Penn Philosophical Perspectives - University of Pennsylvania

Penn Philosophical PerspectivesPenn Philosophical What’s new?January 2010a national student journal fromthe philosophy department at UPenn1

Penn Philosophical PerspectivesForewordDr. Zolton DomotorUPenn Philosophy Undergraduate Chair 1989-2009It has been twelve years since the University of Pennsylvania undergraduate philosophy journal Foundationspublished. Funds from the College have paid for preparation and publishing of Foundations over a couple of years, but whenundergraduate chair of Penn’s Philosophy Department for the past twenty years, I feel that I have been fortunate to oversee thepublication of Foundations and the essays contained in its volumes.In the ensuing decade, after the Foundations, Penn’s undergraduate philosophy community was advised to considerelectronic submissions to various outside-Penn undergraduate philosophy journals, including the Dialogue (Journal of PhiSigma Tau, International Honor Society for Philosophy -- Penn’s Philosophy Department is its regular chapter member and Ihave had the honor of being Penn’s Psi chapter representative), The DualistPenn’s Foundations), and at least eighteen other undergraduate philosophy journals, currently published both in print andonline throughout the United States. undergraduate philosophy journal, Penn Philosophical Perspectives. The inauguration of Penn’s journal comes at a time ofrenewed undergraduate interest in the pursuit of philosophical research and publishable writing, whether inspired as part of aregular class assignment, honors thesis project, or self-motivated. In many ways and by every major measure, Penn has alwaysbeen committed to undergraduate writing -- regularly practiced in its numerous critical writing seminars -- and in Philosophyresearch paper writing is an integral part of teaching and scholarship.I anticipate that under the founders’ innovative editorial management skills and their continued allegiance to academicallyrigorous standards (in determining the quality of research, depth of philosophical inquiry, ingenuity, accessibility, and clarityin the submission pool essays), Penn Philosophical Perspectives will attract the most brilliant undergraduate students in theworld and from all philosophical walks of life. It will not only foster the publication of student papers in philosophy and promotea deeper study of philosophy, but also it will reach a broad community of readers with serious interest in undergraduatescholarship and writing that really matters.Penn’s Journal will join a growing roster of other undergraduate philosophy journals and I expect that initially it willdraw primarily upon Penn students’ exceptional undergraduate contributions in philosophy and their dedication to scholarlywriting. It will provide excellent opportunities for undergraduate students to showcase their work and to bolster applicationsfor admission in graduate schools.In addition to numerous undergraduate philosophy journals, there are many undergraduate philosophy conferences, in-by the Philosophy Department in early February. Students interested in attending such conferences should contact the philosophyundergraduate chair for more information.Last but not least, there are many local and national essay contests, usually open to fulltime students enrolled at variousregarding submission guidelines, please contact the Philosophy Department.These avenues provide opportunities for work in philosophy outside the classroom and they help foster a philosophicalculture among undergraduates, in areas ranging anywhere from ancient and medieval philosophy to contemporary issues inepistemology and metaphysics, moral and political philosophy, and philosophy of science. Penn Philosophical Perspectives and I am grateful to the Philosophy Under-Penn’s new Journal, and talking to me about unveiling it to the undergraduate philosophical community at-large. Finally,initial inspiration and interest, this second Journal venture might probably never have been started.Zoltan DomotorUndergraduate Chair, 1989 - 2009Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PennsylvaniaJanuary 201012

Penn Philosophical PerspectivesContents3. Morality and SagesMencius and Xunzi on Self-Discovery7. Leibnitz’s ContraditionOn the Moral Necessity of Creation11. Complexity, Information, and ModelingRobert RyanDuke University10. Art: Emblem of PhilosophyChristina MaoUniversity of Pennsylvania15. Chip on the ShoulderFinding a Better Alternative to Revenge21. Bad Luck is Not a Way Out of JailDrawing the Line Between Chance and Intention23. Why Fortune Does Not Bring HappinessA Stoic Critique of the Aristotelian Notion of Blessedness26. On the Philosophy of MetaphorsAn interview with Dr. Elisabeth CampAbout PPPBieu Bu TranUniversity of ConnecticutBenjamin NaeckerUniversity of PennsylvaniaBenjamin FarkasPrinceton UniversityGregory L. HertzStanford UniversityDustin ElliotChristina MatthiasUniversity of PennsylvaniaEditorial BoardEditor-in-ChiefExecutive EditorCharles Kenworthy (C’10)EditorsArtistsPenn Philosophical Perspectives publishes research,outstanding course essays, artwork, critical articles, andother writing formats. PPP circulates in print and online,from both graduate and undergraduate students.For details on submissions, how to get involved,or advertising, please visit:www.ppperspectives.orgJanuary 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectives is an independent student publication advised andendorsed by UPenn’s Philosophy Department. All articles are chosen by the EditorialBoard based on merit of argument or reasoning. All opinions expressed herein aresolely those of the author(s) and do not in anyway reflect the opinions or theendorsement of the Editors or the Philosophy Department at UPenn.2

Penn Philosophical PerspectivesMorality and Sages:Mencius and Xunzi on Self-DiscoveryBieu Bu TranUniversity of Connecticutbieu.tran@huskymail.uconn.eduAbstractHuman nature (ren-xing ) has been a widely disputed topic throughout the historyof Chinese philosophy. The disagreement between Confucian philosophers Mencius andXunzi lies in the crucial distinction between ke yi (capacity) and neng (ability).Xunzi criticizes the Mencian view of human nature as being too naive and simplistic, becauseXunzi thinks that morality is not inborn, but rather the creation of the sages. Menciusargues for the opposite: in order for sages to formulate and institute moral processes,there must have been certain “moral endowment” that existed in order for the sages to doso. This paper will attempt to reconcile these two views.Human nature (ren-xing ) has been a widely disputedtopic throughout the history of Chinese philosophy.cius,largely abstained from elaborating on the topic of humannature in the Analects. In fact, the following two passages sumanother by nature. They diverge as a result of repeated practice”and “it is only the most intelligent and most stupid whoare not susceptible to change” (Confucius and Lau 17.2 and-good and bad at the same time, at least one of the two philosophersmust be wrong (Lau 541-565). crucial distinction between ke yi (capacity) and neng(ability). Hence, the two philosophers have prescribed differenthas spontaneous benevolent impulses that, when cultivated, canJanuary 2010correctly result in a wholly benevolent person. In other words,he thinks that humans are endowed with moral resources in theform of the four sprouts provided by Heaven (tian ). However,such endowments require careful and rigorous nurturing that morality is not inborn, but rather the creation of the sages.The sages created rituals to instill moral norms and practicesupon their people in order to curb their excesses and mold their the idea that in order for the sages to formulate and institutemoral processes, there must have been certain “moral resources”that existed in order for the sages to do so.If this interpretation is correct, then the human nature ar-educating others on how to cultivate their natural endowment.-acceptingthat human nature really is good because the initial endowment

y tian (Heaven) provides the necessary moral resources rectreply to this claim is, “the potter molds clay to make anearthenware dish, but how could the dish be regarded as part ofbenevolence and moral goodness have the same form as whatgave rise to them, namely, an endowment of moral resourcesstrategy” that claims that even if humans are good in their originallysimple organic state, they move away from this goodnesssessan endowment of moral resources in a theoretical state ofnature, they are in reality far from being moral and benevolent In this paper I hope to contribute to this larger debate by argument has a genetic fallacy. I will advance a position thatcius.I will argue that sages are a special class of humans who“discovered” morality and norms, rather than created it. Peoplecome to know a “new” discovery (in this case, morality) whenthey consciously come to grips with it, but it does not followthat morality itself did not exist prior to the discovery. In thissense, the sages were merely discoverers of a phenomenon thatwas already in existence, namely, morality. Upon their discovery,the sages then formulated a set of moral norms and ritualsthat allows others to discover the same phenomenon. Thisview is also consistent with the claim that morality or goodnessis inborn, for in order to have morality, one has to personallydiscover something that has been there all along. In this interpretation,the sages are not “creating” morality from moral resourcesbut rather creating a recipe that individuals can followto discover morality with the moral resources that they alreadypossess. This, I believe, is enough to reject the “genetic fallacy”proposition. In order to arrive at this conclusion, I willdraw distinctions between the three classes of humans and theirrelation to goodness and morality, elaborate on the capacityabilitydistinction, and most importantly, establish a connectionbetween moral resources and the discovery of morality.Sages, Ordinary People, Small MenThere are three classes of human beings: sages that arepurely good, small men that are purely wicked, and in between,ordinary people that are capable of being in either category. fuciustoo shares the view that most people tend start out asordinary people that can become good or bad depending onwhat they do in life, as “men are close to one another by nature.They diverge as a result of repeated practice” (ConfuciusJanuary 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesthe same nature and that “a man on the street can become a Yuare their doctrines different? Their doctrines are similar onlybecause their end goal is similar: to bring morality to ordinarypeople so that they can become good rather than evil. However,their doctrines are essentially different as the two philosophersdiverge when it comes to the procedures through which this endgoal is reached.The Capability-Ability Distinction for the notions ke yi (capacity) and neng (ability).The distinction between having capabilities and being able isthis. Capabilities are usually inborn and one need not obtainthem because Heaven has already granted every individuala set of capabilities at birth. The notion of ability, on the otherhand, rests more on the individual rather than Heaven. Capabilitiesenable one to do things, or at the very least, provide athe decision whether to perform these actions or not belongs tothe individual. Thus, in the category of abilities, there are twodistinct notions: bu wei not acting (or unwilling) and bunengif one has the capability to do something in principle but is unableto carry out the task due to practical reasons, it cannot besaid that this is by choice. For example, even though anyone iscapable of not sleeping, perpetual sleep deprivation can lead tosevere illness and death. Thus, no living human has ever experiencedperpetual sleeplessness. clarify the difference between not acting and un-the other hand, if one refuses to massage an elder’s stiff joints,then this is clearly an example of not acting rather than beingand compassionate ruler, it is not because he is unable to doso. Instead, it is because the king is unwilling to act accordingto his endowed capacity, which includes compassion. Indeed,bu ren ) thesuffering of others because they have a heart-mind that allowsthem to feel pity for a child who is about to fall into a well orcommiseration is all the proof that one needs to show that humanbeings are endowed with the capacity to become moral andfersto this endowment made by Heaven as the four sprouts,which when cultivated properly will grow into a virtuous per-selfsimilar to the way one needs to exert effort in order to lift a4

