Russian émigré artists and political opposition in fin-de-siècle Munich

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Kochman 13émigrés’ presence in the city became more publicly politicizedand Article 3 was highlighted as the key loophole designedto support autocratic, oppressive forms of governance, whetherfrom Russia or perhaps more fearfully for Germans, incooperation with Prussia and Bavaria.The issue surfaced during the second of two demonstrationsprotesting Bloody Sunday on January 22 in St. Petersburg, 56the tsarist government’s massacre of hundreds of citizensengaged in a peaceful procession to Winter Palace requestingpolitical and economic reforms. The Munich demonstrationsoccurred on February 2 nd and 3 rd , the first one with anattendance of over three thousand Munich residents and thesecond even larger with an estimated five to ten thousandpersons attending. Among the members of the seconddemonstration’s planning committee were the noted MunichbasedGerman artists Franz von Stuck, Max Halbe and FranzDefregger as well as Georg von Vollmar, the SDP’sparliamentary representative who addressed the crowd duringthe rally. In his speech, von Vollmar stressed the universalapplication of the Russian situation and the importance ofthe rally as a fight against oppression of all kinds. He stated,“The demonstration should not be a rally of a single party, ofa single orientation or of a social class…. It should be ademonstration for all those who have feelings for the sufferersof a belittled oppressed great peoples, for their standing upout of barbarity to culture.” 57 As the rallying crowd cried outin rejection of the tsar, speakers revealed the existence of the1885 extradition treaty with Russia. Article 3, quoted above,was singled out in particular, its unspecific definition ofpolitical behavior cited as an indication of the authoritarianregime’s interest in overly asserting its power over Russianémigrés’ personal fate. Individual civil liberties, freedom ofexpression in any form were therefore threatened as theunspecific nature of what was political was ultimatelydetermined by the viewer and not the producer of the work.Von Vollmar stressed that the agreement was the onlyextradition treaty held by a German state outside Prussia,leading demonstrators’ to angrily conclude that it was aBismarckian tool to enlist Bavaria in Prussia’s dirty work.The Prussian government was accused of abusing its power -like that of Russia - to persecute Bavarians with the additionalallusion to personal family gains on the political agenda asGermany’s Wilhelm II was cousin to Russia’s Nicholas II.The demonstrators identified with the notion of politicaloppression as they perceived it was experienced by Russiancitizens, giving ground to the message of populist solidarityvon Vollmar was trying to pursue and granting credence tothe Social Democratic agenda as a party representing theinterests of the masses. 58Von Vollmar’s platform was a familiar one, for the SDP hadadvocated it to Munich demonstrators 5 years earlier, duringprotests against the Lex Heinze, a censorship law ultimatelycontrolling freedom of expression in the arts. The Lex Heinzehad been introduced to the Reichstag originally in 1892 afterdiscussions in the Prussian Cabinet, 59 to address obscenity,pornography and urban vice, but in the course of years ofparliamentary debates had developed into heated issuesconcerning artistic content and threats to intellectualfreedom. 60 Prominent German artists, such as Franz vonStuck, writers, politicians and the press hotly contested it, asit essentially merged art with vice, leading Von Vollmar tovehemently oppose its requirement that art models registeras prostitutes with the police. 61 Indeed, as the bill was modifiedand re-presented to the parliament over the years, wordingof specific elements became targets of contention asdifferences of interpretation by authorities could meanimprisonment for an artist unintentionally overstepping theboundaries of moral conduct. Vice and prostitution wereconflated to signify nudity for supporters of the bill, to thepoint where they believed the Venus de Milo could not bedisplayed in an art dealer’s shop window, according to Article184a. 62 The city of Munich was the center of the bill’sopposition, as it was home to two liberal satirical art journalsJugend and Simplicissimus, a liberal art press, experimentaltheater and other progressive artistic ventures and had alreadybeen the target of conservatives deeming the city was lackingin moral fiber. 63 During the 1900 demonstration protestingthe bill in Munich, Von Vollmar asserted it was really a meansof suppressing freedom “and artists could learn from theworkers how to fight for their rights.” 64 A revised bill waspassed in June with less extreme measures, althoughcensorship issues continued to appear in specific cases until1914. 65Von Vollmar’s strategy of grouping Munich’s artisticcommunity with populist interests during the Lex Heinzedebates was applied to garner Russian émigré support afterthe events of Bloody Sunday in 1905. An outcome of the laterdemonstration was a formal resolution informing the Germangovernment of Bavarians’ intent to offer asylum to Russians,to encourage those in other German cities to do the same andto demand the termination of the 1885 treaty. 66 The presenceof all Russian émigrés residing in the city became radicalizedas Von Vollmar’s goal of providing protection by Bavarianseffectively grouped them with the same liberals who hadopposed the Lex Heinze’s infringement of artistic freedom.Russians were now more easily associated with the far leftand were ensured political protection from the partyadvocating its allegiance to the masses. Supporting theRussians became a proxy for defending freedom of all kindsand the liberal Munich press readily promoted itsradicalization, by reporting on those events whose limits onfreedom the local authorities were deemed to haveoverstepped. Such newspapers as Münchener NeuesteNachrichten, Münchener Post, and Münchener Zeitungregularly covered the Munich police’s crackdown on Russian
