12.07.2015 Views

A Framework for Regulation - Private Security Monitor

A Framework for Regulation - Private Security Monitor

A Framework for Regulation - Private Security Monitor

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James Cockayne and Emily Speers Mears 13decentralized manner, and in<strong>for</strong>mally, with statesvolunteering to chair “Working Groups” focusingon specific issue areas <strong>for</strong> harmonization. Thisflexible approach could also allow the participationof nonstate actors in the scheme.Alternatively, a more <strong>for</strong>mal membershipassembly could be established, comprising onlystates that have recognized each other as havingadequately harmonized their domestic implementationarrangements around the agreed standards.Associate membership would be proffered to thosestates that aspire to drive up their standards, butneed help to do so. Each state would nominate anational authority dedicated to upholding thestandards, which would send a delegate to theassembly to report on the progress of implementation.22FinanceMember states would fund the secretariat withcontributions graded according to their GDP. 23 Thesecretariat would also receive funding from civilsociety. This report estimates the cost of thesecretariat at roughly $800,000 per annum. Thiswould cover four full-time staff, travel, and officeand administration costs (c. $500,000 personnelcosts, $150,000 operating costs, $150,000overhead).A voluntary trust fund would provide assistanceto countries with weak regulatory capacity wishingto participate in the framework. A mechanismmight also be devised <strong>for</strong> making small contributionsto assist PMSCs with their implementation ofthe standards. The secretariat would engage infundraising, and help states identify donors <strong>for</strong>specific capacity-building projects relating tostandards implementation through its matchingfunction.What are the Barriers?States would have to follow due domestic procedurein changing any legislation in order to bring it inline with the agreed standards. And appropriateassistance would have to be made available to stateswith weak regulatory capacity, to ensure that thisscheme did not create problematic barriers to trade.The participation of such states should be a centralconcern of such a scheme, since more effectiveterritorial state regulation of PMSCs will greatlyreduce costs <strong>for</strong> home and contracting states, andimprove GSI accountability.What are the Benefits?The Montreux Document has already been agreedupon by seventeen states. As a result, nationalregulatory harmonization among these states couldbegin immediately. A harmonization scheme wouldalso provide a nonpunitive means <strong>for</strong> encouragingimproved practice in regulation of the industry.This global framework blueprint offers a confidential<strong>for</strong>um <strong>for</strong> states to encourage each others’improved regulation of the global security industry,as well as a plat<strong>for</strong>m <strong>for</strong> negotiating solutions tospecific regulatory and coordination problems. Theflexibility and in<strong>for</strong>mality of this approach will alsoallow international regulation to develop atdifferent speeds on different tracks, depending onthe specific needs and interests of different statesand GSI stakeholders.5. A GLOBAL SECURITY INDUSTRYCLUBA GSI club would provide a framework <strong>for</strong> states,PMSCs (and their trade association representatives),and clients to develop and implement ashared professional culture or ethic, through collectivelywielded peer pressure. It would start byencouraging its members’ compliance with existingstandards, such as those implied by the MontreuxDocument, and eventually expand to includebroader industry standards (as its membersagreed). It could feasibly be set up by the relevantstakeholder groups immediately.How Would it Work?The club would• have a mixed membership, divided into members(clients, industry, and states) and participantobservers (civil society, affected communities,GSI financiers);• require members to report on their own regulatoryand accountability arrangements;• require PMSC members to incorporate agreedstandards into their internal managementsystems and contracts, and to establish internalmonitoring and reporting mechanisms;22 Like the OPCW.23 This funding structure is modeled on that of the Toxic Waste Convention.

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