Penn Philosophical Perspectivesfeather. Therefore, it follows that a king would need to exert hisaccount of human nature, everything seems genuinely inbornoffers a markedly different account of human nature, one thatcialcreation of morality by the sages. -by foot across the width of the whole world, yet there has neverbeen a case where anyone was able to travel across the worldinghis take on the distinction between being able and choosingnot to act, given that one has the endowed capacity. Knoblock’sthat it reveals the logical possibility that one’s foot can indeedtravel across the “width of the whole world,” rather than translatingthis as “every place under Heaven,” which seems lessmathematically graspable concept that increases the plausibilityof one’s feet walking across the width of the whole world. tionof inborn capabilities, which was granted by Heaven. The“inborn capacity for morality” because both are capabilitiesgranted by Heaven at birth and are inborn rather than learned orobtained. If my reading of this is correct, then it is also plausibleto claim that even though the “inborn capacity for morality”allows one to be moral, thoroughly benevolent, and sage-like,having a capacity does not entail one actually achieving mo--achieving morality, then it appears that morality (if humansare ever going to have it) is something that would have to be(Read top down, from the right)something that already exists. In this sense, the disagreementhumans can obtain morality and not a general debate regardingwhether humanity is good or bad by nature. Henceforth, I willshift the focus of my paper to morality.Morality and Moral Resources that human beings all have a heart of commiseration using thestory of the child who is about to fall into a well. This, I believe, of morality for all humans in the sense that almost everybodywill have the same feeling of sympathy for the child, regardlessof whether he or she will develop this moral feeling intosomething strong enough to induce an action of actually savingthe child. To be sure, by claiming that morality begins upondenbecome moral only because they feel pity for the child whois about to fall into a well. I am merely suggesting that suchbenevolent impulses must have stemmed from a moral sourcethat individuals already possess.Following this line of thought, D.C. Lau interprets the (a) all men are by nature able to distinguish right from wrong,and (b) not only are they able to draw the distinction but theyare also obligated by logic to approve of the right as such anddisapprove of the wrong as such (Lau 548). To approve of thewrong makes it “right” but a wrong can never be right on pain an obligation for men to be able to distinguish between rightand wrong, and subsequently, opting to do the right thing overthe wrong thing, is both practical and can be enforced throughashamed of not being as good as others, how will one ever beas good as others?” The sages too are bound by these obliga- wrong, but this still leaves the possibility that he can do wrong.The difference between a sage and an ordinary man is that theresult, opts to do the right thing over the wrong thing. The ordi-the wrong and often does wrong. In other words, even thoughHeaven has endowed the sage and the ordinary person with anequal amount of moral resources, the sage becomes a sage becausehe has fully cultivated his four sprouts. The benevolent“impulses” which once were weak and spontaneous are nowtransformed into a strong motivating force for goodness. morality and norms are “created” using the same stuff that gaverise to them. In his most direct reply he say that “the pottermolds clay to make an earthenware dish, but how could theJanuary 2010 5

endowed by Heaven with moral resources because his observationson how human beings act in reality lay the foundation for-case by saying that even if humans did possess goodness in theoriginal state, they may have moved away from this at birth.lent.Human desires are largely responsible for these negativequalities that human beings possess, and hence the former sagethose who practice them to obtain morality through “self-arti-crooked wood is straightened. To put it differently, repeatedpractice of rituals gives men their “second” nature, one that in-person’s behavior is in reality markedly different from what hasbeen endowed to that person by Heaven, because endowmentsby Heaven are good while human beings in reality are wicked;(b) the end-product of the rituals and moral norms created bythe sage kings is morality, which is purely good; (c) therefore, acould not have given rise to b because something that is wickedand bad cannot create something that is purely moral and good.Morality and Discovery cantlymore intelligent than the general population and had awith morality, so it is safe to assume that the sage kings werewhat it entails. In this sense, the sages know about moralityonly insofar as they are conscious of it, but it does not followthat morality did not exist prior to their conscious experience,help in understanding this. Christopher Columbus is creditedorto Columbus’ discovery. Thus, it is plausible to assume that-Similarly, the sages are credited with discovering morality becausemorality was not known to the world of humankind, butit does not follow that moral goodness and benevolence did notexist prior to their discovery. To say that morality did not existin the mind of sages and non-sages is not enough to say thatmorality did not exist anywhere prior to its discovery. Thus, itis safe to say that the sages are pioneers who happened to bealsor blueprints based on their discovery, so that “even a manJanuary 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesonly become sages if they are willing to follow the blueprintsmall man can become a gentleman but he refuses to, and a gentlemancan become a small man but he refuses to.” This is alsoresult of repeated practice” (Confucius and Lau 17.2).I think this argument is consistent with both the works of mise.In this view, the sages are responsible for creating andthe possibility that men might have an intuitive sense of moralityendowed by Heaven. This is because ordinary people havea conscious experience of morality and it cannot be disproved-importantly, this argument refutes the claim that there is a ge-are not “creating” morality out of moral resources per se. Instead,the rituals and moral norms created by the sages serve asa blueprint by which ordinary people can attempt to discovermorality through the cultivation of their weak and spontaneousereducation in that an instructor is there only to provide guidanceto the students while leaving the self-discovery processup to the student. Rather than attempting to mold the studentsinto something that they are not, the instructor acts as a guidegreat teachers of morality.Works Cited Deng, Shiru. “Hanging scroll, ink on paper.” 1796. The Palace 65. Print. Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984. Print. Calif: Stanford University Press, 1988-1994. Print.6

Penn Philosophical PerspectivesLeibnitz’s Contradiction:On the Moral Necessity of CreationRobert RyanDuke Universityrsr14@duke.eduAbstractGottfried Leibniz argued that God was morally necessitated to enter into an act of creationsibleworlds. However, despite Leibniz’s attempted differentiation between metaphysicaland moral necessity, I argue that his attempt to necessitate God’s act of creation ultimatelyfails. Given God’s initial perfection, it does not logically follow that creation is the bestchoice, and any attempt to necessitate God’s choice contradicts his perfection.January 2010In his metaphysical worldview, 17th century philosophergumentfor this idea by appealing to the perfection of the char-metaphysical system. Given God’s perfection and the principlebest of all possible worlds because the only created world inline with God’s perfection is the best of all possible worlds.best of all possible worlds. Yet with his assertion that we live in-mentfor why evil exists in the world. Does the existence of evilcalcareer mulling over the various responses to the problemof evil, clearly evidenced by the fact that the last book he everwrote, entitled Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, theFreedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, was fully devoted tothis topic. Yet in assessing this problem, particularly with hiscientreason for God to choose to create a world at all, given thenecessitating God to engage in an act of creation to contradictGod’s perfection, particularly His wisdom and goodness. Discourse on Metaphysics-78

fends his line of reasoning based upon his understanding of theDiscourse byasserting that “the most widely accepted and meaningful notionwe have of God is expressed well enough in these words,-was so prevalent during his time. He holds that “there are severalentirely different perfections in nature, that God possessall of them together, and that each of them belongs to him inan all-knowing, all-powerful, unchanging, and perfectly goodGod, and He retains all of these attributes at the same time andthroughout all of history. The perfections of God, according toture. -different variations, in its most basic form it asserts the notiontied to his understanding of the perfection of God, and we mustGod’s existence, including His acts of creation, must follow thehold the idea that God must act perfectly in all He does. Thereason God chooses to do some things and not others is becauseHe must choose perfectly, in accordance with His nature. It isthe best of all possible worlds. our experiences in our bodies. His notion of the world includesthe entire universe, past, present, and future. His idea of theworld also includes his notion of both our lives here on earthand the idea of the after-life. Death does not end our experiencethesis that we live in the best of all possible worlds by appeal-be a reason why God created this world and not another world.nature. He must create the best of all possible worlds, because,have is to act imperfectly” (185). God cannot act imperfectly,so to act perfectly in His act of creation is to create the best ofall possible worlds. of all possible worlds comes out of the fact that evil exists inholds strong to his assertion that we live in the best of all possibleworlds. He believes that the existence of evil must be inJanuary 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesaccord with God’s creation of the best of all possible worlds.-best of all possible worlds. reason holds for God’s choosing to engage in an act of creation.tionthroughout all of time, including the time before the cre-be necessitated to engage in any act of creation. work Theodicy. In the Theodicycalnecessity is a thing in which the opposite thing or choice isto create is free: God is prompted to all good; the good, eventhe best, inclines him to act; but it does not compel him, forhis choice creates no impossibility in that which is distinct forthe best; it causes no implication of contradiction in that whichit is not metaphysically necessary for God to create becausethat God was morally necessitated to engage in acts of creation.He believes that “it is a moral necessity that the wisest shouldbe bound to choose the best” (270). In accordance with Hisargues that refraining from creating would reveal a lack of wis-possible worlds would not be in accordance with God’s wisdomand perfection. moral necessity is a very important one. If something is metaphysicallynecessitated, then the notion of choice does not evenenter into the picture, whereas if something is morally neces-God’s choice here is morally, but not metaphysically, neces-and wisdom. This argument employs the same line of reasoningmust involve choosing what is best, and choosing to create thebest of all possible worlds is clearly what is best. So God must,create. In order for God to remain praiseworthy, God must actationis this: that to refrain from creating would not be in linewith God’s perfection, especially in terms of His wisdom andgoodness.8

