baltic Sea cod fishery. Table 11provides a summary and analysis of the fisheriesmanagement conditions that apply to fishing forcod within the Baltic Sea for 2006.– 44 –

Table 11. Shows the fisheries management conditions that apply to fishing for cod within the Baltic Sea and comments on issuesrelated to their application.General headings/Sub-headingsDetail of conditions for fishing andobligations on Member State authoritiesAnalysis and commentsFishing effort limits• In order to reduce effort on the cod stocks, the WesternBaltic is closed to fishing with trawls, seines and gillnetsusing a mesh ≥ 90 mm between 15 March and 14 May.• Similarly, the Eastern Baltic is closed between 15 Juneand 14 September.• Also, outside of the “closed season” an additional 30days of no fishing using these methods and mesh sizesare in place.• For the Eastern Baltic, an additional 27 days are inplace.• Fishing with gillnets with a mesh ≥ 110 mm from vessels< 12 m is allowed throughout the year.• Vessels fishing for pelagic species such as herring andsprat may use a mesh as small as 16 mm but can onlyretain a 3% bycatch of cod.Member States are required to describe how they intendto enforce these effort restrictions. This provides anindicator as to whether Member States have minimallymet their obligations, however, there is no measure as tohow effective this has been as there is no requirement toshow when, where and which vessels these restrictionsapply to. As a result, there is limited opportunity toconfirm whether the measures that have been put inplace are effective.Closed areas• There is one area permanently closed to mobile fishinggear and there are three areas that are temporarilyclosed to all forms of fishing between 1 May and 31OctoberThe Commission’s original proposal for 2006, as setout in COM(2005)598 36 , proposed that the three areaswere permanently closed but the Council of Ministerscompromised with the temporary closures.VMS should help the monitoring of closed areas, however,it only shows where a vessel is and does not showwhether it is fishing.If a vessel is transiting a closed area it must have itsfishing gear stowed.Closed areas require dedicated Fisheries Patrol Vessel(FPV) time. Only by inspecting a fishing vessel can it beconfirmed that a vessel is transiting and not fishing.Monitoring,inspection andsurveillance inconnection withthe recovery ofcod stocks• Vessels > 8 m require a special permit to fish for cod inthe Baltic Sea.• To be eligible the vessel must have had a permit in2005.• If the vessel did not hold a permit the Member Statemay issue the vessel a permit but must ensure that a vesselor vessels of the same engine size (measured in kW)are prevented from fishing, i.e. the capacity of the codfleet must not increase.Member States are obliged to publish a list of vesselswith special permits on their website. This provides anindicator to show that Member States have an administrativesystem in place to issue special permits butit does not show whether capacity is minimally beingmaintained. Only by providing more detailed informationcould this be confirmed.Logbooks• Vessels > 8 m are required to keep a logbook• There is an 8% margin in error allowed when estimatingand recording the live weight of cod.• Logsheets must be submitted within 48 hours of landing.In reality, unless logbook offences are extreme (e.g., verylate return, significant differences between actual andestimated weights, blatant and evidenced-based misrecordingof large quantities of species) they tend to beused as additional evidence for more “serious offences”.Prior notification• Vessels ≥ 15 m in length are required to be fitted with aVessel Monitoring System (VMS).• Vessels with a VMS are required to <strong>report</strong>/transmit theircatch on a daily basis to the Member State authorities.• If the vessel does not have a VMS and has > 300 kgs ofcod on board and is moving either to or from the Westernor Eastern Baltic it must <strong>report</strong>/transmit the time,position, quantity of cod onboard, and where and whenthey intend to land. They must not start land their catchuntil they are authorised.Reporting daily catches is meant to reduce the likelihoodof mis<strong>report</strong>ing area of fishing. To be effectivethere needs to be an inspection at sea to confirm thequantities on board.– 45 –

General headings/Sub-headingsDetail of conditions for fishing andobligations on Member State authoritiesAnalysis and commentsDesignated ports• If a vessel has > 750 kgs of cod on board it must onlyland at a designated port.Member States that have designated ports are obligedto publish them on their official website. Some of thedesignated ports are so large that potential landing sitesare many and so difficult to monitor. Designated timeand place of landing would be more effective.Weighing of cod• Authorities may have any quantity of cod weighedbefore it is transported.This obliges the various people involved on dischargingto comply with inspectors’ wishes.VMS messages• The VMS is minimally required to record the entry andexit from port and between sea areas where rules onaccess and stocks are in place.The Member States are required to have a system inplace that allows for cross-checking VMS data withlogsheets. The Commission is able to request thisinformation. This provides an indicator that necessarychecks are in place.Trans-shipment• Trans-shipment (the transfer between vessels) of cod isprohibited.During interviews (see page 15) it was confirmed thattrans-shipment of pelagic species between Russian andsome EU vessels has taken place in the recent past. Onboardinspection is required to confirm that excessivequantities cod are not involved.Transport• A landing declaration must accompany quantities ofcod > 50 kgs that have been landed by vessels ≥ 8 min length.This is meant to ensure that if the vehicle is inspectedat any point during its journey there will be documentationto show the origin of the cod.Joint working• Member States are required to undertake “joint operationalprocedures” with other Member States.As well as other Member State inspectors, Commissioninspectors may also participate.Nationalcontrol actionprogrammes• Member States are required to develop and publish ontheir official websites a national control plan.• Common rules for national control programmes havebeen set:(a) Inspection and surveillance will focus on vesselslikely to catch cod and priorities will be set onthose sectors most affected by fishing opportunities;(b) Random checking of transport and marketing ofcod;(c) Cross-checking to test the effectiveness of inspectionand surveillance;(d) “Benchmarks” will be set by each Member Stateand advertised on official websites which will aimto meet the following targets:– Inspections will aim to cover 20% (by weight) ofcod landings, or, that in a 3 month period thevessels that account for 20% or more of the codlandings are inspected at least once.– Market inspections will aim to cover at least 5%of cod that is offered for auction.– Patrol days in the cod management areas.– Aerial surveillance effort.• Member States are required to aim to specify in theircontrol programmes the following:(a) the number of shore-based and sea-going inspectorsand when and where they are deployed;(b) the number of patrol vessels and aircraft and theareas in which they will be deployed;(c) the budget for undertaking enforcement;(d) a list of designated ports;(e) a description of how compliance is achieved inthe requirement for prior notification;The Member States are able to set their own “benchmarks”and only have to “aim” to specify their meansof control. Therefore, the minimum for each need onlybe applied.Information should be displayed on national authoritieswebsites by 31 January. At the time of writing themajority of Member States had failed to provide theinformation in this form.Common rules are established but there is no commoninspection protocol or criteria so, for example, a vesselcould land in Sweden and be inspected in one wayand then land in Poland and be inspected in a differentway. A standardised approach may provide for improvedconfidence in inspections, however, there wouldstill need to be checks undertaken by the Commissionto ensure that the standard was being upheld.– 46 –

General headings/Sub-headingsDetail of conditions for fishing andobligations on Member State authoritiesAnalysis and commentsNationalcontrol actionprogrammes(f) a description of how compliance is achieved ensuringtolerance in logbook estimates, designatedports and the weighing of landed cod; and,(g) a description of procedures for sea- and shorebasedinspections and communicating andworking with other Member States.• The Commission will evaluate the compliance with andthe results of the national control programmes with theCommittee for Fisheries and Aquaculture.Fishing gear andcondition of theiruse• Various mesh sizes and other gear specifications are setfor static and mobile fishing gears that target cod. Forthose fishing gears that are used to target other speciesbycatch limits are set. Examples of restrictions on fishinggear used to target cod include:(a) 110 mm mesh size for gillnets.(b) 48 hour maximum immersion time for gillnets.(c) Vessels ≤ 12 m may use up to 9 km of net, vessels≥ 12 m may use up to 21 km of net.(d) 105 mm for diamond mesh and 110 mm for squaremesh windows in BACOMA and T90 trawls.Measurement of mesh size is only meaningful whenit is undertaken at sea on fishing gear that has beenobserved to be fishing.Enforcing immersion time restrictions can only be appliedif the gear is marked and its setting was observed.The configuration and construction of trawls arecomplex and difficult even for experienced fisheriesofficers to enforce with confidence. Only blatant abuseof restricting mesh size is relatively easy to enforce.By September 2007 the Commission will present to theFisheries Council an assessment of the selectivity oncod of mobile gears.Minimum landingsize• The minimum landing size of cod in the the Baltic Seais 38 cm– 47 –

