A Framework for Regulation - Private Security Monitor

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14 PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES• deal with specific instances of noncompliancethrough a “mixed commission,” drawing decisionmakers from each of the three membershipgroups (clients, industry, and states);• provide guidance for members on how toimplement standards and also monitor developmentsin the global security industry generally;and• work with existing regulatory bodies—fromindustry associations to regulatory mechanisms,such as the Voluntary Principles on Security andHuman Rights (VPSHR)—to improve standardsand standards implementation. 24Governance StructureThe club would consist of a members’ assembly, aboard, a mixed commission, and a secretariat. Themembers’ assembly would meet semiannually to setthe strategic direction of the framework andconsider reporting from members and the mixedcommission (discussed below). To become amember or a participant observer would requireunanimous agreement among existing participants.Both members and participant observers would beexpected to promote the club, implement or assistin the implementation of its standards, attend themembers assembly, report annually on their effortsto implement the standards at the members’assembly, and participate in dialogue with otherclub participants, including on specific implementationissues. 25 Participant observers could offer toassist members in their reporting. The secretariatshould manage a small voluntary trust fund to bedisbursed to smaller PMSCs and/or smaller statesto facilitate their participation in assemblymeetings.The members’ assembly would also deal withboth specific cases and general recommendations,through the establishment of a subsidiary “mixedcommission.” This would consist of representativeselected from each membership and observer group(states, industry, clients, affected communities, civilsociety actors, investors), to investigate specificallegations of serious violations of the club’sstandards, and make recommendations to themembers’ assembly, as well as to the relevant stateauthorities in the case of any violation of legalstandards. Participation in the club would requirecooperation with this mixed commission. Themixed commission could issue “general comments”on an annual basis, drawing on the practice of clubmembers, its investigations in specific cases andreporting prepared by the secretariat. This wouldhelp the club to develop an acquis of good practicedriving up standards across the industry.The board would consist of six members (twostate representatives, two industry representatives,two client representatives) and three participantobservers (one civil society, one affectedcommunity and one GSI financier representative),with participation rotated every year, throughelection from the members’ assembly.The secretariat would have at least four full-timestaff: a secretary-general, a reporting officer, acompliance officer, and an administrator. As well asdeveloping guidance for implementing standardsand crafting reporting guidelines, the secretariatwould monitor and report on developments in theGSI, and be responsible for producing an annualreview of the club’s activities. All of its recommendationswould be subject to the review and approvalof the members’ assembly.The secretary-general would work with clubmembers to oversee its activities, improvestandards and implementation, and represent theframework internationally. He or she would beresponsible for fundraising for the framework’sactivities and the voluntary trust fund. This wouldbe a senior position and require extensive internationalexperience in the management of securityand/or a relevant nonprofit organization.The reporting officer would receive the members’reports and work with them to craft reportingguidelines, as well as providing periodicmonitoring and reporting on developments in theGSI. The reporting officer would also assist in theproduction of the mixed commission’s annual“general comments,” and prepare the secretariat’sown annual review.The compliance officer would work in coordinationwith the secretary-general to provide guidanceon standards implementation and monitoring andreporting mechanisms, in specific cases. He or she24 As does the BAPSC.25 The club’s membership application structure and participation requirements draw on those of the VPSHR.
James Cockayne and Emily Speers Mears 15would also coordinate the mixed commission andhandle any specific complaints relating to memberconduct.The administrator would coordinate the semiannualmembers’ assembly and manage the club’sfinances and general administration.FinanceThe club would be financed by membership fees,according to a graduated scale to ensure that participationcosts were not prohibitive for any GSIstakeholders. It would cost around $1 million perannum ($500,000 personnel costs; $300,000operating costs; $200,000 overhead). This wouldenable it to carry out significant research, handlereporting, manage the mixed commission andsemiannual members’ assembly meetings, andcover the cost of staffing and running thesecretariat. A separate voluntary trust fund wouldcover participation for smaller members in themembers’ assembly.What are the Barriers?There are no legal barriers to the establishment of aGSI club. It is a soft tool for standards implementationonly, one that would have no enforcementpower other than peer pressure. As a result, it couldeasily become a means for stakeholders to arguethat they were involved in a process of improvingstandards implementation and enforcement, whileeffectively doing neither. Existing clubs, such as theVoluntary Principles on Security and HumanRights, already suffer similar criticisms. 26 Given thevery diverse nature of the likely membership of aGSI, a club would also be vulnerable to a weakeningof the common “ethic” and system of peer pressurethat provides a club’s only real power to enforceparticular standards. 27What are the Benefits?Its participatory nature would be the key addedvalue of a multistakeholder GSI club. And the clubcould also provide a forum for coordinating anddeveloping the various functions discussed inprevious blueprints, including information collection,dispute resolution, and accreditation, as partof an interlocking umbrella framework.What Next? Three StepsToward Realizing a GlobalFrameworkA global framework to assist states in regulating theglobal security industry could be put in placequickly, based on the standards that already exist.The blueprints above are intended as discussionstartersfor how this might come about. All threemain stakeholder groups—states, industry, and civilsociety—have an interest in considering whether itmay be possible to develop a comprehensive GSIframework. As one PMSC noted in its commentson a draft of Beyond Market Forces:responsible industry players welcome … improvedregulation of the industry, more closely definedlegal status for companies and staff working in thefield, and effective mechanisms for company andindividual accountability… Aside from the clearethical imperative … we are also mindful of thebusiness benefits of differentiation and improvedperception of the sector. 28IPI recommends that stakeholders in the GSI takethree steps to develop a comprehensive globalframework based on the blueprints detailed above:(1) consult within stakeholder groups onframework options; (2) agree upon the negotiationprocess; (3) negotiate. These steps are based on areading of what is politically feasible, as well asnormative guidance drawn from the InternationalOrganization for Standardization, the WTOTechnical Barriers to Trade Agreement, and othersources on how such standards frameworksimpacting global business ought be developed. 29States should work with their civil society andindustry partners to convene a series of consultationsfor each stakeholder group, and specific clientsegments, to consider what kind of frameworksmight be feasible. These consultations should eachproduce a simple statement of what the respectivestakeholder group considers feasible, and what“scope” any framework should have—ie., what itshould actually seek to regulate. These statementswill help to clarify whether subsequent effortsshould be channeled toward one shared framework,26 See Part IV of Cockayne, Mears, et al., Beyond Market Forces.27 As is evident in the case of the VPSHR.28 Comments of Control Risks Group, September 30, 2008, available at www.ipinst.org/gsi.29 For a detailed breakdown of what each step would entail, see Part V, Beyond Market Forces.
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