Penn Philosophical Perspectives His line of reasoning implies that through an act of creation,God’s perfection is increased. To make God’s choice to enterinto an act of creation a moral necessity deems that if God doesnot act in such a way, then He will act contrary to His ownnature (for God would not be acting in a perfect way). YetI believe that to follow such a line of reasoning contradictsingthat if God did not create the world, then He would notbe supremely wise. The problem with this argument is that itholds that God’s act of creation adds to His goodness and wis- -to or improved upon, but by necessitating this choice of God’s,that a perfect being, who carries all aspects of perfection in hisDiscourse)must engage in an act of creation. For God was perfect in naturebefore His creation of the world and His decision to createa void that existed before the creation of the world (again, it is-God’s perfection. To necessitate God’s act of creation is to attemptto necessitate something that is not necessitated due tosibleworlds is necessitated by the goodness of His character,His choice as to whether or not to engage in an act of creation for the moral necessity of God’s creation hangs upon his unarguedassumption that God’s decision not to create would notact,” and assumes that creating the best of all possible worldsof reasoning plausible. For I do not see how, given God’s initialperfection, a choice to create is the best choice. God couldperfectly well remain in His initial perfection, complete in Hisglory and goodness, forever enjoying himself, without the creationof a world. perfection was complete in its nature before He chose to createa world. God, before creating the world, was perfectly self-which comes to God from his work is not at all essential tosennot to create a world instead of creating this world. He wascompletely free to choose as He pleased, and there was no no-tinctionbetween metaphysical necessity and moral necessity interms of God’s decision to create or not. For any necessitatedthere is a difference between these two types of necessity in-God did have a choice whether or not to create a world, but byJanuary 2010to create would cause a contradiction in His nature, somethingwhich God obviously cannot do (because it would violate His-not have a choice because choosing not to create would causea contradiction in the nature of God. Instead, I claim that Godwas perfectly free to choose whether or not to create a worldat all. I hold to a libertarian notion of choice in terms of God’s-for stronger reasons the creation of the world, is a necessary any necessary relation to a single one of his creatures” (162).God is not required, in any sense of the word, to enter into anact of creation because He can exist perfectly without the creationof any world. God’s perfection is not dependent upon Hiscreating, but rather creation is dependent upon God’s perfec-necessitated to act in accordance with His nature. God does notHis goodness and wisdom. God must continue to act in accordwith His nature because not to do so would go against His verynature, and thus He would cease to be God. ingthe best of all possible worlds (due to God’s perfection andIt does not follow that given God’s perfection, He must engagein an act of creation. For by attempting to make God’s choicefectionbecause such an argument assumes God’s nature can beaugmented by an act of creation. To augment a perfect being-reason to hold in God’s choice to create a world.Works CitedModern Philosophy:An Anthology of Primary Sources. Indianapolis: HackettPublishing Company, Inc., 1998. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God,the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of EvilYale University Press, 1952. Treatise on Nature and Grace. 910

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Penn Philosophical PerspectivesComplexity, Information, and ModelingBenjamin NaeckerUniversity of Pennsylvaniabenjamn@sas.upenn.eduAbstractScience has long been concerned with the creation of simple models of real-world phenomena.But in the last 150 years, scientists have realized that many important systems are nonlinearand complex. In this paper, I describe the fundamental differences between simple and complexsystems, and argue that the aspects of complex systems that most differentiate them from simplesystems are exactly those that are hard to incorporate into our models. I also propose two pos-Introductiongoal of science is to understand naturethrough the creation of models that represent it. For thefundamentalmajority of the history of science, these models were measurement and mathematical analysis improved, it becameclear that the majority of real-world systems are not nearly assimple as these models implied. The discovery of these complexsystems and the creation of the mathematics required todeal with their fundamental nonlinearities was a watershed inthe history of science. The surge in the study of complexityduring this last century was an attempt at progress in our techniquesof modeling these extraordinarily complex yet abundantsystems. This raises a simple but fundamental question abouthow science purports to explain our world, about how its variousbranches models our reality: why do some systems havesimple models, while other systems stubbornly refuse to submitto this type of analysis?In this paper, I will show that such systems do not admitof simple models because the information structure of thesystem is more detailed than can be accurately represented in tainedin a simple system can be vastly compressed into a simplemathematical form, whereas the relevant information of acomplex system admits of no such compression. This leads tothe understanding that while we may have a one-to-one relationshipbetween simple models and the simple systems theymodels, and the choice of which model to employ can only bedetermined by the parameters to be predicted.January 2010Modeling in ScienceDespite the fact that philosophers of science have onlyrecently termed what scientists do as ‘modeling,’ this has beenthe fundamental pursuit of science from its inception. To learnabout the world, we construct a model of it, or of some relevantportion of the real world we are interested in. The model is usuallyconstructed on the basis of rules, or theories. The comparisonbetween the model that theory generates and the real worldthen either supports or refutes the belief that the current theory this way, called the semantic view of theories, many considerthese statements to be obvious. However, it was not always so.Principiathat connected those equations to the world, based upon hisbelief that the world consisted of simple mathematical relation-The next step toward our modern conception was accomplishedby Gibbs and his work on statistical mechanics. phenomena, Gibbs’s work took a fundamentally statistical approach.Statistical mechanics is a theory, designed in large partby Gibbs, that describes the relationship between microscopicand macroscopic phenomena when large numbers of similarobjects interact. For example, in simple thermodynamic systems,such as a container of gas, each molecule is identical, butthere are trillions of particles. Therefore, while it is exceedinglycan say a great deal of importance about the overall actions ofstatistical groups of particles.The importance of Gibbs’s work for our purposes is thathe explicitly constructed his theories not knowing anythingabout atomic structure, and so made them completely devoidof any physical interpretation. He only connected his statisticalmechanical theory with the thermodynamic systems he was attemptingto describe with thermodynamic analogies. This completebreak between the theory and the physical system it is 11 12

of restrictions, rules, or constraints that are meant to describethe real world in some way. However, the connection with thereal world goes by way of models, which are abstract (possiblymathematical) objects that satisfy the constraints of the theory.Scientists then compare these models with the world, and usethe similarities and discrepancies to better understand our worldand our theories of it.Idealization and Information CompressionIn constructing models, scientists must not only concernthemselves with their correctness or the degree to which theytureof a physical system, while it would give us a great deal ofinformation about that system, would be hopelessly complexgive as much information as possible about their physical ana- glectaspects of a system that have small effects or do not affectthe target system in ways that matter for the current analysis.For example, in high school physics, we calculate the distancea ballistic projectile will travel when launched at some speedand angle without regard to the air resistance, since it has anegligible effect on the outcome. Such calculations give us verylittle more information, but complicate the model immensely(remember that air resistance is proportional to the velocity, thespeed and direction of the air, and the cross-section of the object).Therefore, we abstract away such aspects of the worldglectthese features, since they have minimal effect on the outcome,but a large effect on the effectiveness of the model. creation is the compression of information. The mathematicsof information compression grew out of the work of Turing,Kolmogorov and Chaitin, and rely on the fact that much informationin the world comes in repeating patterns. For example,consider the two strings below.b = 01010101010101010101January 2010Penn Philosophical PerspectivesHere, a looks simply like a random string of twenty digits,which it in fact is. b, on the other hand, looks more ordered, simpler,or patterned. The information contained in b can be com-bcourse, this does not really compress the information much, butif b was ten billion pairs of ‘01,’ then such a description wouldcontain the information in b much more succinctly. However,because a is a random string, there is no pattern that we cancompress, nothing we can take advantage of to condense a intoa more easily used string.This compression of information is of the utmost impor- physical world, ones that must be simpler and easier to use.Compressing information by encoding regularities helps usbuild small models that deal with a great deal of simple phenomena,such as linear relationships and low-period behavior. information compression does not much help us in the case ofcomplex systems.Simple Versus Complex SystemsHaving covered the fundamentals of modeling in science,the next section will elucidate the differences between simplecomplexity that we most wish to capture in our models are infact the biggest hindrances to doing so.Simple systems are almost always synonymous with lin-tionof two solutions is itself a solution. Formally, if x(t) andy(t) are two solutions, then ax(t) + by(t) is also a solution, forany scalar a and b. This property is extremely convenient; it al-that the systems are ‘well-behaved’ in other respects as well.The most important behavior of such linear systems for us isthat they asymptotically approach only three kinds of behavior,these behaviors the system will approach.Complex, or nonlinear, systems, stand in stark contrast to have guessed, it is not generally the case that a linear combina-are no guarantees about the asymptotic behavior of complexsystems. However, there are two aspects of complex systemsthat are most important for the purposes of this paper, and sodeserve sections of their own.Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions lated,most researchers agree that complex systems contain anelement of chaos. Used in this way, chaos does not refer to completedisorder, but to a sensitive dependence on initial conditions.This means that any slight disturbance in the system isdifferent state than if it had not been disturbed. the following map, x n+1= x n n), called the logistic map. a small amount. However, we can see that the differences betweenthe two trajectories on the map are becoming larger, afteronly four iterations.It can be shown that initial conditions to these kinds ofsystems diverge exponentially, so that they are eventuallycompletely different. This sensitive dependence on initial conditionsis generally understood as a stretching and folding ofplexsystems has a fractal structure, so that it is incredibly dif-further implies that it is very hard to show which of the attractorregions the systems approaches at the limit. This is exactly whywe cannot know what the long-term behavior of a complex systemwill be.12

