CHAPTER 11 <strong>Weighted</strong> <strong>Voting</strong> <strong>Systems</strong> 393The weighted voting system [51 : 40, 60] describes a voting system in whichthere are two voters, with voting weights 40 and 60, and the quota is 51.A DictatorSuppose there is one voter, D, who has all of the power. A motion will pass ifand only if D is in favor, and it doesn’t matter how the other participants vote.Most weighted voting systems that we will consider do not have a dictator, butif there is one, his or her voting weight must be equal to or more than the quota.The system [51 : 40, 60] has a dictator because the weight-60 voter can pass anymotion that she wants. Dummy VotersA voting system may include some participants—called dummy voters—whosevotes don’t count. For example, the U.S. Congress has a nonvoting delegate whorepresents the District of Columbia. If a voting system has a dictator, all of theparticipants except the dictator are dummy voters. In the voting system [8 : 5, 3,1], the weight-1 voter is a dummy, because a motion will pass only if it has thesupport of the weight-5 and weight-3 voters, and then the additional 1 vote is notneeded. For another example, consider [51 : 26, 26, 26, 22]. The voter with weight22 is not needed when two of the other voters combine to support a motion;they have enough weight to pass the motion without her. If she joins forces withjust one of the other voters, their total weight, 48, is not enough to win. Thus,the weight-22 voter is a dummy. Three More Three-Voter <strong>Systems</strong>By adjusting the quota, the distribution of power in a weighted voting system canbe altered. We have seen that the weight-1 voter in [8 : 5, 3, 1] is a dummy, butby increasing the quota to 9 we obtain a system in which the power is equallydistributed—unanimous support is required to pass a motion in [9 : 5, 3, 1]. Theweight-1 voter is also not a dummy in [6 : 5, 3, 1] because he can join the weight-5 voter to pass a motion, even if the weight-3 voter opposes. Finally, consider[51 : 49, 48, 3]. Although it looks as if the weight-3 voter will have relativelylittle power, and may even be a dummy, in fact she has the same voting poweras the other two voters. Any two of the three voters in this system can pass ameasure. Veto PowerA voter whose vote is necessary to pass any motion is said to have veto power.For example, in the system [6 : 5, 3, 1], the weight-5 voter has veto power becausethe other two voters do not have enough combined weight to pass a motion.A dictator always has veto power, and it is possible for more than one voterto have veto power as well. In a criminal trial, each juror has veto power. In thesystem [8 : 5, 3, 1] the voters with weights 5 and 3 each have veto power. EXAMPLE 1EXAMPLE 2EXAMPLE 3EXAMPLE 4
394 PART III <strong>Voting</strong> and Social ChoiceSPOTLIGHT11.2Power IndicesThe first widely accepted numerical index forassessing power in voting systems was theShapley–Shubik power index, developed in1954 by a mathematician, Lloyd S. Shapley,and an economist, Martin Shubik. A particularvoter’s power as measured by this index isproportional to the number of differentpermutations (or orderings) of the voters inwhich he or she has the potential to cast thepivotal vote—the vote that first turns fromlosing to winning.The Banzhaf power index was introducedin 1965 by John F. Banzhaf III, a law professorwho is also well-known as the founder of theantismoking organization ASH (Action onSmoking and Health). The Banzhaf index is theone most often cited in court rulings, perhapsbecause Banzhaf brought several cases to courtand continues to file amicus curiae briefs whencourts evaluate weighted voting systems. Avoter’s Banzhaf index is the number of differentpossible voting combinations in which he orshe casts a swing vote—a vote in favor of amotion that is necessary for the motion to pass,or a vote against a motion that is essential forits defeat.Lloyd S. Shapley John F. Banzhaf III Martin ShubikThe voters in the system [6 : 5, 3, 1] are not equally powerful—the weight-5voter has veto power and the other two don’t—and yet none of the voters aredummies. We can’t compare power by comparing the voting weights because theweight-3 voter has the same voting power as the weight-1 voter. Together, theycan stop the weight-5 voter from passing a motion, and either one can combinewith the weight-5 voter to pass a motion. A power index gives a way to measurethe share of power that each participant in a voting system (weighted or otherwise)has. Spotlight 11.2 is a brief history of power indices.11.1 The Shapley–Shubik Power IndexWhen an election looms, politicians focus on “moderate voters.” These are peoplewho could be convinced to favor one side or the other. Moderate voters can