LEXSEE DANIEL GUGGENHEIM; SUSAN ... - Land Use Law

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2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25981, *8Page 4ordinances, whichever occurs first.").7 Goleta, Cal., Ordinance 02-17 (Apr. 22, 2002).8 We say there was a gap because the parties sostipulated, but we do not [*9] imply aconstruction of California law to that effect. TheCalifornia statute says that the newly incorporatedcity must "immediately" and "prior to performingany other official act" adopt an ordinancemaintaining the effectiveness of all countyordinances, so it may be that, were it not for thestipulation, there would be an arguable questionwhether there was any gap.That year, 2002, the Guggenheims sued the Cityclaiming that the rent control ordinance was a taking oftheir property without compensation, and assertingnumerous other claims. 9 They have limited their takingsclaim to a facial challenge, not an "as applied" challenge.They claim that it is the rent control ordinance itself, notits particularized application to their mobile home park orthe regulatory process applied to their park, that hasdenied them their constitutional rights. The theory of thetakings claim is that by locking in a rent below marketrents, and allowing tenants to sell their mobile homes tobuyers who will still enjoy the benefits of the controlledrent (albeit subject to upward adjustment 10 ), theordinance shifts much of the value of ownership of theland from the landlord to the tenant. The [*10]Guggenheims submitted an expert's report with thesummary judgment papers explaining that rents for sitesin their mobile home park would average about $13,000 ayear without rent control, but average less than $3,300with rent control, and that the tenants could sell theirmobile homes for around an average of $14,000 withoutrent control, but because of rent control, the averagemobile home in the park sells for roughly $120,000.Since the Guggenheims lost on summary judgment, weassume for purposes of decision that this is correct.9 These claims include a substantive due processclaim, damages for the deprivation ofconstitutional rights, an equal protection claim,violations of the California state constitution, anda variety of other claims not at issue here. Thefederal constitutional claims are brought under 42U.S.C. § 1983.10 Park owners can automatically raise rent by75% of the local consumer price index (a measureof inflation), and may seek additional increasesfor various reasons provided in the ordinance.Goleta, Cal., Mun. Code § 08.14.050.The case went through a complex procedural course,but the complexities are of no importance here. First thecase in federal court [*11] was stayed pursuant toPullman 11 abstention while the Guggenheims pursuedclaims in state court. They and the City settled the statecase. Returning to federal court, the Guggenheims wonsummary judgment, and the City appealed. While theappeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Lingle v.Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 12 and the Guggenheims and theCity agreed that Lingle so undermined the district courtjudgment that they stipulated to dismiss the appeal andthey reopened the litigation in district court. This time theCity won summary judgment, and the Guggenheimsappeal. The district court observed that the Guggenheims"got exactly what they bargained for when theypurchased the Park--a mobile-home park subject to adetailed rent-control ordinance." We reversed, 13 butdecided to rehear the case en banc, 14 and now vacate ourearlier decision and affirm.II. Analysis11 See Railroad Comm. of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,312 U.S. 496, 501-02, 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971(1941).12 544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 161 L. Ed. 2d876 (2005).13 Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996(9th Cir. 2009).14 Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 598 F.3d 1061(9th Cir. 2010).We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 15The Guggenheims' challenge is to the 2002 City ofGoleta [*12] ordinance adopting the county rent controlordinance, and its readoption within the 120-day period.15 Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).A. JurisdictionThe City does not dispute jurisdiction, but we raisedthe issues of standing and ripeness sua sponte in ourpanel decision. 16 The Guggenheims have claimed aninjury in fact to themselves (deprivation of much of thevalue of their land), which is fairly traceable to Goleta'srent control ordinance, and is redressable by a decision intheir favor, so they do indeed have standing to maintain
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25981, *12Page 5their challenge to the 2002 ordinances. 17 They ownedthe land in 2002 when the City of Goleta promulgated the2002 ordinances.16 Guggenheim, 582 F.3d at 1004 n. 4.17 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351(1992); Colwell v. Dep't of Health & HumanServs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2009)(quoting Lujan); see also Equity Lifestyle Props.,Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184,1193 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a propertyowner must own the affected property at the timethe land use regulation is enacted to have standingto bring a facial regulatory takings claim); CarsonHarbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d468, 472 (9th Cir. 1994), [*13] overruled onother grounds by WMX Techs. Inc. v. Miller, 104F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).Ripeness is more complicated, because ofWilliamson County Regional Planning Commission v.Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. 18 In Williamson, theSupreme Court imposed two ripeness requirements onfederal takings claims. First, a regulatory takings claim isnot ripe until the appropriate administrative agency hasmade a final decision on how the regulation will beapplied to the property at issue. 19 That requirement hasno application to this facial challenge. "Facial challengesare exempt from the first prong of the Williamsonripeness analysis because a facial challenge by its naturedoes not involve a decision applying the statute orregulation." 20 Second, a property owner who sues forinverse condemnation, claiming that his property wastaken without just compensation, generally must seek thatcompensation through the procedures provided by thestate before bringing a federal suit. 2118 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d126 (1985).19 Id. at 192-93; see also Equity Lifestyle, 548F.3d at 1190.20 Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City ofMorgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 2003).21 Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195; [*14] EquityLifestyle, 548 F.3d at 1190.In Yee v. City of Escondido, another Californiamobile home rent control case, the Court held thatalthough an "as applied" challenge would have beenunripe because the park owner had not sought permissionto increase rents from the administrative body establishedby the ordinance, the facial challenge by the park ownerswas indeed ripe, because it did not depend on the extentto which they were deprived of the economic use of theirproperty or the extent to which they were compensated.22 Subsequently in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, the Court described the Williamson ripenessrequirements as "prudential" rather than jurisdictional inthe context of regulatory takings case. 23 In AdamBrothers Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara, weheld that we had discretion to waive the Williamsonexhaustion requirement where the case raised onlyprudential ripeness concerns, and did so, assumingwithout deciding that the takings claim was ripe. 24 In sodoing, we applied McClung v. City of Sumner. 25 InMcClung we had also interpreted Suitum as describingWilliamson ripeness as prudential rather thanjurisdictional, and concluded that "we need [*15] notdetermine the exact contours of when takings claimripeness is merely prudential and not jurisdictional." 2622 503 U.S. 519, 533-34, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed. 2d 153 (1992).23 520 U.S. 725, 733-34, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed. 2d 980 (1997).24 604 F.3d 1142, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2010).25 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008).26 Id. at 1224.That is not to suggest that Williamson is dead. InVentura Mobilehome Communities Owners Associationv. City of San Buenaventura, we held that the onlycognizable claim raised was an as applied challenge, soheld that it was properly dismissed as unripe. 27 And inSinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, we heldthat while as applied challenges required Williamsonexhaustion, facial challenges sometimes did andsometimes did not. 28 A complication that makes itespecially difficult to determine the continuing viabilityof our ripeness precedents is that many involve"substantially advances legitimate state interests" claimsunder Agins v. City of Tiburon, 29 and Agins wasoverruled by Lingle. 30 Indeed, in the case before us,Agins was the law during state proceedings, and Lingledid not come down until the first appeal was pending infederal court. It may be that a claim (even a facial claim),alleging a regulatory taking [*16] based on the theorythat an ordinance takes property without justcompensation, is unripe until that property owner hassought compensation through such state proceedings as
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LEXSEE DANIEL GUGGENHEIM; SUSAN ... - Land Use Law

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