Penn Philosophical Perspectives chaotic mapThe sensitive dependence on initial conditions of complexsystems puts a limit on our ability to represent such systemsvidesa coarser set of equivalence classes of the phase space, sothat two systems that are not actually the same are representedas such in our model. ratefor many initial conditions.Bifurcations and Broken Symmetry real problem for the accuracy of our models, it does seem thatwe can continually improve our models through improvementsin measurement. However, in this section I wish to discuss anotheraspect of complex systems that I believe is much moredaunting. contain elements of ‘surprise.’ In this sense, surprise means thatthe system evolves into a state that we did not expect of it fromthe beginning. In other words, the system enters attractor re-the system evolves, more than one stable solution presents itself,and the system is offered a ‘choice’ between the two attrac-point. In addition, we can see that because both of the solutionsare stable and consistent with the underlying dynamical equations,that they are symmetric with respect to those equations.is chosen over another. terveningspace. If we raise the heat of the lower element aboveto rise in a normal, linear fashion. However, at a certain temperature,T csteadforms complex convection rolls or cells, called Rayleigh-January 2010The important thing to remember about this system is thatThese equations describe the microscopic nature of the system, ccells that occur above are consistent with these micro-dynamics.The two attractors are symmetric with respect to the underlyingdynamics, since there is nothing in those equations whichpredicts a preference for one over the other (yet one exists be-How then, since our model only takes into account themicroscopic equations, can we expect to predict this symmetrytwo attractors, what tips the balance into one attractor over another?The choice is made by the aggregation of the motionof each and every particle in the system. This implies that inorder to track how the system evolves into a new attractor, wemust keep track of each particle in this system. Therefore ourmodel must take into account the actions of every element ofthe system, which is clearly beyond the capacity of even themost powerful computers.Modeling Complex SystemsGiven the issues of the preceding sections, how are we toargue that we simply need to improve the accuracy of measurementsto sidestep the problem of exponential dependence oninitial conditions. However, this is not a true solution, since insome cases improving the accuracy or measurement one mil--There seem to me to be two co-operative ways in whichrequires us to create classes of models which apply to the entirerepertoire of possible behavior of a complex system. The secondsolution takes into account higher-level constraints on themethod.To understand these two solutions, reconsider the Ray-dynamics and heat mechanics equations to describe the system,we may want to specify a new type of model for the new at- 14

tractor regions, such as the convection cells. This model maylook entirely unlike the micro-dynamical equations, but this isirrelevant as long as it accurately describes the genesis and life-may have many more in the case of other systems. These oughtthen to be combined into a single class of models, designed tobe tailored to the situation at hand. a step, and that we still must learn how to decide into whichattractor the system evolves, even if only so that we learn topick the correct model from the class. I do not dispute this insolution may give us insight into this. In addition to creating aclass of models for each system, I believe that we would ben- to be outside the realm of the lower-level models but that canstill provide valuable insight into the behavior of the system.standard heat conduction and the convection cells are consistentwith the underlying equations. However, the system is dis- are preferred to standard heat conduction. Taking into accounthigher-level constraints that may not be accessible to the underlyingdynamical equations may provide insight into why aTaking into account concerns of a fundamentally differentlevel than the underlying dynamics of the equations may seemso. In general, there are complex tradeoffs between the general-ratinga wider set of behaviors tends to reduce the applicabilityof the model to any particular situation, while also creatingYet, science in general assumes that the most powerful theoriesexplain a wide variety of phenomena as different manifestationsof some general class of interactions (consider the search for theThis drive for a powerful and universal description ofbehavior is particularly attractive in the case of complex systems.Such systems display a characteristic which, confusinglyenough, has been called universality, or the fact seeminglydifferent systems at many different levels exhibit very similartypes of behavior. For example, there are many systems withbifurcation points similar to T cHowever, to create a model so general that it explains both thecreation of the convection cells and many other complex phenomenawould probably sap the model of any real explanatorypower.There are very few theories that apply to such a wide classof systems, but I want to argue that taking such theories intoaccount may in fact unify many distinct models into one. Inthe case of the convection cells, the general theory that oughtto be included is that of the thermodynamics of dissipative sys- entropy to the surrounding environment, allowing the creationJanuary 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesof large-scale order that would otherwise be destroyed by thisvironment,we may be able to classify the convection cells asis much work on dissipative systems and their properties, I donot know of any work that tries to understand their structures as ingincorporated the thermodynamic element into our model,how do we know when to start applying it? In other words,when does a system become dissipative? Clearly the Rayleigh-sipativebefore that? The answer must lie in the fact that dissipativesystems are ‘far from equilibrium,’ however no hardincorporating more general or higher-level constraints on ourmodels may complicate the situation, but I believe that enoughmay create a harder problem to solve mathematically, I believethat we will gain a clearer and more general overall picture ofboth the complex system at hand and complex phenomena ingeneral.These more complex models may require search through lems.However, despite fundamental limits on measurement ac-made to create better models of complex systems. The most architecture designed for molecular dynamics simulations,which works on the order of microseconds as opposed to theare very powerful, but lack any sort of general applicability.Hopefully, continued improvements in such systems combinedwith a reworking of the general structure of our models willprovide us with usable techniques for understanding even themost complex of phenomena.Works CitedAtlas.Cambridge University, Cambridge, 2007A Comparison of the Meanings and Uses ofModels in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences. Physics and Chance: Philosophical Issues in theFoundations of Statistical Mechanics. Cambridge Three Kinds of IdealizationOrder Out of Chaos:Man’s New Dialogue With NatureYork, 1984.Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos. Perseus, Anton a Special-Purpose Machine forMolecular Dynamics Simulation. Communications of the 14

Penn Philosophical PerspectivesChip on the ShoulderFinding a Better Alternative to RevengeBenjamin FarkasPrinceton Universitybfarkas@princeton.eduAbstractview of the vicitim’s self-respect and respect for the moral order. This makes sense if thevictim’s self-respect depends on comparing his own moral autonomy to that of the perpetrator,so that revenge raises the victim’s status as a moral agent to that of the perpetrator.However, I argue that focusing on one’s own moral autonomy without comparison to themoral decision making of others is a more virtuous form of self-respect, because this ismore likely to push agents to make moral decisions autonomously, and could eventuallyreduce vindictive desires.Iterhow benign one’s disposition, acts of cruelty will almostinvariably evince some desire that the perpetrator be punished.The rare person who can suffer iniquity without wantingphy19) It does not follow, though, that we ought to emulatesuch a person, that vindictive feelings are themselves immoral.Indeed, in Getting Evenfeelings, when they play an appropriately limited role in humanmotivation, are virtuous because they stand in the defense of“self-respect, self-defense, and respect for the moral order,” im-harmed in part because one cares about one’s personal integrityand about justice (according to which, presumably, one oughtnot be harmed). These appear to be valid moral considerations,and if vindictiveness is an appropriate means of expression forthe right circumstances. I will argue, however, that self-respect,in order to be reliably virtuous, must be respect for oneself as amoral agent, a feeling closely tied to respect for the moral order,necessarily, but rather that we should work to develop the rightform of self-respect. virtue as a matter of vital personal concern:at the same time gaining moral credit by cultivating the virtuesin the second. It is worth noting, then, that there is a large thirdneither bring us moral credit nor cast doubt upon our decency.For example, joy at one’s own success is surely no sign of virtue,but neither, except in unusual or excessive cases, could itas racial hatred and spite. Passions might fall into this categoryIn which category does vindictiveness belong– among those passions that no morally decentperson would willingly retain (malice, cruelty,spite, racial hatred, etc.) or among the passionsthat bring moral credit to the person who possessesthem (kindness, generosity, indignationover wrongs done to others, etc.)? (18) Lawyer defends clientby Ivo Saliger, artist of the Third ReichJanuary 201015 16

if they are felt universally or if they have no obvious, directnegative effects. If a passion is an ineluctable fact of the humanfor feeling it, and if it does no harm or good, it seems pointless tionsonly the additional possibility that vindictiveness might“straddle” the virtuous and evil groups, we must consider alsothe possibility that vindictiveness falls into this neutral categorythat does not imply it should be praised or cultivated. - involves feeling some “negative passions,” and it seems natu-tivepassions negative, it seems, is that they involve seeking toharm the perpetrator, since “the goal of vengeance is simply toin its various forms, then, is effectively the desire for variousforms of vengeance, felt with various levels of intensity. form of vengeance should not be judged on the same standardtionalityof an emotion itself and the rationality of the role thatupon vindictive feelings in many different ways, and we caneven choose not to act on them at all. Thus, we cannot point tosomeone with an all-consuming desire for vengeance as proofmake a similar argument against, say, generosity by claimingthat someone who gives everything away to anyone he meetsmotivation, generosity is certainly a virtue, and nearly any virtuecan be taken to excess or distorted. tionincautiously will justify virtually any passion as long asit is minimally expressed in action. In moments of extremefrustration, for example, I sometimes feel an urge to committhis urge, and so it has no immediate negative consequences inthe world. That I am able to give this urge its proper role in motivatingmy actions (namely, no role at all) should not mean that-one never commits these acts, the passion cannot be considered-acts of random violence, my general outlook on things changesin ways that affect other aspects of my behavior. (I will becomethe passion is part of the general outlook is unclear, but it seemsthat if one works to eliminate destructive, evil passions, one’soverall outlook will improve as a result. Thus, a passion mayJanuary 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesbe considered destructive if eliminating it will produce a morevirtuous outlook on life in general. structive,in fact reinforces two important aspects of a virtuouswill attempt to understand exactly what self-respect ought toequal moral being with basic rights.” (19) These rights surely-otherwise one’s status as a free and equal moral being wouldring hollow. The various forms of harm perpetrated upon usby others violate this basic moral autonomy to various degrees.For example, being lied to deprives one of the information oneuses in making moral judgments, and so the act of lying impliesthat the liar is capable of judging for the person being lied to.The liar deprives the person being lied to of a choice he wouldotherwise have made for himself, and this implies that the liarassumes that his own capacity for moral judgment is superior tothat of the person being lied to. Lying is, in this sense, akin toan act of coercion. Thus not only is my autonomy reduced, butits reduction is the result of a decision made autonomously bysomeone elseIn general, the distinguishing feature of vindictiveness isthat it is directed at an independent moral agent. If a boulderfalls on me, I do not resent the boulder, but if a person punchesme, or even accidentally (but negligently) bumps me, I do re-I have no desire to suffer. Thus it is not losing autonomy thatarouses vindictive feelings, but rather the idea that someoneelse can choose to take away my autonomy, or in the case ofnegligence, willfully disregard it. The inequality of havingsomeone harm me hurts more than the harm itself (and the lackof autonomy it implies). Thus we may even resent good deedsif we see them as establishing the moral superiority of the attemptedaltruist, or if we see the altruist as making choices forus. challenges to this sort of equality-based self-respect, but such respect requires that I value, defend, and maintain my equalityto others as a moral agent. Thus I will naturally have a strongemotional response when another’s action denies my morality.It might seem appealing to assert my moral equality to theperpetrator by seeking to do to him as he did to me; if I am hisThis reasoning is not entirely sound, however. The perpetratortakes himself to be my moral superior; his desire to harm memust, in his view, be inherently a stronger moral considerationthan my desire not to be harmed. If I am devoted to the conceptof moral equality, I cannot use any such claim of moral superiorityin my reasoning. That the perpetrator asserts his superiorityover me and I assert my superiority over him does not make16

