.JOURNAL OFTIIE CHURCHILL CKNTER AND ... - Winston Churchill

forbade him, and rightly pointed out that not Richmondbut Lee's army was his proper objective. In thus deciding,the President did what Lee had expected. After crossingthe Potomac Hooker made his headquarters near Frederick,where he covered "Washington and threatened Lee'sline of communications. General Halleck, Lincoln's militaryadviser, and Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War,had agreed after Chancellorsville that Hooker must notbe in command of the army in the next battle. Whentlierefore the General, denied the use of the Harpers Ferrygarrison, tendered his resignation, it was promptly accepted.Early in the morning of June 28th GeneralGeorge G. Meade, commander of the Fifth Corps, whowas now appointed to the chief command, decided tomove his whole army by forced marches northwards tothe Susquehanna to prevent Lee from crossing that river,and at the same time to cover Baltimore and Washington.Meade was a safe, dogged commander, with no politicalaffiliations. He could be relied upon to avoid acts of folly,and also anything brilliant. Expecting that Lee wouldcome south from the Susquehanna to attack Baltimore,he now prepared to meet him on the line of Pipe Creek,ten miles beyond Westminster.Lee had been greatly perplexed by Stuart's failureto report, but, having implicit confidence in him, hadconcluded that Hooker must still be south of the Potomac.On learning the truth during the 28th he ordereda concentration at Cashtown, close to the eastern foot ofSouth Mountain. He did not hurry, and the march wasconducted with a view to "the comfort of the troops." Atthe outset of the campaign he had been in agreement withLongstreet that the strategy should be offensive and thetactics defensive, and he had no intention of fighting abattle except under favourable conditions. But chanceruled otherwise.ON JUNE 30th a brigade of Hill's corps advancedeight miles from Cashtown to Gettysburg, partlyto look for shoes, partly to reconnoitre a placethrough which Ewell's corps might be moving next day.Gettysburg was found in the hands of some Federal cavalry,which had just entered. The Confederate brigadeturned back without ascertaining the strength of the hostileforce. Buford, the Federal cavalry commander, whobore the Christian names of Napoleon B., seems to havebeen the first man in either army to appreciate the strategicalimportance of Gettysburg, the meeting-place of somedozen roads from all points of the compass. He moved hisdivision to the west of the town, where he found a strongposition behind a stream, and called upon the commanderof the First Corps to come to his aid with all speed. TheFirst Corps was followed by the Eleventh Corps.On July 1st severe fighting began with the leadingConfederate troops, and presently Ewell, comingdown from the north-east, struck in upon the FederalP E N N S Y L V ANJ_,,A• Haqerstown ,,, . .5'-«s=.3Rr- WestminsterMartinsburg •W. .•' '••-.VI RG I N I A _^ •Frederick. TownHarpers Ferry>S^>V/lrt^G I N I ABrandy StationAquia CreekBaltimore*Washington^ >°FredericksburgTHEGETTYSBURGCAMPAIGNflank, driving the Eleventh Corps through Gettysburg toseek shelter on higher ground three miles southwards, wellnamed Cemetery Ridge. On this first day of battle fiftythousand men had been engaged, and four Confederatedivisions had defeated and seriously injured two Federalcorps. It now became a race between Lee and Meade, whocould concentrate his forces first. Neither Lee nor Meadewished to fight decisively at this moment or on thisground; but they were both drawn into the greatest andbloodiest battle of the Civil War. Lee could not extricatehimself and his supply trains without fighting Meade'sarmy to a standstill, and Meade was equally committed toa field he thought ill-chosen.LEE WISHED to open the second day of the battlewith an attack by Ewell and Hill on CemeteryRidge, which he rightly regarded as the key to theFederal position. He was deterred by their objections.Longstreet, when he arrived, argued at length for a manoeuvreround Meade's left to place Lees army betweenMeade and Washington. Such a movement in the absenceof Stuart's cavalry would certainly have been reckless, andit is not easy to see how Lee could have provisioned hisFINEST HOUR 103/20