Notes1ICES. 2005. Report of the Baltic Fisheries Assessment WorkingGroup (WGBFAS), 12-21 April 2005, Hamburg, Germany. Page150 of 589.http://www.ices.dk/<strong>report</strong>s/ACFM/2005/WGBFAS/2-Cod.pdf2ICES. 2005. Report of the ICES Advisory Committee on FisheryManagement, Advisory Committee on the Marine Environmentand Advisory Committee on Ecosystems, 2005. ICES Advice. Volumes8, page 62.http://www.ices.dk/products/AnnualRep/2005/ICES%20Advice%202005%20Volume%208.pdf3Owing to the delay in data collation, 2005 is the most recent yearfor which complete data is available4“Wiadomosci Rybackie” (Fisheries News) March – April 2005http://rybackie.pl/files/WR3-4.05.pdf5ACFA white fish study 20056IFM publication website http://www.ifm.dk/publications.html7“Norms” are often defined as typical actions, attitudes and expectationsconcerning the behaviour and attitude of peers. Furthermore,norms are seen as social pressure that creates both positiveand negative sanctions.8Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 May, 2006 http://gospodarka.gazeta.pl/gospodarka/1,33181,3324426.htm9“Klondyking” is the term given to trans-shipment of fish fromcatching vessels to a “mother” ship where the fish is processed10Espersen Ltdhttp://www.espersen.dk/Default.asp?m=4211Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of 28 January2002 laying downthe general principles and requirements of food law, establishingthe European Food Safety Authority and laying down proceduresin matters of food safety http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_031/l_03120020201en00010024.pdf12Conservation International: www.conservation.org13Fisheries Science Partnershipshttp://www.cefas.co.uk/FSP/default.htm14European Commission press release http://ec.europa.eu/comm/fisheries/news_corner/press/inf06_09_en.htm15Regulation (EC) No. 2371/2002, on the conservation and sustainableexploitation of fisheries resources http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_358/l_35820021231en00590080.pdf16Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a multi-annual planfor the cod stocks in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploitingthose stocks (COM(2006)411)17“Towards uniform and effective implementation of the CommonFisheries Policy”http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/doc_et_publ/factsheets/legal_texts/docscom/en/com_03_130_en.pdf18“Compliance with the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy– “Compliance Work Plan and Scoreboard”http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/doc_et_publ/factsheets/legal_texts/docscom/en/com_03_344_en.pdf19Council Regulation 52/2006 – fixing the fishing opportunitiesand associated conditions for certain fish stocks and groupsof fish stocks applicable in the Baltic Sea for 2006 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_016/l_01620060120en01840199.pdf20“Compliance with the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy– Compliance Work Plan and Scoreboard”http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/doc_et_publ/factsheets/legal_texts/docscom/en/com_03_344_en.pdf21“Towards uniform and effective implementation of the CommonFisheries Policy”http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/doc_et_publ/factsheets/legal_texts/docscom/en/com_03_130_en.pdf22Commission staff working paper. Proposal for a Council Regulationestablishing a Community Fisheries Control Agencyhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/impact/docs/SEC_2004_0448_1_EN.pdf23Council Regulation (EC) No. 768/2005. Establishing a CommunityFisheries Control Agencyhttp://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_128/l_12820050521en00010014.pdf24The CFP Roadmap http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/reform/roadmap_en.htm25Link to the three compliance scoreboards: http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/scoreboard/index_en.htm26Fisheries & Maritime Affairs, 2005 - Press Release, http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news_corner/press/inf05_21_en.htm27COM(2001)650http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0650en01.pdf28COM(2002)687 http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/doc_et_publ/factsheets/legal_texts/docscom/en/com_02_687_en.pdf29COM(2003)782http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2003/com2003_0782en01.pdf30COM(2005)207http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0207en01.pdf31Control Regulationhttp://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993R2018:EN:HTML32Commission <strong>report</strong> on the monitoring of the Member States’ implementationof the CFP 2000-2002http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0849en01.pdf33Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee on Fisherieshttp://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/faq/committee_en.htm#stecf34Commission proposal for 2006 Baltic Sea TACs and quotashttp://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news_corner/press/inf05_69_en.htm35Council Regulation EC No. 2187/2005http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_349/l_34920051231en00010023.pdf36http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/doc_et_publ/factsheets/legal_texts/docscom/en/com_05_598_en.pdf– 48 –

List of tables and figuresTable 1.Table 2.Table 3.Table 4.Table 5.Table 6.Table 7.Table 8.The Baltic Fisheries Assessment Working Group overall RFfor cod landings from the Eastern Baltic between 2000 and2005.A comparison of Member State <strong>report</strong>ed landings and ICESestimates of unallocated quota for the Eastern Baltic.The <strong>report</strong>ed import, export, landing and national consumptionfigures of cod for Poland in 2003A list of the IUU fishing activities associated with theBaltic Sea cod fishery described in interviewsAn analysis of the 11 Point Action Plan for Cooperation inEnforcement with respect to the Baltic Sea cod fisheryThe indicators used in the Commission’s 2004 ComplianceScoreboard and how Baltic Sea Member States performedThe list of types of behaviour which are considered to beserious infringements of the CFP rulesA summary of the Baltic Sea cod TAC and quota allocationsfor 2006 and 2007.Table 9. The key indicators and the level of compliance for theimplementation of technical and control measures for fourBaltic Sea Member States in 2005.Table 10. The indicators used to assess the four Member States’ability to apply important requirements with respect toregistering landing information and their ability or willingnessto follow-up on administrative inaccuracies.Table 11. The fisheries management conditions that apply to fishingfor cod within the Baltic Sea and comments on issuesrelated to their application.Figure 1. The relationship and planned outcomes of the Action Planfor Cooperation in Enforcement and Compliance WorkPlanFigure 2. The potential structure for a joint inspection frameworkwithin which the Community Fisheries Control Agencymight operate– 49 –

ReferencesAnderson, J.L., 2002. Reasons for Technical Inefficiency of DanishBaltic Sea Trawlers. Danish Research Institute of Food Economics.Division for Fisheries Economics and ManagementDanish Directorate of Fisheries, 2002. Yearbook of Fishery Statistics2002. ISBN 87-89443-18-7 ISSN 0907-9238DW World, 2004http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1362542,00.htmlEU Commission, 2004http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/enlargement/info_estonia_en.pdfEU Commission, 2004ahttp://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/enlargement/info_latvia_en.pdfEU Commssion, 2004bhttp://www.eu.int/comm/fisheries/enlargement/info_poland_en.pdfEurofish, 2000http://www.eurofish.dk/indexSub.php?id=584European Commission, 2001. Commission Staff Working Paper,Fisheries Control in Member States, Denmark. SEC(2001)FAO, 1999http://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/DEU/profile.htmFAO, 2001http://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/POL/profile.htmFAO, 2004http://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/DNK/profile.htmFAO, 2004ahttp://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/SWE/profile.htmFAO, 2004bhttp://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/RUS/profile.htmFAO, 2005http://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/FIN/profile.htmFAO, 2005ahttp://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/EST/profile.htmFAO, 2005bhttp://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/en/LVA/profile.htmICES, 2005. Report of the Baltic Fisheries Assessment Working Group(WGBFAS), 12-21 April 2005, Hamburg, Germany. 589 pp.Latvia National Board of Fisheries, 2005http://www.vzp.gov.lv/?sadala=110OECD, 2001http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/21/1836994.xlsOECD, 2003http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/57/34429370.pdfOECD, 2005http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/45/34428239.pdfOECD, 2005ahttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/31/34431367.pdfOECD, 2005bhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/40/34429179.pdfPolish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2003http://www.funduszestrukturalne.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/56D3E5E9-0D1D-411C-8811-B35170002DE5/0/sop_fisheries_final_draft_.pdfPolish Economic Affairs & Labour, 2005. EU Structural Funds inPoland,http://www.funduszestrukturalne.gov.pl/English/SOP++Transport/SOP+Fisheries/Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2003.http://www.funduszestrukturalne.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/56D3E5E9-0D1D-411C-8811-B35170002DE5/0/sop_fisheries_final_draft_.pdfRSPB, 2004. Assessment of the sustainability of industrial fisheriesproducing fish meal and oil. Poseidon Aquatic Resource ManagementLtd & the University of Newcastle upon Tyne– 50 –

Annex IBaltic Member States fishingand processing industriesOverviewThe main target species for Baltic Sea fisheriesare cod, Baltic herring and sprat. They formabout 95 % of the total catch. Other target fishspecies having either local economical importanceor ecosystem importance are Baltic salmon,plaice, flounder, dab, brill, turbot, pike-perch,pike, perch, vendace, whitefish, burbot, eel andsea-trout.The main fisheries for cod in the Baltic use demersaltrawls, pelagic trawls and gillnets. Therewas substantial increase in gillnet fisheries in the1990s but because of the change in stock agecomposition in the late 1990’s and early 2000,the share of the total catch of cod taken by gillnetshas decreased and that of demersal trawlsincreased again.Pelagic fisheries in the Baltic are dominated bypelagic trawlers catching a mixture of herringand sprat. The proportion of the two species inthe catches varies according to area and season.The catches of the pelagic species are used forhuman consumption, reduction to oil and mealand to animal fodder, and is largely dependenton market forces. The following table shows the<strong>report</strong>ed quantities, area and method of capturefor cod in the Baltic Sea in 2004.Country T=Trawl ICES Divisions in the Baltic Sea with <strong>report</strong>ed catches of codG=Gillnet Western Stock Eastern Stock22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 TotalDenmark T 5,238 1,202 4,277 6,209 26 0 0 0 0 16,952G 1,082 725 789 1,145 15 0 0 0 0 3,756Germany T 2,771 0 1,268 2,659 0 0 0 0 0 6,698G 0 0 612 0 0 0 0 0 0 612Poland T 0 0 143 3,309 2,650 0 0 0 0 6,102G 0 0 395 6,658 1,012 0 0 0 0 8,065Finland T 0 0 0 354 0 4 0 0 0 358G 0 0 0 489 6 0 0 0 0 495Latvia T 0 0 0 423 602 4 193 0 0 1,222G 0 0 0 2,496 992 30 95 0 0 3,613Estonia T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0G 0 0 0 1,183 5 3 0 1 0 1,192Sweden T 0 0 701 7,491 15 246 0 0 0 8,453G 0 393 1,026 4,060 9 185 24 9 4 5,710Lithuania T 0 0 0 0 2,041 0 0 0 0 2,041G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Russia T 0 0 0 0 1,520 0 0 0 0 1,520G 0 0 0 0 1,890 0 0 0 0 1,890TOTALS T 8,009 1,202 6,389 20,445 6,854 250 193 0 0 43,342G 1,082 1,118 2,822 16,031 3,918 218 119 10 4 25,322T&G 9,091 2,320 9,211 36,476 10,772 468 311 10 4 68,664Source: data from ICES Baltic Fisheries Working Assessment Group, 2005– 51 –