Penn Philosophical Perspectivesnot always push us to vengeance, but they tend in that directionby desiring the harm of the perpetrator, in effect asserting moralcommon expression of equality-based self-respect, it is not anappropriate one. perpetrator’s repentance rather than his suffering. If the perpetratorrepents, he acknowledges that his prior assertion of moralsuperiority was mistaken, and admits that he and the victim aremoral equals (at the very least). This in effect removes the fac-a claim of moral inequality can be caused by inanimate objectsor animals without engendering any sort of resentment that onefeelings miss the point, unless the purpose in causing harm tothe perpetrator is to secure his repentance, to “make him sorry.”This is only one variety of vindictiveness (we are often vindictivewithout regard to the perpetrator’s repentance), and even sorepentance-oriented vindictiveness ought to be just one weaponin one’s repentance-oriented arsenal, which for example oughtalso to include moral instruction to allow the perpetrator to seethe error of his ways. Indeed, moral instruction would seemto be a more effective tool than punishment because punishmentcreates an external incentive to repent (namely, wantingthe punishment to stop) that may weaken the purity and sincer--then, should be at most a second option to moral instruction if itis motivated by equality-based self-respect.January 2010 ness,though, we must make sure that equality-based self-respecthave any obvious, serious negative consequences, so it wouldappear not to be a vice, meaning that vindictiveness based uponthat either equality-based self-respect or vindictiveness basedon it are virtuous, since this brand of self-respect may fall intothe neutral category of feelings and passions, worthy of neithercensure nor praise. I contend that it is at best minimallypraiseworthy, and certainly not the most praiseworthy form ofself-respect.For a disposition such as equality-based self-respect to bepraiseworthy, it must tend to push one toward laudable outlooksor behaviors. This it does in general terms; a respect for oneselfas the moral equal of others goes hand-in-hand with a respectfor others as the moral equals of oneself, which is a preconditionfor ethical behavior toward others. However, thinkingof one’s own moral agency in comparison with that of othersmuch of an autonomous moral agent as those around me, I willalso assume that what is morally right for others is also morallyright for me (since we are moral equals, with equal responsibilities).I will thus take very seriously the moral reasoning ofothers in deciding how I should act myself. I will not imitateothers whom I believe to be acting immorally, of course, butif I see broad patterns of behavior among those around me Imay assume that those patterns of behavior are typical of moralI am concerned that this sort of reasoning may lead one to adoptothers’ moral codes without seriously considering whether theymatch one’s own instincts. The idea that we are moral equalstoo quickly becomes the idea that, as moral equals, there is onemoral system that works for all of us. Thinking of oneself as themoral equal of others can thus dull the impetus to make deci-esand errors become easily entrenched, and the full complexityof moral dilemmas is often obscured by the dominance of aenceof one’s own moral instincts insidiously undermines one’sown moral autonomy. tonomy,rather than on how that autonomy compares with themoral decision-making of others, is therefore a more virtu-maturation developed by the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg,as described by Carol Gilligan in In a Different Voice-etalvalues and constructs moral principles that are universalown moral instincts take precedence over the moral reasoningingdecisions in the same way, what matters about this sort ofdecision-making is its independence, rather than its equalitywith others. If one’s autonomy is limited, one ought merely torespond in a way that preserves and maintains one’s autonomy,without concern for the moral autonomy or authority claimedown moral instinct, then it does not particularly matter whetherershurts this sort of self-respect because it shows that one’smoral instincts do not always govern the decisions that decideone’s fate, and indeed sometimes are powerless to govern them.Thus, autonomy-based self-respect also induces an emo- should be directed at establishing one’s own moral autonomyrather than equating it to that of others. Sarah, a woman interviewedby Gilligan who faces a complicated abortion decision,vidualworth:I am suddenly beginning to realize that the thingsI like to do, the things I am interested in, and thethings that I believe and the kind of person I am,are not so bad that I have to constantly be sittingon the shelf and letting it gather dust. I am a lot17 18

more worthwhile than my past actions have ledothers to believe. (quoted in Gilligan 93; emphasisadded)Sarah’s sense of the importance of her own beliefs andinstincts is independent of how others regard her, and indeedis developed in contrast to it. She thinks of herself as more ofan autonomous moral agent, more worthwhile than others thinkof her, and it seems not to concern her that others do not seeher as she sees herself. Sarah’s self-respect thus derives fromthe knowledge that she has taken responsibility for acting accordingto her own moral instincts, and so behavior undertakenwith this knowledge, rather than vengeance per se, will have theeffect of reinforcing her self-worth. Thus Sarah ends a dehu-her own moral autonomy, but she does so according to her own -ingwith her lover’s needs ‘as best I can without compromisingmy own.’” (Gilligan 95) Sarah sees this as acting in a “decent,because she considers it the moral thing to do, because beingvindictive breakup from a bad lover is twice over an assertionof her moral autonomy.This suggests that we can develop autonomy-based selfrespectsimply by placing an emphasis on morality in our livesand taking responsibility for the morality of our actions. If so,then it is hard to imagine autonomy-based self-respect hav- it is quite likely that I will want others to be autonomous aswell. This ensures that I will treat others as my equals in moral respect without the drawbacks, autonomy-based self-respectthe equality-based version more strongly, I think, but this onlymeans we should work to cultivate the autonomy-based version. may arise from this sort of self-respect when harming the perpetratoris seen as the morally right thing to do. For example,if Sarah had been committed to a retributivist morality insteadlover in as painful a way as possible. This then would be oneform of vindictiveness arising out of respect for the moral order,the other option for grounding virtuous vindictiveness identi-or for other reasons) to a vision of the moral order that calls forthe punishment of its violators, then one will feel urges to punishviolators. a vision of the moral order that includes vengeance. I haveshown that vindictiveness based on equality-based self-respect,January 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesreasoning unless it is aimed at securing repentance, and eventhen equality-based self-respect is not in itself virtuous. Rely-assumes that it is part of the moral order, so some further basisvideany reason to consider vindictiveness moral, but there maybe reasons I have not considered underlying the moral instinctsof those who do consider vindictiveness moral. In the absenceof these reasons, though, I cannot allow that there is any trulymoral outlook which vindictiveness supports, and therefore, inmy view, vindictiveness (which in the abstract tends to causeharm) ought not be a part of our moral decision-making.However, equality-based self-respect and the vindictivenessthat derives from it are effectively facts of human nature.the other hand, if we are interested in becoming more moral,we should work to develop an autonomy-based sense of selfrespect,which in all likelihood will reduce our vindictive desires(unless our moral instincts are strongly retributivist). It isingit as such may lead to the cheap forgiveness that concernsrespect or sense of morality because it is given without regardfor either oneself or one’s morals. Rather, when one has developeda healthy and proper sense of self-respect that does notdepend upon the moral lives of others, vindictive urges will inall likelihood vanish on their own.Works CitedGilligan, Carol. In a Different VoiceHarvard UP, 1982.Getting Eventice.jpgFor details on submissions,how to get involved, oradvertising, please visit:www.ppperspectives.org18

