CHRO ex. rel. Donald Rajtar v. Town of Bloomfield - Connecticut ...

III.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONA.OverviewThe ADEA and the CFEPA prohibit discrimination based on a person's age. 29 U.S.C. §623(a) (1), General Statutes § 46a-60(a) (1). Access to federal protections is providedthrough General Statutes § 46a-58(a). The complainant has made no claim under thisstatute and hence consideration under the ADEA in not available. Additionally, since“age” is not protected under § 46a-58(a) any such claim would have been likewiseunavailing. Courts use the same framework to analyze claims under both statutes andConnecticut courts employ federal precedent. Levy v. Commission on Human Rightsand Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96 (1996). Therefore state and federal (ADEA) casesmay be considered in evaluating the complainant’s CFEPA age claims, properlypresented through § 46a-60 (a) (1). Because this is a disparate treatment case in whichthe complainant alleges that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent or motive,the case is governed by the burden shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell-DouglasCorp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.2001) ADEA disparate treatment claims analyzed undersame burden shifting framework as Title VII claims.The framework for presenting an employment discrimination case under the McDonnell-Douglas paradigm is well recognized in the Connecticut courts. To do so, thePage 36 of 56