DENMARKThe Baltic is the third most important fishingarea for Danish fishermen – after the North Seaand Skagerrak, respectively (Anderson, 2002).The overall contribution of the fisheries sector tothe economy is small – about 0.5% – but it has avery strong importance to specific regions whichare heavily dependent on fisheries for their livelihoods:north and west Jutland, and the island ofBornholm, where 95% of all landings by Danishvessels are made (European Commission, 2001).Approximately 5,650 fishermen work on 3,831vessels operating from Danish ports. The registeredtonnage of the fleet is 99,720 gross tonnage(GT). The table below provides a breakdown ofthe categories and number of vessels within theDanish fleet.species along with Norway pout, blue whitingand sprat, whereas, sprat are targeted in the Skagerrak/Kattegatand Baltic Sea. Owing to highlevels of dioxins which make them unsuitablefor human consumption, herring has also beenallowed to be targeted in some instances in theBaltic (RSPB, 2004).(ii) The pelagic fishery for human consumption,mainly herring and mackerel stored in tanks andlanded whole; and,(iii) The demersal fishery for white fish (cod,hake, haddock, whiting, saithe), flatfish (sole,plaice, flounder), lobster and deep water prawns(FAO, 2004).The table below indicates the total annual catchof fish from the Baltic Sea by Danish vessels.Category of registered vesselNumberSide trawlers56Stern trawler8Other trawler7Purse seine & combination vessels98Danish seiners 78Longliners and gillnetters ,138Traps, poundnets ,574Dredgers and other vessels6TOTAL 3,831Source: Danish Directorate of Fisheries, 2002Cod are targeted by trawl and gillnets, withlandings of plaice and flounder normally associatedwith the trawl fishery. Sprat and herring aretargeted by trawl and purse seiners.The trawler fleets are based in the main ports inJutland and Bornholm with a large fleet of smallgill netters located in all Danish ports (EuropeanCommission, 2001; Danish Directorate of Fisheries,2002; FAO, 2004). The numbers of gillnettershas declined in recent years owing to thestock age composition with vessels switching tolonglining or trawling. The main pelagic fisheriesare conducted by a small fleet of purse seinersand large trawlers (ICES, 2005).Broadly speaking there are three types of fisheryin Denmark:(i) The industrial fishery for fishmeal and fishoil. In the North Sea, sandeel is the main targetDanish catches from the Baltic Sea (includingThe Belt and The Sound)Main 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998speciesCod 11,843 19,836 34,613 48,521 42,581 29,488Herring 42,986 45,199 37,763 34,340 30,877 38,820Sprat 29,949 69,673 76,716 123,549 153,765 111.003Main 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004speciesCod 38,174 32,050 29,148 21,558 22,342 19,936Herring 37,973 49,727 46,297 18,407 5,300 n/aSprat 97,685 55,521 53,411 47,630 32,000 44,300Source: adapted from Danish Directorate of Fisheries, 2002; ICES2005; OECD, 2005The processing sectorBecause of the inability of the domestic fleet tomeet the national demand of Danish processors,there is a great reliance on imports to sustain theindustry. Denmark also acts as a “hub” for fishtrade. Figures for 2000 indicate there were 738companies dealing with processing and trade infish products: 83 in smoking and drying, 47 incanning and filleting, 5 in fish meal and fish oil,310 in wholesale trade and 293 in retail trade(FAO, 2004).Employment in the fish processing sector between1996 and 2000 is shown in the table below.– 52 –

Number of employees in the fish processingsector in DenmarkType of company 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000Smoking and drying 1,512 1,913 1,568 1,578 1,704Canning and filleting 6,473 5,220 5,251 4,962 4,859Fish meal and fish oil 603 499 488 472 424Wholesale trade 3,237 3,399 3,292 3,099 3,060Retail trade 909 901 955 998 1,048Total 19,612 18,293 17,771 17,285 17,449Source: adapted from FAO, 2004The table below provides a breakdown of thecategories and number of vessels within the Swedishfleet.Category of registered vesselNumberPelagic trawler (≥ 24m) 55Pelagic trawler (< 24 m) 63Demersal trawler (cod, ≥ 24 m)6Demersal trawler (cod, < 24 m) 73Gill netters/longliners (≥ 12 m)9Gill netters/longliners (< 12m)79Shrimp trawler 60Nephrops trawler 90TOTAL 685SWEDENFor Sweden, the Baltic Sea is the most importantfishing area with 45% of total national landingsin volume. Other important fishing areas includethe Skagerrak (15%), the Kattegat (6%), theNorth Sea (12%) and the North Atlantic (23%)(FAO, 2004a).The fishing sector in Sweden is decreasing – landings(value as well as quantity), vessel numbersand numbers of fishermen are all decreasing. Atthe same time, the prices of fish for consumptionhave increased, the amount of fish used forreduction has declined and exports of fish andfishery products have increased (OECD, 2005a).The overall contribution of the fisheries sector tothe economy is small – about 0.2%. On the westcoast, where large processing facilities are based,the economic importance is more significant(FAO, 2004a).There are approximately 1,860 fishermen (FAO,2004a) and 685 vessels with a total gross tonnageof 41,700 (ICES, 2005). The fleet segmentshave differing capacities for adapting to changesin fishing possibilities. The smaller boats usuallyfish from a local port, whereas the mobility oflarger vessels enables them to move betweenfishing grounds and land in other Baltic States.There are a large number of landing sites inSweden. The most important are the harboursof Träslövsläge, Göteborg, Ängholmen, Smögen,and Strömstad on the west coast; and Trelleborg,Simrishamn, Karlskrona, Nogersund, Västervik,and Oxelösund in the Baltic. Several Danish harbours,such as Skagen and Hanstholm, are alsoimportant for landing Swedish catches (FAO,2004a).Source: ICES, 2005The pelagic fisheries are conducted by four fleetcategories:(i)(ii)(iii)(iv)Trawlers catching herring for human consumption.Trawlers catching sprat, some of whichis used for human consumption but themajority is used for industrial purposes.Herring is caught as bycatch in this fishery.Coastal gillnet fishery for herring for humanconsumption.Purse seine fishery near the coast for spawningherring in the second quarter of theyear. This fishery is also for human consumption(FAO, 2004a).The demersal fishery for cod and flatfish in theBaltic is carried out by four fleet categories:(i)(ii)(iii)(iv)Trawlers targeting cod but with a bycatchof flatfish;Gillnetters and longliners targeting codbut with a bycatch of flatfish (longlines arestarting to increase on the behalf of gillnettersin this category, possibly caused by theneed for improved quality which deterioratesmore so with the soak time of nets)(ICES, 2005)Gillnetters targeting flatfish but with abycatch of cod.Coastal fishery with trap nets for eel andother species. Cod and flatfish are caughtin this fishery (FAO, 2004a).The large pelagic vessels accounted for morethan 40% of the total national landings in termsof value and close to 90% of the landed volumein 2003 (FAO, 2004a). EU rules governing the– 53 –

highest allowable level of dioxin in food enteredinto force on 1 July 2002. Sweden has an exemptionfrom these rules relating to fish from theBaltic sold for human consumption, implyingthat products whose dioxin levels exceed theselimits can be placed on the Swedish market. Thisderogation is currently in place until the end of2006 (RSPB, 2004).The table below shows the total <strong>report</strong>ed landingsof fish by Swedish vessels for human consumptionand reduction purposesYear Coastal For human Fordistrict consumption reduction2003 West Coast 28,628 27,256South Coast 24,540 3,909E east Coast 15,163 6,710TOTAL 68,331 37,8752004 West Coast 31,489 24,893South Coast 24,439 6,255E east Coast 14,218 9,548Source FAO, 2004aTOTAL 71,146 40,696Most of the Swedish landings of herring andsprat from the Baltic are from the traditionaltrawl fishery with pelagic trawls as well as bottomtrawls for herring. Fishing with gillnetsfor herring is of local importance in the coastalfisheries, especially in the northern Baltic.The table below shows the total <strong>report</strong>ed landingsof cod by Swedish registered vessels between1993 and 2004.Cod landings by Swedish vesselsYear 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998Cod 12,048 22,190 27,966 36,119 28,374 16,609Herring 66,400 61,600 47,200 25,900 44,100 71,000Sprat 92,700 135,200 143,700 158,200 151,900 191,100Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Cod 15,927 19,172 21,026 14,588 14,585 14,163 *Herring 48,900 60,200 29,800 29,400 31,800 29,300Sprat 137,300 120,600 85,400 77,300 63,400 78,300* preliminarySource: adapted from ICES, 2005The processing sectorIn 2002, the fish processing industry in Swedenwas dominated by a relatively small number oflarge companies located on the Swedish westcoast. There were 184 companies involved inthe processing sector in 2002. Many Swedishcompanies have been bought by or merged withNorwegian or Icelandic companies. This developmenthas increased the availability of raw materialto the Swedish industry, and has also been away for Norwegian and Icelandic companies toget access to the EU market (FAO, 2004a).Total employment in the industry in 2002 was1,804 employees, a decrease of 16 per centcompared with 2001. Swedish fish processingcompanies import about 80 per cent of their rawmaterial. Their main output is herring and codproducts, but they also produce prawn, salmon,mackerel and haddock products. The majority ofimports come from Norway and Denmark (FAO,2004a).FINLANDThe arctic climate is an important characteristicof the Finnish fisheries, with coastal waterscovered by ice to varying degrees for part of theyear. This means that the main fishing periodlies between April and November but ice fishingusing nets, hooks and traps is also common inthe winter season (FAO, 2005).While economically important in some coastalregions the fishing industry is not a significanteconomic force, contributing about 0.1 and 0.2per cent of the national GDP in 2000 (FAO,2005; OECD, 2005b).The commercial fleet is largely comprised ofsmaller vessels, with the majority of the vesselsless than 18 metres in length. Most fishing effortis focused in the coastal waters, but the largestvolumes are caught in the offshore fisheries. Themost important commercial species is Baltic herringfollowed by salmon, whitefish (Coregonuslavaretus) and sprat. Finland catches the secondlargest amount of fish for feed in the EU, afterDenmark. Most of the herring and sprat are usedin industrial processing for animal feed for thefur farming industry (FAO, 2005).In 2003 there were about 1,000 full-time fishermen– in this instance, classed as anyonereceiving more than 30% of their income fromfishing – and a further 1,700 part-time fishermen.The number of fishing vessels was estimated tobe about 3,494 in 2003. 95% of the vessels areshorter than 12 metres (OECD, 2005b).– 54 –

