The Obama Moment. European and American Perspectives

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Introduction
decisively dealing with global challenges, the imperative of not attempting to monopolise
leadership and to share evenly the responsibilities for world governance
applies to any combination of world powers, say the United States and China for
example. Any ‘G2’ or even ‘G3’ would be equally powerless on its own in the face
of the challenges facing the international community. This is generally recognised
when it comes to the economic crisis or the deadlock in trade negotiations, but it
holds equally true when it comes to dealing with environmental, energy, security
and other development-related issues.
The conviction shared in Europe and the United States, with Obama, is that being
open, democratic and culturally diverse societies, gives them the capacity to
play a central role in shaping globalisation. In fact most Europeans share President
Obama’s conviction that power politics and attempts at imposition of national interests,
particularly by military force, are not only against the values they share, but
are not effective in an interdependent multipolar world.
The Obama-EU agenda
President Obama’s international agenda is quite broad in scope, spans virtually the
globe, and includes a number of ambitious goals. Some of these were pre-ordained
in that they relate to disposing of an extremely difficult legacy. This included ending
Iraq’s ‘war of choice’ (in Obama’s words) and dealing with the seriously deteriorating
– some say hopeless – situation in and around Afghanistan. Another set
of goals arise from presidential choice; these were defined and are being pursued
since Obama’s first day in office. By and large, American priorities are the same as
Europe’s. This can hardly come as a surprise, since US and EU interests virtually
coincide as well. The argument that an agenda primarily designed to pursue American
interests can only run counter or be inimical to European interests or indeed
any other nation’s is entirely misguided. This resuscitation of the old paradigm
that competition among states is a zero-sum game could not be further removed
from the European interpretation of the current international paradigm – that in a
globalised world there is an unprecedented degree of interdependence of national
interests. This is hardly different from President Obama’s thinking as reflected in
his UN speech: ‘… in the year 2009 – more than at any point in human history – the
interests of nations and peoples are shared.’ 3 This is after all what, at continental
level, from Portugal to the borders of Russia, the European experience of creating
converging interests has proven: that is possible to build, among states, including
3. President Barack Obama, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 23 September 2009.