CONTENTS - Emerald

3 Security Management and Policy
041301 `IT security in the nancial sector'
C Amey, Computer Fraud and Security Bulletin (Jan 95) pp 16{19
As banking systems get more complex, they become less secure, and the only
real response is managerial | through risk assessment, documentation, education and
design stage application review. The role of technical measures such as authentication
servers is that they can help to recentralise some of the control.
041302 `A Process-Oriented Methodology for Assessing and Improving
Software Trustworthiness'
E Amoroso, C Taylor, J Watson, J Weiss, Fairfax 94 pp 39{50
Various US military agencies and contractors and contractors have been working
since 1989 on a methodology for assessing the amount of trust which can be placed in
a piece of software. The result is a set of trust classes ranging from T0 (no trust) to
T5 (the highest level). As with the Orange Book, there is a matrix of increasing trust
requirements, which is given; and the authors also describe the rationale behind the
design. This combines elements of ISO 9000, CMU SEI's capability maturity model,
and existing defence methodologies, and is heavily oriented to the software process
rather than to the nal product.
041303 `Security Modelling for Organisations'
A Anderson, D Longley, FK Lam, Fairfax 94 pp 241{250
The authors discuss how security o cers can use models of the systems under
their protection to communicate with managers, to estimate the e ectiveness of threat
models, and to assign value to intangible assets such as con dence.
041304 `Liability and Computer Security: Nine Principles'
RJ Anderson, ESORICS 94 pp 231{245
The author discusses recent experience in the UK and elsewhere of legal disputes
involving cryptographic evidence. One of the most powerful tactics in such cases is to
challenge security claims by pushing for disclosure of the other side's security mechanisms;
this has been granted by anumber of courts, leading to the collapse of prosecution
cases. Computer security mechanisms whose purpose is to provide evidence must
therefore be designed to withstand scrutiny from hostile experts. Further problems are
caused by the fact that many security systems are really intended to shift blame rather
than to stop attacks, and this fact itself is concealed; and from system designers' lack
of understanding of how the legal system actually works.
041305 `Daten- und Informationssicherung (IS) als strategische Gesamtlosung'
R Apitzsch, Datenschutzberater v 19 no 2 (15/2/95) pp 6{10 (in German)
The author discusses the security consulting approach of IBM Deutschland. This
focusses on building complete solutions to all an organisation's security and disaster
recovery requirements.
041306 `Secure the Virtual O ce'
DS Bernstein, Datamation (15/1/95) pp 49{52
The author discusses basic computer security and gives a list of vendor contacts.
041307 `The Clipper Chip and the Price of Security in America'
JR Butler, KA Forcht, Information Management and Computer Security v 2 no 5
(1994) pp 9{12
The authors talk about the Clipper chip; they describe in general terms how it
works and discuss some of the political issues raised.
19