Small scale Pelagic Demersal Staticcoastal trawler trawlers gear3,27 63 3 57Source: FAO, 2005Many of the trawlers use both pelagic anddemersal trawls for herring. Pelagic trawls areoften used to exploit the juvenile herring stocks,whereas demersal trawling is directed more tothe adult part of the stock. Only a few vesselsdirectly exploit sprat. However, sprat is the mainbycatch in the herring fishery (ICES, 2005). Ninetyper cent of the total catch is Baltic herringor sprat. Almost all the sprat and three quartersof the Baltic herring is used for reduction orotherwise as animal feed, leaving less than onethird of the total catch for human consumption(FAO, 2005).A few vessels target cod with demersal trawls inthe Main Basin (SDs 24-25) as do a small numberof gillnetters (FAO, 2005).Main species 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Cod ,181 1,388 1,425 1,201 1,168*Herring 31,400 31,500 23,700 24,800 17,900Sprat 5,200 17,400 24,400 25,700 18,900Main species 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Cod 775 856 228 650 1,193*Herring 23,300 26,100 25,700 14,700 14,500Sprat 20,200 15,400 17,200 9,000 18,600*preliminarySource: ICES 2005A coastal trap net fishery for herring, salmon andEuropean whitefish (Coregonidae) is commonnear the coast and inside archipelagos (FAO,2005).The processing sectorThere are a few large processing plants and numeroussmall family businesses. There were 228processing plants in 2001. They mostly processeddomestically landed fish (approximately 35,000tonnes), but also around 6,000 tonnes of importedfish (FAO, 2005).Over half of the Baltic herring used for humanconsumption is deep frozen, whereas half of therainbow trout is consumed in the form of fillets.The majority of fish for human consumption isprocessed into fillets; deep-frozen fish are thesecond most frequently consumed form of fish(OECD, 2005b).ESTONIAFisheries do not play a significant role in theEstonian economy, contributing about 0.3% tothe GDP. It is of economic, social and culturalimportance in coastal areas where alternativeincome sources are scarce. Fisheries employmentis concentrated in the western part of Estonia,the islands along the west coast and the coast ofthe Gulf of Finland (EU Commission, 2004). Approximately2,300 people were employed in thefishing industry in 2003 (FAO, 2005a).In 2004 the Estonian Baltic Sea fishing fleetconsisted primarily of trawlers: 152 fishing vesselsof over 12 m and 888 vessels of under 12 m.The fishery is predominantly focused on herringand sprat. Pelagic trawls take the most significantproportion of the catch but pound net fisheriesin the Gulf of Riga can also take large amounts.Cod is all but absent from the Estonian EEZ soa limited amount of fishing is undertaken by gillnetters in the Main Basin (SD 25) to the east.Brackish water fishes like perch, pike-perch,flounder, eel, sea trout and salmon being targetedby passive fishing gear is mainly used in coastalfisheries (ICES, 2005; FAO, 2005a). The Tablebelow shows the <strong>report</strong>ed quantities of the mainspecies of fish in metric tonnes landed by theEstonian fleet.Main species 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Cod 1,049 1,388 1,420 1,196 1,062Herring 30,700 35,700 42,600 34,000 35,400Sprat 13,100 21,100 38,900 32,300 33,200Main species 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Cod 609 805 37 591 1,193*Herring 30,100 27,400 21,00 13,300 10,900*Sprat 39,400 37,500 41,300 29,200 30,200* preliminarySource: ICES, 2005Estonia has a distant-water fishing fleet whichconsists of 11 factory trawlers – a shadow of itsformer self. Shrimp from the NAFO and NEAFCregulatory areas is the main target species. Themain export destinations for the shrimp pro-– 55 –

duction are Iceland, Norway, Japan and Canada(FAO, 2005a).Most of Estonian fishers are members of theEstonian Fishermen’s Association, with its headquartersin Tallinn. The Estonian Fishermen’sAssociation comprises 6 sections: distant-waterfishery; Baltic cod fishery; open Baltic trawlfishery; coastal Baltic trawl fishery; Baltic coastalfishery; and the inland water fishery (Lakes Peipsiand Võrtsjärv). Estonian fishers are planningto establish a Producer Organisation under EUregulations (FAO, 2005).The processing sectorThe fish processing industry holds a strong positionin Estonia’s food industry, providing 40%of the food industry’s total export volume. Themain products exported were fresh, frozen andcanned fish products as well as preparations. Thevolume of exports was 163,000 tonnes in 2001,whereas imports amounted to 65,000 tonnes.The Estonian processing industry includes producersof canned fish and frozen fish (mainly targetingEastern markets) as well as fast-food, filletand delicacy producers who sell the majority oftheir production on Western markets. The approximately80 processing companies in Estoniaemploy 4,500 people (EU Commission, 2004).RUSSIAInformation regarding the Russian fishing industryis limited. The overall contribution of theentire Russian fishing industry to GDP is 0.71%.The main Russian ports in the Baltic are Kaliningrad(home to approximately 300 fishing vessels)and St Petersburg (FAO, 2004).Baltic herring, sprat and cod are targeted. Asmall number of large vessels (> 15m and enginepower > 1,000 Hp) target sprat for humanconsumption and animal feed in the 1 st and 4 thquarters and 2 nd and 3 rd quarters, respectively(ICES, 2005).Up to 26 vessels operate within the coastal regiontargeting herring in the 4 th and 1 st quarters(ICES, 2005).Data suggests that within the demersal trawlingfleet an average of 6 ships (up to 27m and 300Hp) per fishing day, fish for cod within a year. Agillnet fleet fish for cod with anywhere from 9 to24 vessels per available day (ICES, 2005).The processing sectorThe fishing industry is strongly export-oriented.The major commodities are various kinds offrozen fish products with limited added value.Russia imports fish from Norway, Iceland, theUK and the Baltic countries, in particular (FAO,2004).LATVIALatvia’s overall fishery production is 1.5% ofGDP. However, the fisheries sector plays a significantrole in the national economy, especially incoastal regions where employment opportunitiesare limited. It employs around 13,900 people, or1.2% of the active population. The foreign tradebalance in fish production has been positive sincethe early nineties with exports of fisheries productsrepresenting 3.7% of total export volume(EU Commission, 2004a; FAO, 2005b).In 2005, Latvia had a fleet of 951 vessels totalling42,670 GRT. The fleet can be divided intothree broad divisions: high seas; Baltic Sea/Gulfof Riga; and coastal vessels (ICES, 2005; LatviaNational Board of Fisheries, 2005; FAO, 2005b).The table below provides a breakdown by numberof these divisions.No. high seas No. Baltic Sea No. of coastalvessels >24 m vessels > 12 m