Penn Philosophical PerspectivesBad Luck is Not a Way Out of JailDrawing the Line Between Chance and IntentionGregory L. HertzStanford UniversityAbstractThree intuitions are pervasive in common accounts of moral responsibility. First: individualsare responsible for that which they intend to do. Second: the formation and realizationof one’s intentions are ultimately based on luck. Third: individuals are not morally responsiblefor that which depends on luck. These three intuitions, I argue, cannot all be right.Through an analysis of Thomas Nagel’s views on moral luck, I propose an understandingof moral responsibility that rejects the third intuition. By clarifying the conditions underwhich luck is morally relevant, I propose a notion of moral responsibility rooted in anagent’s constitution-- a constitution that is the entirety of one’s values and projects, and aconstitution that happens to be based on luck.hen the assumptions of a body of knowledge appearcontradictory, coherence requires explaining awaythe contradiction or declaring false one of the assumptions.This paper is an attempt to demonstrate that commonlyheld notions about moral responsibility constitute suchdamentalbeliefs about the relationship between culpability andluck cannot all be valid.depends on luck.January 2010 debate about moral luck, I will examine each of the three principles.I will argue that, together, they do indeed result in a con-cyas we know it. The remaining part of the paper will be anthe third principle may not becategorically true, in light ofsome of the claims made by this account, agents must, inat least some cases, be morallyresponsible for featuresthat can be attributed to luck.I will conclude that luck isfundamental to the notion ofagency. that the extent to which oneis culpable for an action maydepend on features of that actionand how much its consequences can be attributed to chance.turesthat may be subject to luck: personal constitution, circumstances,causes of action, and consequences of action. “They be more culpable or estimable for anything than one is for thatgelseems to think that while the phenomenon is paradoxical, itmentsare irrational, but they reappear involuntarily as soon asthe argument is over.”In Moral Luckas if we should jointly accept or reject their relevance to blameworthiness.Part of my task in this paper is to separate these fourtypes of moral luck. This approach, if successful, would yield atheory that demarcates morally relevant and morally irrelevantluck.I want to begin by examining whether moral responsibilityis indeed rooted in intention. Suppose that Smith shootsand kills Fred, and that in a(mostly) identical situationJones shoots, the bullet hits abird, and Fred lives. I will ignorethe question of whetherJones should be punished,and instead focus on whetherJones is morally culpable?Put another way, did Jonesdo something wrong, and ifso, was it as wrong as whatSmith did?I believe that in comparisonto other cases inwhich luck might be morallyrelevant, it is much less clearin this case that the bird’spresence ought to alter an19 20

assessment of Jones’ blameworthiness. I must concede that inorder to construct a valid argument that the bird was morallyirrelevant, certain assumptions must be made about moral responsibility,and like all concepts, moral responsibility meanswhatever one wants it to mean. That is, there is no good reasonwhy moral responsibility could not mean fault for bringingabout an endresponsibility is more consistent with commonly held beliefs,and is more useful as a tool for ascribing blame and praise.ento mean fault for intendingto bring about an end (intentionhere is the bringing about of anon this account, Jones and Smithare equally morally responsible.same end, and it was only dueto chance that a bird intercepted of the three principles, that (1)agents are morally responsiblefor their intentions. cipleis a necessary axiom, insofaras this notion of moral responsibility is necessary to delineatejudgments of actions from judgments on states of affairs. Hur-Katrina was not morally responsible for destroying parts ofwind currents in order to produce Hurricane Katrina, he wouldrologistbring about an end, but only the meteorologist intendsmoral responsibility is ultimately arbitrary, it better accommodatesour intuitions about the proper subjects of praise andalresponsibility that luck in matters of consequences is morallyagents are responsible for their intention to bring about a consequence.January 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectives come from? Surelycircumstances, previous experiences, upbringing, and perhapsnot choose their parents or the conditions of their childhood,and if one chooses the circumstances of a decision or can re-circumstances which were, in turn, due to previous circum-said about whether intention is exclusively determined by luck;some will maintain the existence of free will of a sort that cantionis at least partially based on luck. It is uncontroversial thathow one is raised at least contributes to one’s decisions, and itis at least the case that circumstances preclude the formation ofcertain intentions. So we have principle (2), that agents’ intentionsdepend on luck.If (1) agents are morally responsible for their intentions, and if(2) agents’ intentions depend on luck, then it must be the casethat agents are morally responsible for that which depends onluck. In other words, it must be false this argument makes no claims about the truth of premises (1)and (2). It is a conditional proof; if it were the case that (1) and(2), thenany two of these principles willmay choose, so to speak, whichpremise to abandon. I believethat the best case can be made forPeter Strawson ceptingthat agents can be responsiblefor that which dependsrelevant to moral responsibility.minemoral responsibility (1) anddepend on luck (2). I now want toshow how individuals can be morallyresponsible for their intentions, even if the formation oftheir intentions came about by luck.Say that Tim has a genetic disposition to become angryand overreact, and he was raised in an environment that hadbred criminal tendencies. If Tim murders someone, we can takederdepends on luck. This would be consistent with the analysisthus far. In contrast, we could excuse Tim on the grounds thathe did not control his upbringing and genes. However, everyintention can be traced to some factor beyond an agent’s con-concept of moral responsibility.So it follows from one feature of moral responsibility(that it must be possible to be morally responsible) that Tim’smoral responsibility must depend on luck. It follows from anotherfeature of moral responsibility (that moral responsibilitymust track intentions) that Jones’ moral responsibility does notdepend on luck. How can moral responsibility only sometimesdepend on luck? The following principle will reconcile the casesand give a possible maxim according to which moral responsibilitywill only sometimes depend on luck: luck is morally relevantonly when it occurs prior to intention. There are, I think,compelling reasons to reject both the claim that luck is alwaysmorally relevant and that luck is never morally relevant. If I amright, and if intention offers a demarcation for luck’s moral relevance,then the notion of agency will remain intact. This is unsurprisingbecause intention is fundamental to agency; indeed,should not always be morally relevant and for why luck shouldnot be declared never morally relevant.Luck should not always be morally relevant because20

Penn Philosophical Perspectivesagents are morally separate from the world around them. Theview that what one’s actions are the source of moral responsibilityis akin to seeing the natural world as an extension ofone’s body. There is an important sense in which one’s body isthe only object that an agent can control in a truly direct sense:the body is part of a conscious being, and so a direct object ofintention. Responsibility, which must track the desires of consciousbeings, can only track the extensions of the body, whichare extensions of the mind. To say that the bird alters Jones’responsibility is akin to saying that the bird is a part of Jones,is plainly not the case. If agency is to make any sense, it mustseparate between the natural world and the isolated consciousminds of agents. Therefore, there should be cases where luck ismorally irrelevant. In these cases, it is necessary that luck occurboth externally to the agent and independent of the formation ofthe intention.Luck should sometimes be morally relevant because luckis fundamental to the creation and constitution of a moral agent.- evaluation applies to judgments about the relevance of luck.-not know about the bird). Luck should not produce moral blameeither- if I turn on a light and unknowingly cause a friend to beshocked, I am not morally responsible. Given the same circum-moral intentions would have done what I did, so I am excused. would it mean to say that Tim is not morally responsible formurder because his upbringing and genes are due to chance?have a problem. For this type of luck is not just something thathappens to a person. Constitutive luck constitutes a person; itdetermines who they arebebringingand genes, Tim would not be Tim. Luck is an excusewhen even a different person would have done the same thing. event may be said to be due to luck if it could have been otherwise.might be. In reality, no event can be otherwise than how it actu-luck if it could have been the case that those two sixes werewhich Jones’ bullet was not intercepted by a bird. Indeed, itis the comparison of what actually transpired and the possiblewe cannot compare one’s identity with one’s potential identityJanuary 2010due to other causal factors. Identity is not a characteristic ofa person; it is the personmean, hardened gangster from the streets of Chicago who likesstrawberry ice cream, but instead is an arachnophobic, scubadiving,clay sculptor is a world in which Tim is a different per-We are unable to view ourselves simply as portionsof the world, and from inside we have a rough ideaof the boundary between what is us and what is not,what we do and what happens to us, what is our personalityand what is an accidental handicap…we donot regard our actions and our characters merely asfortunate or unfortunate episodes…we cannot simplytake an external evaluative view of ourselves…and this remains true even when we have seen thatwe are not responsible for our own existence, or ournature, or the choices we have to make.Constitutive luck is legitimately a feature of moral responsibilitybecause people are a bundle of causal forces. There isnot just any relation between a person and the causal forces ofpersonality, desires, beliefs, fears, etc. There is an equivalence.That is, a person is identical to the sum of the causal factorsthat produce and constitute that person. These range from thecausal factors that make bones to the causal factors that makeone afraid of the dark. Holding someone morally responsiblereally is a judgment about them, but it also really is a judgmentabout their childhood, their past decisions, their outlook on theworld, their genes, their friends, their emotional dispositions,“he did a bad thing” meanother than “his identity, which is partially composed of sev-provedof”? This is what moral responsibility seeks to judge:not the outcome, but the person.In Freedom and Resentment, P.F. Strawson argues forthe detachment of moral responsibility from determinism. Hisidea is that reactive attitudes such as resentment and gratitudeare ingrained in interpersonal human behavior, and, moreover,that such reactive attitudes should be a part of interpersonalrelations. “The human commitment to participation in ordinaryinterpersonal relationships is,” he writes, “too thoroughgoingand deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that ageneral theoretical conviction might so change our world.” He precisely is being exposed to the range of reactive attitudes thatis in question.” This view does not ignore the truth of determinismor moral luck; rather, it accepts that even if every act isdetermined, or even if one’s identity is due to luck, the self isattitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly employ forregulative purposes.” In matters of judging persons, determinismand moral luck detract nothing from the appropriateness ofmoral responsibility.21 22

