Normative <strong>Ethical</strong> Theory 23●●●●●●The stress on consequences can easily lead to the end justifying any means. Can it beright to kill the populations of two entire cities in order to end World War II? Can itbe right to accept or give bribes to keep a workforce employed? Can it be right to usetorture in order to save lives? In the last example, Walzer (1973) offers the ticking bombscenario, in which a terrorist knows where a bomb is due to go off shortly in a populouscity. Many would argue that torture was right if it saved several thousand people. Oneperson suffers, but a lot of others live on happily as a result. Many are uncomfortablewith this. Torture might be justified in such an extreme case, but, argues Walzer, tortureremains wrong. Defence against torture remains enshrined in human rights codes acrossthe globe, because it says something about how we should treat human beings, regardlessof consequences. It is therefore often argued that torture is one of the few things thatcannot have exceptions. It is always wrong. Ironically, this could give rise to another levelof utilitarian argument, along the lines that unless we make a stand on torture it couldgive a sign globally that it is acceptable, leading to increased suffering. At the very leastsuch examples raise real problems for the <strong>theory</strong>.The stress on the good for the majority can easily lead to the oppression of the minority.Just because something will benefit 50.5% of the population does not make it good, andmight in any case disadvantage the 49.5%.It may not be possible to assess the consequences with any precision. One of theproblems about the global warming arguments is that science cannot give an absolutepicture of the consequences. Sarewitz (2004), in relation to climate change, thus arguesthat politicians should not rely on science to tell them what to do. The politicians haveto take responsibility for settling on the values they believe are critical for the goodstewardship of the environment, one of the most important being the precautionaryprinciple. This means that even if you are not sure, you take the precaution of trying tosustain the environment. In the case of the bankers it is simply not possible to assess theconsequences clearly. There is evidence that the global finance system is interconnectedand contributes to wealth in some ways across the world. However, the connection ofthis to big bonuses is problematic. Examination of consequences historically in this areasuggests something quite different. The big bonus system before the credit crisis led tothe pursuit of immediate profit, with no consideration of the mid- or long-term healthof the organisation or the wider finance system. In this light, big bonuses contributeddirectly to the breakdown of the wider system (Sun et al, 2010) – quite the opposite ofthe claims of the bankers’ defence. Furthermore, there is no evidence that suggests thatinvestment bankers would leave if faced by smaller bonuses. Simply to say ‘This is howthe system works’ is not enough. Research on wider leadership experience once moresuggests something different. There is little evidence of many better jobs that wouldattract leaders away. There is evidence of available leaders who would take the job forconsiderably less pay (Kolb, 2006). Many alternative approaches have simply not beentested across industry, such as hiring leaders from within the firm, or recruiting fromdifferent countries. Another approach would be to change recruiting practice suchthat, for instance, candidates bid against each other, and the lowest salary estimate-bidwins. In short, the idea of a limited market has little substance and there may beseveral other ways of attracting leaders that have not been tested. Empirical work inthe area of wider leadership makes depressing reading when it comes to even assessingthe role of the CEO. Increasingly, the assumption about the effectiveness of leadershas been questioned. Khurana (2002: 23) argues that the evidence points to ‘at best acontingent and relatively minor cause-and-effect relationship between CEOs and firms’performances’. Across the piece, research points to no correlation between CEO pay andcorporate performance (Shaw, 2006). With respect to financiers, the point about theirimportance, or uniqueness, is at the very least contested. Some have argued that thedefence of bonuses relies simply on an inflated and unsustainable view of leadership(Conger, 2005).
24Business Ethics in Practice●●In all, the use of utilitarian <strong>theory</strong> comes close to the slippery slope fallacy: ‘Believeme, if you supertax the bonuses, then you will lose the people who are making youmoney.’ A fallacy is an argument that is not logically coherent (see Chapter 3 fordetails). In this case it is not coherent because those consequences do not necessarilyfollow.Summing upIt is important to estimate consequences, but we cannot rely entirely on utilitarianarguments. The stress on utilitarianism in the bankers’ arguments is not well workedout – there is insufficient evidence to support their view of how big bonuses lead to goodconsequences for the most people.Because of the uncertainty about defining what is good, it could be argued that thatutilitarianism is not an ethical <strong>theory</strong> at all, but rather an important element in ethicaldecision-making.deontological theoriesThe <strong>theory</strong> that most immediately stands against a simple utilitarianism is the deontological(based on deon, the ancient Greek for ‘what is required’, and thus ‘duty’). The deontologicalapproach to ethics argues that duty or principles are the base of ethics rather thanconsequences. Right actions, according to Immanuel Kant (1964), are prescribed byprinciples, such as to keep promises, be truthful, be fair, avoid inflicting suffering on others,return the kindness of others. Kantian ethics is thus about doing the right thing regardlessof whether it makes one happy – quite the opposite of Mill’s view. Kant also notes dutiesspecific to the self, such as to do no harm to the self, and to develop one’s character andskills.Kant suggests that these duties:●●●●●●embody respect for personsapply without qualification to all rational personsare universal principles.What makes a person worthy of respect is the capacity to be rational, to develop thegood that will enable the person to do his or her duty, and to fulfil key purposes. Thisrespect involves treating people as ends in themselves, as having their own purpose andcapacity. This in turn means treating people not as a means to our own ends. Coercionand manipulation of different kinds exhibit disrespect in these terms, such that the other isregarded as only useful for what they can do for you.This leads to certain key moral imperatives. Kant contrasts these – referred to as‘categorical imperatives’ – with non-moral imperatives, which he refers to as ‘hypothetical’.Hypothetical imperatives are commands that are based on a condition, such as ‘If you wantto get fit, exercise regularly.’ Categorical imperatives have no such conditions. It is simplywrong to cheat, or to break a promise. These are basic principles which are true without anyreference to conditions or consequences.Such principles also have to be able to apply universally, and Kant argues that mostcommon principles pass this test. ‘Promises should be kept’, for example, applies in allsituations. If we did not keep promises, the very meaning of the word would be broughtinto question.For Kant this points to a view of ethics that is based upon absolute principles. Theauthority for such principles does not come from some outside source, such as God,but from their rational foundation. Beauchamp and Childress (1994) suggest four majorprinciples in professional ethics: respect for the autonomy (self-governance) of the client,justice (treating all parties fairly), beneficence (working for the good of the client), andnon-maleficence (avoiding harm to the client).