The coastal fleet target Baltic herring, salmon,trout, vimba, flounder, eel and pike perch, andalso sprat and cod in smaller quantities (ICES,2005)The table below provides an indication of thetotal <strong>report</strong>ed landings in 2003 for the Latvianfleets.Total landings 2003 (tonnes)High seas fleet Baltic Sea fleet Coastal fleet42,376 71,566 3,500The table below shows the <strong>report</strong>ed quantities ofthe main species of fish in metric tonnes landedby the Latvian fleet.Main species 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Cod 6,643 8,741 6,187 7,778 6,914Herring 9,300 11,600 10,100 10,000 8,300Sprat 24,400 34,200 49,300 44,900 42,800Main species 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Cod 6,280 6,298 4,867 4,634 5,027*Herring 6,700 5,200 3,900 3,100 2,700*Sprat 46,200 42,800 47,500 41,700 52,400*PreliminarySource: ICES, 2005The processing sectorThe fish processing sector is almost entirelysustained by the nations fleets. There are morethan 100 fish processing enterprises in Latvia,most of whom are located on the Baltic Sea andGulf of Riga coasts, close to the fishing ports inthe districts of Riga, Tukums, Talsi, Liepaja andLimbazi (FAO, 2005b).Baltic herring and sprat are the main raw material.Mackerel and Atlantic herring and theirfillets are also being used for processing. Cannedproducts have decreased more recently, beingreplaced by chilled and frozen fish products.This means that export volumes have a greaterproportion of low-added-value products, and aconsiderable part of locally available fish resourcesis being exported (FAO, 2005b).LITHUANIAKlaipeida is Lithuania’s main seaport. The contributionmade by fisheries to GDP is estimated tobe 0.08%, but is more important in coastal areas(FAO, 2005b). In the past few years, the averageyearly yield has been 10,000–15,000 tonnes ofvarious species, 2–3 % of which is caught in thecoastal areas. The main species are cod, herring,sprat and flounder. Some foreign vessels, mostlyRussian, land their catches in Klaipëda (FAO,2005b).As many as 2,500 fishermen are <strong>report</strong>ed to beemployed (FAO, 2005c), which appears to be adisproportionate amount as official figures indicateonly 24 distant water vessels and 292 registeredvessels fishing in the Baltic Sea and coastalregions (FAO, 2005b; Eurofish, 2005; LithuanianMinistry of Agriculture, 2005).No. high seas No. Baltic Sea No. of coastalvessels > 24 m > 12 m < 24m vessels < 12 m24 6 01Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture, 2005Pelagic trawling for sprat and herring and demersaland pelagic trawling for cod is used alongwith some gill netting and very occasionally driftnets and long-lines (FAO, 2005b; ICES, 2005).The Latvian Baltic cod fleet only fish in SD 25-32(Eastern cod stock). Outside of the closed seasoncod is fished all year round and, in some years,as much as one third of the total landings havebeen made in Denmark and Sweden. Herring andsprat are caught all year round, however, there isa marked decrease in effort in the summer. Spratand herring catches are used for human consumption.Due to the lower abundance of cod inrecent years catches of flounder have increased(FAO, 2005c; Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture,2005).The table below shows the <strong>report</strong>ed quantities ofthe main species of fish in metric tonnes landedby the Lithuanian fleet.Main species 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Cod ,513 5,524 4,601 4,176 4,371Herring 3,600 4,200 3,300 2,400 1,300Sprat ,900 10,200 4,800 4,500 2,300Main species 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Cod 5,165 3,317 3,317 2,767 2,041*Herring 1,100 1,600 1,500 2,100 1,800*Sprat ,700 3,000 2,800 2,200 1,600*preliminarySource: ICES, 2005– 57 –

The processing sectorAt the beginning of 2005 there were 38 registeredfish processing enterprises in Lithuania, ascompared to 62 at the end of 2003. The decreaseis a result of more stringent requirements, dueto Lithuania’s EU membership as well as increasedcompetition, shortage of raw materialsand adverse settlement terms with trade outlets.Approximately 3,700 people are employed inthe sector (Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture,2005).Most fish processing enterprises import raw materialsand export the bulk of their production.In addition to the traditional salted, smoked,pickled and canned fish products the industry hasstarted to target higher value products (LithuanianMinistry of Agriculture, 2005).POLANDWhile the contribution of fisheries to the Polisheconomy is limited to approximately0.03–0.07%, Baltic Sea fisheries make a verysignificant contribution in both economic andsocial terms. In the east, the fishing tradition hasresulted in a distinct social group within the Kaszubyregion (FAO, 2001; EU Commission, 2004;Polish Economic Affairs & Labour, 2005).Exports of fisheries products represent approximately2% of the value of Polish food exports.Approximately 4,200 fishermen are employed inBaltic Sea fisheries with a further 14,000 employedin the processing sector (Polish Ministryof Agriculture and Rural Development 2003; EUCommission, 2004).The fleet sectors are divided into size categories.The table below represents the numbers of registeredvessels within each size category in 2001.Fishing vessel size categoryNumber of vessels

some significant changes in the last 20 yearswith a decline in their distant, middle distantand coastal fleets. The size of the fleet more thandoubled after reunification but since then thesize of the fleets had decreased by 40% in thelate 1990s compared to the 1980s (OECD, 2003;FAO, 1999).In 2003 there were estimated to be in the regionof 2,200 registered vessels and approximately4,000 fishermen (OECD, 2003).Cod has been the most important species for theGerman Baltic fleet but in more recent years,with declining cod stocks and available quota,the sprat and herring fisheries have shown significantincreases in <strong>report</strong>ed landings. Each fleetsegment is broken down into similar size categoriesand further divided by the main method offishing. The table below shows the number andmain method used by vessels that fished for herringin 2004.Year Type Vessel No. GRT kWof gear length vessels200 12 (cutter 10 733 3,835& trapnet) fleet)trawl 12 (cutter 47 8,851 27,910fleet)22 and 24 in the 1 st and 4 th quarter of the yearand in SD 25 in the 2 nd quarter.In 2002 and 2003, the landings taken by gillnetsamounted to 30 % and 40 %, respectivelyYear Type of Vessel No. GRT kWgear length vessels2004 Gill nets 12 (cutter 15 916 4,680fleet)trawl 12 (cutter 82 6,959 22,110fleet)TOTAL 573 10,520 49,290Source: ICES, 2005The table below shows the <strong>report</strong>ed quantities ofthe main species of fish in metric tonnes landedby the German fleets.Main species 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Cod 14,692 19,358 14,484 12,492 15,439Herring 0 0 0 0 0Sprat 00 200 400 4,600 200Main species 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Cod 13,080 12,738 8,767 8,129 7,310Herring 0 0 300 3,900 4,300Sprat 0 800 1,000 18,000 28,500TOTAL 445 11,904 50,325Source: ICES,2005The table below shows the number and mainmethod used by vessels that fished for sprat in2004.Year Type of Vessel No. GRT kWgear length m vessels2004 trawl < 02004 trawl > 6 2,750 7,682TOTAL 27 2,774 7,902Source: ICES, 2005The table below shows the number and mainmethod used by vessels that fished for cod in2004. The German cod fishery is focused in SDThe processing sectorDespite the small size of the German fishing fleet,there is a relatively important fish processingindustry. The reduction of the distant-water fleetforced the processors to turn to other (foreign)sources. In 1999 landings by German fisheriescontributed 17 per cent to total supplies to theGerman market whilst, in contrast, imports fromthe EU and third countries accounted for 83 percent (FAO, 1999; EuroFish, 2000).With the accession of the new Member Statessome German companies have, or, are lookingto move their processing operations to thesecountries owing to lower wage costs (DW World,2004).– 59 –

Annex IIMembers of the Administrative Board of theCommunity Fisheries Control Agency 1Chairman: Mr. Marcelo Vasconcelos, Deputy chairman: Mr. Hermann PottRepresentative Deputy representative Member StatesDr Johnny Demaiter Dr Jean-François Verheggen BEMr Jiri Pondelicek Mr Vladimir Gall CZMrs Birgit Bolgann Mr Mik Jensen DKHerrn Hermann Pott Herrn Bernd Kremer DEMr Tarvo Roose Mr Heiki Nurmsalu EEMr Nikolaos Papakonstantinou Mr Konstantino Vourlias ELSr D. Fernando Curcio Ruigómez Sr D. José Navarro Garcia ESM. Pascal Savouret M. Nicolas Mariel FRMr Andrew KinneenIEDr Pasquale Giannella Dr Elisabetta Giannoccari ITMr Loizos Loizides Mrs Mirto Ioannou CYMr Guntis Drunka Mr Kupcans Vladislavs LVMr Genadijus Babcionis Mr Arünas Jonaitis LTMr Frank Schmit Mr Pierre Treinen LUMr Károly Pinter Mr Tibor Györbiró HUDr Anthony Gruppetta Mr John Brincat MTDr G. de Peuter Dhr ir. L.R.M. Lomans NLHerrn Friedrich Huemer Dipl.-Ing Andrä Rupprechter ATMr Jaroslaw Koscielny Mr Stanislaw Kasperek PLMr Eurico Monteiro Mr Alberto Brás PTMr Robert Smoje Mr Matjaz Kocar SIMrs Helena Lettrichová Dr Ján Regenda SKMr Marku Aro Mr Jarmo Raine Vilhunen FIMr Daniel Samuelson Mrs Marie Ingerup SEMr Nigel Gooding Mr Cephas A. Ralph UKMr Anton Dotchev Mrs Eliza Emilova Angelova BGMr Gheorghe StefanROMr Willem Brugge Mr Martin Newman European CommissionMs Valérie Lainé Ms Fuensenta Candela Castillo European CommissionMr Alain Laurec Mr Fergal Nolan European CommissionMr Ernesto Penas Lado Mr Jean-Claude Cueff European CommissionMr Raoul Prado Mr François Dom European CommissionMr Marcelo Vasconcelos Mr Giorgio Gallizioli European Commission1http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/agency/board_en.htm– 60 –