is not just a special case of when luck is morally relevant; it isthe only case. If agency is to make any sense, then people musteven if their identity is arbitrary, but especially because theiridentity is arbitrary. Luck is morally irrelevant when it is unrelatedto the formation of the agent’s identity and intentions.This leaves us with a view of moral responsibility thatcan sometimes take into account luck and sometimes ignore circumstantial, causes of action, and consequences of action.Luck with regard to the consequences that follow from an ac-tutiveluck will be the model sort of luck that will be relevantin determining moral responsibility. Luck in circumstances andcauses of action will sometimes be relevant. For example, taketwo cases of causal luck: if I kick someone because I slippedon a piece of ice, or if I kick someone because I saw someonecauses my action (I happened to slip on ice, I happened to seeseeing the person caused me to form an intention to kick. Thesetypes of luck will be relevant only when they are inherent to theprocess of identity formation or when they provide the circumstancesin which one can form intentions. can say in advance how the moral verdict will depend on theresults.” He gives the example of leaving the bath running witha baby in it, noting that the baby’s drowning makes what oneit may be rational to “concentrate moral assessment on theactual decision in light of the probabilities” but doesn’t fullymust await the outcome, because the outcome determines whathas been done.” In his discussion in the following pages, he-the same way. The outcome should never be relevant, becauseit is always divorced from intention (or lack of intention, asseen in the case of negligence). Thought of another way, actionsretrospectively. The irresponsible parentshould be equally morally responsible whether or not thebaby drowns. That our emotional reactions often don’t accordwith our moral judgment is not surprising; indeed, we regretevents in the past that cannot be changed, and sometimes feelshrinks down the notion of agency, I believe that he is wrong toinclude consequential luck in this contention. is right aboutthink this is because he takes it as a given that his four typesof moral luck must be jointly relevant or irrelevant. Take, forexample, the following passage:January 2010The area of genuine agency, and therefore of legitimatemoral judgment, seems to shrink underthis scrutiny to an extension-less point. Every-Penn Philosophical Perspectives enceof factors, antecedent and posterior to action,that are not within the agent’s control. Sincehe cannot be responsible for them, he cannot beresponsible for their results.I do not think that genuine agency shrinks because of luck.In contrast, constitutive luck seems fundamental to who we are.intention and luck that occurs after the formation of an intentionare both outside of the agents’ control, I think there is a compellingcase for deeming only the former morally relevant. Finally,it does not follow from the fact that an agent is not responsiblefor something that he is not responsible for the results of thatthing. The responsibility may, like a stray cat wandering intoone’s house, assert itself upon someone. Identity asserts itselfcontrol of, one’s identity, but one is certainly responsible for theprojects that one chooses to undertake. something in the idea of agency is incompatible with actionsbeing events, or people being things,” but a theory of agencythat accounts for luck will have little trouble overcoming thisconceptual obstacle. If people are things, then their consciouslong as one maintains a conception of intention, events may be“leaves us with no one left to be,” but it may only be his consequentialluck that ought to be dismissed as morally irrelevant.Constitutive luck, in contrast, provides us with someoneto be. It is appropriate to hold people accountable for who theyprisinglythat our personalities and characteristics are basedon luck, might this be disappointingmanbeing, or, more strangely, that a particular conscious entitywe persist as a single identity in time, lucky that we can smell,taste, and touch the world, lucky that life contains pleasures,and lucky that we are not the only conscious beings. Luck isWorks Cited foot640x480.jpg Moral Luck. In Mortal QuestionsCambridge University Press, 1979.son01.jpgStrawson, P.F. Freedom and ResentmentDerk Pereboom. Indianapolis: Hackett PublishingCompany, 1997.22

Penn Philosophical PerspectivesWhy Fortune Does Not Bring HappinessA Stoic Critique of the Aristotelian Notion of “Blessedness”Dustin Elliotdce16@uga.eduAbstractIs our happiness up to us—that is, is it something we can control? Unlike Aristotle, theif something is outside of one’s control, it should not have a lasting impact on one’s happi-and completeness to be the necessary components of happiness, Aristotle’s notion of blessedness—takento be the highest level of happiness—must be rejected on the grounds of itsIrelation between happiness and those factors that are out of ourcontrol (e.g., external goods). In this essay, I compare and contrastsome of the ancient philosophical responses to this ques- Nicomachean Ethics, presentswhat he considers to be the necessary criteria for happiness.Happiness must be both (i.e. complete in the sense that it issought for its own sake) and (i.e. adequateso that nothing could beadded to improve it). In ac-Stoic thinkers operate by conception of happiness atthe outset, his commitmentto it becomes questionableas he discusses the situationof King Priam, the Trojanking who lost all of hisexternal goods following discusses the problems ofmaintaining that Priam, as avirtuous man, has lost nothing of importance while, at the sametime, suggesting that his happiness has been ruined by a loss ofpresents the notion of blessedness, claiming that Priam has lostthis instead of happiness. canceof external goods in relation to one’s happiness: if somethingis outside of one’s control, it should not have a lastingimpact on one’s happiness. In examining the notion of blessednessand siding with the Stoic philosophy on this matter, I holdJanuary 2010essarycriteria for happiness; one’s happiness, as a result, shouldnot be dependent on external goods. Furthermore, I argue that of blessedness must be rejected on the grounds of its inconsis-tive”objections to the Stoic position.Criteria for HappinessNicomacheanEthics discussion on “the good forman.” He asserts that, “Sincethere are evidently more thanone end, and we choose some and in general instruments)for the sake of somethingelse, clearly not all ends are ingthis claim, explains thatby he is referring to that“which is in itself worthy of cludingsomething that might be desirable in itself and for the-way or another, is sought for the sake of happiness. holds that happiness is also : that which “whenisolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” (12). If

would be unattainable, given that the possibility of improvingit by adding more and more things would be ever-present. Sat- istotleargues, that person can perceive nothing that could improvehis or her life. In this way, then, happiness is not just onegood thing to be counted among other good things; happinessIn order to determine what constitutes the good for man(i.e., man’s happiness), in The Nicomachean Ethicstionof man cannot be nutrition or perception in that these func-a function that pertains to man exclusively. The function ofman, then, insofar as it pertains exclusively to man, must berelated in some way to “the life of the rational element” (sincein continuing with the discussion, uses an analogy involving alyre-player to demonstrate another point regarding the functionof man. Just as the function of a good lyre-player is to playthe lyre well, the function of a good man is to exhibit a “good- some detail throughout the remainder of Nicomachean Ethics,tionof virtuous activity (also described in greater detail in thetreatise itself). In this way, then, human happiness is in directrelation with virtuous activity. The Stoics work largely fromthis same framework of happiness and virtue.Penn Philosophical PerspectivesAristotle, King Priam, and Blessedness chance of disaster that all living men face, it seems risky tocall any man happy (given that something could happen at anya living man happy, then who is happy? It seems strange andinherently problematic to call dead men happy insofar as deadmen cannot exhibit virtuous activity, a principle constituent ofinga living man happy one runs the risks of “making the happyman out to be a ‘chameleon, and inherently based.’” This posesa problem because happiness is supposed to be something thatis lasting and not subject to constant change. It is the durable21). to be troubled by the situation of King Priam, the Trojan kingwho lost everything with the sack of his city during the Trojan-January 2010tion.For many thinkers, however, it seems wrong to suggestthat Priam could be the same both before and after the fall of hisblessedness,suggesting that instead of becoming unhappy as a result of badfortune with respect to external goods, Priam loses his blessed-condition in which one is both happy (i.e., living in accordancewith virtue) and fortunate (e.g. lucky enough to avoid chanceblessedness,if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam” (21).The Stoics on External GoodsIn On Final Endsistotle’smode of thought and that of the Stoics:The Peripatetics [i.e. the Aristotelians] thinkthat no life is completely happy without bodilywell-being. We Stoics could not agree less. Inour opinion not even an abundance of thosegoods which we really do call good makes a differenceto the happiness, desirability or value ofone’s life. (Annas 332)It is not the case, however, that things such as health andwealth are of no concern to the Stoic. These things simplythings are not always good, given that their value depends, tosome degree, on the relevant circumstances, they are not thesame as moral virtue, which is always good (independent of thesituation at hand). Thus, things like health and wealth cannotvirtue in an attempt to improve one’s happiness. -to as either non-preferred or “preferred indifferents” (Inwood their respective circumstances allow. ternalgoods and virtuous activity is to regard the former as extrinsicallyvaluable (i.e., valuable in relation to something else)and the latter as intrinsically valuable (i.e., valuable by its veryyou check into a hotel and have the option to sleep in a dirty is, its value depends on the condition that, at this given time,the Stoics, is inherent. 24

Penn Philosophical Perspectivesthat not only does the idea of blessedness run counter to theStoic conceptions of happiness and virtue, it is also inconsistentblessedness as happiness plus good fortuneintroduces a higher form of happiness. This type of happinessof good fortune (something typically out of one’s control) leads--of thought becomes obvious; external goods, precisely becausethey have the ability to render a higher state of happiness, ac- Thus, if one wishes to remain committed to the original criterianotion of blessedness. that the proposed limitations are, in part, unwarranted. For in-blessedness is simply a different typedifferent type of happiness as opposed to a higher level of hap---same reasons mentioned in defense of the criteria themselves,thought that excludes the possibility of other types of happiness(at least for those who hold the original criteria to be sound).Other Counters and Responses (seemingly) counterintuitive nature of the Stoic disposition inexternal goods. It is absurd, some critics suggest, to maintainthat someone is to remain emotionless and unaffected when heor she suffers misfortunes like those of Priam. Such a state ofbeing seems impossible and inhuman.The problem with this criticism is that it arises from a misunderstandingof a key component in Stoic philosophy. TheStoics, for the most part, do not completely disregard the value(or should not) have the ability to weigh against one’s happi-happiness, is grounded in moral virtue. Someone in Priam’sposition would perhaps experience a period of psychologicaldisturbance and unrest when all of his preferred indifferents, theconditional goods, are taken away. Insofar as he was a virtu--January 2010Perhaps another example will clarify the Stoic position. -would not kill another person for a healthy heart even in anattempt to preserve his own health; doing so would require thathe carry out an immoral act, and the chief concern of the Stoicis to avoid such occurrences. Thus, even though the Stoic doesvalue the external good (e.g., health) to some extent, this typeof value can never weigh against moral virtue (a different typethe Stoic attitude towards external goods does not appear to becompletely counterintuitive.Conclusion Stoic arguments regarding the nature of human good. The Sto-pinessto argue that happiness is not dependent on externals(e.g., health, wealth, etc) in that, if it were dependent on suchthoughhe presents this conception of happiness at the outset ofNicomachean Ethicsblessedness. He holds that when a virtuous person experiencesmisfortune and the loss of external goods, he or she remainshappy but fails “to reach blessedness.” From this explanation,blessedness is happiness plus good fortune, and as such, it canof this notion, however, reveals that if one reaches this higherstate of happiness by obtaining external goods (i.e., by experiencinggood fortune), then this conception of happiness is nohappiness is life in accordance with moral virtue, bestowing nodirect reliance on external goods.Works CitedThe Nicomachean Ethics Cicero. On Final Ends Cicero. On GoalsHellenistic Philosophy radioactive-happiness-face.gifIntroductory Readings. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: HackettPublishing Company.Sextus EmpiricusHellenistic Philosophy25 26

