Shah Ketankumar 2036445 5-11-2012.pdf - General ...

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ABCDEFwhich is alleged to correspond with the refund occurred more than an hour previously. Inevery case, Mr Edwards on behalf of Mr Shah has argued that there was the possibilitythat another member of staff might have used Mr Shah’s PIN without his knowledge. Hehas pointed out that the touch screen number pad on the tills was quite big, and oneperson could look over another’s shoulder to see the PIN being entered.The Committee finds Particular of Allegation 2 proved in its entirety. The only personwho has suggested that one member of staff might know another’s PIN number isMr Shah himself. Not every member of staff was called to give evidence, but those whowere, denied knowing the PIN numbers of other members of staff, although some wereprepared to accept that it was theoretically possible to look over somebody else’sshoulder and see a PIN number being entered if one wanted to do so. None of them hadany experience of this actually happening. The Committee accepts that they were tellingthe truth. Furthermore, the Committee rejects Mr Shah’s suggestion that anybody elseused his PIN number. He told the Committee that he regularly used the tills to record asmany as 200 transactions per day. Yet he did not tell the Committee about any occasionof being locked out of the tills because somebody else was already logged on with hisPIN number. This would have been likely to occur if somebody else had been regularlyusing his PIN. Mr Shah also suggested that there were frequent occasions when hestarted a transaction, using his PIN, and then he was called away, and left anothermember of staff to complete the transaction. The Committee rejects the suggestion that inthese circumstances a spurious refund transaction might have been recorded by somebodyelse, under Mr Shah’s PIN. The evidence of other members of staff, which theCommittee accepts as honest and more probable, is that in those circumstances thetransaction would be suspended, and another member of staff would take over, signing inwith his or her own PIN.GHT A REED& CO LTD01992-465900Another suggestion made on behalf of Mr Shah was that there might have been anothermember of staff, whom Mr Edwards described in argument as “villain number 602”. Atthe foot of the document on page 34 of the Bundle of Documents, there is a reference to atill transaction number 3624 carried out by an operator with that identifying three figurecode. It has been suggested that this unidentified person might be responsible for theincorrect transactions. The Committee rejects that suggestion. It notes that the6- Day 6
ABCDEFGHT A REED& CO LTD01992-465900transaction 3624 immediately follows the transaction 3623 which was carried out by anoperator with the code 812, Mr Shah’s code. The Committee has seen copies of the staffrotas for September, October and November 2005, and there is no additional member ofstaff there recorded with the code 602. On the balance of probabilities, 602 was somespare number used for administrative convenience. It was certainly not a possible villain.Mr Edwards has also pointed out that there is no positive evidence of any stockdiscrepancies arising at the Eastcote store, such as might be expected where refunds aredishonestly recorded after goods have been sold. The Committee notes, however, that therefunds in question were all recorded by reference to “group codes” or, as they havesometimes been called “dump codes”, which do not identify the specific items of stocksold or refunded. There is therefore no direct connection with stock records. There hasbeen no evidence concerning general stock reconciliations or deficiencies for the Eastcotestore. In particular, there is no evidence that stock balanced. The Committee notes thatthe receipts which ought to have been kept in respect of NHS refunds, if genuine, havenot been found. The Committee noted Mr Shah’s suggestion that he might occasionallyhave given a refund to a patient who intended to obtain a pre-payment certificate. TheCommittee rejects this as a wholly improbable and illogical suggestion.The Committee finds that each of the eleven transactions referred to in Schedule 1 wascarried out by Mr Shah, using his own PIN, and the refund in each case was not genuinei.e. no money was repaid to any customers in respect of any of those transactions. Someof those transactions are slightly different from the others, and the Committee hasconsidered each separately. For example, number 6, transaction 4623, might appear to bea genuine refund of part of the goods originally sold, but the records show the till wasopen for the refund for only two seconds. The Committee is satisfied that this was notenough time to enable £27.90 to be counted out in cash to a genuine customer. This ismirrored in a number of other transactions. Number 10, transaction 328 and 329, mightalso appear to be genuine at first sight, since the amount recorded as refunded was exactly10 per cent of the sale price. But the Committee has reflected on the transactions whichhave been proved, and has concluded that they demonstrate a pattern of opportunisticthefts. On the balance of probabilities, it is satisfied that Mr Shah took advantage of theopportunity to steal an amount which would look, to his employers, like a discount repaid7- Day 6
Page 7: ABCthat a refund was paid in cash b
Page 11 and 12: ABCDdocuments. The Committee theref
Page 13: ABCsuggestion he handed over his wi
Page 16: ABHaving weighed all these matters,
Page 20 and 21: Athe profession. The Committee note
Page 22: AThe Committee has concluded that h

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