Annex IIIFormat for Serious Infringement <strong>report</strong>ingMember State:Year:Cases discovered Type of proceedings initiated decision ruling description of the penaltyCaseNoType of offence anddetails(date, zone/port,flag/nationality)DateAdministrativeYes/NoCriminalYes/NoAppealYes/NoFirstinstanceDateOtherinstanceDateFine(Euro)Withdrawal oflicence/fishing permit/other authorisationTemporaryDurationin daysPermanentSeizure(Pleasespecify)Other(Pleasespecify)If suspended:duration inmonthsCode for notifying the types of behaviour which seriously infringe the rules of the common fisheries policyA1 Obstructing the work of fisheries inspectors;A2 Falsifying, concealing, destroying or tampering with evidence;B1 Obstructing the work of observers;C1 Fishing without holding a fishing licence, a fishing permit or any other authorisation required for fishing;C2 Fishing under cover of a falsified document;C3 Falsifying, deleting or concealing the identification marks of the fishing vessel;D1 Using or keeping on board prohibited fishing gear;D2 Using prohibited fishing methods;D3 Not lashing or stowing prohibited fishing gear;D4 Directed fishing for, or keeping on board of, a species subject to a fishing prohibition;D5 Unauthorised fishing;D6 Failure to comply with the rules on minimum sizes;D7 Failure to comply with the rules and procedures relating to transhipments;E1 Falsifying or failing to record data in logbooks, etc;E2 Tampering with the satellite-based vessel monitoring system;E3 Deliberate failure to comply with the Community rules on remote transmission of movements of fishing vessels;E4 Failure of the master of the fishing vessel of a third country to comply with the applicable control rules when operating in Community waters;F1 Landing of fishery products not complying with the Community rules on control and enforcement;F2 Storing, processing, placing on sale and transporting fishery products not meeting the marketing standards in force;– 61 –

Annex IVSummary of the European Commission’sTri-annual Evaluation Report 2000-2002Denmark2, 3, 4, 5Fisheries Management InstitutesThe Ministry for Food Agriculture and Fisheries(Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri)is the central authority responsible for coordinatingand developing fisheries policy. The FisheriesDirectorate (Fiskeridirektoratet) is the Ministerialdepartment that is designated the ‘lead’ organisationfor general matters of control, managementof the fleet register, licensing, management ofquota and catch registration.The Fisheries Directorate consists of a centralunit divided into three divisions (Administration,IT, Fisheries) and three regional inspectorates:• North, with offices in Nykøbing Mors andFrederikshavn;• South, with offices in Fredericia, Randers, andEsbjerg; and,• East, with offices in Roskilde and Nexø.ResourcesThe Fisheries Directorate employ approximately300 people. Of these, approximately 175 weredesignated inspectors, who are based in the CopenhagenHQ, the Regional offices and aboardfour Fisheries Patrol Vessels (FPVs). Each of theRegional Inspectorate offices has at least onesmall patrol boat available to undertake controlsin inshore and inland waters. The Fisheries Directoratehas no aerial surveillance capability butdoes use the UK and Swedish aerial surveillancepatrols in the ‘cod recovery areas’ of the NorthSea and Baltic Sea that fall within the DanishEEZ.Monitoring, control and enforcement: VMSA Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC) is situatedwithin the Fisheries Directorate in Copenhagenand receives and forwards all satellite informationconnected with the activities of Danish andforeign vessels. VMS data is routinely crosscheckedagainst information entered in the EClogbooks and is accessible onboard certain FPVs.Remote access by DG Fish to the computer filescontaining the data recorded by the FMC is alsoprovided.LicensingThere are various types of licence categorieswhich state the conditions for participation inspecific fisheries in certain areas and for set timeperiods.Catch recordingThe information from EC logbooks and landingdeclarations is electronically entered into the systemin the local offices. Sales-note data is mainlysent electronically directly from the auction/buyersand entered into the system automatically.The Fisheries Directorate then runs a dailyvalidation which automatically compares the EClogbook information with sales-note details. Anydiscrepancies are highlighted and subsequentlychecked in the port offices. A paper check is carriedout once a month in the Regional offices toensure that the vessels are complying with quotaregulations and to calculate ‘days at sea’.VMS, licensing, catch registration data and vesselregistration details are held on a central mainframeand the regional offices have access to thissystem.2Danish Directorate of Fisheries website: http://www.fd.dk/info/sjle3/presentation_uk.pdf3Commission staff working documents, Annex to the <strong>report</strong> from the Commission on the monitoring of the Member States implementation ofthe CFP. COM(2004)8494Information provided from individuals during the course of the project5Sustainable Baltic Sea Fisheries – the way forward, Coalition Clean Baltic, 2004 http://www.ccb.se/pdf/050217_ccb_<strong>report</strong>_fisheries.pdf– 62 –

InspectionsAt sea the Danish FPV’s focus their efforts wherefishing activity is expected to be concentrated and/or where experience suggests a strong possibilityof non-compliance. Enforcement of regulationsthat apply to cod in the Baltic are given a highpriority. Between 2000 and 2002 the FPVs spent3,550 days at sea and inspected 2,771 vessels.Fisheries inspectors have authority to: board andinspect fishing vessels; access all premises wherefisheries related business is undertaken; and, withthe support of the police, stop and inspect anyvehicle used to transport fish. They are able totake samples of fish and demand to see and seize,where appropriate, documentation for investigativeand control purposes.There are approximately 340 landing portsin Denmark and 14 auction centres. Nationalmeasures require that cod landed into Denmarkfrom the North Sea and Skagerrak have to besold through the auction. All buyers and sellersof first sale fish have to be authorised. TheFisheries Directorate has the power to undertakeadministrative controls on the records of buyersand processors. However, if there is a suspicionof an offence the police have to be included inthe investigation.Fisheries inspectors are also responsible for monitoringcompliance with Community marketingregulations, including the controls of fish and fishproducts landed by fishing vessels, factory shipsand freighters registered in a Third country. Theyalso verify and deal with payments concerningintervention aid.The Fisheries Directorate sets annual targets forcontrols in the ports which are on average 10%of all landings for human consumption and 1monitor per 1,000 tonnes for industrial catches.of target species, bycatch rules and closed areas.Suspension of fishing licences for set periods canbe used. Administrative sanction for other catchingsectors appears to be limited to relativelyminor offences, such as logbook infringements.In the case of a more serious offence, evidencewill be submitted to the police for further actionand referral to the public prosecutor (anklagemyndigheden).In addition to being the investigating authority,the head of the local police authority is also thepublic prosecutor. In this capacity, he/she maycompound the infraction, i.e. offer an option of afine rather than taking the matter before a court.If this route is chosen, the offence has the samelegal effects as a judgement and it will be registered.Compounding seems to be fairly common,and it is favoured by the police as it means quickjustice.There are no fine levels fixed in the legislation,and the setting of the fine is the exclusive competenceof the court/public prosecutor. The FisheriesDirectorate has issued guidelines for dealingwith fisheries offences with suggested levels offines. However, standardised methods for calculatingthe fines have evolved through case law.Additional commentsIn its assessment of the Danish control and enforcementsystem for the period 2000–2002 andpublished in 2004, the Commission highlightedits concern regarding the system of electronic andmanual verification of control documentation,i.e. logbooks and sales notes. They were of theview that there was a possibility that widespreadmis<strong>report</strong>ing of catches had ocurred in collusionwith the buyers. EC inspectors had observed thisin landings of cod in Bornholm and for herringand mackerel in the ports of northern Jutland.Dealing with infringementsThe regional offices of the Fisheries Directorateundertake investigations and compile evidenceagainst potential offenders. Within the industrialfisheries, administrative sanctions may be appliedfor offences associated with minimum percentage6, 7, 8FinlandFisheries Management InstituitionsThe Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (maa- jametsätousministeriö) has overall responsibilityfor the monitoring of fishing activities and the6Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry website: http://www.mmm.fi/english/7Commission staff working documents, Annex to the <strong>report</strong> from the Commission on the monitoring of the Member States implementation ofthe CFP. COM(2004)8498Information provided from individuals during the course of the project– 63 –

Department of Fisheries and Game (kala- ja riistaosasto)undertakes the practical tasks of controlthrough Regional Fisheries Units. There are sixRegional Units on the mainland and the autonomousprovince of Åland Islands has its ownfisheries monitoring and control administrations.The Finnish Coast Guard (merivatiosto) undertakesmultiple tasks, including surveillanceof fishing activity at sea, and come under theresponsibility of the Ministry of the Interior(sisäasiainministriö).The Customs Authority (Tullihallitus) is responsiblefor controls and import of fish and fisheryproducts into Finland and operates as part of theMinistry of Finance (valtiovarainministeriö).The Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute(Riiista- ja katalouden) is responsible for thecollation of fisheries statistics.ResourcesApproximately 20 fisheries inspectors workwithin the Regional Units and 5 people workon fisheries policy and administration in theMinistry’s headquarters in Helsinki.The Coast Guard has approximately 430 staffwhich contribute to the fisheries control workand a large number of vessels that can be usedfor offshore and inshore patrols. They also havea number of aircraft they can call upon to provideaerial surveillance within the EEZ.Monitoring, Control and Enforcement: VMSThe national Fisheries Monitoring Centre is basedin Helsinki and Regional Units have remoteaccess to the VMS data.LicensingA national fishing vessel licensing scheme is inoperation and a fleet register database is maintainedfor all vessels over 10 m.Catch recordingThe Regional Units collate and cross-checklogsheets, landing declarations and sales notesbefore inputting the data onto a database whichallows for monitoring of quota uptake.InspectionsThere are 12 designated ports for landing codand an estimated 370 landing locations along theFinnish coastline, although many are ice boundduring the year. In total, 17 vessels were issuedspecial permits for cod in 2005. According theMinistry fishing for cod takes place outside theEEZ and no landings of cod were made intoFinnish ports in 2005. Sweden and Denmark arewhere the majority of cod landings are made bythe Finnish cod fleet.Fisheries inspectors have the power to board vesselsand enter premises involved in the trade offish and are able to seize illegal gear, catches anddocumentation. If further investigation is needed,Fisheries Inspectors from the Regional Units areobliged to request assistance from the police and,if a potential offence has happened at sea, theCoast Guard.Fisheries inspectors also ensure that buyers areregistered and their details maintained on anapproved list.Dealing with infringementsSanctioning of infringements is based on criminalprocedure. Suspected infringement <strong>report</strong>s areforwarded to the police authorities for furtherinvestigation. Evidence is presented to the publicprosecutor who decides on whether there is acase to be answered and, if so, the severity of theoffence. If it is considered to be minor, sanctionsin the form of a fine can be administered by thepolice; if more serious, the prosecutor will bringthe case before a court of first instance.Fines are calculated on the seriousness of the offenceand an individual’s daily income.Additional commentsIn the Commission’s 2004 evaluation <strong>report</strong> ofthe Finnish implementation of the CFP whichrefers to the period 2000–2002, it highlights concernin the low number of inspectors and the effectivenessof Coast Guard inspections. Also, themany and diverse demands on police and localprosecutors are considered to result in excessivedelays in getting cases to court and the potentialdeterrent effect is further reduced with the lowestaverage fines of all Member States.– 64 –