On the Philosophy of MetaphorsAn Interview with Dr. Elisabeth CampPenn Philosophical PerspectivesChristina MatthiasUniversity of Pennsylvaniacmatthia@sas.upenn.eduDr. Elisabeth Camp is a philosopher of language andmind, whose research focuses on thoughts and utter- this interview, she discusses her path to becoming aphilosopher, and about the philosophy of metaphors.The paper she discusses here can be found on her website:http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~campe/#papersDr. Camp received her PhD from UC Berkeley, andcompleted postdoctoral research at Harvard. She isnow an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at UPenn.-I wanted to do something else. So I took a philosophy classwhich I thought might be the next best thing. I was a doubleabout fully committing to philosophy; I really enjoyed it andI found it really hard. I always thought it was just somethingI enjoyed, so I worried it was self-indulgent. I then went andworked in Chicago in adult literacy for three years after college.During that time, among the various things I was doing wasworking with people in the Latino community who were learn-and this phrase not a good phrase, and how can we manage tocommunicate these complex things? So that started to get meto see that it can actually matter, and not just be a fun game.stuff enough to go to grad school, but even then, I thought Iso many more topics that I thought were really interesting, andnot just things that were taught in my classes. I started coming-can actually help other people learn how to think, by teachingphilosophy, so I started to be corrupted.Where did most of your experience with neuroscience andJanuary 2010There was this reading group in grad school, post-docs andfaculty. It brought together philosophers who were interestedin psychology, and psychologists and cognitive scientists whoabout concepts, about representation, some about the cognitivearchitecture, like how must thoughts and thinking be substan-much overlap there was, but also how much difference there all trying to talk about the same thing, but the psychologists areconcepts, how do they connect to substantiation, how is it thattionsof using this concept correctly and incorrectly, and wheremore concerned about reference. Philosophers are much moreconcerned with how a concept connects up to the world, andthe psychologists are much more concerned with just what isgoing on inside the head. It was really interesting to see, givenhow much we thought we were agreeing, where we would justdisagree.interested in metaphor, and in the difference between metaphorjorbecause I was interested in that area. From there, I feel likethat has branched into a lot of different things about the ways26

Penn Philosophical Perspectivesour minds are that make us the kinds of creatures who woulduse metaphors, and other kinds of forms of speech that are sortof like metaphor, such as irony. There’s a whole strand of stuffthat just little by little you say, ‘I’m interested in this thing, wellthen I should be interested in this other thing too, etc.’Would you say that studying Philosophy of language piquedThere was actually a pretty funny moment, when my advisorin grad school was very gently trying to suggest that I might-right, and in fact the reason I was interested in the topics inphilosophy of language I was interested in was because of howthey connect up to the mind. I’m interested in places where theinteraction between language and mind is especially interesting,or especially complicated, or especially promising.I think it is really important not to just write for other academicprofessional philosophers. I hope that different pieces of mywriting are more interesting to a wider audience, such as maybeentedtoward philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists.I think it is really important that if you are sitting on aplane, and somebody asks you what you do, you should havesome way of explaining it to them in a way that could get themit all, but that might sound interesting to them. I think later Iwould like to try to write articles that are really accessible topeople who are outside of philosophy.I think overall, one of my ultimate goals is to broaden what philosophersthink of as what they can think about. I think we, philosophers,are most comfortable thinking about kinds of thoughtgreat, it’s nice and clean, it gives us a very orderly model of puttingtogether our thoughts, and it gives us this very orderly wayof testing whether the connection between our thinking and our it’s still really interesting and important for making us human.So my ultimate goal is to get us to pay more attention to thosekinds of things, and to have theories that can help us pay moreattention to those kinds of things.Do you think it’s fair to broadly apply this ultimate goal toIn philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, we have thistask of giving an adequate description of language, or of mind,ditionalthing that is really important, which is making senseJanuary 2010language and philosophy of mind are also concerned with that,the norms of language come from, how can we think clearlyliticalphilosophy, ethics, and epistemology, the question ofnormativity is much more in the forefront. I think of my task asreminding us, as philosophers, that we should pay attention to awider range of things than we often do pay attention to. -of interest in that area; from what kind of context do youThere are two things that people think a lot about in philosophyis, where does metaphor belong in the sort of overall theory ofmeaning, is it part of what words mean, is it part of what utterancesmean, does it have meaning at all, is it what speakerscontext of metaphor. Then people also pay some attention tothe sort of states of mind that would prompt us to speak metaphorically.In that article I’m talking about both of those thingsto some extent, but I was motivated to do it more by thinkingfectsdoes metaphor have in the conversation that makes it auseful, interesting, distinctive, powerful phenomenon. I wasrhetorical effects; you notice that they are distinctive for metaphor,and people want things to be simple, so they’re alwaystrying to assimilate anything to something else-they are alwaystrying to assimilate metaphor to some other kind of phenomenon.For example, you know Davidson wants to say metaphoris just like a bump on the head, and then these relevance theoristsand other people want to say metaphor is really just likeordinary literal talk. I want to say no, that if you think about therhetorical effects, don’t just think about how nice it would be ifthe taxonomy were that way, think about what you actually dowhen you make a metaphor. You’ll notice that these rhetoricaleffects are different in those two cases and that you can’t justassimilate metaphor to realist categories.-be a propositional conclusion, a direct statement. Is thatsomething that we have to assume in order to discuss metaphorin this way, or is that something that you would applyThis is an example of exactly what we have been talking about.Philosophers have a nice theory of formal logic, but more generallywe’ve got a nice theory of meaning, which is propositional,across the board, because it gives you a nice, systematicaccount of how conversations would proceed the way they do,and how words come to have meaning. It gives you a nice doing when you make an utterance, especially an assertion,27 28

model, if you assume that people are trying to communicateSo you get a very nice theory from making that assumption, butthat assumption is false.that it involves this non-propositional thinking, including emo-an important part of our minds, and our ways of thinking. Youcan’t just tell people, “you should be thinking about this thing,”you have to say, “look at this thing you are already interested in,now notice that it requires you to pay attention to this broaderframework.” So I am always looking for ways to make peoplethink about that model of meaning. To this point, in the previouslymentioned article and in general, I often go along withthe ordinary philosophical conception of meaning, and I haveto do that because I have to talk to other philosophers, and so Ia restrictive notion. I am teaching a class in the spring calledwhat are the different kinds of meaning, and where does meaningcome from, and are there legitimate sources of differentto make some systematic sense of that. In order for it not to bejust a terminological debate, I think it is important not to simplysay, “you should include this under meaning,” but I increasinglyam starting to be interested in saying, “these are differentkinds of meaning,” in addition to the narrow propositional kind.Do you see metaphor as a valuable way of expressing meaning,and if so do you think it is in some ways undermined byYes, I think that metaphor, from the standard, traditional, propositional,truth-conditional perspective, looks like a weird devi-would we use this indirect, risky way of communicating, whenreally we’re just communicating propositions anyway? I think-a better model of the mind, and of communication, that makes itcally?I think that one of the things that metaphor is really goodfor, one of the reasons that we do communicate metaphorically,is because it allows us to communicate these really complex,open-ended ways of thinking, in addition to, or even more thanactually say. Sort of the classic example, which I talk about in-all I am saying in my letter of recommendation, that’s a prettyJanuary 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesbad philosopher, but I’m not saying that, so I’m communicat-at, and it is not the only kind of speech that does this, but it isespecially good at communicating not just one or a couple ofextra propositions, but a whole way of thinking, a whole attitude,including especially emotional responses.Another topic you were talking about is the difference betweensemantics and pragmatics. In terms of the relationbetween meaning and creating new frameworks for thinkingabout the philosophy of mind and philosophy of lan-The more I talk to linguists, the more this is a really interestingquestion to me. So many people assume that metaphor isa pragmatic phenomenon; what that means is that when youspeak metaphorically, you say words that have one convention- the pragmatic meaning is different from the semantic meaning.you mean the opposite of what you say. There are all these questionsabout how to understand the relationships within pragmatics,how to understand the relationship between different kindsof pragmatic meaning, different ways in which speakers mightbeen focused within pragmatics; my work in the philosophy oflanguage on metaphor has focused on where within pragmaticsdoes metaphor go, assuming that it doesn’t go into semantics.any linguistic phenomenon that is systematic you should try toput it into semantics if possible; that is you should appeal to adifference between what the words mean and what the speakermeans by using those words only as a last resort.out thinking that I was going to show these people that theyare wrong because the assumptions that they are using to argueagainst my view about metaphor would show that not just metaphor,but sarcasm is a semantic phenomenon, and it seems thatthey say that actually some of the things that suggests are reallycool, that sarcasm or some parts of sarcasm could be semantic.So that means the way we think about what semantics couldbe different than what philosophers have traditionally assumed. know anything about semantics we know about the differencebetween semantics and pragmatics and we know that sarcasmand probably metaphor belong in pragmatics not in seman-it seems like actually you could put this stuff in semantics too.So then the question turns to, what do we want semantics to be?story we can tell, about meanings associated with words thathelp to predict what speakers do with those words. So the moreyou can get systematic predictions by packing it into the semantics,the better.28

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