Emporia State Research Studies 45(1), 2009 14student organizations at local colleges after 1905. Munichauthorities were likely seeking local cells of leftist politicalactivity, such as those associated with the radical Russianparty, the Socialist Revolutionaries, which had declared aterrorist campaign against in 1906. 67 Newspapers wereespecially concerned with Russian students and their schoolorganizations, such as the “Russische AkademischeLesehalle” the “Russischen Studenten-Kasse” and the“Russische Studenten-Lese-Verein” which were investigatedfor potential subversive activity. 68 Many student members hadtheir apartments searched and passports confiscated, as inthe case of Daniel Meerowitsch, chair of the “RussischenStudenten-Kasse”, which was shut down by police in 1907on the suspicion of funnelling money back to Russia for therevolutionary movement. 69 In addition to organizations,Russian émigré student admissions were curtailedimmediately after Bloody Sunday, as in the case of the MunichTechnical College or Münchener Technische Hochschule forthe 1905 spring semester. The Münchener Zeitung and theAugsbürger Abendzeitung both cited the disproportionateenrolment of Russians over other foreigners and Bavariansduring the 1905 winter semester, 70 as well as the politicalcauses behind such a decision. The Augsbürger Abendzeitungacknowledged the schools’ liberal admission policy whileregretfully agreeing it could not have “revolutionary elements”in its student population. 71 The Münchener Zeitung reportedthe Hochschule’s decision to cease Russian admissions was aconsequence of Russian internal politics, 72 and coincided withthe closure of all universities in the Russian Empire in March,as a preventative measure against continued civil unrestsweeping that country. 73Munich authorities sought direct links between Russianémigré students and the revolutionary effort in Russia,concerned that such political instability would spread intoGermany, experiencing its own problems with the growinglabor movement. 74 The massive Ruhr coal miners’ strike wasunderway when Bloody Sunday occurred and was seen bynumerous Marxists and extremists in the SDP as a platformfor moving towards revolution rather than taking a moremoderate pace of reform. 75 In the climate of industrial lockoutsand strikes, increasing sharply in 1905, Germany’s owninstability with its labor force threatened to become moresevere. For authorities concerned with maintaining domesticorder, the Russian Revolution couldn’t have come at a worsetime. The large degree of sympathy bestowed to victims ofthe 1905 Russian Revolution from the German masses ingeneral could potentially fuel domestic leftist sentimenttowards more aggressive action. In Munich, the SocialDemocrats definition of the Russian massacre in terms ofhuman rights violations, universally applied, broadened thebase of people in protest to include Germans - workersstruggling for improved labor conditions; artists, writers andactors seeking greater freedom of expression and publishersand editors fighting to maintain a free press, threatened earlierby the Lex Heinze.VISUAL STRATEGY OF INTERNAL ABSTRACTIONThe effects of the 1905 Russian Revolution in Munich createda culture sensitized to Russian émigrés’ presence and behavior.Russian émigré students and artists alike were never free fromthe association by local Germans that they were victims oftsarist oppression, active in subversive political activity, orsomehow impacted by the political instability within theRussian Empire. 76 Although this may not have been the casefor all Russian émigrés in Munich, this was the predominantview of Russians by Germans in the public sphere. It was aperception with which such Russian émigré artists as Werefkinand Kandinsky were privately frustrated, even before thetensions of 1905. Werefkin, writing in her journal, “Lettres áun Inconnu” on the occasion of the Russo-Japanese War in1904 remarked,Today the city has something new. It is as if a stormwind swept through the streets. One glues one’s nose tothe posted notices. One hears conversation, and the wordsJapan and Russia shoot across the walkway. The worldloves a scandal, whether great or small…. I am so scaredof every contact with reality; I am so scared of the surgeof ideas, which break out of there….Crowds gather infront of the posted notices at every street corner. Thefirst reports are disastrous for us. Three warships put outof action. Behind me cry out voices joyous over the events.A blind rage takes over me, an inexhaustible melancholyand the longing, this fatherland whose weakness onepublicly surrenders, squeezes the heart. Add to that, theCarnival activities, men who look into one’s faceimpudently, and women with eyes [painted] like pregnantcats. One feels alone and amiss on the square in such acrowd. 77Anti-tsarist sentiment in Munich abounded and the ability toexpress her own misgivings about the war and Russia’s losswas not something she could publicly reveal, as she may havebeen fearful of an adverse reaction. Her aristocratic classidentity, the economic, social and political privileges withwhich it was often associated, and the access it provided tothe tsarist government elite would certainly have raisedquestions about her personal allegiances. 78 Vulnerable to thepressures of public accountability, Werefkin went along withthe crowd and regretfully acknowledged her country’s failure,not wishing to admit her attachment and love for herhomeland. 79 Like Werefkin, Kandinsky was also well awareof the perceptions Germans had of Russians and how theyadversely impacted all Russian émigrés in Munich, as wellas himself. Frustrated with the German press who were quickto cast Russians into a political framework, Kandinsky
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Russian émigré artists and political opposition in fin-de-siècle Munich

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