9, 10, 11, 12SwedenFisheries Management InstitutesThe Ministry of Agriculture, Food and ConsumerAffairs (Jordbruksdepartementet) has overallresponsibility for fisheries policy and the developmentof national fisheries legislation and theNational Board of Fisheries (Fiskeriverket) isresponsible for the implementation and enforcementof both EC and national fisheries legislation,as well as, structural matters, licensing andvessel registration. The latter is based in Göteborg.The Board is organised into four departments:(i)(ii)(iii)(iv)Resource Management – which aims to ensurelong-term sustainability in the use fishresources and to support the developmentof the fishing industry;Research and Development – enhancesknowledge of fish and fish stocks, fishingtechniques and the impact of fishing on theenvironment;Fisheries Control – responsible for satellitemonitoring, quota management, developmentof systems for fisheries control,market regulations and management offisheries statistics;Administration – provides services to otherdepartments and works with developmentof organisational efficiency.Although the Fisheries Control Department(Avdelningen för fiskerikontroll) is the mainbody responsible for monitoring and control, theSwedish Coast Guard (Kustbevakningen) undertakesthe practical aspects of sea and shore basedinspections. The Coast Guard is an independentpublic sector authority responsible to the Ministryof Defence and, as such, has additionalmultiple tasks related to defence, security andemergency response. It is estimated that 25% oftheir time is spent on fisheries-related work.There are also a number of other organisationswith responsibilities associated with the Swedishfishing industry, they include: The SwedishCustoms Authority (Tullverket) which carriesout control of imports and fish products fromthird countries; the National Food AdministrationAuthority (Statens livsmedelsverk) whichis responsible for fish hygiene regulations; and,the Swedish Bureau for Statistics (Statistiskacentralbyrån) which is responsible for compilingstatistics on behalf of the Fisheries ControlDepartment.ResourcesThe National Board of Fisheries has approximately300 employees of which 30 work exclusivelyon fisheries control. The Coast Guard employapproximately 600 people, the majority of which(approximately 420) work aboard 27 vessels,with a further 25–30 working on aerial surveillance.All the vessels and hardware are availablefor fisheries monitoring and control purposes. Allair and sea going personnel receive some formaltraining for fisheries control with a further 50, orso, receiving more specialised training.Monitoring, control and enforcement: VMSThe Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC) is basedin Göteberg and is linked to the Coast Guard’soperational centre. An automatic system to crosscheckVMS with logbook data has been developed.LicensingThe Swedish licensing system is based on threetypes of licences: personal fishing licence for eachprofessional fisherman; vessel permits which arecompulsory for vessels > 5 m used for commercialpurposes; and, a special fishing permit forfishing in specific EU or third country waters.Catch recordingData from logsheets, landing declarations andsales notes are collated and entered onto a databaseand is linked to the satellite monitoring andvessel register databases. The fisheries database isused as a support in the administration of quota,licensing and compensation associated withwithdrawals.9Swedish Board of Fisheries website: http://www.fiskeriverket.se/pdf/om_fiskeriverket/engelsk.pdf10Commission staff working documents, Annex to the <strong>report</strong> from the Commission on the monitoring of the Member States implementation ofthe CFP. COM(2004)84911Information provided from individuals during the course of the project12Sustainable Baltic Sea Fisheries – the way forward, Coalition Clean Baltic, 2004 http://www.ccb.se/pdf/050217_ccb_<strong>report</strong>_fisheries.pdf– 65 –

InspectionsThe Fisheries Control Department and the CoastGuard uses a process of risk analysis to directresources as well as control and enforcementeffort. An inspection procedure has been developedwhich requires a minimum of checksto be undertaken according to vessel size andwhere the inspection takes place, i.e. at sea oron shore. Targets of 2% and 10% have been setfor inspection of demersal and pelagic landings,respectively.Fisheries inspectors have the authority to boardand search vessels, premises dealing with fishand vehicles suspected of transporting fish. Theyare also empowered to seize information anddocumentation, including accounts (although thepolice need to be notified) and can retain a vesselor confiscate gear. If during inspection there isreasonable suspicion that an offence has beencommitted, the Fisheries Inspector has policeauthority to undertake further investigation.Dealing with infringementsPreparatory criminal investigations and infringement<strong>report</strong>s are drafted by Fisheries Inspectorsfrom the National Board of Fisheries or theCoast Guard and submitted to the public prosecutor.The public prosecutor then directs eitherthe police, the Coast Guard, or the NationalBoard of Fisheries to conduct supplementaryinvestigations before submitting a final case. Ifthere is adequate evidence, the public prosecutorcan ask for the case to be presented in court offirst instance. The setting of any subsequent fineis at the discretion of the court. Appeals can bemade to the next instance, i.e. the Court of Appeal.Additional commentsIn the Commission’s 2004 evaluation <strong>report</strong> ofthe Swedish implementation of the CFP whichrefers to the period 2000–2002, it highlightsconcern in the level of cooperation betweenthe National Board of Fisheries and the CoastGuard. Their structure and relative independencefrom each other was thought to limit the abilityof the National Board of Fisheries to establishguidelines with the Coast Guard regarding thedirection, scope and content of fisheries control.The number of sea and shore based inspectionswas considered to be low and there were someconcerns as to the thoroughness of monitoring ofpelagic landings.There were also criticisms of the efficiency andeffectiveness of the sanctioning procedure. Therewas comment that the judiciary did not perceivebreeches in fisheries regulations to be very seriousand the length of time between detection anda court hearing were highlighted as being undulylong. A combination of factors were put forwardas contributing to this problem: the low prioritygiven by the police and prosecutors; extendedprocessing times by the Board; and poor evidencegathering and presentation.The Commission recommended improved cooperationbetween the Board, the Coast Guard andthe prosecution authorities, improvements intraining on follow-up to infringements and witnesstraining and the manner with which infringementsare <strong>report</strong>ed to the police.No procedures or guidelines for monitoring andcontrol of fish following first sale had been establishedand control was considered to be limited.Overall the Commission’s view was that furthersignificant effort was required by the Swedishauthorities to ensure full compliance by the Swedishauthorities.13, 14, 15, 16GermanyFisheries Management InstitutesThe Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Food andConsumer Protection (Bundesministerium für Ernährung,Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz)has overall responsibility for general legislativepolicy for fisheries, monitoring, control andlicensing.13Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Affairs website:http://www.ble.de/index.cfm/D8A924F16E11433096BA6DA376003DEA14Commission staff working documents, Annex to the <strong>report</strong> from the Commission on the monitoring of the Member States implementation ofthe CFP. COM(2004)84915Information provided from individuals during the course of the project16Sustainable Baltic Sea Fisheries – the way forward, Coalition Clean Baltic, 2004 http://www.ccb.se/pdf/050217_ccb_<strong>report</strong>_fisheries.pdf– 66 –

Outside of the 12 mile limit, the Ministry isgenerally responsible for the surveillance, monitoringand control of fisheries. Within 12 miles,monitoring and control is the responsibility ofthe coastal states or Länder (Schleswig-Holstein,Niedersachsen/Bremen and Micklenburg-Vorpommern).The Federal Customs Administration (Zoll) mayalso undertake fisheries inspections at sea orashore while the Federal Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz)may undertake surveillance but donot undertake physical inspections.ResourcesThe Ministry has approximately 20 inspectorswho are involved in offshore inspections with afurther 5 inspectors based in Hamburg. The Länderhave approximately 30 inspectors who havea dual sea going and shore based role. While notdedicated fisheries inspectors, Customs Officersare also considered inspectors in the scope oftheir designated competencies.A total of 42 patrol vessels are capable of inspectionsat sea. Of these, 3 are operated by theMinistry, 8 by the Border Guard, 12 by Customsand 19 by the Länder within the 12 nautcial milelimit.In total, 30% of the Customs’ vessel time is spenton fisheries control. They are trained by theMinistry inspectors and are able to make inspectionsand conduct investigations. Border Guardscan be used to monitor protected areas such asspawning areas and they <strong>report</strong> any apparent offencesto the Ministry for follow-up action.Monitoring, control and enforcement: VMSData is centralised in the Fisheries MonitoringCentre in Hamburg and the large Ministryinspection vessels have access and can use thisdata while at sea. Data is exchanged automaticallywith Denmark, Finland and Sweden and theCommission can access recorded data on-line.LicensingAll registered vessels are required to be licensed.There are two types of licence and a special permitfor cod. The licences allow fishing for quotaand non-quota species, respectively.Catch recordingThe collection of logbooks, landing declarationsand sales notes is mainly carried out by theLänder fisheries inspectors. Landings into portswithin Mecklenburg-Vorpommern are crosscheckedand processed by the Länder authorities,whereas landings into other Länder are crosscheckedand then sent to the Ministry offices inHamburg for data processing.Producer Organisations (POs) have some responsibilitiesfor catch restrictions and they areexpected to use internal management measuresto discipline any over-shooting of quotas. POsmay be fined or have the equivalent over quotafish removed from their allocation the followingyear.InspectionsInspections are normally documented in aninspection <strong>report</strong>, a copy of which is provided tothe skipper of the vessel or owner of any premisesthat may be inspected. The control of landingsis the responsibility of the Länder.Ministry and Länder Fisheries Inspectors andCustom Officers, when acting as Fisheries Inspectors,are entitled to seize and search vesselsand premises in the normal course of their duties.They also have powers to search vehicles whenthey are stationary while only the police have theauthority to stop a vehicle in transit.Dealing with infringementsAn administrative sanctioning system is appliedin Germany. Inspection <strong>report</strong>s that establish thatan infringement has taken place are forwardedto either the Ministry’s or Länder’s Headquartersfor further investigation and a decision onwhether to impose a sanction. It is only at thestage of appeal that the prosecution authoritiesare involved.Maximum federal fines are €76,600 if the offenceis considered to be intentional; if the offenceis considered to be a result of negligence themaximum is half this value. The sanction is setaccording to the seriousness of the offence andthe economic circumstances of the offender. However,the legislation states that the fine shouldexceed any economic benefit from the offence. If– 67 –

this was to exceed the maximum, the maximumdoes not apply. Fines can also be accumulated forseveral offences.The different Länder have their own legislationdefining infringements. Maximum Länder finesrange between €10,000 in Mecklenburg-Vorpommernand €25,500 in Schleswig-Holstein.To avoid the potential for appeal, fines may beset at relatively low levels and so reduce theirdeterrent value.Additional commentsThe Commission’s 2004 evaluation <strong>report</strong> of theGerman implementation of the CFP, which refersto the period 2000–2002, highlights concernsthat Federal authorities have limited influence onthe level of staff and resources allocated by theindividual Länder. It considers that this may beproblematic, particularly given the large numberof potential landing points along the Baltic coast.The ability to respond to prior notification andhailing in outside of normal office hours was alsohighlighted as a flaw.The inspection of and control before and afterfirst sale of transported fish was considered to beminimal.– 68 –

Annex VEuropean Regulations that applyto Baltic Sea codTheme/PolicyareaGeneral principlesof the CommonFisheries Policy.GovernanceFleet managementFleet registerVessel MonitoringSystemsRegulationsCouncil Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation offisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy 17Council Regulation (EC) No 1447/1999 of 24 June 1999establishing a list of types of behaviour which seriouslyinfringe the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy 18Council Regulation (EC) No 52/2006 fixing for 2006the fishing opportunities and associated conditions forcertain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicablein Community waters and, for Community vessels, inwaters where catch limitations are required (adopted inDecember 2005) 192005/629/EC Council Decision of 26 August 2005 relatingto the institution of a Scientific, Technical and EconomicCommittee for Fisheries (STECF) 202004/585/EC: Council Decision of 19 July 2004 establishingRegional Advisory Councils (RACs) under the CommonFisheries Policy 21Council Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86 of 22 September1986 defining characteristics for fishing vessels 2295/84/EC: Council Decision of 20 March 1995 concerningthe implementation of the Annex to CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 2930/86 defining the characteristicsof fishing vessels 23Council Regulation (EC) No 1438/2003 of 12 August2003 laying down implementing rules on the CommunityFleet Policy as defined in Chapter III of Council Regulation(EC) No 2371/2002 24Council Regulation (EC) No 26/2004 of 30 December2003 on the Community fishing fleet register 25Council Regulation (EC) No 2244/2003 of 18 December2003 laying down detailed provisions regarding satellitebasedVessel Monitoring Systems 26DescriptionThe “Framework Regulation” of the new CommonFisheries Policy.The annual “serious infringement <strong>report</strong>” which is intendedmeant to indicate how each Member Sates dealswith specific offences.Quotas and conditions on fishing. Annually revised andrenewed.The constitution, function and role of STECF.The constitution, function and role of RACs.Describes characteristics of fishing vessels enablingsome sort of distinction.Describes the changes to re-measure fishing vesselsensuring common practices across the EU.Describes the fleet management measures from 2002onwards, ie. post Multi Annual Guidance Programmes(MAGP I-IV)Establishes a register for all registered fishing vesselsthroughout the EU and used to monitor fleet capacity.Confirms that vessels over 15m and fishing beyondbaselines should be fitted with a satellite based VMS.17http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_358/l_35820021231en00590080.pdf18http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/l_167/l_16719990702en00050006.pdf19http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_016/l_01620060120en01840199.pdf20http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32005D0629:EN:HTML21http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_256/l_25620040803en00170022.pdf22http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31986R2930:EN:HTML23http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995D0084:EN:HTML24http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_016/l_01620060120en01840199.pdf25http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32005D0629:EN:HTML26http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_256/l_25620040803en00170022.pdf– 69 –

Theme/ PolicyareaInspection andcontrolStructural PolicyRegulationsCouncil Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993establishing a control system applicable to the commonfisheries policy 27Council Regulation (EEC) No 3561/85 of 17 December1985 concerning information about inspections of fishingactivities carried out by national control authorities 28Council Regulation (EC) No 1381/87 of 20 May 1987establishing detailed rules concerning the marking anddocumentation of fishing vessels 29Council Regulation (EEC) No 1382/87 of 20 May 1987establishing detailed rules concerning the inspection offishing vessels 30Council Regulation (EC) No 356/2005 of 1 March 2005laying down detailed rules for the marking and identificationof passive fishing gear and beam trawls 31Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 of 21 December2005 for the conservation of fishery resources throughtechnical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and theSound 32Council Regulation (EC) No 1804/2005 of 3 November2005 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83 laying downdetailed rules for recording of information on MemberStates’ catches of fish 33Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds 34Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999 of 21 June 1999on the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) 35Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangementsregarding Community structural assistance in the fisheriessector 36Council Regulation (EC) No 2370/2002 of 20 December2002 establishing an emergency Community measure forscrapping fishing vessels 37DescriptionThe “Control” regulation, requiring Member States tomonitor and <strong>report</strong> on quota uptake, fishing effort andbuyers and sellers of fish.Copy not available to give descriptionDescribes how vessels Port Letter Number (PLN) shouldbe displayed and how their information is documented.Copy not available to give descriptionEnsuring that certain types of fishing gears are markedwith the vessel’s PLNProvides for technical measures in the Baltic Sea, theBelts and the SoundEstablishes detailed rules for recording information onfish catches and fishing effort.Sets out what Structural Funds will be used and therules for their application.Sets out what FIFG will be used for and the rules fortheir application and administration.Sets rules and administrative requirements for restructuring.An emergency Community measure to assist MemberStates to achieve additional reductions in fishing effortresulting from recovery plans adopted by the Council ishereby instituted for the period from 2003 to 2006.MarketsCouncil Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December1999 on the common organisation of the markets in fisheryand aquaculture products 38Establishes market standards, comprising price andtrading systems and common rules on competition27http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31986R2930:EN:HTML28http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995D0084:EN:HTML29European Official Journal Legislation 339 18/12/1985 p.2930European Official Journal Legislation 132 21.05.1987 p.930European Official Journal Legislation 132 21.05.1987 p.1132http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_056/l_05620050302en00080011.pdf33http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_349/l_34920051231en00010023.pdf34http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_290/l_29020051104en00100011.pdf35http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/consleg/1999/R/01999R1260-20050222-en.pdf36http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/l_161/l_16119990626en00540056.pdf37http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/consleg/1999/R/01999R2792-20050402-en.pdf38http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_358/l_35820021231en00570058.pdf39http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_017/l_01720000121en00220052.pdf– 70 –

In 2005, the Fisheries Secretariat (FISH) commissioned a studyinto illegal, un<strong>report</strong>ed and unregulated (IUU) fishing in theBaltic Sea to inform its existing and future work. In particular,FISH was interested in how NGOs might be best able to contributeto improving compliance.As a result of this study, a <strong>report</strong> was produced that was intendedfor internal use.However, with the heightened interest inIUU fishing associated with the Baltic Se cod fishery, FISH hasdecided to publish an amended version of the <strong>report</strong>. We hopethat it will contribute to a better understanding of some of theissues associated with the illegal fishing problem in the BalticSea cod fishery.The <strong>report</strong> is based on a review of the available literature onIUU fishing within the Baltic Sea region, informal meetings/interviews with individuals with an active interest in the BalticSea cod fisheries, as well as a review and analysis of the EUfisheries policy and regulatory frameworks for control and enforcementthat apply within the Baltic Sea.The Fisheries Secretariat (FISH) is a non-profit organisation dedicated to worktowards more sustainable fisheries at an international level, with a focus on theEuropean Union. The Stockholm-based Secretariat was set up in 2003 by threeevironmental NGOs: the Swedish Society for Nature Conservtion, WWF Swedenand the Swedish Angler’s Association.– 71 –